@questpie/mcp 3.16.0 → 3.18.0

package/README.md

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ Model Context Protocol integration for QUESTPIE apps. The package exposes select
 - **Route tools** - opt annotated JSON routes into MCP with path-param support.
 - **Schema resources** - let agents inspect allowed collections, globals, routes, and fields.
 - **Request context preservation** - HTTP tools run under the connecting request/session.
+- **Workload boundary** - remote workloads use a consumer-supplied, fail-closed authorizer instead of OAuth, cookies, requester identity, or stdio system authority.
 
 ## Installation
 
@@ -34,12 +35,48 @@ import { mcpConfig } from "@questpie/mcp";
 export default mcpConfig({
 	crud: {
 		collections: {
-			posts: { expose: true, read: true, write: true },
+			posts: {
+				operations: {
+					list: true,
+					get: true,
+					create: true,
+				},
+			},
 		},
 	},
+	routes: {
+		routes: {
+			"reports/generate": { operations: { execute: true } },
+		},
+	},
+	resources: {
+		collections: { posts: true },
+		routes: { "reports/generate": true },
+	},
+});
+```
+
+Omission exposes nothing. Entity names, operations, annotated routes, and
+schema resources must each be present in this catalog. Unknown names are
+ignored. The resolved catalog also supplies the OAuth scope catalog, so OAuth
+never advertises an app entity or operation that MCP does not release.
+
+## Stdio Authority
+
+Stdio has no ambient system authority. Bind it to an exact user-mode `ctx`, or
+explicitly opt a local maintenance process into the system bypass:
+
+```ts
+await startStdioServer(app, {
+	config: {
+		stdio: { trustedMaintenance: true },
+	},
 });
 ```
 
+Do not enable `trustedMaintenance` for remote or requester-controlled
+processes. It intentionally bypasses ordinary user RBAC and OAuth scope checks.
+
 ## Custom Tools
 
 ```ts
@@ -48,6 +85,8 @@ import { mcpTool } from "@questpie/mcp";
 import { z } from "zod";
 
 export default mcpTool("publish-summary", {
+	access: ({ session }) => !!session,
+	scopes: false,
 	inputSchema: z.object({ postId: z.string() }),
 }).handler(async ({ input, ctx }) => {
 	const post = await ctx.collections.posts.findById(input.postId);
@@ -55,14 +94,119 @@ export default mcpTool("publish-summary", {
 });
 ```
 
+## Remote Workloads
+
+Remote workload execution uses a separate public factory.
+`createWorkloadMcpServer` accepts only an opaque envelope, a consumer-supplied
+authorizer, a required consumer-supplied context binder, an optional audit sink,
+and an optional opaque execution handoff. The binder turns the opaque authorized
+context into the exact QUESTPIE request context used for discovery access checks,
+call-time access checks, and handler execution. The bound context must use
+`accessMode: "user"`; remote workloads cannot acquire the system bypass. The
+factory deliberately has no request, cookie, requester context, OAuth, or
+access-mode option.
+
+Set `concurrencyKey` to a stable, non-secret consumer or tenant identifier when
+multiple workload servers or ports should share one per-principal concurrency
+bucket. Different keys are isolated; omitting the key creates an instance-local
+bucket.
+
+Every workload-visible tool opts into named capability facts:
+
+```ts
+import { mcpTool } from "@questpie/mcp";
+import { z } from "zod";
+
+export default mcpTool("messages.reply", {
+	access: true,
+	scopes: false,
+	inputSchema: z.object({ body: z.string() }),
+	workload: {
+		capabilities: ["messages.write"],
+		handoff: "messages.commit",
+	},
+}).handler(async ({ input }) => ({
+	content: [{ type: "text", text: input.body }],
+}));
+```
+
+MCP passes only the opaque envelope, phase, and bounded tool facts (`kind`,
+`name`, `operation`, `intent`, `transport`, `capabilities`, and optional
+`handoff`) to the authorizer. Discovery and every call are authorized and bound
+independently. MCP does not interpret the returned opaque context or attribution.
+Calls with a `handoff` capability execute through the consumer's handoff; MCP
+does not add a durable effect or idempotency store. Missing or malformed
+authorization or context binding fails closed, and tools without an explicit
+workload requirement stay hidden.
+
+When a trusted in-process subsystem needs only workload-enabled custom tools,
+use the programmatic port instead of creating an MCP client/server loop:
+
+```ts
+import { createWorkloadMcpToolPort, mcpPublicErrorCode } from "@questpie/mcp";
+
+const tools = createWorkloadMcpToolPort(app, workloadOptions);
+const released = await tools.listCustomTools({ signal });
+const result = await tools.callCustomTool({
+	name: "messages.reply",
+	input: { body: "Hello" },
+	signal,
+	requestId: runId,
+});
+```
+
+The port excludes generated CRUD tools, routes, and resources by construction.
+It uses the same immutable release catalog, per-call workload authorization,
+context binding, MCP access rule, Zod input/output validation, execution
+budgets, cancellation, and public error contract as transport calls. A failed
+call returns `isError: true` with a stable code and correlation ID under
+`_meta["questpie/error"]`. `mcpPublicErrorCode(error)` safely reads the code
+from errors thrown by list/cancellation paths.
+
+## Execution Budgets And Errors
+
+All tool calls and schema resource reads share bounded execution state for an
+app, including across HTTP requests and independently created workload ports.
+Defaults can be narrowed with `execution`:
+
+```ts
+export default mcpConfig({
+	execution: {
+		maxInputBytes: 64 * 1024,
+		maxInputDepth: 16,
+		maxOutputDepth: 64,
+		maxValueNodes: 10_000,
+		maxOutputBytes: 1024 * 1024,
+		timeoutMs: 30_000,
+		maxConcurrency: 64,
+		maxConcurrencyPerPrincipal: 8,
+		maxTools: 512,
+		maxResources: 512,
+		onDiagnostic(event) {
+			// Trusted, bounded server-side telemetry only.
+		},
+	},
+});
+```
+
+Saturation rejects immediately; it does not create an unbounded queue. Timed
+out or cancelled work keeps its concurrency permit until the underlying
+operation actually settles, so code that ignores `signal` cannot bypass the
+limit. Custom tool handlers and workload handoffs receive `signal`,
+`requestId`, and `correlationId`. Public errors use stable codes:
+`access_denied`, `invalid_input`, `input_too_large`, `output_too_large`,
+`timeout`, `cancelled`, `busy`, and `internal`. Protocol responses and
+diagnostics never include raw handler/database error messages, request input,
+output, credentials, authorization envelopes, or workload attribution.
+
 ## Exports
 
-| Entry Point                 | Purpose                             |
-| --------------------------- | ----------------------------------- |
+| Entry Point                 | Purpose                              |
+| --------------------------- | ------------------------------------ |
 | `@questpie/mcp`             | Config, plugin, server, tool factory |
-| `@questpie/mcp/modules/mcp` | `mcpModule` for `modules.ts`        |
-| `@questpie/mcp/plugin`      | Codegen plugin export               |
-| `@questpie/mcp/stdio`       | Stdio server entry                  |
+| `@questpie/mcp/modules/mcp` | `mcpModule` for `modules.ts`         |
+| `@questpie/mcp/plugin`      | Codegen plugin export                |
+| `@questpie/mcp/stdio`       | Stdio server entry                   |
 
 ## License