@quantiya/codevibe-antigravity-plugin 2.0.6 → 2.0.8

package/dist/server.js

@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ var TranscriptTailer = class extends import_events.EventEmitter {
     this.watcher.on("unlink", (filePath) => this.onFileUnlinked(filePath));
     this.watcher.on("error", (error) => {
       logger.error("Chokidar error", { error });
-      this.emit("error", error instanceof Error ? error : new Error(String(error)));
+      this.emitError(error);
     });
     this.watcher.on("ready", () => {
       logger.info("Transcript tailer ready (chokidar initial scan complete)");
@@ -388,6 +388,26 @@ var TranscriptTailer = class extends import_events.EventEmitter {
     if (this.flushTimer.unref) this.flushTimer.unref();
     this.isWatching = true;
   }
+  /**
+   * (#638 G4) SAFE 'error' emission. `EventEmitter.emit('error', …)` with NO
+   * registered listener THROWS synchronously — inside a chokidar callback that
+   * becomes an uncaughtException, and inside the async read chain it becomes a
+   * rejection; either way the F6 symmetric process guard can classify it fatal
+   * and kill the daemon over a non-fatal tailing fault (over-death). The server
+   * attaches an 'error' listener before start() (primary path); this guard
+   * covers the residual windows — the doStop teardown detaches listeners
+   * BEFORE the tailer stops, and any embedder that never attached one.
+   */
+  emitError(error) {
+    const err = error instanceof Error ? error : new Error(String(error));
+    if (this.listenerCount("error") > 0) {
+      this.emit("error", err);
+    } else {
+      logger.error("Transcript tailer error (no listener attached \u2014 logged, non-fatal)", {
+        error: String(err)
+      });
+    }
+  }
   /**
    * Stop watching. Flushes offsets one last time before closing chokidar.
    * Idempotent.
@@ -594,7 +614,13 @@ var TranscriptTailer = class extends import_events.EventEmitter {
       return inflight;
     }
     const generation = this.readGeneration;
-    const read = this.drainReadQueue(filePath, conversationId, generation);
+    const read = this.drainReadQueue(filePath, conversationId, generation).catch((error) => {
+      logger.error("Transcript read chain failed (non-fatal) \u2014 next change event retries", {
+        filePath,
+        conversationId,
+        error: String(error)
+      });
+    });
     this.activeReads.set(filePath, read);
     void read.finally(() => {
       if (this.activeReads.get(filePath) === read) {
@@ -651,7 +677,7 @@ var TranscriptTailer = class extends import_events.EventEmitter {
       });
     } catch (error) {
       logger.error("createReadStream failed", { filePath, error });
-      this.emit("error", error instanceof Error ? error : new Error(String(error)));
+      this.emitError(error);
       return;
     }
     let buffered = entry.carryover;
@@ -684,7 +710,7 @@ var TranscriptTailer = class extends import_events.EventEmitter {
       }
     } catch (error) {
       logger.error("Error reading transcript stream", { filePath, error });
-      this.emit("error", error instanceof Error ? error : new Error(String(error)));
+      this.emitError(error);
       return;
     }
     if (generation !== this.readGeneration) return;
@@ -1225,6 +1251,20 @@ var TmuxPaneObserver = class _TmuxPaneObserver extends import_events2.EventEmitt
     this.currentApprovalHeader = extractHeader(candidate.snapshot);
     this.emit("prompt-candidate", candidate);
   }
+  /**
+   * E1 (§6a-2b / F5) — clear the dedup `lastPromptHash` IF it still equals `hash`,
+   * so an UNCHANGED live pane re-emits a fresh 'prompt-candidate'. Called by the
+   * server when an emit-failure rollback discarded the durable record: without this
+   * the observer's `lastPromptHash` still matches the unchanged pane, so
+   * processFileChanges short-circuits (the `snapshotHash === this.lastPromptHash`
+   * guard) and the live prompt is never re-observed = under-nag. The equality guard
+   * targets the EXACT consumed hash so a newer prompt's hash is never clobbered.
+   */
+  resetPromptHash(hash) {
+    if (this.lastPromptHash === hash) {
+      this.lastPromptHash = null;
+    }
+  }
   /** Cancel any in-flight debounce timer + drop the pending candidate.
    *  Called from stop() so a wrapper exit / restart doesn't fire a
    *  prompt for a torn-down observer. Also bumps debounceCycleId so
@@ -1712,14 +1752,14 @@ var ApprovalDetector = class extends import_events3.EventEmitter {
    * Returns the emitted state, or null if dedupe (already emitted for
    * this paneHash) or disabled.
    */
-  emitPaneOnlyPrompt(candidate, conversationId) {
+  emitPaneOnlyPrompt(candidate, conversationId, forcedPromptId) {
     if (this.paneOnlyEmittedHashes.has(candidate.paneHash)) {
       logger.debug("Skipping pane-only re-emit for duplicate paneHash", {
         paneHash: candidate.paneHash.substring(0, 16)
       });
       return null;
     }
-    const promptId = (0, import_uuid.v4)();
+    const promptId = forcedPromptId ?? (0, import_uuid.v4)();
     const syntheticCall = {
       conversationId,
       intentStepIndex: -1,
@@ -1747,7 +1787,11 @@ var ApprovalDetector = class extends import_events3.EventEmitter {
       body: candidate.body,
       emittedAt: Date.now(),
       ttlMs: this.promptTtlMs,
-      paneOptions: candidate.options
+      paneOptions: candidate.options,
+      // E1 (§6a-2b / F5) — carry the consumed pane hash so an emit-failure
+      // rollback can reset the observer's lastPromptHash and let the unchanged
+      // live pane re-emit.
+      paneHash: candidate.paneHash
     };
     this.pendingPrompts.set(promptId, state);
     this.paneOnlyEmittedHashes.add(candidate.paneHash);
@@ -2790,7 +2834,7 @@ function truncate(s, maxBytes) {
 // src/server.ts
 var MOBILE_PROMPT_FLOOR_RECENCY_MS = 12e4;
 var LAUNCH_SETTLE_TIMEOUT_MS = 3e3;
-var McpServer = class {
+var McpServer = class _McpServer {
   constructor(options) {
     /** Per-session causal floor for transcript-event timestamps emitted right
      *  after a MOBILE prompt. The mobile USER_PROMPT is created by the iOS app
@@ -2807,12 +2851,75 @@ var McpServer = class {
      *  under this single sessionId. /resume does NOT create a new
      *  session — same row. */
     this.session = null;
+    // E1 (§4/§6a-4) — per-promptId durable raise entries for the agy producer.
+    // Keyed by the E1 promptId (= derive(ownerToken)); each holds the SECRET
+    // ownerToken so a resume/retirement re-raise re-commits the SAME promptId
+    // (WRITE_ROW on the ownerToken=:token branch → no duplicate row, no under-nag).
+    // This in-memory Map is the AUTHORITATIVE E1 ledger. It outlives the detector's
+    // 60s/5min timer (§3.1), so the TTL-refresh, wake, and retirement re-raises
+    // always cover every still-open prompt this daemon raised. Process-restart
+    // recovery is OUT of v1 scope (F1): a daemon crash is handled by disconnect-
+    // suppression + per-row TTL (design §8), and agy re-observes a live pane on
+    // restart — so there is NO disk persistence (removing it also stops writing the
+    // secret ownerToken to a tmp file). agy is single-session, so sessionId is the
+    // one live session's id.
+    this.e1PromptRaises = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+    // E1 (§6a-2b) — session-scoped content-key → promptId index for the
+    // suppressed-prompt COLLAPSE rule. Key = `${sessionId}::${contentKey}`. A
+    // suppression whose content-key already maps to a LIVE ledger record collapses
+    // onto it (over-nag, never under-nag); an ABSENT content-key mints a fresh badge.
+    this.e1ContentKeyIndex = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+    // E1 (§3.1) — periodic liveness TTL co-refresh for the open-prompt ledger.
+    this.e1TtlRefreshTimer = null;
+    // 5 min (7-day TTL)
+    // E1 (§6a-4) — single-flight guard for the retirement recovery re-raise.
+    this.retiredSessionRecoveryPromise = null;
+    // E1 (§6a-4 / F3) — promptIds whose re-raise (retirement re-point or return-
+    // driven full re-raise) exhausted reRaiseOneE1's bounded per-call attempts and
+    // must keep being retried until the backend acknowledges ("the prompt is never
+    // lost"). drainPendingE1ReRaises re-attempts each still-present entry every TTL
+    // tick; reRaiseOneE1 clears an id on ack and re-flags it on another exhaustion.
+    // Without this a failed retirement re-raise would leave the entry present so
+    // refreshE1Ttls finds it → refreshes → returns no aged-out → never re-fires,
+    // leaving the backend row permanently pointed at the RETIRED session = under-nag.
+    this.e1NeedsReRaise = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+    // E1 (§6a-4 / F2) — bounded exponential backoff for the BLOCK-UNTIL-ACK
+    // retirement re-raise (the pre-heartbeat drain in createLaunchSession, which must
+    // ACK before the replacement's heartbeat advertises liveness — design line 93).
+    // The general (bounded, non-blocking) TTL-drain path keeps its shipped linear
+    // 250·attempt backoff. Overridable in tests so a multi-failure block-until-ack
+    // re-raise doesn't wait real seconds.
+    this.e1BlockingReRaiseBackoff = { baseMs: 250, maxMs: 2e3 };
+    // E1 (§6a-4) — DURABLE park for retirement-orphans awaiting re-home (G-1 fix).
+    // When the backend retires the live session, its still-open prompts are
+    // snapshotted here (FULL records — incl. the secret ownerToken + pre-encryption
+    // content) *before* the replacement-launch attempt, so a transient launch failure
+    // can NOT lose them (the pre-fix snapshot was a LOCAL closure var re-raised only
+    // inside the replacement's pre-heartbeat hook — if that launch failed before the
+    // hook ran, the snapshot was lost and the ledger rows stayed pointed at the
+    // RETIRED session = stranded badgeless live prompt). Drained + re-homed onto the
+    // NEXT successfully-launched session (in createLaunchSession, BEFORE its heartbeat
+    // — §F2) and, as a backstop, on every TTL tick — so a retirement whose OWN
+    // replacement launch failed is still recovered by a later normal activity launch.
+    // Keyed by promptId so re-parks dedupe. In-memory only (process-restart recovery
+    // is out of v1 scope, F1); cleared on a full doStop.
+    this.e1RetirementPark = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
     /** Single subscription for the launch session (v9 — was per-conv Map). */
     this.subscription = null;
     /** Wrapper-level disable flag (free-tier limit / collision). v9
      *  collapses v8's per-conv disabledConversations Set because there's
      *  only ONE backend session per wrapper. */
     this.sessionDisabled = false;
+    /** (#638 G2) Terminal fail-closed-by-absence marker: createLaunchSession hit
+     *  ENCRYPTED_SESSION_NO_KEY for this identity. Retrying cannot derive a key
+     *  this device does not have, so ensureLaunchSession must NOT re-bootstrap —
+     *  the no-session/no-plaintext outcome is the correct terminal state. Logged
+     *  once at the catch; reset on doStop() alongside sessionDisabled. */
+    this.launchKeyUnavailable = false;
+    /** (#638 G2) Single-flight guard for ensureLaunchSession(): concurrent
+     *  activity-triggered re-bootstraps share ONE createLaunchSession attempt
+     *  instead of double-creating backend rows. Null when no attempt in flight. */
+    this.ensureLaunchInFlight = null;
     /** Registry of agy conv UUIDs the wrapper has observed this lifecycle.
      *  Populated from handleConversationDiscovered + handleTranscriptEmit
      *  (after isMainConversation passes). Used by:
@@ -2850,6 +2957,15 @@ var McpServer = class {
      *  out mid-cleanup — separating the bounded "wait for create" from the
      *  always-awaited "mark INACTIVE". (#142 Stage 2 R1 iter-2 HIGH.) */
     this.pendingLaunchSessionId = null;
+    /** (#638 H4) Set by doStop() when a stop runs while a createLaunchSession may
+     *  still be in flight (the bounded Phase-0 settle can expire mid-create). The
+     *  create's post-await tail includes this in its bail check, so a create that
+     *  resolves AFTER doStop's settle bound still deactivates its just-created row
+     *  itself — the settlement obligation survives until the create CONCLUSIVELY
+     *  finishes, instead of doStop "completing" it with a missing-row INACTIVE
+     *  write the backend rejected. Reset on the next start() (a stale prior-
+     *  lifecycle create is additionally caught by the gen mismatch). */
+    this.stopRequestedDuringCreate = false;
     /** Listener references kept so doStop() can detach them. Without this,
      *  a server restart (test mode or future hot-reload) accumulates
      *  listeners on the shared module instances. (Stage 2 HIGH finding
@@ -2890,6 +3006,9 @@ var McpServer = class {
       getActiveSession: () => this.getAnySession()
     });
   }
+  static {
+    this.E1_TTL_REFRESH_MS = 5 * 60 * 1e3;
+  }
   // ─── Lifecycle ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
   async start() {
     if (this.started) throw new Error("McpServer.start() called twice");
@@ -2907,11 +3026,12 @@ var McpServer = class {
         error_message: "no stored OAuth tokens"
       });
       throw new Error(
-        "codevibe-antigravity-plugin: no OAuth tokens \u2014 run `codevibe-agy login` first"
+        "codevibe-antigravity-plugin: no OAuth tokens \u2014 run `codevibe login` first"
       );
     }
     this.started = true;
     this.lifecycleGen++;
+    this.stopRequestedDuringCreate = false;
     this.registerSignalHandlers();
     await (0, import_codevibe_core4.registerDeviceEncryptionKey)(this.appSyncClient, logger);
     if (!this.started) return { httpPort: 0 };
@@ -2946,6 +3066,9 @@ var McpServer = class {
     if (!this.started) {
       return { httpPort: 0 };
     }
+    this.addListener(this.transcriptTailer, "error", (err) => {
+      logger.error("transcript tailer error (non-fatal)", { error: String(err) });
+    });
     this.addListener(this.transcriptTailer, "event", (emit) => {
       void this.handleTranscriptEmit(emit).catch((err) => {
         logger.error("handleTranscriptEmit failed", { error: String(err) });
@@ -3008,8 +3131,16 @@ var McpServer = class {
     }
     if (this.pendingLaunchSessionId) {
       const pendingId = this.pendingLaunchSessionId;
-      this.pendingLaunchSessionId = null;
-      await this.deactivateLaunchRow(pendingId);
+      this.stopRequestedDuringCreate = true;
+      const deactivated = await this.deactivateLaunchRow(pendingId);
+      if (deactivated) {
+        if (this.pendingLaunchSessionId === pendingId) this.pendingLaunchSessionId = null;
+      } else {
+        logger.error(
+          "doStop: INACTIVE write for the pending launch row FAILED (row may not exist yet \u2014 create still in flight). Keeping the settlement obligation: if the create resolves in-process its tail deactivates the row; if the process exits first, an ACTIVE row may leak (SIGKILL-class residual) (#638 H4)",
+          { sessionId: pendingId }
+        );
+      }
     }
     if (this.subscription) {
       try {
@@ -3069,7 +3200,11 @@ var McpServer = class {
       logger.warn("appSyncClient.cleanupSubscriptions failed", { error: String(err) });
     }
     this.session = null;
+    this.stopE1TtlRefresh();
+    this.e1RetirementPark.clear();
     this.sessionDisabled = false;
+    this.launchKeyUnavailable = false;
+    this.ensureLaunchInFlight = null;
     this.observedMainConversationIds.clear();
     await fireDaemonBeacon("daemon_init_step", {
       step: "shutdown",
@@ -3079,6 +3214,7 @@ var McpServer = class {
   async handleConversationDiscovered(conversationId) {
     if (!this.started) return;
     if (this.sessionDisabled) return;
+    await this.ensureLaunchSession();
     if (!this.session) return;
     if (!this.isMainConversation(conversationId)) {
       logger.debug("Ignoring discovery for non-main conversation (subagent)", { conversationId });
@@ -3098,17 +3234,25 @@ var McpServer = class {
    * can't clobber or resurrect ACTIVE. (Separate from the ACTIVE-vs-INACTIVE
    * per-session ordering that core 1.0.29's status-write chain handles.)
    * (#142 Stage 2 R1 iter-2.)
+   *
+   * (#638 H4) Returns whether the INACTIVE write actually SUCCEEDED. A swallowed
+   * failure here is NOT a settled obligation — the row may not exist yet (a
+   * create still in flight) or the network may be down — so callers must keep
+   * their settlement marker/obligation alive on `false` instead of treating the
+   * attempt as completion. The log stays inside so no failure is ever silent.
    */
   async deactivateLaunchRow(sessionId) {
     try {
       this.appSyncClient.stopHeartbeat(sessionId);
       await this.appSyncClient.updateSession({ sessionId, status: "INACTIVE" });
       logger.info("Marked superseded/interrupted launch session INACTIVE", { sessionId });
+      return true;
     } catch (err) {
       logger.warn("Failed to mark superseded/interrupted launch session INACTIVE", {
         sessionId,
         error: String(err)
       });
+      return false;
     }
   }
   /**
@@ -3117,6 +3261,16 @@ var McpServer = class {
    * events under this single sessionId. /resume does NOT create a new
    * row. (Codex Stage 2 R1 v5/v6/v7 switch machinery is now dead code,
    * removed.)
+   *
+   * E1 (§6a-4 / F2) — AFTER the session + subscription are wired but BEFORE the
+   * heartbeat advertises liveness, this drains the durable retirement park onto
+   * THIS session (see {@link drainE1RetirementPark}). So the open prompts of a
+   * retired session are re-pointed onto their replacement (backend-ACK'd) before the
+   * first `lastHeartbeatAt` write — otherwise the client would see a connected
+   * session whose rows still point at the RETIRED session = under-nag (design line
+   * 93). Running on EVERY successful launch (not just the retirement-recovery
+   * re-bootstrap) is what lets a later normal activity launch recover a retirement
+   * whose own replacement launch had failed transiently (G-1).
    */
   async createLaunchSession() {
     const gen = this.lifecycleGen;
@@ -3143,7 +3297,7 @@ var McpServer = class {
       );
       sessionKey = result.sessionKey ?? null;
     } catch (err) {
-      this.pendingLaunchSessionId = null;
+      if (this.pendingLaunchSessionId === sessionId) this.pendingLaunchSessionId = null;
       const msg = String(err);
       if (msg.includes("session-limit-exceeded")) {
         logger.warn("Free-tier session limit reached \u2014 mobile sync disabled for this wrapper", { sessionId });
@@ -3151,12 +3305,25 @@ var McpServer = class {
         this.sessionDisabled = true;
         return;
       }
-      logger.error("createLaunchSession failed (non-fatal)", { sessionId, error: msg });
+      if (err?.code === "ENCRYPTED_SESSION_NO_KEY") {
+        logger.error("createLaunchSession: ENCRYPTED_SESSION_NO_KEY \u2014 no key for the encrypted session; no session created, mobile sync fails closed (no plaintext) (#638)", { sessionId });
+        if (gen !== this.lifecycleGen || !this.started) return;
+        this.launchKeyUnavailable = true;
+        return;
+      }
+      logger.error("createLaunchSession failed (non-fatal; next activity re-attempts via ensureLaunchSession \u2014 #638 G2)", { sessionId, error: msg });
       return;
     }
-    if (gen !== this.lifecycleGen || !this.started) {
-      await this.deactivateLaunchRow(sessionId);
-      if (this.pendingLaunchSessionId === sessionId) this.pendingLaunchSessionId = null;
+    if (gen !== this.lifecycleGen || !this.started || this.stopRequestedDuringCreate) {
+      const deactivated = await this.deactivateLaunchRow(sessionId);
+      if (deactivated) {
+        if (this.pendingLaunchSessionId === sessionId) this.pendingLaunchSessionId = null;
+      } else {
+        logger.error(
+          "createLaunchSession bail: INACTIVE write for the just-created row FAILED \u2014 settlement obligation remains open (marker kept); the row may leak ACTIVE if nothing retries before exit (#638 H4)",
+          { sessionId }
+        );
+      }
       return;
     }
     this.session = {
@@ -3169,7 +3336,14 @@ var McpServer = class {
       createdAt: /* @__PURE__ */ new Date(),
       subscriptionActive: false,
       metadata: { wrapperPid: this.wrapperPid ?? void 0, launch: true },
-      sessionKey
+      sessionKey,
+      // (#638) A null key here means a genuinely unencrypted/legacy session
+      // (resumeOrCreateSession THROWS ENCRYPTED_SESSION_NO_KEY for an encrypted
+      // session this device can't key, handled in the catch above — no session
+      // is created there). So `!!sessionKey` correctly classifies this row; if a
+      // later path ever nulls the key on an encrypted session, encryptOutbound
+      // fails closed instead of leaking plaintext.
+      sessionIsEncrypted: !!sessionKey
     };
     this.pendingLaunchSessionId = null;
     try {
@@ -3180,7 +3354,9 @@ var McpServer = class {
             logger.error("handleMobileEvent failed", { error: String(err) });
           });
         },
-        (err) => logger.warn("AppSync subscription error", { error: String(err) })
+        (err) => logger.warn("AppSync subscription error", { error: String(err) }),
+        // E1 (§6a-4) — recover open prompts if the backend retires this session.
+        { onSessionRetired: () => this.recoverRetiredBackendSession(sessionId) }
       );
       if (gen !== this.lifecycleGen || !this.started) {
         try {
@@ -3194,6 +3370,8 @@ var McpServer = class {
     } catch (err) {
       logger.error("subscribeToEvents failed (non-fatal)", { sessionId, error: String(err) });
     }
+    await this.drainE1RetirementPark({ retryUntilAck: true, gen });
+    if (gen !== this.lifecycleGen || !this.started) return;
     try {
       this.appSyncClient.startHeartbeat(sessionId);
     } catch (err) {
@@ -3206,6 +3384,43 @@ var McpServer = class {
     });
     logger.info("Launch session created", { sessionId, userId });
   }
+  /**
+   * (#638 G2) Single-flight re-bootstrap of the launch session on first
+   * subsequent activity. createLaunchSession() runs once from start(); before
+   * this fix a transient failure there (slow/absent network at daemon start —
+   * the incident) left `this.session = null` forever: every emit site guards
+   * `if (!this.session) return` with no re-bootstrap trigger, so the daemon
+   * lived but never synced (permanently headless).
+   *
+   * Called from the emit-relevant entry points (transcript event handling /
+   * prompt handling / mobile-event handling) BEFORE their `!this.session`
+   * guards. Semantics preserved:
+   *  - session present → returns immediately (fast path, no work);
+   *  - session-limit-exceeded → sessionDisabled stays TERMINAL (no retry);
+   *  - ENCRYPTED_SESSION_NO_KEY → launchKeyUnavailable stays TERMINAL for this
+   *    identity (fail-closed by absence, logged once);
+   *  - ONLY generic/transient errors are retried, single-flight per activity
+   *    arrival (inherently rate-bounded — one attempt per incoming event, and
+   *    concurrent arrivals share one attempt);
+   *  - lifecycleGen/started guards are honored by createLaunchSession itself
+   *    (gen captured at entry, rechecked after every await).
+   */
+  async ensureLaunchSession() {
+    if (this.session) return;
+    if (!this.started || this.sessionDisabled || this.launchKeyUnavailable) return;
+    if (this.ensureLaunchInFlight) {
+      await this.ensureLaunchInFlight;
+      return;
+    }
+    const attempt = this.createLaunchSession();
+    this.ensureLaunchInFlight = attempt;
+    this.launchSessionPromise = attempt;
+    try {
+      await attempt;
+    } finally {
+      if (this.ensureLaunchInFlight === attempt) this.ensureLaunchInFlight = null;
+    }
+  }
   isMainConversation(conversationId) {
     if (process.env.JEST_WORKER_ID && !this.cliLogPath) {
       return true;
@@ -3224,6 +3439,7 @@ var McpServer = class {
     if (this.sessionDisabled) {
       return;
     }
+    await this.ensureLaunchSession();
     if (!this.session) {
       return;
     }
@@ -3271,7 +3487,9 @@ var McpServer = class {
         }
       }
       try {
-        await this.appSyncClient.createEvent(this.encryptOutbound(session, input));
+        const outbound = this.encryptOutbound(session, input);
+        if (!outbound) continue;
+        await this.appSyncClient.createEvent(outbound);
       } catch (err) {
         logger.error("createEvent failed", {
           sessionId: session.sessionId,
@@ -3282,38 +3500,429 @@ var McpServer = class {
     }
   }
   /**
-   * If the session has an E2E sessionKey, encrypt the event's content +
-   * metadata and stamp isEncrypted=true. Returns a new CreateEventInput;
-   * never mutates the input. When no key is set, returns input unchanged.
-   * (Codex Stage 2 HIGH finding 2026-05-20.)
+   * (#638) THE single encrypt-or-fail-closed decision for EVERY mobile-visible
+   * emit, delegated to @quantiya/codevibe-core's encryptForEmit so all three
+   * companion agents share ONE chokepoint. Returns a new CreateEventInput
+   * (never mutates the input), or NULL when the session IS encrypted but has no
+   * derivable key — the caller MUST DROP the event (fail-closed). Previously
+   * this method returned `input` unchanged for ANY keyless session, leaking
+   * cleartext for an encrypted-but-keyless session; the `sessionIsEncrypted`
+   * flag now distinguishes a genuinely unencrypted session (plaintext OK) from
+   * an encrypted keyless one (drop).
    */
   encryptOutbound(session, input) {
-    if (!session.sessionKey) return input;
-    try {
-      const encryptedContent = import_codevibe_core4.cryptoService.encryptContent(input.content, session.sessionKey);
-      let encryptedMetadata = input.metadata;
-      if (input.metadata) {
-        const encryptedMetaStr = import_codevibe_core4.cryptoService.encryptMetadata(
-          input.metadata,
-          session.sessionKey
-        );
-        encryptedMetadata = { encrypted: encryptedMetaStr };
-      }
-      return {
-        ...input,
-        content: encryptedContent,
-        metadata: encryptedMetadata,
-        isEncrypted: true
+    const enc = (0, import_codevibe_core4.encryptForEmit)(
+      session.sessionKey ?? null,
+      session.sessionIsEncrypted ?? false,
+      input.content,
+      input.metadata
+    );
+    if (enc === null) {
+      logger.error("No session key for ENCRYPTED session \u2014 DROPPING event to avoid plaintext leak (#638)", {
+        sessionId: session.sessionId,
+        type: input.type
+      });
+      return null;
+    }
+    if (!enc.isEncrypted) {
+      return input;
+    }
+    return {
+      ...input,
+      content: enc.content,
+      metadata: enc.metadata,
+      isEncrypted: true
+    };
+  }
+  // ─── E1 missed-prompt recovery (§4/§6a) — in-memory ledger + raise helpers ───
+  //
+  // The authoritative ledger is the in-memory `e1PromptRaises` Map (see its field
+  // docstring): it outlives the detector's timer, which is all §6a-4 durability
+  // requires. There is deliberately NO disk persistence — process-restart recovery
+  // is out of v1 scope (F1), and persisting the secret ownerToken to a tmp file was
+  // write-only dead code (never read back on startup).
+  /**
+   * Mint a NEW E1 raise for the agy producer: derive a committed promptId from a
+   * fresh secret, stash a durable entry (identity only — content added at
+   * emit-success via {@link stashE1RaiseContent}), start the TTL timer, and return
+   * the record. `mobileActionable=false` for a suppressed prompt (badge-only
+   * NOTIFICATION carrier, no fabricated options).
+   */
+  newE1Raise(sessionId, mobileActionable, title) {
+    const { record } = (0, import_codevibe_core4.newPromptRaise)({
+      sessionId,
+      producerKind: "PLUGIN_APPROVAL",
+      mobileActionable,
+      agentType: "ANTIGRAVITY",
+      ...title !== void 0 && { title }
+    });
+    this.e1PromptRaises.set(record.promptId, { record });
+    if (!this.e1TtlRefreshTimer) this.startE1TtlRefresh();
+    return record;
+  }
+  /**
+   * E1 (§6a-4) — stash the PRE-ENCRYPTION payload on an already-minted raise entry
+   * at emit-success, so a retirement re-raise can re-encrypt it for the
+   * (replacement) session's key and re-emit the SAME actionable prompt. No-op if
+   * the entry is gone (superseded) or the emit aborted.
+   */
+  stashE1RaiseContent(promptId, contentPlain, metadataPlain) {
+    const entry = this.e1PromptRaises.get(promptId);
+    if (!entry) return;
+    entry.contentPlain = contentPlain;
+    entry.metadataPlain = metadataPlain;
+  }
+  /**
+   * E1 (§6a-2b) — emit the badge-only carrier for a SUPPRESSED prompt (options
+   * couldn't be parsed → mobile must NOT fabricate any). A NOTIFICATION carrying
+   * the raise identity with mobileActionable=false, so the backend's classifyRaise
+   * records/updates the open-prompt row: mobile shows a banner + NO option buttons.
+   * Content is E2E-encrypted; the raise identity rides plaintext top-level.
+   * Fail-closed on a missing session key — never cleartext.
+   */
+  async emitSuppressedPromptCarrier(session, record) {
+    const bannerText = "\u26A0\uFE0F A prompt is waiting in your desktop terminal, but its options could not be shown here. Please answer it on your desktop.";
+    const input = {
+      sessionId: session.sessionId,
+      type: import_codevibe_core4.EventType.NOTIFICATION,
+      source: import_codevibe_core4.EventSource.DESKTOP,
+      content: bannerText,
+      metadata: { e1SuppressedPrompt: true },
+      ...(0, import_codevibe_core4.raiseFieldsFromRecord)(record),
+      notificationText: bannerText,
+      timestamp: (0, import_codevibe_core4.prepareEventTimestamp)({ orderingKey: session.sessionId })
+    };
+    const outbound = this.encryptOutbound(session, input);
+    if (!outbound) return false;
+    await this.appSyncClient.createEvent(outbound);
+    logger.info("E1: emitted suppressed-prompt badge carrier (mobileActionable=false)", {
+      sessionId: session.sessionId,
+      promptId: record.promptId
+    });
+    return true;
+  }
+  /**
+   * E1 (§6a-2b) — badge-only raise for a SUPPRESSED prompt, applying the content-key
+   * COLLAPSE rule. If a LIVE ledger record already covers this content-key in this
+   * session → COLLAPSE (its row keeps the session badge lit; over-nag, never
+   * under-nag). Otherwise mint a fresh mobileActionable:false raise + emit the
+   * NOTIFICATION carrier. A null content-key always mints (can't prove a
+   * re-observation) — never under-nag.
+   */
+  raiseSuppressedBadge(session, contentKey) {
+    if (contentKey) {
+      const idxKey = `${session.sessionId}::${contentKey}`;
+      const existingId = this.e1ContentKeyIndex.get(idxKey);
+      if (existingId && this.e1PromptRaises.has(existingId)) return;
+      if (existingId) this.e1ContentKeyIndex.delete(idxKey);
+    }
+    const record = this.newE1Raise(session.sessionId, false);
+    if (contentKey) this.e1ContentKeyIndex.set(`${session.sessionId}::${contentKey}`, record.promptId);
+    this.emitSuppressedPromptCarrier(session, record).catch((e) => {
+      logger.error("E1: failed to emit suppressed-prompt badge carrier", {
+        sessionId: session.sessionId,
+        promptId: record.promptId,
+        error: e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)
+      });
+    });
+  }
+  /** Snapshot the still-open E1 entries for a session (deep copy of the record). */
+  snapshotOpenE1(sessionId) {
+    return [...this.e1PromptRaises.values()].filter((e) => e.record.sessionId === sessionId).map((e) => ({
+      record: { ...e.record },
+      ...e.contentPlain !== void 0 && { contentPlain: e.contentPlain },
+      ...e.metadataPlain !== void 0 && { metadataPlain: e.metadataPlain }
+    }));
+  }
+  /**
+   * E1 (§6a-4) — re-raise a snapshot of still-open prompts from a RETIRED session
+   * onto its live REPLACEMENT session, re-committing the SAME promptId + ownerToken
+   * (the backend re-points the row's sessionId → the replacement; no orphan, no
+   * under-nag). Actionable → INTERACTIVE_PROMPT (re-encrypted real options);
+   * badge-only / content-less → NOTIFICATION carrier. Retries transient failures.
+   */
+  async reRaiseSnapshotE1(snapshot, replacementSession, opts) {
+    if (snapshot.length === 0) return [];
+    logger.info("E1: re-raising open prompts onto replacement session", {
+      replacementSessionId: replacementSession.sessionId,
+      count: snapshot.length
+    });
+    const unacked = [];
+    for (const snap of snapshot) {
+      const entry = {
+        record: { ...snap.record, sessionId: replacementSession.sessionId },
+        ...snap.contentPlain !== void 0 && { contentPlain: snap.contentPlain },
+        ...snap.metadataPlain !== void 0 && { metadataPlain: snap.metadataPlain }
       };
-    } catch (err) {
-      logger.error("Outbound encryption failed \u2014 DROPPING event to avoid plaintext leak", {
+      this.e1PromptRaises.set(entry.record.promptId, entry);
+      const acked = await this.reRaiseOneE1(replacementSession, entry, opts);
+      if (!acked) unacked.push(snap);
+    }
+    if (!this.e1TtlRefreshTimer) this.startE1TtlRefresh();
+    return unacked;
+  }
+  /**
+   * E1 (§6a-4) — drain the DURABLE retirement park onto the current live session:
+   * re-home each parked orphan (record.sessionId → this session) and re-raise it
+   * ({@link reRaiseSnapshotE1} → {@link reRaiseOneE1}, retry-until-ack via
+   * `e1NeedsReRaise`). This is the second half of the G-1 fix: the park survives a
+   * failed replacement launch, so ANY later successful launch (or TTL tick) re-homes
+   * the orphans that the pre-fix closure snapshot would have lost. agy is
+   * single-session, so the re-home target is unambiguously `this.session`.
+   *
+   * The park entries are moved into the authoritative `e1PromptRaises` ledger by
+   * reRaiseSnapshotE1 (which stamps the new sessionId), so the park is CLEARED up
+   * front — the snapshot + clear are synchronous (no yield) so a concurrent drain
+   * can't double-process, and once handed off the ledger + retry-until-ack own the
+   * entries. No-op when the park is empty or no live session exists yet (retry on
+   * the next launch / tick — never lost).
+   */
+  async drainE1RetirementPark(opts) {
+    if (this.e1RetirementPark.size === 0) return;
+    const session = this.session;
+    if (!session) return;
+    const parked = [...this.e1RetirementPark.values()];
+    this.e1RetirementPark.clear();
+    const unacked = await this.reRaiseSnapshotE1(parked, session, opts);
+    if (unacked.length > 0) {
+      for (const snap of unacked) this.e1RetirementPark.set(snap.record.promptId, snap);
+      logger.info("E1: retirement park drain aborted before ACK \u2014 re-parked for next launch", {
         sessionId: session.sessionId,
-        type: input.type,
-        error: String(err)
+        retained: unacked.length
       });
-      throw err;
     }
   }
+  /**
+   * E1 (§6a-4 / F2) — lifecycle-supersede predicate for the BLOCK-UNTIL-ACK
+   * retirement re-raise. True once the launch generation that started the drain has
+   * been superseded (`gen` mismatch — a stop()→start() ran) OR the daemon has
+   * stopped (`started` is false — a doStop() is in flight). A stopped daemon returns
+   * true even without a `gen`, so the block-until-ack loop can never hang past a
+   * stop. Only the F2 path consults this; the bounded general path ignores it.
+   */
+  reRaiseSuperseded(gen) {
+    if (!this.started) return true;
+    return gen !== void 0 && gen !== this.lifecycleGen;
+  }
+  /**
+   * E1 (§6a-4 / F2) — sleep up to `ms`, waking ~every 50ms to re-check
+   * {@link reRaiseSuperseded} so a stop()/stop()→start() breaks a block-until-ack
+   * backoff PROMPTLY (within ~50ms) rather than after a full backoff interval.
+   * Returns immediately once superseded/stopped.
+   */
+  async interruptibleBackoff(ms, gen) {
+    const deadline = Date.now() + ms;
+    while (Date.now() < deadline) {
+      if (this.reRaiseSuperseded(gen)) return;
+      const slice = Math.min(50, deadline - Date.now());
+      if (slice <= 0) return;
+      await new Promise((resolve3) => setTimeout(resolve3, slice));
+    }
+  }
+  /**
+   * Re-emit ONE E1 entry on `session`, retrying transient failures (§6.8).
+   *
+   * Two modes:
+   *  - BOUNDED general path (default): a per-call backoff over `MAX_ATTEMPTS`
+   *    (linear 250·attempt); on exhaustion it FLAGS the promptId in `e1NeedsReRaise`
+   *    (entry retained, F3) so drainPendingE1ReRaises keeps retrying every TTL tick
+   *    until the backend acknowledges — "the prompt is never lost" (§6a-4).
+   *  - BLOCK-UNTIL-ACK path (`opts.retryUntilAck`, F2 — the pre-heartbeat
+   *    retirement drain in createLaunchSession): retries with a bounded EXPONENTIAL
+   *    backoff and does NOT give up after `MAX_ATTEMPTS`, so the caller (and thus the
+   *    replacement session's heartbeat) waits until the row is re-pointed and
+   *    backend-ACK'd (design line 93 — re-point BEFORE advertising liveness). The
+   *    ONLY exit other than ACK is LIFECYCLE-SUPERSEDE ({@link reRaiseSuperseded}
+   *    on the captured `opts.gen` / `started`), which flags e1NeedsReRaise (entry
+   *    retained → the general net repairs it) and bails so a superseded/stopped
+   *    lifecycle never advertises liveness for a mis-pointed row. Bounded against a
+   *    hang because the re-raise createEvent and the heartbeat hit the SAME backend:
+   *    a down backend fails both (no false-connected), an up backend ACKs quickly.
+   *
+   * On ACK it clears the promptId from `e1NeedsReRaise`. A keyless fail-closed return
+   * leaves the flag as-is so a later tick re-attempts once a key resolves.
+   */
+  async reRaiseOneE1(session, entry, opts) {
+    const rec = entry.record;
+    const actionable = rec.mobileActionable && entry.contentPlain !== void 0;
+    const retryUntilAck = opts?.retryUntilAck === true;
+    const gen = opts?.gen;
+    const MAX_ATTEMPTS = 4;
+    for (let attempt = 1; ; attempt++) {
+      if (retryUntilAck && this.reRaiseSuperseded(gen)) {
+        this.e1NeedsReRaise.add(rec.promptId);
+        logger.warn("E1: block-until-ack re-raise aborted (lifecycle superseded/stopping) \u2014 flagged for retry-until-ack (entry retained)", {
+          sessionId: session.sessionId,
+          promptId: rec.promptId
+        });
+        return false;
+      }
+      try {
+        if (actionable) {
+          const input = {
+            sessionId: session.sessionId,
+            type: import_codevibe_core4.EventType.INTERACTIVE_PROMPT,
+            source: import_codevibe_core4.EventSource.DESKTOP,
+            content: entry.contentPlain,
+            metadata: entry.metadataPlain ?? {},
+            ...(0, import_codevibe_core4.raiseFieldsFromRecord)(rec),
+            timestamp: (0, import_codevibe_core4.prepareEventTimestamp)({ orderingKey: session.sessionId })
+          };
+          const outbound = this.encryptOutbound(session, input);
+          if (!outbound) return false;
+          await this.appSyncClient.createEvent(outbound);
+        } else {
+          rec.mobileActionable = false;
+          if (!await this.emitSuppressedPromptCarrier(session, rec)) return false;
+        }
+        this.e1NeedsReRaise.delete(rec.promptId);
+        logger.info("E1: re-raised prompt onto replacement session", {
+          sessionId: session.sessionId,
+          promptId: rec.promptId,
+          actionable
+        });
+        return true;
+      } catch (e) {
+        if (!retryUntilAck && attempt >= MAX_ATTEMPTS) {
+          this.e1NeedsReRaise.add(rec.promptId);
+          logger.error("E1: re-raise failed after bounded attempts \u2014 flagged for retry-until-ack (entry retained)", {
+            sessionId: session.sessionId,
+            promptId: rec.promptId,
+            error: e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)
+          });
+          return false;
+        }
+        if (retryUntilAck) {
+          const delay2 = Math.min(
+            this.e1BlockingReRaiseBackoff.baseMs * 2 ** (attempt - 1),
+            this.e1BlockingReRaiseBackoff.maxMs
+          );
+          await this.interruptibleBackoff(delay2, gen);
+        } else {
+          await new Promise((resolve3) => setTimeout(resolve3, 250 * attempt));
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  /**
+   * E1 (§6a-4 / F3) — retry-until-ack driver. Re-attempts reRaiseOneE1 for each
+   * promptId still flagged in `e1NeedsReRaise` whose ledger entry is present on the
+   * live session; reRaiseOneE1 clears the flag on ACK or re-flags it on another
+   * exhaustion. A flagged promptId whose ledger entry is gone (superseded/resolved)
+   * is dropped. Called at the top of every refreshE1Ttls tick so a failed
+   * retirement re-point is repaired even though the entry is present (so the row-
+   * exists refresh path never returns it as aged-out).
+   */
+  async drainPendingE1ReRaises() {
+    if (this.e1NeedsReRaise.size === 0) return;
+    const session = this.session;
+    for (const promptId of [...this.e1NeedsReRaise]) {
+      const entry = this.e1PromptRaises.get(promptId);
+      if (!entry) {
+        this.e1NeedsReRaise.delete(promptId);
+        continue;
+      }
+      if (!session || entry.record.sessionId !== session.sessionId) continue;
+      await this.reRaiseOneE1(session, entry);
+    }
+  }
+  /**
+   * E1 (§3.1) — one TTL-refresh tick for the current session's open prompts so a
+   * long-open prompt is never TTL-deleted (under-nag). Aged-out promptIds are
+   * re-materialized via reRaiseOneE1 (return-driven re-raise).
+   */
+  async refreshE1Ttls() {
+    await this.drainPendingE1ReRaises();
+    await this.drainE1RetirementPark();
+    const session = this.session;
+    if (!session) return;
+    const sid = session.sessionId;
+    const promptIds = [...this.e1PromptRaises.values()].filter((e) => e.record.sessionId === sid).map((e) => e.record.promptId);
+    if (promptIds.length === 0) return;
+    try {
+      const agedOut = await this.appSyncClient.refreshOpenPromptTtl(promptIds);
+      for (const promptId of agedOut) {
+        const entry = this.e1PromptRaises.get(promptId);
+        if (entry && this.session && entry.record.sessionId === this.session.sessionId) {
+          await this.reRaiseOneE1(this.session, entry);
+        }
+      }
+    } catch (e) {
+      logger.warn("E1: TTL-refresh tick failed (non-fatal, retries next tick)", {
+        error: e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)
+      });
+    }
+  }
+  /** Start the E1 TTL-refresh timer (idempotent — never stacks). */
+  startE1TtlRefresh() {
+    if (this.e1TtlRefreshTimer) clearInterval(this.e1TtlRefreshTimer);
+    this.e1TtlRefreshTimer = setInterval(() => {
+      void this.refreshE1Ttls();
+    }, _McpServer.E1_TTL_REFRESH_MS);
+  }
+  /** Stop the E1 TTL-refresh timer. */
+  stopE1TtlRefresh() {
+    if (this.e1TtlRefreshTimer) {
+      clearInterval(this.e1TtlRefreshTimer);
+      this.e1TtlRefreshTimer = null;
+    }
+  }
+  /**
+   * E1 (§6a-4) — recover from a backend session RETIREMENT (agy had no such path;
+   * built for E1). The backend retired the live session (RETIRED_SESSION_CANNOT_
+   * REACTIVATE); its open prompts would orphan. Recovery: snapshot the open E1
+   * prompts and PARK them durably (so a transient replacement-launch failure can
+   * NOT lose them — G-1), PARTIALLY tear down the retired session (drop the
+   * singleton + its subscription + heartbeat, but NOT the INACTIVE write — it's
+   * already retired — and keep the daemon + observers running), then re-bootstrap a
+   * FRESH replacement session via ensureLaunchSession (generateLaunchSessionId mints
+   * a unique id, so this never reactivates the retired one). createLaunchSession
+   * drains the park onto the replacement (same promptId+ownerToken → the backend
+   * re-points the row's sessionId; no orphan) BEFORE its heartbeat. If THIS launch
+   * fails, the park is retained and the NEXT successful launch / TTL tick re-homes
+   * it. Single-flight; a stale callback (session already replaced) is a no-op.
+   */
+  recoverRetiredBackendSession(expectedSessionId) {
+    if (this.retiredSessionRecoveryPromise) return this.retiredSessionRecoveryPromise;
+    if (!this.started) return Promise.resolve();
+    const recovery = (async () => {
+      const old = this.session;
+      if (!old || old.sessionId !== expectedSessionId) return;
+      logger.warn("Backend retired live agy session; creating replacement", {
+        sessionId: expectedSessionId
+      });
+      const openE1Snapshot = this.snapshotOpenE1(expectedSessionId);
+      for (const snap of openE1Snapshot) {
+        this.e1RetirementPark.set(snap.record.promptId, snap);
+        this.e1PromptRaises.delete(snap.record.promptId);
+      }
+      try {
+        this.appSyncClient.stopHeartbeat(old.sessionId);
+      } catch {
+      }
+      if (this.subscription) {
+        try {
+          this.subscription();
+        } catch {
+        }
+        this.subscription = null;
+      }
+      this.session = null;
+      await this.ensureLaunchSession();
+      if (this.session) await this.drainE1RetirementPark();
+      if (!this.session) {
+        logger.error("agy retirement recovery: replacement session not established; open prompts PARKED for the next successful launch / TTL tick", {
+          oldSessionId: expectedSessionId,
+          parked: this.e1RetirementPark.size
+        });
+        return;
+      }
+    })();
+    this.retiredSessionRecoveryPromise = recovery.finally(() => {
+      this.retiredSessionRecoveryPromise = null;
+    });
+    return this.retiredSessionRecoveryPromise;
+  }
   /**
    * If the inbound mobile event is marked isEncrypted, decrypt content +
    * metadata in place. Returns a new shallow-copied Event; never mutates
@@ -3357,17 +3966,34 @@ var McpServer = class {
   async handlePromptCandidate(cand) {
     if (!this.started) return;
     if (this.sessionDisabled) return;
-    if (!this.session) return;
+    await this.ensureLaunchSession();
+    const session = this.session;
+    if (!session) {
+      this.paneObserver.resetPromptHash(cand.snapshotHash);
+      return;
+    }
     const parsed = parseApprovalSnapshot(cand.snapshot);
-    if (!parsed) return;
+    if (!parsed) {
+      this.raiseSuppressedBadge(session, cand.snapshotHash);
+      return;
+    }
     const activeConvId = this.pickActiveConversationForPrompt();
     if (!activeConvId) {
       logger.warn("Prompt candidate fired but no active conversation known", {
         observedConvCount: this.observedMainConversationIds.size
       });
+      this.raiseSuppressedBadge(session, cand.snapshotHash);
       return;
     }
-    this.approvalDetector.emitPaneOnlyPrompt(parsed, activeConvId);
+    const e1rec = this.newE1Raise(session.sessionId, true);
+    const emitted = this.approvalDetector.emitPaneOnlyPrompt(parsed, activeConvId, e1rec.promptId);
+    if (emitted) {
+      if (cand.snapshotHash) {
+        this.e1ContentKeyIndex.set(`${session.sessionId}::${cand.snapshotHash}`, e1rec.promptId);
+      }
+    } else {
+      this.e1PromptRaises.delete(e1rec.promptId);
+    }
   }
   /**
    * Pick the agy conversation UUID that owns the current approval UI.
@@ -3397,6 +4023,9 @@ var McpServer = class {
       });
       return;
     }
+    const e1existing = this.e1PromptRaises.get(state.promptId);
+    const e1rec = e1existing ? e1existing.record : this.newE1Raise(session.sessionId, true);
+    if (!e1existing) state.promptId = e1rec.promptId;
     const optionsArr = state.paneOptions ? state.paneOptions.map((o) => ({ number: o.number, text: o.text })) : Object.keys(state.submitMap).map((n) => ({ number: n }));
     const diffParsed = parseFencedDiffFromBody(
       state.body,
@@ -3436,6 +4065,9 @@ var McpServer = class {
       source: import_codevibe_core4.EventSource.DESKTOP,
       content,
       metadata: optionsForMobile,
+      // E1 (§4) — raise identity top-level: promptId + ownerToken/producerKind/
+      // mobileActionable (the backend's classifyRaise upserts the open-prompt row).
+      ...(0, import_codevibe_core4.raiseFieldsFromRecord)(e1rec),
       // Per-conversation monotonic timestamp (event-timestamp-ordering fix
       // v5.4, 2026-05-24). orderingKey scopes the counter to this conv so
       // INTERACTIVE_PROMPT can't be forced to lastMs+1 by a newer event
@@ -3446,13 +4078,22 @@ var McpServer = class {
       })
     };
     try {
-      await this.appSyncClient.createEvent(this.encryptOutbound(session, input));
+      const outbound = this.encryptOutbound(session, input);
+      if (!outbound) return;
+      await this.appSyncClient.createEvent(outbound);
+      this.stashE1RaiseContent(
+        e1rec.promptId,
+        content,
+        optionsForMobile
+      );
     } catch (err) {
       logger.error("createEvent INTERACTIVE_PROMPT failed", {
         promptId: state.promptId,
         error: String(err)
       });
       this.approvalDetector.rollbackPrompt(state.promptId);
+      if (state.paneHash) this.paneObserver.resetPromptHash(state.paneHash);
+      this.e1PromptRaises.delete(state.promptId);
     }
   }
   // ─── Mobile → desktop flow ──────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -3542,6 +4183,7 @@ var McpServer = class {
   async handleMobileEvent(evt) {
     if (!this.started) return;
     if (this.sessionDisabled) return;
+    await this.ensureLaunchSession();
     if (!this.session) return;
     const session = this.session;
     if (evt.source !== import_codevibe_core4.EventSource.MOBILE) return;
@@ -3705,6 +4347,11 @@ var McpServer = class {
       timestamp: (0, import_codevibe_core4.prepareEventTimestamp)({ orderingKey: payload.sessionId })
     };
     const finalInput = this.encryptOutbound(session, input);
+    if (!finalInput) {
+      throw new Error(
+        `fail-closed: encrypted session ${payload.sessionId} has no session key \u2014 event dropped (#638)`
+      );
+    }
     const created = await this.appSyncClient.createEvent(finalInput);
     return { eventId: created.eventId };
   }
@@ -3846,6 +4493,11 @@ async function main() {
     tmuxTarget: process.env.CODEVIBE_AGY_TMUX_TARGET ?? void 0,
     wrapperPid: process.env.CODEVIBE_AGY_WRAPPER_PID ? parseInt(process.env.CODEVIBE_AGY_WRAPPER_PID, 10) : void 0
   });
+  (0, import_codevibe_core4.installDaemonProcessGuards)(logger, {
+    onFatal: () => {
+      void server.stop().finally(() => process.exit(1));
+    }
+  });
   try {
     const { httpPort } = await server.start();
     logger.info("codevibe-antigravity-plugin ready", { httpPort });