@quantakrypto/core 0.4.3 → 0.4.4

package/dist/detectors/cloudformation.d.ts

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+/**
+ * IaC detector: classical asymmetric cryptography (and legacy TLS config)
+ * declared in AWS CloudFormation / Azure ARM (incl. Bicep-compiled JSON)
+ * templates — plus CDK `cdk synth` output, which is plain CloudFormation
+ * JSON. This is a distinct surface from `terraform.ts`: CloudFormation/ARM
+ * use PascalCase JSON/YAML property names, never Terraform's snake_case HCL
+ * attributes, so the two detectors never collide on the same file.
+ *
+ * Covered:
+ *  - AWS::KMS::Key `KeySpec`:                    `"RSA_…"` (kem) / `"ECC_…"` (key-exchange)
+ *  - AWS::CertificateManager::Certificate
+ *    `KeyAlgorithm`:                             `"RSA_…"` / `"EC_…"` (certificate)
+ *  - CloudFront distribution `MinimumProtocolVersion`: legacy `TLSv1` / `TLSv1.1` (tls)
+ *  - ELB/ALB listener `SslPolicy`:                legacy `ELBSecurityPolicy-2016-08` /
+ *                                                 `-TLS-1-0-…` / `-TLS-1-1-…` (tls)
+ *  - Azure ARM `Microsoft.KeyVault` key `kty`:    `"RSA"` (kem) / `"EC"` (key-exchange)
+ *
+ * `KeySpec` is PascalCase and case-sensitive, so it never matches Terraform's
+ * snake_case `customer_master_key_spec` (same underlying AWS API, different
+ * authoring surface). A fast-reject on a CFN/ARM marker keeps this detector
+ * from ever firing on arbitrary JSON/YAML that happens to contain one of
+ * these property names in an unrelated context.
+ */
+import type { Detector } from "../types.js";
+/**
+ * Detects classical asymmetric crypto and legacy TLS config declared in
+ * AWS CloudFormation / Azure ARM (incl. Bicep-compiled JSON) templates.
+ */
+export declare const cloudformationDetector: Detector;
+//# sourceMappingURL=cloudformation.d.ts.map

package/dist/detectors/cloudformation.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"cloudformation.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/detectors/cloudformation.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAsBG;AACH,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAqB,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAsJ/D;;;GAGG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,sBAAsB,EAAE,QAqCpC,CAAC"}

package/dist/detectors/cloudformation.js

@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+import { eachMatch, findingFromRule, hasExtension } from "../detect-utils.js";
+import { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO, CWE_WEAK_STRENGTH } from "../cwe.js";
+const CFN_EXTENSIONS = [".json", ".yaml", ".yml"];
+// Fast-reject markers: at least one must appear before any rule regex runs, so
+// this detector never scans arbitrary JSON/YAML that merely happens to share
+// an attribute name (`KeySpec`, `kty`, …) with an unrelated schema.
+const CFN_MARKERS = [
+    "AWS::KMS",
+    "AWS::CertificateManager",
+    "AWSTemplateFormatVersion",
+    "MinimumProtocolVersion",
+    "Microsoft.KeyVault",
+    '"SslPolicy"',
+];
+// Each attribute is matched with an optional quote around the key and `:` as
+// the separator (both plain-JSON and YAML-block-scalar forms use `:`). The
+// `(?<![\w"-])` lookbehind stops a longer/prefixed attribute name from
+// matching on its suffix.
+const RE_CFN_KMS_RSA = /(?<![\w"-])"?KeySpec"?\s*:\s*"?RSA_\d+"?/g;
+const RE_CFN_KMS_EC = /(?<![\w"-])"?KeySpec"?\s*:\s*"?ECC_[A-Z0-9_]+"?/g;
+const RE_CFN_ACM_RSA = /(?<![\w"-])"?KeyAlgorithm"?\s*:\s*"?RSA_\d+"?/g;
+const RE_CFN_ACM_EC = /(?<![\w"-])"?KeyAlgorithm"?\s*:\s*"?EC_[A-Za-z0-9]+"?/g;
+// CloudFront: only the pre-2018 "TLSv1" / "TLSv1_2016" / "TLSv1.1_2016"
+// values are legacy; the lookahead delimiter stops this from matching a
+// "TLSv1.2_2018"-style value that merely starts with the same prefix.
+const RE_CFN_CLOUDFRONT_TLS = /(?<![\w"-])"?MinimumProtocolVersion"?\s*:\s*"?(?:TLSv1(?:\.1)?_2016|TLSv1)(?=["'\s,}]|$)/gm;
+// ELB/ALB legacy SSL negotiation policies (named, dated policy strings).
+const RE_CFN_ELB_TLS = /(?<![\w"-])"?SslPolicy"?\s*:\s*"ELBSecurityPolicy-(?:2016-08|TLS-1-0-\d{4}-\d{2}|TLS-1-1-\d{4}-\d{2})"/g;
+// Azure ARM Microsoft.KeyVault key resource `properties.kty`.
+const RE_CFN_ARM_KV_RSA = /(?<![\w"-])"?kty"?\s*:\s*"?RSA"?(?!\w)/g;
+const RE_CFN_ARM_KV_EC = /(?<![\w"-])"?kty"?\s*:\s*"?EC"?(?!\w)/g;
+const RULE_CFN_KMS_RSA = {
+    id: "cfn-kms-rsa",
+    title: "CloudFormation KMS RSA key",
+    description: 'AWS::KMS::Key KeySpec = "RSA_*"',
+    category: "kem",
+    severity: "high",
+    confidence: "high",
+    algorithm: "RSA",
+    hndl: true,
+    cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+    message: "CloudFormation provisions a classical RSA KMS key (harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed for encryption CMKs).",
+    remediation: "Plan migration to PQC as cloud KMS adds ML-KEM / ML-DSA key specs.",
+};
+const RULE_CFN_KMS_EC = {
+    id: "cfn-kms-ec",
+    title: "CloudFormation KMS EC key",
+    description: 'AWS::KMS::Key KeySpec = "ECC_*"',
+    category: "key-exchange",
+    severity: "high",
+    confidence: "high",
+    algorithm: "ECDH",
+    hndl: true,
+    cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+    message: "CloudFormation provisions a classical EC KMS key; EC keys feed ECDSA signatures and ECDH key agreement (the ECDH path is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed).",
+    remediation: "For key agreement: hybrid X25519MLKEM768 (ML-KEM-768). For signatures: ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204).",
+};
+const RULE_CFN_ACM_RSA = {
+    id: "cfn-acm-rsa",
+    title: "CloudFormation ACM RSA certificate",
+    description: 'AWS::CertificateManager::Certificate KeyAlgorithm = "RSA_*"',
+    category: "certificate",
+    severity: "high",
+    confidence: "high",
+    algorithm: "RSA",
+    hndl: true,
+    cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+    message: "CloudFormation provisions an ACM certificate with a classical RSA key, which is not quantum-safe.",
+    remediation: "Plan migration to PQC (ML-KEM-768 for encryption, ML-DSA-65 for signatures).",
+};
+const RULE_CFN_ACM_EC = {
+    id: "cfn-acm-ec",
+    title: "CloudFormation ACM EC certificate",
+    description: 'AWS::CertificateManager::Certificate KeyAlgorithm = "EC_*"',
+    category: "certificate",
+    severity: "high",
+    confidence: "high",
+    algorithm: "ECDSA",
+    hndl: false,
+    cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+    message: "CloudFormation provisions an ACM certificate with a classical EC key, forgeable by a quantum attacker.",
+    remediation: "ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205).",
+};
+const RULE_CFN_CLOUDFRONT_TLS = {
+    id: "cfn-cloudfront-legacy-tls",
+    title: "CloudFormation CloudFront legacy TLS",
+    description: 'CloudFront Distribution MinimumProtocolVersion = "TLSv1" / "TLSv1.1"',
+    category: "tls",
+    severity: "medium",
+    confidence: "high",
+    hndl: false,
+    cwe: CWE_WEAK_STRENGTH,
+    message: "CloudFront distribution permits TLS 1.0/1.1, which are deprecated and insecure.",
+    remediation: "Set MinimumProtocolVersion to TLSv1.2_2021 (or later) and prefer PQC-hybrid key exchange.",
+};
+const RULE_CFN_ELB_TLS = {
+    id: "cfn-elb-legacy-tls",
+    title: "CloudFormation ELB/ALB legacy TLS policy",
+    description: "Elastic Load Balancer SslPolicy naming a pre-2017 legacy policy",
+    category: "tls",
+    severity: "medium",
+    confidence: "high",
+    hndl: false,
+    cwe: CWE_WEAK_STRENGTH,
+    message: "Load balancer listener uses a legacy SSL negotiation policy permitting TLS 1.0/1.1.",
+    remediation: "Use ELBSecurityPolicy-TLS13-1-2-2021-06 (or the latest FS+TLS1.2/1.3 policy).",
+};
+const RULE_CFN_ARM_KV_RSA = {
+    id: "cfn-arm-keyvault-rsa",
+    title: "ARM template Key Vault RSA key",
+    description: 'Microsoft.KeyVault key resource kty = "RSA"',
+    category: "kem",
+    severity: "high",
+    confidence: "high",
+    algorithm: "RSA",
+    hndl: true,
+    cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+    message: "ARM template provisions a classical RSA Azure Key Vault key, which is not quantum-safe.",
+    remediation: "Plan migration to PQC (ML-KEM-768 / ML-DSA-65).",
+};
+const RULE_CFN_ARM_KV_EC = {
+    id: "cfn-arm-keyvault-ec",
+    title: "ARM template Key Vault EC key",
+    description: 'Microsoft.KeyVault key resource kty = "EC"',
+    category: "key-exchange",
+    severity: "high",
+    confidence: "high",
+    algorithm: "ECDH",
+    hndl: true,
+    cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+    message: "ARM template provisions a classical EC Azure Key Vault key; EC keys feed ECDSA signatures and ECDH key agreement (the ECDH path is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed).",
+    remediation: "For key agreement: hybrid X25519MLKEM768 (ML-KEM-768). For signatures: ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204).",
+};
+/**
+ * Detects classical asymmetric crypto and legacy TLS config declared in
+ * AWS CloudFormation / Azure ARM (incl. Bicep-compiled JSON) templates.
+ */
+export const cloudformationDetector = {
+    id: "cloudformation-crypto",
+    description: "Classical asymmetric crypto and legacy TLS config declared in CloudFormation / ARM templates (IaC)",
+    scope: "config",
+    language: "any",
+    rules: [
+        RULE_CFN_KMS_RSA,
+        RULE_CFN_KMS_EC,
+        RULE_CFN_ACM_RSA,
+        RULE_CFN_ACM_EC,
+        RULE_CFN_CLOUDFRONT_TLS,
+        RULE_CFN_ELB_TLS,
+        RULE_CFN_ARM_KV_RSA,
+        RULE_CFN_ARM_KV_EC,
+    ],
+    appliesTo: (f) => hasExtension(f, CFN_EXTENSIONS),
+    detect({ file, content }) {
+        if (!CFN_MARKERS.some((marker) => content.includes(marker)))
+            return [];
+        const findings = [];
+        const add = (re, rule) => eachMatch(re, content, (m) => findings.push(findingFromRule(rule, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length })));
+        add(RE_CFN_KMS_RSA, RULE_CFN_KMS_RSA);
+        add(RE_CFN_KMS_EC, RULE_CFN_KMS_EC);
+        add(RE_CFN_ACM_RSA, RULE_CFN_ACM_RSA);
+        add(RE_CFN_ACM_EC, RULE_CFN_ACM_EC);
+        add(RE_CFN_CLOUDFRONT_TLS, RULE_CFN_CLOUDFRONT_TLS);
+        add(RE_CFN_ELB_TLS, RULE_CFN_ELB_TLS);
+        add(RE_CFN_ARM_KV_RSA, RULE_CFN_ARM_KV_RSA);
+        add(RE_CFN_ARM_KV_EC, RULE_CFN_ARM_KV_EC);
+        return findings;
+    },
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=cloudformation.js.map

package/dist/detectors/cloudformation.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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Bicep-compiled JSON)\n * templates — plus CDK `cdk synth` output, which is plain CloudFormation\n * JSON. This is a distinct surface from `terraform.ts`: CloudFormation/ARM\n * use PascalCase JSON/YAML property names, never Terraform's snake_case HCL\n * attributes, so the two detectors never collide on the same file.\n *\n * Covered:\n *  - AWS::KMS::Key `KeySpec`:                    `\"RSA_…\"` (kem) / `\"ECC_…\"` (key-exchange)\n *  - AWS::CertificateManager::Certificate\n *    `KeyAlgorithm`:                             `\"RSA_…\"` / `\"EC_…\"` (certificate)\n *  - CloudFront distribution `MinimumProtocolVersion`: legacy `TLSv1` / `TLSv1.1` (tls)\n *  - ELB/ALB listener `SslPolicy`:                legacy `ELBSecurityPolicy-2016-08` /\n *                                                 `-TLS-1-0-…` / `-TLS-1-1-…` (tls)\n *  - Azure ARM `Microsoft.KeyVault` key `kty`:    `\"RSA\"` (kem) / `\"EC\"` (key-exchange)\n *\n * `KeySpec` is PascalCase and case-sensitive, so it never matches Terraform's\n * snake_case `customer_master_key_spec` (same underlying AWS API, different\n * authoring surface). A fast-reject on a CFN/ARM marker keeps this detector\n * from ever firing on arbitrary JSON/YAML that happens to contain one of\n * these property names in an unrelated context.\n */\nimport type { Detector, Finding, RuleMeta } from \"../types.js\";\nimport { eachMatch, findingFromRule, hasExtension } from \"../detect-utils.js\";\nimport { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO, CWE_WEAK_STRENGTH } from \"../cwe.js\";\n\nconst CFN_EXTENSIONS: readonly string[] = [\".json\", \".yaml\", \".yml\"];\n\n// Fast-reject markers: at least one must appear before any rule regex runs, so\n// this detector never scans arbitrary JSON/YAML that merely happens to share\n// an attribute name (`KeySpec`, `kty`, …) with an unrelated schema.\nconst CFN_MARKERS: readonly string[] = [\n  \"AWS::KMS\",\n  \"AWS::CertificateManager\",\n  \"AWSTemplateFormatVersion\",\n  \"MinimumProtocolVersion\",\n  \"Microsoft.KeyVault\",\n  '\"SslPolicy\"',\n];\n\n// Each attribute is matched with an optional quote around the key and `:` as\n// the separator (both plain-JSON and YAML-block-scalar forms use `:`). The\n// `(?<![\\w\"-])` lookbehind stops a longer/prefixed attribute name from\n// matching on its suffix.\nconst RE_CFN_KMS_RSA = /(?<![\\w\"-])\"?KeySpec\"?\\s*:\\s*\"?RSA_\\d+\"?/g;\nconst RE_CFN_KMS_EC = /(?<![\\w\"-])\"?KeySpec\"?\\s*:\\s*\"?ECC_[A-Z0-9_]+\"?/g;\nconst RE_CFN_ACM_RSA = /(?<![\\w\"-])\"?KeyAlgorithm\"?\\s*:\\s*\"?RSA_\\d+\"?/g;\nconst RE_CFN_ACM_EC = /(?<![\\w\"-])\"?KeyAlgorithm\"?\\s*:\\s*\"?EC_[A-Za-z0-9]+\"?/g;\n// CloudFront: only the pre-2018 \"TLSv1\" / \"TLSv1_2016\" / \"TLSv1.1_2016\"\n// values are legacy; the lookahead delimiter stops this from matching a\n// \"TLSv1.2_2018\"-style value that merely starts with the same prefix.\nconst RE_CFN_CLOUDFRONT_TLS =\n  /(?<![\\w\"-])\"?MinimumProtocolVersion\"?\\s*:\\s*\"?(?:TLSv1(?:\\.1)?_2016|TLSv1)(?=[\"'\\s,}]|$)/gm;\n// ELB/ALB legacy SSL negotiation policies (named, dated policy strings).\nconst RE_CFN_ELB_TLS =\n  /(?<![\\w\"-])\"?SslPolicy\"?\\s*:\\s*\"ELBSecurityPolicy-(?:2016-08|TLS-1-0-\\d{4}-\\d{2}|TLS-1-1-\\d{4}-\\d{2})\"/g;\n// Azure ARM Microsoft.KeyVault key resource `properties.kty`.\nconst RE_CFN_ARM_KV_RSA = /(?<![\\w\"-])\"?kty\"?\\s*:\\s*\"?RSA\"?(?!\\w)/g;\nconst RE_CFN_ARM_KV_EC = /(?<![\\w\"-])\"?kty\"?\\s*:\\s*\"?EC\"?(?!\\w)/g;\n\nconst RULE_CFN_KMS_RSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"cfn-kms-rsa\",\n  title: \"CloudFormation KMS RSA key\",\n  description: 'AWS::KMS::Key KeySpec = \"RSA_*\"',\n  category: \"kem\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"CloudFormation provisions a classical RSA KMS key (harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed for encryption CMKs).\",\n  remediation: \"Plan migration to PQC as cloud KMS adds ML-KEM / ML-DSA key specs.\",\n};\nconst RULE_CFN_KMS_EC: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"cfn-kms-ec\",\n  title: \"CloudFormation KMS EC key\",\n  description: 'AWS::KMS::Key KeySpec = \"ECC_*\"',\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"CloudFormation provisions a classical EC KMS key; EC keys feed ECDSA signatures and ECDH key agreement (the ECDH path is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed).\",\n  remediation:\n    \"For key agreement: hybrid X25519MLKEM768 (ML-KEM-768). For signatures: ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204).\",\n};\nconst RULE_CFN_ACM_RSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"cfn-acm-rsa\",\n  title: \"CloudFormation ACM RSA certificate\",\n  description: 'AWS::CertificateManager::Certificate KeyAlgorithm = \"RSA_*\"',\n  category: \"certificate\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"CloudFormation provisions an ACM certificate with a classical RSA key, which is not quantum-safe.\",\n  remediation: \"Plan migration to PQC (ML-KEM-768 for encryption, ML-DSA-65 for signatures).\",\n};\nconst RULE_CFN_ACM_EC: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"cfn-acm-ec\",\n  title: \"CloudFormation ACM EC certificate\",\n  description: 'AWS::CertificateManager::Certificate KeyAlgorithm = \"EC_*\"',\n  category: \"certificate\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"CloudFormation provisions an ACM certificate with a classical EC key, forgeable by a quantum attacker.\",\n  remediation: \"ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205).\",\n};\nconst RULE_CFN_CLOUDFRONT_TLS: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"cfn-cloudfront-legacy-tls\",\n  title: \"CloudFormation CloudFront legacy TLS\",\n  description: 'CloudFront Distribution MinimumProtocolVersion = \"TLSv1\" / \"TLSv1.1\"',\n  category: \"tls\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_WEAK_STRENGTH,\n  message: \"CloudFront distribution permits TLS 1.0/1.1, which are deprecated and insecure.\",\n  remediation:\n    \"Set MinimumProtocolVersion to TLSv1.2_2021 (or later) and prefer PQC-hybrid key exchange.\",\n};\nconst RULE_CFN_ELB_TLS: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"cfn-elb-legacy-tls\",\n  title: \"CloudFormation ELB/ALB legacy TLS policy\",\n  description: \"Elastic Load Balancer SslPolicy naming a pre-2017 legacy policy\",\n  category: \"tls\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_WEAK_STRENGTH,\n  message: \"Load balancer listener uses a legacy SSL negotiation policy permitting TLS 1.0/1.1.\",\n  remediation: \"Use ELBSecurityPolicy-TLS13-1-2-2021-06 (or the latest FS+TLS1.2/1.3 policy).\",\n};\nconst RULE_CFN_ARM_KV_RSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"cfn-arm-keyvault-rsa\",\n  title: \"ARM template Key Vault RSA key\",\n  description: 'Microsoft.KeyVault key resource kty = \"RSA\"',\n  category: \"kem\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"ARM template provisions a classical RSA Azure Key Vault key, which is not quantum-safe.\",\n  remediation: \"Plan migration to PQC (ML-KEM-768 / ML-DSA-65).\",\n};\nconst RULE_CFN_ARM_KV_EC: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"cfn-arm-keyvault-ec\",\n  title: \"ARM template Key Vault EC key\",\n  description: 'Microsoft.KeyVault key resource kty = \"EC\"',\n  category: \"key-exchange\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDH\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"ARM template provisions a classical EC Azure Key Vault key; EC keys feed ECDSA signatures and ECDH key agreement (the ECDH path is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed).\",\n  remediation:\n    \"For key agreement: hybrid X25519MLKEM768 (ML-KEM-768). For signatures: ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204).\",\n};\n\n/**\n * Detects classical asymmetric crypto and legacy TLS config declared in\n * AWS CloudFormation / Azure ARM (incl. Bicep-compiled JSON) templates.\n */\nexport const cloudformationDetector: Detector = {\n  id: \"cloudformation-crypto\",\n  description:\n    \"Classical asymmetric crypto and legacy TLS config declared in CloudFormation / ARM templates (IaC)\",\n  scope: \"config\",\n  language: \"any\",\n  rules: [\n    RULE_CFN_KMS_RSA,\n    RULE_CFN_KMS_EC,\n    RULE_CFN_ACM_RSA,\n    RULE_CFN_ACM_EC,\n    RULE_CFN_CLOUDFRONT_TLS,\n    RULE_CFN_ELB_TLS,\n    RULE_CFN_ARM_KV_RSA,\n    RULE_CFN_ARM_KV_EC,\n  ],\n  appliesTo: (f) => hasExtension(f, CFN_EXTENSIONS),\n  detect({ file, content }): Finding[] {\n    if (!CFN_MARKERS.some((marker) => content.includes(marker))) return [];\n\n    const findings: Finding[] = [];\n    const add = (re: RegExp, rule: RuleMeta) =>\n      eachMatch(re, content, (m) =>\n        findings.push(\n          findingFromRule(rule, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length }),\n        ),\n      );\n    add(RE_CFN_KMS_RSA, RULE_CFN_KMS_RSA);\n    add(RE_CFN_KMS_EC, RULE_CFN_KMS_EC);\n    add(RE_CFN_ACM_RSA, RULE_CFN_ACM_RSA);\n    add(RE_CFN_ACM_EC, RULE_CFN_ACM_EC);\n    add(RE_CFN_CLOUDFRONT_TLS, RULE_CFN_CLOUDFRONT_TLS);\n    add(RE_CFN_ELB_TLS, RULE_CFN_ELB_TLS);\n    add(RE_CFN_ARM_KV_RSA, RULE_CFN_ARM_KV_RSA);\n    add(RE_CFN_ARM_KV_EC, RULE_CFN_ARM_KV_EC);\n    return findings;\n  },\n};\n"]}

package/dist/detectors/database.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+/**
+ * Config detector: classical crypto in database usage — public-key encryption of
+ * stored data (pgcrypto) and weak client TLS posture. Data-at-rest is the sharpest
+ * harvest-now-decrypt-later target: a column encrypted to an RSA key today is a
+ * time capsule an adversary can hold until key recovery is cheap.
+ *
+ * Covered:
+ *  - pgcrypto `pgp_pub_encrypt` / `pgp_pub_decrypt` in `.sql` (RSA/ElGamal public-key
+ *    encryption of column data) → `hndl:true`.
+ *  - libpq `sslmode = disable | allow | prefer | require` in any config/connection
+ *    file — a mode that does NOT verify the server certificate, so the classical
+ *    TLS session it does (or doesn't) negotiate is both MITM-able and harvestable.
+ */
+import type { Detector } from "../types.js";
+/** Detects classical database at-rest / transport crypto. */
+export declare const databaseDetector: Detector;
+//# sourceMappingURL=database.d.ts.map

package/dist/detectors/database.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"database.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/detectors/database.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;GAYG;AACH,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAqB,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAqC/D,6DAA6D;AAC7D,eAAO,MAAM,gBAAgB,EAAE,QAoC9B,CAAC"}

package/dist/detectors/database.js

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+import { DOC_EXTENSIONS, eachMatch, findingFromRule, hasExtension } from "../detect-utils.js";
+import { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO, CWE_CERT_VALIDATION } from "../cwe.js";
+const RE_PGCRYPTO = /\bpgp_pub_(?:encrypt|decrypt)\b/g;
+const RE_WEAK_SSLMODE = /\bsslmode\s*=\s*["']?(?:disable|allow|prefer|require)\b/gi;
+const RULE_PGCRYPTO = {
+    id: "db-pgcrypto-pubkey",
+    title: "pgcrypto public-key encryption",
+    description: "Postgres pgcrypto pgp_pub_encrypt / pgp_pub_decrypt (RSA/ElGamal) on stored data",
+    category: "kem",
+    severity: "high",
+    confidence: "high",
+    algorithm: "RSA",
+    hndl: true,
+    cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+    message: "Column data is encrypted with pgcrypto public-key crypto (classical RSA/ElGamal); stored ciphertext is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.",
+    remediation: "Plan migration to a post-quantum KEM (ML-KEM-768) envelope for at-rest data; re-encrypt long-lived rows.",
+};
+const RULE_WEAK_SSLMODE = {
+    id: "db-weak-sslmode",
+    title: "Database sslmode without verification",
+    description: "libpq sslmode is disable/allow/prefer/require (no certificate verification)",
+    category: "tls",
+    severity: "medium",
+    confidence: "high",
+    hndl: false,
+    cwe: CWE_CERT_VALIDATION,
+    message: "Database sslmode does not verify the server certificate; the classical TLS session is MITM-able and its key exchange is harvestable.",
+    remediation: "Use sslmode=verify-full and TLS 1.3; track PQC-hybrid KEX (X25519MLKEM768) for database transport.",
+};
+/** Detects classical database at-rest / transport crypto. */
+export const databaseDetector = {
+    id: "database-crypto",
+    description: "Classical crypto in database usage (pgcrypto public-key, weak client sslmode)",
+    scope: "config",
+    language: "any",
+    rules: [RULE_PGCRYPTO, RULE_WEAK_SSLMODE],
+    // Skip prose/docs: a README showing `sslmode=require` is not a live connection string.
+    appliesTo: (f) => !hasExtension(f, DOC_EXTENSIONS),
+    detect({ file, content }) {
+        const findings = [];
+        if (file.toLowerCase().endsWith(".sql") && content.includes("pgp_pub_")) {
+            eachMatch(RE_PGCRYPTO, content, (m) => findings.push(findingFromRule(RULE_PGCRYPTO, {
+                file,
+                content,
+                index: m.index,
+                matchLength: m[0].length,
+            })));
+        }
+        if (content.includes("sslmode")) {
+            eachMatch(RE_WEAK_SSLMODE, content, (m) => findings.push(findingFromRule(RULE_WEAK_SSLMODE, {
+                file,
+                content,
+                index: m.index,
+                matchLength: m[0].length,
+            })));
+        }
+        return findings;
+    },
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=database.js.map

package/dist/detectors/database.js.map

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Data-at-rest is the sharpest\n * harvest-now-decrypt-later target: a column encrypted to an RSA key today is a\n * time capsule an adversary can hold until key recovery is cheap.\n *\n * Covered:\n *  - pgcrypto `pgp_pub_encrypt` / `pgp_pub_decrypt` in `.sql` (RSA/ElGamal public-key\n *    encryption of column data) → `hndl:true`.\n *  - libpq `sslmode = disable | allow | prefer | require` in any config/connection\n *    file — a mode that does NOT verify the server certificate, so the classical\n *    TLS session it does (or doesn't) negotiate is both MITM-able and harvestable.\n */\nimport type { Detector, Finding, RuleMeta } from \"../types.js\";\nimport { DOC_EXTENSIONS, eachMatch, findingFromRule, hasExtension } from \"../detect-utils.js\";\nimport { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO, CWE_CERT_VALIDATION } from \"../cwe.js\";\n\nconst RE_PGCRYPTO = /\\bpgp_pub_(?:encrypt|decrypt)\\b/g;\nconst RE_WEAK_SSLMODE = /\\bsslmode\\s*=\\s*[\"']?(?:disable|allow|prefer|require)\\b/gi;\n\nconst RULE_PGCRYPTO: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"db-pgcrypto-pubkey\",\n  title: \"pgcrypto public-key encryption\",\n  description: \"Postgres pgcrypto pgp_pub_encrypt / pgp_pub_decrypt (RSA/ElGamal) on stored data\",\n  category: \"kem\",\n  severity: \"high\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: true,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"Column data is encrypted with pgcrypto public-key crypto (classical RSA/ElGamal); stored ciphertext is harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed.\",\n  remediation:\n    \"Plan migration to a post-quantum KEM (ML-KEM-768) envelope for at-rest data; re-encrypt long-lived rows.\",\n};\nconst RULE_WEAK_SSLMODE: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"db-weak-sslmode\",\n  title: \"Database sslmode without verification\",\n  description: \"libpq sslmode is disable/allow/prefer/require (no certificate verification)\",\n  category: \"tls\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_CERT_VALIDATION,\n  message:\n    \"Database sslmode does not verify the server certificate; the classical TLS session is MITM-able and its key exchange is harvestable.\",\n  remediation:\n    \"Use sslmode=verify-full and TLS 1.3; track PQC-hybrid KEX (X25519MLKEM768) for database transport.\",\n};\n\n/** Detects classical database at-rest / transport crypto. */\nexport const databaseDetector: Detector = {\n  id: \"database-crypto\",\n  description: \"Classical crypto in database usage (pgcrypto public-key, weak client sslmode)\",\n  scope: \"config\",\n  language: \"any\",\n  rules: [RULE_PGCRYPTO, RULE_WEAK_SSLMODE],\n  // Skip prose/docs: a README showing `sslmode=require` is not a live connection string.\n  appliesTo: (f) => !hasExtension(f, DOC_EXTENSIONS),\n  detect({ file, content }): Finding[] {\n    const findings: Finding[] = [];\n    if (file.toLowerCase().endsWith(\".sql\") && content.includes(\"pgp_pub_\")) {\n      eachMatch(RE_PGCRYPTO, content, (m) =>\n        findings.push(\n          findingFromRule(RULE_PGCRYPTO, {\n            file,\n            content,\n            index: m.index,\n            matchLength: m[0].length,\n          }),\n        ),\n      );\n    }\n    if (content.includes(\"sslmode\")) {\n      eachMatch(RE_WEAK_SSLMODE, content, (m) =>\n        findings.push(\n          findingFromRule(RULE_WEAK_SSLMODE, {\n            file,\n            content,\n            index: m.index,\n            matchLength: m[0].length,\n          }),\n        ),\n      );\n    }\n    return findings;\n  },\n};\n"]}

package/dist/detectors/dnssec.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/**
+ * Config detector: classical DNSSEC signing algorithms in zone files and
+ * signer/resolver config (BIND, Knot DNS, PowerDNS, `ldns-signzone` /
+ * `dnssec-signzone` invocations recorded in ops config).
+ *
+ * DNSSEC is "communication between things" infrastructure: resolvers verify
+ * DNSKEY/RRSIG chains to authenticate zone data. Unlike a KEM or key-exchange
+ * finding, a DNSSEC signing key is not harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed —
+ * there is no confidentiality to harvest — but every classical signature it
+ * produces becomes FORGEABLE the moment a cryptographically-relevant quantum
+ * computer (CRQC) exists. A forged DNSKEY/RRSIG chain lets an attacker spoof
+ * DNSSEC-validated records (cache poisoning that a validating resolver would
+ * otherwise reject). So these findings are `category: "signature"`,
+ * `hndl: false`.
+ *
+ * RFC 8624 / IANA "DNSSEC Algorithm Numbers" families covered, mapped to
+ * {@link AlgorithmFamily}:
+ *  - RSASHA1 (5), RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 (7), RSASHA256 (8), RSASHA512 (10) → RSA
+ *  - ECDSAP256SHA256 (13), ECDSAP384SHA384 (14)                        → ECDSA
+ *  - ED25519 (15), ED448 (16)                                          → EdDSA
+ *  - DSA (3), DSA-NSEC3-SHA1 (6)                                      → DSA
+ *
+ * Two independent match shapes per family, both gated to `.zone` / `.db` /
+ * `.conf` files AND to a file-level DNSSEC marker (see `hasDnssecMarker`
+ * below) so the algorithm tokens can't fire on unrelated config:
+ *
+ *  1. NAMED form — the algorithm's mnemonic name, as written in signer/policy
+ *     config (Knot `algorithm RSASHA256;`, a `dnssec-policy` block, BIND
+ *     `algorithm: ecdsap256sha256;`) or on an `ldns-signzone -a ECDSAP256SHA256`
+ *     / `dnssec-signzone -a ECDSAP256SHA256` command line. These mnemonics
+ *     (`RSASHA256`, `ECDSAP384SHA384`, `ED25519`, …) are distinctive enough to
+ *     match bare, EXCEPT plain `DSA`, which is too generic a token on its own
+ *     (used well outside DNSSEC); that one is only matched immediately after
+ *     an `algorithm` keyword.
+ *  2. STRUCTURAL form — the DNSKEY presentation-format RDATA, e.g.
+ *     `example.com. IN DNSKEY 257 3 8 AwEAAd...`, where the fields after the
+ *     `DNSKEY` keyword are `flags protocol algorithm public-key` (RFC 4034
+ *     §2). Anchoring on the literal `DNSKEY` keyword AND the literal
+ *     protocol value `3` (always 3 for DNSSEC) before a restricted algorithm
+ *     number keeps this precise despite being numeric. Bare algorithm
+ *     numbers with no such anchor are deliberately NOT matched anywhere —
+ *     `algorithm 8;` alone is far too ambiguous to key off of.
+ *
+ * Fast reject: `detect()` bails unless the file contains `DNSKEY`, `RRSIG`,
+ * a case-insensitive `dnssec` substring (present in `dnssec-policy`,
+ * `dnssec-signing: on`, etc. in any real signer config), or an
+ * `ldns-signzone` / `dnssec-signzone` invocation. This stops the DSA/EdDSA
+ * named-form tokens — which are individually generic outside DNSSEC — from
+ * firing on, say, an unrelated SSH or TLS `.conf` file that happens to
+ * mention `ED25519` or `DSA` for its own reasons.
+ */
+import type { Detector } from "../types.js";
+/** Detects classical DNSSEC signing algorithms in zone files and signer config. */
+export declare const dnssecDetector: Detector;
+//# sourceMappingURL=dnssec.d.ts.map

package/dist/detectors/dnssec.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"dnssec.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/detectors/dnssec.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAkDG;AACH,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAqB,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AA+G/D,mFAAmF;AACnF,eAAO,MAAM,cAAc,EAAE,QAsB5B,CAAC"}

package/dist/detectors/dnssec.js

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+import { eachMatch, findingFromRule, hasExtension } from "../detect-utils.js";
+import { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO } from "../cwe.js";
+const DNSSEC_EXTENSIONS = [".zone", ".db", ".conf"];
+// IANA DNSSEC algorithm numbers, grouped by family.
+const NUM_RSA = "5|7|8|10"; // RSASHA1, RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1, RSASHA256, RSASHA512
+const NUM_ECDSA = "13|14"; // ECDSAP256SHA256, ECDSAP384SHA384
+const NUM_EDDSA = "15|16"; // ED25519, ED448
+const NUM_DSA = "3|6"; // DSA, DSA-NSEC3-SHA1
+// --- NAMED form: mnemonic algorithm names in signer/policy config or CLI args. ---
+const RE_NAMED_RSA = /\bRSASHA(?:256|512|1(?:-NSEC3-SHA1)?)\b/g;
+const RE_NAMED_ECDSA = /\bECDSAP(?:256SHA256|384SHA384)\b/g;
+const RE_NAMED_EDDSA = /\bED(?:25519|448)\b/g;
+// Bare "DSA" is too generic to key off alone; require it right after an
+// `algorithm` keyword (Knot/BIND config / dnssec-policy style), optionally
+// quoted or separated by `:`/`=`.
+const RE_NAMED_DSA = /\balgorithm\s*[:=]?\s*"?DSA(?:-NSEC3-SHA1)?"?\b/gi;
+// --- STRUCTURAL form: `DNSKEY <flags> 3 <algorithm>` presentation RDATA (RFC 4034 §2). ---
+const RE_DNSKEY_RSA = new RegExp(`\\bDNSKEY\\s+\\d+\\s+3\\s+(?:${NUM_RSA})\\b`, "g");
+const RE_DNSKEY_ECDSA = new RegExp(`\\bDNSKEY\\s+\\d+\\s+3\\s+(?:${NUM_ECDSA})\\b`, "g");
+const RE_DNSKEY_EDDSA = new RegExp(`\\bDNSKEY\\s+\\d+\\s+3\\s+(?:${NUM_EDDSA})\\b`, "g");
+const RE_DNSKEY_DSA = new RegExp(`\\bDNSKEY\\s+\\d+\\s+3\\s+(?:${NUM_DSA})\\b`, "g");
+const RULE_DNSSEC_RSA = {
+    id: "dnssec-rsa-sig",
+    title: "DNSSEC RSA signing algorithm",
+    description: "DNSSEC zone signed with a classical RSA algorithm (RSASHA1/256/512)",
+    category: "signature",
+    severity: "medium",
+    confidence: "high",
+    algorithm: "RSA",
+    hndl: false,
+    cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+    message: "DNSSEC zone is signed with a classical RSA algorithm (RSASHA1/RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1/RSASHA256/RSASHA512); DNSKEY/RRSIG signatures become forgeable once a CRQC exists.",
+    remediation: "Track IETF dnsop post-quantum DNSSEC signing work (ML-DSA); plan re-signing with a PQC algorithm once assigned an IANA DNSSEC algorithm number.",
+};
+const RULE_DNSSEC_ECDSA = {
+    id: "dnssec-ecdsa-sig",
+    title: "DNSSEC ECDSA signing algorithm",
+    description: "DNSSEC zone signed with a classical ECDSA algorithm (ECDSAP256SHA256/384SHA384)",
+    category: "signature",
+    severity: "medium",
+    confidence: "high",
+    algorithm: "ECDSA",
+    hndl: false,
+    cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+    message: "DNSSEC zone is signed with a classical ECDSA algorithm (ECDSAP256SHA256/ECDSAP384SHA384); DNSKEY/RRSIG signatures become forgeable once a CRQC exists.",
+    remediation: "Track IETF dnsop post-quantum DNSSEC signing work (ML-DSA); plan re-signing with a PQC algorithm once assigned an IANA DNSSEC algorithm number.",
+};
+const RULE_DNSSEC_EDDSA = {
+    id: "dnssec-eddsa-sig",
+    title: "DNSSEC EdDSA signing algorithm",
+    description: "DNSSEC zone signed with a classical EdDSA algorithm (ED25519/ED448)",
+    category: "signature",
+    severity: "medium",
+    confidence: "high",
+    algorithm: "EdDSA",
+    hndl: false,
+    cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+    message: "DNSSEC zone is signed with a classical EdDSA algorithm (ED25519/ED448); modern but still classical — DNSKEY/RRSIG signatures become forgeable once a CRQC exists.",
+    remediation: "Track IETF dnsop post-quantum DNSSEC signing work (ML-DSA); plan re-signing with a PQC algorithm once assigned an IANA DNSSEC algorithm number.",
+};
+const RULE_DNSSEC_DSA = {
+    id: "dnssec-dsa-sig",
+    title: "DNSSEC DSA signing algorithm (deprecated)",
+    description: "DNSSEC zone signed with the deprecated classical DSA algorithm (DSA/DSA-NSEC3-SHA1)",
+    category: "signature",
+    severity: "medium",
+    confidence: "high",
+    algorithm: "DSA",
+    hndl: false,
+    cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,
+    message: "DNSSEC zone is signed with DSA/DSA-NSEC3-SHA1 — deprecated by RFC 8624 (MUST NOT sign) and, independent of that, forgeable once a CRQC exists.",
+    remediation: "Re-sign with a non-deprecated algorithm today (RFC 8624); track IETF dnsop post-quantum DNSSEC signing work (ML-DSA) for the eventual PQC migration.",
+};
+/** True when `content` carries some DNSSEC-specific marker (not just a bare algorithm token). */
+function hasDnssecMarker(content) {
+    return (content.includes("DNSKEY") ||
+        content.includes("RRSIG") ||
+        /dnssec/i.test(content) ||
+        /ldns-signzone|dnssec-signzone/.test(content));
+}
+const DNSSEC_RULES = [
+    { meta: RULE_DNSSEC_RSA, res: [RE_NAMED_RSA, RE_DNSKEY_RSA] },
+    { meta: RULE_DNSSEC_ECDSA, res: [RE_NAMED_ECDSA, RE_DNSKEY_ECDSA] },
+    { meta: RULE_DNSSEC_EDDSA, res: [RE_NAMED_EDDSA, RE_DNSKEY_EDDSA] },
+    { meta: RULE_DNSSEC_DSA, res: [RE_NAMED_DSA, RE_DNSKEY_DSA] },
+];
+/** Detects classical DNSSEC signing algorithms in zone files and signer config. */
+export const dnssecDetector = {
+    id: "dnssec-crypto",
+    description: "Classical DNSSEC signing algorithms in zone files / signer config",
+    scope: "config",
+    language: "any",
+    rules: DNSSEC_RULES.map((r) => r.meta),
+    appliesTo: (f) => hasExtension(f, DNSSEC_EXTENSIONS),
+    detect({ file, content }) {
+        if (!hasDnssecMarker(content))
+            return [];
+        const findings = [];
+        for (const { meta, res } of DNSSEC_RULES) {
+            for (const re of res) {
+                eachMatch(re, content, (m) => findings.push(findingFromRule(meta, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length })));
+            }
+        }
+        return findings;
+    },
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=dnssec.js.map

package/dist/detectors/dnssec.js.map

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Unlike a KEM or key-exchange\n * finding, a DNSSEC signing key is not harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed —\n * there is no confidentiality to harvest — but every classical signature it\n * produces becomes FORGEABLE the moment a cryptographically-relevant quantum\n * computer (CRQC) exists. A forged DNSKEY/RRSIG chain lets an attacker spoof\n * DNSSEC-validated records (cache poisoning that a validating resolver would\n * otherwise reject). So these findings are `category: \"signature\"`,\n * `hndl: false`.\n *\n * RFC 8624 / IANA \"DNSSEC Algorithm Numbers\" families covered, mapped to\n * {@link AlgorithmFamily}:\n *  - RSASHA1 (5), RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 (7), RSASHA256 (8), RSASHA512 (10) → RSA\n *  - ECDSAP256SHA256 (13), ECDSAP384SHA384 (14)                        → ECDSA\n *  - ED25519 (15), ED448 (16)                                          → EdDSA\n *  - DSA (3), DSA-NSEC3-SHA1 (6)                                      → DSA\n *\n * Two independent match shapes per family, both gated to `.zone` / `.db` /\n * `.conf` files AND to a file-level DNSSEC marker (see `hasDnssecMarker`\n * below) so the algorithm tokens can't fire on unrelated config:\n *\n *  1. NAMED form — the algorithm's mnemonic name, as written in signer/policy\n *     config (Knot `algorithm RSASHA256;`, a `dnssec-policy` block, BIND\n *     `algorithm: ecdsap256sha256;`) or on an `ldns-signzone -a ECDSAP256SHA256`\n *     / `dnssec-signzone -a ECDSAP256SHA256` command line. These mnemonics\n *     (`RSASHA256`, `ECDSAP384SHA384`, `ED25519`, …) are distinctive enough to\n *     match bare, EXCEPT plain `DSA`, which is too generic a token on its own\n *     (used well outside DNSSEC); that one is only matched immediately after\n *     an `algorithm` keyword.\n *  2. STRUCTURAL form — the DNSKEY presentation-format RDATA, e.g.\n *     `example.com. IN DNSKEY 257 3 8 AwEAAd...`, where the fields after the\n *     `DNSKEY` keyword are `flags protocol algorithm public-key` (RFC 4034\n *     §2). Anchoring on the literal `DNSKEY` keyword AND the literal\n *     protocol value `3` (always 3 for DNSSEC) before a restricted algorithm\n *     number keeps this precise despite being numeric. Bare algorithm\n *     numbers with no such anchor are deliberately NOT matched anywhere —\n *     `algorithm 8;` alone is far too ambiguous to key off of.\n *\n * Fast reject: `detect()` bails unless the file contains `DNSKEY`, `RRSIG`,\n * a case-insensitive `dnssec` substring (present in `dnssec-policy`,\n * `dnssec-signing: on`, etc. in any real signer config), or an\n * `ldns-signzone` / `dnssec-signzone` invocation. This stops the DSA/EdDSA\n * named-form tokens — which are individually generic outside DNSSEC — from\n * firing on, say, an unrelated SSH or TLS `.conf` file that happens to\n * mention `ED25519` or `DSA` for its own reasons.\n */\nimport type { Detector, Finding, RuleMeta } from \"../types.js\";\nimport { eachMatch, findingFromRule, hasExtension } from \"../detect-utils.js\";\nimport { CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO } from \"../cwe.js\";\n\nconst DNSSEC_EXTENSIONS: readonly string[] = [\".zone\", \".db\", \".conf\"];\n\n// IANA DNSSEC algorithm numbers, grouped by family.\nconst NUM_RSA = \"5|7|8|10\"; // RSASHA1, RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1, RSASHA256, RSASHA512\nconst NUM_ECDSA = \"13|14\"; // ECDSAP256SHA256, ECDSAP384SHA384\nconst NUM_EDDSA = \"15|16\"; // ED25519, ED448\nconst NUM_DSA = \"3|6\"; // DSA, DSA-NSEC3-SHA1\n\n// --- NAMED form: mnemonic algorithm names in signer/policy config or CLI args. ---\nconst RE_NAMED_RSA = /\\bRSASHA(?:256|512|1(?:-NSEC3-SHA1)?)\\b/g;\nconst RE_NAMED_ECDSA = /\\bECDSAP(?:256SHA256|384SHA384)\\b/g;\nconst RE_NAMED_EDDSA = /\\bED(?:25519|448)\\b/g;\n// Bare \"DSA\" is too generic to key off alone; require it right after an\n// `algorithm` keyword (Knot/BIND config / dnssec-policy style), optionally\n// quoted or separated by `:`/`=`.\nconst RE_NAMED_DSA = /\\balgorithm\\s*[:=]?\\s*\"?DSA(?:-NSEC3-SHA1)?\"?\\b/gi;\n\n// --- STRUCTURAL form: `DNSKEY <flags> 3 <algorithm>` presentation RDATA (RFC 4034 §2). ---\nconst RE_DNSKEY_RSA = new RegExp(`\\\\bDNSKEY\\\\s+\\\\d+\\\\s+3\\\\s+(?:${NUM_RSA})\\\\b`, \"g\");\nconst RE_DNSKEY_ECDSA = new RegExp(`\\\\bDNSKEY\\\\s+\\\\d+\\\\s+3\\\\s+(?:${NUM_ECDSA})\\\\b`, \"g\");\nconst RE_DNSKEY_EDDSA = new RegExp(`\\\\bDNSKEY\\\\s+\\\\d+\\\\s+3\\\\s+(?:${NUM_EDDSA})\\\\b`, \"g\");\nconst RE_DNSKEY_DSA = new RegExp(`\\\\bDNSKEY\\\\s+\\\\d+\\\\s+3\\\\s+(?:${NUM_DSA})\\\\b`, \"g\");\n\nconst RULE_DNSSEC_RSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"dnssec-rsa-sig\",\n  title: \"DNSSEC RSA signing algorithm\",\n  description: \"DNSSEC zone signed with a classical RSA algorithm (RSASHA1/256/512)\",\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"RSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"DNSSEC zone is signed with a classical RSA algorithm (RSASHA1/RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1/RSASHA256/RSASHA512); DNSKEY/RRSIG signatures become forgeable once a CRQC exists.\",\n  remediation:\n    \"Track IETF dnsop post-quantum DNSSEC signing work (ML-DSA); plan re-signing with a PQC algorithm once assigned an IANA DNSSEC algorithm number.\",\n};\nconst RULE_DNSSEC_ECDSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"dnssec-ecdsa-sig\",\n  title: \"DNSSEC ECDSA signing algorithm\",\n  description: \"DNSSEC zone signed with a classical ECDSA algorithm (ECDSAP256SHA256/384SHA384)\",\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"ECDSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"DNSSEC zone is signed with a classical ECDSA algorithm (ECDSAP256SHA256/ECDSAP384SHA384); DNSKEY/RRSIG signatures become forgeable once a CRQC exists.\",\n  remediation:\n    \"Track IETF dnsop post-quantum DNSSEC signing work (ML-DSA); plan re-signing with a PQC algorithm once assigned an IANA DNSSEC algorithm number.\",\n};\nconst RULE_DNSSEC_EDDSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"dnssec-eddsa-sig\",\n  title: \"DNSSEC EdDSA signing algorithm\",\n  description: \"DNSSEC zone signed with a classical EdDSA algorithm (ED25519/ED448)\",\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"EdDSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"DNSSEC zone is signed with a classical EdDSA algorithm (ED25519/ED448); modern but still classical — DNSKEY/RRSIG signatures become forgeable once a CRQC exists.\",\n  remediation:\n    \"Track IETF dnsop post-quantum DNSSEC signing work (ML-DSA); plan re-signing with a PQC algorithm once assigned an IANA DNSSEC algorithm number.\",\n};\nconst RULE_DNSSEC_DSA: RuleMeta = {\n  id: \"dnssec-dsa-sig\",\n  title: \"DNSSEC DSA signing algorithm (deprecated)\",\n  description:\n    \"DNSSEC zone signed with the deprecated classical DSA algorithm (DSA/DSA-NSEC3-SHA1)\",\n  category: \"signature\",\n  severity: \"medium\",\n  confidence: \"high\",\n  algorithm: \"DSA\",\n  hndl: false,\n  cwe: CWE_BROKEN_CRYPTO,\n  message:\n    \"DNSSEC zone is signed with DSA/DSA-NSEC3-SHA1 — deprecated by RFC 8624 (MUST NOT sign) and, independent of that, forgeable once a CRQC exists.\",\n  remediation:\n    \"Re-sign with a non-deprecated algorithm today (RFC 8624); track IETF dnsop post-quantum DNSSEC signing work (ML-DSA) for the eventual PQC migration.\",\n};\n\n/** True when `content` carries some DNSSEC-specific marker (not just a bare algorithm token). */\nfunction hasDnssecMarker(content: string): boolean {\n  return (\n    content.includes(\"DNSKEY\") ||\n    content.includes(\"RRSIG\") ||\n    /dnssec/i.test(content) ||\n    /ldns-signzone|dnssec-signzone/.test(content)\n  );\n}\n\ninterface DnssecRule {\n  meta: RuleMeta;\n  res: readonly RegExp[];\n}\n\nconst DNSSEC_RULES: readonly DnssecRule[] = [\n  { meta: RULE_DNSSEC_RSA, res: [RE_NAMED_RSA, RE_DNSKEY_RSA] },\n  { meta: RULE_DNSSEC_ECDSA, res: [RE_NAMED_ECDSA, RE_DNSKEY_ECDSA] },\n  { meta: RULE_DNSSEC_EDDSA, res: [RE_NAMED_EDDSA, RE_DNSKEY_EDDSA] },\n  { meta: RULE_DNSSEC_DSA, res: [RE_NAMED_DSA, RE_DNSKEY_DSA] },\n];\n\n/** Detects classical DNSSEC signing algorithms in zone files and signer config. */\nexport const dnssecDetector: Detector = {\n  id: \"dnssec-crypto\",\n  description: \"Classical DNSSEC signing algorithms in zone files / signer config\",\n  scope: \"config\",\n  language: \"any\",\n  rules: DNSSEC_RULES.map((r) => r.meta),\n  appliesTo: (f) => hasExtension(f, DNSSEC_EXTENSIONS),\n  detect({ file, content }): Finding[] {\n    if (!hasDnssecMarker(content)) return [];\n\n    const findings: Finding[] = [];\n    for (const { meta, res } of DNSSEC_RULES) {\n      for (const re of res) {\n        eachMatch(re, content, (m) =>\n          findings.push(\n            findingFromRule(meta, { file, content, index: m.index, matchLength: m[0].length }),\n          ),\n        );\n      }\n    }\n    return findings;\n  },\n};\n"]}

package/dist/detectors/elixir.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+/**
+ * Source-code detector for classical asymmetric cryptography in Elixir (the BEAM
+ * / Phoenix ecosystem), previously uncovered. Handles the three common surfaces:
+ *
+ *  - **Erlang `:crypto`** — `:crypto.generate_key(:rsa|:ecdh|:dh|:eddsa, …)`
+ *    (the curve atom disambiguates X25519/X448 from a generic ECDH curve) and
+ *    `:crypto.sign/:crypto.verify(:rsa|:ecdsa|:eddsa, …)`.
+ *  - **`X509`** (the `x509` hex package) — `X509.PrivateKey.new_rsa` / `new_ec`.
+ *  - **`JOSE`** (erlang-jose) — `JOSE.JWK.generate_key({:rsa|:ec|:okp, …})`.
+ *
+ * Lexical, like the other packs; the `:crypto.` atom-module syntax and the
+ * `X509.` / `JOSE.` module paths are distinctive, so the false-positive rate is low.
+ *
+ * HNDL: RSA and (EC/X)DH key agreement are harvest-now-decrypt-later exposed
+ * (hndl:true); ECDSA / EdDSA signatures are hndl:false but forgeable.
+ */
+import type { Detector } from "../types.js";
+/** Detects classical asymmetric crypto in Elixir (:crypto, X509, JOSE). */
+export declare const elixirDetector: Detector;
+//# sourceMappingURL=elixir.d.ts.map

package/dist/detectors/elixir.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"elixir.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/detectors/elixir.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAeG;AACH,OAAO,KAAK,EAAmB,QAAQ,EAAqB,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAuIhF,2EAA2E;AAC3E,eAAO,MAAM,cAAc,EAAE,QAoF5B,CAAC"}