@quantiya/codevibe-codex-plugin 2.0.10 → 2.0.11

package/node_modules/@quantiya/codevibe-core/dist/appsync/__tests__/appsync-client-flag-locator.test.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+export {};

package/node_modules/@quantiya/codevibe-core/dist/appsync/__tests__/dispose-watcher-socket.test.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+export {};

package/node_modules/@quantiya/codevibe-core/dist/appsync/appsync-client.d.ts

@@ -1,8 +1,30 @@
+import WebSocket from 'ws';
 import { CreateEventInput, CreateSessionInput, UpdateSessionInput, UpdateEventStatusInput, Event, Session, EventSource, DeviceKey, GrantSessionKeyInput, UpdateReviewerPolicyInput, UserReviewerPolicySnapshot } from '../types';
 import type { PostDecisionAction } from '../orchestration-shell/types';
+import type { InvocationUsageSnapshot } from '../reviewer/token-usage';
 import type { CreateTaskGroupInput, CreateTaskGroupResult, SubmitMergeGateVerdictInput, SubmitMergeGateVerdictResult, SubmitTrackVerificationOutcomeInput, SubmitTrackVerificationOutcomeResult, ClaimGroupDecisionInput, ClaimGroupDecisionResult } from '../local-executor/task-group-types';
 import type { ReviewerVerdict, ReviewerRole, AgentKind as ReviewerAgentKind } from '../reviewer/types';
 import type { PlannerDecision } from '../planner/types';
+/**
+ * Dispose a watcher/subscription WebSocket without crashing the process
+ * (#657 D-1 fix-forward — the clean-quit session/admission leak).
+ *
+ * `ws.close()` on a still-CONNECTING socket aborts the handshake and emits an
+ * ASYNC 'error' ("WebSocket was closed before the connection was established")
+ * on a LATER tick. Every prior disposal site paired `close(1000)` with
+ * `removeAllListeners()` — in either order — so that late emission always
+ * found a listener-less socket and crashed Node with an unhandled 'error'
+ * mid-teardown, BEFORE `retireHostedSession` could land the session INACTIVE
+ * mutation. Net effect: every clean `/quit` whose Class B watcher (or any
+ * other watcher) was mid-(re)connect leaked an ACTIVE session row AND an
+ * `activeSessionAdmissionCount` slot (#101 class), hard-capping the
+ * 19-scenario GA baseline after exactly the free headroom.
+ *
+ * Order is load-bearing: strip stale handlers FIRST, re-arm a swallow-all
+ * 'error' handler, THEN close. Exported for the regression test only — not
+ * part of the public SDK surface.
+ */
+export declare function disposeWatcherSocket(ws: WebSocket, subscriptionId?: string): void;
 /**
  * One assigned reviewer seat returned by `getInReviewAssignments`. Mirrors the
  * engine `InReviewAssignment` serde (camelCase) in
@@ -101,6 +123,24 @@ export interface RecordExecutionEventInput {
     /** Free-form JSON; encrypted before crossing AppSync. */
     payload: unknown;
     dedupKeyHex: string;
+    /**
+     * O1 C1 (#652) §3.1 item 3 — the plaintext flag-target locator, REQUIRED
+     * when `kind = 'FLAG_BAD_APPROVAL'` and absent otherwise (non-flag events
+     * stay byte-identical to the pre-O1-C1 wire). Row COORDINATES only — zero
+     * content. Field names mirror the Rust handler DTO
+     * (`RecordExecutionEventInput` in core-rs `types.rs`, camelCase serde) —
+     * the wire-shape source of truth. The server rejects a request whose
+     * `taskId` ≠ `flaggedTaskId` (the per-task dedup-partition pin).
+     */
+    flaggedTaskId?: string;
+    /**
+     * The flagged row's audit-table sort key — the zero-padded 16-digit
+     * `seqNum` string exactly as surfaced by `queryAudit`'s additive
+     * `AuditEntryWireRow.seqNum` projection.
+     */
+    flaggedSeqNum?: string;
+    /** The flagged entry's `entry_id` (also the dedup-key derivation input). */
+    flaggedEntryId?: string;
 }
 /**
  * PHASE-CP-1-F.1 Part A (LOCK L2) — tolerant `AWSJSON!` object read.
@@ -180,8 +220,29 @@ export interface TaskReviewSummaryDurations {
 }
 export interface TaskReviewSummaryTokenUsage {
     knownTotal?: number;
+    knownInput?: number;
+    knownOutput?: number;
+    knownCachedInput?: number;
     availability: string;
     unavailableRoles: string[];
+    invocations?: TaskReviewSummaryTokenInvocation[];
+}
+export interface TaskReviewSummaryTokenInvocation {
+    role: string;
+    agent: string;
+    taskId?: string;
+    trackIndex?: number;
+    round?: number;
+    gateId?: string;
+    seatId?: number;
+    reviewerRole?: string;
+    inputTokens?: number;
+    outputTokens?: number;
+    cachedInputTokens?: number;
+    totalTokens?: number;
+    elapsedMs?: number;
+    availability: string;
+    unavailableReason?: string;
 }
 /** One round in the per-round summary (decrypted). */
 export interface TaskReviewSummaryRound {
@@ -862,6 +923,7 @@ export declare class AppSyncClient {
         sessionId: string;
         roundNumber: number;
         rawOutput: string;
+        usage?: InvocationUsageSnapshot;
     }, sessionKeyBase64: string): Promise<{
         gateId: string;
         workflowState: string;

package/node_modules/@quantiya/codevibe-core/dist/auth/__tests__/keychain-cli-nudge.test.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+export {};

package/node_modules/@quantiya/codevibe-core/dist/auth/keychain-cli.d.ts

@@ -4,3 +4,11 @@
  * the raw process argv (node, script, "keychain", subcommand, flags…).
  */
 export declare function runKeychainCli(argv: string[]): Promise<number>;
+/**
+ * Advisory nudge for `codevibe login` / `codevibe status` (GA follow-up to #642):
+ * when this machine still holds file-backed credentials, has NOT migrated, and the
+ * OS keyring is actually usable, print the `keychain migrate` suggestion. Purely
+ * additive output — never throws, never mutates state, silent on any ambiguity
+ * (see migrate-nudge.ts invariants).
+ */
+export declare function maybePrintKeychainMigrationNudge(print?: (line: string) => void): Promise<void>;