@quickback-dev/cli 0.10.12 → 0.10.14

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
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  export const DOCS = {
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  "changelog": {
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  "title": "Changelog",
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- "content": "# Changelog\n\nRelease notes for the Quickback compiler, CLI, and platform.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.12 — May 1, 2026\n\n### Bundled-docs sync for the MCP recon fix\n\nPatch release that re-bundles the CLI's offline docs (consulted by the\nClaude Code skill, Cursor rules, and other AI assistants) so they\nreflect the corrected `tools/list` access-filter behavior and CORS\nposture shipped in v0.10.11. The `compiler/config/agents.mdx` page\nitself was already corrected on the docs site immediately after the\n0.10.11 release; this bump propagates that text into the bundle inside\n`@quickback-dev/cli`.\n\nNo runtime or compiler behavior change — re-running `quickback compile`\nagainst this version produces the same output as v0.10.11.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.11 — May 1, 2026\n\n### MCP `tools/list` is now access-filtered + recon-tightened\n\nThe generated MCP-over-HTTP server (`src/routes/mcp.ts`) had three holes\nthat turned a standard pentest into trivial recon:\n\n1. `tools/list` returned the entire tool catalogue to anyone — including\n admin-only endpoints — without checking auth or roles. Tool\n descriptions also leaked sentences like `[UNSAFE] bypasses tenant\n scoping and requires elevated access` verbatim.\n2. The endpoint set `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` so any origin could\n pull the catalogue from a browser.\n3. Unauthenticated `GET /mcp` enumerated every tool name in its\n discovery payload.\n\nFix:\n\n- Each tool now carries sanitised access metadata (`_access` covering\n `roles` / `userRole` / `or` / `and`, plus `_public` for `PUBLIC`\n pseudo-role or empty `security`). `tools/list` filters against the\n caller's `ctx` — unauth callers see only `_public` tools, authed\n callers see only role-gated tools they pass. Record predicates and\n function-form access (opaque at list time) are dropped.\n- Wildcard CORS removed entirely. The parent app's `cors()` middleware\n (origin allowlist via `TRUSTED_ORIGINS` + `BETTER_AUTH_URL`) now\n applies uniformly to `/mcp`, same as every other route.\n- `[UNSAFE] ... bypasses tenant scoping ...` flavour text is gone.\n `annotations.destructiveHint` and `_unsafe` remain — those are the\n spec-correct signals for clients to warn users.\n- Unauthenticated `GET /mcp` no longer lists tool names. Inventory is\n only available via the access-filtered `tools/list`.\n\nThis filter is recon-mitigation, not a security boundary: `tools/call`\nstill re-enters the Hono app and runs every middleware (auth, firewall,\naccess, guards, masking), so hiding a tool from list never weakens the\nunderlying gate.\n\nKnown follow-up: Better Auth admin endpoints (`ban-user`, `create-user`,\n`impersonate-user`, etc.) don't yet emit `x-access` in the OpenAPI spec,\nso any logged-in user still sees them in `tools/list` (the actual call\nis still gated by the admin plugin). Tracked separately.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.10 — April 29, 2026\n\n### Reject reserved keys inside `access.record` at compile time\n\n`access.record` is a flat field map evaluated as implicit AND between\nentries — keys must be column names. Putting `and: [...]` (or `or` /\n`roles` / `userRole`) inside `record` was a real-world footgun: the\nruntime treated the literal string `\"and\"` as a column lookup, the\npredicate failed on every row, and the caller got a silent `403` /\nempty list with nothing pointing at the misuse. The TypeScript type\ncouldn't catch this — `RecordConditions` is an open-ended index\nsignature, so any key parses.\n\nThe compiler now walks every access node attached to a resource (CRUD\nops, `read.access`, view access, masking `show` / `query`, action\naccess) and throws a clear migration error when `record` contains a\nreserved key:\n\n- `and` / `or` inside `record` → use the top-level `and` / `or`\n sibling: `{ and: [{ record: { ... } }, { record: { ... } }] }`\n- `roles` / `userRole` inside `record` → put them at the access node\n alongside `record`: `{ roles: [...], record: { ... } }`\n\nThe error names the exact origin (`crud.update.access`,\n`actions.focus.access.or[1]`, etc.) so the fix lands in the right place.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.9 — April 29, 2026\n\n### Role hierarchy now expands in record-based action access\n\n`auth.roleHierarchy: ['member', 'admin', 'owner']` plus\n`access: { roles: ['member+'] }` on a record-based action used to\nsilently 403 valid callers. The standalone-action route generator\ninlined the expanded role list as a JSON literal, but the\nrecord-based generator read the access config back through the\nruntime `actions['name'].access` import — the user's source, where\nthe unexpanded `'member+'` shorthand still lived. The runtime did\nliteral string matching against `ctx.roles`, so an `owner` calling\nthe action got `['member+'] !== 'owner'` and was rejected.\n\nFixed: record-based action routes now inline the expanded list the\nsame way standalone routes do. `input` and `execute` still flow\nthrough the runtime import (closures aren't serializable); only the\naccess config is lifted to a JSON literal so the compile-time\nexpansion actually reaches the matcher.\n\nA regression test (`role-hierarchy-action-routes.test.ts`) locks the\nbehavior in — it asserts that `member+` never reaches the route\noutput and that the access config is no longer read from\n`actions[name].access` at runtime.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.8 — April 29, 2026\n\n### Audit support on postgres targets, plus a generated-API quality pass\n\n**Audit on PG.** Until this release, `audit_events` only existed on cloudflare-d1 — projects on Neon (or any postgres target) silently skipped audit logging on `unsafe:` and `PUBLIC`-role actions, and hard delete was hard-blocked. Postgres has no equivalent of D1's separate-database binding model, but it has native schemas — so the audit table now lives in a dedicated `audit` schema in the same database as features (`drizzle.pgSchema('audit')`). The `hasSecurityAudit` gate accepts D1 OR any PG dialect; the `auditDatabaseId` requirement only fires for D1 (which still uses the separate-binding model). The recruitment example wires `auditDatabaseId` so the recompile path stays green.\n\n**`auditDatabaseId` is now a compile-time requirement** (D1 only). Previously, projects with unsafe/PUBLIC actions but no audit id silently produced a `database_id = \"local-audit\"` placeholder in production `wrangler.toml`; Cloudflare's worker upload step then rejected it with code 10021 *after* assets and migrations had already run. The compile-time error names the exact `wrangler d1 create <project>-audit` command and the `auditDatabaseId` config key where the returned id goes.\n\n### Five fixes from a Loop integration ticket pass\n\n**Action input → OpenAPI / MCP.** `defineAction({ input: z.object({...}) })` schemas now flow into `requestBody` on the OpenAPI operation and `inputSchema.properties` / `_bodyFields` on the MCP tool list. Simple `z.object` shapes are extracted at compile time; for discriminated unions, refinements, recursive schemas, and bare-identifier references (`input: createPersonInput`), the compiler runs your action file through Zod 4's native `z.toJSONSchema()` during compilation — full-fidelity output with no static translator to maintain. Pre-fix, every action came out as a no-arg endpoint, which gutted typed SDK generation and made MCP useless for actions that take parameters.\n\n**OpenAPI fidelity.** Three surgical fixes that strict validators (zod, openapi-typescript, openapi-fetch) had been complaining about:\n- Response schemas now emit `required[]` for every non-nullable column, so generated SDKs treat them as guaranteed-present rather than optional.\n- `text(_, { enum: [...] })` columns emit as closed `{ type: \"string\", enum: [...] }`, narrowing to literal unions.\n- `id` only claims `format: \"uuid\"` when the project's `generateId` actually produces UUIDs. cuid2 / prefixed / nanoid / serial generators get plain `{ type: \"string\" }` — strict validators stop rejecting responses against their own spec.\n\n**Mask auto-detector now checks the column exists.** The auto-mask predicate used to be unconditionally `show: { or: 'owner', roles: ['admin'] }` — including for tables with no owner column at all (no `userId` / `ownerId` and no `q.scope('owner')`). The generated mask function would reference a non-existent column and fail under TypeScript checks. The auto-detector now verifies the resolved owner column exists in the parsed schema before emitting the `or` clause; when it doesn't, the rule falls back to roles-only and the compiler emits a warning so the behavior is transparent.\n\n**Error code consistency.** The generated CRUD layer was emitting raw codes (`'UNAUTHORIZED'`, `'NOT_NULL_VIOLATION'`, `'UNIQUE_VIOLATION'`, `'INSERT_FAILED'`, `'UPDATE_FAILED'`) that were never in the `QuickbackErrorCode` enum, so consumers couldn't switch exhaustively on `code`. New `database` layer + `DB_NOT_NULL_VIOLATION` / `DB_UNIQUE_VIOLATION` / `DB_INSERT_FAILED` / `DB_UPDATE_FAILED` / `NOT_FOUND` codes are now in the enum, the routes use `AuthErrors.missing()` / `DatabaseErrors.*()` helpers throughout, and the OpenAPI `Error` component emits `code` as a closed enum sourced from the canonical `QUICKBACK_ERROR_CODES` list. Generated SDKs can now `switch` on `code` without a default branch swallowing unknown values. See [API errors](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/errors#database).\n\n**Dropped dead `auditFields` preamble from action route generators.** The audit wrapper's `Proxy` already hard-stamps `createdAt` / `createdBy` / `modifiedAt` / `modifiedBy` on every INSERT and `modifiedAt` / `modifiedBy` on every UPDATE — the `auditFields` const the route preamble built was never read. Dropped from `standalone.ts` / `record-based.ts` and from the `ActionExecutorParams` JSDoc. Migrated 7 example handlers (drop `modifiedAt: auditFields!.modifiedAt` from `.set` payloads — the wrapper handles it). Note: `.onConflictDoUpdate({ set })` is *not* intercepted by the wrapper, so `upsertBatch`-style handlers keep an explicit `modifiedAt: now`.\n\n---\n\n## One file per action: greenfield action authoring\n\nAction authoring collapses to a single shape. Each action is its own file under `<feature>/actions/<name>.ts` using `defineAction({...})`. The filename is the action name AND the URL segment.\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move an application forward in the pipeline\",\n input: z.object({ nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]) }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"admin\"] },\n transition: {\n field: \"status\",\n via: \"nextStatus\",\n fromTo: { applied: [\"screening\"], screening: [\"interview\"], interview: [\"offer\"] },\n },\n async execute({ db, record, input, auditFields, whereTransition }) { /* … */ },\n});\n```\n\n`defineAction` is imported from a generated per-feature helper at `<feature>/.quickback/define-action.ts` — types `record`, `input`, and audit fields without manual annotations. The directory says what `:id` mounts to; the imports say what the body reads or writes.\n\n**Discovery rules:**\n- `actions/<name>.ts` binds to the feature's primary table (the `<feature>.ts` file at the feature root).\n- `actions/<table>/<name>.ts` binds to the sibling table file `<table>.ts` — for multi-table features.\n- Setting `path:` makes the action standalone (custom URL, no record fetch, no firewall preload).\n- Tableless features (no top-level `*.ts` files) require every action to be standalone.\n- Action names are unique per `(bindTable, name)` pair — sibling-bound actions on different tables may share a verb (e.g. `actions/episodes/publish.ts` + `actions/shows/publish.ts` mount at `/episodes/:id/publish` and `/shows/:id/publish` and don't collide). Standalone actions are unique per `(method, path)`.\n- Files under `<feature>/lib/` are copied verbatim for feature-local helpers; `quickback/lib/` is exposed via the `~/lib/*` alias for cross-feature shared code (with a one-way import rule enforced at compile time).\n\n**Retired** (rejected at load time with migration guidance):\n\n- `actions.ts` (bundled multi-action file)\n- `_feature.ts` (shared preamble + tableless actions)\n- `handlers/` directory + `handler:` string ref\n- `defineActions(table, {…})` and `defineActions(null, {…})`\n- `export default { actions: {…} }`\n- Colocated `defineActions` inside table files\n- `standalone: true` flag (presence of `path:` is the new signal)\n- `*-actions.ts` / `*.actions.ts` filename patterns\n\nThe phantom-`unsafe` regex bug that flattened nested `unsafe: { … }` blocks into a fake top-level action is gone — the parser now reads action files as real TS modules with real imports, so type inference, jump-to-definition, and rename refactoring all work end-to-end.\n\nThe CLI loader rejects retired primitives at load time with batched migration errors. Existing projects need to be migrated by hand to the new shape before recompiling.\n\nSee the [Actions docs](/compiler/definitions/actions) for the full reference.\n\n---\n\n## Multi-table actions per feature\n\nFeatures used to support exactly one `defineActions(table, …)` call via `actions.ts`, which forced unnatural feature splits whenever multiple tables in the same feature needed actions (a podcast feature with `episodes`, `shows`, `seasons`, `collections`, etc.). One feature directory can now own actions on multiple tables across three discovery modes:\n\n- **Colocated** (canonical) — `<table>.ts` containing both `defineTable` and `defineActions(<table>, …)`. One file per entity. Default for new features.\n- **`actions.ts`** (existing) — single primary-table actions file at feature root. Unchanged behaviour.\n- **`actions/<table>.ts`** — per-table action files for teams that want strict schema/behavior separation or need to break an import cycle.\n\nPlus the universal `_feature.ts` slot (at feature root) for **non-table-bound feature-level actions** (`export default { actions: { … } }` shape) and **shared Zod schemas** that get prepended once to the merged actions module so every sibling action sees them. Allowed in any of the three modes — orthogonal to table binding.\n\nThe decision flowchart: *one table with actions → colocate. Multiple tables with actions → colocate each. Hit a cycle or want strict separation → `actions/<table>.ts`. Want schema/actions split for a single-table feature → `actions.ts`. Non-table actions → always `_feature.ts`.*\n\nConflicts are batched and printed once before the compiler aborts — no \"fix one, recompile, fix the next\" loop. The CLI hard-errors when a feature mixes `actions.ts` with table-bound mode, when the same table has its `defineActions` declared in two places, when an `actions/<x>.ts` first-arg doesn't match the basename, or when `_feature.ts` contains `defineActions(table, …)`. Legacy `*-actions.ts` / `*.actions.ts` filenames in a feature dir trigger a soft warning naming the offending paths.\n\nWithin the legacy bundled `actions.ts` DSL, action names had to be unique within a feature — the runtime module merged every source into one keyspace, so colliding `publish` actions on `episodes` and `shows` would have silently overwritten each other. The retired `actions.ts` shape is no longer accepted, so this constraint is gone: the current one-file-per-action layout keys uniqueness per `(bindTable, name)` pair, and the codegen aggregator mangles the JS map key per bind-table while keeping the URL segment bare. Sibling-bound `actions/episodes/publish.ts` and `actions/shows/publish.ts` mount at `/episodes/:id/publish` and `/shows/:id/publish` and compile cleanly.\n\nInline `execute:` bodies must be arrow functions (`execute: async (ctx) => { … }`). `async function` and plain `function` shapes were silently misparsed by the route emitter — they now hard-error at parse time pointing at the canonical arrow form, with a suggestion to use `handler:` for callers who genuinely need a named function declaration.\n\n`handlers/` walks recursively now — `handlers/<table>/<action>.ts` is the canonical layout. A new `lib/` directory under each feature gets copied verbatim into the output for feature-local helpers.\n\nMigration: existing `actions.ts` projects compile bit-identically — the legacy single-table path is unchanged. Legacy `*-actions.ts` filenames produce a soft warning and silently aren't picked up; rename to `<table>.ts` (colocated), `actions/<table>.ts`, or single `actions.ts`.\n\n---\n\n## Firewall: named-scope shape restored, auto-detection synonyms widened\n\nThe named-scope firewall shape (`firewall: { organization: { column: 'tenant_id' } }`) is back as a co-equal user-facing input alongside the predicate array. DSL v2 step 8 had walled it off, but the internal architecture still kept named-scope around for the route + scoped-db generators — so re-accepting it at the input boundary is a thin coercion layer, not an architectural change.\n\n```typescript\n// All three are now valid; all compile to the same predicate array internally.\nfirewall: { organization: { column: 'tenant_id' } } // named-scope (compact)\nfirewall: { owner: { column: 'account_user_id' } }\nfirewall: { exception: true }\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'deletedAt', isNull: true },\n] // predicate array (explicit)\n```\n\nPick the form that reads better — named-scope for the common one-line case, predicate array when you need custom `in`-lists or non-scope predicates.\n\n**Auto-detection synonyms expanded.** When `firewall:` is omitted entirely, the compiler scans the schema for an isolation column. The org-scope list now accepts `organizationId`, `organisationId`, `orgId`, `organization`, `organisation`, `org` (American + British). User-scope still accepts `userId` only.\n\n**`ownerId` is now a targeted error signal.** When a table carries `ownerId` but no isolation column AND no explicit `firewall:`, the compiler raises a specific error: `\\`ownerId\\` is business-logic ownership, not access control — Quickback won't auto-derive a firewall from it. Either rename to \\`userId\\` if this column controls access, add a separate \\`userId\\` / \\`organizationId\\` column, or specify \\`firewall:\\` explicitly.` This replaces the generic \"missing isolation column\" error in the `ownerId`-only case and preserves the documented distinction between RLS-style access control (`userId`) and business-logic ownership (`ownerId`).\n\nMigration: nothing breaks. Projects on the predicate-array shape compile bit-identically. Projects on the named-scope shape — including any test fixtures or example projects that were left on the legacy form — now compile cleanly again.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.0 — April 26, 2026\n\n### `q.scope()` column DSL + unified `masking.query` gate\n\nTwo related DSL consolidations land. The `q.scope()` half is purely additive; the `masking.query` half rejects three legacy per-capability flags at compile time (migration is mechanical — see below).\n\n**`q.scope(kind)` — single-declaration tenant scoping.** Replaces the three-place pattern (column declaration + firewall predicate + implicit ownership-guard) with one column. `q.scope('organization')` compiles to `text(...).notNull()` and tells the compiler:\n\n1. Auto-derive the firewall predicate (`{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }`) so the explicit `firewall:` block can be omitted entirely.\n2. Add the column to `GUARDS_CONFIG.systemManaged` so client input is rejected at the guard layer.\n3. Auto-populate from `ctx` on create / upsert.\n\nThe systemManaged extension generalises beyond `q.scope()`: any firewall predicate whose `equals` references `ctx.*` adds its `field` to the systemManaged set. So a hand-rolled `firewall: [{ field: 'tenantId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }]` gets the same treatment.\n\n```typescript\ncolumns: {\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'), // → ctx.activeOrgId\n ownerId: q.scope('owner'), // → ctx.userId\n teamId: q.scope('team'), // → ctx.activeTeamId\n}\n```\n\nThe auto-derived firewall also includes the soft-delete predicate (`{ field: 'deletedAt', isNull: true }`) when audit-field injection is on (the default). See [`q.scope()` in the schema docs](/compiler/definitions/schema#qscope--tenant-scope-columns).\n\n**`masking[col].query.roles` — unified role gate for filter / sort / search.** The three legacy per-capability flags (`filterable`, `searchable`, `sortable`) are replaced by a single allowlist that says \"these roles can query the column.\"\n\n```typescript\nmasking: {\n email: {\n type: 'email',\n show: { roles: ['admin'] },\n query: { roles: ['admin'] }, // optional — defaults to show.roles\n },\n}\n```\n\nWhen omitted, `query` inherits from `show.roles` (\"if you can see it, you can query it\") which is the right shape for almost all PII. A view's own `query.{filterable,searchable,sortable}` allowlist is the opt-in for higher-privileged roles; the existing intersection validator gates it at compile time. See [Masking query gate](/compiler/definitions/masking#query-gate-filter--sort--search).\n\n**Breaking:** Setting `masking[col].filterable / .searchable / .sortable` is rejected at compile time with a migration hint. Replace with `query.roles` (or just delete the flags — `query` defaults to `show.roles`).\n\n---\n\n## v0.9.0 — April 25, 2026\n\n### DSL v2: unified `read:` pipeline, transactional batches, ID-probe defense\n\nStep 8 of the DSL v2 refactor lands. The headline shift is that the read\nside of every resource now has its own block — `read:` — that owns the\ncollection-level `GET /` endpoint, single-record `GET /:id`, and named view\nprojections. The legacy `crud.list` and `crud.get` shapes are rejected at\ncompile time. See the new [Read pipeline](/compiler/definitions/read) page\nfor the full reference and migration table.\n\n**Breaking changes** (compile-time errors with migration hints):\n\n- `crud.list` → [`read.access`](/compiler/definitions/read) (plus `read.pageSize` / `read.maxPageSize`)\n- `crud.get` → `read.access` (single-record GET inherits automatically; use record-level conditions on `read.access` for differentiated single-record gates)\n- Top-level `views: {...}` → [`read.views: {...}`](/compiler/definitions/read#views-under-read-views)\n- `crud.list.fields` / `crud.get.fields` → declare a named view under `read.views` and call `?view={name}` (or `/views/{name}`)\n\n**Pre-record access ordering on `/:id`**: handlers now run a role-only\naccess check **before** the firewall query, so a caller without a matching\nrole gets 403 before the database is touched. This closes the 404-vs-403\nID-probe channel — an unauthorized caller can no longer distinguish \"row\nexists in another tenant\" from \"row doesn't exist.\" See\n[Access evaluation order](/compiler/definitions/access#evaluation-order).\n\n**Transactional batch operations**: batch endpoints now expose a\n`failFast` option (replacing the old `atomic` naming) and a\n`meta.transactional` response field. On tx-supporting providers\n(postgres, supabase, neon, libsql, better-sqlite3, bun-sqlite), `failFast: true`\nwraps the per-record loop in `db.transaction(...)` so any failure rolls\nback the entire batch. On Cloudflare D1 (no `db.transaction`), `failFast: true`\nstill stops on the first error but prior writes stay committed; inspect\n`meta.transactional` to know which guarantee you got. Embedding queue\nmessages and realtime broadcasts are emitted **after** the transaction\ncommits, so a rolled-back batch produces no orphan jobs. See\n[Batch Operations: Transactional semantics](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/batch-operations#transactional-semantics).\n\n**`firewallErrorMode` lifted off the firewall block**: the field that\ncontrols 403-vs-404 on firewall misses now lives at the resource top level\n(sibling to `firewall:`), since the firewall config is now a predicate\narray and this is a presentation-layer choice. Existing `firewall.errorMode`\nvalues should be lifted to `firewallErrorMode` at the resource level.\n\n**Read-only resources**: an empty `crud: {}` block (or omitting `crud:`\nentirely) is valid for read-only resources. `read:` alone is enough to\nexpose `GET /` and `GET /:id`.\n\n**Strict-mode top-level keys**: the strict allow-list now includes `dev` so\n`defineConfig({ dev: { ... } })` is accepted at the top level.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.7 — April 17, 2026\n\n### Security: Hono CVE cluster fix\n\nHono is bumped to `^4.12.14` across the monorepo, the compiler Docker image's pre-installed deps, and every generator path that emits Hono into compiled projects. Older ranges (`^4.0.0` / `^4.5.0` / `^4.6.0` / `^4.7.11`) covered the vulnerable window. Recompile to pick up the fix in your generated project's `package.json`.\n\n### Cloudflare Email Sending is now in public beta\n\nQuickback already defaults to the Workers `send_email` binding for Cloudflare deploys, and Cloudflare Email Sending has now graduated to public beta — production-ready with zero-config, no API keys, no third-party accounts. No action needed; recompiling any existing project continues to wire the default Cloudflare transport. AWS SES remains a fully supported opt-in (`email.provider: 'aws-ses'`) for non-Cloudflare runtimes or existing SES setups. See [Email Configuration](/compiler/config#email-configuration).\n\n### Minor/patch dep sweep\n\nAligned the whole dep surface — monorepo, compiler Docker image, and generator emissions into compiled projects — so new compiles and existing recompiles converge on the same versions:\n\n- `wrangler@^4.83.0`\n- `drizzle-orm@^0.45.2`, `drizzle-kit@^0.31.10`\n- `zod@^4.3.6`\n- `@cloudflare/workers-types@^4.20260417.1` (also deduped — was accidentally declared in both `dependencies` and `devDependencies` in some paths)\n- `@tanstack/react-query@^5.99.0` (Account app)\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.5 — April 15, 2026\n\n### Fix: Better Auth 1.5 and `@cloudflare/workers-types` Compatibility\n\nGenerated API code failed to typecheck after Better Auth bumped to 1.5 and `@cloudflare/workers-types` tightened `BufferSource` to `ArrayBufferView<ArrayBuffer>`. Four unrelated surfaces broke:\n\n- **`databaseHooks.member.update.after` was removed** in Better Auth 1.5. The compiler now emits the member role-change broadcast hook as `organizationHooks.afterUpdateMemberRole` inside the `organization()` plugin call, which is the current supported shape.\n- **`REALTIME_URL` and `ACCESS_TOKEN`** are always emitted as optional `CloudflareBindings` fields when the organization plugin is active, so the broadcast hook typechecks even when `realtimeMode` is `\"inline\"` (or realtime isn't configured at all).\n- **`auth.api.listOrganizations` / `getFullOrganization` / `session.session.activeOrganizationId`** — third-party Better Auth plugins narrow the inferred `auth.api` type and hide organization-plugin endpoints. The generated middleware and `/admin/v1/organizations` route now cast through `any` for these calls.\n- **`crypto.subtle.sign` / `verify`** no longer accept `Uint8Array<ArrayBufferLike>` directly. Generated `jwt.ts` casts encoded payloads to `BufferSource`.\n\nNo config changes required — recompile to pick up the fixes.\n\n### CMS Admin Gate Now Enforced Server-Side\n\n`cms: { access: \"admin\" }` previously only hid the CMS link in Account UI and rendered an \"Access Denied\" screen inside the SPA — the static assets, `/api/v1/schema`, and `/api/v1/custom_view` CRUD were reachable by any authenticated user. A non-admin with an API token or cookie could bypass the UI and read schema metadata or saved CMS views directly.\n\nThis release adds server-side enforcement at every CMS-facing surface:\n\n- **CMS SPA shell** — the Worker checks `ctx.userRole === \"admin\"` before serving `index.html`. Unauthenticated requests redirect to login; authenticated non-admins get `403 Admin access required`. Static bundles (JS/CSS) remain reachable so browser caches aren't invalidated.\n- **`/api/v1/schema`** — returns `403` to non-admins.\n- **`custom_view` CRUD** — now gated on the new `userRole: [\"admin\"]` primitive rather than org membership.\n- **In-SPA gate** — unchanged; defense in depth behind the server-side gates.\n\nYour resource CRUD endpoints are unaffected — they keep their per-resource `crud.access.roles`.\n\n### New `userRole` Access Primitive\n\nAdded `userRole?: string[]` to the declarative `Access` config, evaluated against `ctx.userRole` (the Better Auth admin-plugin `user.role` column). This is distinct from `roles`, which matches `ctx.roles` (org membership).\n\n```typescript\n// Old: in multi-tenant this meant org-admin, not platform-admin\naccess: { roles: ['admin'] }\n\n// New: explicitly require user.role === 'admin' regardless of org membership\naccess: { userRole: ['admin'] }\n\n// \"Org owner OR platform admin\"\naccess: { or: [{ roles: ['owner'] }, { userRole: ['admin'] }] }\n\n// Platform admins see SSNs across every org\nmasking: { ssn: { type: 'ssn', show: { userRole: ['admin'] } } }\n```\n\n`userRole` works everywhere `Access` is accepted — CRUD, actions, views, masking, and inside `or`/`and` combinators. See [Access - userRole vs roles](/compiler/definitions/access#userrole-vs-roles).\n\n### Fix: `ReferenceError: customAlphabet is not defined` in generated POST handlers\n\nProjects with `providers.database.config.generateId: \"short\"` (or `\"nanoid\"` / `\"cuid\"`) compiled routes that called the ID helper but never imported it. Every generated `src/features/**/*.routes.ts` had `customAlphabet('0123...', 6)()` in its POST body but no matching `import { customAlphabet } from 'nanoid';` at the top of the file. Every `POST /api/v1/<resource>` and batch-create returned `500` with `ReferenceError: customAlphabet is not defined` on the first write.\n\nThe compiler now emits the correct import alongside the ID expression for all three modes: `nanoid`, `customAlphabet`, and `createId` from `@paralleldrive/cuid2`.\n\nNo config changes required — recompile to pick up the fix.\n\n### Fix: Dangling `export const` in generated `actions.ts` breaks `tsc`\n\nWhen a feature authored actions as `export const xActions = defineActions(...)` (instead of `export default defineActions(...)`), the compiler's preamble extractor leaked the assignment's left-hand side into the generated `src/features/<feature>/actions.ts`. The output contained a dangling `export const xActions =` with no right-hand side, and `tsc --noEmit` failed with `TS1109: Expression expected`. Runtime happened to work because the unused placeholder was never evaluated, but typecheck was red.\n\nThe preamble extractor now anchors its boundary to the start of the top-level statement containing `defineActions(...)`, covering `export default`, `export const X =`, `const X =`, and bare call forms. Local Zod helper declarations above the call continue to be preserved.\n\n### Fix: Files worker `database_id` reverted to `\"local-files\"` on every compile\n\nProjects using the two-worker R2 architecture had their files worker's `wrangler.toml` (`apps/backend/cloudflare-workers/files/wrangler.toml`) rewritten with `database_id = \"local-files\"` on every `quickback compile`, even when `providers.database.config.filesDatabaseId` was set to a real D1 UUID. The main worker's binding was correct — only the files worker fell through. Remote deploys of the files worker bound to a non-existent D1, so file serving and access-control reads failed with a binding error.\n\nThe files-worker wrangler generator now reads `filesDatabaseId` (and `filesDatabaseName`) from `providers.database.config` as a fallback when they aren't set on `providers.fileStorage.config`, matching the precedence chain already used by the main worker. Local dev is unaffected — `wrangler dev --local` uses `.wrangler/state/` regardless of the configured ID.\n\nNo config changes required — recompile and redeploy the files worker.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.6 — April 16, 2026\n\n### Fix: Audit columns silently dropped from tables with a same-line index callback\n\nTables authored with the composite-index shape Drizzle / prettier produces —\n\n```ts\nexport const episodeTags = sqliteTable(\"episode_tags\", {\n id: text(\"id\").primaryKey(),\n episodeId: text(\"episode_id\").notNull(),\n tagId: text(\"tag_id\").notNull(),\n}, (t) => [ // <-- \"}, (t) =>\" on one line\n uniqueIndex(\"episode_tag_unique\").on(t.episodeId, t.tagId),\n]);\n```\n\nnever received audit field injection. A regex in `injectAuditFields` required a literal `\\n` between the columns-object `},` and the `(t) =>` index callback, so same-line closers were silently skipped and the function returned the source unchanged. drizzle-kit then diffed the audit-less schema against the previous snapshot and emitted `ALTER TABLE ... DROP COLUMN created_at/modified_at/deleted_at/created_by/modified_by/deleted_by` for every affected table. Any project that applied those migrations had production CRUD return `500` because the generated firewall helper still referenced `deletedAt`.\n\nThe regex is now whitespace-flexible and the identifier class accepts any valid JS identifier (`t`, `table`, `_t`, `tbl2`). A defensive guard throws at compile time if all three terminator patterns fail on a recognizable Drizzle table — no more silent drops.\n\n**Recovery path:**\n\n- Most projects: recompile. drizzle-kit will detect the audit columns are missing from the DB snapshot and emit an `ADD COLUMN` migration to restore them. Apply it.\n- Projects that already hand-patched their schema and ran a manual `ADD COLUMN` migration (like the `podcast-app` workaround in commit `98d8758`): the next compile will regenerate a matching `ADD COLUMN` migration that will fail with \"duplicate column name\" against a DB that already has the columns. Mark the new migration as applied without running it (e.g. `INSERT INTO __drizzle_migrations` in the features DB) or hand-edit the generated SQL to a no-op, then continue normally.\n\n### Fix: `firewall.exception` generated `isNull(<table>.deletedAt)` against a missing column\n\nResources with `firewall: { exception: true }` always emitted `return isNull(<table>.deletedAt);` inside `buildFirewallConditions()`, regardless of whether the table actually had a `deletedAt` column. Projects that disabled audit injection globally (`compiler.features.auditFields: false`) or authored a schema without `deletedAt` ended up with Drizzle resolving `<table>.deletedAt` to `undefined` at query time — every `GET /api/v1/<resource>` returned `500`.\n\nThe three concerns are now fully independent:\n\n- **`firewall.exception: true`** — only disables tenant scoping (org/user/team `WHERE` clauses). It does not gate audit fields or soft-delete.\n- **Audit fields** — always injected unless globally opted out. Unchanged.\n- **Soft-delete filter** — emitted only when the schema actually has `deletedAt` *or* the user explicitly set `firewall.softDelete`.\n\nIn the default configuration (audit injection on), behavior is unchanged: exception resources still filter `deletedAt IS NULL`. Only the broken case changes — exception resources on a schema without `deletedAt` now return `undefined` (no firewall), matching the column reality.\n\nNo config changes required — recompile to pick up the fix.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.4 — April 14, 2026\n\n### New `generateId: \"short\"` Strategy\n\nAdded a compact ID option for tables where short, shareable codes matter more than collision resistance at scale:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n generateId: \"short\",\n }),\n}\n```\n\nGenerates 6-character alphanumeric IDs (e.g. `a3F9xK`) using nanoid's `customAlphabet` with the full 62-char alphabet (`0-9A-Za-z`). Requires the `nanoid` package in your project (same as the existing `\"nanoid\"` strategy).\n\n**When to use:** room codes, invite links, share URLs, ephemeral records — anywhere the ID appears in a URL or needs to be human-typeable.\n\n**When not to use:** high-volume tables. 62^6 ≈ 56.8B combinations means ~238K rows before a 50% collision probability (birthday bound). For large tables stick with `\"uuid\"`, `\"cuid\"`, or `\"prefixed\"`.\n\nSee [Providers - ID Generation Options](/compiler/config/providers#id-generation-options) for the full list of strategies.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.3 — April 14, 2026\n\n### Fix: `wrangler.toml` Route Placement and Binding IDs\n\nTwo bugs in the generated `wrangler.toml` that blocked production deployment without manual edits:\n\n**Routes were nested under `[dev]`.** The `routes = [...]` array was emitted after the `[dev]` section header, so TOML parsed it as `dev.routes` and wrangler ignored the custom domain (warning: `Unexpected fields found in dev field: \"routes\"`). Routes now emit as a top-level key.\n\n**D1 and KV bindings used placeholder IDs.** Despite `databaseId`, `filesDatabaseId`, and `kvId` being set in the quickback config, the generated `wrangler.toml` wrote `\"local-features\"`, `\"local-files\"`, and `\"local\"` instead of the real UUIDs. The compiler now resolves IDs from multiple config sources:\n\n| Binding | Config sources checked (in order) |\n|---------|-----------------------------------|\n| `AUTH_DB` | `database.config.authDatabaseId` |\n| `DB` | `database.config.featuresDatabaseId`, `database.config.databaseId` |\n| `FILES_DB` | `fileStorage.config.filesDatabaseId`, `database.config.filesDatabaseId` |\n| `KV` | `database.config.kvNamespaceId`, `storage.config.namespaceId`, `auth.config.kvId` |\n\nSee [Providers - Database Options](/compiler/config/providers#database-options) for the full list of supported ID properties.\n\n### Fix: Account SPA Post-Login Redirect on Unified Domain\n\nWhen the Account SPA was served at `/account/` on the unified quickback domain (e.g. `secure.example.com/account/`), post-login redirects dropped the basepath and sent users to `/dashboard` instead of `/account/dashboard`. Sign-out redirects had the same issue.\n\nThe SPA now shares a basepath module across the router and all raw `window.location.href` assignments, so login, signup, email OTP, welcome, and sign-out flows all stay under the correct path prefix regardless of whether the SPA is on the unified domain or its own dedicated auth subdomain.\n\nNo config changes required — recompile to pick up the fix.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.2 — April 11, 2026\n\n### Catch-All `VITE_QUICKBACK_URL` Environment Variable\n\nInstead of setting four separate URL env vars, you can now point at a single Quickback origin:\n\n```bash\n# One variable — done.\nVITE_QUICKBACK_URL=https://secure.example.com\n```\n\nWhen set, it's used as a fallback for the individual URLs:\n\n| Individual var (explicit) | Fallback when unset |\n|---|---|\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}` |\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_ACCOUNT_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}/account` |\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_CMS_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}/cms` |\n\n`VITE_QUICKBACK_APP_URL` stays independent — it points at the tenant's own frontend, not the Quickback server.\n\n**Non-breaking.** Individual vars still take precedence when set, so existing configurations work unchanged. The compiler now also emits `VITE_QUICKBACK_URL` into the generated SPA `.env` files, and library users can set `__QUICKBACK_URL__` on `globalThis` for the same effect.\n\nSee [Environment Variables](/stack/account-ui/environment-variables) for the full reference.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.1 — April 9, 2026\n\n### Role Hierarchy with `+` Suffix\n\nYou can now define a role hierarchy in your config and use the `+` suffix in access rules to mean \"this role and above\":\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nauth: {\n roleHierarchy: ['member', 'admin', 'owner'],\n}\n\n// In resource definitions\ncrud: {\n list: { access: { roles: [\"member+\"] } }, // member, admin, owner\n create: { access: { roles: [\"admin+\"] } }, // admin, owner\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"owner\"] } }, // owner only\n}\n```\n\nRoles are expanded at compile time. No `+` = exact match. See [Access - Role Hierarchy](/compiler/definitions/access#role-hierarchy) for details.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.0 — April 9, 2026\n\n### Breaking: VITE URL Environment Variables Renamed\n\nAll Quickback-generated URL environment variables are now namespaced under `VITE_QUICKBACK_*` to avoid collisions with other Vite projects.\n\n| Old | New |\n|-----|-----|\n| `VITE_API_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL` |\n| `VITE_ACCOUNT_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_ACCOUNT_URL` |\n| `VITE_APP_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_APP_URL` |\n| `VITE_CMS_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_CMS_URL` |\n\n**Non-URL variables are unchanged:** `VITE_ENABLE_*` feature flags, branding vars (`VITE_APP_NAME`, etc.), and `VITE_STRIPE_PUBLISHABLE_KEY` stay as-is.\n\n**Action required:**\n- **Compiled projects** — re-run `quickback compile`. The compiler generates the new names automatically.\n- **Standalone deploys** — update `.env`, `.env.production`, and `wrangler.toml` files manually.\n- **Library users** — the `__QUICKBACK_API_URL__` / `__QUICKBACK_APP_URL__` globalThis names are unchanged, but if you pipe Vite env vars into them, update the var names.\n\nSee [Environment Variables](/stack/account-ui/environment-variables) for the full reference.\n\n### CMS Access Control\n\nThe `cms.access` config option now enforces access at the CMS level, not just link visibility in Account UI.\n\n```typescript\ncms: { access: \"admin\" }\n```\n\nWhen set to `\"admin\"`, non-admin users (`user.role !== \"admin\"`) see an \"Access Denied\" screen with a sign-out button instead of the CMS. When set to `\"user\"` (the default), any authenticated user can access the CMS.\n\nSee [CMS Connecting](/stack/cms/connecting) and [Compiler Config](/compiler/config) for details.\n\n### SPA Sub-Route Fix\n\nFixed a bug where hard-refreshing or directly navigating to SPA sub-routes (e.g., `/account/profile`, `/cms/tables/users`) returned a blank white screen. The Worker now correctly serves `index.html` for all SPA paths, allowing the client-side router to handle routing.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.11 — February 24, 2026\n\n### Email OTP & Auth Fixes\n\n- Fixed email-OTP magic links not working correctly\n- Removed deprecated `/internal/validate` endpoint — use standard Better Auth session validation instead\n- Auth is now required for all API routes when running locally (previously some routes were unprotected in dev)\n\n### Multiple Table Exports Fix\n\n- Fixed a compiler error when a single file exports multiple Drizzle tables alongside a `defineTable()` default export\n- The CLI now properly detects and reports this with a clear error message pointing to the fix\n\n### Headless Drizzle Rename Hints\n\n- Added `compiler.migrations.renames` configuration for CI/CD environments where Drizzle's interactive rename prompts would block compilation\n- Compile errors now include explicit rename key paths and fail fast on malformed rename config keys\n- See [Configuration](/compiler/config) for details\n\n### Security Contract Report Artifacts\n\n- Added generated security contract artifacts to compiler output:\n - `reports/security-contracts.report.json`\n - `reports/security-contracts.report.sig.json`\n- Added config-driven signing controls:\n - `compiler.securityContracts.report.signature.enabled`\n - `compiler.securityContracts.report.signature.required`\n - `compiler.securityContracts.report.signature.key` / `keyEnv` / `keyId`\n- Missing required signing keys now fail loudly with explicit remediation guidance\n- Added strict config validation for report/signature paths and signing options\n\n### Mandatory Unsafe Action Audit Trail\n\n- Added structured unsafe action config (`unsafe: { reason, adminOnly, crossTenant, targetScope }`)\n- Cross-tenant unsafe actions now require Better Auth authentication plus platform admin role (`ctx.userRole === \"admin\"`)\n- Added mandatory audit logging for unsafe cross-tenant actions (success, denial, and error paths)\n- Cloudflare output now includes optional `AUDIT_DB` wiring, `drizzle.audit.config.ts`, and `db:migrate:audit:*` scripts when unsafe actions are present\n- Added compile-time raw SQL guard for actions and handlers (`allowRawSql: true` required per action)\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.10 — February 19, 2026\n\n### Compiler Page Parsing & CLI Output\n\n- Improved compiler page parsing for `definePage()` definitions\n- Better CLI output formatting during compilation\n- Added `apiPath` to schema registry for CMS integration\n\n### Bug Fixes\n\n- Fixed hyphenated action names not being properly quoted in generated code (e.g., `mark-complete` now generates valid JavaScript)\n- API key authentication (`x-api-key` header) is now handled separately from session tokens (`Bearer` header)\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.9 — February 16, 2026\n\n### CMS Pages & CLI Page Support\n\n- Added `definePage()` support for CMS-managed pages\n- Auth middleware improvements for page routes\n- CLI now supports page definitions alongside table and action definitions\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.8 — February 14, 2026\n\n### CMS App\n\n- Introduced the Quickback CMS — a schema-driven admin panel that connects to your generated API\n- CMS namespace added to actions for admin-specific operations\n- Fixed `guard` → `access` naming inconsistency in CMS action definitions\n\n### Schema Registry & Firewall Improvements\n\n- Added schema registry generator — the compiler now outputs a JSON schema registry used by the CMS\n- Firewall error modes: choose between `reveal` (403 with details) and `hide` (opaque 404) for security-sensitive deployments\n\n### Bug Fixes\n\n- Fixed anonymous user email format generation\n- Organization selector improvements in Account UI\n- Config validation now catches more errors at compile time\n- Better CRUD error handling with structured error responses\n- Fixed masking to use representative star counts instead of fixed formatting\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.7 — February 12, 2026\n\n### Scoped Database for Actions\n\nActions now receive a **security-scoped database** instead of a raw Drizzle instance. The compiler generates a proxy wrapper that automatically enforces org isolation, owner filtering, and soft-delete visibility — the same protections that CRUD routes have always had.\n\nThe scoped DB uses duck-typed column detection at runtime:\n\n| Column Detected | SELECT / UPDATE / DELETE | INSERT |\n|---|---|---|\n| `organizationId` | Adds `WHERE organizationId = ?` | Auto-injects `organizationId` from context |\n| `ownerId` | Adds `WHERE ownerId = ?` | Auto-injects `ownerId` from context |\n| `deletedAt` | Adds `WHERE deletedAt IS NULL` | — |\n\nThis means **every action is secure by default** — no manual `WHERE` clauses needed.\n\n```typescript\ndefineActions(todos, {\n complete: {\n type: \"record\",\n execute: async ({ db, ctx, record, input }) => {\n // db is scoped — only sees records in user's org, excludes soft-deleted\n const siblings = await db.select().from(todos);\n // ↑ automatically filtered to ctx.activeOrgId + deletedAt IS NULL\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\n#### Unsafe Mode\n\nActions that intentionally need to bypass security (admin reports, cross-org queries, migrations) can declare `unsafe: true` to receive a raw, unscoped database handle:\n\n```typescript\ndefineActions(analytics, {\n globalReport: {\n unsafe: true,\n execute: async ({ db, rawDb, ctx, input }) => {\n // db → still scoped (safety net)\n // rawDb → bypasses all security filters\n const allOrgs = await rawDb.select().from(organizations);\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\nWithout `unsafe: true`, `rawDb` is `undefined`.\n\n**Related docs:** [Actions](/compiler/definitions/actions), [Actions API](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/actions-api)\n\n---\n\n### Cascading Soft Delete\n\nSoft-deleting a parent record now **automatically cascades** to child and junction tables within the same feature. The compiler detects foreign key references at build time and generates cascade UPDATE statements.\n\n```\nDELETE /api/v1/projects/:id\n```\n\nGenerated behavior:\n```typescript\n// 1. Soft delete the parent\nawait db.update(projects)\n .set({ deletedAt: now, deletedBy: userId })\n .where(eq(projects.id, id));\n\n// 2. Auto-cascade to children (compiler-generated)\nawait db.update(projectMembers)\n .set({ deletedAt: now, deletedBy: userId })\n .where(eq(projectMembers.projectId, id));\n\nawait db.update(projectTasks)\n .set({ deletedAt: now, deletedBy: userId })\n .where(eq(projectTasks.projectId, id));\n```\n\nRules:\n- Only applies to **soft delete** (the default). Hard delete relies on database-level `ON DELETE CASCADE`.\n- Only cascades within the **same feature** — cross-feature references are not affected.\n- Child tables must have `deletedAt` / `deletedBy` columns (auto-added by the compiler's audit fields).\n\n**Related docs:** [Actions API — Cascading Soft Delete](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/actions-api#cascading-soft-delete)\n\n---\n\n### Advanced Query Parameters\n\nNew query parameter capabilities for all list endpoints:\n\n- **Field selection** — `?fields=id,name,status` returns only the columns you need\n- **Multi-sort** — `?sort=status:asc,createdAt:desc` sorts by multiple fields\n- **Total count** — `?count=true` returns total matching records in response headers (`X-Total-Count`)\n- **Full-text search** — `?search=keyword` searches across all text columns\n\n```bash\n# Get only names and statuses, sorted by status then date, with total count\nGET /api/v1/todos?fields=id,name,status&sort=status:asc,createdAt:desc&count=true\n\n# Search across all text fields\nGET /api/v1/todos?search=urgent\n```\n\n**Related docs:** [Query Parameters](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/query-params)\n\n---\n\n### Audit Field Improvements\n\n- `deletedAt` and `deletedBy` fields are now **always injected** by the compiler for tables with soft delete enabled — no need to define them in your schema\n- All audit fields (`createdAt`, `createdBy`, `modifiedAt`, `modifiedBy`, `deletedAt`, `deletedBy`) are auto-managed\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.6 — February 8, 2026\n\n### Database Naming Conventions\n\n- Default table and column naming changed to **snake_case** with `usePlurals: false`\n- Table names derived from generated Better Auth schema for consistency\n- Removed legacy single-database mode — split databases (auth + features) is now the standard\n\n### Auth Variable Shadowing Fix\n\n- Fixed `member` variable in auth middleware that shadowed the Drizzle `member` table import\n- Renamed to `sessionMember` to avoid conflicts in generated routes\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.5 — February 5, 2026\n\n### Better Auth Plugins\n\n- Published `@quickback-dev/better-auth-upgrade-anonymous` v1.1.0 — post-passkey email collection flow\n- Published `@quickback-dev/better-auth-combo-auth` — combined email + password + OTP authentication\n- Published `@quickback-dev/better-auth-aws-ses` — AWS SES email provider for Better Auth\n\n### OpenAPI Spec Generation\n\n- Generated APIs now include a full OpenAPI specification at `/openapi.json`\n- Better Auth endpoints included in the spec\n- Runtime route: `GET /openapi.json`\n\n### Security Hardening\n\n- Global error handler prevents leaking internal error details\n- Security headers middleware (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options)\n- `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` properly passed to generated config\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.4 — January 30, 2026\n\n### Account UI\n\n- Pre-built authentication UI deployed as Cloudflare Workers\n- Features: sessions, organizations, passkeys, passwordless, admin panel, API keys\n- Dual-mode: standalone (degit template) or embedded with Quickback projects\n\n### Webhook System\n\n- Inbound webhook endpoints with signature verification\n- Outbound webhooks via Cloudflare Queues with automatic retries\n- Configurable per-feature webhook events\n\n### Realtime & Vector Search\n\n- Durable Objects + WebSocket realtime subscriptions\n- Vector embeddings via Cloudflare Vectorize\n- KV and R2 storage integrations\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.0 — January 2026\n\n### Initial Release\n\n- **Quickback Compiler** — TypeScript-first backend compiler\n- **Four Security Pillars** — Firewall, Access, Guards, Masking\n- **`defineTable()`** — Schema + security configuration in a single file\n- **Templates** — Cloudflare Workers, Bun standalone, B2B SaaS\n- **Cloud Compiler** — Remote compilation via `compiler.quickback.dev`\n- **CLI** — `quickback create`, `quickback compile`, `quickback init`\n- **Better Auth Integration** — Organizations, roles, sessions\n- **Drizzle ORM** — Schema-first with automatic migrations\n- **Cloudflare D1** — Split database support (auth + features)"
6
+ "content": "# Changelog\n\nRelease notes for the Quickback compiler, CLI, and platform.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.14 — May 1, 2026\n\n### `auth.jwt` — JWT bearer-token fast-path config\n\nQuickback's bearer-token JWT (the one minted by the auth middleware and consumed by the fast-path on every subsequent request) is now configurable. The most-tuned knob is `expiresIn` — drop it to bound the post-revocation replay window without affecting browser SPAs, which auto-refresh via `set-auth-token` on every authed call:\n\n```ts\nauth: {\n jwt: {\n expiresIn: 30, // 30s post-revocation replay window\n issuer: 'my-api', // iss claim (verified on the way back in)\n audience: 'partner-svc', // aud claim\n secretEnv: 'CUSTOM_JWT_SECRET', // override BETTER_AUTH_SECRET if you need the JWT secret rotated independently\n },\n}\n```\n\n`revocationCheck: 'kv'` (KV-denylist consult on every fast-path verify, ~5-15ms edge-cached, no D1 hit) is reserved in the schema today but **deferred to 0.10.15** — setting it errors at compile so the migration path is explicit. `'none'` (today's behaviour, 0 cost, replay bound by TTL) stays the default.\n\nSee [the docs page](/docs/compiler/config/auth) for the full knob list and tuning recommendations.\n\n### MCP admin endpoints hidden from non-admin `tools/list`\n\nBetter Auth admin endpoints (`/admin/list-users`, `/admin/ban-user`, `/admin/impersonate-user`, etc. — 9 in total) now carry `x-access: { userRole: ['admin'] }` in the generated OpenAPI spec, which means the MCP server's existing access-filter automatically drops them from `tools/list` for callers without an admin token. Anonymous and member-role callers no longer see admin tooling enumerated through MCP; admin endpoints still exist on the HTTP surface (Better Auth gates them server-side regardless).\n\n### Declarative `security` config block\n\nEvery security response-header (`Content-Security-Policy`, `Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy`, `Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy`, `Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy`, `X-Frame-Options`, `Strict-Transport-Security`, `Referrer-Policy`, `Permissions-Policy`) is now configurable from `quickback.config.ts`. Loop's `postcompile-patch.mjs` (which re-injected a fuller CSP and COOP after every `quickback compile`) can now be deleted in favour of:\n\n```ts\nsecurity: {\n csp: {\n defaultSrc: ['@self'],\n scriptSrc: ['@self'],\n styleSrc: ['@self', '@unsafe-inline'],\n frameAncestors: ['@none'],\n objectSrc: ['@none'],\n upgradeInsecureRequests: true,\n },\n coop: 'same-origin',\n}\n```\n\n`@`-prefixed sentinels (`@self`, `@none`, `@unsafe-inline`, `@unsafe-eval`, `@trustedOrigins`, `@nonce`) save users from awkward `\"'self'\"` quoting and let `@trustedOrigins` resolve to the same allowlist `cors()` uses. Unknown sentinels throw at compile rather than silently stringify into the wire CSP.\n\nThe compiler runs lint rules over the resolved config — errors for `@nonce` (deferred to 0.10.15), `@unsafe-inline + @nonce` (silently broken), and sentinel-only directives that would resolve to nothing at runtime; warnings for `@unsafe-inline` in `script-src`, wildcard sources, missing `default-src`, HSTS preload-list misconfiguration, etc.\n\nDefaults preserve 0.10.13 behaviour byte-for-byte — adding the block without setting any field is a no-op.\n\nSee [the docs page](/docs/compiler/config/security) for the full reference.\n\n### HSTS no longer pins `localhost` to HTTPS\n\nThe generated middleware now skips `Strict-Transport-Security` when the request hostname is `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, or `*.localhost`. Without this gate, `wrangler dev` would pin the developer's browser to HTTPS for `max-age` seconds — observable across every project on that machine since HSTS keys on hostname, not port. Affects every project running locally.\n\n### Out of scope (deferred)\n\n- **Per-request CSP nonces** — Phase 2 / 0.10.15. Sentinel exists at config-validation level so users can author their final CSP today knowing it'll start working when nonces ship.\n- **Asset-hash CSP** for inline `<style>` and `<script>` blocks emitted by the bundled SPAs — Phase 3.\n- **Per-route CSP overrides** (e.g. one looser policy for `/admin`) — single global CSP for now.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.13 — May 1, 2026\n\n### Clickjacking protection on every generated Worker\n\nEvery Worker now emits two clickjacking-defence headers on every\nresponse:\n\n- `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self' <TRUSTED_ORIGINS…>`\n- `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN`\n\nThe CSP allowlist is sourced from the same `TRUSTED_ORIGINS` constant\nthat gates CORS, so users configure their domains in one place\n(`auth.trustedOrigins` / `auth.trustedOriginDefaults` in\n`quickback.config.ts`) and both CORS and frame-ancestors stay in\nlockstep. `'self'` is always allowed so an app's own SPAs can frame\ntheir own routes (e.g. an account login popover hosted on the same\norigin).\n\nModern browsers obey `frame-ancestors` and ignore `X-Frame-Options`\nwhen both are set; the legacy header is included for clients that\ndon't speak CSP3. The CSP intentionally only sets `frame-ancestors` —\nadding `script-src` / `default-src` would need a much wider audit\nacross SPA assets, inline scripts, and third-party embeds, so that's\nleft as a follow-up.\n\nRecompile (`quickback compile`) and redeploy to pick this up — no\nconfig change needed unless you want to allow extra cross-origin\niframe embeds, in which case add them to `auth.trustedOrigins`.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.12 — May 1, 2026\n\n### Bundled-docs sync for the MCP recon fix\n\nPatch release that re-bundles the CLI's offline docs (consulted by the\nClaude Code skill, Cursor rules, and other AI assistants) so they\nreflect the corrected `tools/list` access-filter behavior and CORS\nposture shipped in v0.10.11. The `compiler/config/agents.mdx` page\nitself was already corrected on the docs site immediately after the\n0.10.11 release; this bump propagates that text into the bundle inside\n`@quickback-dev/cli`.\n\nNo runtime or compiler behavior change — re-running `quickback compile`\nagainst this version produces the same output as v0.10.11.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.11 — May 1, 2026\n\n### MCP `tools/list` is now access-filtered + recon-tightened\n\nThe generated MCP-over-HTTP server (`src/routes/mcp.ts`) had three holes\nthat turned a standard pentest into trivial recon:\n\n1. `tools/list` returned the entire tool catalogue to anyone — including\n admin-only endpoints — without checking auth or roles. Tool\n descriptions also leaked sentences like `[UNSAFE] bypasses tenant\n scoping and requires elevated access` verbatim.\n2. The endpoint set `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` so any origin could\n pull the catalogue from a browser.\n3. Unauthenticated `GET /mcp` enumerated every tool name in its\n discovery payload.\n\nFix:\n\n- Each tool now carries sanitised access metadata (`_access` covering\n `roles` / `userRole` / `or` / `and`, plus `_public` for `PUBLIC`\n pseudo-role or empty `security`). `tools/list` filters against the\n caller's `ctx` — unauth callers see only `_public` tools, authed\n callers see only role-gated tools they pass. Record predicates and\n function-form access (opaque at list time) are dropped.\n- Wildcard CORS removed entirely. The parent app's `cors()` middleware\n (origin allowlist via `TRUSTED_ORIGINS` + `BETTER_AUTH_URL`) now\n applies uniformly to `/mcp`, same as every other route.\n- `[UNSAFE] ... bypasses tenant scoping ...` flavour text is gone.\n `annotations.destructiveHint` and `_unsafe` remain — those are the\n spec-correct signals for clients to warn users.\n- Unauthenticated `GET /mcp` no longer lists tool names. Inventory is\n only available via the access-filtered `tools/list`.\n\nThis filter is recon-mitigation, not a security boundary: `tools/call`\nstill re-enters the Hono app and runs every middleware (auth, firewall,\naccess, guards, masking), so hiding a tool from list never weakens the\nunderlying gate.\n\nKnown follow-up: Better Auth admin endpoints (`ban-user`, `create-user`,\n`impersonate-user`, etc.) don't yet emit `x-access` in the OpenAPI spec,\nso any logged-in user still sees them in `tools/list` (the actual call\nis still gated by the admin plugin). Tracked separately.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.10 — April 29, 2026\n\n### Reject reserved keys inside `access.record` at compile time\n\n`access.record` is a flat field map evaluated as implicit AND between\nentries — keys must be column names. Putting `and: [...]` (or `or` /\n`roles` / `userRole`) inside `record` was a real-world footgun: the\nruntime treated the literal string `\"and\"` as a column lookup, the\npredicate failed on every row, and the caller got a silent `403` /\nempty list with nothing pointing at the misuse. The TypeScript type\ncouldn't catch this — `RecordConditions` is an open-ended index\nsignature, so any key parses.\n\nThe compiler now walks every access node attached to a resource (CRUD\nops, `read.access`, view access, masking `show` / `query`, action\naccess) and throws a clear migration error when `record` contains a\nreserved key:\n\n- `and` / `or` inside `record` → use the top-level `and` / `or`\n sibling: `{ and: [{ record: { ... } }, { record: { ... } }] }`\n- `roles` / `userRole` inside `record` → put them at the access node\n alongside `record`: `{ roles: [...], record: { ... } }`\n\nThe error names the exact origin (`crud.update.access`,\n`actions.focus.access.or[1]`, etc.) so the fix lands in the right place.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.9 — April 29, 2026\n\n### Role hierarchy now expands in record-based action access\n\n`auth.roleHierarchy: ['member', 'admin', 'owner']` plus\n`access: { roles: ['member+'] }` on a record-based action used to\nsilently 403 valid callers. The standalone-action route generator\ninlined the expanded role list as a JSON literal, but the\nrecord-based generator read the access config back through the\nruntime `actions['name'].access` import — the user's source, where\nthe unexpanded `'member+'` shorthand still lived. The runtime did\nliteral string matching against `ctx.roles`, so an `owner` calling\nthe action got `['member+'] !== 'owner'` and was rejected.\n\nFixed: record-based action routes now inline the expanded list the\nsame way standalone routes do. `input` and `execute` still flow\nthrough the runtime import (closures aren't serializable); only the\naccess config is lifted to a JSON literal so the compile-time\nexpansion actually reaches the matcher.\n\nA regression test (`role-hierarchy-action-routes.test.ts`) locks the\nbehavior in — it asserts that `member+` never reaches the route\noutput and that the access config is no longer read from\n`actions[name].access` at runtime.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.8 — April 29, 2026\n\n### Audit support on postgres targets, plus a generated-API quality pass\n\n**Audit on PG.** Until this release, `audit_events` only existed on cloudflare-d1 — projects on Neon (or any postgres target) silently skipped audit logging on `unsafe:` and `PUBLIC`-role actions, and hard delete was hard-blocked. Postgres has no equivalent of D1's separate-database binding model, but it has native schemas — so the audit table now lives in a dedicated `audit` schema in the same database as features (`drizzle.pgSchema('audit')`). The `hasSecurityAudit` gate accepts D1 OR any PG dialect; the `auditDatabaseId` requirement only fires for D1 (which still uses the separate-binding model). The recruitment example wires `auditDatabaseId` so the recompile path stays green.\n\n**`auditDatabaseId` is now a compile-time requirement** (D1 only). Previously, projects with unsafe/PUBLIC actions but no audit id silently produced a `database_id = \"local-audit\"` placeholder in production `wrangler.toml`; Cloudflare's worker upload step then rejected it with code 10021 *after* assets and migrations had already run. The compile-time error names the exact `wrangler d1 create <project>-audit` command and the `auditDatabaseId` config key where the returned id goes.\n\n### Five fixes from a Loop integration ticket pass\n\n**Action input → OpenAPI / MCP.** `defineAction({ input: z.object({...}) })` schemas now flow into `requestBody` on the OpenAPI operation and `inputSchema.properties` / `_bodyFields` on the MCP tool list. Simple `z.object` shapes are extracted at compile time; for discriminated unions, refinements, recursive schemas, and bare-identifier references (`input: createPersonInput`), the compiler runs your action file through Zod 4's native `z.toJSONSchema()` during compilation — full-fidelity output with no static translator to maintain. Pre-fix, every action came out as a no-arg endpoint, which gutted typed SDK generation and made MCP useless for actions that take parameters.\n\n**OpenAPI fidelity.** Three surgical fixes that strict validators (zod, openapi-typescript, openapi-fetch) had been complaining about:\n- Response schemas now emit `required[]` for every non-nullable column, so generated SDKs treat them as guaranteed-present rather than optional.\n- `text(_, { enum: [...] })` columns emit as closed `{ type: \"string\", enum: [...] }`, narrowing to literal unions.\n- `id` only claims `format: \"uuid\"` when the project's `generateId` actually produces UUIDs. cuid2 / prefixed / nanoid / serial generators get plain `{ type: \"string\" }` — strict validators stop rejecting responses against their own spec.\n\n**Mask auto-detector now checks the column exists.** The auto-mask predicate used to be unconditionally `show: { or: 'owner', roles: ['admin'] }` — including for tables with no owner column at all (no `userId` / `ownerId` and no `q.scope('owner')`). The generated mask function would reference a non-existent column and fail under TypeScript checks. The auto-detector now verifies the resolved owner column exists in the parsed schema before emitting the `or` clause; when it doesn't, the rule falls back to roles-only and the compiler emits a warning so the behavior is transparent.\n\n**Error code consistency.** The generated CRUD layer was emitting raw codes (`'UNAUTHORIZED'`, `'NOT_NULL_VIOLATION'`, `'UNIQUE_VIOLATION'`, `'INSERT_FAILED'`, `'UPDATE_FAILED'`) that were never in the `QuickbackErrorCode` enum, so consumers couldn't switch exhaustively on `code`. New `database` layer + `DB_NOT_NULL_VIOLATION` / `DB_UNIQUE_VIOLATION` / `DB_INSERT_FAILED` / `DB_UPDATE_FAILED` / `NOT_FOUND` codes are now in the enum, the routes use `AuthErrors.missing()` / `DatabaseErrors.*()` helpers throughout, and the OpenAPI `Error` component emits `code` as a closed enum sourced from the canonical `QUICKBACK_ERROR_CODES` list. Generated SDKs can now `switch` on `code` without a default branch swallowing unknown values. See [API errors](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/errors#database).\n\n**Dropped dead `auditFields` preamble from action route generators.** The audit wrapper's `Proxy` already hard-stamps `createdAt` / `createdBy` / `modifiedAt` / `modifiedBy` on every INSERT and `modifiedAt` / `modifiedBy` on every UPDATE — the `auditFields` const the route preamble built was never read. Dropped from `standalone.ts` / `record-based.ts` and from the `ActionExecutorParams` JSDoc. Migrated 7 example handlers (drop `modifiedAt: auditFields!.modifiedAt` from `.set` payloads — the wrapper handles it). Note: `.onConflictDoUpdate({ set })` is *not* intercepted by the wrapper, so `upsertBatch`-style handlers keep an explicit `modifiedAt: now`.\n\n---\n\n## One file per action: greenfield action authoring\n\nAction authoring collapses to a single shape. Each action is its own file under `<feature>/actions/<name>.ts` using `defineAction({...})`. The filename is the action name AND the URL segment.\n\n```typescript\n// features/applications/actions/advance.ts\n\nexport default defineAction({\n description: \"Move an application forward in the pipeline\",\n input: z.object({ nextStatus: z.enum([\"screening\", \"interview\", \"offer\"]) }),\n access: { roles: [\"owner\", \"admin\"] },\n transition: {\n field: \"status\",\n via: \"nextStatus\",\n fromTo: { applied: [\"screening\"], screening: [\"interview\"], interview: [\"offer\"] },\n },\n async execute({ db, record, input, auditFields, whereTransition }) { /* … */ },\n});\n```\n\n`defineAction` is imported from a generated per-feature helper at `<feature>/.quickback/define-action.ts` — types `record`, `input`, and audit fields without manual annotations. The directory says what `:id` mounts to; the imports say what the body reads or writes.\n\n**Discovery rules:**\n- `actions/<name>.ts` binds to the feature's primary table (the `<feature>.ts` file at the feature root).\n- `actions/<table>/<name>.ts` binds to the sibling table file `<table>.ts` — for multi-table features.\n- Setting `path:` makes the action standalone (custom URL, no record fetch, no firewall preload).\n- Tableless features (no top-level `*.ts` files) require every action to be standalone.\n- Action names are unique per `(bindTable, name)` pair — sibling-bound actions on different tables may share a verb (e.g. `actions/episodes/publish.ts` + `actions/shows/publish.ts` mount at `/episodes/:id/publish` and `/shows/:id/publish` and don't collide). Standalone actions are unique per `(method, path)`.\n- Files under `<feature>/lib/` are copied verbatim for feature-local helpers; `quickback/lib/` is exposed via the `~/lib/*` alias for cross-feature shared code (with a one-way import rule enforced at compile time).\n\n**Retired** (rejected at load time with migration guidance):\n\n- `actions.ts` (bundled multi-action file)\n- `_feature.ts` (shared preamble + tableless actions)\n- `handlers/` directory + `handler:` string ref\n- `defineActions(table, {…})` and `defineActions(null, {…})`\n- `export default { actions: {…} }`\n- Colocated `defineActions` inside table files\n- `standalone: true` flag (presence of `path:` is the new signal)\n- `*-actions.ts` / `*.actions.ts` filename patterns\n\nThe phantom-`unsafe` regex bug that flattened nested `unsafe: { … }` blocks into a fake top-level action is gone — the parser now reads action files as real TS modules with real imports, so type inference, jump-to-definition, and rename refactoring all work end-to-end.\n\nThe CLI loader rejects retired primitives at load time with batched migration errors. Existing projects need to be migrated by hand to the new shape before recompiling.\n\nSee the [Actions docs](/compiler/definitions/actions) for the full reference.\n\n---\n\n## Multi-table actions per feature\n\nFeatures used to support exactly one `defineActions(table, …)` call via `actions.ts`, which forced unnatural feature splits whenever multiple tables in the same feature needed actions (a podcast feature with `episodes`, `shows`, `seasons`, `collections`, etc.). One feature directory can now own actions on multiple tables across three discovery modes:\n\n- **Colocated** (canonical) — `<table>.ts` containing both `defineTable` and `defineActions(<table>, …)`. One file per entity. Default for new features.\n- **`actions.ts`** (existing) — single primary-table actions file at feature root. Unchanged behaviour.\n- **`actions/<table>.ts`** — per-table action files for teams that want strict schema/behavior separation or need to break an import cycle.\n\nPlus the universal `_feature.ts` slot (at feature root) for **non-table-bound feature-level actions** (`export default { actions: { … } }` shape) and **shared Zod schemas** that get prepended once to the merged actions module so every sibling action sees them. Allowed in any of the three modes — orthogonal to table binding.\n\nThe decision flowchart: *one table with actions → colocate. Multiple tables with actions → colocate each. Hit a cycle or want strict separation → `actions/<table>.ts`. Want schema/actions split for a single-table feature → `actions.ts`. Non-table actions → always `_feature.ts`.*\n\nConflicts are batched and printed once before the compiler aborts — no \"fix one, recompile, fix the next\" loop. The CLI hard-errors when a feature mixes `actions.ts` with table-bound mode, when the same table has its `defineActions` declared in two places, when an `actions/<x>.ts` first-arg doesn't match the basename, or when `_feature.ts` contains `defineActions(table, …)`. Legacy `*-actions.ts` / `*.actions.ts` filenames in a feature dir trigger a soft warning naming the offending paths.\n\nWithin the legacy bundled `actions.ts` DSL, action names had to be unique within a feature — the runtime module merged every source into one keyspace, so colliding `publish` actions on `episodes` and `shows` would have silently overwritten each other. The retired `actions.ts` shape is no longer accepted, so this constraint is gone: the current one-file-per-action layout keys uniqueness per `(bindTable, name)` pair, and the codegen aggregator mangles the JS map key per bind-table while keeping the URL segment bare. Sibling-bound `actions/episodes/publish.ts` and `actions/shows/publish.ts` mount at `/episodes/:id/publish` and `/shows/:id/publish` and compile cleanly.\n\nInline `execute:` bodies must be arrow functions (`execute: async (ctx) => { … }`). `async function` and plain `function` shapes were silently misparsed by the route emitter — they now hard-error at parse time pointing at the canonical arrow form, with a suggestion to use `handler:` for callers who genuinely need a named function declaration.\n\n`handlers/` walks recursively now — `handlers/<table>/<action>.ts` is the canonical layout. A new `lib/` directory under each feature gets copied verbatim into the output for feature-local helpers.\n\nMigration: existing `actions.ts` projects compile bit-identically — the legacy single-table path is unchanged. Legacy `*-actions.ts` filenames produce a soft warning and silently aren't picked up; rename to `<table>.ts` (colocated), `actions/<table>.ts`, or single `actions.ts`.\n\n---\n\n## Firewall: named-scope shape restored, auto-detection synonyms widened\n\nThe named-scope firewall shape (`firewall: { organization: { column: 'tenant_id' } }`) is back as a co-equal user-facing input alongside the predicate array. DSL v2 step 8 had walled it off, but the internal architecture still kept named-scope around for the route + scoped-db generators — so re-accepting it at the input boundary is a thin coercion layer, not an architectural change.\n\n```typescript\n// All three are now valid; all compile to the same predicate array internally.\nfirewall: { organization: { column: 'tenant_id' } } // named-scope (compact)\nfirewall: { owner: { column: 'account_user_id' } }\nfirewall: { exception: true }\nfirewall: [\n { field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' },\n { field: 'deletedAt', isNull: true },\n] // predicate array (explicit)\n```\n\nPick the form that reads better — named-scope for the common one-line case, predicate array when you need custom `in`-lists or non-scope predicates.\n\n**Auto-detection synonyms expanded.** When `firewall:` is omitted entirely, the compiler scans the schema for an isolation column. The org-scope list now accepts `organizationId`, `organisationId`, `orgId`, `organization`, `organisation`, `org` (American + British). User-scope still accepts `userId` only.\n\n**`ownerId` is now a targeted error signal.** When a table carries `ownerId` but no isolation column AND no explicit `firewall:`, the compiler raises a specific error: `\\`ownerId\\` is business-logic ownership, not access control — Quickback won't auto-derive a firewall from it. Either rename to \\`userId\\` if this column controls access, add a separate \\`userId\\` / \\`organizationId\\` column, or specify \\`firewall:\\` explicitly.` This replaces the generic \"missing isolation column\" error in the `ownerId`-only case and preserves the documented distinction between RLS-style access control (`userId`) and business-logic ownership (`ownerId`).\n\nMigration: nothing breaks. Projects on the predicate-array shape compile bit-identically. Projects on the named-scope shape — including any test fixtures or example projects that were left on the legacy form — now compile cleanly again.\n\n---\n\n## v0.10.0 — April 26, 2026\n\n### `q.scope()` column DSL + unified `masking.query` gate\n\nTwo related DSL consolidations land. The `q.scope()` half is purely additive; the `masking.query` half rejects three legacy per-capability flags at compile time (migration is mechanical — see below).\n\n**`q.scope(kind)` — single-declaration tenant scoping.** Replaces the three-place pattern (column declaration + firewall predicate + implicit ownership-guard) with one column. `q.scope('organization')` compiles to `text(...).notNull()` and tells the compiler:\n\n1. Auto-derive the firewall predicate (`{ field: 'organizationId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }`) so the explicit `firewall:` block can be omitted entirely.\n2. Add the column to `GUARDS_CONFIG.systemManaged` so client input is rejected at the guard layer.\n3. Auto-populate from `ctx` on create / upsert.\n\nThe systemManaged extension generalises beyond `q.scope()`: any firewall predicate whose `equals` references `ctx.*` adds its `field` to the systemManaged set. So a hand-rolled `firewall: [{ field: 'tenantId', equals: 'ctx.activeOrgId' }]` gets the same treatment.\n\n```typescript\ncolumns: {\n organizationId: q.scope('organization'), // → ctx.activeOrgId\n ownerId: q.scope('owner'), // → ctx.userId\n teamId: q.scope('team'), // → ctx.activeTeamId\n}\n```\n\nThe auto-derived firewall also includes the soft-delete predicate (`{ field: 'deletedAt', isNull: true }`) when audit-field injection is on (the default). See [`q.scope()` in the schema docs](/compiler/definitions/schema#qscope--tenant-scope-columns).\n\n**`masking[col].query.roles` — unified role gate for filter / sort / search.** The three legacy per-capability flags (`filterable`, `searchable`, `sortable`) are replaced by a single allowlist that says \"these roles can query the column.\"\n\n```typescript\nmasking: {\n email: {\n type: 'email',\n show: { roles: ['admin'] },\n query: { roles: ['admin'] }, // optional — defaults to show.roles\n },\n}\n```\n\nWhen omitted, `query` inherits from `show.roles` (\"if you can see it, you can query it\") which is the right shape for almost all PII. A view's own `query.{filterable,searchable,sortable}` allowlist is the opt-in for higher-privileged roles; the existing intersection validator gates it at compile time. See [Masking query gate](/compiler/definitions/masking#query-gate-filter--sort--search).\n\n**Breaking:** Setting `masking[col].filterable / .searchable / .sortable` is rejected at compile time with a migration hint. Replace with `query.roles` (or just delete the flags — `query` defaults to `show.roles`).\n\n---\n\n## v0.9.0 — April 25, 2026\n\n### DSL v2: unified `read:` pipeline, transactional batches, ID-probe defense\n\nStep 8 of the DSL v2 refactor lands. The headline shift is that the read\nside of every resource now has its own block — `read:` — that owns the\ncollection-level `GET /` endpoint, single-record `GET /:id`, and named view\nprojections. The legacy `crud.list` and `crud.get` shapes are rejected at\ncompile time. See the new [Read pipeline](/compiler/definitions/read) page\nfor the full reference and migration table.\n\n**Breaking changes** (compile-time errors with migration hints):\n\n- `crud.list` → [`read.access`](/compiler/definitions/read) (plus `read.pageSize` / `read.maxPageSize`)\n- `crud.get` → `read.access` (single-record GET inherits automatically; use record-level conditions on `read.access` for differentiated single-record gates)\n- Top-level `views: {...}` → [`read.views: {...}`](/compiler/definitions/read#views-under-read-views)\n- `crud.list.fields` / `crud.get.fields` → declare a named view under `read.views` and call `?view={name}` (or `/views/{name}`)\n\n**Pre-record access ordering on `/:id`**: handlers now run a role-only\naccess check **before** the firewall query, so a caller without a matching\nrole gets 403 before the database is touched. This closes the 404-vs-403\nID-probe channel — an unauthorized caller can no longer distinguish \"row\nexists in another tenant\" from \"row doesn't exist.\" See\n[Access evaluation order](/compiler/definitions/access#evaluation-order).\n\n**Transactional batch operations**: batch endpoints now expose a\n`failFast` option (replacing the old `atomic` naming) and a\n`meta.transactional` response field. On tx-supporting providers\n(postgres, supabase, neon, libsql, better-sqlite3, bun-sqlite), `failFast: true`\nwraps the per-record loop in `db.transaction(...)` so any failure rolls\nback the entire batch. On Cloudflare D1 (no `db.transaction`), `failFast: true`\nstill stops on the first error but prior writes stay committed; inspect\n`meta.transactional` to know which guarantee you got. Embedding queue\nmessages and realtime broadcasts are emitted **after** the transaction\ncommits, so a rolled-back batch produces no orphan jobs. See\n[Batch Operations: Transactional semantics](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/batch-operations#transactional-semantics).\n\n**`firewallErrorMode` lifted off the firewall block**: the field that\ncontrols 403-vs-404 on firewall misses now lives at the resource top level\n(sibling to `firewall:`), since the firewall config is now a predicate\narray and this is a presentation-layer choice. Existing `firewall.errorMode`\nvalues should be lifted to `firewallErrorMode` at the resource level.\n\n**Read-only resources**: an empty `crud: {}` block (or omitting `crud:`\nentirely) is valid for read-only resources. `read:` alone is enough to\nexpose `GET /` and `GET /:id`.\n\n**Strict-mode top-level keys**: the strict allow-list now includes `dev` so\n`defineConfig({ dev: { ... } })` is accepted at the top level.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.7 — April 17, 2026\n\n### Security: Hono CVE cluster fix\n\nHono is bumped to `^4.12.14` across the monorepo, the compiler Docker image's pre-installed deps, and every generator path that emits Hono into compiled projects. Older ranges (`^4.0.0` / `^4.5.0` / `^4.6.0` / `^4.7.11`) covered the vulnerable window. Recompile to pick up the fix in your generated project's `package.json`.\n\n### Cloudflare Email Sending is now in public beta\n\nQuickback already defaults to the Workers `send_email` binding for Cloudflare deploys, and Cloudflare Email Sending has now graduated to public beta — production-ready with zero-config, no API keys, no third-party accounts. No action needed; recompiling any existing project continues to wire the default Cloudflare transport. AWS SES remains a fully supported opt-in (`email.provider: 'aws-ses'`) for non-Cloudflare runtimes or existing SES setups. See [Email Configuration](/compiler/config#email-configuration).\n\n### Minor/patch dep sweep\n\nAligned the whole dep surface — monorepo, compiler Docker image, and generator emissions into compiled projects — so new compiles and existing recompiles converge on the same versions:\n\n- `wrangler@^4.83.0`\n- `drizzle-orm@^0.45.2`, `drizzle-kit@^0.31.10`\n- `zod@^4.3.6`\n- `@cloudflare/workers-types@^4.20260417.1` (also deduped — was accidentally declared in both `dependencies` and `devDependencies` in some paths)\n- `@tanstack/react-query@^5.99.0` (Account app)\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.5 — April 15, 2026\n\n### Fix: Better Auth 1.5 and `@cloudflare/workers-types` Compatibility\n\nGenerated API code failed to typecheck after Better Auth bumped to 1.5 and `@cloudflare/workers-types` tightened `BufferSource` to `ArrayBufferView<ArrayBuffer>`. Four unrelated surfaces broke:\n\n- **`databaseHooks.member.update.after` was removed** in Better Auth 1.5. The compiler now emits the member role-change broadcast hook as `organizationHooks.afterUpdateMemberRole` inside the `organization()` plugin call, which is the current supported shape.\n- **`REALTIME_URL` and `ACCESS_TOKEN`** are always emitted as optional `CloudflareBindings` fields when the organization plugin is active, so the broadcast hook typechecks even when `realtimeMode` is `\"inline\"` (or realtime isn't configured at all).\n- **`auth.api.listOrganizations` / `getFullOrganization` / `session.session.activeOrganizationId`** — third-party Better Auth plugins narrow the inferred `auth.api` type and hide organization-plugin endpoints. The generated middleware and `/admin/v1/organizations` route now cast through `any` for these calls.\n- **`crypto.subtle.sign` / `verify`** no longer accept `Uint8Array<ArrayBufferLike>` directly. Generated `jwt.ts` casts encoded payloads to `BufferSource`.\n\nNo config changes required — recompile to pick up the fixes.\n\n### CMS Admin Gate Now Enforced Server-Side\n\n`cms: { access: \"admin\" }` previously only hid the CMS link in Account UI and rendered an \"Access Denied\" screen inside the SPA — the static assets, `/api/v1/schema`, and `/api/v1/custom_view` CRUD were reachable by any authenticated user. A non-admin with an API token or cookie could bypass the UI and read schema metadata or saved CMS views directly.\n\nThis release adds server-side enforcement at every CMS-facing surface:\n\n- **CMS SPA shell** — the Worker checks `ctx.userRole === \"admin\"` before serving `index.html`. Unauthenticated requests redirect to login; authenticated non-admins get `403 Admin access required`. Static bundles (JS/CSS) remain reachable so browser caches aren't invalidated.\n- **`/api/v1/schema`** — returns `403` to non-admins.\n- **`custom_view` CRUD** — now gated on the new `userRole: [\"admin\"]` primitive rather than org membership.\n- **In-SPA gate** — unchanged; defense in depth behind the server-side gates.\n\nYour resource CRUD endpoints are unaffected — they keep their per-resource `crud.access.roles`.\n\n### New `userRole` Access Primitive\n\nAdded `userRole?: string[]` to the declarative `Access` config, evaluated against `ctx.userRole` (the Better Auth admin-plugin `user.role` column). This is distinct from `roles`, which matches `ctx.roles` (org membership).\n\n```typescript\n// Old: in multi-tenant this meant org-admin, not platform-admin\naccess: { roles: ['admin'] }\n\n// New: explicitly require user.role === 'admin' regardless of org membership\naccess: { userRole: ['admin'] }\n\n// \"Org owner OR platform admin\"\naccess: { or: [{ roles: ['owner'] }, { userRole: ['admin'] }] }\n\n// Platform admins see SSNs across every org\nmasking: { ssn: { type: 'ssn', show: { userRole: ['admin'] } } }\n```\n\n`userRole` works everywhere `Access` is accepted — CRUD, actions, views, masking, and inside `or`/`and` combinators. See [Access - userRole vs roles](/compiler/definitions/access#userrole-vs-roles).\n\n### Fix: `ReferenceError: customAlphabet is not defined` in generated POST handlers\n\nProjects with `providers.database.config.generateId: \"short\"` (or `\"nanoid\"` / `\"cuid\"`) compiled routes that called the ID helper but never imported it. Every generated `src/features/**/*.routes.ts` had `customAlphabet('0123...', 6)()` in its POST body but no matching `import { customAlphabet } from 'nanoid';` at the top of the file. Every `POST /api/v1/<resource>` and batch-create returned `500` with `ReferenceError: customAlphabet is not defined` on the first write.\n\nThe compiler now emits the correct import alongside the ID expression for all three modes: `nanoid`, `customAlphabet`, and `createId` from `@paralleldrive/cuid2`.\n\nNo config changes required — recompile to pick up the fix.\n\n### Fix: Dangling `export const` in generated `actions.ts` breaks `tsc`\n\nWhen a feature authored actions as `export const xActions = defineActions(...)` (instead of `export default defineActions(...)`), the compiler's preamble extractor leaked the assignment's left-hand side into the generated `src/features/<feature>/actions.ts`. The output contained a dangling `export const xActions =` with no right-hand side, and `tsc --noEmit` failed with `TS1109: Expression expected`. Runtime happened to work because the unused placeholder was never evaluated, but typecheck was red.\n\nThe preamble extractor now anchors its boundary to the start of the top-level statement containing `defineActions(...)`, covering `export default`, `export const X =`, `const X =`, and bare call forms. Local Zod helper declarations above the call continue to be preserved.\n\n### Fix: Files worker `database_id` reverted to `\"local-files\"` on every compile\n\nProjects using the two-worker R2 architecture had their files worker's `wrangler.toml` (`apps/backend/cloudflare-workers/files/wrangler.toml`) rewritten with `database_id = \"local-files\"` on every `quickback compile`, even when `providers.database.config.filesDatabaseId` was set to a real D1 UUID. The main worker's binding was correct — only the files worker fell through. Remote deploys of the files worker bound to a non-existent D1, so file serving and access-control reads failed with a binding error.\n\nThe files-worker wrangler generator now reads `filesDatabaseId` (and `filesDatabaseName`) from `providers.database.config` as a fallback when they aren't set on `providers.fileStorage.config`, matching the precedence chain already used by the main worker. Local dev is unaffected — `wrangler dev --local` uses `.wrangler/state/` regardless of the configured ID.\n\nNo config changes required — recompile and redeploy the files worker.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.6 — April 16, 2026\n\n### Fix: Audit columns silently dropped from tables with a same-line index callback\n\nTables authored with the composite-index shape Drizzle / prettier produces —\n\n```ts\nexport const episodeTags = sqliteTable(\"episode_tags\", {\n id: text(\"id\").primaryKey(),\n episodeId: text(\"episode_id\").notNull(),\n tagId: text(\"tag_id\").notNull(),\n}, (t) => [ // <-- \"}, (t) =>\" on one line\n uniqueIndex(\"episode_tag_unique\").on(t.episodeId, t.tagId),\n]);\n```\n\nnever received audit field injection. A regex in `injectAuditFields` required a literal `\\n` between the columns-object `},` and the `(t) =>` index callback, so same-line closers were silently skipped and the function returned the source unchanged. drizzle-kit then diffed the audit-less schema against the previous snapshot and emitted `ALTER TABLE ... DROP COLUMN created_at/modified_at/deleted_at/created_by/modified_by/deleted_by` for every affected table. Any project that applied those migrations had production CRUD return `500` because the generated firewall helper still referenced `deletedAt`.\n\nThe regex is now whitespace-flexible and the identifier class accepts any valid JS identifier (`t`, `table`, `_t`, `tbl2`). A defensive guard throws at compile time if all three terminator patterns fail on a recognizable Drizzle table — no more silent drops.\n\n**Recovery path:**\n\n- Most projects: recompile. drizzle-kit will detect the audit columns are missing from the DB snapshot and emit an `ADD COLUMN` migration to restore them. Apply it.\n- Projects that already hand-patched their schema and ran a manual `ADD COLUMN` migration (like the `podcast-app` workaround in commit `98d8758`): the next compile will regenerate a matching `ADD COLUMN` migration that will fail with \"duplicate column name\" against a DB that already has the columns. Mark the new migration as applied without running it (e.g. `INSERT INTO __drizzle_migrations` in the features DB) or hand-edit the generated SQL to a no-op, then continue normally.\n\n### Fix: `firewall.exception` generated `isNull(<table>.deletedAt)` against a missing column\n\nResources with `firewall: { exception: true }` always emitted `return isNull(<table>.deletedAt);` inside `buildFirewallConditions()`, regardless of whether the table actually had a `deletedAt` column. Projects that disabled audit injection globally (`compiler.features.auditFields: false`) or authored a schema without `deletedAt` ended up with Drizzle resolving `<table>.deletedAt` to `undefined` at query time — every `GET /api/v1/<resource>` returned `500`.\n\nThe three concerns are now fully independent:\n\n- **`firewall.exception: true`** — only disables tenant scoping (org/user/team `WHERE` clauses). It does not gate audit fields or soft-delete.\n- **Audit fields** — always injected unless globally opted out. Unchanged.\n- **Soft-delete filter** — emitted only when the schema actually has `deletedAt` *or* the user explicitly set `firewall.softDelete`.\n\nIn the default configuration (audit injection on), behavior is unchanged: exception resources still filter `deletedAt IS NULL`. Only the broken case changes — exception resources on a schema without `deletedAt` now return `undefined` (no firewall), matching the column reality.\n\nNo config changes required — recompile to pick up the fix.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.4 — April 14, 2026\n\n### New `generateId: \"short\"` Strategy\n\nAdded a compact ID option for tables where short, shareable codes matter more than collision resistance at scale:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n generateId: \"short\",\n }),\n}\n```\n\nGenerates 6-character alphanumeric IDs (e.g. `a3F9xK`) using nanoid's `customAlphabet` with the full 62-char alphabet (`0-9A-Za-z`). Requires the `nanoid` package in your project (same as the existing `\"nanoid\"` strategy).\n\n**When to use:** room codes, invite links, share URLs, ephemeral records — anywhere the ID appears in a URL or needs to be human-typeable.\n\n**When not to use:** high-volume tables. 62^6 ≈ 56.8B combinations means ~238K rows before a 50% collision probability (birthday bound). For large tables stick with `\"uuid\"`, `\"cuid\"`, or `\"prefixed\"`.\n\nSee [Providers - ID Generation Options](/compiler/config/providers#id-generation-options) for the full list of strategies.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.3 — April 14, 2026\n\n### Fix: `wrangler.toml` Route Placement and Binding IDs\n\nTwo bugs in the generated `wrangler.toml` that blocked production deployment without manual edits:\n\n**Routes were nested under `[dev]`.** The `routes = [...]` array was emitted after the `[dev]` section header, so TOML parsed it as `dev.routes` and wrangler ignored the custom domain (warning: `Unexpected fields found in dev field: \"routes\"`). Routes now emit as a top-level key.\n\n**D1 and KV bindings used placeholder IDs.** Despite `databaseId`, `filesDatabaseId`, and `kvId` being set in the quickback config, the generated `wrangler.toml` wrote `\"local-features\"`, `\"local-files\"`, and `\"local\"` instead of the real UUIDs. The compiler now resolves IDs from multiple config sources:\n\n| Binding | Config sources checked (in order) |\n|---------|-----------------------------------|\n| `AUTH_DB` | `database.config.authDatabaseId` |\n| `DB` | `database.config.featuresDatabaseId`, `database.config.databaseId` |\n| `FILES_DB` | `fileStorage.config.filesDatabaseId`, `database.config.filesDatabaseId` |\n| `KV` | `database.config.kvNamespaceId`, `storage.config.namespaceId`, `auth.config.kvId` |\n\nSee [Providers - Database Options](/compiler/config/providers#database-options) for the full list of supported ID properties.\n\n### Fix: Account SPA Post-Login Redirect on Unified Domain\n\nWhen the Account SPA was served at `/account/` on the unified quickback domain (e.g. `secure.example.com/account/`), post-login redirects dropped the basepath and sent users to `/dashboard` instead of `/account/dashboard`. Sign-out redirects had the same issue.\n\nThe SPA now shares a basepath module across the router and all raw `window.location.href` assignments, so login, signup, email OTP, welcome, and sign-out flows all stay under the correct path prefix regardless of whether the SPA is on the unified domain or its own dedicated auth subdomain.\n\nNo config changes required — recompile to pick up the fix.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.2 — April 11, 2026\n\n### Catch-All `VITE_QUICKBACK_URL` Environment Variable\n\nInstead of setting four separate URL env vars, you can now point at a single Quickback origin:\n\n```bash\n# One variable — done.\nVITE_QUICKBACK_URL=https://secure.example.com\n```\n\nWhen set, it's used as a fallback for the individual URLs:\n\n| Individual var (explicit) | Fallback when unset |\n|---|---|\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}` |\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_ACCOUNT_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}/account` |\n| `VITE_QUICKBACK_CMS_URL` | `${VITE_QUICKBACK_URL}/cms` |\n\n`VITE_QUICKBACK_APP_URL` stays independent — it points at the tenant's own frontend, not the Quickback server.\n\n**Non-breaking.** Individual vars still take precedence when set, so existing configurations work unchanged. The compiler now also emits `VITE_QUICKBACK_URL` into the generated SPA `.env` files, and library users can set `__QUICKBACK_URL__` on `globalThis` for the same effect.\n\nSee [Environment Variables](/stack/account-ui/environment-variables) for the full reference.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.1 — April 9, 2026\n\n### Role Hierarchy with `+` Suffix\n\nYou can now define a role hierarchy in your config and use the `+` suffix in access rules to mean \"this role and above\":\n\n```typescript\n// quickback.config.ts\nauth: {\n roleHierarchy: ['member', 'admin', 'owner'],\n}\n\n// In resource definitions\ncrud: {\n list: { access: { roles: [\"member+\"] } }, // member, admin, owner\n create: { access: { roles: [\"admin+\"] } }, // admin, owner\n delete: { access: { roles: [\"owner\"] } }, // owner only\n}\n```\n\nRoles are expanded at compile time. No `+` = exact match. See [Access - Role Hierarchy](/compiler/definitions/access#role-hierarchy) for details.\n\n---\n\n## v0.8.0 — April 9, 2026\n\n### Breaking: VITE URL Environment Variables Renamed\n\nAll Quickback-generated URL environment variables are now namespaced under `VITE_QUICKBACK_*` to avoid collisions with other Vite projects.\n\n| Old | New |\n|-----|-----|\n| `VITE_API_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_API_URL` |\n| `VITE_ACCOUNT_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_ACCOUNT_URL` |\n| `VITE_APP_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_APP_URL` |\n| `VITE_CMS_URL` | `VITE_QUICKBACK_CMS_URL` |\n\n**Non-URL variables are unchanged:** `VITE_ENABLE_*` feature flags, branding vars (`VITE_APP_NAME`, etc.), and `VITE_STRIPE_PUBLISHABLE_KEY` stay as-is.\n\n**Action required:**\n- **Compiled projects** — re-run `quickback compile`. The compiler generates the new names automatically.\n- **Standalone deploys** — update `.env`, `.env.production`, and `wrangler.toml` files manually.\n- **Library users** — the `__QUICKBACK_API_URL__` / `__QUICKBACK_APP_URL__` globalThis names are unchanged, but if you pipe Vite env vars into them, update the var names.\n\nSee [Environment Variables](/stack/account-ui/environment-variables) for the full reference.\n\n### CMS Access Control\n\nThe `cms.access` config option now enforces access at the CMS level, not just link visibility in Account UI.\n\n```typescript\ncms: { access: \"admin\" }\n```\n\nWhen set to `\"admin\"`, non-admin users (`user.role !== \"admin\"`) see an \"Access Denied\" screen with a sign-out button instead of the CMS. When set to `\"user\"` (the default), any authenticated user can access the CMS.\n\nSee [CMS Connecting](/stack/cms/connecting) and [Compiler Config](/compiler/config) for details.\n\n### SPA Sub-Route Fix\n\nFixed a bug where hard-refreshing or directly navigating to SPA sub-routes (e.g., `/account/profile`, `/cms/tables/users`) returned a blank white screen. The Worker now correctly serves `index.html` for all SPA paths, allowing the client-side router to handle routing.\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.11 — February 24, 2026\n\n### Email OTP & Auth Fixes\n\n- Fixed email-OTP magic links not working correctly\n- Removed deprecated `/internal/validate` endpoint — use standard Better Auth session validation instead\n- Auth is now required for all API routes when running locally (previously some routes were unprotected in dev)\n\n### Multiple Table Exports Fix\n\n- Fixed a compiler error when a single file exports multiple Drizzle tables alongside a `defineTable()` default export\n- The CLI now properly detects and reports this with a clear error message pointing to the fix\n\n### Headless Drizzle Rename Hints\n\n- Added `compiler.migrations.renames` configuration for CI/CD environments where Drizzle's interactive rename prompts would block compilation\n- Compile errors now include explicit rename key paths and fail fast on malformed rename config keys\n- See [Configuration](/compiler/config) for details\n\n### Security Contract Report Artifacts\n\n- Added generated security contract artifacts to compiler output:\n - `reports/security-contracts.report.json`\n - `reports/security-contracts.report.sig.json`\n- Added config-driven signing controls:\n - `compiler.securityContracts.report.signature.enabled`\n - `compiler.securityContracts.report.signature.required`\n - `compiler.securityContracts.report.signature.key` / `keyEnv` / `keyId`\n- Missing required signing keys now fail loudly with explicit remediation guidance\n- Added strict config validation for report/signature paths and signing options\n\n### Mandatory Unsafe Action Audit Trail\n\n- Added structured unsafe action config (`unsafe: { reason, adminOnly, crossTenant, targetScope }`)\n- Cross-tenant unsafe actions now require Better Auth authentication plus platform admin role (`ctx.userRole === \"admin\"`)\n- Added mandatory audit logging for unsafe cross-tenant actions (success, denial, and error paths)\n- Cloudflare output now includes optional `AUDIT_DB` wiring, `drizzle.audit.config.ts`, and `db:migrate:audit:*` scripts when unsafe actions are present\n- Added compile-time raw SQL guard for actions and handlers (`allowRawSql: true` required per action)\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.10 — February 19, 2026\n\n### Compiler Page Parsing & CLI Output\n\n- Improved compiler page parsing for `definePage()` definitions\n- Better CLI output formatting during compilation\n- Added `apiPath` to schema registry for CMS integration\n\n### Bug Fixes\n\n- Fixed hyphenated action names not being properly quoted in generated code (e.g., `mark-complete` now generates valid JavaScript)\n- API key authentication (`x-api-key` header) is now handled separately from session tokens (`Bearer` header)\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.9 — February 16, 2026\n\n### CMS Pages & CLI Page Support\n\n- Added `definePage()` support for CMS-managed pages\n- Auth middleware improvements for page routes\n- CLI now supports page definitions alongside table and action definitions\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.8 — February 14, 2026\n\n### CMS App\n\n- Introduced the Quickback CMS — a schema-driven admin panel that connects to your generated API\n- CMS namespace added to actions for admin-specific operations\n- Fixed `guard` → `access` naming inconsistency in CMS action definitions\n\n### Schema Registry & Firewall Improvements\n\n- Added schema registry generator — the compiler now outputs a JSON schema registry used by the CMS\n- Firewall error modes: choose between `reveal` (403 with details) and `hide` (opaque 404) for security-sensitive deployments\n\n### Bug Fixes\n\n- Fixed anonymous user email format generation\n- Organization selector improvements in Account UI\n- Config validation now catches more errors at compile time\n- Better CRUD error handling with structured error responses\n- Fixed masking to use representative star counts instead of fixed formatting\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.7 — February 12, 2026\n\n### Scoped Database for Actions\n\nActions now receive a **security-scoped database** instead of a raw Drizzle instance. The compiler generates a proxy wrapper that automatically enforces org isolation, owner filtering, and soft-delete visibility — the same protections that CRUD routes have always had.\n\nThe scoped DB uses duck-typed column detection at runtime:\n\n| Column Detected | SELECT / UPDATE / DELETE | INSERT |\n|---|---|---|\n| `organizationId` | Adds `WHERE organizationId = ?` | Auto-injects `organizationId` from context |\n| `ownerId` | Adds `WHERE ownerId = ?` | Auto-injects `ownerId` from context |\n| `deletedAt` | Adds `WHERE deletedAt IS NULL` | — |\n\nThis means **every action is secure by default** — no manual `WHERE` clauses needed.\n\n```typescript\ndefineActions(todos, {\n complete: {\n type: \"record\",\n execute: async ({ db, ctx, record, input }) => {\n // db is scoped — only sees records in user's org, excludes soft-deleted\n const siblings = await db.select().from(todos);\n // ↑ automatically filtered to ctx.activeOrgId + deletedAt IS NULL\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\n#### Unsafe Mode\n\nActions that intentionally need to bypass security (admin reports, cross-org queries, migrations) can declare `unsafe: true` to receive a raw, unscoped database handle:\n\n```typescript\ndefineActions(analytics, {\n globalReport: {\n unsafe: true,\n execute: async ({ db, rawDb, ctx, input }) => {\n // db → still scoped (safety net)\n // rawDb → bypasses all security filters\n const allOrgs = await rawDb.select().from(organizations);\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\nWithout `unsafe: true`, `rawDb` is `undefined`.\n\n**Related docs:** [Actions](/compiler/definitions/actions), [Actions API](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/actions-api)\n\n---\n\n### Cascading Soft Delete\n\nSoft-deleting a parent record now **automatically cascades** to child and junction tables within the same feature. The compiler detects foreign key references at build time and generates cascade UPDATE statements.\n\n```\nDELETE /api/v1/projects/:id\n```\n\nGenerated behavior:\n```typescript\n// 1. Soft delete the parent\nawait db.update(projects)\n .set({ deletedAt: now, deletedBy: userId })\n .where(eq(projects.id, id));\n\n// 2. Auto-cascade to children (compiler-generated)\nawait db.update(projectMembers)\n .set({ deletedAt: now, deletedBy: userId })\n .where(eq(projectMembers.projectId, id));\n\nawait db.update(projectTasks)\n .set({ deletedAt: now, deletedBy: userId })\n .where(eq(projectTasks.projectId, id));\n```\n\nRules:\n- Only applies to **soft delete** (the default). Hard delete relies on database-level `ON DELETE CASCADE`.\n- Only cascades within the **same feature** — cross-feature references are not affected.\n- Child tables must have `deletedAt` / `deletedBy` columns (auto-added by the compiler's audit fields).\n\n**Related docs:** [Actions API — Cascading Soft Delete](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/actions-api#cascading-soft-delete)\n\n---\n\n### Advanced Query Parameters\n\nNew query parameter capabilities for all list endpoints:\n\n- **Field selection** — `?fields=id,name,status` returns only the columns you need\n- **Multi-sort** — `?sort=status:asc,createdAt:desc` sorts by multiple fields\n- **Total count** — `?count=true` returns total matching records in response headers (`X-Total-Count`)\n- **Full-text search** — `?search=keyword` searches across all text columns\n\n```bash\n# Get only names and statuses, sorted by status then date, with total count\nGET /api/v1/todos?fields=id,name,status&sort=status:asc,createdAt:desc&count=true\n\n# Search across all text fields\nGET /api/v1/todos?search=urgent\n```\n\n**Related docs:** [Query Parameters](/compiler/targets/hono-api/using-the-api/query-params)\n\n---\n\n### Audit Field Improvements\n\n- `deletedAt` and `deletedBy` fields are now **always injected** by the compiler for tables with soft delete enabled — no need to define them in your schema\n- All audit fields (`createdAt`, `createdBy`, `modifiedAt`, `modifiedBy`, `deletedAt`, `deletedBy`) are auto-managed\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.6 — February 8, 2026\n\n### Database Naming Conventions\n\n- Default table and column naming changed to **snake_case** with `usePlurals: false`\n- Table names derived from generated Better Auth schema for consistency\n- Removed legacy single-database mode — split databases (auth + features) is now the standard\n\n### Auth Variable Shadowing Fix\n\n- Fixed `member` variable in auth middleware that shadowed the Drizzle `member` table import\n- Renamed to `sessionMember` to avoid conflicts in generated routes\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.5 — February 5, 2026\n\n### Better Auth Plugins\n\n- Published `@quickback-dev/better-auth-upgrade-anonymous` v1.1.0 — post-passkey email collection flow\n- Published `@quickback-dev/better-auth-combo-auth` — combined email + password + OTP authentication\n- Published `@quickback-dev/better-auth-aws-ses` — AWS SES email provider for Better Auth\n\n### OpenAPI Spec Generation\n\n- Generated APIs now include a full OpenAPI specification at `/openapi.json`\n- Better Auth endpoints included in the spec\n- Runtime route: `GET /openapi.json`\n\n### Security Hardening\n\n- Global error handler prevents leaking internal error details\n- Security headers middleware (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options)\n- `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` properly passed to generated config\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.4 — January 30, 2026\n\n### Account UI\n\n- Pre-built authentication UI deployed as Cloudflare Workers\n- Features: sessions, organizations, passkeys, passwordless, admin panel, API keys\n- Dual-mode: standalone (degit template) or embedded with Quickback projects\n\n### Webhook System\n\n- Inbound webhook endpoints with signature verification\n- Outbound webhooks via Cloudflare Queues with automatic retries\n- Configurable per-feature webhook events\n\n### Realtime & Vector Search\n\n- Durable Objects + WebSocket realtime subscriptions\n- Vector embeddings via Cloudflare Vectorize\n- KV and R2 storage integrations\n\n---\n\n## v0.5.0 — January 2026\n\n### Initial Release\n\n- **Quickback Compiler** — TypeScript-first backend compiler\n- **Four Security Pillars** — Firewall, Access, Guards, Masking\n- **`defineTable()`** — Schema + security configuration in a single file\n- **Templates** — Cloudflare Workers, Bun standalone, B2B SaaS\n- **Cloud Compiler** — Remote compilation via `compiler.quickback.dev`\n- **CLI** — `quickback create`, `quickback compile`, `quickback init`\n- **Better Auth Integration** — Organizations, roles, sessions\n- **Drizzle ORM** — Schema-first with automatic migrations\n- **Cloudflare D1** — Split database support (auth + features)"
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  },
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  "compiler/claude-code-skill": {
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  "title": "AI Developer Tools",
@@ -37,6 +37,10 @@ export const DOCS = {
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  "title": "AI Agent Readiness",
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  "content": "Every compiled Quickback Worker advertises itself to AI agents and MCP clients — no user wiring required. One config flag controls the whole discovery surface.\n\n## What the compiler generates\n\nWhen `agents` is enabled (the default), the Worker serves:\n\n| Route | What it is |\n|-------|-----------|\n| `GET /robots.txt` | AI-bot policy with the [Cloudflare Content Signals](https://developers.cloudflare.com/bots/concepts/content-signals/) preamble and explicit `Allow:` rules for GPTBot, ClaudeBot, PerplexityBot, Google-Extended, CCBot, Applebot-Extended, Bytespider, MistralAI, Cohere, DuckAssist. |\n| `GET /llms.txt` | Agent-facing summary of the API — project name, authentication, resource list, endpoint conventions — derived from your own config. |\n| `GET /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource` | [RFC 9728](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9728) metadata declaring this Worker as a protected resource. |\n| `GET /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server` | [RFC 8414](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8414) metadata pointing at the sign-in and token endpoints. |\n| `GET /.well-known/api-catalog` | [RFC 9727](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9727) catalog linking at `/openapi.json`. |\n| `GET /.well-known/mcp.json` | MCP Server Card — discoverable metadata for the MCP server below. |\n| `POST /mcp` | Auto-generated MCP-over-HTTP server. One tool per OpenAPI operation, JWT auth forwarded through the same middleware as the REST API. |\n\n## Default behavior\n\n```ts title=\"quickback.config.ts\"\n\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: 'my-api',\n // …\n // agents: true is the default — no need to write it.\n});\n```\n\nRun `quickback compile` and every endpoint above ships in the Worker.\n\n## Opting out\n\n```ts title=\"quickback.config.ts\"\nexport default defineConfig({\n // …\n agents: false, // disables everything\n});\n```\n\n## Fine-grained control\n\nPass an object to toggle individual surfaces:\n\n```ts title=\"quickback.config.ts\"\nexport default defineConfig({\n // …\n agents: {\n robotsTxt: true, // default\n llmsTxt: true, // default\n mcp: true, // default\n oauthDiscovery: true, // default\n apiCatalog: true, // default\n allowAiCrawlers: true, // default — flip to false to Disallow in robots.txt\n },\n});\n```\n\n## The MCP server\n\n### Tools\n\nEvery operation in your generated OpenAPI spec becomes one MCP tool. The tool name is the operation's `operationId` (e.g. `listCustomers`, `createInvoice`, `sendInvoice`). Each tool's `inputSchema` is a flat JSON Schema combining path params, query params, and the request body.\n\n`tools/call` re-enters the same Hono app via `app.request(...)` — so **every existing middleware runs exactly as it would for a direct REST call**: authentication, firewall, access control, guards, masking. No bypass.\n\n### Access-filtered `tools/list`\n\n`tools/list` only returns tools the calling identity could actually invoke. Each generated tool entry carries the operation's access metadata (`roles`, `userRole`, `or` / `and` combinators) and `tools/list` filters against `ctx` before responding:\n\n- **Unauthenticated callers** see only tools whose access declares the `PUBLIC` pseudo-role, or operations that have no security requirement at all (e.g. sign-in / sign-up).\n- **Authenticated callers** see tools whose role gate intersects their `ctx.roles` or `ctx.userRole`. Admin-only endpoints don't appear for non-admins.\n- **Function-form access** (escape hatch) is opaque at list time — surfaced to any authenticated caller, then evaluated for real on `tools/call`.\n- **Record predicates** are dropped from the list-time check (no record yet) and applied normally on the actual call.\n\nThis is recon-mitigation, not a security boundary. Hiding a tool from the list never weakens the underlying gate — `tools/call` still runs the full middleware chain and rejects unauthorized invocations the same way a direct REST call would.\n\nThe unauthenticated `GET /mcp` discovery payload returns server info only; it does **not** enumerate tool names. Inventory is exclusively available via the access-filtered `tools/list`.\n\n### Authentication\n\nMCP clients pass their credentials through the standard `Authorization: Bearer <jwt>` header. The generated MCP handler forwards the header verbatim into the internal request, and the same JWT middleware that guards `/api/v1/*` validates it.\n\nMint a JWT from an authenticated session:\n\n```bash\ncurl -X POST https://my-api.example.com/api/v1/token \\\n -H \"Cookie: better-auth.session_token=...\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\"\n```\n\n### Connecting clients\n\n**Claude Desktop** — add to `~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json`:\n\n```json\n{\n \"mcpServers\": {\n \"my-api\": {\n \"url\": \"https://my-api.example.com/mcp\",\n \"headers\": {\n \"Authorization\": \"Bearer <jwt>\"\n }\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\n**Cursor** — use the same config shape under `.cursor/mcp.json`.\n\n**Quick sanity check with curl:**\n\n```bash\n# List available tools\ncurl -X POST https://my-api.example.com/mcp \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer $JWT\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d '{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1,\"method\":\"tools/list\"}'\n\n# Call a tool\ncurl -X POST https://my-api.example.com/mcp \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer $JWT\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d '{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":2,\"method\":\"tools/call\",\"params\":{\"name\":\"listCustomers\",\"arguments\":{\"limit\":10}}}'\n```\n\n### Transport\n\nThe server speaks the **Streamable HTTP** MCP transport — JSON-RPC 2.0 over `POST`. A plain `GET /mcp` returns the server info document for sanity checks.\n\nThe MCP route does **not** emit its own CORS headers. The Worker's existing `cors()` middleware applies uniformly, so browser-origin access is governed by the same allowlist as the rest of the API (`auth.trustedOrigins` + the deploy origin). Server-to-server clients (Claude Desktop, Cursor, MCP Inspector) connect with a Bearer token and don't need browser CORS at all. If you want a browser-based MCP client (ChatGPT, Claude.ai) to connect cross-origin, add its origin to `auth.trustedOrigins` like any other web client.\n\n## Verification\n\nAfter you deploy, scan both the REST and MCP surfaces:\n\n```bash\n# Agent-readiness scan (external)\nopen https://isitagentready.com/?url=https://my-api.example.com\n\n# MCP Inspector (official tool)\nnpx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector https://my-api.example.com/mcp\n```"
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  },
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+ "compiler/config/auth": {
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+ "title": "Auth & JWT",
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+ "content": "The top-level `auth` config block holds provider-agnostic auth knobs that affect how Quickback emits the auth middleware, JWT helpers, and access-rule expansion.\n\n```ts title=\"quickback.config.ts\"\nexport default defineConfig({\n // ...\n auth: {\n roleHierarchy: ['member', 'admin', 'owner'],\n jwt: {\n expiresIn: 60,\n issuer: 'my-api',\n // audience, secretEnv, algorithm, revocationCheck...\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\n## `auth.roleHierarchy`\n\nLowest-to-highest privilege list. Lets access rules use `'role+'` shorthand to mean \"this role and above\". Documented in detail under [Access — Role hierarchy](/compiler/definitions/access#role-hierarchy).\n\n## `auth.jwt` — JWT bearer-token fast-path\n\nQuickback ships its own custom HMAC-SHA256 JWT (not Better Auth's JWT plugin) so it can embed `orgId` and `role` claims the fast-path needs to reconstruct `AppContext` without a database round-trip. The signing secret is shared with Better Auth (`BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`) by default — users only manage one secret.\n\n### Behavior recap\n\n1. The browser SPA gets a JWT via the `set-auth-token` response header on every authenticated call.\n2. On subsequent requests the SPA sends `Authorization: Bearer <jwt>`.\n3. The auth middleware's **fast-path** verifies the signature only — no DB query, no session lookup. `AppContext` is reconstructed from JWT claims.\n4. If verification fails (or no JWT is present), the middleware falls back to session auth.\n5. After successful session auth, a fresh JWT is minted and returned via `set-auth-token`. The cycle continues.\n\nThe fast-path is intentionally stateless: it trusts the claims for the full TTL. **Stolen or pre-revocation tokens are valid until they expire.** That's the trade-off the fast-path makes — and the reason `expiresIn` is the most-tuned knob below.\n\n### `expiresIn?: number` — TTL in seconds\n\nDefault `180` (3 minutes).\n\nLowering this shrinks the worst-case window where a stolen / pre-revocation token still works. Browser SPAs auto-refresh via `set-auth-token` on every authed call, so a low TTL is invisible to logged-in users; only stale server-to-server bearer tokens feel it.\n\n```ts\nauth: { jwt: { expiresIn: 30 } } // 30s — tight post-revocation window\nauth: { jwt: { expiresIn: 3600 } } // 1h — longer-lived tokens for CLI / CI\n```\n\n### `issuer?: string` — `iss` claim\n\nDefault omitted.\n\nSet this when other services need to distinguish JWTs minted by this Worker from other issuers. The compiler bakes the issuer into both the mint side (added to claims) and the verify side (rejects tokens with mismatched `iss`).\n\n### `audience?: string` — `aud` claim\n\nDefault omitted.\n\nSet this when this Worker's JWTs are consumed by a sibling service that should reject tokens minted for a different audience. Same mint-and-verify treatment as `issuer`.\n\n### `secretEnv?: string` — signing secret env var\n\nDefault `'BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'`.\n\nOverride this if you want JWT signing isolated from the Better Auth secret (e.g. rotating one without invalidating the other).\n\n```ts\nauth: { jwt: { secretEnv: 'CUSTOM_JWT_SECRET' } }\n```\n\nThe compiler emits `c.env.CUSTOM_JWT_SECRET` (or `process.env.CUSTOM_JWT_SECRET` on Bun/Node) in the auth middleware's verify and mint sites and the `/api/v1/token` endpoint.\n\n> **Note:** the files-worker (separate Worker for R2 access) still reads `BETTER_AUTH_SECRET` directly. If you override `secretEnv`, set both env vars to the same value or the files worker's JWT verification will fall back to DB session lookup. Threading `secretEnv` through the files worker is on the roadmap.\n\n### `algorithm?: 'HS256'`\n\nOnly `HS256` is supported in 0.10.14. `RS256` (asymmetric, public-key verify / private-key sign) is on the roadmap.\n\n### `revocationCheck?: 'none' | 'kv'` — token revocation strategy\n\nDefault `'none'`.\n\n| Value | Behavior | Cost per verify |\n|---|---|---|\n| `'none'` | No revocation check. Stolen tokens valid until TTL expires. Use a low `expiresIn` to bound the replay window. | 0 |\n| `'kv'` | Fast-path consults a denylist KV namespace before accepting the token. Banning a user / revoking sessions writes the user's `sub` to the denylist. | 1 KV read (~5-15ms, edge-cached) |\n\nThe `'kv'` path keeps the fast-path stateless against the auth DB (still 0 D1 queries) — KV reads on Workers are an order of magnitude cheaper than a D1 round trip *and* give sub-second revocation.\n\n> **`'kv'` is deferred to 0.10.15.** Setting `'kv'` in 0.10.14 errors at compile time so the migration path is explicit; the schema accepts it now so users can author their final config today.\n\n## Defaults preserve 0.10.13 behavior\n\nAdding the `auth.jwt` block without setting any field is a no-op vs. the 0.10.13 baseline. Each missing field falls back to its hardcoded value:\n\n| Field | Default |\n|---|---|\n| `expiresIn` | 180 |\n| `issuer` | omitted |\n| `audience` | omitted |\n| `secretEnv` | `'BETTER_AUTH_SECRET'` |\n| `algorithm` | `'HS256'` |\n| `revocationCheck` | `'none'` |\n\n## Tuning recommendations\n\n- **B2C SaaS, mostly browser traffic:** keep defaults. The 180s TTL + auto-refresh model just works.\n- **Pentest engagement / enterprise compliance:** set `expiresIn: 30`. Tokens stay invisible to logged-in users (auto-refreshed every authed call) but stolen-token windows shrink to 30s.\n- **CLI-heavy / long-running CI tokens:** `expiresIn: 3600` for one-hour bearer tokens. Pair with `issuer` / `audience` if multiple services consume the same JWT.\n- **Need immediate revocation:** wait for 0.10.15's `revocationCheck: 'kv'`. Or, today, drop TTL to ~30s — same effect with bounded delay."
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+ },
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  "compiler/config/bindings": {
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  "title": "Custom Bindings",
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  "content": "Quickback's compiler owns the D1/KV/R2/ASSETS/queue blocks it needs for its own features. Anything else your worker binds to — Cloudflare Email, an extra R2 bucket, a custom queue, a service binding, your own Durable Object, Workers AI, or non-secret `[vars]` — goes under the top-level `bindings` key:\n\n```ts\n\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: \"studio-mail\",\n template: \"hono\",\n providers: {\n runtime: defineRuntime(\"cloudflare\"),\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", { splitDatabases: true }),\n auth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\"),\n },\n bindings: {\n sendEmail: [{ name: \"EMAIL\" }],\n r2Buckets: [\n { binding: \"MAIL_RAW\", bucketName: \"studio-mail-raw\" },\n { binding: \"MAIL_ATTACHMENTS\", bucketName: \"studio-mail-attachments\" },\n ],\n vars: {\n MAIL_SENDING_DOMAIN: \"studio.example.com\",\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\ncamelCase field names map 1:1 to the snake_case TOML blocks in `wrangler.toml`. Every compile regenerates `wrangler.toml` from your config, so these entries are the source of truth — no more post-compile patch scripts.\n\n## Fields\n\n### `sendEmail`\n\nEmits `[[send_email]]`. Use when your worker calls `env.<NAME>.send(...)` via Cloudflare Email Service.\n\n```ts\nsendEmail: [\n {\n name: \"EMAIL\",\n // Optional: restrict who the worker is allowed to send to.\n destinationAddress: \"alerts@example.com\",\n allowedDestinationAddresses: [\"alerts@example.com\", \"ops@example.com\"],\n },\n]\n```\n\n### `r2Buckets`\n\nEmits additional `[[r2_buckets]]` blocks alongside the compiler-owned files bucket.\n\n```ts\nr2Buckets: [\n {\n binding: \"MAIL_RAW\",\n bucketName: \"studio-mail-raw\",\n previewBucketName: \"studio-mail-raw-preview\", // optional\n jurisdiction: \"eu\", // optional\n },\n]\n```\n\n### `queueProducers` / `queueConsumers`\n\nEmits `[[queues.producers]]` and `[[queues.consumers]]`. Useful for app-owned queues beyond the compiler's webhook/embedding queues.\n\n```ts\nqueueProducers: [\n { binding: \"MAIL_QUEUE\", queue: \"mail-send\" },\n],\nqueueConsumers: [\n {\n queue: \"mail-send\",\n maxBatchSize: 5,\n maxBatchTimeout: 30,\n maxRetries: 3,\n maxConcurrency: 2,\n deadLetterQueue: \"mail-dlq\",\n },\n]\n```\n\n### `services`\n\nEmits `[[services]]` — service bindings to sibling workers.\n\n```ts\nservices: [\n { binding: \"INBOUND\", service: \"studio-mail-inbound\", environment: \"production\" },\n]\n```\n\n### `durableObjects`\n\nEmits `[[durable_objects.bindings]]` for app-owned Durable Objects. Don't use this for Quickback's built-in `BROADCASTER` realtime DO — that one is compiler-owned.\n\n```ts\ndurableObjects: [\n { name: \"SESSION_ROOM\", className: \"SessionRoom\" },\n // Cross-worker DO: reference the exporting worker explicitly.\n { name: \"RATE_LIMITER\", className: \"RateLimiter\", scriptName: \"rate-limit-worker\" },\n]\n```\n\n### `vars`\n\nMerged into the compiler's own `[vars]` table — emitting a second `[vars]` block would be invalid TOML. Values must be `string`, `number`, or `boolean`.\n\n```ts\nvars: {\n MAIL_SENDING_DOMAIN: \"studio.example.com\",\n MAIL_MAX_ATTACHMENTS: 10,\n MAIL_DEBUG: false,\n}\n```\n\nSecrets do **not** go here. Use Wrangler's secret store instead:\n\n```bash\nwrangler secret put MAIL_INBOUND_SECRET\n```\n\n### `ai`\n\nEmits a top-level `[ai]` block. Use this if you need Workers AI bound under a name different from Quickback's internal `AI`.\n\n```ts\nai: { binding: \"USER_AI\" }\n```\n\n## Reserved binding names\n\nBinding names that clash with compiler-owned bindings are rejected at validation time, with the offending field path in the error message. Reserved names depend on what your config enables:\n\n| Name | Reserved when |\n|------|---------------|\n| `AUTH_DB`, `DB` | `splitDatabases: true` (default) |\n| `DATABASE` | `splitDatabases: false` |\n| `AUDIT_DB` | always (cross-tenant unsafe-action audit) |\n| `WEBHOOKS_DB`, `WEBHOOKS_QUEUE` | a webhooks binding is configured |\n| `KV` | always |\n| `R2_BUCKET`, `FILES_DB` | `fileStorage: defineFileStorage(\"cloudflare-r2\")` |\n| `VECTORIZE` | a Vectorize index is configured |\n| `BROADCASTER` | realtime is enabled |\n| `EMAIL` | `email: { provider: \"cloudflare\" }` |\n| `ASSETS` | `cms: true` or `account: true` |\n| `AI`, `EMBEDDINGS_QUEUE` | embeddings are configured |\n\nPick a different name — the generated `env` on the handler side takes whatever binding you pick.\n\n## See also\n\n- [Environment Variables](/compiler/config/variables) — the non-secret `[vars]` / secret split\n- [Providers](/compiler/config/providers) — runtime / database / auth selection"
@@ -57,6 +61,10 @@ export const DOCS = {
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  "title": "Providers",
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  "content": "Providers configure which services your compiled backend targets.\n\n## Runtime Providers\n\n| Provider | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `cloudflare` | Cloudflare Workers (Hono) |\n| `bun` | Bun runtime (Hono) |\n| `node` | Node.js runtime (Hono) |\n\n```typescript\n\nproviders: {\n runtime: defineRuntime(\"cloudflare\"),\n}\n```\n\n## Database Providers\n\n| Provider | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `cloudflare-d1` | Cloudflare D1 (SQLite) |\n| `better-sqlite3` | SQLite via better-sqlite3 (Bun/Node) |\n| `libsql` | LibSQL / Turso |\n| `neon` | Neon (PostgreSQL) |\n| `supabase` | Supabase (PostgreSQL) |\n\n```typescript\n\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n generateId: \"prefixed\", // \"uuid\" | \"cuid\" | \"nanoid\" | \"prefixed\" | \"serial\" | false\n namingConvention: \"snake_case\", // \"camelCase\" | \"snake_case\"\n usePlurals: false, // Auth table names: \"users\" vs \"user\"\n }),\n}\n```\n\n### Database Options\n\n| Option | Type | Default (D1) | Description |\n|--------|------|---------|-------------|\n| `generateId` | `string \\| false` | `\"prefixed\"` | ID generation strategy |\n| `namingConvention` | `string` | `\"snake_case\"` | Column naming convention |\n| `usePlurals` | `boolean` | `false` | Pluralize auth table names (e.g. `user` vs `users`) |\n| `splitDatabases` | `boolean` | `true` | Separate auth and features databases |\n| `authBinding` | `string` | `\"AUTH_DB\"` | Binding name for auth database |\n| `featuresBinding` | `string` | `\"DB\"` | Binding name for features database |\n| `databaseId` | `string` | — | D1 database ID for the features database (used in generated wrangler.toml) |\n| `authDatabaseId` | `string` | — | D1 database ID for the auth database |\n| `featuresDatabaseId` | `string` | — | Explicit features DB ID (falls back to `databaseId`) |\n| `filesDatabaseId` | `string` | — | D1 database ID for the files metadata database |\n| `webhooksDatabaseId` | `string` | — | D1 database ID for the webhooks database |\n| `auditBinding` | `string` | `\"AUDIT_DB\"` | Binding name for the security audit database |\n| `auditDatabaseName` | `string` | `\"{app}-audit\"` | D1 database name for audit events |\n| `auditDatabaseId` | `string` | — | Explicit D1 database ID for audit events |\n| `webhookAdminRoles` | `string[]` | `[\"owner\", \"admin\"]` | Org roles allowed to manage webhook endpoints |\n\n#### Audit Database\n\nCross-tenant `unsafe` actions (see [Actions → Unsafe mode](/compiler/definitions/actions#unsafe-mode)) write mandatory audit events. Those events land in a dedicated D1 database — separate from your features DB — so audit history stays isolated from application data and can't be tampered with through a normal CRUD route.\n\nYou don't need to do anything to enable it — the compiler wires up the binding automatically if your project declares any unsafe action. To override defaults:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n auditBinding: \"MY_AUDIT_DB\", // default: AUDIT_DB\n auditDatabaseName: \"my-app-audit-prod\", // default: {app}-audit\n auditDatabaseId: \"c3b8866b-cc4f-4e51-8382-0af244584d93\",\n }),\n}\n```\n\nThe binding name must match what your Worker reads at runtime. If you don't declare any unsafe actions, no audit DB is provisioned and these options have no effect.\n\n#### Setting Database IDs for Deployment\n\nWhen deploying to production, set your D1 database IDs so the compiler generates a ready-to-deploy `wrangler.toml`:\n\n```typescript\nproviders: {\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\", {\n authDatabaseId: \"fe6c77c4-2131-40be-a8fc-3649eef2a38c\",\n databaseId: \"bba22981-cb6e-43d6-bf32-4193513c60b1\",\n filesDatabaseId: \"c3b8866b-cc4f-4e51-8382-0af244584d93\",\n }),\n}\n```\n\nIf these are omitted, the compiler uses local-dev placeholders and you'll need to manually edit `wrangler.toml` before deploying.\n\n### ID Generation Options\n\n| Value | Description | Example |\n|-------|-------------|---------|\n| `\"uuid\"` | Server generates UUID | `550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000` |\n| `\"cuid\"` | Server generates CUID | `clh2v8k9g0000l508h5gx8j1a` |\n| `\"nanoid\"` | Server generates nanoid (21-char, URL-safe) | `V1StGXR8_Z5jdHi6B-myT` |\n| `\"short\"` | 6-char alphanumeric (nanoid `customAlphabet`) | `a3F9xK` |\n| `\"prefixed\"` | Prefixed ID from table name | `room_abc123` |\n| `\"serial\"` | Database auto-increments | `1`, `2`, `3` |\n| `false` | Client provides ID (enables PUT/upsert) | Any string |\n\n## Auth Providers\n\n| Provider | Description |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `better-auth` | Better Auth with plugins |\n| `supabase-auth` | Supabase Auth |\n| `external` | External auth via Cloudflare service binding |\n\n```typescript\n\nproviders: {\n auth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\", {\n session: {\n expiresInDays: 7,\n updateAgeInDays: 1,\n },\n rateLimit: {\n enabled: true,\n window: 60,\n max: 100,\n },\n }),\n}\n```\n\n### Better Auth Options\n\n| Option | Type | Description |\n|--------|------|-------------|\n| `session.expiresInDays` | `number` | Session expiration in days |\n| `session.updateAgeInDays` | `number` | Session refresh interval in days |\n| `rateLimit.enabled` | `boolean` | Enable rate limiting |\n| `rateLimit.window` | `number` | Rate limit window in seconds |\n| `rateLimit.max` | `number` | Max requests per window |\n| `socialProviders` | `object` | Social login providers (`google`, `github`, `discord`) |\n| `debugLogs` | `boolean` | Enable auth debug logging |\n\n### Better Auth Plugins\n\nWhen `features: [\"organizations\"]` is set in your config, the compiler automatically enables organization-related plugins. Additional plugins can be configured:\n\n| Plugin | Description |\n|--------|-------------|\n| `organization` | Multi-tenant organizations |\n| `admin` | Admin panel access |\n| `apiKey` | API key authentication |\n| `anonymous` | Anonymous sessions |\n| `upgradeAnonymous` | Convert anonymous to full accounts |\n| `twoFactor` | Two-factor authentication |\n| `passkey` | WebAuthn passkey login |\n| `magicLink` | Email magic link login |\n| `emailOtp` | Email one-time password |\n| `deviceAuthorization` | Device auth flow (CLI tools) |\n| `jwt` | JWT token support |\n| `openAPI` | OpenAPI spec generation |\n\n## Storage Providers\n\n```typescript\n\nproviders: {\n storage: defineStorage(\"kv\", {\n binding: \"KV_STORE\",\n namespaceId: \"7ed0f824a8c54c388713d9fdf63cd004\",\n }),\n fileStorage: defineFileStorage(\"r2\", {\n binding: \"FILES\",\n maxFileSize: \"10mb\",\n allowedTypes: [\"image/png\", \"image/jpeg\", \"application/pdf\"],\n publicDomain: \"files.example.com\",\n }),\n}\n```\n\n### Storage Types\n\n| Type | Description |\n|------|-------------|\n| `kv` | Key-value storage (Cloudflare KV, Redis) |\n| `r2` | Object storage (Cloudflare R2) |\n| `memory` | In-memory storage (development only) |\n| `redis` | Redis storage |\n\n### File Storage Options\n\n| Option | Type | Description |\n|--------|------|-------------|\n| `binding` | `string` | R2 bucket binding name |\n| `maxFileSize` | `string` | Maximum file size (e.g. `\"10mb\"`) |\n| `allowedTypes` | `string[]` | Allowed MIME types |\n| `publicDomain` | `string` | Public domain for file URLs |\n| `userScopedBuckets` | `boolean` | Scope files by user |"
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  },
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+ "compiler/config/security": {
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+ "title": "Security Headers",
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+ "content": "Every compiled Quickback Worker sets a baseline of security response-headers on every response: HSTS, `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, a clickjacking CSP (`frame-ancestors 'self' …TRUSTED_ORIGINS`), `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN`, `Referrer-Policy`, and `Permissions-Policy`. Adding the `security` block lets you override individual headers, ship a fuller Content-Security-Policy, or suppress them all if an upstream gateway handles headers.\n\n## Default behavior\n\nOmit `security` entirely → the baseline above. No config change needed for clickjacking + HSTS protection.\n\n```ts title=\"quickback.config.ts\"\n\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: 'my-api',\n // ...\n // security defaults are applied automatically.\n});\n```\n\n## Suppress every security header\n\nFor Workers fronted by a gateway that owns headers:\n\n```ts title=\"quickback.config.ts\"\nexport default defineConfig({\n // ...\n security: false,\n});\n```\n\nThe compiler emits a no-op middleware comment so the route table still lines up with the rest of the generated code, but no `c.header(...)` calls fire.\n\n## Per-header overrides\n\nEach field on the `security` block accepts either a typed value or `false` to suppress that specific header. Defaults still apply for fields you don't set.\n\n```ts title=\"quickback.config.ts\"\nexport default defineConfig({\n // ...\n security: {\n // Suppress just CSP — keeps HSTS, referrer, permissions, etc.\n csp: false,\n\n // Or override individual fields:\n coop: 'same-origin',\n coep: 'credentialless',\n referrerPolicy: 'no-referrer',\n permissionsPolicy: { geolocation: [], microphone: [], camera: [], payment: [] },\n hsts: { maxAge: 63072000, includeSubDomains: true, preload: true },\n },\n});\n```\n\n## Content Security Policy\n\n`security.csp` accepts a typed object. Each `*Src` field is an array of source expressions. The compiler accepts both the `@`-prefixed sentinels (idiomatic, type-safe) and CSP wire-form keywords (`\"'self'\"`, `\"'unsafe-inline'\"`); both normalize to the same output.\n\n### Sentinels\n\n| Sentinel | Wire form | Notes |\n|---|---|---|\n| `@self` | `'self'` | Same-origin. |\n| `@none` | `'none'` | Empty-set keyword. |\n| `@unsafe-inline` | `'unsafe-inline'` | Allows inline scripts/styles — defeats most XSS mitigation when used in `script-src`. |\n| `@unsafe-eval` | `'unsafe-eval'` | Allows `eval()` and friends. |\n| `@trustedOrigins` | The `…TRUSTED_ORIGINS` constant at runtime | Resolves to `auth.trustedOrigins` as configured in `quickback.config.ts`. |\n| `@nonce` | `'nonce-…'` per request | Reserved for the per-request nonce middleware shipping in 0.10.15. Using this in 0.10.14 is a compile-time error. |\n\nUnknown `@…` tokens are rejected at compile rather than silently stringified into the wire CSP.\n\n### Example: paste-in CSP for a Quickback SPA project\n\nThe bundled CMS and Account SPAs load Google Fonts cross-origin, so the strict `'self'`-only CSP would white-screen them on load. This config is a known-working starting point for Quickback projects with the bundled SPAs:\n\n```ts title=\"quickback.config.ts\"\nexport default defineConfig({\n // ...\n security: {\n csp: {\n defaultSrc: ['@self'],\n // Tailwind dynamic styles + bundled Google Fonts CSS need\n // unsafe-inline + the gstatic / googleapis hosts. Tightening\n // styles to nonces ships in 0.10.15.\n styleSrc: ['@self', '@unsafe-inline', 'https://fonts.googleapis.com'],\n scriptSrc: ['@self'],\n fontSrc: ['@self', 'data:', 'https://fonts.gstatic.com'],\n imgSrc: ['@self', 'data:', 'blob:', 'https:'],\n connectSrc: ['@self', '@trustedOrigins'],\n frameAncestors: ['@self', '@trustedOrigins'],\n formAction: ['@self'],\n baseUri: ['@self'],\n objectSrc: ['@none'],\n upgradeInsecureRequests: true,\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\n### Auto-derivations\n\nThe compiler applies these so config stays minimal:\n\n- **`csp.frameAncestors` defaults to `['@self', '@trustedOrigins']`** when `csp` is set but `frameAncestors` is omitted. Same allowlist as CORS.\n- **`X-Frame-Options` derives from `csp.frameAncestors`** (`['@none']` → `DENY`, contains `@self` → `SAMEORIGIN`, otherwise omitted — XFO can't represent arbitrary origins so CSP becomes the truth there). Override with `security.frameOptions`.\n- **`corp: 'same-origin'` is auto-emitted when `coep` is set.** `require-corp` without CORP breaks the ASSETS binding fetches on Cloudflare; the compiler couples them so users don't have to remember.\n\n## Cross-origin window/embedder isolation\n\n```ts title=\"quickback.config.ts\"\nsecurity: {\n coop: 'same-origin', // Defends against window.opener back-references from popups.\n coep: 'credentialless', // Required for SharedArrayBuffer / cross-origin isolation.\n // corp auto-emits as 'same-origin' here.\n}\n```\n\n## HSTS\n\nDefault: `max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload` (HSTS preload-list eligible).\n\n```ts title=\"quickback.config.ts\"\nsecurity: {\n hsts: { maxAge: 63072000, includeSubDomains: true, preload: true },\n}\n```\n\nThe generated middleware automatically suppresses HSTS on `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, and `*.localhost` regardless of this config. Without that gate, `wrangler dev` would pin the developer's browser to HTTPS for `maxAge` seconds, which is observable across every project on that machine.\n\nTo submit to the [HSTS preload list](https://hstspreload.org), you need:\n\n- `maxAge` ≥ 31536000 (one year)\n- `includeSubDomains: true`\n- `preload: true`\n\nThe compiler warns at compile time if `preload: true` without the other two — the preload list rejects either anyway.\n\n## Permissions Policy\n\nMap of feature name → list of allowed origins.\n\n```ts title=\"quickback.config.ts\"\nsecurity: {\n permissionsPolicy: {\n geolocation: [], // disabled for everyone\n microphone: ['self'], // allowed only on own origin\n camera: ['self', 'https://meet.example.com'],\n payment: [],\n },\n}\n```\n\nThe compiler encodes the wire syntax (which differs from CSP — values use `()`, not space-separated tokens, with bareword `self` and quoted URLs).\n\n## Compile-time lint rules\n\nThe compiler walks the resolved config and emits warnings (or errors) for known footguns. Errors block compile; warnings print to stderr.\n\n| Code | Severity | Trigger |\n|---|---|---|\n| `csp/nonce-not-yet-supported` | error | `@nonce` sentinel used in 0.10.14. Per-request nonce middleware ships in 0.10.15. |\n| `csp/unsafe-inline-with-nonce` | error | `@unsafe-inline` and `@nonce` in the same directive (CSP3 silently ignores `unsafe-inline` when nonce is present). |\n| `csp/empty-resolved-directive` | error | `*Src` array contains only `@trustedOrigins` and `auth.trustedOrigins` is empty — would emit a directive Chrome reads as `'none'`. |\n| `csp/unsafe-inline-script` | warn | `@unsafe-inline` in `scriptSrc` defeats most XSS mitigations. |\n| `csp/open-source` | warn | Wildcard `*` or scheme-only `https:` / `http:` in any `*-src`. |\n| `csp/unsafe-eval-with-data` | warn | `@unsafe-eval` combined with any `data:` source — trivial bypass. |\n| `csp/missing-default-src` | warn | Other `*-src` set without `defaultSrc`. |\n| `csp/upgrade-with-http` | warn | `upgradeInsecureRequests: true` plus an `http://` source elsewhere. |\n| `csp/report-uri-only` | warn | `reportUri` set without `reportTo` (deprecated CSP2 path). |\n| `hsts/preload-needs-long-max-age` | warn | `preload: true` with `maxAge < 31536000`. |\n| `hsts/preload-needs-include-subdomains` | warn | `preload: true` without `includeSubDomains`. |\n\n## Verification\n\nSpin up the deployed Worker (or `wrangler dev`) and check the response headers:\n\n```bash\ncurl -sI https://my-api.example.com/health \\\n | grep -E '^(content-security-policy|x-frame-options|strict-transport-security|cross-origin-opener-policy|cross-origin-embedder-policy|cross-origin-resource-policy|referrer-policy|permissions-policy):'\n```\n\nUse [securityheaders.com](https://securityheaders.com) for an external grade — Quickback's defaults are A on the baseline and A+ once a fuller `csp` is configured."
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+ },
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  "compiler/config/single-tenant": {
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  "title": "Single-Tenant Mode",
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  "content": "Single-tenant mode disables the Better Auth organization plugin, removing the `organizationId` requirement from your API. This is ideal for personal sites, blogs, admin panels, or any app with a single tenant.\n\n## Enabling Single-Tenant Mode\n\nSet `features.organizations` to `false` in your config:\n\n```typescript\n\nexport default defineConfig({\n name: \"my-site\",\n template: \"hono\",\n features: {\n organizations: false,\n },\n providers: {\n runtime: defineRuntime(\"cloudflare\"),\n database: defineDatabase(\"cloudflare-d1\"),\n auth: defineAuth(\"better-auth\"),\n },\n});\n```\n\n## What Changes\n\n| Aspect | Multi-Tenant (default) | Single-Tenant |\n|--------|----------------------|---------------|\n| Organization plugin | Enabled | Disabled |\n| `organizationId` columns | Required on resources | Not used |\n| Role source | Org membership table | `user.role` field |\n| Firewall scopes | `owner`, `organization`, `team`, `exception` | `owner`, `exception` only |\n| Admin org endpoints | `/admin/v1/organizations` generated | Skipped |\n| `ctx.activeOrgId` | From session/JWT | Always `undefined` |\n| `ctx.roles` | From org member role | From `user.role` |\n\n## Firewall Configuration\n\nIn single-tenant mode, resources use either **owner** scope (user-scoped data) or **exception** (public/system data):\n\n```typescript\n// User-scoped data (requires authentication)\nexport default defineTable(posts, {\n firewall: [{ field: 'ownerId', equals: 'ctx.userId' }],\n read: {\n access: { roles: ['user', 'admin'] },\n },\n crud: {\n create: { access: { roles: ['admin'] } },\n },\n});\n\n// Public data (no ownership filtering)\nexport default defineTable(pages, {\n firewall: [{ exception: true }],\n read: {\n access: { roles: ['PUBLIC'] },\n },\n crud: {\n create: { access: { roles: ['admin'] } },\n update: { access: { roles: ['admin'] } },\n delete: { access: { roles: ['admin'] } },\n },\n});\n```\n\n## Public Routes\n\nUse the `PUBLIC` role to expose routes without authentication. This works the same as in multi-tenant mode:\n\n```typescript\nread: {\n access: { roles: ['PUBLIC'] }, // GET / and GET /:id — no auth required\n},\ncrud: {\n create: { access: { roles: ['admin'] } }, // Admin only\n}\n```\n\n## Role-Based Access\n\nRoles come from the `user.role` field (managed by Better Auth's [admin plugin](https://www.better-auth.com/docs/plugins/admin)).\n\n| Role | Description |\n|------|-------------|\n| `admin` | Full access, set via Better Auth admin plugin |\n| `user` | Default role for authenticated users |\n| `PUBLIC` | Unauthenticated access (special keyword) |\n\n```typescript\n// Admin-only action\nexport default defineActions({\n publish: {\n access: { roles: ['admin'] },\n execute: async ({ ctx, db }) => {\n // ctx.userRole === 'admin'\n // ctx.roles === ['admin']\n },\n },\n});\n```\n\n## Consuming the API\n\nSince single-tenant mode produces a JSON API, pair it with any frontend framework:\n\n```typescript\n// Astro, Next.js, SvelteKit, etc.\nconst posts = await fetch('https://api.mysite.com/api/v1/posts').then(r => r.json());\n\n// Admin operations require authentication\nconst res = await fetch('https://api.mysite.com/api/v1/posts', {\n method: 'POST',\n headers: {\n 'Authorization': `Bearer ${token}`,\n 'Content-Type': 'application/json',\n },\n body: JSON.stringify({ title: 'New Post', content: '...' }),\n});\n```"
@@ -480,11 +488,13 @@ export const TOPIC_LIST = [
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  "compiler/cloud-compiler/local-compiler",
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+ "compiler/config/auth",
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  "compiler/definitions/access",
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1
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{"version":3,"file":"content.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/docs/content.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,+BAA+B;AAC/B,0DAA0D;AAO1D,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,IAAI,GAA6B;IAC5C,WAAW,EAAE;QACX,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW;QACpB,SAAS,EAAE,s/xDAAs/xD;KAClgyD;IACD,4BAA4B,EAAE;QAC5B,OAAO,EAAE,oBAAoB;QAC7B,SAAS,EAAE,giRAAgiR;KAC5iR;IACD,wCAAwC,EAAE;QACxC,OAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB;QACzB,SAAS,EAAE,2nEAA2nE;KACvoE;IACD,6BAA6B,EAAE;QAC7B,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe;QACxB,SAAS,EAAE,upQAAupQ;KACnqQ;IACD,mCAAmC,EAAE;QACnC,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW;QACpB,SAAS,EAAE,iuGAAiuG;KAC7uG;IACD,yBAAyB,EAAE;QACzB,OAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB;QACzB,SAAS,EAAE,w4EAAw4E;KACp5E;IACD,wCAAwC,EAAE;QACxC,OAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB;QACzB,SAAS,EAAE,+tFAA+tF;KAC3uF;IACD,yCAAyC,EAAE;QACzC,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB;QAC1B,SAAS,EAAE,k/DAAk/D;KAC9/D;IACD,wBAAwB,EAAE;QACxB,OAAO,EAAE,oBAAoB;QAC7B,SAAS,EAAE,w+MAAw+M;KACp/M;IACD,sBAAsB,EAAE;QACtB,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY;QACrB,SAAS,EAAE,8jLAA8jL;KAC1kL;IACD,0BAA0B,EAAE;QAC1B,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB;QAC1B,SAAS,EAAE,4nJAA4nJ;KACxoJ;IACD,yBAAyB,EAAE;QACzB,OAAO,EAAE,2BAA2B;QACpC,SAAS,EAAE,k9LAAk9L;KAC99L;IACD,iBAAiB,EAAE;QACjB,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe;QACxB,SAAS,EAAE,+lhBAA+lhB;KAC3mhB;IACD,wBAAwB,EAAE;QACxB,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB;QAC3B,SAAS,EAAE,ggWAAggW;KAC5gW;IACD,2BAA2B,EAAE;QAC3B,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW;QACpB,SAAS,EAAE,6zOAA6zO;KACz0O;IACD,0BAA0B,EAAE;QAC1B,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB;QAC3B,SAAS,EAAE,0iQAA0iQ;KACtjQ;IACD,+BAA+B,EAAE;QAC/B,OAAO,EAAE,oBAAoB;QAC7B,SAAS,EAAE,k5GAAk5G;KAC95G;IACD,2BAA2B,EAAE;QAC3B,OAAO,EAAE,uBAAuB;QAChC,SAAS,EAAE,+xLAA+xL;KAC3yL;IACD,6BAA6B,EAAE;QAC7B,OAAO,EAAE,gDAAgD;QACzD,SAAS,EAAE,ohhBAAohhB;KAChihB;IACD,8BAA8B,EAAE;QAC9B,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS;QAClB,SAAS,EAAE,4n4BAA4n4B;KACxo4B;IACD,+BAA+B,EAAE;QAC/B,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU;QACnB,SAAS,EAAE,slIAAslI;KAClmI;IACD,8BAA8B,EAAE;QAC9B,OAAO,EAAE,iCAAiC;QAC1C,SAAS,EAAE,sgPAAsgP;KAClhP;IACD,+BAA+B,EAAE;QAC/B,OAAO,EAAE,2BAA2B;QACpC,SAAS,EAAE,4oXAA4oX;KACxpX;IACD,6BAA6B,EAAE;QAC7B,OAAO,EAAE,mCAAmC;QAC5C,SAAS,EAAE,swPAAswP;KAClxP;IACD,sBAAsB,EAAE;QACtB,OAAO,EAAE,sBAAsB;QAC/B,SAAS,EAAE,uzRAAuzR;KACn0R;IACD,8BAA8B,EAAE;QAC9B,OAAO,EAAE,2BAA2B;QACpC,SAAS,EAAE,muQAAmuQ;KAC/uQ;IACD,2BAA2B,EAAE;QAC3B,OAAO,EAAE,8BAA8B;QACvC,SAAS,EAAE,09MAA09M;KACt+M;IACD,6BAA6B,EAAE;QAC7B,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB;QAC1B,SAAS,EAAE,uo8BAAuo8B;KACnp8B;IACD,iCAAiC,EAAE;QACjC,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY;QACrB,SAAS,EAAE,q6BAAq6B;KACj7B;IACD,4BAA4B,EAAE;QAC5B,OAAO,EAAE,+BAA+B;QACxC,SAAS,EAAE,g5RAAg5R;KAC55R;IACD,sCAAsC,EAAE;QACtC,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU;QACnB,SAAS,EAAE,qsHAAqsH;KACjtH;IACD,uCAAuC,EAAE;QACvC,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB;QAC3B,SAAS,EAAE,8saAA8sa;KAC1ta;IACD,uCAAuC,EAAE;QACvC,OAAO,EAAE,oBAAoB;QAC7B,SAAS,EAAE,07JAA07J;KACt8J;IACD,0BAA0B,EAAE;QAC1B,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB;QAC1B,SAAS,EAAE,6qNAA6qN;KACzrN;IACD,mCAAmC,EAAE;QACnC,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB;QAC1B,SAAS,EAAE,s4PAAs4P;KACl5P;IACD,wCAAwC,EAAE;QACxC,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe;QACxB,SAAS,EAAE,s/NAAs/N;KAClgO;IACD,8CAA8C,EAAE;QAC9C,OAAO,EAAE,qBAAqB;QAC9B,SAAS,EAAE,o+MAAo+M;KACh/M;IACD,yCAAyC,EAAE;QACzC,OAAO,EAAE,6BAA6B;QACtC,SAAS,EAAE,29FAA29F;KACv+F;IACD,oCAAoC,EAAE;QACpC,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW;QACpB,SAAS,EAAE,uhIAAuhI;KACniI;IACD,UAAU,EAAE;QACV,OAAO,EAAE,oBAAoB;QAC7B,SAAS,EAAE,+zGAA+zG;KAC30G;IACD,sCAAsC,EAAE;QACtC,OAAO,EAAE,oBAAoB;QAC7B,SAAS,EAAE,4mGAA4mG;KACxnG;IACD,uCAAuC,EAAE;QACvC,OAAO,EAAE,aAAa;QACtB,SAAS,EAAE,gpQAAgpQ;KAC5pQ;IACD,oCAAoC,EAAE;QACpC,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU;QACnB,SAAS,EAAE,2vBAA2vB;KACvwB;IACD,yCAAyC,EAAE;QACzC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM;QACf,SAAS,EAAE,+nJAA+nJ;KAC3oJ;IACD,6CAA6C,EAAE;QAC7C,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU;QACnB,SAAS,EAAE,83BAA83B;KAC14B;IACD,2BAA2B,EAAE;QAC3B,OAAO,EAAE,wBAAwB;QACjC,SAAS,EAAE,23DAA23D;KACv4D;IACD,qDAAqD,EAAE;QACrD,OAAO,EAAE,aAAa;QACtB,SAAS,EAAE,m7UAAm7U;KAC/7U;IACD,0DAA0D,EAAE;QAC1D,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB;QAC3B,SAAS,EAAE,gzWAAgzW;KAC5zW;IACD,iDAAiD,EAAE;QACjD,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB;QAC1B,SAAS,EAAE,4xGAA4xG;KACxyG;IACD,8CAA8C,EAAE;QAC9C,OAAO,EAAE,gBAAgB;QACzB,SAAS,EAAE,48mBAA48mB;KACx9mB;IACD,gDAAgD,EAAE;QAChD,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ;QACjB,SAAS,EAAE,y1OAAy1O;KACr2O;IACD,yCAAyC,EAAE;QACzC,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe;QACxB,SAAS,EAAE,8lDAA8lD;KAC1mD;IACD,iDAAiD,EAAE;QACjD,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc;QACvB,SAAS,EAAE,k4OAAk4O;KAC94O;IACD,sDAAsD,EAAE;QACtD,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB;QAC3B,SAAS,EAAE,o2LAAo2L;KACh3L;IACD,mDAAmD,EAAE;QACnD,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW;QACpB,SAAS,EAAE,07JAA07J;KACt8J;IACD,kBAAkB,EAAE;QAClB,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB;QAC1B,SAAS,EAAE,8wDAA8wD;KAC1xD;IACD,+BAA+B,EAAE;QAC/B,OAAO,EAAE,4BAA4B;QACrC,SAAS,EAAE,u+EAAu+E;KACn/E;IACD,2CAA2C,EAAE;QAC3C,OAAO,EAAE,aAAa;QACtB,SAAS,EAAE,soGAAsoG;KAClpG;IACD,wCAAwC,EAAE;QACxC,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU;QACnB,SAAS,EAAE,63FAA63F;KACz4F;IACD,qCAAqC,EAAE;QACrC,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO;QAChB,SAAS,EAAE,29EAA29E;KACv+E;IACD,0BAA0B,EAAE;QAC1B,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB;QAC1B,SAAS,EAAE,g4JAAg4J;KAC54J;IACD,OAAO,EAAE;QACP,OAAO,EAAE,yBAAyB;QAClC,SAAS,EAAE,ooGAAooG;KAChpG;IACD,gCAAgC,EAAE;QAChC,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe;QACxB,SAAS,EAAE,0pRAA0pR;KACtqR;IACD,wCAAwC,EAAE;QACxC,OAAO,EAAE,uBAAuB;QAChC,SAAS,EAAE,izPAAizP;KAC7zP;IACD,iCAAiC,EAAE;QACjC,OAAO,EAAE,aAAa;QACtB,SAAS,EAAE,m9FAAm9F;KAC/9F;IACD,oCAAoC,EAAE;QACpC,OAAO,EAAE,oBAAoB;QAC7B,SAAS,EAAE,wgBAAwgB;KACphB;IACD,mCAAmC,EAAE;QACnC,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS;QAClB,SAAS,EAAE,+6BAA+6B;KAC37B;IACD,yCAAyC,EAAE;QACzC,OAAO,EAAE,mBAAmB;QAC5B,SAAS,E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package/dist/index.js CHANGED
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
10
10
  */
11
11
  import pc from "picocolors";
12
12
  // Version injected at build time by scripts/inject-version.ts
13
- const CLI_VERSION = "0.10.12";
13
+ const CLI_VERSION = "0.10.14";
14
14
  function getPackageVersion() {
15
15
  return CLI_VERSION;
16
16
  }
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "@quickback-dev/cli",
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- "version": "0.10.12",
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+ "version": "0.10.14",
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  "description": "CLI for Quickback — define your backend in TypeScript, compile to a fully wired Cloudflare Worker (or Bun / Node) with auth, database, migrations, security, CMS, and Account UI.",
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  "author": "Kardoe Incorporated <paul@kardoe.com>",
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  "license": "MIT",