@quantakrypto/core 0.4.3 → 0.5.0

package/src/detectors/bicep.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+/**
+ * IaC detector: classical asymmetric cryptography and legacy TLS declared in Azure
+ * Bicep (`.bicep`) — Azure's native IaC DSL, distinct from the ARM/CloudFormation
+ * JSON the cloudformation detector already covers (Bicep is the *source*; ARM JSON is
+ * its compiled output). Bicep provisions the same Key Vault keys and TLS floors, but
+ * in its own single-quoted-string syntax that the JSON detector never sees.
+ *
+ * Covered (gated to `.bicep` files):
+ *  - `Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults/keys` `kty: 'RSA' | 'RSA-HSM' | 'EC' | 'EC-HSM'` — a
+ *    classical Key Vault key. RSA is KEM (HNDL); EC feeds ECDSA + ECDH (the ECDH path
+ *    is HNDL). Gated to a `Microsoft.KeyVault` marker so a stray `kty` elsewhere in a
+ *    template does not fire.
+ *  - `minimumTlsVersion: 'TLS1_0' | 'TLS1_1'` — a deprecated TLS floor on storage /
+ *    app-service / other resources (RFC 8996). Not HNDL (a config weakness), category
+ *    "tls".
+ */
+import type { Detector, Finding, RuleMeta } from "../types.js";
+import {
+  eachMatch,
+  findingFromRule,
+  hasExtension,
+  maskBlockComments,
+  maskCommentLines,
+} from "../detect-utils.js";
+import { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO, CWE_WEAK_STRENGTH } from "../cwe.js";
+
+const BICEP_EXTENSIONS: readonly string[] = [".bicep"];
+
+// Bicep string values are single-quoted. `kty: 'RSA'` / `'RSA-HSM'` (KEM) and
+// `kty: 'EC'` / `'EC-HSM'` (EC). The `(?<![\w-])` lookbehind stops a longer key name
+// from matching on a `kty` suffix; the value bound keeps `'EC'` from matching `'ECX'`.
+const RE_BICEP_KTY_RSA = /(?<![\w-])kty\s*:\s*'RSA(?:-HSM)?'/g;
+const RE_BICEP_KTY_EC = /(?<![\w-])kty\s*:\s*'EC(?:-HSM)?'/g;
+// Legacy TLS floor. `TLS1_0` / `TLS1_1` are deprecated; `TLS1_2` / `TLS1_3` are fine,
+// and the closing quote keeps this from matching them.
+const RE_BICEP_MIN_TLS = /(?<![\w])minimumTlsVersion\s*:\s*'TLS1_[01]'/g;
+
+const RULE_BICEP_KTY_RSA: RuleMeta = {
+  id: "bicep-keyvault-rsa",
+  title: "Bicep Azure Key Vault RSA key",
+  description: "Azure Bicep Microsoft.KeyVault key with kty: 'RSA'",
+  category: "kem",
+  severity: "high",
+  confidence: "high",
+  algorithm: "RSA",
+  hndl: true,
+  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+  message: "Bicep provisions a classical RSA Azure Key Vault key, which is not quantum-safe.",
+  remediation: "Plan migration to PQC (ML-KEM-768 for encryption, ML-DSA-65 for signatures).",
+};
+const RULE_BICEP_KTY_EC: RuleMeta = {
+  id: "bicep-keyvault-ec",
+  title: "Bicep Azure Key Vault EC key",
+  description: "Azure Bicep Microsoft.KeyVault key with kty: 'EC'",
+  category: "key-exchange",
+  severity: "high",
+  confidence: "high",
+  algorithm: "ECDH",
+  hndl: true,
+  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+  message:
+    "Bicep provisions a classical EC Azure Key Vault key; EC keys feed ECDSA signatures and ECDH key agreement (the ECDH path is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed).",
+  remediation:
+    "For key agreement: hybrid X25519MLKEM768 (ML-KEM-768). For signatures: ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204).",
+};
+const RULE_BICEP_MIN_TLS: RuleMeta = {
+  id: "bicep-min-tls-legacy",
+  title: "Bicep legacy minimum TLS version",
+  description: "Azure Bicep resource pins minimumTlsVersion to TLS 1.0/1.1",
+  category: "tls",
+  severity: "medium",
+  confidence: "high",
+  hndl: false,
+  cwe: CWE_WEAK_STRENGTH,
+  message: "Bicep resource pins a deprecated TLS floor (TLS 1.0/1.1); require TLS 1.2+ (1.3).",
+  remediation: "Set minimumTlsVersion: 'TLS1_2' and prefer PQC-hybrid key exchange as it lands.",
+};
+
+/** Detects classical asymmetric crypto and legacy TLS declared in Azure Bicep. */
+export const bicepDetector: Detector = {
+  id: "bicep-crypto",
+  description: "Classical asymmetric crypto and legacy TLS declared in Azure Bicep (IaC)",
+  scope: "config",
+  language: "any",
+  rules: [RULE_BICEP_KTY_RSA, RULE_BICEP_KTY_EC, RULE_BICEP_MIN_TLS],
+  appliesTo: (f) => hasExtension(f, BICEP_EXTENSIONS),
+  detect({ file, content }): Finding[] {
+    // Bicep comments are `//` and `/* … */`; mask block comments (multi-line) then
+    // whole `//` comment lines so a commented-out resource can't fire. Offsets preserved.
+    const scan = maskCommentLines(maskBlockComments(content), ["//"]);
+    const findings: Finding[] = [];
+    const add = (re: RegExp, rule: RuleMeta) =>
+      eachMatch(re, scan, (m) =>
+        findings.push(
+          findingFromRule(rule, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length }),
+        ),
+      );
+    // The bare `kty` field is generic; only treat it as a Key Vault key when the
+    // resource type is actually present, mirroring the cloudformation ARM gate.
+    if (content.includes("Microsoft.KeyVault")) {
+      add(RE_BICEP_KTY_RSA, RULE_BICEP_KTY_RSA);
+      add(RE_BICEP_KTY_EC, RULE_BICEP_KTY_EC);
+    }
+    add(RE_BICEP_MIN_TLS, RULE_BICEP_MIN_TLS);
+    return findings;
+  },
+};

package/src/detectors/c.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
 /**
  * Source-code detector for classical asymmetric cryptography in C / C++ using
- * OpenSSL (the dominant crypto library for the ecosystem). Lexical, same
- * strategy as the other packs; the OpenSSL function names are distinctive.
+ * OpenSSL (the dominant crypto library for the ecosystem), libsodium, and — for
+ * the embedded / firmware / IoT niche — Mbed TLS (`mbedtls_*`) and wolfSSL /
+ * wolfCrypt (`wc_*`). Lexical, same strategy as the other packs; every library's
+ * function names are distinctive enough to keep the false-positive risk low.
  *
  * NOTE: scanning OpenSSL's OWN source/headers will naturally light up (the
  * library declares these symbols) — that is inherent to lexical scanning of a
@@ -46,8 +48,28 @@ const RE_C_RSA_VERIFY = /\bRSA_verify\s*\(/g;
 const RE_C_RSA_CRYPT = /\bRSA_public_encrypt\s*\(|\bRSA_private_decrypt\s*\(/g;
 // C/OpenSSL legacy TLS configuration (mirrors source.ts tlsDetector): forcing a
 // deprecated protocol version or disabling certificate verification.
-const RE_C_TLS_VERSION = /\bTLSv1_method\b|\bSSLv3_method\b/g;
+// TLSv1_method / TLSv1_1_method (+ the client/server-specific variants) and the
+// SSLv2/SSLv3 method constructors — all pin a deprecated protocol (RFC 8996).
+const RE_C_TLS_VERSION = /\b(?:TLSv1(?:_1)?|SSLv2|SSLv3)(?:_client|_server)?_method\b/g;
 const RE_C_TLS_VERIFY_NONE = /\bSSL_VERIFY_NONE\b/g;
+// Embedded C crypto libraries (the "embedded" niche): Mbed TLS and wolfSSL /
+// wolfCrypt. Both use highly-distinctive `mbedtls_*` / `wc_*` prefixes, so the
+// false-positive risk is low. These dominate firmware / IoT / RTOS builds where
+// OpenSSL is too heavy — a codebase surface qScan previously missed entirely.
+const RE_C_MBEDTLS_RSA = /\bmbedtls_rsa_gen_key\s*\(/g;
+const RE_C_MBEDTLS_EC = /\bmbedtls_ecp_gen_key(?:pair)?\s*\(/g;
+const RE_C_MBEDTLS_ECDSA =
+  /\bmbedtls_ecdsa_(?:sign|write_signature|read_signature|verify)\w*\s*\(/g;
+const RE_C_MBEDTLS_ECDH = /\bmbedtls_ecdh_(?:compute_shared|calc_secret)\s*\(/g;
+const RE_C_MBEDTLS_DH = /\bmbedtls_dhm_(?:make_public|make_params|calc_secret)\s*\(/g;
+const RE_C_WOLF_RSA =
+  /\bwc_MakeRsaKey\s*\(|\bwc_RsaPublicEncrypt\s*\(|\bwc_RsaPrivateDecrypt\s*\(/g;
+const RE_C_WOLF_ECC = /\bwc_ecc_make_key(?:_ex)?\s*\(/g;
+const RE_C_WOLF_ECDSA = /\bwc_ecc_sign_hash\s*\(|\bwc_ecc_verify_hash\s*\(/g;
+const RE_C_WOLF_ECDH = /\bwc_ecc_shared_secret\s*\(/g;
+const RE_C_WOLF_DH = /\bwc_DhGenerateKeyPair\s*\(|\bwc_DhAgree\s*\(/g;
+const RE_C_WOLF_CURVE25519 = /\bwc_curve25519_(?:make_key|shared_secret)\s*\(/g;
+const RE_C_WOLF_ED25519 = /\bwc_ed25519_(?:make_key|sign_msg|verify_msg)\s*\(/g;
 
 const RULE_C_RSA: RuleMeta = {
   id: "c-rsa-keygen",
@@ -275,11 +297,173 @@ const RULE_C_TLS_VERIFY_NONE: RuleMeta = {
   message: "SSL_VERIFY_NONE disables TLS certificate verification (MITM risk).",
   remediation: "Use SSL_VERIFY_PEER and verify certificates properly.",
 };
+// --- Mbed TLS (embedded) ---
+const RULE_C_MBEDTLS_RSA: RuleMeta = {
+  id: "c-mbedtls-rsa-keygen",
+  title: "Mbed TLS RSA key generation",
+  description: "Mbed TLS mbedtls_rsa_gen_key",
+  category: "kem",
+  severity: "high",
+  confidence: "high",
+  algorithm: "RSA",
+  hndl: true,
+  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+  message: "Generates a classical RSA key pair (Mbed TLS, embedded), which is not quantum-safe.",
+};
+const RULE_C_MBEDTLS_EC: RuleMeta = {
+  id: "c-mbedtls-ec-keygen",
+  title: "Mbed TLS EC key generation",
+  description: "Mbed TLS mbedtls_ecp_gen_key / mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair",
+  category: "key-exchange",
+  severity: "high",
+  confidence: "high",
+  algorithm: "ECDH",
+  hndl: true,
+  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+  message:
+    "Generates a classical EC key pair (Mbed TLS, embedded). EC keys feed BOTH ECDSA signatures and ECDH key agreement; the ECDH path is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.",
+  remediation:
+    "For key agreement: hybrid X25519MLKEM768 (ML-KEM-768). For signatures: ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204).",
+};
+const RULE_C_MBEDTLS_ECDSA: RuleMeta = {
+  id: "c-mbedtls-ecdsa",
+  title: "Mbed TLS ECDSA signature",
+  description: "Mbed TLS mbedtls_ecdsa_sign / write_signature / read_signature / verify",
+  category: "signature",
+  severity: "high",
+  confidence: "high",
+  algorithm: "ECDSA",
+  hndl: false,
+  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+  message: "Classical ECDSA (Mbed TLS, embedded) is forgeable by a quantum attacker.",
+  remediation: "ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205)",
+};
+const RULE_C_MBEDTLS_ECDH: RuleMeta = {
+  id: "c-mbedtls-ecdh",
+  title: "Mbed TLS ECDH key agreement",
+  description: "Mbed TLS mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared / mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret",
+  category: "key-exchange",
+  severity: "high",
+  confidence: "high",
+  algorithm: "ECDH",
+  hndl: true,
+  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+  message:
+    "Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (Mbed TLS, embedded) is broken by Shor's algorithm (harvest-now-decrypt-later).",
+};
+const RULE_C_MBEDTLS_DH: RuleMeta = {
+  id: "c-mbedtls-dh",
+  title: "Mbed TLS Diffie-Hellman key exchange",
+  description: "Mbed TLS mbedtls_dhm_make_public / make_params / calc_secret",
+  category: "key-exchange",
+  severity: "high",
+  confidence: "high",
+  algorithm: "DH",
+  hndl: true,
+  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+  message:
+    "Finite-field Diffie-Hellman (Mbed TLS, embedded) is broken by Shor's algorithm (harvest-now-decrypt-later).",
+};
+// --- wolfSSL / wolfCrypt (embedded) ---
+const RULE_C_WOLF_RSA: RuleMeta = {
+  id: "c-wolfssl-rsa",
+  title: "wolfSSL RSA key/usage",
+  description: "wolfCrypt wc_MakeRsaKey / wc_RsaPublicEncrypt / wc_RsaPrivateDecrypt",
+  category: "kem",
+  severity: "high",
+  confidence: "high",
+  algorithm: "RSA",
+  hndl: true,
+  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+  message:
+    "Classical RSA key generation / encryption (wolfSSL, embedded) is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.",
+};
+const RULE_C_WOLF_ECC: RuleMeta = {
+  id: "c-wolfssl-ecc-keygen",
+  title: "wolfSSL EC key generation",
+  description: "wolfCrypt wc_ecc_make_key / wc_ecc_make_key_ex",
+  category: "key-exchange",
+  severity: "high",
+  confidence: "high",
+  algorithm: "ECDH",
+  hndl: true,
+  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+  message:
+    "Generates a classical EC key pair (wolfSSL, embedded). EC keys feed BOTH ECDSA signatures and ECDH key agreement; the ECDH path is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.",
+  remediation:
+    "For key agreement: hybrid X25519MLKEM768 (ML-KEM-768). For signatures: ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204).",
+};
+const RULE_C_WOLF_ECDSA: RuleMeta = {
+  id: "c-wolfssl-ecdsa",
+  title: "wolfSSL ECDSA signature",
+  description: "wolfCrypt wc_ecc_sign_hash / wc_ecc_verify_hash",
+  category: "signature",
+  severity: "high",
+  confidence: "high",
+  algorithm: "ECDSA",
+  hndl: false,
+  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+  message: "Classical ECDSA (wolfSSL, embedded) is forgeable by a quantum attacker.",
+  remediation: "ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205)",
+};
+const RULE_C_WOLF_ECDH: RuleMeta = {
+  id: "c-wolfssl-ecdh",
+  title: "wolfSSL ECDH key agreement",
+  description: "wolfCrypt wc_ecc_shared_secret",
+  category: "key-exchange",
+  severity: "high",
+  confidence: "high",
+  algorithm: "ECDH",
+  hndl: true,
+  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+  message:
+    "Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (wolfSSL, embedded) is broken by Shor's algorithm (harvest-now-decrypt-later).",
+};
+const RULE_C_WOLF_DH: RuleMeta = {
+  id: "c-wolfssl-dh",
+  title: "wolfSSL Diffie-Hellman key exchange",
+  description: "wolfCrypt wc_DhGenerateKeyPair / wc_DhAgree",
+  category: "key-exchange",
+  severity: "high",
+  confidence: "high",
+  algorithm: "DH",
+  hndl: true,
+  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+  message:
+    "Finite-field Diffie-Hellman (wolfSSL, embedded) is broken by Shor's algorithm (harvest-now-decrypt-later).",
+};
+const RULE_C_WOLF_CURVE25519: RuleMeta = {
+  id: "c-wolfssl-curve25519",
+  title: "wolfSSL X25519 key agreement",
+  description: "wolfCrypt wc_curve25519_make_key / wc_curve25519_shared_secret",
+  category: "key-exchange",
+  severity: "medium",
+  confidence: "high",
+  algorithm: "X25519",
+  hndl: true,
+  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+  message:
+    "X25519 key agreement (wolfSSL, embedded) is modern but classical, and harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.",
+};
+const RULE_C_WOLF_ED25519: RuleMeta = {
+  id: "c-wolfssl-ed25519",
+  title: "wolfSSL Ed25519 signature",
+  description: "wolfCrypt wc_ed25519_make_key / wc_ed25519_sign_msg / wc_ed25519_verify_msg",
+  category: "signature",
+  severity: "low",
+  confidence: "high",
+  algorithm: "EdDSA",
+  hndl: false,
+  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+  message:
+    "Ed25519 signatures (wolfSSL, embedded) are classical and forgeable by a quantum attacker.",
+  remediation: "ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205)",
+};
 
 /** Detects classical asymmetric crypto in C/C++ (OpenSSL). */
 export const cDetector: Detector = {
   id: "c-crypto",
-  description: "Classical asymmetric crypto in C/C++ (OpenSSL)",
+  description: "Classical asymmetric crypto in C/C++ (OpenSSL, libsodium, Mbed TLS, wolfSSL)",
   scope: "source",
   language: "c",
   rules: [
@@ -300,6 +484,18 @@ export const cDetector: Detector = {
     RULE_C_RSA_CRYPT,
     RULE_C_TLS_VERSION,
     RULE_C_TLS_VERIFY_NONE,
+    RULE_C_MBEDTLS_RSA,
+    RULE_C_MBEDTLS_EC,
+    RULE_C_MBEDTLS_ECDSA,
+    RULE_C_MBEDTLS_ECDH,
+    RULE_C_MBEDTLS_DH,
+    RULE_C_WOLF_RSA,
+    RULE_C_WOLF_ECC,
+    RULE_C_WOLF_ECDSA,
+    RULE_C_WOLF_ECDH,
+    RULE_C_WOLF_DH,
+    RULE_C_WOLF_CURVE25519,
+    RULE_C_WOLF_ED25519,
   ],
   appliesTo: (f) => hasExtension(f, C_EXTENSIONS),
   detect({ file, content }): Finding[] {
@@ -317,9 +513,35 @@ export const cDetector: Detector = {
     add(RE_C_DSA, RULE_C_DSA);
     add(RE_C_DH, RULE_C_DH);
     add(RE_C_EVP_KEYGEN, RULE_C_EVP_KEYGEN);
-    add(RE_C_EVP_DERIVE, RULE_C_EVP_DERIVE);
+    // `EVP_PKEY_derive` is OpenSSL's entry point for BOTH (EC)DH key agreement and the
+    // symmetric KDFs (HKDF/scrypt/TLS1-PRF). Real (EC)DH always sets a peer key via
+    // `EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer`; a KDF never does. So only treat it as classical key
+    // agreement when a peer is set, or when no KDF context marker is present.
+    const hasKdfCtx = /\bEVP_PKEY_(?:HKDF|SCRYPT|TLS1_PRF)\b/.test(content);
+    if (content.includes("EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer") || !hasKdfCtx) {
+      add(RE_C_EVP_DERIVE, RULE_C_EVP_DERIVE);
+    }
     add(RE_C_EVP_CRYPT, RULE_C_EVP_CRYPT);
-    add(RE_C_EVP_SIGN, RULE_C_EVP_SIGN);
+    // `EVP_DigestSign*` also drives HMAC/CMAC (a symmetric MAC keyed by
+    // `EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC/CMAC, …)`), which is NOT a classical
+    // asymmetric signature. Suppress a `DigestSign*` match ONLY when a MAC key setup
+    // sits just before it — per-match, so a real RSA/ECDSA sign elsewhere in the same
+    // file is still reported. `DigestVerify*` (no MAC form here) is never suppressed.
+    eachMatch(RE_C_EVP_SIGN, content, (m) => {
+      const isSign = m[0].includes("DigestSign");
+      if (isSign) {
+        const back = content.slice(Math.max(0, m.index - 300), m.index);
+        if (/EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key|EVP_PKEY_(?:HMAC|CMAC)\b/.test(back)) return;
+      }
+      findings.push(
+        findingFromRule(RULE_C_EVP_SIGN, {
+          file,
+          content,
+          index: m.index,
+          matchLength: m[0].length,
+        }),
+      );
+    });
     add(RE_C_SODIUM_BOX, RULE_C_SODIUM_BOX);
     add(RE_C_SODIUM_SIGN, RULE_C_SODIUM_SIGN);
     add(RE_C_ECDSA_VERIFY, RULE_C_ECDSA_VERIFY);
@@ -327,6 +549,18 @@ export const cDetector: Detector = {
     add(RE_C_RSA_CRYPT, RULE_C_RSA_CRYPT);
     add(RE_C_TLS_VERSION, RULE_C_TLS_VERSION);
     add(RE_C_TLS_VERIFY_NONE, RULE_C_TLS_VERIFY_NONE);
+    add(RE_C_MBEDTLS_RSA, RULE_C_MBEDTLS_RSA);
+    add(RE_C_MBEDTLS_EC, RULE_C_MBEDTLS_EC);
+    add(RE_C_MBEDTLS_ECDSA, RULE_C_MBEDTLS_ECDSA);
+    add(RE_C_MBEDTLS_ECDH, RULE_C_MBEDTLS_ECDH);
+    add(RE_C_MBEDTLS_DH, RULE_C_MBEDTLS_DH);
+    add(RE_C_WOLF_RSA, RULE_C_WOLF_RSA);
+    add(RE_C_WOLF_ECC, RULE_C_WOLF_ECC);
+    add(RE_C_WOLF_ECDSA, RULE_C_WOLF_ECDSA);
+    add(RE_C_WOLF_ECDH, RULE_C_WOLF_ECDH);
+    add(RE_C_WOLF_DH, RULE_C_WOLF_DH);
+    add(RE_C_WOLF_CURVE25519, RULE_C_WOLF_CURVE25519);
+    add(RE_C_WOLF_ED25519, RULE_C_WOLF_ED25519);
     return findings;
   },
 };

package/src/detectors/cicd.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+/**
+ * Config detector: classical signing of build artifacts and code in CI/CD
+ * pipelines (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Jenkins, Azure Pipelines, CircleCI).
+ *
+ * Artifact and code signatures are the signature-side analogue of "harvest now,
+ * decrypt later": a release signed today with a classical key is *forgeable* once
+ * a CRQC exists, and long-lived artifacts (container images, released binaries,
+ * SBOM attestations) keep verifying against that classical public key for years.
+ * So these are flagged `hndl:false` (a signature is not confidentiality — nothing
+ * to harvest) but remain real quantum-migration debt.
+ *
+ * Covered command invocations (distinctive enough inside a CI file that the
+ * false-positive risk is low):
+ *  - `cosign sign|attest|generate-key-pair`  → sigstore/cosign uses ECDSA P-256
+ *    (both key-based and keyless/Fulcio).
+ *  - `gpg --detach-sign|--clearsign|--sign`   → GnuPG, classically RSA.
+ *  - `jarsigner`                              → Java JAR signing (RSA/DSA/EC).
+ *  - `codesign --sign|-s`                     → Apple code signing (RSA).
+ *  - `minisign`                               → Ed25519 signatures.
+ *
+ * Gated to CI/CD pipeline files so `gpg`/`cosign` mentioned in a shell script or
+ * doc does not fire; the surface here is specifically the release pipeline.
+ */
+import type { Detector, Finding, RuleMeta } from "../types.js";
+import { eachMatch, findingFromRule, maskCommentLines } from "../detect-utils.js";
+import { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO } from "../cwe.js";
+
+/** True for the CI/CD pipeline definition files this detector inspects. */
+function isCiPipelineFile(filePath: string): boolean {
+  const lower = filePath.toLowerCase();
+  const base = lower.split("/").pop() ?? lower;
+  return (
+    (lower.includes(".github/workflows/") && (lower.endsWith(".yml") || lower.endsWith(".yaml"))) ||
+    base === ".gitlab-ci.yml" ||
+    lower.endsWith(".gitlab-ci.yml") ||
+    base === "jenkinsfile" ||
+    lower.endsWith(".jenkinsfile") ||
+    base === "azure-pipelines.yml" ||
+    base === "azure-pipelines.yaml" ||
+    (lower.includes(".circleci/") && (lower.endsWith(".yml") || lower.endsWith(".yaml")))
+  );
+}
+
+interface CiRule {
+  re: RegExp;
+  meta: RuleMeta;
+}
+
+const CI_RULES: CiRule[] = [
+  {
+    // `sign-blob` precedes `sign` so the longer subcommand wins — otherwise `sign`
+    // matches first and the trailing `\b` succeeds at the `-`, never reaching `sign-blob`.
+    re: /\bcosign\s+(?:sign-blob|sign|attest|generate-key-pair)\b/g,
+    meta: {
+      id: "ci-cosign-ecdsa",
+      title: "cosign artifact signing (ECDSA)",
+      description: "sigstore/cosign signing in a CI pipeline",
+      category: "signature",
+      severity: "medium",
+      confidence: "high",
+      algorithm: "ECDSA",
+      hndl: false,
+      cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+      message:
+        "CI pipeline signs artifacts with cosign (ECDSA P-256, key-based or keyless/Fulcio); classical signatures are forgeable once a CRQC exists.",
+      remediation:
+        "Track sigstore's post-quantum signing roadmap (ML-DSA); plan hybrid signing for long-lived release artifacts.",
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    // Bound the span to the gpg invocation ([^\n&|;] stops it crossing `&&`/`|`/`;`
+    // into another command's flag), and `(?![\w-])` stops `--sign` matching the
+    // `--sign` prefix of an unrelated flag like `--sign-artifacts`. The short forms
+    // `-s` (sign) / `-b` (detach-sign) are safe inside the bounded gpg span.
+    re: /\bgpg\b[^\n&|;]{0,120}?\s(?:-[sb]\b|--(?:detach-sign|clearsign|sign)(?![\w-]))/g,
+    meta: {
+      id: "ci-gpg-sign",
+      title: "GPG signing (RSA)",
+      description: "GnuPG detached/clear signing in a CI pipeline",
+      category: "signature",
+      severity: "medium",
+      confidence: "high",
+      algorithm: "RSA",
+      hndl: false,
+      cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+      message:
+        "CI pipeline signs with GPG, classically an RSA signing key; forgeable once a CRQC exists.",
+      remediation: "Plan migration to ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) signatures.",
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    re: /\bjarsigner\b/g,
+    meta: {
+      id: "ci-jarsigner",
+      title: "Java jarsigner (classical)",
+      description: "JDK jarsigner code signing in a CI pipeline",
+      category: "signature",
+      severity: "medium",
+      confidence: "high",
+      algorithm: "RSA",
+      hndl: false,
+      cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+      message:
+        "CI pipeline signs JARs with jarsigner (classical RSA/DSA/EC signing key); forgeable once a CRQC exists.",
+      remediation:
+        "Plan migration to a PQC signature scheme (ML-DSA-65 / SLH-DSA) as the JDK adds support.",
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    // Allow intervening flags (the common `codesign --force --options runtime --sign`
+    // form), bounded to the codesign invocation so it can't latch onto a later
+    // command's `--sign` across `&&`/`|`/`;`.
+    re: /\bcodesign\b[^\n&|;]{0,120}?\s(?:-s\b|--sign\b)/g,
+    meta: {
+      id: "ci-codesign",
+      title: "Apple codesign (RSA)",
+      description: "Apple codesign in a CI pipeline",
+      category: "signature",
+      severity: "medium",
+      confidence: "high",
+      algorithm: "RSA",
+      hndl: false,
+      cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+      message:
+        "CI pipeline signs with Apple codesign (classical RSA signing identity); forgeable once a CRQC exists.",
+      remediation: "Classical only today; track Apple's PQC signing support and plan migration.",
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    re: /\bminisign\b/g,
+    meta: {
+      id: "ci-minisign",
+      title: "minisign (Ed25519)",
+      description: "minisign signing in a CI pipeline",
+      category: "signature",
+      severity: "low",
+      confidence: "high",
+      algorithm: "EdDSA",
+      hndl: false,
+      cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+      message:
+        "CI pipeline signs with minisign (Ed25519); modern but classical and forgeable once a CRQC exists.",
+      remediation: "Plan migration to ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205).",
+    },
+  },
+];
+
+/** Detects classical artifact / code signing in CI/CD pipeline definitions. */
+export const cicdDetector: Detector = {
+  id: "cicd-signing",
+  description: "Classical artifact / code signing in CI/CD pipelines",
+  scope: "config",
+  language: "any",
+  rules: CI_RULES.map((r) => r.meta),
+  appliesTo: isCiPipelineFile,
+  detect({ file, content }): Finding[] {
+    const findings: Finding[] = [];
+    // A commented-out CI step (`# - run: cosign sign …`, or a `//` line in a
+    // Jenkinsfile) is not an active signing step. Mask comment lines first; offsets
+    // are preserved so the snippet from the original `content` stays correct.
+    const scan = maskCommentLines(content, ["#", "//"]);
+    for (const rule of CI_RULES) {
+      eachMatch(rule.re, scan, (m) => {
+        findings.push(
+          findingFromRule(rule.meta, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length }),
+        );
+      });
+    }
+    return findings;
+  },
+};