@quickback-dev/cli 0.10.16 → 0.11.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/commands/compile.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/commands/compile.js +40 -2
- package/dist/commands/compile.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/docs/content.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/docs/content.js +15 -10
- package/dist/docs/content.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.js +1 -1
- package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/skill/SKILL.md +142 -1051
- package/dist/skill/agents/quickback-specialist/AGENT.md +36 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/changelog.md +1225 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/claude-code-skill.md +312 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/cloud-compiler/authentication.md +63 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/cloud-compiler/cli.md +307 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/cloud-compiler/endpoints.md +78 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/cloud-compiler/index.md +65 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/cloud-compiler/local-compiler.md +115 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/cloud-compiler/troubleshooting.md +76 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/config/agents.md +144 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/config/auth.md +109 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/config/bindings.md +176 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/config/domains.md +149 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/config/index.md +419 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/config/output.md +338 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/config/providers.md +248 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/config/security.md +255 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/config/single-tenant.md +128 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/config/variables.md +157 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/access.md +445 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/actions.md +884 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/concepts.md +52 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/feature.md +164 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/firewall.md +285 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/guards.md +241 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/index.md +219 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/masking.md +241 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/read.md +220 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/schema.md +697 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/validation.md +35 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/views.md +292 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/getting-started/claude-code.md +126 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/getting-started/full-example.md +431 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/getting-started/hand-crafted.md +178 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/getting-started/index.md +192 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/getting-started/patterns.md +225 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/getting-started/template-blog.md +280 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/getting-started/template-cloudflare.md +260 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/getting-started/template-empty.md +112 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/getting-started/templates.md +111 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/index.md +85 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/cloudflare.md +94 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/database/d1.md +246 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/database/index.md +16 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/database/neon.md +144 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/database/using-d1.md +39 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/index.md +37 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/actions-api.md +323 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/batch-operations.md +357 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/caching.md +105 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/crud.md +652 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/errors.md +224 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/index.md +37 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/openapi.md +203 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/query-params.md +199 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/views-api.md +161 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/targets/index.md +47 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/targets/supabase-rls/index.md +55 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/targets/supabase-rls/limitations.md +48 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/targets/supabase-rls/mappings.md +99 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/targets/supabase-rls/setup.md +88 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/compiler/troubleshooting.md +120 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/index.md +77 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/customization.md +378 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/environment-variables.md +325 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/features/admin.md +76 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/features/api-keys.md +22 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/features/avatars.md +37 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/features/cli-authorize.md +21 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/features/index.md +291 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/features/organizations.md +29 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/features/passkeys.md +31 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/features/passwordless.md +28 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/features/sessions.md +20 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/hooks.md +209 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/index.md +147 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/library-usage.md +257 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/standalone.md +149 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/with-quickback.md +160 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/worker.md +362 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/auth/api-keys.md +15 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/auth/device-auth.md +14 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/auth/index.md +64 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/auth/jwt-optimization.md +245 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/auth/plugins/aws-ses.md +127 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/auth/plugins/combo-auth.md +74 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/auth/plugins/index.md +340 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/auth/plugins/upgrade-anonymous.md +155 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/auth/security.md +455 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/auth/using-auth.md +39 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/cms/actions.md +199 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/cms/components.md +479 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/cms/connecting.md +199 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/cms/dashboard.md +39 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/cms/index.md +158 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/cms/inline-editing.md +136 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/cms/pages.md +275 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/cms/record-layouts.md +151 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/cms/schema-format.md +437 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/cms/schema-registry.md +200 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/cms/security.md +203 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/cms/table-views.md +142 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/index.md +65 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/queues/handlers.md +317 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/queues/index.md +56 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/queues/using-queues.md +192 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/realtime/durable-objects.md +488 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/realtime/index.md +73 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms.md +146 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/realtime/using-realtime.md +211 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/storage/index.md +17 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/storage/kv.md +204 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/storage/r2.md +232 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/storage/using-kv.md +70 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/storage/using-r2.md +55 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/vector/embeddings.md +554 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/vector/index.md +44 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/vector/using-embeddings.md +186 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/webhooks/inbound.md +186 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/webhooks/index.md +36 -0
- package/dist/skill/docs/stack/webhooks/outbound.md +281 -0
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/src/skill/SKILL.md +142 -1051
- package/src/skill/agents/quickback-specialist/AGENT.md +36 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/changelog.md +1225 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/claude-code-skill.md +312 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/cloud-compiler/authentication.md +63 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/cloud-compiler/cli.md +307 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/cloud-compiler/endpoints.md +78 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/cloud-compiler/index.md +65 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/cloud-compiler/local-compiler.md +115 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/cloud-compiler/troubleshooting.md +76 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/config/agents.md +144 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/config/auth.md +109 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/config/bindings.md +176 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/config/domains.md +149 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/config/index.md +419 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/config/output.md +338 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/config/providers.md +248 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/config/security.md +255 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/config/single-tenant.md +128 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/config/variables.md +157 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/access.md +445 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/actions.md +884 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/concepts.md +52 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/feature.md +164 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/firewall.md +285 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/guards.md +241 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/index.md +219 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/masking.md +241 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/read.md +220 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/schema.md +697 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/validation.md +35 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/definitions/views.md +292 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/getting-started/claude-code.md +126 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/getting-started/full-example.md +431 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/getting-started/hand-crafted.md +178 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/getting-started/index.md +192 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/getting-started/patterns.md +225 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/getting-started/template-blog.md +280 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/getting-started/template-cloudflare.md +260 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/getting-started/template-empty.md +112 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/getting-started/templates.md +111 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/index.md +85 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/cloudflare.md +94 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/database/d1.md +246 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/database/index.md +16 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/database/neon.md +144 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/database/using-d1.md +39 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/index.md +37 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/actions-api.md +323 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/batch-operations.md +357 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/caching.md +105 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/crud.md +652 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/errors.md +224 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/index.md +37 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/openapi.md +203 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/query-params.md +199 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/views-api.md +161 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/targets/index.md +47 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/targets/supabase-rls/index.md +55 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/targets/supabase-rls/limitations.md +48 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/targets/supabase-rls/mappings.md +99 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/targets/supabase-rls/setup.md +88 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/compiler/troubleshooting.md +120 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/index.md +77 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/customization.md +378 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/environment-variables.md +325 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/features/admin.md +76 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/features/api-keys.md +22 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/features/avatars.md +37 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/features/cli-authorize.md +21 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/features/index.md +291 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/features/organizations.md +29 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/features/passkeys.md +31 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/features/passwordless.md +28 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/features/sessions.md +20 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/hooks.md +209 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/index.md +147 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/library-usage.md +257 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/standalone.md +149 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/with-quickback.md +160 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/account-ui/worker.md +362 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/auth/api-keys.md +15 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/auth/device-auth.md +14 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/auth/index.md +64 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/auth/jwt-optimization.md +245 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/auth/plugins/aws-ses.md +127 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/auth/plugins/combo-auth.md +74 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/auth/plugins/index.md +340 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/auth/plugins/upgrade-anonymous.md +155 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/auth/security.md +455 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/auth/using-auth.md +39 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/cms/actions.md +199 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/cms/components.md +479 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/cms/connecting.md +199 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/cms/dashboard.md +39 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/cms/index.md +158 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/cms/inline-editing.md +136 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/cms/pages.md +275 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/cms/record-layouts.md +151 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/cms/schema-format.md +437 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/cms/schema-registry.md +200 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/cms/security.md +203 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/cms/table-views.md +142 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/index.md +65 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/queues/handlers.md +317 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/queues/index.md +56 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/queues/using-queues.md +192 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/realtime/durable-objects.md +488 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/realtime/index.md +73 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms.md +146 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/realtime/using-realtime.md +211 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/storage/index.md +17 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/storage/kv.md +204 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/storage/r2.md +232 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/storage/using-kv.md +70 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/storage/using-r2.md +55 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/vector/embeddings.md +554 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/vector/index.md +44 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/vector/using-embeddings.md +186 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/webhooks/inbound.md +186 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/webhooks/index.md +36 -0
- package/src/skill/docs/stack/webhooks/outbound.md +281 -0
package/dist/docs/content.js
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export const DOCS = {
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"changelog": {
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"content": "# Changelog\n\nRelease notes for the Quickback compiler, CLI, and platform.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.16 — May 2, 2026\n\n### CSP auto-config now covers SPA-baked-in API origins\n\nWhen the bundled CMS or Account SPA is enabled, the compiler already inlines the API URL into the SPA bundle as a string literal at build time (`VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL=https://${unifiedDomain}`). That hardcoded URL is what the SPA actually fetches — regardless of which origin is currently serving the page. CSP `connect-src` must allow it explicitly.\n\n0.10.16's auto-config picks up every domain the compiler already knows about — `config.domain`, the inferred `quickback.{baseDomain}`, `cms.domain`, `account.domain`, the admin domain — and adds `https://${each}` to `connectSrc` whenever a bundled SPA is enabled.\n\nThe motivating case: running the SPA on `localhost:5173` while it's still baked against `https://quickback.your-app.com`. Pre-0.10.16 the localhost CSP's `'self'` blocked the prod URL; users were patching it manually. Now it just works.\n\n```\n[security] auto-added https://quickback.loop.kardoe.com to csp.connectSrc — account: true → bundled Account SPA → SPA bundle hardcodes https://quickback.loop.kardoe.com as VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL / etc.\n```\n\n`@trustedOrigins` (the CORS allowlist) is unchanged — it still gets added independently. The two cover different things: `@trustedOrigins` permits CORS-allowed sibling subdomains; the new SPA-baked addition permits the exact URL the SPA's compiled bundle hardcodes.\n\nCombined with 0.10.15's bundled-SPA defaults, most projects can now write the minimal:\n\n```ts\nsecurity: {\n csp: {\n defaultSrc: ['@self'],\n scriptSrc: ['@self'],\n objectSrc: ['@none'],\n upgradeInsecureRequests: true,\n },\n}\n```\n\n…and the compiler fills in styleSrc font hosts, fontSrc gstatic, connectSrc trusted origins, and connectSrc SPA-baked URLs.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.15 — May 2, 2026\n\n### CSP auto-config — bundled-SPA origins added automatically\n\nWhen `security.csp` is set, the compiler now widens directives **additively** based on the project's enabled features. The four rules:\n\n| Trigger | Auto-added | Directive |\n|---|---|---|\n| `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `'unsafe-inline'`, `https://fonts.googleapis.com` | `styleSrc` |\n| `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `https://fonts.gstatic.com` | `fontSrc` |\n| `csp` set (always) | `@trustedOrigins` | `connectSrc` |\n\nAnything you already wrote stays — auto-config never removes or overrides. Every applied addition prints to stderr at compile so the magic is visible:\n\n```\n[security] auto-added 'unsafe-inline' to csp.styleSrc — account: true → bundled Account SPA → inline style attributes from Tailwind / TanStack Router\n[security] auto-added @trustedOrigins to csp.connectSrc — CORS-trusted origins must be reachable from XHR/fetch (matches cors() allowlist)\n```\n\nThe recipe in [the security docs](/compiler/config/security#example-paste-in-csp-for-a-quickback-spa-project) becomes ~5 lines shorter — most projects no longer need to list `fonts.googleapis.com` / `fonts.gstatic.com` / `@trustedOrigins` themselves. **Loop's CSP shrinks dramatically** after recompiling against this version.\n\n**Opt-out:** `security: { cspAutoConfig: false, csp: { ... } }` for projects fronted by a CDN that injects its own CSP, or teams that want strict from-scratch control.\n\n**Smart fallback:** if you set `defaultSrc` but omit the target directive (e.g. `defaultSrc: ['@self']` and nothing for `connectSrc`), the addition lands in `defaultSrc` rather than creating a sibling directive — CSP fall-back semantics mean a sibling would *narrow* your intent, so we preserve the broader fallback.\n\n### Troubleshooting table for CSP violations\n\nThe security docs page now includes a [Troubleshooting CSP violations](/compiler/config/security#troubleshooting-csp-violations) table mapping browser console errors back to the directive that needs widening. Useful when auto-config is disabled or the project has a non-bundled SPA hitting third-party origins.\n\n### Out of scope (deferred)\n\n- **Per-request CSP nonces** (`@nonce` sentinel implementation) — Phase 2 / 0.10.16. Sentinel still errors at compile in 0.10.15.\n- **`revocationCheck: 'kv'` for `auth.jwt`** — schema accepts it, runtime still errors at compile. Slipped from 0.10.15 to 0.10.16.\n- **Public R2 host auto-add to `imgSrc`** — most R2 access today goes through the worker so the SPA fetches from `'@self'`. Will revisit once we have a clean way to discover public-bucket hosts at compile.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.14 — May 1, 2026\n\n### `auth.jwt` — JWT bearer-token fast-path config\n\nQuickback's bearer-token JWT (the one minted by the auth middleware and consumed by the fast-path on every subsequent request) is now configurable. The most-tuned knob is `expiresIn` — drop it to bound the post-revocation replay window without affecting browser SPAs, which auto-refresh via `set-auth-token` on every authed call:\n\n```ts\nauth: {\n jwt: {\n expiresIn: 30, // 30s post-revocation replay window\n issuer: 'my-api', // iss claim (verified on the way back in)\n audience: 'partner-svc', // aud claim\n secretEnv: 'CUSTOM_JWT_SECRET', // override BETTER_AUTH_SECRET if you need the JWT secret rotated independently\n },\n}\n```\n\n`revocationCheck: 'kv'` (KV-denylist consult on every fast-path verify, ~5-15ms edge-cached, no D1 hit) is reserved in the schema today but **deferred to 0.10.15** — setting it errors at compile so the migration path is explicit. `'none'` (today's behaviour, 0 cost, replay bound by TTL) stays the default.\n\nSee [the docs page](/compiler/config/auth) for the full knob list and tuning recommendations.\n\n### MCP admin endpoints hidden from non-admin `tools/list`\n\nBetter Auth admin endpoints (`/admin/list-users`, `/admin/ban-user`, `/admin/impersonate-user`, etc. — 9 in total) now carry `x-access: { userRole: ['admin'] }` in the generated OpenAPI spec, which means the MCP server's existing access-filter automatically drops them from `tools/list` for callers without an admin token. Anonymous and member-role callers no longer see admin tooling enumerated through MCP; admin endpoints still exist on the HTTP surface (Better Auth gates them server-side regardless).\n\n### Declarative `security` config block\n\nEvery security response-header (`Content-Security-Policy`, `Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy`, `Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy`, `Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy`, `X-Frame-Options`, `Strict-Transport-Security`, `Referrer-Policy`, `Permissions-Policy`) is now configurable from `quickback.config.ts`. Loop's `postcompile-patch.mjs` (which re-injected a fuller CSP and COOP after every `quickback compile`) can now be deleted in favour of:\n\n```ts\nsecurity: {\n csp: {\n defaultSrc: ['@self'],\n scriptSrc: ['@self'],\n styleSrc: ['@self', '@unsafe-inline'],\n frameAncestors: ['@none'],\n objectSrc: ['@none'],\n upgradeInsecureRequests: true,\n },\n coop: 'same-origin',\n}\n```\n\n`@`-prefixed sentinels (`@self`, `@none`, `@unsafe-inline`, `@unsafe-eval`, `@trustedOrigins`, `@nonce`) save users from awkward `\"'self'\"` quoting and let `@trustedOrigins` resolve to the same allowlist `cors()` uses. Unknown sentinels throw at compile rather than silently stringify into the wire CSP.\n\nThe compiler runs lint rules over the resolved config — errors for `@nonce` (deferred to 0.10.15), `@unsafe-inline + @nonce` (silently broken), and sentinel-only directives that would resolve to nothing at runtime; warnings for `@unsafe-inline` in `script-src`, wildcard sources, missing `default-src`, HSTS preload-list misconfiguration, etc.\n\nDefaults preserve 0.10.13 behaviour byte-for-byte — adding the block without setting any field is a no-op.\n\nSee [the docs page](/compiler/config/security) for the full reference.\n\n### HSTS no longer pins `localhost` to HTTPS\n\nThe generated middleware now skips `Strict-Transport-Security` when the request hostname is `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, or `*.localhost`. Without this gate, `wrangler dev` would pin the developer's browser to HTTPS for `max-age` seconds — observable across every project on that machine since HSTS keys on hostname, not port. Affects every project running locally.\n\n### Out of scope (deferred)\n\n- **Per-request CSP nonces** — Phase 2 / 0.10.15. Sentinel exists at config-validation level so users can author their final CSP today knowing it'll start working when nonces ship.\n- **Asset-hash CSP** for inline `<style>` and `<script>` blocks emitted by the bundled SPAs — Phase 3.\n- **Per-route CSP overrides** (e.g. one looser policy for `/admin`) — single global CSP for now.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.13 — May 1, 2026\n\n### Clickjacking protection on every generated Worker\n\nEvery Worker now emits two clickjacking-defence headers on every\nresponse:\n\n- `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self' <TRUSTED_ORIGINS…>`\n- `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN`\n\nThe CSP allowlist is sourced from the same `TRUSTED_ORIGINS` constant\nthat gates CORS, so users configure their domains in one place\n(`auth.trustedOrigins` / `auth.trustedOriginDefaults` in\n`quickback.config.ts`) and both CORS and frame-ancestors stay in\nlockstep. `'self'` is always allowed so an app's own SPAs can frame\ntheir own routes (e.g. an account login popover hosted on the same\norigin).\n\nModern browsers obey `frame-ancestors` and ignore `X-Frame-Options`\nwhen both are set; the legacy header is included for clients that\ndon't speak CSP3. The CSP intentionally only sets `frame-ancestors` —\nadding `script-src` / `default-src` would need a much wider audit\nacross SPA assets, inline scripts, and third-party embeds, so that's\nleft as a follow-up.\n\nRecompile (`quickback compile`) and redeploy to pick this up — no\nconfig change needed unless you want to allow extra cross-origin\niframe embeds, in which case add them to `auth.trustedOrigins`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.12 — May 1, 2026\n\n### Bundled-docs sync for the MCP recon fix\n\nPatch release that re-bundles the CLI's offline docs (consulted by the\nClaude Code skill, Cursor rules, and other AI assistants) so they\nreflect the corrected `tools/list` access-filter behavior and CORS\nposture shipped in v0.10.11. The `compiler/config/agents.mdx` page\nitself was already corrected on the docs site immediately after the\n0.10.11 release; this bump propagates that text into the bundle inside\n`@quickback-dev/cli`.\n\nNo runtime or compiler behavior change — re-running `quickback compile`\nagainst this version produces the same output as v0.10.11.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.11 — May 1, 2026\n\n### MCP `tools/list` is now access-filtered + recon-tightened\n\nThe generated MCP-over-HTTP server (`src/routes/mcp.ts`) had three holes\nthat turned a standard pentest into trivial recon:\n\n1. `tools/list` returned the entire tool catalogue to anyone — including\n admin-only endpoints — without checking auth or roles. Tool\n descriptions also leaked sentences like `[UNSAFE] bypasses tenant\n scoping and requires elevated access` verbatim.\n2. The endpoint set `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` so any origin could\n pull the catalogue from a browser.\n3. Unauthenticated `GET /mcp` enumerated every tool name in its\n discovery payload.\n\nFix:\n\n- Each tool now carries sanitised access metadata (`_access` covering\n `roles` / `userRole` / `or` / `and`, plus `_public` for `PUBLIC`\n pseudo-role or empty `security`). `tools/list` filters against the\n caller's `ctx` — unauth callers see only `_public` tools, authed\n callers see only role-gated tools they pass. Record predicates and\n function-form access (opaque at list time) are dropped.\n- Wildcard CORS removed entirely. The parent app's `cors()` middleware\n (origin allowlist via `TRUSTED_ORIGINS` + `BETTER_AUTH_URL`) now\n applies uniformly to `/mcp`, same as every other route.\n- `[UNSAFE] ... bypasses tenant scoping ...` flavour text is gone.\n `annotations.destructiveHint` and `_unsafe` remain — those are the\n spec-correct signals for clients to warn users.\n- Unauthenticated `GET /mcp` no longer lists tool names. Inventory is\n only available via the access-filtered `tools/list`.\n\nThis filter is recon-mitigation, not a security boundary: `tools/call`\nstill re-enters the Hono app and runs every middleware (auth, firewall,\naccess, guards, masking), so hiding a tool from list never weakens the\nunderlying gate.\n\nKnown follow-up: Better Auth admin endpoints (`ban-user`, `create-user`,\n`impersonate-user`, etc.) don't yet emit `x-access` in the OpenAPI spec,\nso any logged-in user still sees them in `tools/list` (the actual call\nis still gated by the admin plugin). Tracked separately.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.10 — April 29, 2026\n\n### Reject reserved keys inside `access.record` at compile time\n\n`access.record` is a flat field map evaluated as implicit AND between\nentries — keys must be column names. Putting `and: [...]` (or `or` /\n`roles` / `userRole`) inside `record` was a real-world footgun: the\nruntime treated the literal string `\"and\"` as a column lookup, the\npredicate failed on every row, and the caller got a silent `403` /\nempty list with nothing pointing at the misuse. The TypeScript type\ncouldn't catch this — `RecordConditions` is an open-ended index\nsignature, so any key parses.\n\nThe compiler now walks every access node attached to a resource (CRUD\nops, `read.access`, view access, masking `show` / `query`, action\naccess) and throws a clear migration error when `record` contains a\nreserved key:\n\n- `and` / `or` inside `record` → use the top-level `and` / `or`\n sibling: `{ and: [{ record: { ... } }, { record: { ... } }] }`\n- `roles` / `userRole` inside `record` → put them at the access node\n alongside `record`: `{ roles: [...], record: { ... } }`\n\nThe error names the exact origin (`crud.update.access`,\n`actions.focus.access.or[1]`, etc.) so the fix lands in the right place.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.9 — April 29, 2026\n\n### Role hierarchy now expands in record-based action access\n\n`auth.roleHierarchy: ['member', 'admin', 'owner']` plus\n`access: { roles: ['member+'] }` on a record-based action used to\nsilently 403 valid callers. The standalone-action route generator\ninlined the expanded role list as a JSON literal, but the\nrecord-based generator read the access config back through the\nruntime `actions['name'].access` import — the user's source, where\nthe unexpanded `'member+'` shorthand still lived. The runtime did\nliteral string matching against `ctx.roles`, so an `owner` calling\nthe action got `['member+'] !== 'owner'` and was rejected.\n\nFixed: record-based action routes now inline the expanded list the\nsame way standalone routes do. `input` and `execute` still flow\nthrough the runtime import (closures aren't serializable); only the\naccess config is lifted to a JSON literal so the compile-time\nexpansion actually reaches the matcher.\n\nA regression test (`role-hierarchy-action-routes.test.ts`) locks the\nbehavior in — it asserts that `member+` never reaches the route\noutput and that the access config is no longer read from\n`actions[name].access` at runtime.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.8 — April 29, 2026\n\n### Audit support on postgres targets, plus a generated-API quality pass\n\n**Audit on PG.** Until this release, `audit_events` only existed on cloudflare-d1 — projects on Neon (or any postgres target) silently skipped audit logging on `unsafe:` and `PUBLIC`-role actions, and hard delete was hard-blocked. Postgres has no equivalent of D1's separate-database binding model, but it has native schemas — so the audit table now lives in a dedicated `audit` schema in the same database as features (`drizzle.pgSchema('audit')`). The `hasSecurityAudit` gate accepts D1 OR any PG dialect; the `auditDatabaseId` requirement only fires for D1 (which still uses the separate-binding model). The recruitment example wires `auditDatabaseId` so the recompile path stays green.\n\n**`auditDatabaseId` is now a compile-time requirement** (D1 only). Previously, projects with unsafe/PUBLIC actions but no audit id silently produced a `database_id = \"local-audit\"` placeholder in production `wrangler.toml`; Cloudflare's worker upload step then rejected it with code 10021 *after* assets and migrations had already run. The compile-time error names the exact `wrangler d1 create <project>-audit` command and the `auditDatabaseId` config key where the returned id goes.\n\n### Five fixes from a Loop integration ticket pass\n\n**Action input → OpenAPI / MCP.** `defineAction({ input: z.object({...}) })` schemas now flow into `requestBody` on the OpenAPI operation and `inputSchema.properties` / `_bodyFields` on the MCP tool list. Simple `z.object` shapes are extracted at compile time; for discriminated unions, refinements, recursive schemas, and bare-identifier references (`input: createPersonInput`), the compiler runs your action file through Zod 4's native `z.toJSONSchema()` during compilation — full-fidelity output with no static translator to maintain. Pre-fix, every action came out as a no-arg endpoint, which gutted typed SDK generation and made MCP useless for actions that take parameters.\n\n**OpenAPI fidelity.** Three surgical fixes that strict validators (zod, openapi-typescript, openapi-fetch) had been complaining about:\n- Response schemas now emit `required[]` for every non-nullable column, so generated SDKs treat them as guaranteed-present rather than optional.\n- `text(_, { enum: [...] })` columns emit as closed `{ type: \"string\", enum: [...] }`, narrowing to literal unions.\n- `id` only claims `format: \"uuid\"` when the project's `generateId` actually produces UUIDs. cuid2 / prefixed / nanoid / serial generators get plain `{ type: \"string\" }` — strict validators stop rejecting responses against their own spec.\n\n**Mask auto-detector now checks the column exists.** The auto-mask predicate used to be unconditionally `show: { or: 'owner', roles: ['admin'] }` — including for tables with no owner column at all (no `userId` / `ownerId` and no `q.scope('owner')`). The generated mask function would reference a non-existent column and fail under TypeScript checks. The auto-detector now verifies the resolved owner column exists in the parsed schema before emitting the `or` clause; when it doesn't, the rule falls back to roles-only and the compiler emits a warning so the behavior is transparent.\n\n**Error code consistency.** The generated CRUD layer was emitting raw codes (`'UNAUTHORIZED'`, `'NOT_NULL_VIOLATION'`, `'UNIQUE_VIOLATION'`, `'INSERT_FAILED'`, `'UPDATE_FAILED'`) that were never in the `QuickbackErrorCode` enum, so consumers couldn't switch exhaustively on `code`. New `database` layer + `DB_NOT_NULL_VIOLATION` / `DB_UNIQUE_VIOLATION` / `DB_INSERT_FAILED` / `DB_UPDATE_FAILED` / `NOT_FOUND` codes are now in the enum, the routes use `AuthErrors.missing()` / `DatabaseErrors.*()` helpers throughout, and the OpenAPI `Error` component emits `code` as a closed enum sourced from the canonical `QUICKBACK_ERROR_CODES` list. Generated SDKs can now `switch` on `code` without a default branch swallowing unknown values. See [API errors](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/errors#database).\n\n**Dropped dead `auditFields` preamble from action route generators.** The audit wrapper's `Proxy` already hard-stamps `createdAt` / `createdBy` / `modifiedAt` / `modifiedBy` on every INSERT and `modifiedAt` / `modifiedBy` on every UPDATE — the `auditFields` const the route preamble built was never read. Dropped from `standalone.ts` / `record-based.ts` and from the `ActionExecutorParams` JSDoc. Migrated 7 example handlers (drop `modifiedAt: auditFields!.modifiedAt` from `.set` payloads — the wrapper handles it). Note: `.onConflictDoUpdate({ set })` is *not* intercepted by the wrapper, so `upsertBatch`-style handlers keep an explicit `modifiedAt: now`.\n\n---\n\n## One file per action: greenfield action authoring\n\nAction authoring collapses to a single shape. Each action is its own file under `<feature>/actions/<name>.ts` using `defineAction({...})`. The filename is the action name AND the URL segment.\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move an application forward in the pipeline\",\n input: z.object({ nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]) }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"admin\"] },\n transition: {\n field: \"status\",\n via: \"nextStatus\",\n fromTo: { applied: [\"screening\"], screening: [\"interview\"], interview: [\"offer\"] },\n },\n async execute({ db, record, input, auditFields, whereTransition }) { /* … */ },\n});\n```\n\n`defineAction` is imported from a generated per-feature helper at `<feature>/.quickback/define-action.ts` — types `record`, `input`, and audit fields without manual annotations. The directory says what `:id` mounts to; the imports say what the body reads or writes.\n\n**Discovery rules:**\n- `actions/<name>.ts` binds to the feature's primary table (the `<feature>.ts` file at the feature root).\n- `actions/<table>/<name>.ts` binds to the sibling table file `<table>.ts` — for multi-table features.\n- Setting `path:` makes the action standalone (custom URL, no record fetch, no firewall preload).\n- Tableless features (no top-level `*.ts` files) require every action to be standalone.\n- Action names are unique per `(bindTable, name)` pair — sibling-bound actions on different tables may share a verb (e.g. `actions/episodes/publish.ts` + `actions/shows/publish.ts` mount at `/episodes/:id/publish` and `/shows/:id/publish` and don't collide). Standalone actions are unique per `(method, path)`.\n- Files under `<feature>/lib/` are copied verbatim for feature-local helpers; `quickback/lib/` is exposed via the `~/lib/*` alias for cross-feature shared code (with a one-way import rule enforced at compile time).\n\n**Retired** (rejected at load time with migration guidance):\n\n- `actions.ts` (bundled multi-action file)\n- `_feature.ts` (shared preamble + tableless actions)\n- `handlers/` directory + `handler:` string ref\n- `defineActions(table, {…})` and `defineActions(null, {…})`\n- `export default { actions: {…} }`\n- Colocated `defineActions` inside table files\n- `standalone: true` flag (presence of `path:` is the new signal)\n- `*-actions.ts` / `*.actions.ts` filename patterns\n\nThe phantom-`unsafe` regex bug that flattened nested `unsafe: { … }` blocks into a fake top-level action is gone — the parser now reads action files as real TS modules with real imports, so type inference, jump-to-definition, and rename refactoring all work end-to-end.\n\nThe CLI loader rejects retired primitives at load time with batched migration errors. Existing projects need to be migrated by hand to the new shape before recompiling.\n\nSee the [Actions docs](/compiler/definitions/actions) for the full reference.\n\n---\n\n## Multi-table actions per feature\n\nFeatures used to support exactly one `defineActions(table, …)` call via `actions.ts`, which forced unnatural feature splits whenever multiple tables in the same feature needed actions (a podcast feature with `episodes`, `shows`, `seasons`, `collections`, etc.). One feature directory can now own actions on multiple tables across three discovery modes:\n\n- **Colocated** (canonical) — `<table>.ts` containing both `defineTable` and `defineActions(<table>, …)`. One file per entity. Default for new features.\n- **`actions.ts`** (existing) — single primary-table actions file at feature root. Unchanged behaviour.\n- **`actions/<table>.ts`** — per-table action files for teams that want strict schema/behavior separation or need to break an import cycle.\n\nPlus the universal `_feature.ts` slot (at feature root) for **non-table-bound feature-level actions** (`export default { actions: { … } }` shape) and **shared Zod schemas** that get prepended once to the merged actions module so every sibling action sees them. Allowed in any of the three modes — orthogonal to table binding.\n\nThe decision flowchart: *one table with actions → colocate. Multiple tables with actions → colocate each. Hit a cycle or want strict separation → `actions/<table>.ts`. Want schema/actions split for a single-table feature → `actions.ts`. Non-table actions → always `_feature.ts`.*\n\nConflicts are batched and printed once before the compiler aborts — no \"fix one, recompile, fix the next\" loop. The CLI hard-errors when a feature mixes `actions.ts` with table-bound mode, when the same table has its `defineActions` declared in two places, when an `actions/<x>.ts` first-arg doesn't match the basename, or when `_feature.ts` contains `defineActions(table, …)`. Legacy `*-actions.ts` / `*.actions.ts` filenames in a feature dir trigger a soft warning naming the offending paths.\n\nWithin the legacy bundled `actions.ts` DSL, action names had to be unique within a feature — the runtime module merged every source into one keyspace, so colliding `publish` actions on `episodes` and `shows` would have silently overwritten each other. The retired `actions.ts` shape is no longer accepted, so this constraint is gone: the current one-file-per-action layout keys uniqueness per `(bindTable, name)` pair, and the codegen aggregator mangles the JS map key per bind-table while keeping the URL segment bare. Sibling-bound `actions/episodes/publish.ts` and `actions/shows/publish.ts` mount at `/episodes/:id/publish` and `/shows/:id/publish` and compile cleanly.\n\nInline `execute:` bodies must be arrow functions (`execute: async (ctx) => { … }`). `async function` and plain `function` shapes were silently misparsed by the route emitter — they now hard-error at parse time pointing at the canonical arrow form, with a suggestion to use `handler:` for callers who genuinely need a named function declaration.\n\n`handlers/` walks recursively now — `handlers/<table>/<action>.ts` is the canonical layout. A new `lib/` directory under each feature gets copied verbatim into the output for feature-local helpers.\n\nMigration: existing `actions.ts` projects compile bit-identically — the legacy single-table path is unchanged. Legacy `*-actions.ts` filenames produce a soft warning and silently aren't picked up; rename to `<table>.ts` (colocated), `actions/<table>.ts`, or single `actions.ts`.\n\n---\n\n## Firewall: named-scope shape restored, auto-detection synonyms widened\n\nThe named-scope firewall shape (`firewall: { organization: { column: 'tenant_id' } }`) is back as a co-equal user-facing input alongside the predicate array. DSL v2 step 8 had walled it off, but the internal architecture still kept named-scope around for the route + scoped-db generators — so re-accepting it at the input boundary is a thin coercion layer, not an architectural change.\n\n```typescript\n// All three are now valid; all compile to the same predicate array internally.\nfirewall: { organization: { column: 'tenant_id' } } // named-scope (compact)\nfirewall: { owner: { column: 'account_user_id' } }\nfirewall: { exception: true }\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'deletedAt', isNull: true },\n] // predicate array (explicit)\n```\n\nPick the form that reads better — named-scope for the common one-line case, predicate array when you need custom `in`-lists or non-scope predicates.\n\n**Auto-detection synonyms expanded.** When `firewall:` is omitted entirely, the compiler scans the schema for an isolation column. The org-scope list now accepts `organizationId`, `organisationId`, `orgId`, `organization`, `organisation`, `org` (American + British). User-scope still accepts `userId` only.\n\n**`ownerId` is now a targeted error signal.** When a table carries `ownerId` but no isolation column AND no explicit `firewall:`, the compiler raises a specific error: `\\`ownerId\\` is business-logic ownership, not access control — Quickback won't auto-derive a firewall from it. Either rename to \\`userId\\` if this column controls access, add a separate \\`userId\\` / \\`organizationId\\` column, or specify \\`firewall:\\` explicitly.` This replaces the generic \"missing isolation column\" error in the `ownerId`-only case and preserves the documented distinction between RLS-style access control (`userId`) and business-logic ownership (`ownerId`).\n\nMigration: nothing breaks. Projects on the predicate-array shape compile bit-identically. Projects on the named-scope shape — including any test fixtures or example projects that were left on the legacy form — now compile cleanly again.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.0 — April 26, 2026\n\n### `q.scope()` column DSL + unified `masking.query` gate\n\nTwo related DSL consolidations land. The `q.scope()` half is purely additive; the `masking.query` half rejects three legacy per-capability flags at compile time (migration is mechanical — see below).\n\n**`q.scope(kind)` — single-declaration tenant scoping.** Replaces the three-place pattern (column declaration + firewall predicate + implicit ownership-guard) with one column. `q.scope('organization')` compiles to `text(...).notNull()` and tells the compiler:\n\n1. Auto-derive the firewall predicate (`{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }`) so the explicit `firewall:` block can be omitted entirely.\n2. Add the column to `GUARDS_CONFIG.systemManaged` so client input is rejected at the guard layer.\n3. Auto-populate from `ctx` on create / upsert.\n\nThe systemManaged extension generalises beyond `q.scope()`: any firewall predicate whose `equals` references `ctx.*` adds its `field` to the systemManaged set. So a hand-rolled `firewall: [{ field: 'tenantId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }]` gets the same treatment.\n\n```typescript\ncolumns: {\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'), // → ctx.activeOrgId\n ownerId: q.scope('owner'), // → ctx.userId\n teamId: q.scope('team'), // → ctx.activeTeamId\n}\n```\n\nThe auto-derived firewall also includes the soft-delete predicate (`{ field: 'deletedAt', isNull: true }`) when audit-field injection is on (the default). See [`q.scope()` in the schema docs](/compiler/definitions/schema#qscope--tenant-scope-columns).\n\n**`masking[col].query.roles` — unified role gate for filter / sort / search.** The three legacy per-capability flags (`filterable`, `searchable`, `sortable`) are replaced by a single allowlist that says \"these roles can query the column.\"\n\n```typescript\nmasking: {\n email: {\n type: 'email',\n show: { roles: ['admin'] },\n query: { roles: ['admin'] }, // optional — defaults to show.roles\n },\n}\n```\n\nWhen omitted, `query` inherits from `show.roles` (\"if you can see it, you can query it\") which is the right shape for almost all PII. A view's own `query.{filterable,searchable,sortable}` allowlist is the opt-in for higher-privileged roles; the existing intersection validator gates it at compile time. See [Masking query gate](/compiler/definitions/masking#query-gate-filter--sort--search).\n\n**Breaking:** Setting `masking[col].filterable / .searchable / .sortable` is rejected at compile time with a migration hint. Replace with `query.roles` (or just delete the flags — `query` defaults to `show.roles`).\n\n---\n\n## v0.9.0 — April 25, 2026\n\n### DSL v2: unified `read:` pipeline, transactional batches, ID-probe defense\n\nStep 8 of the DSL v2 refactor lands. The headline shift is that the read\nside of every resource now has its own block — `read:` — that owns the\ncollection-level `GET /` endpoint, single-record `GET /:id`, and named view\nprojections. The legacy `crud.list` and `crud.get` shapes are rejected at\ncompile time. See the new [Read pipeline](/compiler/definitions/read) page\nfor the full reference and migration table.\n\n**Breaking changes** (compile-time errors with migration hints):\n\n- `crud.list` → [`read.access`](/compiler/definitions/read) (plus `read.pageSize` / `read.maxPageSize`)\n- `crud.get` → `read.access` (single-record GET inherits automatically; use record-level conditions on `read.access` for differentiated single-record gates)\n- Top-level `views: {...}` → [`read.views: {...}`](/compiler/definitions/read#views-under-read-views)\n- `crud.list.fields` / `crud.get.fields` → declare a named view under `read.views` and call `?view={name}` (or `/views/{name}`)\n\n**Pre-record access ordering on `/:id`**: handlers now run a role-only\naccess check **before** the firewall query, so a caller without a matching\nrole gets 403 before the database is touched. This closes the 404-vs-403\nID-probe channel — an unauthorized caller can no longer distinguish \"row\nexists in another tenant\" from \"row doesn't exist.\" See\n[Access evaluation order](/compiler/definitions/access#evaluation-order).\n\n**Transactional batch operations**: batch endpoints now expose a\n`failFast` option (replacing the old `atomic` naming) and a\n`meta.transactional` response field. On tx-supporting providers\n(postgres, supabase, neon, libsql, better-sqlite3, bun-sqlite), `failFast: true`\nwraps the per-record loop in `db.transaction(...)` so any failure rolls\nback the entire batch. On Cloudflare D1 (no `db.transaction`), `failFast: true`\nstill stops on the first error but prior writes stay committed; inspect\n`meta.transactional` to know which guarantee you got. Embedding queue\nmessages and realtime broadcasts are emitted **after** the transaction\ncommits, so a rolled-back batch produces no orphan jobs. See\n[Batch Operations: Transactional semantics](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/batch-operations#transactional-semantics).\n\n**`firewallErrorMode` lifted off the firewall block**: the field that\ncontrols 403-vs-404 on firewall misses now lives at the resource top level\n(sibling to `firewall:`), since the firewall config is now a predicate\narray and this is a presentation-layer choice. Existing `firewall.errorMode`\nvalues should be lifted to `firewallErrorMode` at the resource level.\n\n**Read-only resources**: an empty `crud: {}` block (or omitting `crud:`\nentirely) is valid for read-only resources. `read:` alone is enough to\nexpose `GET /` and `GET /:id`.\n\n**Strict-mode top-level keys**: the strict allow-list now includes `dev` so\n`defineConfig({ dev: { ... } })` is accepted at the top level.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.7 — April 17, 2026\n\n### Security: Hono CVE cluster fix\n\nHono is bumped to `^4.12.14` across the monorepo, the compiler Docker image's pre-installed deps, and every generator path that emits Hono into compiled projects. Older ranges (`^4.0.0` / `^4.5.0` / `^4.6.0` / `^4.7.11`) covered the vulnerable window. Recompile to pick up the fix in your generated project's `package.json`.\n\n### Cloudflare Email Sending is now in public beta\n\nQuickback already defaults to the Workers `send_email` binding for Cloudflare deploys, and Cloudflare Email Sending has now graduated to public beta — production-ready with zero-config, no API keys, no third-party accounts. No action needed; recompiling any existing project continues to wire the default Cloudflare transport. AWS SES remains a fully supported opt-in (`email.provider: 'aws-ses'`) for non-Cloudflare runtimes or existing SES setups. See [Email Configuration](/compiler/config#email-configuration).\n\n### Minor/patch dep sweep\n\nAligned the whole dep surface — monorepo, compiler Docker image, and generator emissions into compiled projects — so new compiles and existing recompiles converge on the same versions:\n\n- `wrangler@^4.83.0`\n- `drizzle-orm@^0.45.2`, `drizzle-kit@^0.31.10`\n- `zod@^4.3.6`\n- `@cloudflare/workers-types@^4.20260417.1` (also deduped — was accidentally declared in both `dependencies` and `devDependencies` in some paths)\n- `@tanstack/react-query@^5.99.0` (Account app)\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.5 — April 15, 2026\n\n### Fix: Better Auth 1.5 and `@cloudflare/workers-types` Compatibility\n\nGenerated API code failed to typecheck after Better Auth bumped to 1.5 and `@cloudflare/workers-types` tightened `BufferSource` to `ArrayBufferView<ArrayBuffer>`. Four unrelated surfaces broke:\n\n- **`databaseHooks.member.update.after` was removed** in Better Auth 1.5. The compiler now emits the member role-change broadcast hook as `organizationHooks.afterUpdateMemberRole` inside the `organization()` plugin call, which is the current supported shape.\n- **`REALTIME_URL` and `ACCESS_TOKEN`** are always emitted as optional `CloudflareBindings` fields when the organization plugin is active, so the broadcast hook typechecks even when `realtimeMode` is `\"inline\"` (or realtime isn't configured at all).\n- **`auth.api.listOrganizations` / `getFullOrganization` / `session.session.activeOrganizationId`** — third-party Better Auth plugins narrow the inferred `auth.api` type and hide organization-plugin endpoints. The generated middleware and `/admin/v1/organizations` route now cast through `any` for these calls.\n- **`crypto.subtle.sign` / `verify`** no longer accept `Uint8Array<ArrayBufferLike>` directly. Generated `jwt.ts` casts encoded payloads to `BufferSource`.\n\nNo config changes required — recompile to pick up the fixes.\n\n### CMS Admin Gate Now Enforced Server-Side\n\n`cms: { access: \"admin\" }` previously only hid the CMS link in Account UI and rendered an \"Access Denied\" screen inside the SPA — the static assets, `/api/v1/schema`, and `/api/v1/custom_view` CRUD were reachable by any authenticated user. A non-admin with an API token or cookie could bypass the UI and read schema metadata or saved CMS views directly.\n\nThis release adds server-side enforcement at every CMS-facing surface:\n\n- **CMS SPA shell** — the Worker checks `ctx.userRole === \"admin\"` before serving `index.html`. Unauthenticated requests redirect to login; authenticated non-admins get `403 Admin access required`. Static bundles (JS/CSS) remain reachable so browser caches aren't invalidated.\n- **`/api/v1/schema`** — returns `403` to non-admins.\n- **`custom_view` CRUD** — now gated on the new `userRole: [\"admin\"]` primitive rather than org membership.\n- **In-SPA gate** — unchanged; defense in depth behind the server-side gates.\n\nYour resource CRUD endpoints are unaffected — they keep their per-resource `crud.access.roles`.\n\n### New `userRole` Access Primitive\n\nAdded `userRole?: string[]` to the declarative `Access` config, evaluated against `ctx.userRole` (the Better Auth admin-plugin `user.role` column). This is distinct from `roles`, which matches `ctx.roles` (org membership).\n\n```typescript\n// Old: in multi-tenant this meant org-admin, not platform-admin\naccess: { roles: ['admin'] }\n\n// New: explicitly require user.role === 'admin' regardless of org membership\naccess: { userRole: ['admin'] }\n\n// \"Org owner OR platform admin\"\naccess: { or: [{ roles: ['owner'] }, { userRole: ['admin'] }] }\n\n// Platform admins see SSNs across every org\nmasking: { ssn: { type: 'ssn', show: { userRole: ['admin'] } } }\n```\n\n`userRole` works everywhere `Access` is accepted — CRUD, actions, views, masking, and inside `or`/`and` combinators. See [Access - userRole vs roles](/compiler/definitions/access#userrole-vs-roles).\n\n### Fix: `ReferenceError: customAlphabet is not defined` in generated POST handlers\n\nProjects with `providers.database.config.generateId: \"short\"` (or `\"nanoid\"` / `\"cuid\"`) compiled routes that called the ID helper but never imported it. Every generated `src/features/**/*.routes.ts` had `customAlphabet('0123...', 6)()` in its POST body but no matching `import { customAlphabet } from 'nanoid';` at the top of the file. Every `POST /api/v1/<resource>` and batch-create returned `500` with `ReferenceError: customAlphabet is not defined` on the first write.\n\nThe compiler now emits the correct import alongside the ID expression for all three modes: `nanoid`, `customAlphabet`, and `createId` from `@paralleldrive/cuid2`.\n\nNo config changes required — recompile to pick up the fix.\n\n### Fix: Dangling `export const` in generated `actions.ts` breaks `tsc`\n\nWhen a feature authored actions as `export const xActions = defineActions(...)` (instead of `export default defineActions(...)`), the compiler's preamble extractor leaked the assignment's left-hand side into the generated `src/features/<feature>/actions.ts`. The output contained a dangling `export const xActions =` with no right-hand side, and `tsc --noEmit` failed with `TS1109: Expression expected`. Runtime happened to work because the unused placeholder was never evaluated, but typecheck was red.\n\nThe preamble extractor now anchors its boundary to the start of the top-level statement containing `defineActions(...)`, covering `export default`, `export const X =`, `const X =`, and bare call forms. Local Zod helper declarations above the call continue to be preserved.\n\n### Fix: Files worker `database_id` reverted to `\"local-files\"` on every compile\n\nProjects using the two-worker R2 architecture had their files worker's `wrangler.toml` (`apps/backend/cloudflare-workers/files/wrangler.toml`) rewritten with `database_id = \"local-files\"` on every `quickback compile`, even when `providers.database.config.filesDatabaseId` was set to a real D1 UUID. The main worker's binding was correct — only the files worker fell through. Remote deploys of the files worker bound to a non-existent D1, so file serving and access-control reads failed with a binding error.\n\nThe files-worker wrangler generator now reads `filesDatabaseId` (and `filesDatabaseName`) from `providers.database.config` as a fallback when they aren't set on `providers.fileStorage.config`, matching the precedence chain already used by the main worker. Local dev is unaffected — `wrangler dev --local` uses `.wrangler/state/` regardless of the configured ID.\n\nNo config changes required — recompile and redeploy the files worker.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.6 — April 16, 2026\n\n### Fix: Audit columns silently dropped from tables with a same-line index callback\n\nTables authored with the composite-index shape Drizzle / prettier produces —\n\n```ts\nexport const episodeTags = sqliteTable(\"episode_tags\", {\n id: text(\"id\").primaryKey(),\n episodeId: text(\"episode_id\").notNull(),\n tagId: text(\"tag_id\").notNull(),\n}, (t) => [ // <-- \"}, (t) =>\" on one line\n uniqueIndex(\"episode_tag_unique\").on(t.episodeId, t.tagId),\n]);\n```\n\nnever received audit field injection. A regex in `injectAuditFields` required a literal `\\n` between the columns-object `},` and the `(t) =>` index callback, so same-line closers were silently skipped and the function returned the source unchanged. drizzle-kit then diffed the audit-less schema against the previous snapshot and emitted `ALTER TABLE ... DROP COLUMN created_at/modified_at/deleted_at/created_by/modified_by/deleted_by` for every affected table. Any project that applied those migrations had production CRUD return `500` because the generated firewall helper still referenced `deletedAt`.\n\nThe regex is now whitespace-flexible and the identifier class accepts any valid JS identifier (`t`, `table`, `_t`, `tbl2`). A defensive guard throws at compile time if all three terminator patterns fail on a recognizable Drizzle table — no more silent drops.\n\n**Recovery path:**\n\n- Most projects: recompile. drizzle-kit will detect the audit columns are missing from the DB snapshot and emit an `ADD COLUMN` migration to restore them. Apply it.\n- Projects that already hand-patched their schema and ran a manual `ADD COLUMN` migration (like the `podcast-app` workaround in commit `98d8758`): the next compile will regenerate a matching `ADD COLUMN` migration that will fail with \"duplicate column name\" against a DB that already has the columns. Mark the new migration as applied without running it (e.g. `INSERT INTO __drizzle_migrations` in the features DB) or hand-edit the generated SQL to a no-op, then continue normally.\n\n### Fix: `firewall.exception` generated `isNull(<table>.deletedAt)` against a missing column\n\nResources with `firewall: { exception: true }` always emitted `return isNull(<table>.deletedAt);` inside `buildFirewallConditions()`, regardless of whether the table actually had a `deletedAt` column. Projects that disabled audit injection globally (`compiler.features.auditFields: false`) or authored a schema without `deletedAt` ended up with Drizzle resolving `<table>.deletedAt` to `undefined` at query time — every `GET /api/v1/<resource>` returned `500`.\n\nThe three concerns are now fully independent:\n\n- **`firewall.exception: true`** — only disables tenant scoping (org/user/team `WHERE` clauses). It does not gate audit fields or soft-delete.\n- **Audit fields** — always injected unless globally opted out. Unchanged.\n- **Soft-delete filter** — emitted only when the schema actually has `deletedAt` *or* the user explicitly set `firewall.softDelete`.\n\nIn the default configuration (audit injection on), behavior is unchanged: exception resources still filter `deletedAt IS NULL`. Only the broken case changes — exception resources on a schema without `deletedAt` now return `undefined` (no firewall), matching the column reality.\n\nNo config changes required — recompile to pick up the fix.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.4 — April 14, 2026\n\n### New `generateId: \"short\"` Strategy\n\nAdded a compact ID option for tables where short, shareable codes matter more than collision resistance at scale:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n generateId: \"short\",\n }),\n}\n```\n\nGenerates 6-character alphanumeric IDs (e.g. `a3F9xK`) using nanoid's `customAlphabet` with the full 62-char alphabet (`0-9A-Za-z`). Requires the `nanoid` package in your project (same as the existing `\"nanoid\"` strategy).\n\n**When to use:** room codes, invite links, share URLs, ephemeral records — anywhere the ID appears in a URL or needs to be human-typeable.\n\n**When not to use:** high-volume tables. 62^6 ≈ 56.8B combinations means ~238K rows before a 50% collision probability (birthday bound). For large tables stick with `\"uuid\"`, `\"cuid\"`, or `\"prefixed\"`.\n\nSee [Providers - ID Generation Options](/compiler/config/providers#id-generation-options) for the full list of strategies.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.3 — April 14, 2026\n\n### Fix: `wrangler.toml` Route Placement and Binding IDs\n\nTwo bugs in the generated `wrangler.toml` that blocked production deployment without manual edits:\n\n**Routes were nested under `[dev]`.** The `routes = [...]` array was emitted after the `[dev]` section header, so TOML parsed it as `dev.routes` and wrangler ignored the custom domain (warning: `Unexpected fields found in dev field: \"routes\"`). Routes now emit as a top-level key.\n\n**D1 and KV bindings used placeholder IDs.** Despite `databaseId`, `filesDatabaseId`, and `kvId` being set in the quickback config, the generated `wrangler.toml` wrote `\"local-features\"`, `\"local-files\"`, and `\"local\"` instead of the real UUIDs. The compiler now resolves IDs from multiple config sources:\n\n| Binding | Config sources checked (in order) |\n|---------|-----------------------------------|\n| `AUTH_DB` | `database.config.authDatabaseId` |\n| `DB` | `database.config.featuresDatabaseId`, `database.config.databaseId` |\n| `FILES_DB` | `fileStorage.config.filesDatabaseId`, `database.config.filesDatabaseId` |\n| `KV` | `database.config.kvNamespaceId`, `storage.config.namespaceId`, `auth.config.kvId` |\n\nSee [Providers - Database Options](/compiler/config/providers#database-options) for the full list of supported ID properties.\n\n### Fix: Account SPA Post-Login Redirect on Unified Domain\n\nWhen the Account SPA was served at `/account/` on the unified quickback domain (e.g. `secure.example.com/account/`), post-login redirects dropped the basepath and sent users to `/dashboard` instead of `/account/dashboard`. Sign-out redirects had the same issue.\n\nThe SPA now shares a basepath module across the router and all raw `window.location.href` assignments, so login, signup, email OTP, welcome, and sign-out flows all stay under the correct path prefix regardless of whether the SPA is on the unified domain or its own dedicated auth subdomain.\n\nNo config changes required — recompile to pick up the fix.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.2 — April 11, 2026\n\n### Catch-All `VITE_QUICKBACK_URL` Environment Variable\n\nInstead of setting four separate URL env vars, you can now point at a single Quickback origin:\n\n```bash\n# One variable — done.\nVITE_QUICKBACK_URL=https://secure.example.com\n```\n\nWhen set, it's used as a fallback for the individual URLs:\n\n| Individual var (explicit) | Fallback when unset |\n|---|---|\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}` |\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_ACCOUNT_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}/account` |\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_CMS_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}/cms` |\n\n`VITE_QUICKBACK_APP_URL` stays independent — it points at the tenant's own frontend, not the Quickback server.\n\n**Non-breaking.** Individual vars still take precedence when set, so existing configurations work unchanged. The compiler now also emits `VITE_QUICKBACK_URL` into the generated SPA `.env` files, and library users can set `__QUICKBACK_URL__` on `globalThis` for the same effect.\n\nSee [Environment Variables](/stack/account-ui/environment-variables) for the full reference.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.1 — April 9, 2026\n\n### Role Hierarchy with `+` Suffix\n\nYou can now define a role hierarchy in your config and use the `+` suffix in access rules to mean \"this role and above\":\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nauth: {\n roleHierarchy: ['member', 'admin', 'owner'],\n}\n\n// In resource definitions\ncrud: {\n list: { access: { roles: [\"member+\"] } }, // member, admin, owner\n create: { access: { roles: [\"admin+\"] } }, // admin, owner\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"owner\"] } }, // owner only\n}\n```\n\nRoles are expanded at compile time. No `+` = exact match. See [Access - Role Hierarchy](/compiler/definitions/access#role-hierarchy) for details.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.0 — April 9, 2026\n\n### Breaking: VITE URL Environment Variables Renamed\n\nAll Quickback-generated URL environment variables are now namespaced under `VITE_QUICKBACK_*` to avoid collisions with other Vite projects.\n\n| Old | New |\n|-----|-----|\n| `VITE_API_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL` |\n| `VITE_ACCOUNT_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_ACCOUNT_URL` |\n| `VITE_APP_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_APP_URL` |\n| `VITE_CMS_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_CMS_URL` |\n\n**Non-URL variables are unchanged:** `VITE_ENABLE_*` feature flags, branding vars (`VITE_APP_NAME`, etc.), and `VITE_STRIPE_PUBLISHABLE_KEY` stay as-is.\n\n**Action required:**\n- **Compiled projects** — re-run `quickback compile`. The compiler generates the new names automatically.\n- **Standalone deploys** — update `.env`, `.env.production`, and `wrangler.toml` files manually.\n- **Library users** — the `__QUICKBACK_API_URL__` / `__QUICKBACK_APP_URL__` globalThis names are unchanged, but if you pipe Vite env vars into them, update the var names.\n\nSee [Environment Variables](/stack/account-ui/environment-variables) for the full reference.\n\n### CMS Access Control\n\nThe `cms.access` config option now enforces access at the CMS level, not just link visibility in Account UI.\n\n```typescript\ncms: { access: \"admin\" }\n```\n\nWhen set to `\"admin\"`, non-admin users (`user.role !== \"admin\"`) see an \"Access Denied\" screen with a sign-out button instead of the CMS. When set to `\"user\"` (the default), any authenticated user can access the CMS.\n\nSee [CMS Connecting](/stack/cms/connecting) and [Compiler Config](/compiler/config) for details.\n\n### SPA Sub-Route Fix\n\nFixed a bug where hard-refreshing or directly navigating to SPA sub-routes (e.g., `/account/profile`, `/cms/tables/users`) returned a blank white screen. The Worker now correctly serves `index.html` for all SPA paths, allowing the client-side router to handle routing.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.11 — February 24, 2026\n\n### Email OTP & Auth Fixes\n\n- Fixed email-OTP magic links not working correctly\n- Removed deprecated `/internal/validate` endpoint — use standard Better Auth session validation instead\n- Auth is now required for all API routes when running locally (previously some routes were unprotected in dev)\n\n### Multiple Table Exports Fix\n\n- Fixed a compiler error when a single file exports multiple Drizzle tables alongside a `defineTable()` default export\n- The CLI now properly detects and reports this with a clear error message pointing to the fix\n\n### Headless Drizzle Rename Hints\n\n- Added `compiler.migrations.renames` configuration for CI/CD environments where Drizzle's interactive rename prompts would block compilation\n- Compile errors now include explicit rename key paths and fail fast on malformed rename config keys\n- See [Configuration](/compiler/config) for details\n\n### Security Contract Report Artifacts\n\n- Added generated security contract artifacts to compiler output:\n - `reports/security-contracts.report.json`\n - `reports/security-contracts.report.sig.json`\n- Added config-driven signing controls:\n - `compiler.securityContracts.report.signature.enabled`\n - `compiler.securityContracts.report.signature.required`\n - `compiler.securityContracts.report.signature.key` / `keyEnv` / `keyId`\n- Missing required signing keys now fail loudly with explicit remediation guidance\n- Added strict config validation for report/signature paths and signing options\n\n### Mandatory Unsafe Action Audit Trail\n\n- Added structured unsafe action config (`unsafe: { reason, adminOnly, crossTenant, targetScope }`)\n- Cross-tenant unsafe actions now require Better Auth authentication plus platform admin role (`ctx.userRole === \"admin\"`)\n- Added mandatory audit logging for unsafe cross-tenant actions (success, denial, and error paths)\n- Cloudflare output now includes optional `AUDIT_DB` wiring, `drizzle.audit.config.ts`, and `db:migrate:audit:*` scripts when unsafe actions are present\n- Added compile-time raw SQL guard for actions and handlers (`allowRawSql: true` required per action)\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.10 — February 19, 2026\n\n### Compiler Page Parsing & CLI Output\n\n- Improved compiler page parsing for `definePage()` definitions\n- Better CLI output formatting during compilation\n- Added `apiPath` to schema registry for CMS integration\n\n### Bug Fixes\n\n- Fixed hyphenated action names not being properly quoted in generated code (e.g., `mark-complete` now generates valid JavaScript)\n- API key authentication (`x-api-key` header) is now handled separately from session tokens (`Bearer` header)\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.9 — February 16, 2026\n\n### CMS Pages & CLI Page Support\n\n- Added `definePage()` support for CMS-managed pages\n- Auth middleware improvements for page routes\n- CLI now supports page definitions alongside table and action definitions\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.8 — February 14, 2026\n\n### CMS App\n\n- Introduced the Quickback CMS — a schema-driven admin panel that connects to your generated API\n- CMS namespace added to actions for admin-specific operations\n- Fixed `guard` → `access` naming inconsistency in CMS action definitions\n\n### Schema Registry & Firewall Improvements\n\n- Added schema registry generator — the compiler now outputs a JSON schema registry used by the CMS\n- Firewall error modes: choose between `reveal` (403 with details) and `hide` (opaque 404) for security-sensitive deployments\n\n### Bug Fixes\n\n- Fixed anonymous user email format generation\n- Organization selector improvements in Account UI\n- Config validation now catches more errors at compile time\n- Better CRUD error handling with structured error responses\n- Fixed masking to use representative star counts instead of fixed formatting\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.7 — February 12, 2026\n\n### Scoped Database for Actions\n\nActions now receive a **security-scoped database** instead of a raw Drizzle instance. The compiler generates a proxy wrapper that automatically enforces org isolation, owner filtering, and soft-delete visibility — the same protections that CRUD routes have always had.\n\nThe scoped DB uses duck-typed column detection at runtime:\n\n| Column Detected | SELECT / UPDATE / DELETE | INSERT |\n|---|---|---|\n| `organizationId` | Adds `WHERE organizationId = ?` | Auto-injects `organizationId` from context |\n| `ownerId` | Adds `WHERE ownerId = ?` | Auto-injects `ownerId` from context |\n| `deletedAt` | Adds `WHERE deletedAt IS NULL` | — |\n\nThis means **every action is secure by default** — no manual `WHERE` clauses needed.\n\n```typescript\ndefineActions(todos, {\n complete: {\n type: \"record\",\n execute: async ({ db, ctx, record, input }) => {\n // db is scoped — only sees records in user's org, excludes soft-deleted\n const siblings = await db.select().from(todos);\n // ↑ automatically filtered to ctx.activeOrgId + deletedAt IS NULL\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\n#### Unsafe Mode\n\nActions that intentionally need to bypass security (admin reports, cross-org queries, migrations) can declare `unsafe: true` to receive a raw, unscoped database handle:\n\n```typescript\ndefineActions(analytics, {\n globalReport: {\n unsafe: true,\n execute: async ({ db, rawDb, ctx, input }) => {\n // db → still scoped (safety net)\n // rawDb → bypasses all security filters\n const allOrgs = await rawDb.select().from(organizations);\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\nWithout `unsafe: true`, `rawDb` is `undefined`.\n\n**Related docs:** [Actions](/compiler/definitions/actions), [Actions API](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/actions-api)\n\n---\n\n### Cascading Soft Delete\n\nSoft-deleting a parent record now **automatically cascades** to child and junction tables within the same feature. The compiler detects foreign key references at build time and generates cascade UPDATE statements.\n\n```\nDELETE /api/v1/projects/:id\n```\n\nGenerated behavior:\n```typescript\n// 1. Soft delete the parent\nawait db.update(projects)\n .set({ deletedAt: now, deletedBy: userId })\n .where(eq(projects.id, id));\n\n// 2. Auto-cascade to children (compiler-generated)\nawait db.update(projectMembers)\n .set({ deletedAt: now, deletedBy: userId })\n .where(eq(projectMembers.projectId, id));\n\nawait db.update(projectTasks)\n .set({ deletedAt: now, deletedBy: userId })\n .where(eq(projectTasks.projectId, id));\n```\n\nRules:\n- Only applies to **soft delete** (the default). Hard delete relies on database-level `ON DELETE CASCADE`.\n- Only cascades within the **same feature** — cross-feature references are not affected.\n- Child tables must have `deletedAt` / `deletedBy` columns (auto-added by the compiler's audit fields).\n\n**Related docs:** [Actions API — Cascading Soft Delete](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/actions-api#cascading-soft-delete)\n\n---\n\n### Advanced Query Parameters\n\nNew query parameter capabilities for all list endpoints:\n\n- **Field selection** — `?fields=id,name,status` returns only the columns you need\n- **Multi-sort** — `?sort=status:asc,createdAt:desc` sorts by multiple fields\n- **Total count** — `?count=true` returns total matching records in response headers (`X-Total-Count`)\n- **Full-text search** — `?search=keyword` searches across all text columns\n\n```bash\n# Get only names and statuses, sorted by status then date, with total count\nGET /api/v1/todos?fields=id,name,status&sort=status:asc,createdAt:desc&count=true\n\n# Search across all text fields\nGET /api/v1/todos?search=urgent\n```\n\n**Related docs:** [Query Parameters](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/query-params)\n\n---\n\n### Audit Field Improvements\n\n- `deletedAt` and `deletedBy` fields are now **always injected** by the compiler for tables with soft delete enabled — no need to define them in your schema\n- All audit fields (`createdAt`, `createdBy`, `modifiedAt`, `modifiedBy`, `deletedAt`, `deletedBy`) are auto-managed\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.6 — February 8, 2026\n\n### Database Naming Conventions\n\n- Default table and column naming changed to **snake_case** with `usePlurals: false`\n- Table names derived from generated Better Auth schema for consistency\n- Removed legacy single-database mode — split databases (auth + features) is now the standard\n\n### Auth Variable Shadowing Fix\n\n- Fixed `member` variable in auth middleware that shadowed the Drizzle `member` table import\n- Renamed to `sessionMember` to avoid conflicts in generated routes\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.5 — February 5, 2026\n\n### Better Auth Plugins\n\n- Published `@quickback-dev/better-auth-upgrade-anonymous` v1.1.0 — post-passkey email collection flow\n- Published `@quickback-dev/better-auth-combo-auth` — combined email + password + OTP authentication\n- Published `@quickback-dev/better-auth-aws-ses` — AWS SES email provider for Better Auth\n\n### OpenAPI Spec Generation\n\n- Generated APIs now include a full OpenAPI specification at `/openapi.json`\n- Better Auth endpoints included in the spec\n- Runtime route: `GET /openapi.json`\n\n### Security Hardening\n\n- Global error handler prevents leaking internal error details\n- Security headers middleware (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options)\n- `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` properly passed to generated config\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.4 — January 30, 2026\n\n### Account UI\n\n- Pre-built authentication UI deployed as Cloudflare Workers\n- Features: sessions, organizations, passkeys, passwordless, admin panel, API keys\n- Dual-mode: standalone (degit template) or embedded with Quickback projects\n\n### Webhook System\n\n- Inbound webhook endpoints with signature verification\n- Outbound webhooks via Cloudflare Queues with automatic retries\n- Configurable per-feature webhook events\n\n### Realtime & Vector Search\n\n- Durable Objects + WebSocket realtime subscriptions\n- Vector embeddings via Cloudflare Vectorize\n- KV and R2 storage integrations\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.0 — January 2026\n\n### Initial Release\n\n- **Quickback Compiler** — TypeScript-first backend compiler\n- **Four Security Pillars** — Firewall, Access, Guards, Masking\n- **`defineTable()`** — Schema + security configuration in a single file\n- **Templates** — Cloudflare Workers, Bun standalone, B2B SaaS\n- **Cloud Compiler** — Remote compilation via `compiler.quickback.dev`\n- **CLI** — `quickback create`, `quickback compile`, `quickback init`\n- **Better Auth Integration** — Organizations, roles, sessions\n- **Drizzle ORM** — Schema-first with automatic migrations\n- **Cloudflare D1** — Split database support (auth + features)"
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"content": "# Changelog\n\nRelease notes for the Quickback compiler, CLI, and platform.\n\n---\n\n## v0.11.0 — May 5, 2026\n\n### OAuth Provider plugin (MCP-ready)\n\nQuickback can now act as a standards-compliant OAuth 2.1 + OIDC authorization server via [`@better-auth/oauth-provider`](https://better-auth.com/docs/plugins/oauth-provider). Enable it with `plugins: [\"oauthProvider\"]` in your auth config — the compiler auto-includes Better Auth's `jwt` plugin (the OAuth provider delegates access-token signing to it) and the Account SPA gains a `/consent` page for the standard authorization-code flow.\n\nThis replaces Better Auth's deprecated `mcp` plugin and gives every future MCP client (Cursor, Claude Desktop, claude.ai connectors, custom tooling) RFC 7591 dynamic client registration + the well-known discovery documents they need to bootstrap themselves. See [Auth Plugins → OAuth Provider](/stack/auth/plugins#oauth-provider-mcp-ready).\n\n### API key auth via query parameter\n\nThe auth middleware now accepts API keys as `?api_key=...` or `?key=...` query parameters in addition to the `x-api-key` header. The header takes precedence when both are sent. This unblocks clients that can't inject custom headers — most notably claude.ai's MCP connector, which previously returned zero tools because every list/call attempt was unauthenticated.\n\nThe query-param form lands in access logs and `Referer` headers; prefer the header whenever the client supports it. See [Auth Plugins → API Keys](/stack/auth/plugins#api-keys).\n\n### PartyServer rooms + realtime URL split (breaking)\n\nThe realtime URL space is reorganized so the names match what each primitive does:\n\n- **`/realtime/v1/*` → `/broadcast/v1/*`** — the existing org-wide Broadcaster (Postgres-changes fan-out, ws-ticket auth) moves to its semantically accurate prefix. Same code, same behavior, just a different mount point.\n- **`/realtime/<binding>/<room-id>` is the new mount for [PartyServer](/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms) rooms** — bidirectional, per-room (per-document) Durable Objects with presence and lifecycle hooks. Auto-mounted via `hono-party` whenever a project declares any in-worker DO via `bindings.durableObjects[].from`. Use these for collaborative editing, live cursors, and per-room state.\n\n**Breaking changes** — recompile + redeploy required:\n\n- The `REALTIME_URL` runtime env var is renamed to `BROADCAST_URL` (used by the org member-update broadcast hook in separate-mode realtime). If you set this via `wrangler secret put REALTIME_URL`, re-set it as `BROADCAST_URL`.\n- The auth-ui SPA helpers `getRealtimeWsUrl()` / `getRealtimeTicketUrl()` are renamed to `getBroadcastWsUrl()` / `getBroadcastTicketUrl()`. The `appConfig.routes.api.realtime` field is renamed to `appConfig.routes.api.broadcast`.\n- WebSocket subscribers that hardcoded `/realtime/v1/websocket` or `/realtime/v1/ws-ticket` need to be updated to `/broadcast/v1/...`. The bundled CMS and Account SPAs handle this automatically; custom clients need a one-line change.\n\n**Pre-installed deps in the compiler image:** `partyserver`, `partysocket`, and `hono-party` are now cached in `/deps/node_modules` so opt-in collab projects compile without an extra `npm install` step. `Y-PartyServer` (Yjs CRDT support) stays opt-in.\n\n**Recipe:** see the new [PartyServer Rooms](/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms) doc page and the `examples/recruitment` interview-room demo for an end-to-end example with presence and live notes.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.20 — May 4, 2026\n\n### In-worker Durable Objects via `bindings.durableObjects[].from`\n\n`bindings.durableObjects` previously only emitted the binding declaration — useful for cross-worker DOs (`scriptName: \"other-worker\"`), but not enough for app-owned classes that live in this worker's source. Authors had to hand-edit `src/index.ts` (to add `export { ItemStream } from './...'`) and `wrangler.toml` (to add the `[[migrations]]` block) on every compile.\n\nAdding `from` flips the entry into in-worker mode and the compiler does both:\n\n```ts\ndurableObjects: [\n {\n name: \"ITEM_STREAM\",\n className: \"ItemStream\",\n from: \"features/loops/lib/ItemStream\", // module path under src/\n },\n]\n```\n\nGenerates:\n- `src/index.ts`: `export { ItemStream } from './features/loops/lib/ItemStream';` — wrangler resolves the binding by class export.\n- `wrangler.toml`: a `[[migrations]]` block with `tag = \"qb-do-ItemStream\"` and `new_sqlite_classes = [\"ItemStream\"]`.\n- `CloudflareBindings`: `ITEM_STREAM: DurableObjectNamespace` so `c.env.ITEM_STREAM.idFromName(...)` typechecks.\n\nWhere the class file lives: in-worker DO classes go under `quickback/lib/` or `quickback/features/<feature>/lib/` — both copy verbatim into the generated `src/` tree on every compile (the rest of `src/` is wiped). The `from` value is the resulting `src/`-relative path with no `./` prefix and no `.ts` suffix.\n\n`from` and `scriptName` are mutually exclusive — the compiler rejects entries that set both. Cross-worker entries (`scriptName` set) skip the re-export and the migration block; the exporting worker owns its own migration table.\n\n`migrationTag` (default `qb-do-${className}`) is stable across regenerations and **must never be removed or renamed once deployed** — wrangler tracks applied tags and will reject deploys that try to walk them back. `useSqlite` defaults to `true`; set to `false` for legacy KV-backed DOs.\n\nSee [Bindings → Durable Objects](/compiler/config/bindings#durableobjects) for the full reference.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.19 — May 4, 2026\n\n### Fix: bundled-SPA auth survives `wrangler dev` on custom_domain projects\n\n`wrangler dev` rewrites the configured `custom_domain` host in **every** response header value (Location, Content-Security-Policy, X-…) to the local hostname, with a case-sensitive substring matcher. That mangles the CSP `connect-src` for projects with `domain: \"api.example.com\"` + bundled CMS / Account SPAs:\n\n```\n# Compiled (correct)\nconnect-src 'self' https://api.example.com …\n\n# Served by wrangler dev (mangled)\nconnect-src 'self' https://localhost:8787 …\n```\n\nResult: the bundled SPA's hardcoded `VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL` fetches get blocked in dev because the CSP only allows localhost. Reported by Loop on the 0.10.18 thread; verified end-to-end with a minimal `wrangler@4.85.0 dev --local` repro.\n\nThe compiler now emits the SPA-baked-origin literal in `connect-src` with the host's first letter capitalised (`https://Api.example.com`). CSP host-source matching is ASCII case-insensitive per CSP3, so browsers accept it for connections to `https://api.example.com`; wrangler's case-sensitive matcher misses it. The case-shift is applied at compile time and only to URLs whose host matches the configured `custom_domain` — other origins (localhost, third-party hosts) are unchanged.\n\n`TRUSTED_ORIGINS` keeps its lowercase prod entries: it's consumed by the CORS `isTrustedOrigin` check via `Array.includes()` against the browser-supplied Origin header (always lowercase). The CSP fix only needs to land on the SPA-baked literal — that's the entry the SPA's hardcoded fetch needs covered.\n\nIf wrangler ships a fix for the response-header rewrite, the case-shifted source remains a valid CSP entry that browsers match identically — no follow-up needed in user code.\n\n**Action required:** none. Recompile (`quickback compile`) to pick up the fix.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.18 — May 2, 2026\n\n### `experimentalRemote` — share deployed D1 with `wrangler dev`\n\nPer-binding `experimental_remote = true` flag emitted into the generated `wrangler.toml`. Useful for \"share prod auth in dev, keep feature writes sandboxed\":\n\n```ts\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n splitDatabases: true,\n experimentalRemote: {\n auth: true, // wrangler dev reads/writes deployed AUTH_DB\n features: false, // (default) features stays local\n audit: false,\n webhooks: false,\n files: false,\n },\n }),\n}\n```\n\nKeys are logical binding names — `auth` flips the flag on the `AUTH_DB` binding, `features` flips it on `DB` (or the legacy single-DB binding), `audit` / `webhooks` / `files` follow the same pattern. Off by default; only enable for databases you intend to share.\n\n### Google OAuth + signup ToS\n\nThe Account SPA now wires Google OAuth end-to-end when `auth.providers.auth.config.socialProviders.google.enabled: true`. The compiler bakes the right `VITE_ENABLE_GOOGLE_OAUTH` flag into the SPA's `.env` so the social-login button renders only when the provider is enabled — no more dead buttons.\n\nSignup flow gains a Terms-of-Service checkbox gate (configurable via the Account SPA's branding config).\n\n### CLI compile auth gate + device-auth redirect fix\n\n- `quickback compile` now requires authentication for cloud-compiler runs (closes the unauth public-compile path).\n- The device-flow `/cli/authorize` page was sending `?returnTo=` to login, but `signup.tsx` and the `_authenticated` middleware only read `?redirect=` — so a user who clicked \"Create one\" from `/login` lost the return URL. Standardized on `?redirect=` everywhere.\n\n### Skill restructure (Claude Code skill)\n\nThe bundled Claude Code skill was reorganized for clarity:\n\n- `SKILL.md` is now a thin orientation pointer, not a 600-line dump\n- Reference docs split into `Compiler` and `Stack` sections\n- Docs bundled as **files** the model navigates with `Read` / `Glob` rather than via `quickback docs <topic>` shell calls — same content, fewer tool calls per lookup\n- Tightened against audit gaps surfaced by red-team review\n\nRun `quickback claude install` to pick up the new skill layout.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.17 — May 2, 2026\n\n### Security fix: CSP auto-config no longer widens `default-src`\n\nWhen 0.10.15's auto-config was asked to add a value to a directive the user hadn't declared (e.g. `https://fonts.googleapis.com` → `style-src` when only `default-src` was set), it incorrectly pushed the value into `default-src` itself. Because CSP3 fall-back semantics make `default-src` the fallback for `script-src`, `img-src`, `media-src`, and others, this widened the attack surface to every directive that fell back to it — a `style-src`-only host became reachable from `script-src`.\n\n0.10.17 fixes the logic: missing target directives are now **scaffolded** with the user's `default-src` values as baseline, then extended with the auto-config addition. `default-src` stays clean. The new directive (e.g. `style-src`) covers exactly the styles the SPA needs and nothing else.\n\nBefore (0.10.16):\n```\ndefault-src 'self' https://fonts.googleapis.com https://fonts.gstatic.com @trustedOrigins https://api.example.com\n```\n\nAfter (0.10.17):\n```\ndefault-src 'self'\nstyle-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com\nfont-src 'self' https://fonts.gstatic.com\nconnect-src 'self' @trustedOrigins https://api.example.com\n```\n\n**Action required:** recompile (`quickback compile`) to regenerate the security middleware with the corrected scaffolding. Configs that already declared each `*-src` directive explicitly were unaffected by the bug — the regression only surfaced when users wrote `defaultSrc: ['@self']` and let auto-config fill in the rest.\n\nThe user-side workaround from 0.10.16 (declaring each directive with `['@self']` to force scaffold) is no longer needed in 0.10.17 — the compiler does the right thing automatically.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.16 — May 2, 2026\n\n### CSP auto-config now covers SPA-baked-in API origins\n\nWhen the bundled CMS or Account SPA is enabled, the compiler already inlines the API URL into the SPA bundle as a string literal at build time (`VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL=https://${unifiedDomain}`). That hardcoded URL is what the SPA actually fetches — regardless of which origin is currently serving the page. CSP `connect-src` must allow it explicitly.\n\n0.10.16's auto-config picks up every domain the compiler already knows about — `config.domain`, the inferred `quickback.{baseDomain}`, `cms.domain`, `account.domain`, the admin domain — and adds `https://${each}` to `connectSrc` whenever a bundled SPA is enabled.\n\nThe motivating case: running the SPA on `localhost:5173` while it's still baked against `https://quickback.your-app.com`. Pre-0.10.16 the localhost CSP's `'self'` blocked the prod URL; users were patching it manually. Now it just works.\n\n```\n[security] auto-added https://quickback.loop.kardoe.com to csp.connectSrc — account: true → bundled Account SPA → SPA bundle hardcodes https://quickback.loop.kardoe.com as VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL / etc.\n```\n\n`@trustedOrigins` (the CORS allowlist) is unchanged — it still gets added independently. The two cover different things: `@trustedOrigins` permits CORS-allowed sibling subdomains; the new SPA-baked addition permits the exact URL the SPA's compiled bundle hardcodes.\n\nCombined with 0.10.15's bundled-SPA defaults, most projects can now write the minimal:\n\n```ts\nsecurity: {\n csp: {\n defaultSrc: ['@self'],\n scriptSrc: ['@self'],\n objectSrc: ['@none'],\n upgradeInsecureRequests: true,\n },\n}\n```\n\n…and the compiler fills in styleSrc font hosts, fontSrc gstatic, connectSrc trusted origins, and connectSrc SPA-baked URLs.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.15 — May 2, 2026\n\n### CSP auto-config — bundled-SPA origins added automatically\n\nWhen `security.csp` is set, the compiler now widens directives **additively** based on the project's enabled features. The four rules:\n\n| Trigger | Auto-added | Directive |\n|---|---|---|\n| `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `'unsafe-inline'`, `https://fonts.googleapis.com` | `styleSrc` |\n| `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `https://fonts.gstatic.com` | `fontSrc` |\n| `csp` set (always) | `@trustedOrigins` | `connectSrc` |\n\nAnything you already wrote stays — auto-config never removes or overrides. Every applied addition prints to stderr at compile so the magic is visible:\n\n```\n[security] auto-added 'unsafe-inline' to csp.styleSrc — account: true → bundled Account SPA → inline style attributes from Tailwind / TanStack Router\n[security] auto-added @trustedOrigins to csp.connectSrc — CORS-trusted origins must be reachable from XHR/fetch (matches cors() allowlist)\n```\n\nThe recipe in [the security docs](/compiler/config/security#example-paste-in-csp-for-a-quickback-spa-project) becomes ~5 lines shorter — most projects no longer need to list `fonts.googleapis.com` / `fonts.gstatic.com` / `@trustedOrigins` themselves. **Loop's CSP shrinks dramatically** after recompiling against this version.\n\n**Opt-out:** `security: { cspAutoConfig: false, csp: { ... } }` for projects fronted by a CDN that injects its own CSP, or teams that want strict from-scratch control.\n\n**Smart fallback:** if you set `defaultSrc` but omit the target directive (e.g. `defaultSrc: ['@self']` and nothing for `connectSrc`), the addition lands in `defaultSrc` rather than creating a sibling directive — CSP fall-back semantics mean a sibling would *narrow* your intent, so we preserve the broader fallback.\n\n### Troubleshooting table for CSP violations\n\nThe security docs page now includes a [Troubleshooting CSP violations](/compiler/config/security#troubleshooting-csp-violations) table mapping browser console errors back to the directive that needs widening. Useful when auto-config is disabled or the project has a non-bundled SPA hitting third-party origins.\n\n### Out of scope (deferred)\n\n- **Per-request CSP nonces** (`@nonce` sentinel implementation) — Phase 2 / 0.10.16. Sentinel still errors at compile in 0.10.15.\n- **`revocationCheck: 'kv'` for `auth.jwt`** — schema accepts it, runtime still errors at compile. Slipped from 0.10.15 to 0.10.16.\n- **Public R2 host auto-add to `imgSrc`** — most R2 access today goes through the worker so the SPA fetches from `'@self'`. Will revisit once we have a clean way to discover public-bucket hosts at compile.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.14 — May 1, 2026\n\n### `auth.jwt` — JWT bearer-token fast-path config\n\nQuickback's bearer-token JWT (the one minted by the auth middleware and consumed by the fast-path on every subsequent request) is now configurable. The most-tuned knob is `expiresIn` — drop it to bound the post-revocation replay window without affecting browser SPAs, which auto-refresh via `set-auth-token` on every authed call:\n\n```ts\nauth: {\n jwt: {\n expiresIn: 30, // 30s post-revocation replay window\n issuer: 'my-api', // iss claim (verified on the way back in)\n audience: 'partner-svc', // aud claim\n secretEnv: 'CUSTOM_JWT_SECRET', // override BETTER_AUTH_SECRET if you need the JWT secret rotated independently\n },\n}\n```\n\n`revocationCheck: 'kv'` (KV-denylist consult on every fast-path verify, ~5-15ms edge-cached, no D1 hit) is reserved in the schema today but **deferred to 0.10.15** — setting it errors at compile so the migration path is explicit. `'none'` (today's behaviour, 0 cost, replay bound by TTL) stays the default.\n\nSee [the docs page](/compiler/config/auth) for the full knob list and tuning recommendations.\n\n### MCP admin endpoints hidden from non-admin `tools/list`\n\nBetter Auth admin endpoints (`/admin/list-users`, `/admin/ban-user`, `/admin/impersonate-user`, etc. — 9 in total) now carry `x-access: { userRole: ['admin'] }` in the generated OpenAPI spec, which means the MCP server's existing access-filter automatically drops them from `tools/list` for callers without an admin token. Anonymous and member-role callers no longer see admin tooling enumerated through MCP; admin endpoints still exist on the HTTP surface (Better Auth gates them server-side regardless).\n\n### Declarative `security` config block\n\nEvery security response-header (`Content-Security-Policy`, `Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy`, `Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy`, `Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy`, `X-Frame-Options`, `Strict-Transport-Security`, `Referrer-Policy`, `Permissions-Policy`) is now configurable from `quickback.config.ts`. Loop's `postcompile-patch.mjs` (which re-injected a fuller CSP and COOP after every `quickback compile`) can now be deleted in favour of:\n\n```ts\nsecurity: {\n csp: {\n defaultSrc: ['@self'],\n scriptSrc: ['@self'],\n styleSrc: ['@self', '@unsafe-inline'],\n frameAncestors: ['@none'],\n objectSrc: ['@none'],\n upgradeInsecureRequests: true,\n },\n coop: 'same-origin',\n}\n```\n\n`@`-prefixed sentinels (`@self`, `@none`, `@unsafe-inline`, `@unsafe-eval`, `@trustedOrigins`, `@nonce`) save users from awkward `\"'self'\"` quoting and let `@trustedOrigins` resolve to the same allowlist `cors()` uses. Unknown sentinels throw at compile rather than silently stringify into the wire CSP.\n\nThe compiler runs lint rules over the resolved config — errors for `@nonce` (deferred to 0.10.15), `@unsafe-inline + @nonce` (silently broken), and sentinel-only directives that would resolve to nothing at runtime; warnings for `@unsafe-inline` in `script-src`, wildcard sources, missing `default-src`, HSTS preload-list misconfiguration, etc.\n\nDefaults preserve 0.10.13 behaviour byte-for-byte — adding the block without setting any field is a no-op.\n\nSee [the docs page](/compiler/config/security) for the full reference.\n\n### HSTS no longer pins `localhost` to HTTPS\n\nThe generated middleware now skips `Strict-Transport-Security` when the request hostname is `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, or `*.localhost`. Without this gate, `wrangler dev` would pin the developer's browser to HTTPS for `max-age` seconds — observable across every project on that machine since HSTS keys on hostname, not port. Affects every project running locally.\n\n### Out of scope (deferred)\n\n- **Per-request CSP nonces** — Phase 2 / 0.10.15. Sentinel exists at config-validation level so users can author their final CSP today knowing it'll start working when nonces ship.\n- **Asset-hash CSP** for inline `<style>` and `<script>` blocks emitted by the bundled SPAs — Phase 3.\n- **Per-route CSP overrides** (e.g. one looser policy for `/admin`) — single global CSP for now.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.13 — May 1, 2026\n\n### Clickjacking protection on every generated Worker\n\nEvery Worker now emits two clickjacking-defence headers on every\nresponse:\n\n- `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self' <TRUSTED_ORIGINS…>`\n- `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN`\n\nThe CSP allowlist is sourced from the same `TRUSTED_ORIGINS` constant\nthat gates CORS, so users configure their domains in one place\n(`auth.trustedOrigins` / `auth.trustedOriginDefaults` in\n`quickback.config.ts`) and both CORS and frame-ancestors stay in\nlockstep. `'self'` is always allowed so an app's own SPAs can frame\ntheir own routes (e.g. an account login popover hosted on the same\norigin).\n\nModern browsers obey `frame-ancestors` and ignore `X-Frame-Options`\nwhen both are set; the legacy header is included for clients that\ndon't speak CSP3. The CSP intentionally only sets `frame-ancestors` —\nadding `script-src` / `default-src` would need a much wider audit\nacross SPA assets, inline scripts, and third-party embeds, so that's\nleft as a follow-up.\n\nRecompile (`quickback compile`) and redeploy to pick this up — no\nconfig change needed unless you want to allow extra cross-origin\niframe embeds, in which case add them to `auth.trustedOrigins`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.12 — May 1, 2026\n\n### Bundled-docs sync for the MCP recon fix\n\nPatch release that re-bundles the CLI's offline docs (consulted by the\nClaude Code skill, Cursor rules, and other AI assistants) so they\nreflect the corrected `tools/list` access-filter behavior and CORS\nposture shipped in v0.10.11. The `compiler/config/agents.mdx` page\nitself was already corrected on the docs site immediately after the\n0.10.11 release; this bump propagates that text into the bundle inside\n`@quickback-dev/cli`.\n\nNo runtime or compiler behavior change — re-running `quickback compile`\nagainst this version produces the same output as v0.10.11.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.11 — May 1, 2026\n\n### MCP `tools/list` is now access-filtered + recon-tightened\n\nThe generated MCP-over-HTTP server (`src/routes/mcp.ts`) had three holes\nthat turned a standard pentest into trivial recon:\n\n1. `tools/list` returned the entire tool catalogue to anyone — including\n admin-only endpoints — without checking auth or roles. Tool\n descriptions also leaked sentences like `[UNSAFE] bypasses tenant\n scoping and requires elevated access` verbatim.\n2. The endpoint set `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` so any origin could\n pull the catalogue from a browser.\n3. Unauthenticated `GET /mcp` enumerated every tool name in its\n discovery payload.\n\nFix:\n\n- Each tool now carries sanitised access metadata (`_access` covering\n `roles` / `userRole` / `or` / `and`, plus `_public` for `PUBLIC`\n pseudo-role or empty `security`). `tools/list` filters against the\n caller's `ctx` — unauth callers see only `_public` tools, authed\n callers see only role-gated tools they pass. Record predicates and\n function-form access (opaque at list time) are dropped.\n- Wildcard CORS removed entirely. The parent app's `cors()` middleware\n (origin allowlist via `TRUSTED_ORIGINS` + `BETTER_AUTH_URL`) now\n applies uniformly to `/mcp`, same as every other route.\n- `[UNSAFE] ... bypasses tenant scoping ...` flavour text is gone.\n `annotations.destructiveHint` and `_unsafe` remain — those are the\n spec-correct signals for clients to warn users.\n- Unauthenticated `GET /mcp` no longer lists tool names. Inventory is\n only available via the access-filtered `tools/list`.\n\nThis filter is recon-mitigation, not a security boundary: `tools/call`\nstill re-enters the Hono app and runs every middleware (auth, firewall,\naccess, guards, masking), so hiding a tool from list never weakens the\nunderlying gate.\n\nKnown follow-up: Better Auth admin endpoints (`ban-user`, `create-user`,\n`impersonate-user`, etc.) don't yet emit `x-access` in the OpenAPI spec,\nso any logged-in user still sees them in `tools/list` (the actual call\nis still gated by the admin plugin). Tracked separately.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.10 — April 29, 2026\n\n### Reject reserved keys inside `access.record` at compile time\n\n`access.record` is a flat field map evaluated as implicit AND between\nentries — keys must be column names. Putting `and: [...]` (or `or` /\n`roles` / `userRole`) inside `record` was a real-world footgun: the\nruntime treated the literal string `\"and\"` as a column lookup, the\npredicate failed on every row, and the caller got a silent `403` /\nempty list with nothing pointing at the misuse. The TypeScript type\ncouldn't catch this — `RecordConditions` is an open-ended index\nsignature, so any key parses.\n\nThe compiler now walks every access node attached to a resource (CRUD\nops, `read.access`, view access, masking `show` / `query`, action\naccess) and throws a clear migration error when `record` contains a\nreserved key:\n\n- `and` / `or` inside `record` → use the top-level `and` / `or`\n sibling: `{ and: [{ record: { ... } }, { record: { ... } }] }`\n- `roles` / `userRole` inside `record` → put them at the access node\n alongside `record`: `{ roles: [...], record: { ... } }`\n\nThe error names the exact origin (`crud.update.access`,\n`actions.focus.access.or[1]`, etc.) so the fix lands in the right place.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.9 — April 29, 2026\n\n### Role hierarchy now expands in record-based action access\n\n`auth.roleHierarchy: ['member', 'admin', 'owner']` plus\n`access: { roles: ['member+'] }` on a record-based action used to\nsilently 403 valid callers. The standalone-action route generator\ninlined the expanded role list as a JSON literal, but the\nrecord-based generator read the access config back through the\nruntime `actions['name'].access` import — the user's source, where\nthe unexpanded `'member+'` shorthand still lived. The runtime did\nliteral string matching against `ctx.roles`, so an `owner` calling\nthe action got `['member+'] !== 'owner'` and was rejected.\n\nFixed: record-based action routes now inline the expanded list the\nsame way standalone routes do. `input` and `execute` still flow\nthrough the runtime import (closures aren't serializable); only the\naccess config is lifted to a JSON literal so the compile-time\nexpansion actually reaches the matcher.\n\nA regression test (`role-hierarchy-action-routes.test.ts`) locks the\nbehavior in — it asserts that `member+` never reaches the route\noutput and that the access config is no longer read from\n`actions[name].access` at runtime.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.8 — April 29, 2026\n\n### Audit support on postgres targets, plus a generated-API quality pass\n\n**Audit on PG.** Until this release, `audit_events` only existed on cloudflare-d1 — projects on Neon (or any postgres target) silently skipped audit logging on `unsafe:` and `PUBLIC`-role actions, and hard delete was hard-blocked. Postgres has no equivalent of D1's separate-database binding model, but it has native schemas — so the audit table now lives in a dedicated `audit` schema in the same database as features (`drizzle.pgSchema('audit')`). The `hasSecurityAudit` gate accepts D1 OR any PG dialect; the `auditDatabaseId` requirement only fires for D1 (which still uses the separate-binding model). The recruitment example wires `auditDatabaseId` so the recompile path stays green.\n\n**`auditDatabaseId` is now a compile-time requirement** (D1 only). Previously, projects with unsafe/PUBLIC actions but no audit id silently produced a `database_id = \"local-audit\"` placeholder in production `wrangler.toml`; Cloudflare's worker upload step then rejected it with code 10021 *after* assets and migrations had already run. The compile-time error names the exact `wrangler d1 create <project>-audit` command and the `auditDatabaseId` config key where the returned id goes.\n\n### Five fixes from a Loop integration ticket pass\n\n**Action input → OpenAPI / MCP.** `defineAction({ input: z.object({...}) })` schemas now flow into `requestBody` on the OpenAPI operation and `inputSchema.properties` / `_bodyFields` on the MCP tool list. Simple `z.object` shapes are extracted at compile time; for discriminated unions, refinements, recursive schemas, and bare-identifier references (`input: createPersonInput`), the compiler runs your action file through Zod 4's native `z.toJSONSchema()` during compilation — full-fidelity output with no static translator to maintain. Pre-fix, every action came out as a no-arg endpoint, which gutted typed SDK generation and made MCP useless for actions that take parameters.\n\n**OpenAPI fidelity.** Three surgical fixes that strict validators (zod, openapi-typescript, openapi-fetch) had been complaining about:\n- Response schemas now emit `required[]` for every non-nullable column, so generated SDKs treat them as guaranteed-present rather than optional.\n- `text(_, { enum: [...] })` columns emit as closed `{ type: \"string\", enum: [...] }`, narrowing to literal unions.\n- `id` only claims `format: \"uuid\"` when the project's `generateId` actually produces UUIDs. cuid2 / prefixed / nanoid / serial generators get plain `{ type: \"string\" }` — strict validators stop rejecting responses against their own spec.\n\n**Mask auto-detector now checks the column exists.** The auto-mask predicate used to be unconditionally `show: { or: 'owner', roles: ['admin'] }` — including for tables with no owner column at all (no `userId` / `ownerId` and no `q.scope('owner')`). The generated mask function would reference a non-existent column and fail under TypeScript checks. The auto-detector now verifies the resolved owner column exists in the parsed schema before emitting the `or` clause; when it doesn't, the rule falls back to roles-only and the compiler emits a warning so the behavior is transparent.\n\n**Error code consistency.** The generated CRUD layer was emitting raw codes (`'UNAUTHORIZED'`, `'NOT_NULL_VIOLATION'`, `'UNIQUE_VIOLATION'`, `'INSERT_FAILED'`, `'UPDATE_FAILED'`) that were never in the `QuickbackErrorCode` enum, so consumers couldn't switch exhaustively on `code`. New `database` layer + `DB_NOT_NULL_VIOLATION` / `DB_UNIQUE_VIOLATION` / `DB_INSERT_FAILED` / `DB_UPDATE_FAILED` / `NOT_FOUND` codes are now in the enum, the routes use `AuthErrors.missing()` / `DatabaseErrors.*()` helpers throughout, and the OpenAPI `Error` component emits `code` as a closed enum sourced from the canonical `QUICKBACK_ERROR_CODES` list. Generated SDKs can now `switch` on `code` without a default branch swallowing unknown values. See [API errors](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/errors#database).\n\n**Dropped dead `auditFields` preamble from action route generators.** The audit wrapper's `Proxy` already hard-stamps `createdAt` / `createdBy` / `modifiedAt` / `modifiedBy` on every INSERT and `modifiedAt` / `modifiedBy` on every UPDATE — the `auditFields` const the route preamble built was never read. Dropped from `standalone.ts` / `record-based.ts` and from the `ActionExecutorParams` JSDoc. Migrated 7 example handlers (drop `modifiedAt: auditFields!.modifiedAt` from `.set` payloads — the wrapper handles it). Note: `.onConflictDoUpdate({ set })` is *not* intercepted by the wrapper, so `upsertBatch`-style handlers keep an explicit `modifiedAt: now`.\n\n---\n\n## One file per action: greenfield action authoring\n\nAction authoring collapses to a single shape. Each action is its own file under `<feature>/actions/<name>.ts` using `defineAction({...})`. The filename is the action name AND the URL segment.\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move an application forward in the pipeline\",\n input: z.object({ nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]) }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"admin\"] },\n transition: {\n field: \"status\",\n via: \"nextStatus\",\n fromTo: { applied: [\"screening\"], screening: [\"interview\"], interview: [\"offer\"] },\n },\n async execute({ db, record, input, auditFields, whereTransition }) { /* … */ },\n});\n```\n\n`defineAction` is imported from a generated per-feature helper at `<feature>/.quickback/define-action.ts` — types `record`, `input`, and audit fields without manual annotations. The directory says what `:id` mounts to; the imports say what the body reads or writes.\n\n**Discovery rules:**\n- `actions/<name>.ts` binds to the feature's primary table (the `<feature>.ts` file at the feature root).\n- `actions/<table>/<name>.ts` binds to the sibling table file `<table>.ts` — for multi-table features.\n- Setting `path:` makes the action standalone (custom URL, no record fetch, no firewall preload).\n- Tableless features (no top-level `*.ts` files) require every action to be standalone.\n- Action names are unique per `(bindTable, name)` pair — sibling-bound actions on different tables may share a verb (e.g. `actions/episodes/publish.ts` + `actions/shows/publish.ts` mount at `/episodes/:id/publish` and `/shows/:id/publish` and don't collide). Standalone actions are unique per `(method, path)`.\n- Files under `<feature>/lib/` are copied verbatim for feature-local helpers; `quickback/lib/` is exposed via the `~/lib/*` alias for cross-feature shared code (with a one-way import rule enforced at compile time).\n\n**Retired** (rejected at load time with migration guidance):\n\n- `actions.ts` (bundled multi-action file)\n- `_feature.ts` (shared preamble + tableless actions)\n- `handlers/` directory + `handler:` string ref\n- `defineActions(table, {…})` and `defineActions(null, {…})`\n- `export default { actions: {…} }`\n- Colocated `defineActions` inside table files\n- `standalone: true` flag (presence of `path:` is the new signal)\n- `*-actions.ts` / `*.actions.ts` filename patterns\n\nThe phantom-`unsafe` regex bug that flattened nested `unsafe: { … }` blocks into a fake top-level action is gone — the parser now reads action files as real TS modules with real imports, so type inference, jump-to-definition, and rename refactoring all work end-to-end.\n\nThe CLI loader rejects retired primitives at load time with batched migration errors. Existing projects need to be migrated by hand to the new shape before recompiling.\n\nSee the [Actions docs](/compiler/definitions/actions) for the full reference.\n\n---\n\n## Multi-table actions per feature\n\nFeatures used to support exactly one `defineActions(table, …)` call via `actions.ts`, which forced unnatural feature splits whenever multiple tables in the same feature needed actions (a podcast feature with `episodes`, `shows`, `seasons`, `collections`, etc.). One feature directory can now own actions on multiple tables across three discovery modes:\n\n- **Colocated** (canonical) — `<table>.ts` containing both `defineTable` and `defineActions(<table>, …)`. One file per entity. Default for new features.\n- **`actions.ts`** (existing) — single primary-table actions file at feature root. Unchanged behaviour.\n- **`actions/<table>.ts`** — per-table action files for teams that want strict schema/behavior separation or need to break an import cycle.\n\nPlus the universal `_feature.ts` slot (at feature root) for **non-table-bound feature-level actions** (`export default { actions: { … } }` shape) and **shared Zod schemas** that get prepended once to the merged actions module so every sibling action sees them. Allowed in any of the three modes — orthogonal to table binding.\n\nThe decision flowchart: *one table with actions → colocate. Multiple tables with actions → colocate each. Hit a cycle or want strict separation → `actions/<table>.ts`. Want schema/actions split for a single-table feature → `actions.ts`. Non-table actions → always `_feature.ts`.*\n\nConflicts are batched and printed once before the compiler aborts — no \"fix one, recompile, fix the next\" loop. The CLI hard-errors when a feature mixes `actions.ts` with table-bound mode, when the same table has its `defineActions` declared in two places, when an `actions/<x>.ts` first-arg doesn't match the basename, or when `_feature.ts` contains `defineActions(table, …)`. Legacy `*-actions.ts` / `*.actions.ts` filenames in a feature dir trigger a soft warning naming the offending paths.\n\nWithin the legacy bundled `actions.ts` DSL, action names had to be unique within a feature — the runtime module merged every source into one keyspace, so colliding `publish` actions on `episodes` and `shows` would have silently overwritten each other. The retired `actions.ts` shape is no longer accepted, so this constraint is gone: the current one-file-per-action layout keys uniqueness per `(bindTable, name)` pair, and the codegen aggregator mangles the JS map key per bind-table while keeping the URL segment bare. Sibling-bound `actions/episodes/publish.ts` and `actions/shows/publish.ts` mount at `/episodes/:id/publish` and `/shows/:id/publish` and compile cleanly.\n\nInline `execute:` bodies must be arrow functions (`execute: async (ctx) => { … }`). `async function` and plain `function` shapes were silently misparsed by the route emitter — they now hard-error at parse time pointing at the canonical arrow form, with a suggestion to use `handler:` for callers who genuinely need a named function declaration.\n\n`handlers/` walks recursively now — `handlers/<table>/<action>.ts` is the canonical layout. A new `lib/` directory under each feature gets copied verbatim into the output for feature-local helpers.\n\nMigration: existing `actions.ts` projects compile bit-identically — the legacy single-table path is unchanged. Legacy `*-actions.ts` filenames produce a soft warning and silently aren't picked up; rename to `<table>.ts` (colocated), `actions/<table>.ts`, or single `actions.ts`.\n\n---\n\n## Firewall: named-scope shape restored, auto-detection synonyms widened\n\nThe named-scope firewall shape (`firewall: { organization: { column: 'tenant_id' } }`) is back as a co-equal user-facing input alongside the predicate array. DSL v2 step 8 had walled it off, but the internal architecture still kept named-scope around for the route + scoped-db generators — so re-accepting it at the input boundary is a thin coercion layer, not an architectural change.\n\n```typescript\n// All three are now valid; all compile to the same predicate array internally.\nfirewall: { organization: { column: 'tenant_id' } } // named-scope (compact)\nfirewall: { owner: { column: 'account_user_id' } }\nfirewall: { exception: true }\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'deletedAt', isNull: true },\n] // predicate array (explicit)\n```\n\nPick the form that reads better — named-scope for the common one-line case, predicate array when you need custom `in`-lists or non-scope predicates.\n\n**Auto-detection synonyms expanded.** When `firewall:` is omitted entirely, the compiler scans the schema for an isolation column. The org-scope list now accepts `organizationId`, `organisationId`, `orgId`, `organization`, `organisation`, `org` (American + British). User-scope still accepts `userId` only.\n\n**`ownerId` is now a targeted error signal.** When a table carries `ownerId` but no isolation column AND no explicit `firewall:`, the compiler raises a specific error: `\\`ownerId\\` is business-logic ownership, not access control — Quickback won't auto-derive a firewall from it. Either rename to \\`userId\\` if this column controls access, add a separate \\`userId\\` / \\`organizationId\\` column, or specify \\`firewall:\\` explicitly.` This replaces the generic \"missing isolation column\" error in the `ownerId`-only case and preserves the documented distinction between RLS-style access control (`userId`) and business-logic ownership (`ownerId`).\n\nMigration: nothing breaks. Projects on the predicate-array shape compile bit-identically. Projects on the named-scope shape — including any test fixtures or example projects that were left on the legacy form — now compile cleanly again.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.0 — April 26, 2026\n\n### `q.scope()` column DSL + unified `masking.query` gate\n\nTwo related DSL consolidations land. The `q.scope()` half is purely additive; the `masking.query` half rejects three legacy per-capability flags at compile time (migration is mechanical — see below).\n\n**`q.scope(kind)` — single-declaration tenant scoping.** Replaces the three-place pattern (column declaration + firewall predicate + implicit ownership-guard) with one column. `q.scope('organization')` compiles to `text(...).notNull()` and tells the compiler:\n\n1. Auto-derive the firewall predicate (`{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }`) so the explicit `firewall:` block can be omitted entirely.\n2. Add the column to `GUARDS_CONFIG.systemManaged` so client input is rejected at the guard layer.\n3. Auto-populate from `ctx` on create / upsert.\n\nThe systemManaged extension generalises beyond `q.scope()`: any firewall predicate whose `equals` references `ctx.*` adds its `field` to the systemManaged set. So a hand-rolled `firewall: [{ field: 'tenantId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }]` gets the same treatment.\n\n```typescript\ncolumns: {\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'), // → ctx.activeOrgId\n ownerId: q.scope('owner'), // → ctx.userId\n teamId: q.scope('team'), // → ctx.activeTeamId\n}\n```\n\nThe auto-derived firewall also includes the soft-delete predicate (`{ field: 'deletedAt', isNull: true }`) when audit-field injection is on (the default). See [`q.scope()` in the schema docs](/compiler/definitions/schema#qscope--tenant-scope-columns).\n\n**`masking[col].query.roles` — unified role gate for filter / sort / search.** The three legacy per-capability flags (`filterable`, `searchable`, `sortable`) are replaced by a single allowlist that says \"these roles can query the column.\"\n\n```typescript\nmasking: {\n email: {\n type: 'email',\n show: { roles: ['admin'] },\n query: { roles: ['admin'] }, // optional — defaults to show.roles\n },\n}\n```\n\nWhen omitted, `query` inherits from `show.roles` (\"if you can see it, you can query it\") which is the right shape for almost all PII. A view's own `query.{filterable,searchable,sortable}` allowlist is the opt-in for higher-privileged roles; the existing intersection validator gates it at compile time. See [Masking query gate](/compiler/definitions/masking#query-gate-filter--sort--search).\n\n**Breaking:** Setting `masking[col].filterable / .searchable / .sortable` is rejected at compile time with a migration hint. Replace with `query.roles` (or just delete the flags — `query` defaults to `show.roles`).\n\n---\n\n## v0.9.0 — April 25, 2026\n\n### DSL v2: unified `read:` pipeline, transactional batches, ID-probe defense\n\nStep 8 of the DSL v2 refactor lands. The headline shift is that the read\nside of every resource now has its own block — `read:` — that owns the\ncollection-level `GET /` endpoint, single-record `GET /:id`, and named view\nprojections. The legacy `crud.list` and `crud.get` shapes are rejected at\ncompile time. See the new [Read pipeline](/compiler/definitions/read) page\nfor the full reference and migration table.\n\n**Breaking changes** (compile-time errors with migration hints):\n\n- `crud.list` → [`read.access`](/compiler/definitions/read) (plus `read.pageSize` / `read.maxPageSize`)\n- `crud.get` → `read.access` (single-record GET inherits automatically; use record-level conditions on `read.access` for differentiated single-record gates)\n- Top-level `views: {...}` → [`read.views: {...}`](/compiler/definitions/read#views-under-read-views)\n- `crud.list.fields` / `crud.get.fields` → declare a named view under `read.views` and call `?view={name}` (or `/views/{name}`)\n\n**Pre-record access ordering on `/:id`**: handlers now run a role-only\naccess check **before** the firewall query, so a caller without a matching\nrole gets 403 before the database is touched. This closes the 404-vs-403\nID-probe channel — an unauthorized caller can no longer distinguish \"row\nexists in another tenant\" from \"row doesn't exist.\" See\n[Access evaluation order](/compiler/definitions/access#evaluation-order).\n\n**Transactional batch operations**: batch endpoints now expose a\n`failFast` option (replacing the old `atomic` naming) and a\n`meta.transactional` response field. On tx-supporting providers\n(postgres, supabase, neon, libsql, better-sqlite3, bun-sqlite), `failFast: true`\nwraps the per-record loop in `db.transaction(...)` so any failure rolls\nback the entire batch. On Cloudflare D1 (no `db.transaction`), `failFast: true`\nstill stops on the first error but prior writes stay committed; inspect\n`meta.transactional` to know which guarantee you got. Embedding queue\nmessages and realtime broadcasts are emitted **after** the transaction\ncommits, so a rolled-back batch produces no orphan jobs. See\n[Batch Operations: Transactional semantics](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/batch-operations#transactional-semantics).\n\n**`firewallErrorMode` lifted off the firewall block**: the field that\ncontrols 403-vs-404 on firewall misses now lives at the resource top level\n(sibling to `firewall:`), since the firewall config is now a predicate\narray and this is a presentation-layer choice. Existing `firewall.errorMode`\nvalues should be lifted to `firewallErrorMode` at the resource level.\n\n**Read-only resources**: an empty `crud: {}` block (or omitting `crud:`\nentirely) is valid for read-only resources. `read:` alone is enough to\nexpose `GET /` and `GET /:id`.\n\n**Strict-mode top-level keys**: the strict allow-list now includes `dev` so\n`defineConfig({ dev: { ... } })` is accepted at the top level.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.7 — April 17, 2026\n\n### Security: Hono CVE cluster fix\n\nHono is bumped to `^4.12.14` across the monorepo, the compiler Docker image's pre-installed deps, and every generator path that emits Hono into compiled projects. Older ranges (`^4.0.0` / `^4.5.0` / `^4.6.0` / `^4.7.11`) covered the vulnerable window. Recompile to pick up the fix in your generated project's `package.json`.\n\n### Cloudflare Email Sending is now in public beta\n\nQuickback already defaults to the Workers `send_email` binding for Cloudflare deploys, and Cloudflare Email Sending has now graduated to public beta — production-ready with zero-config, no API keys, no third-party accounts. No action needed; recompiling any existing project continues to wire the default Cloudflare transport. AWS SES remains a fully supported opt-in (`email.provider: 'aws-ses'`) for non-Cloudflare runtimes or existing SES setups. See [Email Configuration](/compiler/config#email-configuration).\n\n### Minor/patch dep sweep\n\nAligned the whole dep surface — monorepo, compiler Docker image, and generator emissions into compiled projects — so new compiles and existing recompiles converge on the same versions:\n\n- `wrangler@^4.83.0`\n- `drizzle-orm@^0.45.2`, `drizzle-kit@^0.31.10`\n- `zod@^4.3.6`\n- `@cloudflare/workers-types@^4.20260417.1` (also deduped — was accidentally declared in both `dependencies` and `devDependencies` in some paths)\n- `@tanstack/react-query@^5.99.0` (Account app)\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.5 — April 15, 2026\n\n### Fix: Better Auth 1.5 and `@cloudflare/workers-types` Compatibility\n\nGenerated API code failed to typecheck after Better Auth bumped to 1.5 and `@cloudflare/workers-types` tightened `BufferSource` to `ArrayBufferView<ArrayBuffer>`. Four unrelated surfaces broke:\n\n- **`databaseHooks.member.update.after` was removed** in Better Auth 1.5. The compiler now emits the member role-change broadcast hook as `organizationHooks.afterUpdateMemberRole` inside the `organization()` plugin call, which is the current supported shape.\n- **`REALTIME_URL` and `ACCESS_TOKEN`** are always emitted as optional `CloudflareBindings` fields when the organization plugin is active, so the broadcast hook typechecks even when `realtimeMode` is `\"inline\"` (or realtime isn't configured at all).\n- **`auth.api.listOrganizations` / `getFullOrganization` / `session.session.activeOrganizationId`** — third-party Better Auth plugins narrow the inferred `auth.api` type and hide organization-plugin endpoints. The generated middleware and `/admin/v1/organizations` route now cast through `any` for these calls.\n- **`crypto.subtle.sign` / `verify`** no longer accept `Uint8Array<ArrayBufferLike>` directly. Generated `jwt.ts` casts encoded payloads to `BufferSource`.\n\nNo config changes required — recompile to pick up the fixes.\n\n### CMS Admin Gate Now Enforced Server-Side\n\n`cms: { access: \"admin\" }` previously only hid the CMS link in Account UI and rendered an \"Access Denied\" screen inside the SPA — the static assets, `/api/v1/schema`, and `/api/v1/custom_view` CRUD were reachable by any authenticated user. A non-admin with an API token or cookie could bypass the UI and read schema metadata or saved CMS views directly.\n\nThis release adds server-side enforcement at every CMS-facing surface:\n\n- **CMS SPA shell** — the Worker checks `ctx.userRole === \"admin\"` before serving `index.html`. Unauthenticated requests redirect to login; authenticated non-admins get `403 Admin access required`. Static bundles (JS/CSS) remain reachable so browser caches aren't invalidated.\n- **`/api/v1/schema`** — returns `403` to non-admins.\n- **`custom_view` CRUD** — now gated on the new `userRole: [\"admin\"]` primitive rather than org membership.\n- **In-SPA gate** — unchanged; defense in depth behind the server-side gates.\n\nYour resource CRUD endpoints are unaffected — they keep their per-resource `crud.access.roles`.\n\n### New `userRole` Access Primitive\n\nAdded `userRole?: string[]` to the declarative `Access` config, evaluated against `ctx.userRole` (the Better Auth admin-plugin `user.role` column). This is distinct from `roles`, which matches `ctx.roles` (org membership).\n\n```typescript\n// Old: in multi-tenant this meant org-admin, not platform-admin\naccess: { roles: ['admin'] }\n\n// New: explicitly require user.role === 'admin' regardless of org membership\naccess: { userRole: ['admin'] }\n\n// \"Org owner OR platform admin\"\naccess: { or: [{ roles: ['owner'] }, { userRole: ['admin'] }] }\n\n// Platform admins see SSNs across every org\nmasking: { ssn: { type: 'ssn', show: { userRole: ['admin'] } } }\n```\n\n`userRole` works everywhere `Access` is accepted — CRUD, actions, views, masking, and inside `or`/`and` combinators. See [Access - userRole vs roles](/compiler/definitions/access#userrole-vs-roles).\n\n### Fix: `ReferenceError: customAlphabet is not defined` in generated POST handlers\n\nProjects with `providers.database.config.generateId: \"short\"` (or `\"nanoid\"` / `\"cuid\"`) compiled routes that called the ID helper but never imported it. Every generated `src/features/**/*.routes.ts` had `customAlphabet('0123...', 6)()` in its POST body but no matching `import { customAlphabet } from 'nanoid';` at the top of the file. Every `POST /api/v1/<resource>` and batch-create returned `500` with `ReferenceError: customAlphabet is not defined` on the first write.\n\nThe compiler now emits the correct import alongside the ID expression for all three modes: `nanoid`, `customAlphabet`, and `createId` from `@paralleldrive/cuid2`.\n\nNo config changes required — recompile to pick up the fix.\n\n### Fix: Dangling `export const` in generated `actions.ts` breaks `tsc`\n\nWhen a feature authored actions as `export const xActions = defineActions(...)` (instead of `export default defineActions(...)`), the compiler's preamble extractor leaked the assignment's left-hand side into the generated `src/features/<feature>/actions.ts`. The output contained a dangling `export const xActions =` with no right-hand side, and `tsc --noEmit` failed with `TS1109: Expression expected`. Runtime happened to work because the unused placeholder was never evaluated, but typecheck was red.\n\nThe preamble extractor now anchors its boundary to the start of the top-level statement containing `defineActions(...)`, covering `export default`, `export const X =`, `const X =`, and bare call forms. Local Zod helper declarations above the call continue to be preserved.\n\n### Fix: Files worker `database_id` reverted to `\"local-files\"` on every compile\n\nProjects using the two-worker R2 architecture had their files worker's `wrangler.toml` (`apps/backend/cloudflare-workers/files/wrangler.toml`) rewritten with `database_id = \"local-files\"` on every `quickback compile`, even when `providers.database.config.filesDatabaseId` was set to a real D1 UUID. The main worker's binding was correct — only the files worker fell through. Remote deploys of the files worker bound to a non-existent D1, so file serving and access-control reads failed with a binding error.\n\nThe files-worker wrangler generator now reads `filesDatabaseId` (and `filesDatabaseName`) from `providers.database.config` as a fallback when they aren't set on `providers.fileStorage.config`, matching the precedence chain already used by the main worker. Local dev is unaffected — `wrangler dev --local` uses `.wrangler/state/` regardless of the configured ID.\n\nNo config changes required — recompile and redeploy the files worker.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.6 — April 16, 2026\n\n### Fix: Audit columns silently dropped from tables with a same-line index callback\n\nTables authored with the composite-index shape Drizzle / prettier produces —\n\n```ts\nexport const episodeTags = sqliteTable(\"episode_tags\", {\n id: text(\"id\").primaryKey(),\n episodeId: text(\"episode_id\").notNull(),\n tagId: text(\"tag_id\").notNull(),\n}, (t) => [ // <-- \"}, (t) =>\" on one line\n uniqueIndex(\"episode_tag_unique\").on(t.episodeId, t.tagId),\n]);\n```\n\nnever received audit field injection. A regex in `injectAuditFields` required a literal `\\n` between the columns-object `},` and the `(t) =>` index callback, so same-line closers were silently skipped and the function returned the source unchanged. drizzle-kit then diffed the audit-less schema against the previous snapshot and emitted `ALTER TABLE ... DROP COLUMN created_at/modified_at/deleted_at/created_by/modified_by/deleted_by` for every affected table. Any project that applied those migrations had production CRUD return `500` because the generated firewall helper still referenced `deletedAt`.\n\nThe regex is now whitespace-flexible and the identifier class accepts any valid JS identifier (`t`, `table`, `_t`, `tbl2`). A defensive guard throws at compile time if all three terminator patterns fail on a recognizable Drizzle table — no more silent drops.\n\n**Recovery path:**\n\n- Most projects: recompile. drizzle-kit will detect the audit columns are missing from the DB snapshot and emit an `ADD COLUMN` migration to restore them. Apply it.\n- Projects that already hand-patched their schema and ran a manual `ADD COLUMN` migration (like the `podcast-app` workaround in commit `98d8758`): the next compile will regenerate a matching `ADD COLUMN` migration that will fail with \"duplicate column name\" against a DB that already has the columns. Mark the new migration as applied without running it (e.g. `INSERT INTO __drizzle_migrations` in the features DB) or hand-edit the generated SQL to a no-op, then continue normally.\n\n### Fix: `firewall.exception` generated `isNull(<table>.deletedAt)` against a missing column\n\nResources with `firewall: { exception: true }` always emitted `return isNull(<table>.deletedAt);` inside `buildFirewallConditions()`, regardless of whether the table actually had a `deletedAt` column. Projects that disabled audit injection globally (`compiler.features.auditFields: false`) or authored a schema without `deletedAt` ended up with Drizzle resolving `<table>.deletedAt` to `undefined` at query time — every `GET /api/v1/<resource>` returned `500`.\n\nThe three concerns are now fully independent:\n\n- **`firewall.exception: true`** — only disables tenant scoping (org/user/team `WHERE` clauses). It does not gate audit fields or soft-delete.\n- **Audit fields** — always injected unless globally opted out. Unchanged.\n- **Soft-delete filter** — emitted only when the schema actually has `deletedAt` *or* the user explicitly set `firewall.softDelete`.\n\nIn the default configuration (audit injection on), behavior is unchanged: exception resources still filter `deletedAt IS NULL`. Only the broken case changes — exception resources on a schema without `deletedAt` now return `undefined` (no firewall), matching the column reality.\n\nNo config changes required — recompile to pick up the fix.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.4 — April 14, 2026\n\n### New `generateId: \"short\"` Strategy\n\nAdded a compact ID option for tables where short, shareable codes matter more than collision resistance at scale:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n generateId: \"short\",\n }),\n}\n```\n\nGenerates 6-character alphanumeric IDs (e.g. `a3F9xK`) using nanoid's `customAlphabet` with the full 62-char alphabet (`0-9A-Za-z`). Requires the `nanoid` package in your project (same as the existing `\"nanoid\"` strategy).\n\n**When to use:** room codes, invite links, share URLs, ephemeral records — anywhere the ID appears in a URL or needs to be human-typeable.\n\n**When not to use:** high-volume tables. 62^6 ≈ 56.8B combinations means ~238K rows before a 50% collision probability (birthday bound). For large tables stick with `\"uuid\"`, `\"cuid\"`, or `\"prefixed\"`.\n\nSee [Providers - ID Generation Options](/compiler/config/providers#id-generation-options) for the full list of strategies.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.3 — April 14, 2026\n\n### Fix: `wrangler.toml` Route Placement and Binding IDs\n\nTwo bugs in the generated `wrangler.toml` that blocked production deployment without manual edits:\n\n**Routes were nested under `[dev]`.** The `routes = [...]` array was emitted after the `[dev]` section header, so TOML parsed it as `dev.routes` and wrangler ignored the custom domain (warning: `Unexpected fields found in dev field: \"routes\"`). Routes now emit as a top-level key.\n\n**D1 and KV bindings used placeholder IDs.** Despite `databaseId`, `filesDatabaseId`, and `kvId` being set in the quickback config, the generated `wrangler.toml` wrote `\"local-features\"`, `\"local-files\"`, and `\"local\"` instead of the real UUIDs. The compiler now resolves IDs from multiple config sources:\n\n| Binding | Config sources checked (in order) |\n|---------|-----------------------------------|\n| `AUTH_DB` | `database.config.authDatabaseId` |\n| `DB` | `database.config.featuresDatabaseId`, `database.config.databaseId` |\n| `FILES_DB` | `fileStorage.config.filesDatabaseId`, `database.config.filesDatabaseId` |\n| `KV` | `database.config.kvNamespaceId`, `storage.config.namespaceId`, `auth.config.kvId` |\n\nSee [Providers - Database Options](/compiler/config/providers#database-options) for the full list of supported ID properties.\n\n### Fix: Account SPA Post-Login Redirect on Unified Domain\n\nWhen the Account SPA was served at `/account/` on the unified quickback domain (e.g. `secure.example.com/account/`), post-login redirects dropped the basepath and sent users to `/dashboard` instead of `/account/dashboard`. Sign-out redirects had the same issue.\n\nThe SPA now shares a basepath module across the router and all raw `window.location.href` assignments, so login, signup, email OTP, welcome, and sign-out flows all stay under the correct path prefix regardless of whether the SPA is on the unified domain or its own dedicated auth subdomain.\n\nNo config changes required — recompile to pick up the fix.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.2 — April 11, 2026\n\n### Catch-All `VITE_QUICKBACK_URL` Environment Variable\n\nInstead of setting four separate URL env vars, you can now point at a single Quickback origin:\n\n```bash\n# One variable — done.\nVITE_QUICKBACK_URL=https://secure.example.com\n```\n\nWhen set, it's used as a fallback for the individual URLs:\n\n| Individual var (explicit) | Fallback when unset |\n|---|---|\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}` |\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_ACCOUNT_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}/account` |\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_CMS_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}/cms` |\n\n`VITE_QUICKBACK_APP_URL` stays independent — it points at the tenant's own frontend, not the Quickback server.\n\n**Non-breaking.** Individual vars still take precedence when set, so existing configurations work unchanged. The compiler now also emits `VITE_QUICKBACK_URL` into the generated SPA `.env` files, and library users can set `__QUICKBACK_URL__` on `globalThis` for the same effect.\n\nSee [Environment Variables](/stack/account-ui/environment-variables) for the full reference.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.1 — April 9, 2026\n\n### Role Hierarchy with `+` Suffix\n\nYou can now define a role hierarchy in your config and use the `+` suffix in access rules to mean \"this role and above\":\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nauth: {\n roleHierarchy: ['member', 'admin', 'owner'],\n}\n\n// In resource definitions\ncrud: {\n list: { access: { roles: [\"member+\"] } }, // member, admin, owner\n create: { access: { roles: [\"admin+\"] } }, // admin, owner\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"owner\"] } }, // owner only\n}\n```\n\nRoles are expanded at compile time. No `+` = exact match. See [Access - Role Hierarchy](/compiler/definitions/access#role-hierarchy) for details.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.0 — April 9, 2026\n\n### Breaking: VITE URL Environment Variables Renamed\n\nAll Quickback-generated URL environment variables are now namespaced under `VITE_QUICKBACK_*` to avoid collisions with other Vite projects.\n\n| Old | New |\n|-----|-----|\n| `VITE_API_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL` |\n| `VITE_ACCOUNT_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_ACCOUNT_URL` |\n| `VITE_APP_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_APP_URL` |\n| `VITE_CMS_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_CMS_URL` |\n\n**Non-URL variables are unchanged:** `VITE_ENABLE_*` feature flags, branding vars (`VITE_APP_NAME`, etc.), and `VITE_STRIPE_PUBLISHABLE_KEY` stay as-is.\n\n**Action required:**\n- **Compiled projects** — re-run `quickback compile`. The compiler generates the new names automatically.\n- **Standalone deploys** — update `.env`, `.env.production`, and `wrangler.toml` files manually.\n- **Library users** — the `__QUICKBACK_API_URL__` / `__QUICKBACK_APP_URL__` globalThis names are unchanged, but if you pipe Vite env vars into them, update the var names.\n\nSee [Environment Variables](/stack/account-ui/environment-variables) for the full reference.\n\n### CMS Access Control\n\nThe `cms.access` config option now enforces access at the CMS level, not just link visibility in Account UI.\n\n```typescript\ncms: { access: \"admin\" }\n```\n\nWhen set to `\"admin\"`, non-admin users (`user.role !== \"admin\"`) see an \"Access Denied\" screen with a sign-out button instead of the CMS. When set to `\"user\"` (the default), any authenticated user can access the CMS.\n\nSee [CMS Connecting](/stack/cms/connecting) and [Compiler Config](/compiler/config) for details.\n\n### SPA Sub-Route Fix\n\nFixed a bug where hard-refreshing or directly navigating to SPA sub-routes (e.g., `/account/profile`, `/cms/tables/users`) returned a blank white screen. The Worker now correctly serves `index.html` for all SPA paths, allowing the client-side router to handle routing.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.11 — February 24, 2026\n\n### Email OTP & Auth Fixes\n\n- Fixed email-OTP magic links not working correctly\n- Removed deprecated `/internal/validate` endpoint — use standard Better Auth session validation instead\n- Auth is now required for all API routes when running locally (previously some routes were unprotected in dev)\n\n### Multiple Table Exports Fix\n\n- Fixed a compiler error when a single file exports multiple Drizzle tables alongside a `defineTable()` default export\n- The CLI now properly detects and reports this with a clear error message pointing to the fix\n\n### Headless Drizzle Rename Hints\n\n- Added `compiler.migrations.renames` configuration for CI/CD environments where Drizzle's interactive rename prompts would block compilation\n- Compile errors now include explicit rename key paths and fail fast on malformed rename config keys\n- See [Configuration](/compiler/config) for details\n\n### Security Contract Report Artifacts\n\n- Added generated security contract artifacts to compiler output:\n - `reports/security-contracts.report.json`\n - `reports/security-contracts.report.sig.json`\n- Added config-driven signing controls:\n - `compiler.securityContracts.report.signature.enabled`\n - `compiler.securityContracts.report.signature.required`\n - `compiler.securityContracts.report.signature.key` / `keyEnv` / `keyId`\n- Missing required signing keys now fail loudly with explicit remediation guidance\n- Added strict config validation for report/signature paths and signing options\n\n### Mandatory Unsafe Action Audit Trail\n\n- Added structured unsafe action config (`unsafe: { reason, adminOnly, crossTenant, targetScope }`)\n- Cross-tenant unsafe actions now require Better Auth authentication plus platform admin role (`ctx.userRole === \"admin\"`)\n- Added mandatory audit logging for unsafe cross-tenant actions (success, denial, and error paths)\n- Cloudflare output now includes optional `AUDIT_DB` wiring, `drizzle.audit.config.ts`, and `db:migrate:audit:*` scripts when unsafe actions are present\n- Added compile-time raw SQL guard for actions and handlers (`allowRawSql: true` required per action)\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.10 — February 19, 2026\n\n### Compiler Page Parsing & CLI Output\n\n- Improved compiler page parsing for `definePage()` definitions\n- Better CLI output formatting during compilation\n- Added `apiPath` to schema registry for CMS integration\n\n### Bug Fixes\n\n- Fixed hyphenated action names not being properly quoted in generated code (e.g., `mark-complete` now generates valid JavaScript)\n- API key authentication (`x-api-key` header) is now handled separately from session tokens (`Bearer` header)\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.9 — February 16, 2026\n\n### CMS Pages & CLI Page Support\n\n- Added `definePage()` support for CMS-managed pages\n- Auth middleware improvements for page routes\n- CLI now supports page definitions alongside table and action definitions\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.8 — February 14, 2026\n\n### CMS App\n\n- Introduced the Quickback CMS — a schema-driven admin panel that connects to your generated API\n- CMS namespace added to actions for admin-specific operations\n- Fixed `guard` → `access` naming inconsistency in CMS action definitions\n\n### Schema Registry & Firewall Improvements\n\n- Added schema registry generator — the compiler now outputs a JSON schema registry used by the CMS\n- Firewall error modes: choose between `reveal` (403 with details) and `hide` (opaque 404) for security-sensitive deployments\n\n### Bug Fixes\n\n- Fixed anonymous user email format generation\n- Organization selector improvements in Account UI\n- Config validation now catches more errors at compile time\n- Better CRUD error handling with structured error responses\n- Fixed masking to use representative star counts instead of fixed formatting\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.7 — February 12, 2026\n\n### Scoped Database for Actions\n\nActions now receive a **security-scoped database** instead of a raw Drizzle instance. The compiler generates a proxy wrapper that automatically enforces org isolation, owner filtering, and soft-delete visibility — the same protections that CRUD routes have always had.\n\nThe scoped DB uses duck-typed column detection at runtime:\n\n| Column Detected | SELECT / UPDATE / DELETE | INSERT |\n|---|---|---|\n| `organizationId` | Adds `WHERE organizationId = ?` | Auto-injects `organizationId` from context |\n| `ownerId` | Adds `WHERE ownerId = ?` | Auto-injects `ownerId` from context |\n| `deletedAt` | Adds `WHERE deletedAt IS NULL` | — |\n\nThis means **every action is secure by default** — no manual `WHERE` clauses needed.\n\n```typescript\ndefineActions(todos, {\n complete: {\n type: \"record\",\n execute: async ({ db, ctx, record, input }) => {\n // db is scoped — only sees records in user's org, excludes soft-deleted\n const siblings = await db.select().from(todos);\n // ↑ automatically filtered to ctx.activeOrgId + deletedAt IS NULL\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\n#### Unsafe Mode\n\nActions that intentionally need to bypass security (admin reports, cross-org queries, migrations) can declare `unsafe: true` to receive a raw, unscoped database handle:\n\n```typescript\ndefineActions(analytics, {\n globalReport: {\n unsafe: true,\n execute: async ({ db, rawDb, ctx, input }) => {\n // db → still scoped (safety net)\n // rawDb → bypasses all security filters\n const allOrgs = await rawDb.select().from(organizations);\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\nWithout `unsafe: true`, `rawDb` is `undefined`.\n\n**Related docs:** [Actions](/compiler/definitions/actions), [Actions API](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/actions-api)\n\n---\n\n### Cascading Soft Delete\n\nSoft-deleting a parent record now **automatically cascades** to child and junction tables within the same feature. The compiler detects foreign key references at build time and generates cascade UPDATE statements.\n\n```\nDELETE /api/v1/projects/:id\n```\n\nGenerated behavior:\n```typescript\n// 1. Soft delete the parent\nawait db.update(projects)\n .set({ deletedAt: now, deletedBy: userId })\n .where(eq(projects.id, id));\n\n// 2. Auto-cascade to children (compiler-generated)\nawait db.update(projectMembers)\n .set({ deletedAt: now, deletedBy: userId })\n .where(eq(projectMembers.projectId, id));\n\nawait db.update(projectTasks)\n .set({ deletedAt: now, deletedBy: userId })\n .where(eq(projectTasks.projectId, id));\n```\n\nRules:\n- Only applies to **soft delete** (the default). Hard delete relies on database-level `ON DELETE CASCADE`.\n- Only cascades within the **same feature** — cross-feature references are not affected.\n- Child tables must have `deletedAt` / `deletedBy` columns (auto-added by the compiler's audit fields).\n\n**Related docs:** [Actions API — Cascading Soft Delete](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/actions-api#cascading-soft-delete)\n\n---\n\n### Advanced Query Parameters\n\nNew query parameter capabilities for all list endpoints:\n\n- **Field selection** — `?fields=id,name,status` returns only the columns you need\n- **Multi-sort** — `?sort=status:asc,createdAt:desc` sorts by multiple fields\n- **Total count** — `?count=true` returns total matching records in response headers (`X-Total-Count`)\n- **Full-text search** — `?search=keyword` searches across all text columns\n\n```bash\n# Get only names and statuses, sorted by status then date, with total count\nGET /api/v1/todos?fields=id,name,status&sort=status:asc,createdAt:desc&count=true\n\n# Search across all text fields\nGET /api/v1/todos?search=urgent\n```\n\n**Related docs:** [Query Parameters](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/query-params)\n\n---\n\n### Audit Field Improvements\n\n- `deletedAt` and `deletedBy` fields are now **always injected** by the compiler for tables with soft delete enabled — no need to define them in your schema\n- All audit fields (`createdAt`, `createdBy`, `modifiedAt`, `modifiedBy`, `deletedAt`, `deletedBy`) are auto-managed\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.6 — February 8, 2026\n\n### Database Naming Conventions\n\n- Default table and column naming changed to **snake_case** with `usePlurals: false`\n- Table names derived from generated Better Auth schema for consistency\n- Removed legacy single-database mode — split databases (auth + features) is now the standard\n\n### Auth Variable Shadowing Fix\n\n- Fixed `member` variable in auth middleware that shadowed the Drizzle `member` table import\n- Renamed to `sessionMember` to avoid conflicts in generated routes\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.5 — February 5, 2026\n\n### Better Auth Plugins\n\n- Published `@quickback-dev/better-auth-upgrade-anonymous` v1.1.0 — post-passkey email collection flow\n- Published `@quickback-dev/better-auth-combo-auth` — combined email + password + OTP authentication\n- Published `@quickback-dev/better-auth-aws-ses` — AWS SES email provider for Better Auth\n\n### OpenAPI Spec Generation\n\n- Generated APIs now include a full OpenAPI specification at `/openapi.json`\n- Better Auth endpoints included in the spec\n- Runtime route: `GET /openapi.json`\n\n### Security Hardening\n\n- Global error handler prevents leaking internal error details\n- Security headers middleware (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options)\n- `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` properly passed to generated config\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.4 — January 30, 2026\n\n### Account UI\n\n- Pre-built authentication UI deployed as Cloudflare Workers\n- Features: sessions, organizations, passkeys, passwordless, admin panel, API keys\n- Dual-mode: standalone (degit template) or embedded with Quickback projects\n\n### Webhook System\n\n- Inbound webhook endpoints with signature verification\n- Outbound webhooks via Cloudflare Queues with automatic retries\n- Configurable per-feature webhook events\n\n### Realtime & Vector Search\n\n- Durable Objects + WebSocket realtime subscriptions\n- Vector embeddings via Cloudflare Vectorize\n- KV and R2 storage integrations\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.0 — January 2026\n\n### Initial Release\n\n- **Quickback Compiler** — TypeScript-first backend compiler\n- **Four Security Pillars** — Firewall, Access, Guards, Masking\n- **`defineTable()`** — Schema + security configuration in a single file\n- **Templates** — Cloudflare Workers, Bun standalone, B2B SaaS\n- **Cloud Compiler** — Remote compilation via `compiler.quickback.dev`\n- **CLI** — `quickback create`, `quickback compile`, `quickback init`\n- **Better Auth Integration** — Organizations, roles, sessions\n- **Drizzle ORM** — Schema-first with automatic migrations\n- **Cloudflare D1** — Split database support (auth + features)"
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"content": "Quickback's compiler owns the D1/KV/R2/ASSETS/queue blocks it needs for its own features. Anything else your worker binds to — Cloudflare Email, an extra R2 bucket, a custom queue, a service binding, your own Durable Object, Workers AI, or non-secret `[vars]` — goes under the top-level `bindings` key:\n\n```ts\n\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: \"studio-mail\",\n template: \"hono\",\n providers: {\n runtime: defineRuntime(\"cloudflare\"),\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", { splitDatabases: true }),\n auth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\"),\n },\n bindings: {\n sendEmail: [{ name: \"EMAIL\" }],\n r2Buckets: [\n { binding: \"MAIL_RAW\", bucketName: \"studio-mail-raw\" },\n { binding: \"MAIL_ATTACHMENTS\", bucketName: \"studio-mail-attachments\" },\n ],\n vars: {\n MAIL_SENDING_DOMAIN: \"studio.example.com\",\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\ncamelCase field names map 1:1 to the snake_case TOML blocks in `wrangler.toml`. Every compile regenerates `wrangler.toml` from your config, so these entries are the source of truth — no more post-compile patch scripts.\n\n## Fields\n\n### `sendEmail`\n\nEmits `[[send_email]]`. Use when your worker calls `env.<NAME>.send(...)` via Cloudflare Email Service.\n\n```ts\nsendEmail: [\n {\n name: \"EMAIL\",\n // Optional: restrict who the worker is allowed to send to.\n destinationAddress: \"alerts@example.com\",\n allowedDestinationAddresses: [\"alerts@example.com\", \"ops@example.com\"],\n },\n]\n```\n\n### `r2Buckets`\n\nEmits additional `[[r2_buckets]]` blocks alongside the compiler-owned files bucket.\n\n```ts\nr2Buckets: [\n {\n binding: \"MAIL_RAW\",\n bucketName: \"studio-mail-raw\",\n previewBucketName: \"studio-mail-raw-preview\", // optional\n jurisdiction: \"eu\", // optional\n },\n]\n```\n\n### `queueProducers` / `queueConsumers`\n\nEmits `[[queues.producers]]` and `[[queues.consumers]]`. Useful for app-owned queues beyond the compiler's webhook/embedding queues.\n\n```ts\nqueueProducers: [\n { binding: \"MAIL_QUEUE\", queue: \"mail-send\" },\n],\nqueueConsumers: [\n {\n queue: \"mail-send\",\n maxBatchSize: 5,\n maxBatchTimeout: 30,\n maxRetries: 3,\n maxConcurrency: 2,\n deadLetterQueue: \"mail-dlq\",\n },\n]\n```\n\n### `services`\n\nEmits `[[services]]` — service bindings to sibling workers.\n\n```ts\nservices: [\n { binding: \"INBOUND\", service: \"studio-mail-inbound\", environment: \"production\" },\n]\n```\n\n### `durableObjects`\n\nEmits `[[durable_objects.bindings]]` for app-owned Durable Objects. Don't use this for Quickback's built-in `BROADCASTER` realtime DO — that one is compiler-owned.\n\n```ts\ndurableObjects: [\n { name: \"
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"content": "Quickback's compiler owns the D1/KV/R2/ASSETS/queue blocks it needs for its own features. Anything else your worker binds to — Cloudflare Email, an extra R2 bucket, a custom queue, a service binding, your own Durable Object, Workers AI, or non-secret `[vars]` — goes under the top-level `bindings` key:\n\n```ts\n\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: \"studio-mail\",\n template: \"hono\",\n providers: {\n runtime: defineRuntime(\"cloudflare\"),\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", { splitDatabases: true }),\n auth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\"),\n },\n bindings: {\n sendEmail: [{ name: \"EMAIL\" }],\n r2Buckets: [\n { binding: \"MAIL_RAW\", bucketName: \"studio-mail-raw\" },\n { binding: \"MAIL_ATTACHMENTS\", bucketName: \"studio-mail-attachments\" },\n ],\n vars: {\n MAIL_SENDING_DOMAIN: \"studio.example.com\",\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\ncamelCase field names map 1:1 to the snake_case TOML blocks in `wrangler.toml`. Every compile regenerates `wrangler.toml` from your config, so these entries are the source of truth — no more post-compile patch scripts.\n\n## Fields\n\n### `sendEmail`\n\nEmits `[[send_email]]`. Use when your worker calls `env.<NAME>.send(...)` via Cloudflare Email Service.\n\n```ts\nsendEmail: [\n {\n name: \"EMAIL\",\n // Optional: restrict who the worker is allowed to send to.\n destinationAddress: \"alerts@example.com\",\n allowedDestinationAddresses: [\"alerts@example.com\", \"ops@example.com\"],\n },\n]\n```\n\n### `r2Buckets`\n\nEmits additional `[[r2_buckets]]` blocks alongside the compiler-owned files bucket.\n\n```ts\nr2Buckets: [\n {\n binding: \"MAIL_RAW\",\n bucketName: \"studio-mail-raw\",\n previewBucketName: \"studio-mail-raw-preview\", // optional\n jurisdiction: \"eu\", // optional\n },\n]\n```\n\n### `queueProducers` / `queueConsumers`\n\nEmits `[[queues.producers]]` and `[[queues.consumers]]`. Useful for app-owned queues beyond the compiler's webhook/embedding queues.\n\n```ts\nqueueProducers: [\n { binding: \"MAIL_QUEUE\", queue: \"mail-send\" },\n],\nqueueConsumers: [\n {\n queue: \"mail-send\",\n maxBatchSize: 5,\n maxBatchTimeout: 30,\n maxRetries: 3,\n maxConcurrency: 2,\n deadLetterQueue: \"mail-dlq\",\n },\n]\n```\n\n### `services`\n\nEmits `[[services]]` — service bindings to sibling workers.\n\n```ts\nservices: [\n { binding: \"INBOUND\", service: \"studio-mail-inbound\", environment: \"production\" },\n]\n```\n\n### `durableObjects`\n\nEmits `[[durable_objects.bindings]]` for app-owned Durable Objects. Don't use this for Quickback's built-in `BROADCASTER` realtime DO — that one is compiler-owned.\n\nA DO entry has two flavors: **in-worker** (the class lives in this worker — set `from`) or **cross-worker** (the class lives in another worker — set `scriptName`). The two are mutually exclusive.\n\n```ts\ndurableObjects: [\n // In-worker DO — Quickback re-exports the class from src/index.ts\n // and emits a [[migrations]] block. Class file lives at\n // quickback/features/loops/lib/ItemStream.ts (copied verbatim to src/).\n { name: \"ITEM_STREAM\", className: \"ItemStream\", from: \"features/loops/lib/ItemStream\" },\n\n // Cross-worker DO — the exporting worker owns the migration; this\n // worker only declares the binding.\n { name: \"RATE_LIMITER\", className: \"RateLimiter\", scriptName: \"rate-limit-worker\" },\n]\n```\n\nEach in-worker DO entry accepts:\n\n| Field | Default | Notes |\n|-------|---------|-------|\n| `name` | — | Wrangler binding name. Becomes `c.env.<NAME>` (typed as `DurableObjectNamespace`). |\n| `className` | — | The exported TypeScript class. |\n| `from` | — | Module path under `src/` (no `./`, no `.ts`). The compiler copies `quickback/lib/...` and `quickback/features/<f>/lib/...` verbatim into `src/`, so use that same relative path. |\n| `migrationTag` | `qb-do-${className}` | Wrangler migration tag. Stable across regenerations — **never remove or rename a deployed tag**, or wrangler will reject the deploy. |\n| `useSqlite` | `true` | SQLite-backed DO storage. Set to `false` for the legacy KV-backed mode. |\n| `scriptName` | — | Cross-worker only. Mutually exclusive with `from`. |\n\nWhere the class file lives: in-worker DO classes go under `quickback/lib/` or `quickback/features/<feature>/lib/` so they survive every compile (the rest of `src/` is wiped). Both copy verbatim into the generated `src/` tree.\n\nRemoving a DO from config doesn't emit a tear-down migration — that's a wrangler concern. If you need to drop a class, hand-edit the migrations array (or use a fresh script) before redeploying.\n\n### `vars`\n\nMerged into the compiler's own `[vars]` table — emitting a second `[vars]` block would be invalid TOML. Values must be `string`, `number`, or `boolean`.\n\n```ts\nvars: {\n MAIL_SENDING_DOMAIN: \"studio.example.com\",\n MAIL_MAX_ATTACHMENTS: 10,\n MAIL_DEBUG: false,\n}\n```\n\nSecrets do **not** go here. Use Wrangler's secret store instead:\n\n```bash\nwrangler secret put MAIL_INBOUND_SECRET\n```\n\n### `ai`\n\nEmits a top-level `[ai]` block. Use this if you need Workers AI bound under a name different from Quickback's internal `AI`.\n\n```ts\nai: { binding: \"USER_AI\" }\n```\n\n## Reserved binding names\n\nBinding names that clash with compiler-owned bindings are rejected at validation time, with the offending field path in the error message. Reserved names depend on what your config enables:\n\n| Name | Reserved when |\n|------|---------------|\n| `AUTH_DB`, `DB` | `splitDatabases: true` (default) |\n| `DATABASE` | `splitDatabases: false` |\n| `AUDIT_DB` | always (cross-tenant unsafe-action audit) |\n| `WEBHOOKS_DB`, `WEBHOOKS_QUEUE` | a webhooks binding is configured |\n| `KV` | always |\n| `R2_BUCKET`, `FILES_DB` | `fileStorage: defineFileStorage(\"cloudflare-r2\")` |\n| `VECTORIZE` | a Vectorize index is configured |\n| `BROADCASTER` | realtime is enabled |\n| `EMAIL` | `email: { provider: \"cloudflare\" }` |\n| `ASSETS` | `cms: true` or `account: true` |\n| `AI`, `EMBEDDINGS_QUEUE` | embeddings are configured |\n\nPick a different name — the generated `env` on the handler side takes whatever binding you pick.\n\n## See also\n\n- [Environment Variables](/compiler/config/variables) — the non-secret `[vars]` / secret split\n- [Providers](/compiler/config/providers) — runtime / database / auth selection"
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"content": "Providers configure which services your compiled backend targets.\n\n## Runtime Providers\n\n| Provider | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `cloudflare` | Cloudflare Workers (Hono) |\n| `bun` | Bun runtime (Hono) |\n| `node` | Node.js runtime (Hono) |\n\n```typescript\n\nproviders: {\n runtime: defineRuntime(\"cloudflare\"),\n}\n```\n\n## Database Providers\n\n| Provider | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `cloudflare-d1` | Cloudflare D1 (SQLite) |\n| `better-sqlite3` | SQLite via better-sqlite3 (Bun/Node) |\n| `libsql` | LibSQL / Turso |\n| `neon` | Neon (PostgreSQL) |\n| `supabase` | Supabase (PostgreSQL) |\n\n```typescript\n\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n generateId: \"prefixed\", // \"uuid\" | \"cuid\" | \"nanoid\" | \"prefixed\" | \"serial\" | false\n namingConvention: \"snake_case\", // \"camelCase\" | \"snake_case\"\n usePlurals: false, // Auth table names: \"users\" vs \"user\"\n }),\n}\n```\n\n### Database Options\n\n| Option | Type | Default (D1) | Description |\n|--------|------|---------|-------------|\n| `generateId` | `string \\| false` | `\"prefixed\"` | ID generation strategy |\n| `namingConvention` | `string` | `\"snake_case\"` | Column naming convention |\n| `usePlurals` | `boolean` | `false` | Pluralize auth table names (e.g. `user` vs `users`) |\n| `splitDatabases` | `boolean` | `true` | Separate auth and features databases |\n| `authBinding` | `string` | `\"AUTH_DB\"` | Binding name for auth database |\n| `featuresBinding` | `string` | `\"DB\"` | Binding name for features database |\n| `databaseId` | `string` | — | D1 database ID for the features database (used in generated wrangler.toml) |\n| `authDatabaseId` | `string` | — | D1 database ID for the auth database |\n| `featuresDatabaseId` | `string` | — | Explicit features DB ID (falls back to `databaseId`) |\n| `filesDatabaseId` | `string` | — | D1 database ID for the files metadata database |\n| `webhooksDatabaseId` | `string` | — | D1 database ID for the webhooks database |\n| `auditBinding` | `string` | `\"AUDIT_DB\"` | Binding name for the security audit database |\n| `auditDatabaseName` | `string` | `\"{app}-audit\"` | D1 database name for audit events |\n| `auditDatabaseId` | `string` | — | Explicit D1 database ID for audit events |\n| `webhookAdminRoles` | `string[]` | `[\"owner\", \"admin\"]` | Org roles allowed to manage webhook endpoints |\n\n#### Audit Database\n\nCross-tenant `unsafe` actions (see [Actions → Unsafe mode](/compiler/definitions/actions#unsafe-mode)) write mandatory audit events. Those events land in a dedicated D1 database — separate from your features DB — so audit history stays isolated from application data and can't be tampered with through a normal CRUD route.\n\nYou don't need to do anything to enable it — the compiler wires up the binding automatically if your project declares any unsafe action. To override defaults:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n auditBinding: \"MY_AUDIT_DB\", // default: AUDIT_DB\n auditDatabaseName: \"my-app-audit-prod\", // default: {app}-audit\n auditDatabaseId: \"c3b8866b-cc4f-4e51-8382-0af244584d93\",\n }),\n}\n```\n\nThe binding name must match what your Worker reads at runtime. If you don't declare any unsafe actions, no audit DB is provisioned and these options have no effect.\n\n#### Setting Database IDs for Deployment\n\nWhen deploying to production, set your D1 database IDs so the compiler generates a ready-to-deploy `wrangler.toml`:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n authDatabaseId: \"fe6c77c4-2131-40be-a8fc-3649eef2a38c\",\n databaseId: \"bba22981-cb6e-43d6-bf32-4193513c60b1\",\n filesDatabaseId: \"c3b8866b-cc4f-4e51-8382-0af244584d93\",\n }),\n}\n```\n\nIf these are omitted, the compiler uses local-dev placeholders and you'll need to manually edit `wrangler.toml` before deploying.\n\n### ID Generation Options\n\n| Value | Description | Example |\n|-------|-------------|---------|\n| `\"uuid\"` | Server generates UUID | `550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000` |\n| `\"cuid\"` | Server generates CUID | `clh2v8k9g0000l508h5gx8j1a` |\n| `\"nanoid\"` | Server generates nanoid (21-char, URL-safe) | `V1StGXR8_Z5jdHi6B-myT` |\n| `\"short\"` | 6-char alphanumeric (nanoid `customAlphabet`) | `a3F9xK` |\n| `\"prefixed\"` | Prefixed ID from table name | `room_abc123` |\n| `\"serial\"` | Database auto-increments | `1`, `2`, `3` |\n| `false` | Client provides ID (enables PUT/upsert) | Any string |\n\n## Auth Providers\n\n| Provider | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `better-auth` | Better Auth with plugins |\n| `supabase-auth` | Supabase Auth |\n| `external` | External auth via Cloudflare service binding |\n\n```typescript\n\nproviders: {\n auth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n session: {\n expiresInDays: 7,\n updateAgeInDays: 1,\n },\n rateLimit: {\n enabled: true,\n window: 60,\n max: 100,\n },\n }),\n}\n```\n\n### Better Auth Options\n\n| Option | Type | Description |\n|--------|------|-------------|\n| `session.expiresInDays` | `number` | Session expiration in days |\n| `session.updateAgeInDays` | `number` | Session refresh interval in days |\n| `rateLimit.enabled` | `boolean` | Enable rate limiting |\n| `rateLimit.window` | `number` | Rate limit window in seconds |\n| `rateLimit.max` | `number` | Max requests per window |\n| `socialProviders` | `object` | Social login providers (`google`, `github`, `discord`) |\n| `debugLogs` | `boolean` | Enable auth debug logging |\n\n### Better Auth Plugins\n\nWhen `features: [\"organizations\"]` is set in your config, the compiler automatically enables organization-related plugins. Additional plugins can be configured:\n\n| Plugin | Description |\n|--------|-------------|\n| `organization` | Multi-tenant organizations |\n| `admin` | Admin panel access |\n| `apiKey` | API key authentication |\n| `anonymous` | Anonymous sessions |\n| `upgradeAnonymous` | Convert anonymous to full accounts |\n| `twoFactor` | Two-factor authentication |\n| `passkey` | WebAuthn passkey login |\n| `magicLink` | Email magic link login |\n| `emailOtp` | Email one-time password |\n| `deviceAuthorization` | Device auth flow (CLI tools) |\n| `jwt` | JWT token support |\n| `openAPI` | OpenAPI spec generation |\n\n## Storage Providers\n\n```typescript\n\nproviders: {\n storage: defineStorage(\"kv\", {\n binding: \"KV_STORE\",\n namespaceId: \"7ed0f824a8c54c388713d9fdf63cd004\",\n }),\n fileStorage: defineFileStorage(\"r2\", {\n binding: \"FILES\",\n maxFileSize: \"10mb\",\n allowedTypes: [\"image/png\", \"image/jpeg\", \"application/pdf\"],\n publicDomain: \"files.example.com\",\n }),\n}\n```\n\n### Storage Types\n\n| Type | Description |\n|------|-------------|\n| `kv` | Key-value storage (Cloudflare KV, Redis) |\n| `r2` | Object storage (Cloudflare R2) |\n| `memory` | In-memory storage (development only) |\n| `redis` | Redis storage |\n\n### File Storage Options\n\n| Option | Type | Description |\n|--------|------|-------------|\n| `binding` | `string` | R2 bucket binding name |\n| `maxFileSize` | `string` | Maximum file size (e.g. `\"10mb\"`) |\n| `allowedTypes` | `string[]` | Allowed MIME types |\n| `publicDomain` | `string` | Public domain for file URLs |\n| `userScopedBuckets` | `boolean` | Scope files by user |"
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"content": "Providers configure which services your compiled backend targets.\n\n## Runtime Providers\n\n| Provider | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `cloudflare` | Cloudflare Workers (Hono) |\n| `bun` | Bun runtime (Hono) |\n| `node` | Node.js runtime (Hono) |\n\n```typescript\n\nproviders: {\n runtime: defineRuntime(\"cloudflare\"),\n}\n```\n\n## Database Providers\n\n| Provider | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `cloudflare-d1` | Cloudflare D1 (SQLite) |\n| `better-sqlite3` | SQLite via better-sqlite3 (Bun/Node) |\n| `libsql` | LibSQL / Turso |\n| `neon` | Neon (PostgreSQL) |\n| `supabase` | Supabase (PostgreSQL) |\n\n```typescript\n\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n generateId: \"prefixed\", // \"uuid\" | \"cuid\" | \"nanoid\" | \"prefixed\" | \"serial\" | false\n namingConvention: \"snake_case\", // \"camelCase\" | \"snake_case\"\n usePlurals: false, // Auth table names: \"users\" vs \"user\"\n }),\n}\n```\n\n### Database Options\n\n| Option | Type | Default (D1) | Description |\n|--------|------|---------|-------------|\n| `generateId` | `string \\| false` | `\"prefixed\"` | ID generation strategy |\n| `namingConvention` | `string` | `\"snake_case\"` | Column naming convention |\n| `usePlurals` | `boolean` | `false` | Pluralize auth table names (e.g. `user` vs `users`) |\n| `splitDatabases` | `boolean` | `true` | Separate auth and features databases |\n| `authBinding` | `string` | `\"AUTH_DB\"` | Binding name for auth database |\n| `featuresBinding` | `string` | `\"DB\"` | Binding name for features database |\n| `databaseId` | `string` | — | D1 database ID for the features database (used in generated wrangler.toml) |\n| `authDatabaseId` | `string` | — | D1 database ID for the auth database |\n| `featuresDatabaseId` | `string` | — | Explicit features DB ID (falls back to `databaseId`) |\n| `filesDatabaseId` | `string` | — | D1 database ID for the files metadata database |\n| `webhooksDatabaseId` | `string` | — | D1 database ID for the webhooks database |\n| `auditBinding` | `string` | `\"AUDIT_DB\"` | Binding name for the security audit database |\n| `auditDatabaseName` | `string` | `\"{app}-audit\"` | D1 database name for audit events |\n| `auditDatabaseId` | `string` | — | Explicit D1 database ID for audit events |\n| `experimentalRemote` | `{ auth?, features?, audit?, webhooks?, files? }` | `{}` | Per-binding `experimental_remote = true` flag for `wrangler dev` (see [below](#sharing-deployed-d1-in-dev-experimental_remote)) |\n| `webhookAdminRoles` | `string[]` | `[\"owner\", \"admin\"]` | Org roles allowed to manage webhook endpoints |\n\n#### Audit Database\n\nCross-tenant `unsafe` actions (see [Actions → Unsafe mode](/compiler/definitions/actions#unsafe-mode)) write mandatory audit events. Those events land in a dedicated D1 database — separate from your features DB — so audit history stays isolated from application data and can't be tampered with through a normal CRUD route.\n\nYou don't need to do anything to enable it — the compiler wires up the binding automatically if your project declares any unsafe action. To override defaults:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n auditBinding: \"MY_AUDIT_DB\", // default: AUDIT_DB\n auditDatabaseName: \"my-app-audit-prod\", // default: {app}-audit\n auditDatabaseId: \"c3b8866b-cc4f-4e51-8382-0af244584d93\",\n }),\n}\n```\n\nThe binding name must match what your Worker reads at runtime. If you don't declare any unsafe actions, no audit DB is provisioned and these options have no effect.\n\n#### Setting Database IDs for Deployment\n\nWhen deploying to production, set your D1 database IDs so the compiler generates a ready-to-deploy `wrangler.toml`:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n authDatabaseId: \"fe6c77c4-2131-40be-a8fc-3649eef2a38c\",\n databaseId: \"bba22981-cb6e-43d6-bf32-4193513c60b1\",\n filesDatabaseId: \"c3b8866b-cc4f-4e51-8382-0af244584d93\",\n }),\n}\n```\n\nIf these are omitted, the compiler uses local-dev placeholders and you'll need to manually edit `wrangler.toml` before deploying.\n\n#### Sharing deployed D1 in dev (`experimental_remote`)\n\nWrangler can read or write the **deployed** D1 for a specific binding while `wrangler dev` runs locally. A common workflow: share the production auth DB in dev so real sessions and users work against the running local Worker, while feature writes stay sandboxed in the local SQLite shadow.\n\nQuickback regenerates `wrangler.toml` on every compile, so flags like `experimental_remote = true` need to live in `quickback.config.ts`:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n authDatabaseId: \"fe6c77c4-2131-40be-a8fc-3649eef2a38c\",\n experimentalRemote: { auth: true },\n }),\n}\n```\n\nKeys map to logical bindings, not the runtime binding string:\n\n| Key | Binding affected |\n|-----|------------------|\n| `auth` | `AUTH_DB` (also applied to the files worker's auth binding) |\n| `features` | `DB` (or the legacy single-DB binding when `splitDatabases: false`) |\n| `audit` | `AUDIT_DB` |\n| `webhooks` | `WEBHOOKS_DB` |\n| `files` | `FILES_DB` (also applied to the files worker) |\n\nOnly `true` flips the flag on; `false` or omitted leaves the binding local. Off by default — only enable against databases you intend to share.\n\n### ID Generation Options\n\n| Value | Description | Example |\n|-------|-------------|---------|\n| `\"uuid\"` | Server generates UUID | `550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000` |\n| `\"cuid\"` | Server generates CUID | `clh2v8k9g0000l508h5gx8j1a` |\n| `\"nanoid\"` | Server generates nanoid (21-char, URL-safe) | `V1StGXR8_Z5jdHi6B-myT` |\n| `\"short\"` | 6-char alphanumeric (nanoid `customAlphabet`) | `a3F9xK` |\n| `\"prefixed\"` | Prefixed ID from table name | `room_abc123` |\n| `\"serial\"` | Database auto-increments | `1`, `2`, `3` |\n| `false` | Client provides ID (enables PUT/upsert) | Any string |\n\n## Auth Providers\n\n| Provider | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `better-auth` | Better Auth with plugins |\n| `supabase-auth` | Supabase Auth |\n| `external` | External auth via Cloudflare service binding |\n\n```typescript\n\nproviders: {\n auth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n session: {\n expiresInDays: 7,\n updateAgeInDays: 1,\n },\n rateLimit: {\n enabled: true,\n window: 60,\n max: 100,\n },\n }),\n}\n```\n\n### Better Auth Options\n\n| Option | Type | Description |\n|--------|------|-------------|\n| `session.expiresInDays` | `number` | Session expiration in days |\n| `session.updateAgeInDays` | `number` | Session refresh interval in days |\n| `rateLimit.enabled` | `boolean` | Enable rate limiting |\n| `rateLimit.window` | `number` | Rate limit window in seconds |\n| `rateLimit.max` | `number` | Max requests per window |\n| `socialProviders` | `object` | Social login providers (`google`, `github`, `discord`) |\n| `debugLogs` | `boolean` | Enable auth debug logging |\n\n### Better Auth Plugins\n\nWhen `features: [\"organizations\"]` is set in your config, the compiler automatically enables organization-related plugins. Additional plugins can be configured:\n\n| Plugin | Description |\n|--------|-------------|\n| `organization` | Multi-tenant organizations |\n| `admin` | Admin panel access |\n| `apiKey` | API key authentication |\n| `anonymous` | Anonymous sessions |\n| `upgradeAnonymous` | Convert anonymous to full accounts |\n| `twoFactor` | Two-factor authentication |\n| `passkey` | WebAuthn passkey login |\n| `magicLink` | Email magic link login |\n| `emailOtp` | Email one-time password |\n| `deviceAuthorization` | Device auth flow (CLI tools) |\n| `jwt` | JWT token support |\n| `openAPI` | OpenAPI spec generation |\n\n## Storage Providers\n\n```typescript\n\nproviders: {\n storage: defineStorage(\"kv\", {\n binding: \"KV_STORE\",\n namespaceId: \"7ed0f824a8c54c388713d9fdf63cd004\",\n }),\n fileStorage: defineFileStorage(\"r2\", {\n binding: \"FILES\",\n maxFileSize: \"10mb\",\n allowedTypes: [\"image/png\", \"image/jpeg\", \"application/pdf\"],\n publicDomain: \"files.example.com\",\n }),\n}\n```\n\n### Storage Types\n\n| Type | Description |\n|------|-------------|\n| `kv` | Key-value storage (Cloudflare KV, Redis) |\n| `r2` | Object storage (Cloudflare R2) |\n| `memory` | In-memory storage (development only) |\n| `redis` | Redis storage |\n\n### File Storage Options\n\n| Option | Type | Description |\n|--------|------|-------------|\n| `binding` | `string` | R2 bucket binding name |\n| `maxFileSize` | `string` | Maximum file size (e.g. `\"10mb\"`) |\n| `allowedTypes` | `string[]` | Allowed MIME types |\n| `publicDomain` | `string` | Public domain for file URLs |\n| `userScopedBuckets` | `boolean` | Scope files by user |"
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"content": "Every compiled Quickback Worker sets a baseline of security response-headers on every response: HSTS, `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, a clickjacking CSP (`frame-ancestors 'self' …TRUSTED_ORIGINS`), `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN`, `Referrer-Policy`, and `Permissions-Policy`. Adding the `security` block lets you override individual headers, ship a fuller Content-Security-Policy, or suppress them all if an upstream gateway handles headers.\n\n## Default behavior\n\nOmit `security` entirely → the baseline above. No config change needed for clickjacking + HSTS protection.\n\n```ts title=\"quickback.config.ts\"\n\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: 'my-api',\n // ...\n // security defaults are applied automatically.\n});\n```\n\n## Suppress every security header\n\nFor Workers fronted by a gateway that owns headers:\n\n```ts title=\"quickback.config.ts\"\nexport default defineConfig({\n // ...\n security: false,\n});\n```\n\nThe compiler emits a no-op middleware comment so the route table still lines up with the rest of the generated code, but no `c.header(...)` calls fire.\n\n## Per-header overrides\n\nEach field on the `security` block accepts either a typed value or `false` to suppress that specific header. Defaults still apply for fields you don't set.\n\n```ts title=\"quickback.config.ts\"\nexport default defineConfig({\n // ...\n security: {\n // Suppress just CSP — keeps HSTS, referrer, permissions, etc.\n csp: false,\n\n // Or override individual fields:\n coop: 'same-origin',\n coep: 'credentialless',\n referrerPolicy: 'no-referrer',\n permissionsPolicy: { geolocation: [], microphone: [], camera: [], payment: [] },\n hsts: { maxAge: 63072000, includeSubDomains: true, preload: true },\n },\n});\n```\n\n## Content Security Policy\n\n`security.csp` accepts a typed object. Each `*Src` field is an array of source expressions. The compiler accepts both the `@`-prefixed sentinels (idiomatic, type-safe) and CSP wire-form keywords (`\"'self'\"`, `\"'unsafe-inline'\"`); both normalize to the same output.\n\n### Sentinels\n\n| Sentinel | Wire form | Notes |\n|---|---|---|\n| `@self` | `'self'` | Same-origin. |\n| `@none` | `'none'` | Empty-set keyword. |\n| `@unsafe-inline` | `'unsafe-inline'` | Allows inline scripts/styles — defeats most XSS mitigation when used in `script-src`. |\n| `@unsafe-eval` | `'unsafe-eval'` | Allows `eval()` and friends. |\n| `@trustedOrigins` | The `…TRUSTED_ORIGINS` constant at runtime | Resolves to `auth.trustedOrigins` as configured in `quickback.config.ts`. |\n| `@nonce` | `'nonce-…'` per request | Reserved for the per-request nonce middleware shipping in 0.10.15. Using this in 0.10.14 is a compile-time error. |\n\nUnknown `@…` tokens are rejected at compile rather than silently stringified into the wire CSP.\n\n### Example: paste-in CSP for a Quickback SPA project\n\nThe bundled CMS and Account SPAs load Google Fonts cross-origin, so the strict `'self'`-only CSP would white-screen them on load. This config is a known-working starting point for Quickback projects with the bundled SPAs:\n\n```ts title=\"quickback.config.ts\"\nexport default defineConfig({\n // ...\n security: {\n csp: {\n defaultSrc: ['@self'],\n // Tailwind dynamic styles + bundled Google Fonts CSS need\n // unsafe-inline + the gstatic / googleapis hosts. Tightening\n // styles to nonces ships in 0.10.15.\n styleSrc: ['@self', '@unsafe-inline', 'https://fonts.googleapis.com'],\n scriptSrc: ['@self'],\n fontSrc: ['@self', 'data:', 'https://fonts.gstatic.com'],\n imgSrc: ['@self', 'data:', 'blob:', 'https:'],\n connectSrc: ['@self', '@trustedOrigins'],\n frameAncestors: ['@self', '@trustedOrigins'],\n formAction: ['@self'],\n baseUri: ['@self'],\n objectSrc: ['@none'],\n upgradeInsecureRequests: true,\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\n### Troubleshooting CSP violations\n\nIf the browser console shows CSP errors after enabling `security.csp`, match the directive named in the error against this table — it maps the failure mode back to the directive that needs widening.\n\n| Console error | Directive | Why it happens | Fix |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `Loading the stylesheet 'https://fonts.googleapis.com/...' violates 'style-src ...'` | `styleSrc` | Bundled CMS/Account SPAs `<link>` to Google Fonts CSS. | Add `'https://fonts.googleapis.com'` to `styleSrc`. |\n| `Refused to load the font 'https://fonts.gstatic.com/...' because it violates 'font-src ...'` | `fontSrc` | The CSS file from googleapis loads `.woff2` files from gstatic. | Add `'https://fonts.gstatic.com'` to `fontSrc`. |\n| `Connecting to 'https://api.your-domain/...' violates 'connect-src 'self''` | `connectSrc` | API on a sibling subdomain (e.g. SPA on `app.example.com`, API on `api.example.com`) — `'self'` only covers exact origin. | Use `connectSrc: ['@self', '@trustedOrigins']` so the same allowlist `cors()` enforces gets reused. |\n| `Refused to apply inline style because it violates 'style-src ...'` | `styleSrc` | TanStack Router / Tailwind's `style=\"...\"` attributes are inline. | Add `'@unsafe-inline'` to `styleSrc` until 0.10.15 ships per-request nonces. |\n| `Refused to load the image '...' because it violates 'img-src ...'` | `imgSrc` | User-uploaded avatars / R2-hosted assets / `data:` URIs from blob previews. | Widen `imgSrc` to `['@self', 'data:', 'blob:', 'https:']` (or list specific hosts). |\n| `Refused to connect to 'wss://...' because it violates 'connect-src ...'` | `connectSrc` | Realtime / Durable Object WebSockets. | The `@trustedOrigins` sentinel covers HTTPS only — add the explicit `wss://` origin if your DO lives elsewhere. |\n\nThe general rule: `'self'` means *exact origin* (scheme + host + port). Anything cross-origin needs an explicit host or the `@trustedOrigins` sentinel. The [paste-in recipe above](#example-paste-in-csp-for-a-quickback-spa-project) is a known-good baseline for a stock Quickback project — start there and tighten, rather than starting from `'self'`-only and chasing console errors.\n\n### Auto-derivations\n\nThe compiler applies these so config stays minimal:\n\n- **`csp.frameAncestors` defaults to `['@self', '@trustedOrigins']`** when `csp` is set but `frameAncestors` is omitted. Same allowlist as CORS.\n- **`X-Frame-Options` derives from `csp.frameAncestors`** (`['@none']` → `DENY`, contains `@self` → `SAMEORIGIN`, otherwise omitted — XFO can't represent arbitrary origins so CSP becomes the truth there). Override with `security.frameOptions`.\n- **`corp: 'same-origin'` is auto-emitted when `coep` is set.** `require-corp` without CORP breaks the ASSETS binding fetches on Cloudflare; the compiler couples them so users don't have to remember.\n\n### CSP auto-config (0.10.15+)\n\nWhen you opt into a `csp` object, the compiler additively widens directives based on which Quickback features your project has enabled. **Additive** means anything you already wrote stays; we only push values that aren't already present.\n\n| Trigger | Auto-added | To directive | Why |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `'unsafe-inline'` | `styleSrc` | Tailwind / TanStack Router emit inline `style=` attributes |\n| `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `https://fonts.googleapis.com` | `styleSrc` | Bundled SPAs `<link>` to Google Fonts CSS |\n| `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `https://fonts.gstatic.com` | `fontSrc` | The googleapis CSS loads `.woff2` from gstatic |\n| `csp` set (always) | `@trustedOrigins` | `connectSrc` | XHR/fetch must reach the same allowlist `cors()` permits — covers cross-subdomain APIs without re-listing them |\n| `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `https://${domain}` for each `cms.domain` / `account.domain` / `domain` / inferred unified domain | `connectSrc` | The Vite bundle hardcodes `VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL` at compile time, so the SPA fetches that exact URL even when the page is served from a different origin (e.g. localhost dev hitting prod-baked SPA) |\n\n**Fallback rule:** if you set `defaultSrc` but omit the target directive (e.g. you wrote `defaultSrc: ['@self']` and nothing for `connectSrc`), the addition lands in `defaultSrc` rather than creating a sibling directive. CSP fall-back semantics mean a sibling would *narrow* your intent — `defaultSrc` already covers `connectSrc` until something explicitly overrides it. Auto-config preserves that.\n\n**Visibility:** every applied addition prints to stderr at compile time — one line per addition with the directive, value, and reason. No silent magic. Loop's compile output now looks like:\n\n```\n[security] auto-added 'unsafe-inline' to csp.styleSrc — account: true → bundled Account SPA → inline style attributes from Tailwind / TanStack Router\n[security] auto-added https://fonts.googleapis.com to csp.styleSrc — account: true → bundled Account SPA → loads Google Fonts CSS cross-origin\n[security] auto-added https://fonts.gstatic.com to csp.fontSrc — account: true → bundled Account SPA → woff2 font files served from gstatic.com\n[security] auto-added @trustedOrigins to csp.connectSrc — CORS-trusted origins must be reachable from XHR/fetch (matches cors() allowlist)\n```\n\n**Opt-out:** `security: { cspAutoConfig: false, csp: { ... } }` for projects fronted by a CDN that injects its own CSP, or teams that want strict from-scratch control. With auto-config off, every value above must be authored by hand.\n\nWith auto-config on, the [paste-in recipe above](#example-paste-in-csp-for-a-quickback-spa-project) becomes much shorter — most users only need:\n\n```ts\nsecurity: {\n csp: {\n defaultSrc: ['@self'],\n scriptSrc: ['@self'],\n imgSrc: ['@self', 'data:', 'blob:', 'https:'],\n objectSrc: ['@none'],\n upgradeInsecureRequests: true,\n },\n}\n```\n\nThe compiler fills in the SPA-specific font hosts, inline-style allowance, and trusted-origin connect rules from the project's own feature flags.\n\n## Cross-origin window/embedder isolation\n\n```ts title=\"quickback.config.ts\"\nsecurity: {\n coop: 'same-origin', // Defends against window.opener back-references from popups.\n coep: 'credentialless', // Required for SharedArrayBuffer / cross-origin isolation.\n // corp auto-emits as 'same-origin' here.\n}\n```\n\n## HSTS\n\nDefault: `max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload` (HSTS preload-list eligible).\n\n```ts title=\"quickback.config.ts\"\nsecurity: {\n hsts: { maxAge: 63072000, includeSubDomains: true, preload: true },\n}\n```\n\nThe generated middleware automatically suppresses HSTS on `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, and `*.localhost` regardless of this config. Without that gate, `wrangler dev` would pin the developer's browser to HTTPS for `maxAge` seconds, which is observable across every project on that machine.\n\nTo submit to the [HSTS preload list](https://hstspreload.org), you need:\n\n- `maxAge` ≥ 31536000 (one year)\n- `includeSubDomains: true`\n- `preload: true`\n\nThe compiler warns at compile time if `preload: true` without the other two — the preload list rejects either anyway.\n\n## Permissions Policy\n\nMap of feature name → list of allowed origins.\n\n```ts title=\"quickback.config.ts\"\nsecurity: {\n permissionsPolicy: {\n geolocation: [], // disabled for everyone\n microphone: ['self'], // allowed only on own origin\n camera: ['self', 'https://meet.example.com'],\n payment: [],\n },\n}\n```\n\nThe compiler encodes the wire syntax (which differs from CSP — values use `()`, not space-separated tokens, with bareword `self` and quoted URLs).\n\n## Compile-time lint rules\n\nThe compiler walks the resolved config and emits warnings (or errors) for known footguns. Errors block compile; warnings print to stderr.\n\n| Code | Severity | Trigger |\n|---|---|---|\n| `csp/nonce-not-yet-supported` | error | `@nonce` sentinel used in 0.10.14. Per-request nonce middleware ships in 0.10.15. |\n| `csp/unsafe-inline-with-nonce` | error | `@unsafe-inline` and `@nonce` in the same directive (CSP3 silently ignores `unsafe-inline` when nonce is present). |\n| `csp/empty-resolved-directive` | error | `*Src` array contains only `@trustedOrigins` and `auth.trustedOrigins` is empty — would emit a directive Chrome reads as `'none'`. |\n| `csp/unsafe-inline-script` | warn | `@unsafe-inline` in `scriptSrc` defeats most XSS mitigations. |\n| `csp/open-source` | warn | Wildcard `*` or scheme-only `https:` / `http:` in any `*-src`. |\n| `csp/unsafe-eval-with-data` | warn | `@unsafe-eval` combined with any `data:` source — trivial bypass. |\n| `csp/missing-default-src` | warn | Other `*-src` set without `defaultSrc`. |\n| `csp/upgrade-with-http` | warn | `upgradeInsecureRequests: true` plus an `http://` source elsewhere. |\n| `csp/report-uri-only` | warn | `reportUri` set without `reportTo` (deprecated CSP2 path). |\n| `hsts/preload-needs-long-max-age` | warn | `preload: true` with `maxAge < 31536000`. |\n| `hsts/preload-needs-include-subdomains` | warn | `preload: true` without `includeSubDomains`. |\n\n## Verification\n\nSpin up the deployed Worker (or `wrangler dev`) and check the response headers:\n\n```bash\ncurl -sI https://my-api.example.com/health \\\n | grep -E '^(content-security-policy|x-frame-options|strict-transport-security|cross-origin-opener-policy|cross-origin-embedder-policy|cross-origin-resource-policy|referrer-policy|permissions-policy):'\n```\n\nUse [securityheaders.com](https://securityheaders.com) for an external grade — Quickback's defaults are A on the baseline and A+ once a fuller `csp` is configured."
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"content": "Every compiled Quickback Worker sets a baseline of security response-headers on every response: HSTS, `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, a clickjacking CSP (`frame-ancestors 'self' …TRUSTED_ORIGINS`), `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN`, `Referrer-Policy`, and `Permissions-Policy`. Adding the `security` block lets you override individual headers, ship a fuller Content-Security-Policy, or suppress them all if an upstream gateway handles headers.\n\n## Default behavior\n\nOmit `security` entirely → the baseline above. No config change needed for clickjacking + HSTS protection.\n\n```ts title=\"quickback.config.ts\"\n\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: 'my-api',\n // ...\n // security defaults are applied automatically.\n});\n```\n\n## Suppress every security header\n\nFor Workers fronted by a gateway that owns headers:\n\n```ts title=\"quickback.config.ts\"\nexport default defineConfig({\n // ...\n security: false,\n});\n```\n\nThe compiler emits a no-op middleware comment so the route table still lines up with the rest of the generated code, but no `c.header(...)` calls fire.\n\n## Per-header overrides\n\nEach field on the `security` block accepts either a typed value or `false` to suppress that specific header. Defaults still apply for fields you don't set.\n\n```ts title=\"quickback.config.ts\"\nexport default defineConfig({\n // ...\n security: {\n // Suppress just CSP — keeps HSTS, referrer, permissions, etc.\n csp: false,\n\n // Or override individual fields:\n coop: 'same-origin',\n coep: 'credentialless',\n referrerPolicy: 'no-referrer',\n permissionsPolicy: { geolocation: [], microphone: [], camera: [], payment: [] },\n hsts: { maxAge: 63072000, includeSubDomains: true, preload: true },\n },\n});\n```\n\n## Content Security Policy\n\n`security.csp` accepts a typed object. Each `*Src` field is an array of source expressions. The compiler accepts both the `@`-prefixed sentinels (idiomatic, type-safe) and CSP wire-form keywords (`\"'self'\"`, `\"'unsafe-inline'\"`); both normalize to the same output.\n\n### Sentinels\n\n| Sentinel | Wire form | Notes |\n|---|---|---|\n| `@self` | `'self'` | Same-origin. |\n| `@none` | `'none'` | Empty-set keyword. |\n| `@unsafe-inline` | `'unsafe-inline'` | Allows inline scripts/styles — defeats most XSS mitigation when used in `script-src`. |\n| `@unsafe-eval` | `'unsafe-eval'` | Allows `eval()` and friends. |\n| `@trustedOrigins` | The `…TRUSTED_ORIGINS` constant at runtime | Resolves to `auth.trustedOrigins` as configured in `quickback.config.ts`. |\n| `@nonce` | `'nonce-…'` per request | Reserved for the per-request nonce middleware shipping in 0.10.15. Using this in 0.10.14 is a compile-time error. |\n\nUnknown `@…` tokens are rejected at compile rather than silently stringified into the wire CSP.\n\n### Example: paste-in CSP for a Quickback SPA project\n\nThe bundled CMS and Account SPAs load Google Fonts cross-origin, so the strict `'self'`-only CSP would white-screen them on load. This config is a known-working starting point for Quickback projects with the bundled SPAs:\n\n```ts title=\"quickback.config.ts\"\nexport default defineConfig({\n // ...\n security: {\n csp: {\n defaultSrc: ['@self'],\n // Tailwind dynamic styles + bundled Google Fonts CSS need\n // unsafe-inline + the gstatic / googleapis hosts. Tightening\n // styles to nonces ships in 0.10.15.\n styleSrc: ['@self', '@unsafe-inline', 'https://fonts.googleapis.com'],\n scriptSrc: ['@self'],\n fontSrc: ['@self', 'data:', 'https://fonts.gstatic.com'],\n imgSrc: ['@self', 'data:', 'blob:', 'https:'],\n connectSrc: ['@self', '@trustedOrigins'],\n frameAncestors: ['@self', '@trustedOrigins'],\n formAction: ['@self'],\n baseUri: ['@self'],\n objectSrc: ['@none'],\n upgradeInsecureRequests: true,\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\n### Troubleshooting CSP violations\n\nIf the browser console shows CSP errors after enabling `security.csp`, match the directive named in the error against this table — it maps the failure mode back to the directive that needs widening.\n\n| Console error | Directive | Why it happens | Fix |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `Loading the stylesheet 'https://fonts.googleapis.com/...' violates 'style-src ...'` | `styleSrc` | Bundled CMS/Account SPAs `<link>` to Google Fonts CSS. | Add `'https://fonts.googleapis.com'` to `styleSrc`. |\n| `Refused to load the font 'https://fonts.gstatic.com/...' because it violates 'font-src ...'` | `fontSrc` | The CSS file from googleapis loads `.woff2` files from gstatic. | Add `'https://fonts.gstatic.com'` to `fontSrc`. |\n| `Connecting to 'https://api.your-domain/...' violates 'connect-src 'self''` | `connectSrc` | API on a sibling subdomain (e.g. SPA on `app.example.com`, API on `api.example.com`) — `'self'` only covers exact origin. | Use `connectSrc: ['@self', '@trustedOrigins']` so the same allowlist `cors()` enforces gets reused. |\n| `Refused to apply inline style because it violates 'style-src ...'` | `styleSrc` | TanStack Router / Tailwind's `style=\"...\"` attributes are inline. | Add `'@unsafe-inline'` to `styleSrc` until 0.10.15 ships per-request nonces. |\n| `Refused to load the image '...' because it violates 'img-src ...'` | `imgSrc` | User-uploaded avatars / R2-hosted assets / `data:` URIs from blob previews. | Widen `imgSrc` to `['@self', 'data:', 'blob:', 'https:']` (or list specific hosts). |\n| `Refused to connect to 'wss://...' because it violates 'connect-src ...'` | `connectSrc` | Realtime / Durable Object WebSockets. | The `@trustedOrigins` sentinel covers HTTPS only — add the explicit `wss://` origin if your DO lives elsewhere. |\n\nThe general rule: `'self'` means *exact origin* (scheme + host + port). Anything cross-origin needs an explicit host or the `@trustedOrigins` sentinel. The [paste-in recipe above](#example-paste-in-csp-for-a-quickback-spa-project) is a known-good baseline for a stock Quickback project — start there and tighten, rather than starting from `'self'`-only and chasing console errors.\n\n### Auto-derivations\n\nThe compiler applies these so config stays minimal:\n\n- **`csp.frameAncestors` defaults to `['@self', '@trustedOrigins']`** when `csp` is set but `frameAncestors` is omitted. Same allowlist as CORS.\n- **`X-Frame-Options` derives from `csp.frameAncestors`** (`['@none']` → `DENY`, contains `@self` → `SAMEORIGIN`, otherwise omitted — XFO can't represent arbitrary origins so CSP becomes the truth there). Override with `security.frameOptions`.\n- **`corp: 'same-origin'` is auto-emitted when `coep` is set.** `require-corp` without CORP breaks the ASSETS binding fetches on Cloudflare; the compiler couples them so users don't have to remember.\n\n### CSP auto-config (0.10.15+)\n\nWhen you opt into a `csp` object, the compiler additively widens directives based on which Quickback features your project has enabled. **Additive** means anything you already wrote stays; we only push values that aren't already present.\n\n| Trigger | Auto-added | To directive | Why |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `'unsafe-inline'` | `styleSrc` | Tailwind / TanStack Router emit inline `style=` attributes |\n| `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `https://fonts.googleapis.com` | `styleSrc` | Bundled SPAs `<link>` to Google Fonts CSS |\n| `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `https://fonts.gstatic.com` | `fontSrc` | The googleapis CSS loads `.woff2` from gstatic |\n| `csp` set (always) | `@trustedOrigins` | `connectSrc` | XHR/fetch must reach the same allowlist `cors()` permits — covers cross-subdomain APIs without re-listing them |\n| `cms: true` OR `account: true` | `https://${domain}` for each `cms.domain` / `account.domain` / `domain` / inferred unified domain | `connectSrc` | The Vite bundle hardcodes `VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL` at compile time, so the SPA fetches that exact URL even when the page is served from a different origin (e.g. localhost dev hitting prod-baked SPA). Emitted with the host's first letter capitalised (`https://Api.example.com`) so `wrangler dev`'s response-header rewrite can't mangle it — see [the `wrangler dev` note below](#why-the-spa-baked-origin-shows-up-capitalised-in-csp). |\n\n**Scaffold rule:** if you set `defaultSrc` but omit the target directive (e.g. you wrote `defaultSrc: ['@self']` and nothing for `connectSrc`), auto-config creates the new directive seeded with your `defaultSrc` values plus the addition. `defaultSrc` itself stays clean. So `defaultSrc: ['@self']` + auto-config produces:\n\n```\ndefault-src 'self'\nstyle-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://fonts.googleapis.com\nfont-src 'self' https://fonts.gstatic.com\nconnect-src 'self' @trustedOrigins https://api.your-app.com\n```\n\nEach directive is scoped to exactly what it needs. `defaultSrc` is *not* widened with style-only or connect-only hosts — that would let those hosts also reach `script-src` / `img-src` / `media-src` via fall-back, which is wider than the bundled SPA actually needs. (This rule changed in 0.10.17 — earlier versions incorrectly pushed additions into defaultSrc.)\n\n**Visibility:** every applied addition prints to stderr at compile time — one line per addition with the directive, value, and reason. No silent magic. Loop's compile output now looks like:\n\n```\n[security] auto-added 'unsafe-inline' to csp.styleSrc — account: true → bundled Account SPA → inline style attributes from Tailwind / TanStack Router\n[security] auto-added https://fonts.googleapis.com to csp.styleSrc — account: true → bundled Account SPA → loads Google Fonts CSS cross-origin\n[security] auto-added https://fonts.gstatic.com to csp.fontSrc — account: true → bundled Account SPA → woff2 font files served from gstatic.com\n[security] auto-added @trustedOrigins to csp.connectSrc — CORS-trusted origins must be reachable from XHR/fetch (matches cors() allowlist)\n```\n\n**Opt-out:** `security: { cspAutoConfig: false, csp: { ... } }` for projects fronted by a CDN that injects its own CSP, or teams that want strict from-scratch control. With auto-config off, every value above must be authored by hand.\n\n#### Why the SPA-baked origin shows up capitalised in CSP\n\nProjects with `domain: \"...\"` + bundled CMS / Account SPAs will see `connect-src 'self' https://Api.example.com …` in their served CSP — note the capital `A`. That's deliberate (added in 0.10.19) and works around a `wrangler dev` quirk, not a typo on our end.\n\n`wrangler dev` rewrites the configured `custom_domain` host string in **every** response header value (Location, Content-Security-Policy, X-…) to the local hostname, with a case-sensitive substring matcher. Without the case-shift, the served CSP becomes `connect-src 'self' https://localhost:8787 …` and the bundled SPA's hardcoded `VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL` fetches get blocked because the prod URL no longer appears in the allowlist.\n\nCSP host-source matching is ASCII case-insensitive per CSP3 (`Matching Source Expressions`), so browsers treat `https://Api.example.com` as identical to `https://api.example.com` for the purpose of CSP checks. Wrangler's matcher is case-sensitive, so the capitalised form slips past the rewrite and survives into the served header. End result: the SPA's lowercase fetch target matches the capitalised CSP entry, auth round-trips work in dev, and prod CSP behaviour is unchanged (browsers don't care).\n\nIf wrangler ever fixes the response-header rewrite, the capitalised form remains a valid CSP entry — no follow-up needed.\n\nWith auto-config on, the [paste-in recipe above](#example-paste-in-csp-for-a-quickback-spa-project) becomes much shorter — most users only need:\n\n```ts\nsecurity: {\n csp: {\n defaultSrc: ['@self'],\n scriptSrc: ['@self'],\n imgSrc: ['@self', 'data:', 'blob:', 'https:'],\n objectSrc: ['@none'],\n upgradeInsecureRequests: true,\n },\n}\n```\n\nThe compiler fills in the SPA-specific font hosts, inline-style allowance, and trusted-origin connect rules from the project's own feature flags.\n\n## Cross-origin window/embedder isolation\n\n```ts title=\"quickback.config.ts\"\nsecurity: {\n coop: 'same-origin', // Defends against window.opener back-references from popups.\n coep: 'credentialless', // Required for SharedArrayBuffer / cross-origin isolation.\n // corp auto-emits as 'same-origin' here.\n}\n```\n\n## HSTS\n\nDefault: `max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload` (HSTS preload-list eligible).\n\n```ts title=\"quickback.config.ts\"\nsecurity: {\n hsts: { maxAge: 63072000, includeSubDomains: true, preload: true },\n}\n```\n\nThe generated middleware automatically suppresses HSTS on `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, and `*.localhost` regardless of this config. Without that gate, `wrangler dev` would pin the developer's browser to HTTPS for `maxAge` seconds, which is observable across every project on that machine.\n\nTo submit to the [HSTS preload list](https://hstspreload.org), you need:\n\n- `maxAge` ≥ 31536000 (one year)\n- `includeSubDomains: true`\n- `preload: true`\n\nThe compiler warns at compile time if `preload: true` without the other two — the preload list rejects either anyway.\n\n## Permissions Policy\n\nMap of feature name → list of allowed origins.\n\n```ts title=\"quickback.config.ts\"\nsecurity: {\n permissionsPolicy: {\n geolocation: [], // disabled for everyone\n microphone: ['self'], // allowed only on own origin\n camera: ['self', 'https://meet.example.com'],\n payment: [],\n },\n}\n```\n\nThe compiler encodes the wire syntax (which differs from CSP — values use `()`, not space-separated tokens, with bareword `self` and quoted URLs).\n\n## Compile-time lint rules\n\nThe compiler walks the resolved config and emits warnings (or errors) for known footguns. Errors block compile; warnings print to stderr.\n\n| Code | Severity | Trigger |\n|---|---|---|\n| `csp/nonce-not-yet-supported` | error | `@nonce` sentinel used in 0.10.14. Per-request nonce middleware ships in 0.10.15. |\n| `csp/unsafe-inline-with-nonce` | error | `@unsafe-inline` and `@nonce` in the same directive (CSP3 silently ignores `unsafe-inline` when nonce is present). |\n| `csp/empty-resolved-directive` | error | `*Src` array contains only `@trustedOrigins` and `auth.trustedOrigins` is empty — would emit a directive Chrome reads as `'none'`. |\n| `csp/unsafe-inline-script` | warn | `@unsafe-inline` in `scriptSrc` defeats most XSS mitigations. |\n| `csp/open-source` | warn | Wildcard `*` or scheme-only `https:` / `http:` in any `*-src`. |\n| `csp/unsafe-eval-with-data` | warn | `@unsafe-eval` combined with any `data:` source — trivial bypass. |\n| `csp/missing-default-src` | warn | Other `*-src` set without `defaultSrc`. |\n| `csp/upgrade-with-http` | warn | `upgradeInsecureRequests: true` plus an `http://` source elsewhere. |\n| `csp/report-uri-only` | warn | `reportUri` set without `reportTo` (deprecated CSP2 path). |\n| `hsts/preload-needs-long-max-age` | warn | `preload: true` with `maxAge < 31536000`. |\n| `hsts/preload-needs-include-subdomains` | warn | `preload: true` without `includeSubDomains`. |\n\n## Verification\n\nSpin up the deployed Worker (or `wrangler dev`) and check the response headers:\n\n```bash\ncurl -sI https://my-api.example.com/health \\\n | grep -E '^(content-security-policy|x-frame-options|strict-transport-security|cross-origin-opener-policy|cross-origin-embedder-policy|cross-origin-resource-policy|referrer-policy|permissions-policy):'\n```\n\nUse [securityheaders.com](https://securityheaders.com) for an external grade — Quickback's defaults are A on the baseline and A+ once a fuller `csp` is configured."
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"content": "Define who can perform CRUD operations and under what conditions.\n\n## Basic Usage\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/applications.ts\n\nexport const applications = sqliteTable('applications', {\n id: text('id').primaryKey(),\n candidateId: text('candidate_id').notNull(),\n jobId: text('job_id').notNull(),\n stage: text('stage').notNull(),\n notes: text('notes'),\n organizationId: text('organization_id').notNull(),\n});\n\nexport default defineTable(applications, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }],\n guards: { createable: [\"candidateId\", \"jobId\", \"notes\"], updatable: [\"notes\"] },\n read: {\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\", \"interviewer\"] },\n },\n crud: {\n create: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\"] } },\n update: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\"] } },\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] } },\n },\n});\n```\n\n## Role Hierarchy\n\nIf your project uses a tiered role system (e.g., `member` < `admin` < `owner`), you can define a hierarchy in your config and use the `+` suffix to mean \"this role and above\":\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: \"my-app\",\n auth: {\n roleHierarchy: ['member', 'admin', 'owner'], // lowest → highest\n },\n // ...\n});\n```\n\nThen in your resource definitions:\n\n```typescript\nread: { access: { roles: [\"member+\"] } }, // member, admin, owner\ncrud: {\n create: { access: { roles: [\"admin+\"] } }, // admin, owner\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"owner\"] } }, // owner only (no +)\n}\n```\n\nThe `+` suffix expands at compile time — `\"member+\"` becomes `[\"member\", \"admin\", \"owner\"]` in the generated code. You can mix hierarchical and exact roles: `roles: [\"member+\", \"finance\"]` expands to `[\"member\", \"admin\", \"owner\", \"finance\"]`.\n\n- Roles without `+` are exact matches (no expansion)\n- Pseudo-roles (`PUBLIC`, `AUTHENTICATED`, `USER`, `ADMIN`) cannot use the `+` suffix — they're terminal markers\n- Using `+` with a role not in the hierarchy throws a compile error\n- Using `+` without configuring `auth.roleHierarchy` throws a compile error\n\n## Configuration Options\n\n```typescript\ninterface Access {\n // Org-membership roles (OR logic — user needs at least one)\n // Matched against ctx.roles. Use \"role+\" suffix for hierarchy expansion.\n roles?: string[];\n\n // User-table role (OR logic). Matched against ctx.userRole from the\n // user.role column — independent of org membership. See userRole below.\n userRole?: string[];\n\n // Record-level conditions\n record?: {\n [field: string]: FieldCondition;\n };\n\n // Combinators\n or?: Access[];\n and?: Access[];\n}\n```\n\n## `userRole` vs `roles`\n\n`roles` and `userRole` check **two different fields** and are often confused — get this wrong and you'll grant access too broadly.\n\n| Primitive | Checks | Source | Example values |\n|-----------|--------|--------|----------------|\n| `roles` | `ctx.roles` | Org membership (multi-tenant) or single-tenant mirror of `user.role` | `\"owner\"`, `\"admin\"`, `\"member\"` |\n| `userRole` | `ctx.userRole` | The `user.role` column (Better Auth admin plugin) | `\"user\"`, `\"admin\"` |\n\nIn multi-tenant mode, **`roles: [\"admin\"]` means \"org admin\" — not a platform-wide admin.** An org-admin of Acme Corp has no elevated rights across other orgs. If you want to let Better Auth system admins through regardless of org membership (e.g., for support/ops), use `userRole: [\"admin\"]`.\n\nIn single-tenant mode (`features.organizations: false`), `ctx.roles` mirrors `user.role`, so `roles: [\"admin\"]` and `userRole: [\"admin\"]` behave the same. Using `userRole` in single-tenant code is still preferred — it documents intent and keeps the gate correct if you later enable orgs.\n\n### When to use `userRole`\n\n```typescript\n// Platform admin can see SSNs on every customer record, regardless of org\nmasking: {\n ssn: { type: 'ssn', show: { userRole: ['admin'] } },\n}\n\n// Support staff (user.role === 'admin') OR the org owner can refund\naccess: {\n or: [\n { userRole: ['admin'] },\n { roles: ['owner'] },\n ],\n}\n\n// CMS-internal resource: only platform admins\nread: { access: { userRole: ['admin'] } },\ncrud: {\n create: { access: { userRole: ['admin'] } },\n update: { access: { userRole: ['admin'] } },\n delete: { access: { userRole: ['admin'] } },\n}\n```\n\nWhen `roles` and `userRole` both appear in a single `Access` node, they're combined with AND — the user must satisfy both. Use `or:` to express \"one or the other\".\n\n`userRole` doesn't expand with the `+` hierarchy suffix — user-table roles are flat (typically just `\"user\"` and `\"admin\"`). If you've added custom user-table roles via Better Auth, list them explicitly.\n\n### Pseudo-roles\n\nQuickback ships four UPPERCASE role markers that are **not backed by a Better Auth role column** — they're system-level shortcuts handled directly by the compiler. The casing carries the boundary: UPPERCASE = pseudo-role (no plugin context required), lowercase = real role from a plugin's table (e.g. `members.role` from the org plugin).\n\n| Role | Auth gate | Compile-time requirement | Runtime check |\n|------|-----------|-------------------------|---------------|\n| `PUBLIC` | bypassed | none | always passes (auth skipped) |\n| `AUTHENTICATED` | required | none | `ctx.authenticated === true` |\n| `USER` | required | resource firewall **must** scope by `userId` | `ctx.authenticated` AND (`ctx.userRole` is unset OR `ctx.userRole === \"user\"`) |\n| `ADMIN` | required | Better Auth admin plugin **must** be enabled | `ctx.authenticated && ctx.userRole === \"admin\"` |\n\nYou can mix pseudo-roles with real roles in the same list — they're OR'd together.\n\n#### `PUBLIC` — unauthenticated access\n\nUse `roles: [\"PUBLIC\"]` for public-facing endpoints like contact forms, public listings, or webhooks. Skips both the auth gate and the role check.\n\n```typescript\naccess: { roles: [\"PUBLIC\"] }\n```\n\n**Important:**\n- `PUBLIC` skips authentication and role checks — anyone can call the endpoint\n- **Firewall still applies** — data is scoped by the firewall (organization, owner, team)\n- Every `PUBLIC` action invocation is **mandatory audit logged** to the security audit table (IP address, input, result, timing)\n- The wildcard `\"*\"` is **not supported** — using it throws a compile-time error\n- Tables with no isolation columns and any `PUBLIC` route do not require `firewall: [{ exception: true }]`\n\nFor org-scoped tables, `PUBLIC` routes still filter by organization. Since the user isn't authenticated, the organization ID must be passed as a query parameter:\n\n```\nGET /api/v1/listings?organizationId=org_abc123\n```\n\nThe firewall WHERE clause is always enforced. If no `organizationId` is provided, the API returns a `400` with code `ORG_REQUIRED`.\n\n```typescript\n// Public listing page — anyone can browse, but scoped to an org\nexport default defineTable(listings, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }],\n read: { access: { roles: [\"PUBLIC\"] } }, // Public browsing + detail\n crud: {\n create: { access: { roles: [\"admin\", \"member\"] } }, // Auth required to create\n },\n});\n```\n\n#### `AUTHENTICATED` — any signed-in user\n\nUse `roles: [\"AUTHENTICATED\"]` for endpoints that any logged-in user can hit, regardless of role or org membership. No plugin context required.\n\n```typescript\n// Public events feed — any signed-in user can list/read; anonymous gets 401\nread: { access: { roles: [\"AUTHENTICATED\"] } }\n```\n\n#### `USER` — per-user records\n\nUse `roles: [\"USER\"]` for resources where each user only sees their own records. **Requires the firewall to scope by `userId`** — the role marker is the access half of the pair, the firewall is the row-filter half.\n\n```typescript\n// \"My todos\" — each caller sees only their own rows\nexport default defineTable(todos, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' }],\n read: { access: { roles: [\"USER\"] } },\n crud: {\n create: { access: { roles: [\"USER\"] } },\n update: { access: { roles: [\"USER\"] } },\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"USER\"] } },\n },\n});\n```\n\nIf you forget the `userId` firewall predicate, the compiler throws:\n\n> `roles: [\"USER\"]` requires the resource to be scoped per-user. Add a `userId` column (auto-scoped) or an explicit owner predicate. If you want any signed-in user to read all records, use `roles: [\"AUTHENTICATED\"]` instead.\n\nWhen the Better Auth admin plugin is enabled, `USER` matches `user.role === \"user\"` specifically — admins are excluded and should use `[\"USER\", \"ADMIN\"]` if the same route should serve both.\n\n#### `ADMIN` — Better Auth admin-plugin admins\n\nUse `roles: [\"ADMIN\"]` for system-administrator endpoints. **Requires the Better Auth admin plugin** so `user.role` exists. Compiles to `ctx.userRole === \"admin\"`.\n\n```typescript\n// Platform-admin-only audit log\nread: { access: { roles: [\"ADMIN\"] } }\n```\n\nWithout the admin plugin you get a compile error pointing you to either enable the plugin or use lowercase `roles: [\"admin\"]` (the org-membership admin role).\n\n#### Mixing pseudo-roles with real roles\n\nPseudo-roles and lowercase real roles compose with OR:\n\n```typescript\n// Record owner OR a system admin can read\nread: { access: { roles: [\"USER\", \"ADMIN\"] } }\n\n// Org owner OR system admin\ndelete: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"ADMIN\"] } }\n```\n\n> Note: today, an `ADMIN` match still goes through the `userId` firewall scope on USER-scoped resources — admins see only records they own on those routes. Use `firewall: { exception: true }` on a separate admin-only route if you need cross-user visibility.\n\n#### Quick reference\n\n```typescript\n// Unauthenticated public\naccess: { roles: [\"PUBLIC\"] }\n\n// Any signed-in user, no scoping\naccess: { roles: [\"AUTHENTICATED\"] }\n\n// Per-user records (requires userId firewall scope)\naccess: { roles: [\"USER\"] }\n\n// System admin (requires admin plugin)\naccess: { roles: [\"ADMIN\"] }\n\n// Org-membership roles with hierarchy expansion\naccess: { roles: [\"member+\"] } // expands to [\"member\", \"admin\", \"owner\"]\naccess: { roles: [\"admin+\"] } // expands to [\"admin\", \"owner\"]\naccess: { roles: [\"admin\"] } // exact match (no expansion)\n```\n\n```typescript\n// Field conditions - value can be string | number | boolean\ntype FieldCondition =\n | { equals: value | '$ctx.userId' | '$ctx.activeOrgId' }\n | { notEquals: value }\n | { in: value[] }\n | { notIn: value[] }\n | { lessThan: number }\n | { greaterThan: number }\n | { lessThanOrEqual: number }\n | { greaterThanOrEqual: number };\n```\n\n## Read & CRUD Configuration\n\nReads (`GET /` and `GET /:id`) live under `read:`; mutations live under `crud:`. See [Read](/compiler/definitions/read) for the full read pipeline reference.\n\n```typescript\nread: {\n // LIST + GET - GET /resource and GET /resource/:id\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\", \"interviewer\"] },\n pageSize: 25, // Default page size\n maxPageSize: 100, // Client can't exceed this\n views: { // Per-view field projections\n summary: {\n fields: ['id', 'candidateId', 'jobId', 'stage'],\n access: { roles: [\"interviewer\"] },\n },\n },\n}\n\ncrud: {\n // CREATE - POST /resource\n create: {\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\"] },\n defaults: { // Default values for new records\n stage: 'applied',\n },\n },\n\n // UPDATE - PATCH /resource/:id\n update: {\n access: {\n or: [\n { roles: [\"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\"] },\n { roles: [\"interviewer\"], record: { stage: { equals: \"interview\" } } }\n ]\n },\n },\n\n // DELETE - DELETE /resource/:id\n delete: {\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] },\n mode: \"soft\", // 'soft' (default) or 'hard'\n },\n\n // PUT - PUT /resource/:id (only when generateId: false + guards: false)\n put: {\n access: { roles: [\"hiring-manager\", \"sync-service\"] },\n },\n}\n```\n\n## Evaluation Order\n\nGenerated `/:id` and batch handlers evaluate access in this fixed order:\n\n1. **Auth gate** — 401 if unauthenticated\n2. **Pre-record access** — role-only check (skips `access.record` predicates)\n3. **Firewall query** — `WHERE` clause filters by ownership\n4. **Post-record access** — full check including record-level predicates\n5. **Masking** — applied to the response\n\nStep 2 closes the 404-vs-403 ID-probe channel: an unauthorized caller without\na matching role gets 403 before the database is touched, so they can't tell\napart \"row exists out-of-scope\" from \"row doesn't exist.\" A caller with the\nright role but the wrong tenant gets 403 by default (firewall reveals via\nthe access layer); set\n[`firewallErrorMode: 'hide'`](/compiler/definitions/firewall) to return an\nopaque 404 instead.\n\nFunction-form access (`access: async (ctx, record) => ...`) is opaque to\nthe pre-record phase and always passes there; it's fully evaluated post-record.\n\n## List Filtering (Query Parameters)\n\nThe LIST endpoint automatically supports filtering via query params:\n\n```\nGET /jobs?status=open # Exact match\nGET /jobs?salaryMin.gt=50000 # Greater than\nGET /jobs?salaryMin.gte=50000 # Greater than or equal\nGET /jobs?salaryMax.lt=200000 # Less than\nGET /jobs?salaryMax.lte=200000 # Less than or equal\nGET /jobs?status.ne=closed # Not equal\nGET /jobs?title.like=Engineer # Pattern match (LIKE %value%)\nGET /jobs?status.in=open,draft # IN clause\n```\n\n| Operator | Query Param | SQL Equivalent |\n|----------|-------------|----------------|\n| Equals | `?field=value` | `WHERE field = value` |\n| Not equals | `?field.ne=value` | `WHERE field != value` |\n| Greater than | `?field.gt=value` | `WHERE field > value` |\n| Greater or equal | `?field.gte=value` | `WHERE field >= value` |\n| Less than | `?field.lt=value` | `WHERE field < value` |\n| Less or equal | `?field.lte=value` | `WHERE field <= value` |\n| Pattern match | `?field.like=value` | `WHERE field LIKE '%value%'` |\n| In list | `?field.in=a,b,c` | `WHERE field IN ('a','b','c')` |\n\n## Sorting & Pagination\n\n```\nGET /jobs?sort=createdAt&order=desc # Sort by field\nGET /jobs?limit=25&offset=50 # Pagination\n```\n\n- **Default limit**: 50\n- **Max limit**: 100 (or `maxPageSize` if configured)\n- **Default order**: `asc`\n\n## Delete Modes\n\n```typescript\ndelete: {\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] },\n mode: \"soft\", // Sets deletedAt/deletedBy, record stays in DB\n}\n\ndelete: {\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] },\n mode: \"hard\", // Permanent deletion from database\n}\n```\n\n## Context Variables\n\nUse `$ctx.` prefix to reference context values in conditions:\n\n```typescript\n// User can only view their own records\naccess: {\n record: { userId: { equals: \"$ctx.userId\" } }\n}\n\n// Nested path support for complex context objects\naccess: {\n record: { ownerId: { equals: \"$ctx.user.id\" } }\n}\n```\n\n### AppContext Reference\n\n| Property | Type | Description |\n|----------|------|-------------|\n| `$ctx.userId` | `string` | Current authenticated user's ID |\n| `$ctx.activeOrgId` | `string` | User's active organization ID |\n| `$ctx.activeTeamId` | `string \\| null` | User's active team ID (if applicable) |\n| `$ctx.roles` | `string[]` | User's roles in current context |\n| `$ctx.isAnonymous` | `boolean` | Whether user is anonymous |\n| `$ctx.user` | `object` | Full user object from auth provider |\n| `$ctx.user.id` | `string` | User ID (nested path example) |\n| `$ctx.user.email` | `string` | User's email address |\n| `$ctx.{property}` | `any` | Any custom context property |\n\n## Function-Based Access\n\nFor complex access logic that can't be expressed declaratively, use a function:\n\n```typescript\ncrud: {\n update: {\n access: async (ctx, record) => {\n // Custom logic - return true to allow, false to deny\n if (ctx.roles.includes('admin')) return true;\n if (record.ownerId === ctx.userId) return true;\n\n // Check custom business logic\n const membership = await checkTeamMembership(ctx.userId, record.teamId);\n return membership.canEdit;\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nFunction access receives:\n- `ctx`: The full AppContext object\n- `record`: The record being accessed (for get/update/delete operations)"
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"content": "Define who can perform CRUD operations and under what conditions.\n\n## Basic Usage\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/applications.ts\n\nexport const applications = sqliteTable('applications', {\n id: text('id').primaryKey(),\n candidateId: text('candidate_id').notNull(),\n jobId: text('job_id').notNull(),\n stage: text('stage').notNull(),\n notes: text('notes'),\n organizationId: text('organization_id').notNull(),\n});\n\nexport default defineTable(applications, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }],\n guards: { createable: [\"candidateId\", \"jobId\", \"notes\"], updatable: [\"notes\"] },\n read: {\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\", \"interviewer\"] },\n },\n crud: {\n create: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\"] } },\n update: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\"] } },\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] } },\n },\n});\n```\n\n## Role Hierarchy\n\nIf your project uses a tiered role system (e.g., `member` < `admin` < `owner`), you can define a hierarchy in your config and use the `+` suffix to mean \"this role and above\":\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: \"my-app\",\n auth: {\n roleHierarchy: ['member', 'admin', 'owner'], // lowest → highest\n },\n // ...\n});\n```\n\nThen in your resource definitions:\n\n```typescript\nread: { access: { roles: [\"member+\"] } }, // member, admin, owner\ncrud: {\n create: { access: { roles: [\"admin+\"] } }, // admin, owner\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"owner\"] } }, // owner only (no +)\n}\n```\n\nThe `+` suffix expands at compile time — `\"member+\"` becomes `[\"member\", \"admin\", \"owner\"]` in the generated code. You can mix hierarchical and exact roles: `roles: [\"member+\", \"finance\"]` expands to `[\"member\", \"admin\", \"owner\", \"finance\"]`.\n\n- Roles without `+` are exact matches (no expansion)\n- Pseudo-roles (`PUBLIC`, `AUTHENTICATED`, `USER`, `ADMIN`) cannot use the `+` suffix — they're terminal markers\n- Using `+` with a role not in the hierarchy throws a compile error\n- Using `+` without configuring `auth.roleHierarchy` throws a compile error\n\n## Configuration Options\n\n```typescript\ninterface Access {\n // Org-membership roles (OR logic — user needs at least one)\n // Matched against ctx.roles. Use \"role+\" suffix for hierarchy expansion.\n roles?: string[];\n\n // User-table role (OR logic). Matched against ctx.userRole from the\n // user.role column — independent of org membership. See userRole below.\n userRole?: string[];\n\n // Record-level conditions\n record?: {\n [field: string]: FieldCondition;\n };\n\n // Combinators\n or?: Access[];\n and?: Access[];\n}\n```\n\n## `userRole` vs `roles`\n\n`roles` and `userRole` check **two different fields** and are often confused — get this wrong and you'll grant access too broadly.\n\n| Primitive | Checks | Source | Example values |\n|-----------|--------|--------|----------------|\n| `roles` | `ctx.roles` | Org membership (multi-tenant) or single-tenant mirror of `user.role` | `\"owner\"`, `\"admin\"`, `\"member\"` |\n| `userRole` | `ctx.userRole` | The `user.role` column (Better Auth admin plugin) | `\"user\"`, `\"admin\"` |\n\nIn multi-tenant mode, **`roles: [\"admin\"]` means \"org admin\" — not a platform-wide admin.** An org-admin of Acme Corp has no elevated rights across other orgs. If you want to let Better Auth system admins through regardless of org membership (e.g., for support/ops), use `userRole: [\"admin\"]`.\n\nIn single-tenant mode (`features.organizations: false`), `ctx.roles` mirrors `user.role`, so `roles: [\"admin\"]` and `userRole: [\"admin\"]` behave the same. Using `userRole` in single-tenant code is still preferred — it documents intent and keeps the gate correct if you later enable orgs.\n\n### When to use `userRole`\n\n```typescript\n// Platform admin can see SSNs on every customer record, regardless of org\nmasking: {\n ssn: { type: 'ssn', show: { userRole: ['admin'] } },\n}\n\n// Support staff (user.role === 'admin') OR the org owner can refund\naccess: {\n or: [\n { userRole: ['admin'] },\n { roles: ['owner'] },\n ],\n}\n\n// CMS-internal resource: only platform admins\nread: { access: { userRole: ['admin'] } },\ncrud: {\n create: { access: { userRole: ['admin'] } },\n update: { access: { userRole: ['admin'] } },\n delete: { access: { userRole: ['admin'] } },\n}\n```\n\nWhen `roles` and `userRole` both appear in a single `Access` node, they're combined with AND — the user must satisfy both. Use `or:` to express \"one or the other\".\n\n`userRole` doesn't expand with the `+` hierarchy suffix — user-table roles are flat (typically just `\"user\"` and `\"admin\"`). If you've added custom user-table roles via Better Auth, list them explicitly.\n\n### Pseudo-roles\n\nQuickback ships four UPPERCASE role markers that are **not backed by a Better Auth role column** — they're system-level shortcuts handled directly by the compiler. The casing carries the boundary: UPPERCASE = pseudo-role (no plugin context required), lowercase = real role from a plugin's table (e.g. `members.role` from the org plugin).\n\n| Role | Auth gate | Compile-time requirement | Runtime check |\n|------|-----------|-------------------------|---------------|\n| `PUBLIC` | bypassed | **read-only** — rejected on `crud.create`/`update`/`delete` and on actions | always passes (auth skipped) |\n| `AUTHENTICATED` | required | none | `ctx.authenticated === true` |\n| `USER` | required | resource firewall **must** scope by `userId` | `ctx.authenticated` AND (`ctx.userRole` is unset OR `ctx.userRole === \"user\"`) |\n| `ADMIN` | required | Better Auth admin plugin **must** be enabled | `ctx.authenticated && ctx.userRole === \"admin\"` |\n\nYou can mix pseudo-roles with real roles in the same list — they're OR'd together.\n\n#### `PUBLIC` — unauthenticated access\n\nUse `roles: [\"PUBLIC\"]` for public-facing endpoints like contact forms, public listings, or webhooks. Skips both the auth gate and the role check.\n\n```typescript\naccess: { roles: [\"PUBLIC\"] }\n```\n\n**Important:**\n- `PUBLIC` skips authentication and role checks — anyone can call the endpoint\n- **`PUBLIC` is read-only.** It's allowed on `read.access`, `crud.list`, `crud.get`, and `read.views.*`, but **rejected at compile time** on `crud.create`, `crud.update`, `crud.delete`, and on actions. Anonymous writes are almost always a misconfiguration (vibe-coded `/comments` POST endpoints, runaway forms). If you genuinely need an anonymous write surface — public form submission, webhook ingest — declare a custom action that does its own auth (signed payload, captcha, HMAC) and use `firewall: { exception: true }` on the resource.\n- **Firewall still applies** — data is scoped by the firewall (organization, owner, team)\n- Every `PUBLIC` action invocation is **mandatory audit logged** to the security audit table (IP address, input, result, timing)\n- The wildcard `\"*\"` is **not supported** — using it throws a compile-time error\n- Tables with no isolation columns and any `PUBLIC` route do not require `firewall: [{ exception: true }]`\n\nFor org-scoped tables, `PUBLIC` routes still filter by organization. Since the user isn't authenticated, the organization ID must be passed as a query parameter:\n\n```\nGET /api/v1/listings?organizationId=org_abc123\n```\n\nThe firewall WHERE clause is always enforced. If no `organizationId` is provided, the API returns a `400` with code `ORG_REQUIRED`.\n\n```typescript\n// Public listing page — anyone can browse, but scoped to an org\nexport default defineTable(listings, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }],\n read: { access: { roles: [\"PUBLIC\"] } }, // Public browsing + detail\n crud: {\n create: { access: { roles: [\"admin\", \"member\"] } }, // Auth required to create\n },\n});\n```\n\n#### `AUTHENTICATED` — any signed-in user\n\nUse `roles: [\"AUTHENTICATED\"]` for endpoints that any logged-in user can hit, regardless of role or org membership. No plugin context required.\n\n```typescript\n// Public events feed — any signed-in user can list/read; anonymous gets 401\nread: { access: { roles: [\"AUTHENTICATED\"] } }\n```\n\n#### `USER` — per-user records\n\nUse `roles: [\"USER\"]` for resources where each user only sees their own records. **Requires the firewall to scope by `userId`** — the role marker is the access half of the pair, the firewall is the row-filter half.\n\n```typescript\n// \"My todos\" — each caller sees only their own rows\nexport default defineTable(todos, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'userId', equals: 'ctx.userId' }],\n read: { access: { roles: [\"USER\"] } },\n crud: {\n create: { access: { roles: [\"USER\"] } },\n update: { access: { roles: [\"USER\"] } },\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"USER\"] } },\n },\n});\n```\n\nIf you forget the `userId` firewall predicate, the compiler throws:\n\n> `roles: [\"USER\"]` requires the resource to be scoped per-user. Add a `userId` column (auto-scoped) or an explicit owner predicate. If you want any signed-in user to read all records, use `roles: [\"AUTHENTICATED\"]` instead.\n\nWhen the Better Auth admin plugin is enabled, `USER` matches `user.role === \"user\"` specifically — admins are excluded and should use `[\"USER\", \"ADMIN\"]` if the same route should serve both.\n\n#### `ADMIN` — Better Auth admin-plugin admins\n\nUse `roles: [\"ADMIN\"]` for system-administrator endpoints. **Requires the Better Auth admin plugin** so `user.role` exists. Compiles to `ctx.userRole === \"admin\"`.\n\n```typescript\n// Platform-admin-only audit log\nread: { access: { roles: [\"ADMIN\"] } }\n```\n\nWithout the admin plugin you get a compile error pointing you to either enable the plugin or use lowercase `roles: [\"admin\"]` (the org-membership admin role).\n\n#### Mixing pseudo-roles with real roles\n\nPseudo-roles and lowercase real roles compose with OR:\n\n```typescript\n// Record owner OR a system admin can read\nread: { access: { roles: [\"USER\", \"ADMIN\"] } }\n\n// Org owner OR system admin\ndelete: { access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"ADMIN\"] } }\n```\n\n> Note: today, an `ADMIN` match still goes through the `userId` firewall scope on USER-scoped resources — admins see only records they own on those routes. Use `firewall: { exception: true }` on a separate admin-only route if you need cross-user visibility.\n\n#### Quick reference\n\n```typescript\n// Unauthenticated public\naccess: { roles: [\"PUBLIC\"] }\n\n// Any signed-in user, no scoping\naccess: { roles: [\"AUTHENTICATED\"] }\n\n// Per-user records (requires userId firewall scope)\naccess: { roles: [\"USER\"] }\n\n// System admin (requires admin plugin)\naccess: { roles: [\"ADMIN\"] }\n\n// Org-membership roles with hierarchy expansion\naccess: { roles: [\"member+\"] } // expands to [\"member\", \"admin\", \"owner\"]\naccess: { roles: [\"admin+\"] } // expands to [\"admin\", \"owner\"]\naccess: { roles: [\"admin\"] } // exact match (no expansion)\n```\n\n```typescript\n// Field conditions - value can be string | number | boolean\ntype FieldCondition =\n | { equals: value | '$ctx.userId' | '$ctx.activeOrgId' }\n | { notEquals: value }\n | { in: value[] }\n | { notIn: value[] }\n | { lessThan: number }\n | { greaterThan: number }\n | { lessThanOrEqual: number }\n | { greaterThanOrEqual: number };\n```\n\n## Read & CRUD Configuration\n\nReads (`GET /` and `GET /:id`) live under `read:`; mutations live under `crud:`. See [Read](/compiler/definitions/read) for the full read pipeline reference.\n\n```typescript\nread: {\n // LIST + GET - GET /resource and GET /resource/:id\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\", \"interviewer\"] },\n pageSize: 25, // Default page size\n maxPageSize: 100, // Client can't exceed this\n views: { // Per-view field projections\n summary: {\n fields: ['id', 'candidateId', 'jobId', 'stage'],\n access: { roles: [\"interviewer\"] },\n },\n },\n}\n\ncrud: {\n // CREATE - POST /resource\n create: {\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\"] },\n defaults: { // Default values for new records\n stage: 'applied',\n },\n },\n\n // UPDATE - PATCH /resource/:id\n update: {\n access: {\n or: [\n { roles: [\"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\"] },\n { roles: [\"interviewer\"], record: { stage: { equals: \"interview\" } } }\n ]\n },\n },\n\n // DELETE - DELETE /resource/:id\n delete: {\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] },\n mode: \"soft\", // 'soft' (default) or 'hard'\n },\n\n // PUT - PUT /resource/:id (only when generateId: false + guards: false)\n put: {\n access: { roles: [\"hiring-manager\", \"sync-service\"] },\n },\n}\n```\n\n## Evaluation Order\n\nGenerated `/:id` and batch handlers evaluate access in this fixed order:\n\n1. **Auth gate** — 401 if unauthenticated\n2. **Pre-record access** — role-only check (skips `access.record` predicates)\n3. **Firewall query** — `WHERE` clause filters by ownership\n4. **Post-record access** — full check including record-level predicates\n5. **Masking** — applied to the response\n\nStep 2 closes the 404-vs-403 ID-probe channel: an unauthorized caller without\na matching role gets 403 before the database is touched, so they can't tell\napart \"row exists out-of-scope\" from \"row doesn't exist.\" A caller with the\nright role but the wrong tenant gets 403 by default (firewall reveals via\nthe access layer); set\n[`firewallErrorMode: 'hide'`](/compiler/definitions/firewall) to return an\nopaque 404 instead.\n\nFunction-form access (`access: async (ctx, record) => ...`) is opaque to\nthe pre-record phase and always passes there; it's fully evaluated post-record.\n\n## List Filtering (Query Parameters)\n\nThe LIST endpoint automatically supports filtering via query params:\n\n```\nGET /jobs?status=open # Exact match\nGET /jobs?salaryMin.gt=50000 # Greater than\nGET /jobs?salaryMin.gte=50000 # Greater than or equal\nGET /jobs?salaryMax.lt=200000 # Less than\nGET /jobs?salaryMax.lte=200000 # Less than or equal\nGET /jobs?status.ne=closed # Not equal\nGET /jobs?title.like=Engineer # Pattern match (LIKE %value%)\nGET /jobs?status.in=open,draft # IN clause\n```\n\n| Operator | Query Param | SQL Equivalent |\n|----------|-------------|----------------|\n| Equals | `?field=value` | `WHERE field = value` |\n| Not equals | `?field.ne=value` | `WHERE field != value` |\n| Greater than | `?field.gt=value` | `WHERE field > value` |\n| Greater or equal | `?field.gte=value` | `WHERE field >= value` |\n| Less than | `?field.lt=value` | `WHERE field < value` |\n| Less or equal | `?field.lte=value` | `WHERE field <= value` |\n| Pattern match | `?field.like=value` | `WHERE field LIKE '%value%'` |\n| In list | `?field.in=a,b,c` | `WHERE field IN ('a','b','c')` |\n\n## Sorting & Pagination\n\n```\nGET /jobs?sort=createdAt&order=desc # Sort by field\nGET /jobs?limit=25&offset=50 # Pagination\n```\n\n- **Default limit**: 50\n- **Max limit**: 100 (or `maxPageSize` if configured)\n- **Default order**: `asc`\n\n## Delete Modes\n\n```typescript\ndelete: {\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] },\n mode: \"soft\", // Sets deletedAt/deletedBy, record stays in DB\n}\n\ndelete: {\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"hiring-manager\"] },\n mode: \"hard\", // Permanent deletion from database\n}\n```\n\n## Context Variables\n\nUse `$ctx.` prefix to reference context values in conditions:\n\n```typescript\n// User can only view their own records\naccess: {\n record: { userId: { equals: \"$ctx.userId\" } }\n}\n\n// Nested path support for complex context objects\naccess: {\n record: { ownerId: { equals: \"$ctx.user.id\" } }\n}\n```\n\n### AppContext Reference\n\n| Property | Type | Description |\n|----------|------|-------------|\n| `$ctx.userId` | `string` | Current authenticated user's ID |\n| `$ctx.activeOrgId` | `string` | User's active organization ID |\n| `$ctx.activeTeamId` | `string \\| null` | User's active team ID (if applicable) |\n| `$ctx.roles` | `string[]` | User's roles in current context |\n| `$ctx.isAnonymous` | `boolean` | Whether user is anonymous |\n| `$ctx.user` | `object` | Full user object from auth provider |\n| `$ctx.user.id` | `string` | User ID (nested path example) |\n| `$ctx.user.email` | `string` | User's email address |\n| `$ctx.{property}` | `any` | Any custom context property |\n\n## Function-Based Access\n\nFor complex access logic that can't be expressed declaratively, use a function:\n\n```typescript\ncrud: {\n update: {\n access: async (ctx, record) => {\n // Custom logic - return true to allow, false to deny\n if (ctx.roles.includes('admin')) return true;\n if (record.ownerId === ctx.userId) return true;\n\n // Check custom business logic\n const membership = await checkTeamMembership(ctx.userId, record.teamId);\n return membership.canEdit;\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nFunction access receives:\n- `ctx`: The full AppContext object\n- `record`: The record being accessed (for get/update/delete operations)"
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"content": "Hide sensitive data from unauthorized users while showing it to those with permission.\n\n## Automatic Masking (Secure by Default)\n\nQuickback automatically applies masking to columns that match sensitive naming patterns. This ensures a high security posture even if you don't explicitly configure masking.\n\n### Sensitive Keywords & Default Masks\n\n| Pattern | Default Mask | Description |\n| :--- | :--- | :--- |\n| `email` | `email` | p***@e******.com |\n| `phone`, `mobile`, `fax` | `phone` | ******4567 |\n| `ssn`, `socialsecurity`, `nationalid` | `ssn` | *****6789 |\n| `creditcard`, `cc`, `cardnumber`, `cvv` | `creditCard` | ************1234 |\n| `iban` | `
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"content": "Hide sensitive data from unauthorized users while showing it to those with permission.\n\n## Automatic Masking (Secure by Default)\n\nQuickback automatically applies masking to columns that match sensitive naming patterns. This ensures a high security posture even if you don't explicitly configure masking.\n\n### Sensitive Keywords & Default Masks\n\n| Pattern | Default Mask | Description |\n| :--- | :--- | :--- |\n| `email` | `email` | p***@e******.com |\n| `phone`, `mobile`, `fax` | `phone` | ******4567 |\n| `ssn`, `socialsecurity`, `nationalid` | `ssn` | *****6789 |\n| `creditcard`, `cc`, `cardnumber`, `cvv` | `creditCard` | ************1234 |\n| `iban` | `redact` | [REDACTED] |\n| `password`, `secret`, `token`, `apikey`, `privatekey` | `redact` | [REDACTED] |\n| `accesstoken`, `refreshtoken`, `clientsecret`, `signingsecret`, `bearer` | `redact` | [REDACTED] |\n| `stripe`, `webhook` | `redact` | [REDACTED] |\n\n### Build-Time Alerts\n\nIf the compiler auto-detects a sensitive column that you haven't explicitly configured, it will emit a warning:\n\n```bash\n[Warning] Auto-masking enabled for sensitive column \"users.email\". Explicitly configure masking to silence this warning.\n```\n\nTo silence this warning or change the behavior, simply define the field explicitly in your `masking` configuration. Explicit configurations always take precedence over auto-detected defaults.\n\n#### Tables without an owner column\n\nThe default auto-mask predicate is `show: { or: 'owner', roles: ['admin'] }` — admins always see the value, the row's owner sees their own. If the table has no owner column at all (no `userId` / `ownerId` and no `q.scope('owner')`), the compiler drops the `owner` clause and emits a second warning so the rule is still safe but transparent:\n\n```bash\n[Warning] Auto-masking on \"people.email\" requested owner OR-show, but \"people\"\n has no \"ownerId\" column. Falling back to roles-only (roles: [\"admin\"]).\n Declare `masking: { email: { show: { roles: [...] } } }` explicitly to\n silence this and pick a real predicate.\n```\n\nThis is a real behavioral signal, not boilerplate — the auto-detector can't tell whether the table is \"ownerless on purpose\" (e.g. a shared lookup table) or \"should have an owner column but was authored without one.\" Declare the predicate explicitly to silence the warning and lock in the intent.\n\n### Overriding Defaults\n\nIf you want to show a sensitive field to everyone (disable masking) or use a different rule, define it explicitly in the `resource.masking` block:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(candidates, {\n masking: {\n // Show email to everyone (overrides auto-masking)\n email: { type: 'email', show: { roles: ['everyone'] } },\n\n // Silence warning but keep secure (recruiter and above only)\n phone: { type: 'phone', show: { roles: ['owner', 'hiring-manager', 'recruiter'] } }\n }\n});\n```\n\n## Basic Usage\n\n```typescript\n// features/candidates/candidates.ts\n\nexport default feature('candidates', {\n columns: {\n id: q.id(),\n name: q.text().required(),\n email: q.text().required(),\n phone: q.text().optional(),\n resumeUrl: q.text().optional(),\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'),\n },\n guards: { createable: [\"name\", \"email\", \"phone\", \"resumeUrl\"], updatable: [\"name\", \"phone\"] },\n masking: {\n email: { type: 'email', show: { roles: ['owner', 'hiring-manager', 'recruiter'] } },\n phone: { type: 'phone', show: { roles: ['owner', 'hiring-manager', 'recruiter'] } },\n },\n read: { access: { roles: ['owner', 'hiring-manager', 'recruiter', 'interviewer'] } },\n crud: { /* ... */ },\n});\n```\n\n## Built-in Mask Types\n\n| Type | Example Input | Masked Output |\n|------|---------------|---------------|\n| `'email'` | `john@yourdomain.com` | `j***@y*********.com` |\n| `'phone'` | `555-123-4567` | `******4567` |\n| `'ssn'` | `123-45-6789` | `*****6789` |\n| `'creditCard'` | `4111111111111111` | `************1111` |\n| `'name'` | `John Smith` | `J*** S****` |\n| `'redact'` | `anything` | `[REDACTED]` |\n| `'custom'` | (your logic) | (your output) |\n\n## Configuration\n\n```typescript\nmasking: {\n // Basic masking - everyone sees masked value\n phone: { type: 'phone' },\n\n // Show unmasked to specific roles\n email: {\n type: 'email',\n show: { roles: ['hiring-manager', 'recruiter'] }\n },\n\n // Show unmasked to owner (createdBy === ctx.userId)\n resumeUrl: {\n type: 'redact',\n show: { or: 'owner' }\n },\n\n // Custom mask function\n externalProfileUrl: {\n type: 'custom',\n mask: (value) => value.slice(0, 4) + '...' + value.slice(-4),\n show: { roles: ['recruiter'] }\n },\n}\n```\n\n## Show Conditions\n\n```typescript\nshow: {\n roles?: string[]; // Unmasked if user has any of these roles\n or?: 'owner'; // Unmasked if user is the record owner\n}\n```\n\nThe `'owner'` condition compares against the owner column declared via `q.scope('owner')` (or auto-detected from a `userId` / `ownerId` column). If no owner scope is present, it falls back to `createdBy`.\n\n## Query Gate (filter / sort / search)\n\nMasking has a second concern beyond hiding values in the response: a non-admin caller could enumerate masked PII via the query string — e.g. `?filter=email:like:%@target.com` — and infer presence even when the response payload is redacted. The `query` allowlist closes this:\n\n```typescript\nmasking: {\n email: {\n type: 'email',\n show: { roles: ['admin'] },\n // Optional — defaults to show.roles when omitted\n query: { roles: ['admin'] },\n },\n}\n```\n\n`query` is a single role gate that covers `?filter`, `?sort`, and `?search` uniformly. When omitted, it inherits from `show.roles` — \"if you can see it, you can query it\" — which is the right shape for almost all PII.\n\nA view can opt back in for a higher-privileged role pair by listing the column in its own `query.{filterable,searchable,sortable}` allowlist. The compiler validates at build time that the view's access roles intersect the masking `query.roles` (or `show.roles` when `query` is omitted), so the opt-in can never reach a caller who'd see the value masked.\n\n```typescript\nmasking: {\n email: { type: 'email', show: { roles: ['admin'] } },\n // query: defaults to show.roles → ['admin']\n},\nread: {\n views: {\n pipeline: {\n fields: ['id', 'name'],\n access: { roles: ['member', 'admin'] },\n query: {\n searchable: ['name'], // email NOT listed → not searchable on this view\n },\n },\n full: {\n fields: ['id', 'name', 'email'],\n access: { roles: ['admin'] },\n query: {\n filterable: ['email'], // ✓ admin satisfies email's query gate\n searchable: ['name', 'email'],\n },\n },\n },\n},\n```\n\n`query` replaces the legacy per-capability flags (`filterable`, `searchable`, `sortable`). Setting any of those is rejected at compile time with a migration hint.\n\n## Complete Example\n\n```typescript\n// features/candidates/candidates.ts\n\nexport default feature('candidates', {\n columns: {\n id: q.id(),\n name: q.text().required().filterable('like').searchable(),\n email: q.text().required().filterable('eq').searchable(),\n phone: q.text().optional().filterable('eq'),\n resumeUrl: q.text().optional(),\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'),\n },\n guards: {\n createable: ['name', 'email', 'phone', 'resumeUrl'],\n updatable: ['name', 'phone'],\n },\n masking: {\n email: { type: 'email', show: { roles: ['admin+'] } },\n phone: { type: 'phone', show: { roles: ['admin+'] } },\n resumeUrl: {\n type: 'custom',\n mask: () => '[RESUME LINK HIDDEN]',\n show: { roles: ['admin+'] },\n },\n },\n read: {\n access: { roles: ['member+'] },\n views: {\n pipeline: {\n fields: ['id', 'name'],\n access: { roles: ['member+'] },\n query: { searchable: ['name'] },\n },\n full: {\n fields: ['id', 'name', 'email', 'phone', 'resumeUrl'],\n access: { roles: ['admin+'] },\n query: {\n filterable: ['email', 'phone'],\n searchable: ['name', 'email'],\n },\n },\n },\n },\n crud: {\n create: { access: { roles: ['admin+'] } },\n update: { access: { roles: ['admin+'] } },\n delete: { access: { roles: ['owner'] }, mode: 'soft' },\n },\n});\n```"
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"content": "Quickback ships with a curated set of Better Auth plugins and helper wiring so your auth stack is production-ready by default. Enable these in `quickback.config.ts` under `providers.auth`.\n\n## Available Plugins\n\n### Email OTP (with AWS SES)\n\nQuickback wires the Better Auth Email OTP flow to AWS SES. When `emailOtp` is enabled, the compiler emits the SES plugin and combo-auth email flow (magic link + OTP).\n\n**Enable in config:**\n\n```ts\n\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: \"quickback-api\",\n providers: {\n runtime: defineRuntime(\"cloudflare\"),\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n vars: {\n AWS_SES_REGION: \"us-east-2\",\n EMAIL_FROM: \"noreply@yourdomain.com\",\n EMAIL_FROM_NAME: \"Your App | Account Services\",\n APP_NAME: \"Your App\",\n APP_URL: \"https://account.yourdomain.com\",\n BETTER_AUTH_URL: \"https://api.yourdomain.com\",\n },\n }),\n auth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n emailAndPassword: { enabled: true },\n plugins: [\"emailOtp\"],\n }),\n },\n});\n```\n\n**Endpoints:**\n- `POST /auth/v1/email-otp/send-verification-otp`\n- `POST /auth/v1/email-otp/verify-otp`\n\n**Email readiness check:**\n\nUse this to show UI warnings when SES isn't configured.\n\n- `GET /api/v1/system/email-status`\n- Response: `{ \"emailConfigured\": true|false }`\n\n### Upgrade Anonymous\n\nAdds a first-class endpoint to convert an anonymous user into a full user. This flips `isAnonymous` to `false` and refreshes the session cache immediately.\n\n**Enable in config:**\n\n```ts\nauth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n emailAndPassword: { enabled: true },\n plugins: [\"anonymous\", \"upgradeAnonymous\"],\n}),\n```\n\n**Endpoint:**\n- `POST /auth/v1/upgrade-anonymous`\n\n**Note:** If you send `Content-Type: application/json`, include a body (an empty `{}` is fine). This avoids request parsing errors in some clients.\n\n### AWS SES Plugin\n\nThis is a Quickback-provided Better Auth plugin for Email OTP and other transactional emails. It handles SES signing and delivery over the Web Crypto API so it runs in Cloudflare Workers without the AWS SDK. It is wired up only when you opt in via `email.provider: 'aws-ses'` — the default transport is Cloudflare Email Sending (`send_email` binding).\n\nRequired vars (only when `email.provider: 'aws-ses'` is set; use Wrangler secrets for credentials):\n- `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID` (secret)\n- `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` (secret)\n- `AWS_SES_REGION`\n- `EMAIL_FROM`\n\nOptional vars:\n- `EMAIL_FROM_NAME`\n- `EMAIL_REPLY_TO` - Reply-to address for emails (defaults to `EMAIL_FROM`)\n- `APP_NAME`\n- `APP_URL`\n- `BETTER_AUTH_URL`\n\n### Magic Links\n\nMagic links provide passwordless authentication by sending a unique login link to the user's email. When clicked, the link authenticates the user without requiring a password.\n\n**Enable in config:**\n\n```ts\nauth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n plugins: [\"magicLink\"],\n}),\n```\n\n**Endpoints:**\n- `POST /auth/v1/magic-link/send` - Send magic link email\n- `GET /auth/v1/magic-link/verify` - Verify magic link token\n\n**Email customization:**\n\nMagic link emails use the same AWS SES configuration as Email OTP. Customize the email template via environment variables:\n\n- `APP_NAME` - Application name in email subject\n- `APP_URL` - Base URL for magic link redirect\n- `EMAIL_FROM` - Sender email address\n- `EMAIL_FROM_NAME` - Sender display name\n\n**Frontend integration:**\n\n```ts\n// Request magic link\nawait fetch('/auth/v1/magic-link/send', {\n method: 'POST',\n headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n body: JSON.stringify({ email: 'user@yourdomain.com' })\n});\n\n// User clicks link in email, which redirects to your app\n// The token is verified automatically via the callback URL\n```\n\n### Passkeys\n\nPasskeys provide passwordless authentication using WebAuthn/FIDO2. Users authenticate with biometrics (fingerprint, face) or device PIN instead of passwords.\n\n**Enable in config:**\n\n```ts\nauth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n plugins: [\"passkey\"],\n}),\n```\n\n**Required environment variable:**\n- `ACCOUNT_URL` - Your account/frontend URL (used as the relying party origin for WebAuthn)\n\n**Endpoints:**\n- `POST /auth/v1/passkey/register/options` - Get registration challenge\n- `POST /auth/v1/passkey/register/verify` - Complete registration\n- `POST /auth/v1/passkey/authenticate/options` - Get authentication challenge\n- `POST /auth/v1/passkey/authenticate/verify` - Complete authentication\n- `GET /auth/v1/passkey/list-user-passkeys` - List user's registered passkeys\n- `POST /auth/v1/passkey/delete-passkey` - Delete a registered passkey\n\n**Browser support:**\n\nPasskeys are supported in all modern browsers:\n- Chrome 67+\n- Safari 14+\n- Firefox 60+\n- Edge 79+\n\n**Registration flow:**\n\n```ts\n// 1. Get registration options\nconst optionsRes = await fetch('/auth/v1/passkey/register/options', {\n method: 'POST',\n credentials: 'include'\n});\nconst options = await optionsRes.json();\n\n// 2. Create credential using WebAuthn API\nconst credential = await navigator.credentials.create({\n publicKey: options\n});\n\n// 3. Send credential to server\nawait fetch('/auth/v1/passkey/register/verify', {\n method: 'POST',\n headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n credentials: 'include',\n body: JSON.stringify(credential)\n});\n```\n\n**Authentication flow:**\n\n```ts\n// 1. Get authentication options\nconst optionsRes = await fetch('/auth/v1/passkey/authenticate/options', {\n method: 'POST'\n});\nconst options = await optionsRes.json();\n\n// 2. Get credential using WebAuthn API\nconst credential = await navigator.credentials.get({\n publicKey: options\n});\n\n// 3. Verify credential\nawait fetch('/auth/v1/passkey/authenticate/verify', {\n method: 'POST',\n headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n credentials: 'include',\n body: JSON.stringify(credential)\n});\n```\n\n### JWT Plugin\n\nBetter Auth's JWT plugin adds asymmetric-signed tokens and a JWKS endpoint for external services that need to verify user identity without sharing a shared secret.\n\n**Enable in config:**\n\n```ts\nauth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n plugins: [\"jwt\"],\n}),\n```\n\n**Endpoints:**\n- `GET /auth/v1/jwks` — public keys for verifying BA-issued tokens\n- `POST /auth/v1/token` — mint an asymmetric-signed JWT from the current session\n\n**When to enable:** you have external services (non-Quickback workers, third-party integrations) that need to verify a user's identity via JWKS without holding `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`. The BA-issued tokens won't carry Quickback's `orgId`/`role` claims, so they're for identity, not API access.\n\n## Where This Runs\n\nAll Better Auth plugin routes are served under your auth base path:\n\n```\n/auth/v1/*\n```"
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"content": "Quickback ships with a curated set of Better Auth plugins and helper wiring so your auth stack is production-ready by default. Enable these in `quickback.config.ts` under `providers.auth`.\n\n## Available Plugins\n\n### Email OTP (with AWS SES)\n\nQuickback wires the Better Auth Email OTP flow to AWS SES. When `emailOtp` is enabled, the compiler emits the SES plugin and combo-auth email flow (magic link + OTP).\n\n**Enable in config:**\n\n```ts\n\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: \"quickback-api\",\n providers: {\n runtime: defineRuntime(\"cloudflare\"),\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n vars: {\n AWS_SES_REGION: \"us-east-2\",\n EMAIL_FROM: \"noreply@yourdomain.com\",\n EMAIL_FROM_NAME: \"Your App | Account Services\",\n APP_NAME: \"Your App\",\n APP_URL: \"https://account.yourdomain.com\",\n BETTER_AUTH_URL: \"https://api.yourdomain.com\",\n },\n }),\n auth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n emailAndPassword: { enabled: true },\n plugins: [\"emailOtp\"],\n }),\n },\n});\n```\n\n**Endpoints:**\n- `POST /auth/v1/email-otp/send-verification-otp`\n- `POST /auth/v1/email-otp/verify-otp`\n\n**Email readiness check:**\n\nUse this to show UI warnings when SES isn't configured.\n\n- `GET /api/v1/system/email-status`\n- Response: `{ \"emailConfigured\": true|false }`\n\n### Upgrade Anonymous\n\nAdds a first-class endpoint to convert an anonymous user into a full user. This flips `isAnonymous` to `false` and refreshes the session cache immediately.\n\n**Enable in config:**\n\n```ts\nauth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n emailAndPassword: { enabled: true },\n plugins: [\"anonymous\", \"upgradeAnonymous\"],\n}),\n```\n\n**Endpoint:**\n- `POST /auth/v1/upgrade-anonymous`\n\n**Note:** If you send `Content-Type: application/json`, include a body (an empty `{}` is fine). This avoids request parsing errors in some clients.\n\n### AWS SES Plugin\n\nThis is a Quickback-provided Better Auth plugin for Email OTP and other transactional emails. It handles SES signing and delivery over the Web Crypto API so it runs in Cloudflare Workers without the AWS SDK. It is wired up only when you opt in via `email.provider: 'aws-ses'` — the default transport is Cloudflare Email Sending (`send_email` binding).\n\nRequired vars (only when `email.provider: 'aws-ses'` is set; use Wrangler secrets for credentials):\n- `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID` (secret)\n- `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` (secret)\n- `AWS_SES_REGION`\n- `EMAIL_FROM`\n\nOptional vars:\n- `EMAIL_FROM_NAME`\n- `EMAIL_REPLY_TO` - Reply-to address for emails (defaults to `EMAIL_FROM`)\n- `APP_NAME`\n- `APP_URL`\n- `BETTER_AUTH_URL`\n\n### Magic Links\n\nMagic links provide passwordless authentication by sending a unique login link to the user's email. When clicked, the link authenticates the user without requiring a password.\n\n**Enable in config:**\n\n```ts\nauth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n plugins: [\"magicLink\"],\n}),\n```\n\n**Endpoints:**\n- `POST /auth/v1/magic-link/send` - Send magic link email\n- `GET /auth/v1/magic-link/verify` - Verify magic link token\n\n**Email customization:**\n\nMagic link emails use the same AWS SES configuration as Email OTP. Customize the email template via environment variables:\n\n- `APP_NAME` - Application name in email subject\n- `APP_URL` - Base URL for magic link redirect\n- `EMAIL_FROM` - Sender email address\n- `EMAIL_FROM_NAME` - Sender display name\n\n**Frontend integration:**\n\n```ts\n// Request magic link\nawait fetch('/auth/v1/magic-link/send', {\n method: 'POST',\n headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n body: JSON.stringify({ email: 'user@yourdomain.com' })\n});\n\n// User clicks link in email, which redirects to your app\n// The token is verified automatically via the callback URL\n```\n\n### Passkeys\n\nPasskeys provide passwordless authentication using WebAuthn/FIDO2. Users authenticate with biometrics (fingerprint, face) or device PIN instead of passwords.\n\n**Enable in config:**\n\n```ts\nauth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n plugins: [\"passkey\"],\n}),\n```\n\n**Required environment variable:**\n- `ACCOUNT_URL` - Your account/frontend URL (used as the relying party origin for WebAuthn)\n\n**Endpoints:**\n- `POST /auth/v1/passkey/register/options` - Get registration challenge\n- `POST /auth/v1/passkey/register/verify` - Complete registration\n- `POST /auth/v1/passkey/authenticate/options` - Get authentication challenge\n- `POST /auth/v1/passkey/authenticate/verify` - Complete authentication\n- `GET /auth/v1/passkey/list-user-passkeys` - List user's registered passkeys\n- `POST /auth/v1/passkey/delete-passkey` - Delete a registered passkey\n\n**Browser support:**\n\nPasskeys are supported in all modern browsers:\n- Chrome 67+\n- Safari 14+\n- Firefox 60+\n- Edge 79+\n\n**Registration flow:**\n\n```ts\n// 1. Get registration options\nconst optionsRes = await fetch('/auth/v1/passkey/register/options', {\n method: 'POST',\n credentials: 'include'\n});\nconst options = await optionsRes.json();\n\n// 2. Create credential using WebAuthn API\nconst credential = await navigator.credentials.create({\n publicKey: options\n});\n\n// 3. Send credential to server\nawait fetch('/auth/v1/passkey/register/verify', {\n method: 'POST',\n headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n credentials: 'include',\n body: JSON.stringify(credential)\n});\n```\n\n**Authentication flow:**\n\n```ts\n// 1. Get authentication options\nconst optionsRes = await fetch('/auth/v1/passkey/authenticate/options', {\n method: 'POST'\n});\nconst options = await optionsRes.json();\n\n// 2. Get credential using WebAuthn API\nconst credential = await navigator.credentials.get({\n publicKey: options\n});\n\n// 3. Verify credential\nawait fetch('/auth/v1/passkey/authenticate/verify', {\n method: 'POST',\n headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },\n credentials: 'include',\n body: JSON.stringify(credential)\n});\n```\n\n### JWT Plugin\n\nBetter Auth's JWT plugin adds asymmetric-signed tokens and a JWKS endpoint for external services that need to verify user identity without sharing a shared secret.\n\n**Enable in config:**\n\n```ts\nauth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n plugins: [\"jwt\"],\n}),\n```\n\n**Endpoints:**\n- `GET /auth/v1/jwks` — public keys for verifying BA-issued tokens\n- `POST /auth/v1/token` — mint an asymmetric-signed JWT from the current session\n\n**When to enable:** you have external services (non-Quickback workers, third-party integrations) that need to verify a user's identity via JWKS without holding `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`. The BA-issued tokens won't carry Quickback's `orgId`/`role` claims, so they're for identity, not API access.\n\n### API Keys\n\nStatic, long-lived credentials for cron jobs, scripts, and machine-to-machine integrations. Better Auth's `apiKey` plugin is auto-included when you enable the organizations feature, so no explicit config is required for the standard B2B SaaS shape.\n\n**Authenticating requests:**\n\nPass the key as the `x-api-key` header (preferred) or as an `?api_key=` / `?key=` query parameter:\n\n```bash\n# Header form (preferred — keys don't leak into access logs or Referer)\ncurl -H \"x-api-key: ${KEY}\" https://api.example.com/v1/jobs\n\n# Query-param form (for clients that can't inject custom headers,\n# e.g., claude.ai's MCP connector)\ncurl \"https://api.example.com/v1/jobs?api_key=${KEY}\"\n```\n\nThe header takes precedence when both are present. The query-param form lands in nginx / Cloudflare access logs and `Referer` headers when the page navigates away — prefer headers whenever the client supports them.\n\n**Endpoints (managed by Better Auth):**\n- `POST /auth/v1/api-key/create` — issue a new key (returns the secret once; store it)\n- `GET /auth/v1/api-key/list` — list keys for the current user\n- `POST /auth/v1/api-key/delete` — revoke a key\n\nKeys can carry organization context via `metadata.organizationId` — when set, the auth middleware looks up the user's role in that org and populates `ctx.roles` accordingly, so a single key inherits the same firewall + access scope as the user who created it.\n\n### OAuth Provider (MCP-ready)\n\nTurns your Quickback worker into a standards-compliant OAuth 2.1 + OIDC authorization server. The plugin ships RFC 7591 dynamic client registration plus the well-known discovery documents an MCP client needs to bootstrap itself, so every future MCP client (Cursor, Claude Desktop, Cowork, custom integrations) Just Works without bespoke per-client header injection.\n\n**Enable in config:**\n\n```ts\nauth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n plugins: [\"oauthProvider\"],\n}),\n```\n\nThe compiler auto-includes Better Auth's `jwt` plugin alongside `oauthProvider` — `@better-auth/oauth-provider` delegates access-token signing to it, and schema generation fails without it.\n\n**Custom configuration** (object form):\n\n```ts\nauth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n plugins: {\n oauthProvider: {\n consentPage: \"/consent\", // path on ACCOUNT_URL — default\n loginPage: \"/login\", // path on ACCOUNT_URL — default\n allowDynamicClientRegistration: true, // default\n allowUnauthenticatedClientRegistration: true, // default — MCP needs this\n validAudiences: [\"https://api.example.com\"], // optional — defaults to BETTER_AUTH_URL\n scopes: [\"openid\", \"profile\", \"email\", \"offline_access\"],\n },\n },\n}),\n```\n\n**Endpoints:**\n\nDiscovery (public, no auth):\n- `GET /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server` — RFC 8414 metadata\n- `GET /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource` — MCP resource metadata\n- `GET /.well-known/openid-configuration` — OIDC discovery\n\nAuthorization flow:\n- `POST /oauth2/register` — RFC 7591 dynamic client registration\n- `POST /oauth2/authorize` — start auth code flow\n- `POST /oauth2/token` — exchange code or refresh for access token\n- `POST /oauth2/consent` — accept/deny (called by the consent page)\n- `POST /oauth2/introspect` — RFC 7662 token validity check\n- `POST /oauth2/revoke` — RFC 7009 token revocation\n- `GET /oauth2/userinfo` — OIDC user info (requires `openid` scope)\n\nClient management (authenticated):\n- `GET /oauth2/get-clients`, `GET /oauth2/get-client?client_id=`, `GET /oauth2/public-client?client_id=`\n- `POST /oauth2/create-client`, `POST /oauth2/update-client`, `POST /oauth2/delete-client`\n- `POST /oauth2/client/rotate-secret`\n\nConsent management:\n- `GET /oauth2/get-consents`, `GET /oauth2/get-consent?id=`\n- `POST /oauth2/update-consent`, `POST /oauth2/delete-consent`\n\n**Account SPA wiring:**\n\nThe compiled Account SPA already serves `/consent`. When `oauthProvider` is enabled, Better Auth redirects unauthenticated users to `${ACCOUNT_URL}/login?redirect=...` and authenticated users straight to `${ACCOUNT_URL}/consent?client_id=...&scope=...&oauth_query=...`. The bundled consent screen reads those params, fetches client metadata via `/oauth2/public-client`, and POSTs back to `/oauth2/consent`.\n\n**Verifying tokens in your own Workers / route handlers:**\n\nIssued tokens are JWTs by default — verify them locally without a DB hit:\n\n```ts\n\nconst serverClient = createAuthClient({\n plugins: [oauthProviderResourceClient(auth)],\n});\n\nconst token = req.headers.get(\"authorization\")?.replace(\"Bearer \", \"\");\nconst payload = await serverClient.verifyAccessToken(token, {\n verifyOptions: { issuer: env.BETTER_AUTH_URL, audience: env.BETTER_AUTH_URL },\n});\n// payload.sub → userId, payload.scope → granted scopes\n```\n\n**Why this and not the deprecated `mcp` plugin?**\n\nBetter Auth's older `better-auth/plugins/mcp` is being deprecated in favour of `@better-auth/oauth-provider`. The new package is a full OAuth 2.1 server (the MCP plugin only exposed a subset), supports dynamic registration that MCP clients now require, and lets you scope/revoke per-client.\n\nKeep `apiKey` enabled alongside it — server-to-server flows (cron, scripts) want a static key; OAuth is for interactive clients.\n\n## Where This Runs\n\nAll Better Auth plugin routes are served under your auth base path:\n\n```\n/auth/v1/*\n```"
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"content": "Quickback can generate realtime notification helpers for broadcasting changes to connected clients. This enables live updates via WebSocket using Cloudflare Durable Objects.\n\n## Enabling Realtime\n\nAdd `realtime` configuration to individual table definitions:\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/applications.ts\n\nexport const applications = sqliteTable(\"applications\", {\n id: text(\"id\").primaryKey(),\n candidateId: text(\"candidate_id\").notNull(),\n jobId: text(\"job_id\").notNull(),\n stage: text(\"stage\").notNull(),\n organizationId: text(\"organization_id\").notNull(),\n});\n\nexport default defineTable(applications, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }],\n realtime: {\n enabled: true, // Enable realtime for this table\n onInsert: true, // Broadcast on INSERT (default: true)\n onUpdate: true, // Broadcast on UPDATE (default: true)\n onDelete: true, // Broadcast on DELETE (default: true)\n requiredRoles: [\"recruiter\", \"hiring-manager\"], // Who receives broadcasts\n fields: [\"id\", \"candidateId\", \"stage\"], // Fields to include (optional)\n },\n // ... guards, crud\n});\n```\n\nWhen any table has realtime enabled, the compiler generates `src/lib/realtime.ts` with helper functions for sending notifications.\n\n## Generated Helper\n\nThe `createRealtime()` factory provides convenient methods for both Postgres Changes (CRUD events) and custom broadcasts:\n\n```typescript\n\nexport const execute: ActionExecutor = async ({ db, ctx, input }) => {\n const realtime = createRealtime(ctx.env);\n\n // After creating a record\n await realtime.insert('applications', newApplication, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n\n // After updating a record\n await realtime.update('applications', newApplication, oldApplication, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n\n // After deleting a record\n await realtime.delete('applications', { id: applicationId }, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n\n return { success: true };\n};\n```\n\n## Event Format\n\nQuickback broadcasts events in a structured JSON format for easy client-side handling.\n\n### Insert Event\n\n```typescript\nawait realtime.insert('applications', {\n id: 'app_123',\n candidateId: 'cnd_456',\n stage: 'applied'\n}, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n```\n\nBroadcasts:\n```json\n{\n \"type\": \"postgres_changes\",\n \"table\": \"applications\",\n \"eventType\": \"INSERT\",\n \"schema\": \"public\",\n \"new\": {\n \"id\": \"app_123\",\n \"candidateId\": \"cnd_456\",\n \"stage\": \"applied\"\n },\n \"old\": null\n}\n```\n\n### Update Event\n\n```typescript\nawait realtime.update('applications',\n { id: 'app_123', stage: 'interview' }, // new\n { id: 'app_123', stage: 'screening' }, // old\n ctx.activeOrgId!\n);\n```\n\nBroadcasts:\n```json\n{\n \"type\": \"postgres_changes\",\n \"table\": \"applications\",\n \"eventType\": \"UPDATE\",\n \"schema\": \"public\",\n \"new\": { \"id\": \"app_123\", \"stage\": \"interview\" },\n \"old\": { \"id\": \"app_123\", \"stage\": \"screening\" }\n}\n```\n\n### Delete Event\n\n```typescript\nawait realtime.delete('applications',\n { id: 'app_123' },\n ctx.activeOrgId!\n);\n```\n\nBroadcasts:\n```json\n{\n \"type\": \"postgres_changes\",\n \"table\": \"applications\",\n \"eventType\": \"DELETE\",\n \"schema\": \"public\",\n \"new\": null,\n \"old\": { \"id\": \"app_123\" }\n}\n```\n\n## Custom Broadcasts\n\nFor arbitrary events that don't map to CRUD operations:\n\n```typescript\nawait realtime.broadcast('screening-complete', {\n applicationId: 'app_123',\n candidateId: 'cnd_456',\n stage: 'interview'\n}, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n```\n\nBroadcasts:\n```json\n{\n \"type\": \"broadcast\",\n \"event\": \"screening-complete\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"applicationId\": \"app_123\",\n \"candidateId\": \"cnd_456\",\n \"stage\": \"interview\"\n }\n}\n```\n\n## User-Specific Broadcasts\n\nTarget a specific user instead of the entire organization:\n\n```typescript\n// Only this user receives the notification\nawait realtime.insert('notifications', newNotification, ctx.activeOrgId!, {\n userId: ctx.userId\n});\n\n// Notify a hiring manager of a new application\nawait realtime.broadcast('application-received', {\n applicationId: 'app_123',\n jobId: 'job_789'\n}, ctx.activeOrgId!, {\n userId: hiringManagerId\n});\n```\n\n## Role-Based Filtering\n\nLimit which roles receive a broadcast using `targetRoles`:\n\n```typescript\n// Only hiring managers and recruiters receive this broadcast\nawait realtime.insert('applications', application, ctx.activeOrgId!, {\n targetRoles: ['hiring-manager', 'recruiter']\n});\n\n// Interviewers only see applications assigned to them\nawait realtime.update('applications', newRecord, oldRecord, ctx.activeOrgId!, {\n targetRoles: ['hiring-manager']\n});\n```\n\nIf `targetRoles` is not specified, all authenticated users in the organization receive the broadcast.\n\n## Per-Role Field Masking\n\nApply different field masking based on the subscriber's role using `maskingConfig`:\n\n```typescript\nawait realtime.insert('candidates', newCandidate, ctx.activeOrgId!, {\n maskingConfig: {\n phone: { type: 'phone', show: { roles: ['owner', 'hiring-manager', 'recruiter'] } },\n email: { type: 'email', show: { roles: ['owner', 'hiring-manager', 'recruiter'] } },\n resumeUrl: { type: 'redact', show: { roles: ['owner', 'hiring-manager', 'recruiter'] } },\n },\n});\n```\n\n**How masking works:**\n- Each subscriber receives a payload masked according to their role\n- Roles in the `show.roles` array see unmasked values\n- All other roles see the masked version\n- Masking is pre-computed per-role (O(roles) not O(subscribers))\n\n**Available mask types:**\n| Type | Example Output |\n|------|----------------|\n| `email` | `j***@y*********.com` |\n| `phone` | `******4567` |\n| `ssn` | `*****6789` |\n| `creditCard` | `**** **** **** 1111` |\n| `name` | `J***` |\n| `redact` | `[REDACTED]` |\n\n### Owner-Based Masking\n\nShow unmasked data to the record owner:\n\n```typescript\nmaskingConfig: {\n phone: {\n type: 'phone',\n show: { roles: ['hiring-manager'], or: 'owner' } // Hiring manager OR owner sees unmasked\n },\n}\n```\n\n## Client-Side Subscription\n\n### WebSocket Authentication\n\nQuickback uses **ticket-based authentication** for WebSocket connections. The client first obtains a short-lived ticket from the main API, then connects with it as a URL parameter. The Broadcaster verifies the ticket cryptographically at upgrade time — no HTTP round-trip needed.\n\n```typescript\n// 1. Get a ws-ticket from your API (requires session auth)\nconst response = await fetch('/realtime/v1/ws-ticket', {\n method: 'POST',\n headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${sessionToken}` },\n});\nconst { wsTicket } = await response.json();\n\n// 2. Connect with ticket as URL param\nconst ws = new WebSocket(\n `wss://api.yourdomain.com/realtime/v1/websocket?ws_ticket=${wsTicket}&organizationId=${activeOrgId}`\n);\n\nws.onopen = () => {\n console.log('Connected and authenticated!');\n // No auth message needed — pre-authenticated at upgrade\n};\n```\n\nTickets expire after 60 seconds, so fetch a fresh one before each connection or reconnection.\n\n### Handling Messages\n\n```typescript\nws.onmessage = (event) => {\n const msg = JSON.parse(event.data);\n\n // Handle CRUD events\n if (msg.type === 'postgres_changes') {\n const { table, eventType, new: newRecord, old: oldRecord } = msg;\n\n if (eventType === 'INSERT') {\n addRecord(table, newRecord);\n } else if (eventType === 'UPDATE') {\n updateRecord(table, newRecord);\n } else if (eventType === 'DELETE') {\n removeRecord(table, oldRecord.id);\n }\n }\n\n // Handle custom broadcasts\n if (msg.type === 'broadcast') {\n const { event, payload } = msg;\n\n if (event === 'screening-complete') {\n refreshApplication(payload.applicationId);\n } else if (event === 'interview-scheduled') {\n showInterviewNotification(payload.applicationId);\n }\n }\n};\n```\n\n## Environment\n\nNo additional environment variables are needed for realtime. The Broadcaster DO runs inline in your main worker and uses `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` (already required for auth) to sign and verify WebSocket tickets.\n\n| Variable | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` | Signs/verifies WebSocket tickets (already set for auth) |\n\nThe `BROADCASTER` binding is a `DurableObjectNamespace` — the compiler generates this in your `wrangler.toml` automatically:\n\n```toml\n[[durable_objects.bindings]]\nname = \"BROADCASTER\"\nclass_name = \"Broadcaster\"\n\n[[migrations]]\ntag = \"v1\"\nnew_classes = [\"Broadcaster\"]\n```\n\n## Architecture\n\n```\n 1. POST /ws-ticket\n┌───────────────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────┐\n│ Quickback Worker │ ◄──│ Browser Client │\n│ │ ──►│ │\n│ ┌──────────┐ DO binding ┌────────────────┐ │ └───────┬─────────┘\n│ │ Hono API │ ───────────► │ Broadcaster DO │ │ │\n│ └──────────┘ (in-process)└───────┬────────┘ │ 2. WS ?ws_ticket=...\n│ │ │ │\n└────────────────────────────────────┼──────────┘ │\n │◄──────────────────────┘\n WebSocket (verified at upgrade)\n```\n\n1. **Client gets a ticket** — `POST /realtime/v1/ws-ticket` on the main API (session-authenticated). Returns a 60-second HMAC-signed ticket.\n2. **Client connects** — Opens WebSocket with `?ws_ticket=<ticket>`. The Durable Object verifies the ticket cryptographically at upgrade — no HTTP round-trip.\n3. **API broadcasts** — After CRUD ops, the API calls the Broadcaster DO directly via its binding (in-process, no network hop).\n\n## Best Practices\n\n### Broadcast After Commit\n\nAlways broadcast after the database operation succeeds:\n\n```typescript\n// Good - broadcast after successful insert\nconst [newApp] = await db.insert(applications).values(data).returning();\nawait realtime.insert('applications', newApp, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n\n// Bad - don't broadcast before confirming success\nawait realtime.insert('applications', data, ctx.activeOrgId!);\nawait db.insert(applications).values(data); // Could fail!\n```\n\n### Minimal Payloads\n\nOnly include necessary data in broadcasts:\n\n```typescript\n// Good - minimal payload\nawait realtime.update('applications',\n { id: record.id, stage: 'interview' },\n { id: record.id, stage: 'screening' },\n ctx.activeOrgId!\n);\n\n// Avoid - sending entire record with large content\nawait realtime.update('applications', fullRecord, oldRecord, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n```\n\n### Use Broadcasts for Complex Events\n\nFor events that don't map cleanly to CRUD:\n\n```typescript\n// Hiring pipeline stage completed\nawait realtime.broadcast('pipeline-stage-complete', {\n applicationId: application.id,\n stages: ['applied', 'screening', 'interview'],\n currentStage: 'offer',\n candidateId: application.candidateId\n}, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n```\n\n## Custom Event Namespaces\n\nFor complex applications with many custom events, you can define typed event namespaces using `defineRealtime`. This generates strongly-typed helper methods for your custom events.\n\n### Defining Event Namespaces\n\nCreate a file in `services/realtime/`:\n\n```typescript\n// services/realtime/screening.ts\n\nexport default defineRealtime({\n name: 'screening',\n events: ['started', 'progress', 'completed', 'failed'],\n description: 'Candidate screening pipeline events',\n});\n```\n\n### Generated Helper Methods\n\nAfter compilation, the `createRealtime()` helper includes your custom namespace:\n\n```typescript\n\nexport const execute: ActionExecutor = async ({ ctx, input }) => {\n const realtime = createRealtime(ctx.env);\n\n // Type-safe custom event methods\n await realtime.screening.started({\n applicationId: input.applicationId,\n }, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n\n // Progress updates\n await realtime.screening.progress({\n applicationId: input.applicationId,\n percent: 50,\n step: 'background-check',\n }, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n\n // Completion\n await realtime.screening.completed({\n applicationId: input.applicationId,\n result: 'passed',\n duration: 1234,\n }, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n\n return { success: true };\n};\n```\n\n### Event Format\n\nCustom namespace events use the `broadcast` type with namespaced event names:\n\n```json\n{\n \"type\": \"broadcast\",\n \"event\": \"screening:started\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"applicationId\": \"app_123\"\n }\n}\n```\n\n### Multiple Namespaces\n\nDefine multiple namespaces for different parts of your application:\n\n```typescript\n// services/realtime/notifications.ts\nexport default defineRealtime({\n name: 'notifications',\n events: ['interview-reminder', 'offer-update', 'application-received'],\n description: 'Recruitment notification events',\n});\n\n// services/realtime/presence.ts\nexport default defineRealtime({\n name: 'presence',\n events: ['joined', 'left', 'reviewing', 'idle'],\n description: 'Who is reviewing which candidate',\n});\n```\n\nUsage:\n```typescript\nconst realtime = createRealtime(ctx.env);\n\n// Notification events\nawait realtime.notifications['interview-reminder']({ ... }, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n\n// Presence events — who's reviewing which candidate\nawait realtime.presence.reviewing({ userId: ctx.userId, candidateId: 'cnd_456' }, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n```\n\n### Namespace vs Generic Broadcast\n\n| Use Case | Approach |\n|----------|----------|\n| One-off custom event | `realtime.broadcast('event-name', payload, orgId)` |\n| Repeated event patterns | `defineRealtime` namespace |\n| Type-safe events | `defineRealtime` namespace |\n| Event discovery | `defineRealtime` (appears in generated types) |"
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"content": "Quickback can generate realtime notification helpers for broadcasting changes to connected clients. This enables live updates via WebSocket using Cloudflare Durable Objects.\n\n## Enabling Realtime\n\nAdd `realtime` configuration to individual table definitions:\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/applications.ts\n\nexport const applications = sqliteTable(\"applications\", {\n id: text(\"id\").primaryKey(),\n candidateId: text(\"candidate_id\").notNull(),\n jobId: text(\"job_id\").notNull(),\n stage: text(\"stage\").notNull(),\n organizationId: text(\"organization_id\").notNull(),\n});\n\nexport default defineTable(applications, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }],\n realtime: {\n enabled: true, // Enable realtime for this table\n onInsert: true, // Broadcast on INSERT (default: true)\n onUpdate: true, // Broadcast on UPDATE (default: true)\n onDelete: true, // Broadcast on DELETE (default: true)\n requiredRoles: [\"recruiter\", \"hiring-manager\"], // Who receives broadcasts\n fields: [\"id\", \"candidateId\", \"stage\"], // Fields to include (optional)\n },\n // ... guards, crud\n});\n```\n\nWhen any table has realtime enabled, the compiler generates `src/lib/realtime.ts` with helper functions for sending notifications.\n\n## Generated Helper\n\nThe `createRealtime()` factory provides convenient methods for both Postgres Changes (CRUD events) and custom broadcasts:\n\n```typescript\n\nexport const execute: ActionExecutor = async ({ db, ctx, input }) => {\n const realtime = createRealtime(ctx.env);\n\n // After creating a record\n await realtime.insert('applications', newApplication, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n\n // After updating a record\n await realtime.update('applications', newApplication, oldApplication, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n\n // After deleting a record\n await realtime.delete('applications', { id: applicationId }, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n\n return { success: true };\n};\n```\n\n## Event Format\n\nQuickback broadcasts events in a structured JSON format for easy client-side handling.\n\n### Insert Event\n\n```typescript\nawait realtime.insert('applications', {\n id: 'app_123',\n candidateId: 'cnd_456',\n stage: 'applied'\n}, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n```\n\nBroadcasts:\n```json\n{\n \"type\": \"postgres_changes\",\n \"table\": \"applications\",\n \"eventType\": \"INSERT\",\n \"schema\": \"public\",\n \"new\": {\n \"id\": \"app_123\",\n \"candidateId\": \"cnd_456\",\n \"stage\": \"applied\"\n },\n \"old\": null\n}\n```\n\n### Update Event\n\n```typescript\nawait realtime.update('applications',\n { id: 'app_123', stage: 'interview' }, // new\n { id: 'app_123', stage: 'screening' }, // old\n ctx.activeOrgId!\n);\n```\n\nBroadcasts:\n```json\n{\n \"type\": \"postgres_changes\",\n \"table\": \"applications\",\n \"eventType\": \"UPDATE\",\n \"schema\": \"public\",\n \"new\": { \"id\": \"app_123\", \"stage\": \"interview\" },\n \"old\": { \"id\": \"app_123\", \"stage\": \"screening\" }\n}\n```\n\n### Delete Event\n\n```typescript\nawait realtime.delete('applications',\n { id: 'app_123' },\n ctx.activeOrgId!\n);\n```\n\nBroadcasts:\n```json\n{\n \"type\": \"postgres_changes\",\n \"table\": \"applications\",\n \"eventType\": \"DELETE\",\n \"schema\": \"public\",\n \"new\": null,\n \"old\": { \"id\": \"app_123\" }\n}\n```\n\n## Custom Broadcasts\n\nFor arbitrary events that don't map to CRUD operations:\n\n```typescript\nawait realtime.broadcast('screening-complete', {\n applicationId: 'app_123',\n candidateId: 'cnd_456',\n stage: 'interview'\n}, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n```\n\nBroadcasts:\n```json\n{\n \"type\": \"broadcast\",\n \"event\": \"screening-complete\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"applicationId\": \"app_123\",\n \"candidateId\": \"cnd_456\",\n \"stage\": \"interview\"\n }\n}\n```\n\n## User-Specific Broadcasts\n\nTarget a specific user instead of the entire organization:\n\n```typescript\n// Only this user receives the notification\nawait realtime.insert('notifications', newNotification, ctx.activeOrgId!, {\n userId: ctx.userId\n});\n\n// Notify a hiring manager of a new application\nawait realtime.broadcast('application-received', {\n applicationId: 'app_123',\n jobId: 'job_789'\n}, ctx.activeOrgId!, {\n userId: hiringManagerId\n});\n```\n\n## Role-Based Filtering\n\nLimit which roles receive a broadcast using `targetRoles`:\n\n```typescript\n// Only hiring managers and recruiters receive this broadcast\nawait realtime.insert('applications', application, ctx.activeOrgId!, {\n targetRoles: ['hiring-manager', 'recruiter']\n});\n\n// Interviewers only see applications assigned to them\nawait realtime.update('applications', newRecord, oldRecord, ctx.activeOrgId!, {\n targetRoles: ['hiring-manager']\n});\n```\n\nIf `targetRoles` is not specified, all authenticated users in the organization receive the broadcast.\n\n## Per-Role Field Masking\n\nApply different field masking based on the subscriber's role using `maskingConfig`:\n\n```typescript\nawait realtime.insert('candidates', newCandidate, ctx.activeOrgId!, {\n maskingConfig: {\n phone: { type: 'phone', show: { roles: ['owner', 'hiring-manager', 'recruiter'] } },\n email: { type: 'email', show: { roles: ['owner', 'hiring-manager', 'recruiter'] } },\n resumeUrl: { type: 'redact', show: { roles: ['owner', 'hiring-manager', 'recruiter'] } },\n },\n});\n```\n\n**How masking works:**\n- Each subscriber receives a payload masked according to their role\n- Roles in the `show.roles` array see unmasked values\n- All other roles see the masked version\n- Masking is pre-computed per-role (O(roles) not O(subscribers))\n\n**Available mask types:**\n| Type | Example Output |\n|------|----------------|\n| `email` | `j***@y*********.com` |\n| `phone` | `******4567` |\n| `ssn` | `*****6789` |\n| `creditCard` | `**** **** **** 1111` |\n| `name` | `J***` |\n| `redact` | `[REDACTED]` |\n\n### Owner-Based Masking\n\nShow unmasked data to the record owner:\n\n```typescript\nmaskingConfig: {\n phone: {\n type: 'phone',\n show: { roles: ['hiring-manager'], or: 'owner' } // Hiring manager OR owner sees unmasked\n },\n}\n```\n\n## Client-Side Subscription\n\n### WebSocket Authentication\n\nQuickback uses **ticket-based authentication** for WebSocket connections. The client first obtains a short-lived ticket from the main API, then connects with it as a URL parameter. The Broadcaster verifies the ticket cryptographically at upgrade time — no HTTP round-trip needed.\n\n```typescript\n// 1. Get a ws-ticket from your API (requires session auth)\nconst response = await fetch('/broadcast/v1/ws-ticket', {\n method: 'POST',\n headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${sessionToken}` },\n});\nconst { wsTicket } = await response.json();\n\n// 2. Connect with ticket as URL param\nconst ws = new WebSocket(\n `wss://api.yourdomain.com/broadcast/v1/websocket?ws_ticket=${wsTicket}&organizationId=${activeOrgId}`\n);\n\nws.onopen = () => {\n console.log('Connected and authenticated!');\n // No auth message needed — pre-authenticated at upgrade\n};\n```\n\nTickets expire after 60 seconds, so fetch a fresh one before each connection or reconnection.\n\n### Handling Messages\n\n```typescript\nws.onmessage = (event) => {\n const msg = JSON.parse(event.data);\n\n // Handle CRUD events\n if (msg.type === 'postgres_changes') {\n const { table, eventType, new: newRecord, old: oldRecord } = msg;\n\n if (eventType === 'INSERT') {\n addRecord(table, newRecord);\n } else if (eventType === 'UPDATE') {\n updateRecord(table, newRecord);\n } else if (eventType === 'DELETE') {\n removeRecord(table, oldRecord.id);\n }\n }\n\n // Handle custom broadcasts\n if (msg.type === 'broadcast') {\n const { event, payload } = msg;\n\n if (event === 'screening-complete') {\n refreshApplication(payload.applicationId);\n } else if (event === 'interview-scheduled') {\n showInterviewNotification(payload.applicationId);\n }\n }\n};\n```\n\n## Environment\n\nNo additional environment variables are needed for realtime. The Broadcaster DO runs inline in your main worker and uses `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` (already required for auth) to sign and verify WebSocket tickets.\n\n| Variable | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` | Signs/verifies WebSocket tickets (already set for auth) |\n\nThe `BROADCASTER` binding is a `DurableObjectNamespace` — the compiler generates this in your `wrangler.toml` automatically:\n\n```toml\n[[durable_objects.bindings]]\nname = \"BROADCASTER\"\nclass_name = \"Broadcaster\"\n\n[[migrations]]\ntag = \"v1\"\nnew_classes = [\"Broadcaster\"]\n```\n\n## Architecture\n\n```\n 1. POST /ws-ticket\n┌───────────────────────────────────────────────┐ ┌─────────────────┐\n│ Quickback Worker │ ◄──│ Browser Client │\n│ │ ──►│ │\n│ ┌──────────┐ DO binding ┌────────────────┐ │ └───────┬─────────┘\n│ │ Hono API │ ───────────► │ Broadcaster DO │ │ │\n│ └──────────┘ (in-process)└───────┬────────┘ │ 2. WS ?ws_ticket=...\n│ │ │ │\n└────────────────────────────────────┼──────────┘ │\n │◄──────────────────────┘\n WebSocket (verified at upgrade)\n```\n\n1. **Client gets a ticket** — `POST /broadcast/v1/ws-ticket` on the main API (session-authenticated). Returns a 60-second HMAC-signed ticket.\n2. **Client connects** — Opens WebSocket with `?ws_ticket=<ticket>`. The Durable Object verifies the ticket cryptographically at upgrade — no HTTP round-trip.\n3. **API broadcasts** — After CRUD ops, the API calls the Broadcaster DO directly via its binding (in-process, no network hop).\n\n## Best Practices\n\n### Broadcast After Commit\n\nAlways broadcast after the database operation succeeds:\n\n```typescript\n// Good - broadcast after successful insert\nconst [newApp] = await db.insert(applications).values(data).returning();\nawait realtime.insert('applications', newApp, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n\n// Bad - don't broadcast before confirming success\nawait realtime.insert('applications', data, ctx.activeOrgId!);\nawait db.insert(applications).values(data); // Could fail!\n```\n\n### Minimal Payloads\n\nOnly include necessary data in broadcasts:\n\n```typescript\n// Good - minimal payload\nawait realtime.update('applications',\n { id: record.id, stage: 'interview' },\n { id: record.id, stage: 'screening' },\n ctx.activeOrgId!\n);\n\n// Avoid - sending entire record with large content\nawait realtime.update('applications', fullRecord, oldRecord, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n```\n\n### Use Broadcasts for Complex Events\n\nFor events that don't map cleanly to CRUD:\n\n```typescript\n// Hiring pipeline stage completed\nawait realtime.broadcast('pipeline-stage-complete', {\n applicationId: application.id,\n stages: ['applied', 'screening', 'interview'],\n currentStage: 'offer',\n candidateId: application.candidateId\n}, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n```\n\n## Custom Event Namespaces\n\nFor complex applications with many custom events, you can define typed event namespaces using `defineRealtime`. This generates strongly-typed helper methods for your custom events.\n\n### Defining Event Namespaces\n\nCreate a file in `services/realtime/`:\n\n```typescript\n// services/realtime/screening.ts\n\nexport default defineRealtime({\n name: 'screening',\n events: ['started', 'progress', 'completed', 'failed'],\n description: 'Candidate screening pipeline events',\n});\n```\n\n### Generated Helper Methods\n\nAfter compilation, the `createRealtime()` helper includes your custom namespace:\n\n```typescript\n\nexport const execute: ActionExecutor = async ({ ctx, input }) => {\n const realtime = createRealtime(ctx.env);\n\n // Type-safe custom event methods\n await realtime.screening.started({\n applicationId: input.applicationId,\n }, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n\n // Progress updates\n await realtime.screening.progress({\n applicationId: input.applicationId,\n percent: 50,\n step: 'background-check',\n }, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n\n // Completion\n await realtime.screening.completed({\n applicationId: input.applicationId,\n result: 'passed',\n duration: 1234,\n }, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n\n return { success: true };\n};\n```\n\n### Event Format\n\nCustom namespace events use the `broadcast` type with namespaced event names:\n\n```json\n{\n \"type\": \"broadcast\",\n \"event\": \"screening:started\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"applicationId\": \"app_123\"\n }\n}\n```\n\n### Multiple Namespaces\n\nDefine multiple namespaces for different parts of your application:\n\n```typescript\n// services/realtime/notifications.ts\nexport default defineRealtime({\n name: 'notifications',\n events: ['interview-reminder', 'offer-update', 'application-received'],\n description: 'Recruitment notification events',\n});\n\n// services/realtime/presence.ts\nexport default defineRealtime({\n name: 'presence',\n events: ['joined', 'left', 'reviewing', 'idle'],\n description: 'Who is reviewing which candidate',\n});\n```\n\nUsage:\n```typescript\nconst realtime = createRealtime(ctx.env);\n\n// Notification events\nawait realtime.notifications['interview-reminder']({ ... }, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n\n// Presence events — who's reviewing which candidate\nawait realtime.presence.reviewing({ userId: ctx.userId, candidateId: 'cnd_456' }, ctx.activeOrgId!);\n```\n\n### Namespace vs Generic Broadcast\n\n| Use Case | Approach |\n|----------|----------|\n| One-off custom event | `realtime.broadcast('event-name', payload, orgId)` |\n| Repeated event patterns | `defineRealtime` namespace |\n| Type-safe events | `defineRealtime` namespace |\n| Event discovery | `defineRealtime` (appears in generated types) |"
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"content": "Quickback ships **two parallel realtime primitives**, both backed by Cloudflare Durable Objects:\n\n- **`/broadcast/v1/*` — server fan-out.** One DO instance per organization. Postgres-changes events from CRUD routes plus custom broadcast events flow out to every subscriber, with role filtering and per-role field masking applied. Best for \"tell every client in this org that something changed.\" Documented on this page.\n- **`/realtime/<binding>/<room-id>` — bidirectional rooms.** One DO instance per room (per document, per interview, per game). Client↔client messages, presence, and CRDT-friendly state. Use these for collaborative editing. See [PartyServer rooms](/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms).\n\nBoth share the same auth model and ride on the same compiled worker; they solve different problems.\n\n## Architecture\n\n```\n┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐\n│ Quickback Worker │\n│ │\n│ ┌──────────┐ DO binding ┌────────────────────┐\n│ │ Hono API │ ──────────────► │ Broadcaster (DO) │\n│ │ │ │ WebSocket manager │\n│ └──────────┘ └─────────┬──────────┘\n│ │\n└─────────────────────────────────────────┼┘\n │ WebSocket\n │\n ┌────────▼─────────┐\n │ Browser Clients │\n │ (CMS, Account, │\n │ Admin, Custom) │\n └──────────────────┘\n```\n\nThe Broadcaster Durable Object runs **inline** in your main Quickback worker — no separate worker deployment needed. The API calls the DO directly via its binding (in-process, no network hop).\n\n1. **Quickback Worker** — Your compiled API with the Broadcaster DO class exported from the same worker.\n2. **Broadcaster (Durable Object)** — Manages WebSocket connections per organization. One instance per org.\n3. **Browser Clients** — CMS, Account, Admin, and custom frontends connect via WebSocket on the same origin.\n\n## Key Features\n\n| Feature | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| Organization-scoped | Each org gets its own Durable Object instance |\n| Role-based filtering | Only send events to users with matching roles |\n| Per-role masking | Different users see different field values based on their role |\n| User-specific targeting | Send events to a specific user within an org |\n| Custom broadcasts | Arbitrary events beyond CRUD |\n| Custom namespaces | `defineRealtime()` for type-safe event helpers |\n| Ticket-based auth | HMAC-signed tickets verified at WebSocket upgrade — no HTTP round-trip |\n\n## Enabling Realtime\n\nAdd `realtime` to individual table definitions:\n\n```typescript\nexport default defineTable(applications, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }],\n realtime: {\n enabled: true,\n onInsert: true,\n onUpdate: true,\n onDelete: true,\n requiredRoles: [\"recruiter\", \"hiring-manager\"],\n fields: [\"id\", \"candidateId\", \"stage\"],\n },\n});\n```\n\nAnd enable the realtime binding in your database config. The compiler generates the Durable Object class, helper functions, and wrangler bindings — all within your main worker.\n\n## Pages\n\n- **[Durable Objects Setup](/stack/realtime/durable-objects)** — Broadcaster configuration, wrangler bindings, event formats, masking, and custom namespaces\n- **[Using Realtime](/stack/realtime/using-realtime)** — Subscribing to `/broadcast/v1/*`: WebSocket connection, ticket auth, client-side handling\n- **[PartyServer Rooms](/stack/realtime/partyserver-rooms)** — Per-room collab via `/realtime/<binding>/<room-id>`: presence, live notes, room IDs"
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"content": "When you need **client↔client** state — presence, live cursors, shared notes, concurrent editing — Quickback exposes [PartyServer](https://github.com/cloudflare/partykit) rooms at `/realtime/<binding>/<room-id>`. Each room is its own Durable Object instance, so isolation between rooms is automatic and the runtime hibernates idle rooms for free.\n\nThis is **separate from `/broadcast/v1/*`** (the org-wide server fan-out documented in [Using Realtime](/stack/realtime/using-realtime)). They share the worker and the auth model but solve different problems:\n\n| Concern | `/broadcast/v1/*` | `/realtime/<binding>/<room-id>` |\n|---|---|---|\n| Direction | Server → clients | Client ↔ clients |\n| Sharding | One DO per org | One DO per room |\n| Use case | Postgres-changes, app-wide events | Live cursors, shared edits, presence |\n| Catchup | Ephemeral | Per-room state survives reconnects |\n\n## When to use rooms vs broadcast\n\nReach for rooms when **the messages flow between users in the same context** (interview, document, game match). Reach for broadcast when **the server is publishing facts** that any client in the org may want to react to (a record was updated, a webhook fired, a role changed).\n\nYou can use both in the same project. Cost is the same.\n\n## Define a room class\n\nThe PartyServer `Server` class extends `DurableObject`, so any in-worker DO you wire up via `bindings.durableObjects` qualifies. The lifecycle hooks below are what PartyServer adds on top:\n\n```ts\n// quickback/features/interviews/lib/InterviewRoom.ts\n\nexport class InterviewRoom extends Server {\n static options = { hibernate: true };\n\n presence = new Map<string, { userId?: string; name?: string }>();\n\n onConnect(connection: Connection) {\n this.presence.set(connection.id, {});\n this.broadcastPresence();\n }\n\n onMessage(connection: Connection, message: WSMessage) {\n if (typeof message !== 'string') return;\n const parsed = JSON.parse(message);\n if (parsed.type === 'note') {\n this.broadcast(JSON.stringify({ type: 'note', from: connection.id, body: parsed.body }), [connection.id]);\n }\n }\n\n onClose(connection: Connection) {\n this.presence.delete(connection.id);\n this.broadcastPresence();\n }\n\n private broadcastPresence() {\n const peers = Array.from(this.presence.entries()).map(([id, meta]) => ({ id, ...meta }));\n this.broadcast(JSON.stringify({ type: 'presence', peers }));\n }\n}\n```\n\n## Wire it into your config\n\nOne entry under `bindings.durableObjects` is everything the compiler needs. The Server class lives under a `lib/` directory inside the feature (the same path the compiler uses for any in-worker shared code) — author it at `quickback/features/interviews/lib/InterviewRoom.ts`. The `from` value is the corresponding module path, no extension.\n\n```ts\n// quickback/quickback.config.ts\nexport default defineConfig({\n // ...\n bindings: {\n durableObjects: [\n {\n name: 'INTERVIEW_ROOM',\n className: 'InterviewRoom',\n from: 'features/interviews/lib/InterviewRoom',\n },\n ],\n },\n build: {\n dependencies: {\n partyserver: '^0.5.5',\n partysocket: '^1.1.18',\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\nThe compiler emits the `[[durable_objects.bindings]]` block, the `[[migrations]]` entry (SQLite-backed by default), and the class re-export from `src/index.ts`. **It also auto-mounts the `hono-party` middleware at `/realtime/*`** the moment any in-worker DO is declared, so URL routing follows PartyServer's own convention.\n\n## Connect from the client\n\nThe `partysocket` package handles reconnection, buffering, and resilience. The `party` field is the kebab-cased binding name (`INTERVIEW_ROOM` → `interview-room`); the `room` field is any opaque ID.\n\n```ts\n\nconst socket = new PartySocket({\n host: window.location.host,\n party: 'interview-room',\n room: 'interview-abc123',\n prefix: 'realtime',\n});\n\nsocket.addEventListener('message', (e) => {\n const msg = JSON.parse(e.data);\n if (msg.type === 'presence') updatePresence(msg.peers);\n if (msg.type === 'note') appendNote(msg.from, msg.body);\n});\n\nsocket.send(JSON.stringify({ type: 'note', body: 'asked about tenure' }));\n```\n\n## Authentication\n\nPartyServer accepts an `onBeforeConnect` hook that runs before the WebSocket upgrade. Reject the upgrade by returning a `Response`; otherwise return `undefined` (or a modified `Request`) and the connection proceeds. This is where you call into Quickback's existing auth path:\n\n```ts\n\napp.use('/realtime/*', partyserverMiddleware({\n options: {\n prefix: 'realtime',\n onBeforeConnect: async (req) => {\n const token = new URL(req.url).searchParams.get('ws_ticket');\n if (!token || !await verifyTicket(token)) {\n return new Response('Unauthorized', { status: 401 });\n }\n },\n },\n}));\n```\n\nFor the auto-mounted middleware (the default), the same `ws_ticket` flow used by `/broadcast/v1/*` works — generate a ticket from your authenticated UI and pass it as a query param.\n\n## CRDT-grade document collab (Yjs)\n\nDrop in [`Y-PartyServer`](https://github.com/cloudflare/partykit) when you need true concurrent text/document editing. It's a `Server` subclass that wraps Yjs's sync protocol; everything else above stays the same.\n\n```ts\n\nexport class DocumentRoom extends YServer {\n // Yjs doc lives on `this.doc`; sync protocol is automatic.\n // Override `onLoad()` / `onSave()` to persist to R2 / KV / your DB.\n}\n```\n\n## Why this and not the Broadcaster\n\nThe Broadcaster is a one-DO-per-org fan-out. It can't shard by document, and it doesn't model client→client messages. PartyServer's per-room model is the right primitive for collab; the Broadcaster's per-org model is the right primitive for \"tell everyone in this org that X happened.\" Run both."
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"content": "This page covers connecting to the Quickback realtime system from client applications — authentication, subscribing to events, and handling messages.\n\n## Connecting\n\nOpen a WebSocket connection to the realtime worker:\n\n```typescript\nconst ws = new WebSocket(\"wss://api.yourdomain.com/
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"content": "This page covers connecting to the Quickback realtime system from client applications — authentication, subscribing to events, and handling messages.\n\n## Connecting\n\nOpen a WebSocket connection to the realtime worker:\n\n```typescript\nconst ws = new WebSocket(\"wss://api.yourdomain.com/broadcast/v1/websocket\");\n```\n\n## Authentication\n\nQuickback uses **ticket-based authentication** for WebSocket connections. This is a two-step process:\n\n1. **Get a ticket** — Call the ws-ticket endpoint with your session auth\n2. **Connect with ticket** — Pass the ticket as a URL parameter when opening the WebSocket\n\nThis approach is faster and more secure than in-band auth messages — the connection is authenticated at upgrade time with no HTTP round-trip from the Durable Object.\n\n### Step 1: Get a WebSocket Ticket\n\n```typescript\nconst response = await fetch(\"/broadcast/v1/ws-ticket\", {\n method: \"POST\",\n headers: {\n Authorization: `Bearer ${sessionToken}`,\n \"Content-Type\": \"application/json\",\n },\n});\nconst { wsTicket, expiresIn } = await response.json();\n// expiresIn = 60 (seconds)\n```\n\nThe ticket is a short-lived (60-second) HMAC-signed token containing your userId, organizationId, and roles.\n\n### Step 2: Connect with Ticket\n\n```typescript\nconst ws = new WebSocket(\n `wss://api.yourdomain.com/broadcast/v1/websocket?ws_ticket=${wsTicket}&organizationId=${activeOrgId}`\n);\n\nws.onopen = () => {\n console.log(\"Connected and authenticated!\");\n // No auth message needed — connection is pre-authenticated\n};\n```\n\nIf the ticket is invalid or expired, the WebSocket upgrade is rejected with a 401 status.\n\n## Handling Messages\n\n### CRUD Events\n\nCRUD events use the `postgres_changes` type:\n\n```typescript\nws.onmessage = (event) => {\n const msg = JSON.parse(event.data);\n\n if (msg.type === \"postgres_changes\") {\n const { table, eventType, new: newRecord, old: oldRecord } = msg;\n\n switch (eventType) {\n case \"INSERT\":\n addRecord(table, newRecord);\n break;\n case \"UPDATE\":\n updateRecord(table, newRecord);\n break;\n case \"DELETE\":\n removeRecord(table, oldRecord.id);\n break;\n }\n }\n};\n```\n\n**Event payload:**\n\n```json\n{\n \"type\": \"postgres_changes\",\n \"table\": \"applications\",\n \"schema\": \"public\",\n \"eventType\": \"INSERT\",\n \"new\": { \"id\": \"app_123\", \"candidateId\": \"cnd_456\", \"stage\": \"interview\" },\n \"old\": null\n}\n```\n\nFor UPDATE events, both `new` and `old` are populated. For DELETE events, only `old` is populated.\n\n### Custom Broadcasts\n\nCustom events use the `broadcast` type:\n\n```typescript\nif (msg.type === \"broadcast\") {\n const { event, payload } = msg;\n\n if (event === \"screening-complete\") {\n refreshApplication(payload.applicationId);\n } else if (event === \"screening:progress\") {\n updateProgressBar(payload.percent);\n }\n}\n```\n\n**Event payload:**\n\n```json\n{\n \"type\": \"broadcast\",\n \"event\": \"screening-complete\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"applicationId\": \"app_123\",\n \"candidateId\": \"cnd_456\",\n \"stage\": \"interview\"\n }\n}\n```\n\nCustom namespaces (from `defineRealtime()`) use the format `namespace:event` — e.g., `screening:started`, `screening:progress`.\n\n## Security\n\n### Role-Based Filtering\n\nEvents are only delivered to users whose role matches the broadcast's `targetRoles`. If a table's realtime config specifies `requiredRoles: [\"hiring-manager\", \"recruiter\"]`, only users with those roles receive the events.\n\n### Per-Role Masking\n\nField values are masked according to the subscriber's role. For example, with this masking config:\n\n```typescript\nmasking: {\n ssn: { type: \"ssn\", show: { roles: [\"owner\"] } },\n}\n```\n\n- **Owner sees:** `{ ssn: \"123-45-6789\" }`\n- **Recruiter sees:** `{ ssn: \"*****6789\" }`\n\nMasking is pre-computed per-role (O(roles), not O(subscribers)) for efficiency.\n\n### User-Specific Events\n\nEvents can target a specific user within an organization. Only that user receives the broadcast — all other connections in the org are skipped.\n\n### Organization Isolation\n\nEach organization has its own Durable Object instance. Users can only subscribe to events in organizations they belong to, enforced during authentication.\n\n## Reconnection\n\nWebSocket connections can drop due to network issues. Implement reconnection logic in your client — note that you need to fetch a fresh ticket on each reconnect since tickets expire after 60 seconds:\n\n```typescript\nasync function connect() {\n // Get a fresh ticket each time\n const res = await fetch(\"/broadcast/v1/ws-ticket\", {\n method: \"POST\",\n headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${sessionToken}` },\n });\n const { wsTicket } = await res.json();\n\n const ws = new WebSocket(\n `wss://api.yourdomain.com/broadcast/v1/websocket?ws_ticket=${wsTicket}&organizationId=${activeOrgId}`\n );\n\n ws.onclose = () => {\n // Reconnect after delay\n setTimeout(connect, 2000);\n };\n\n ws.onmessage = (event) => {\n const msg = JSON.parse(event.data);\n handleMessage(msg);\n };\n\n return ws;\n}\n```\n\n## Environment\n\nNo additional environment variables are needed for realtime. The Broadcaster Durable Object runs inline in your main worker and reuses `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` for WebSocket ticket signing.\n\nThe compiler generates the required `wrangler.toml` bindings automatically:\n\n```toml\n[[durable_objects.bindings]]\nname = \"BROADCASTER\"\nclass_name = \"Broadcaster\"\n\n[[migrations]]\ntag = \"v1\"\nnew_classes = [\"Broadcaster\"]\n```\n\n## Cloudflare Only\n\nRealtime requires Cloudflare Durable Objects and is only available with the Cloudflare runtime.\n\n## See Also\n\n- [Durable Objects Setup](/stack/realtime/durable-objects) — Configuration, event formats, masking, and custom namespaces\n- [Masking](/compiler/definitions/masking) — Field masking configuration"
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