@qmediat.io/gemini-code-context-mcp 1.4.0 → 1.5.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +89 -0
- package/README.md +36 -3
- package/dist/config.d.ts +23 -0
- package/dist/config.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/config.js +9 -0
- package/dist/config.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/indexer/globs.d.ts +106 -0
- package/dist/indexer/globs.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/indexer/globs.js +151 -11
- package/dist/indexer/globs.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tools/agentic/sandbox.d.ts +55 -0
- package/dist/tools/agentic/sandbox.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/tools/agentic/sandbox.js +272 -0
- package/dist/tools/agentic/sandbox.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/tools/agentic/workspace-tools.d.ts +104 -0
- package/dist/tools/agentic/workspace-tools.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/tools/agentic/workspace-tools.js +518 -0
- package/dist/tools/agentic/workspace-tools.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/tools/ask-agentic.tool.d.ts +85 -0
- package/dist/tools/ask-agentic.tool.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/tools/ask-agentic.tool.js +727 -0
- package/dist/tools/ask-agentic.tool.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/tools/ask.tool.d.ts +12 -12
- package/dist/tools/ask.tool.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tools/ask.tool.js +522 -477
- package/dist/tools/ask.tool.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tools/code.tool.d.ts +8 -8
- package/dist/tools/code.tool.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tools/code.tool.js +457 -423
- package/dist/tools/code.tool.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tools/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tools/index.js +2 -0
- package/dist/tools/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tools/registry.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/tools/registry.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/tools/registry.js +8 -2
- package/dist/tools/registry.js.map +1 -1
- package/package.json +2 -2
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/**
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* Path-safety primitives for agentic workspace tools.
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*
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* The `ask_agentic` path exposes Gemini function calls that read arbitrary
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* user-supplied paths. If the model (or a prompt-injected document) smuggles
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* `../../.ssh/id_ed25519` or a symlink pointing outside the workspace, we
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* must reject at every step — not only at schema validation.
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*
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* Two classes of defence:
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* 1. **Structural jail** via `realpath` on BOTH the root and the target.
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* Prevents symlink escape and `..` traversal. `path.resolve +
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* startsWith(root)` is NOT safe — a symlink inside the root that points
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* outside the root will lexically look fine but actually escape.
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*
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* 2. **Content denylist** — even inside the jail, refuse known secret-
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* bearing filenames (`.env`, `*.pem`, `.ssh/*`, `credentials`…) and
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* path fragments that match `DEFAULT_EXCLUDE_DIRS` (already covers
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* `.aws`, `.kube`, `.gnupg`, etc.). Belt and suspenders.
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*
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* Codex PR #20 review #2 flagged that `resolve+startsWith` is symlink-
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* unsafe. This module implements `realpath + root jail` per that feedback.
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*/
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export type SandboxErrorCode = 'PATH_TRAVERSAL' | 'SECRET_DENYLIST' | 'EXCLUDED_DIR' | 'EXCLUDED_FILENAME' | 'NON_SOURCE_FILE' | 'NOT_A_DIRECTORY' | 'NOT_FOUND' | 'NOT_INSIDE_ROOT' | 'INVALID_INPUT';
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export declare class SandboxError extends Error {
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readonly code: SandboxErrorCode;
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readonly requestedPath: string;
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constructor(code: SandboxErrorCode, message: string, requestedPath: string);
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}
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/** Absolute, real (symlink-resolved) path of `rootInput`. The caller must
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* cache this value for the life of an agentic call so we avoid repeated
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* `realpath` calls on the same root. */
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export declare function resolveWorkspaceRoot(rootInput: string): Promise<string>;
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/**
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* Resolve `relOrAbs` to a real (symlink-resolved) absolute path, or throw
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* `SandboxError` if it escapes the workspace or matches a denylist.
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*
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* Returns both the resolved absolute path and the POSIX relative path —
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* callers need the absolute for FS operations and the relative for logging
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* and response payloads. Relative path is always forward-slash form
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* regardless of host OS.
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*
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* Missing-file policy: when the target path doesn't exist on disk, we
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* still enforce the structural jail on the PARENT of the missing leaf so
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* a request like `read_file(".ssh/id_ed25519")` fails with `PATH_TRAVERSAL`
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* even if that specific file is absent. Without walking to a real parent
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* we'd leak a `NOT_FOUND` error that confirms the path shape to an
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* attacker — indirect enumeration signal. Acceptable trade-off: the
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* missing-file error for a valid path inside the root still surfaces as
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* `NOT_FOUND` once the parent resolves.
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*/
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export declare function resolveInsideWorkspace(workspaceRoot: string, relOrAbs: string): Promise<{
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absolutePath: string;
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relpath: string;
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}>;
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//# sourceMappingURL=sandbox.d.ts.map
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{"version":3,"file":"sandbox.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/tools/agentic/sandbox.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAqBG;AAyDH,MAAM,MAAM,gBAAgB,GACxB,gBAAgB,GAChB,iBAAiB,GACjB,cAAc,GACd,mBAAmB,GACnB,iBAAiB,GACjB,iBAAiB,GACjB,WAAW,GACX,iBAAiB,GACjB,eAAe,CAAC;AAmDpB,qBAAa,YAAa,SAAQ,KAAK;IACrC,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,gBAAgB,CAAC;IAChC,QAAQ,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;gBACnB,IAAI,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM;CAM3E;AAED;;wCAEwC;AACxC,wBAAsB,oBAAoB,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAU7E;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAiBG;AACH,wBAAsB,sBAAsB,CAC1C,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,EACrB,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,GACf,OAAO,CAAC;IAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;CAAE,CAAC,CA6IpD"}
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/**
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* Path-safety primitives for agentic workspace tools.
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+
*
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4
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+
* The `ask_agentic` path exposes Gemini function calls that read arbitrary
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* user-supplied paths. If the model (or a prompt-injected document) smuggles
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* `../../.ssh/id_ed25519` or a symlink pointing outside the workspace, we
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* must reject at every step — not only at schema validation.
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+
*
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* Two classes of defence:
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* 1. **Structural jail** via `realpath` on BOTH the root and the target.
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+
* Prevents symlink escape and `..` traversal. `path.resolve +
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* startsWith(root)` is NOT safe — a symlink inside the root that points
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* outside the root will lexically look fine but actually escape.
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*
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* 2. **Content denylist** — even inside the jail, refuse known secret-
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* bearing filenames (`.env`, `*.pem`, `.ssh/*`, `credentials`…) and
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* path fragments that match `DEFAULT_EXCLUDE_DIRS` (already covers
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* `.aws`, `.kube`, `.gnupg`, etc.). Belt and suspenders.
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*
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* Codex PR #20 review #2 flagged that `resolve+startsWith` is symlink-
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* unsafe. This module implements `realpath + root jail` per that feedback.
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*/
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import { realpath } from 'node:fs/promises';
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import { basename, sep as pathSep, relative, resolve } from 'node:path';
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import { DEFAULT_EXCLUDE_DIRS, DEFAULT_EXCLUDE_FILE_NAMES_LOWER } from '../../indexer/globs.js';
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/** Filename-basename entries that NEVER leak through `read_file`. Even when
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* the path resolves safely under the workspace root, any of these basenames
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* is a hard reject — protects against secrets dropped into the project by
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* the user (`.env.local`) or by dev tooling (`credentials`).
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*
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* Stored in lowercase so the lookup set works on case-insensitive
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* filesystems (macOS APFS, Windows NTFS) where `.ENV` resolves to the same
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* file as `.env`. The `Set` below is built at load time. */
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const AGENTIC_SECRET_BASENAMES = [
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'.env',
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'.env.local',
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'.env.development',
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'.env.production',
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'.env.test',
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'.env.staging',
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'.netrc',
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'.npmrc',
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'.pgpass',
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'.git-credentials',
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'.htpasswd',
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'credentials',
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'credentials.json',
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'secrets.json',
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'secrets.yaml',
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'secrets.yml',
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'service-account.json',
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];
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/** Lowercased `Set` for O(1) case-insensitive basename denylist lookup. */
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const AGENTIC_SECRET_BASENAMES_LOWER = new Set(AGENTIC_SECRET_BASENAMES.map((s) => s.toLowerCase()));
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/** Extensions that frequently carry sensitive key material. Extra gate on
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* top of `AGENTIC_SECRET_BASENAMES`. Matched via `endsWith(lowerBase, ext)`. */
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const AGENTIC_SECRET_EXTENSIONS = [
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'.pem',
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'.key',
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'.crt',
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'.cer',
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'.p12',
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'.pfx',
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'.p8',
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'.asc',
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'.gpg',
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'.keystore',
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'.jks',
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'.ppk',
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'.ovpn',
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];
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/**
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* Directories that carry sensitive material and should trip the
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* `SECRET_DENYLIST` error code (not the generic `EXCLUDED_DIR`). The
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* distinction matters for observability: a downstream audit log tracing
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* "model tried to read secrets" vs. "model tried to read a generated
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* dist file" can filter on the error code. Functionally both are
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* rejected, so security posture is identical.
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*
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* Introduced in PR #24 round-3 self-review finding #7.
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*/
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const SECRET_EXCLUDE_DIRS = new Set([
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'.ssh',
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'.aws',
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'.gnupg',
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'.gpg',
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'.kube',
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'.docker',
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'.1password',
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'.pki',
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'.gcloud',
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'.azure',
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'.config/gcloud',
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'.config/azure',
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'Keychains',
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].map((s) => s.toLowerCase()));
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Path-compare helpers (declared at the top of the file so no function is
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// referenced before its declaration in source order — a defensive tidy-up
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// after PR #24 round-3 review flagged the hoisting-dependent layout. JS
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// `function` declarations are hoisted to the enclosing scope, so the
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// previous order worked at runtime — but a future refactor replacing
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// `function` with `const arrow` would introduce a TDZ crash. Putting them
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// BEFORE `resolveInsideWorkspace` removes that footgun.
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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function isInside(root, candidate) {
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if (candidate === root)
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return true;
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// Compare with the native separator so Windows behaves correctly; the
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// caller's relpath is converted to POSIX *after* this structural check.
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return candidate.startsWith(`${root}${pathSep}`);
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}
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function toPosix(p) {
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return pathSep === '/' ? p : p.split(pathSep).join('/');
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}
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export class SandboxError extends Error {
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code;
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requestedPath;
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constructor(code, message, requestedPath) {
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super(message);
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this.name = 'SandboxError';
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this.code = code;
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this.requestedPath = requestedPath;
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}
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}
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/** Absolute, real (symlink-resolved) path of `rootInput`. The caller must
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* cache this value for the life of an agentic call so we avoid repeated
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* `realpath` calls on the same root. */
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export async function resolveWorkspaceRoot(rootInput) {
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try {
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return await realpath(resolve(rootInput));
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}
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catch (err) {
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throw new SandboxError('NOT_FOUND', `workspace root does not exist or is unreadable: ${rootInput} (${String(err)})`, rootInput);
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}
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}
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/**
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* Resolve `relOrAbs` to a real (symlink-resolved) absolute path, or throw
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* `SandboxError` if it escapes the workspace or matches a denylist.
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*
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* Returns both the resolved absolute path and the POSIX relative path —
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* callers need the absolute for FS operations and the relative for logging
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* and response payloads. Relative path is always forward-slash form
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* regardless of host OS.
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*
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* Missing-file policy: when the target path doesn't exist on disk, we
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* still enforce the structural jail on the PARENT of the missing leaf so
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* a request like `read_file(".ssh/id_ed25519")` fails with `PATH_TRAVERSAL`
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* even if that specific file is absent. Without walking to a real parent
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* we'd leak a `NOT_FOUND` error that confirms the path shape to an
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* attacker — indirect enumeration signal. Acceptable trade-off: the
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* missing-file error for a valid path inside the root still surfaces as
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* `NOT_FOUND` once the parent resolves.
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*/
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export async function resolveInsideWorkspace(workspaceRoot, relOrAbs) {
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if (typeof relOrAbs !== 'string' || relOrAbs.length === 0) {
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throw new SandboxError('PATH_TRAVERSAL', 'path argument is empty', relOrAbs);
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}
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// Empty after normalisation (only whitespace) → reject.
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const cleaned = relOrAbs.trim();
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if (cleaned.length === 0) {
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throw new SandboxError('PATH_TRAVERSAL', 'path argument is whitespace only', relOrAbs);
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}
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const candidate = resolve(workspaceRoot, cleaned);
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// First pass: try to realpath the target. If it exists, we get a canonical
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// symlink-resolved form. If not, walk up to the nearest existing parent
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// and realpath that — so we detect escapes through symlinks that exist
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// even if the leaf does not.
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let resolved;
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try {
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resolved = await realpath(candidate);
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}
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catch {
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// Target doesn't exist (yet). Walk to nearest existing ancestor so we
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// can still assert "the parent is inside the workspace". This avoids
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// leaking "file not found" for paths that are structurally illegal.
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let parent = candidate;
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let existingAncestor = null;
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while (true) {
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const next = resolve(parent, '..');
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if (next === parent)
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break; // hit filesystem root
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parent = next;
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try {
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existingAncestor = await realpath(parent);
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break;
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}
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catch {
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/* keep walking */
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}
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}
|
|
192
|
+
if (existingAncestor === null) {
|
|
193
|
+
throw new SandboxError('NOT_FOUND', `path has no existing ancestor: ${relOrAbs}`, relOrAbs);
|
|
194
|
+
}
|
|
195
|
+
// Assert the existing ancestor is inside the jail. If YES, the missing
|
|
196
|
+
// leaf is legitimately absent inside the workspace; we return a
|
|
197
|
+
// `NOT_FOUND`. If NO, the request was trying to escape via a path
|
|
198
|
+
// whose leaf doesn't exist — treat as traversal.
|
|
199
|
+
if (!isInside(workspaceRoot, existingAncestor)) {
|
|
200
|
+
throw new SandboxError('PATH_TRAVERSAL', `path escapes workspace root: ${relOrAbs}`, relOrAbs);
|
|
201
|
+
}
|
|
202
|
+
throw new SandboxError('NOT_FOUND', `path does not exist: ${relOrAbs}`, relOrAbs);
|
|
203
|
+
}
|
|
204
|
+
// realpath succeeded — enforce jail on the RESOLVED path so symlinks are caught.
|
|
205
|
+
if (!isInside(workspaceRoot, resolved)) {
|
|
206
|
+
throw new SandboxError('PATH_TRAVERSAL', `path escapes workspace root (symlink or absolute outside): ${relOrAbs}`, relOrAbs);
|
|
207
|
+
}
|
|
208
|
+
const rel = toPosix(relative(workspaceRoot, resolved));
|
|
209
|
+
// Content denylist (Codex #4): secrets-by-basename + extension.
|
|
210
|
+
// Both checks are case-insensitive — macOS/APFS and Windows/NTFS are
|
|
211
|
+
// case-insensitive by default, so `.ENV` resolves to the same inode as
|
|
212
|
+
// `.env`. Comparing pre-lowercased protects against a file literally
|
|
213
|
+
// stored as `.ENV` (or `.Env.Local`, `CREDENTIALS`, …) bypassing the
|
|
214
|
+
// list. Extension check was already case-insensitive; basename check
|
|
215
|
+
// used to be strict-equal — bug reported in PR #24 review by Gemini.
|
|
216
|
+
const base = basename(resolved);
|
|
217
|
+
const lowerBase = base.toLowerCase();
|
|
218
|
+
if (AGENTIC_SECRET_BASENAMES_LOWER.has(lowerBase)) {
|
|
219
|
+
throw new SandboxError('SECRET_DENYLIST', `filename on secret-basename denylist: ${base}`, relOrAbs);
|
|
220
|
+
}
|
|
221
|
+
for (const ext of AGENTIC_SECRET_EXTENSIONS) {
|
|
222
|
+
if (lowerBase.endsWith(ext)) {
|
|
223
|
+
throw new SandboxError('SECRET_DENYLIST', `filename on secret-extension denylist: ${base}`, relOrAbs);
|
|
224
|
+
}
|
|
225
|
+
}
|
|
226
|
+
// Excluded-dir check: if the POSIX relative path sits under any entry in
|
|
227
|
+
// `DEFAULT_EXCLUDE_DIRS`, refuse. Same semantics as `globs.ts#isPathExcluded`
|
|
228
|
+
// but we reuse the table rather than the function to skip the MatchConfig
|
|
229
|
+
// plumbing (we already know we're inside the jail, so only dir-name
|
|
230
|
+
// matching matters here).
|
|
231
|
+
//
|
|
232
|
+
// Case-insensitive matching (PR #24 round-3 #2): we compare against the
|
|
233
|
+
// lowercased relative path + lowercased dir entries so macOS APFS /
|
|
234
|
+
// Windows NTFS (case-insensitive by default) don't let a file named
|
|
235
|
+
// `NODE_MODULES/foo.js` slip past a strict-case check.
|
|
236
|
+
//
|
|
237
|
+
// `SECRET_EXCLUDE_DIRS` wins before the generic list so `.ssh/id_ed25519`
|
|
238
|
+
// yields `SECRET_DENYLIST` (not `EXCLUDED_DIR`) — distinguishes "user
|
|
239
|
+
// tried to exfiltrate" from "this dir is just boring build output" in
|
|
240
|
+
// observability. Functionally both are blocked.
|
|
241
|
+
const relLower = rel.toLowerCase();
|
|
242
|
+
for (const dir of DEFAULT_EXCLUDE_DIRS) {
|
|
243
|
+
const dirLower = dir.toLowerCase();
|
|
244
|
+
const isHit = relLower === dirLower ||
|
|
245
|
+
relLower.startsWith(`${dirLower}/`) ||
|
|
246
|
+
relLower.includes(`/${dirLower}/`);
|
|
247
|
+
if (!isHit)
|
|
248
|
+
continue;
|
|
249
|
+
const code = SECRET_EXCLUDE_DIRS.has(dirLower)
|
|
250
|
+
? 'SECRET_DENYLIST'
|
|
251
|
+
: 'EXCLUDED_DIR';
|
|
252
|
+
const detail = code === 'SECRET_DENYLIST'
|
|
253
|
+
? `path is inside a secret-bearing directory: ${dir}`
|
|
254
|
+
: relLower === dirLower
|
|
255
|
+
? `path is an excluded directory: ${dir}`
|
|
256
|
+
: `path is inside excluded directory: ${dir}`;
|
|
257
|
+
throw new SandboxError(code, detail, relOrAbs);
|
|
258
|
+
}
|
|
259
|
+
// And one more pass over DEFAULT_EXCLUDE_FILE_NAMES — lockfiles,
|
|
260
|
+
// tsconfig.tsbuildinfo, etc. — they were uninteresting even in the
|
|
261
|
+
// eager path, and definitely shouldn't cost agentic iterations.
|
|
262
|
+
// Uses the lowercased `Set` so mis-cased files (e.g. `PACKAGE-LOCK.JSON`
|
|
263
|
+
// on case-insensitive FS) still match. Uses `EXCLUDED_FILENAME`
|
|
264
|
+
// (distinct from `EXCLUDED_DIR`) so the calling model can tell
|
|
265
|
+
// "this is a blacklisted filename" from "this is a blacklisted
|
|
266
|
+
// directory" in the `functionResponse.error` payload.
|
|
267
|
+
if (DEFAULT_EXCLUDE_FILE_NAMES_LOWER.has(lowerBase)) {
|
|
268
|
+
throw new SandboxError('EXCLUDED_FILENAME', `filename on default exclude list: ${base}`, relOrAbs);
|
|
269
|
+
}
|
|
270
|
+
return { absolutePath: resolved, relpath: rel };
|
|
271
|
+
}
|
|
272
|
+
//# sourceMappingURL=sandbox.js.map
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
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K,QAAQ;gBACrB,CAAC,CAAC,kCAAkC,GAAG,EAAE;gBACzC,CAAC,CAAC,sCAAsC,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;QACpD,MAAM,IAAI,YAAY,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC;IACjD,CAAC;IACD,iEAAiE;IACjE,mEAAmE;IACnE,gEAAgE;IAChE,yEAAyE;IACzE,gEAAgE;IAChE,+DAA+D;IAC/D,+DAA+D;IAC/D,sDAAsD;IACtD,IAAI,gCAAgC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QACpD,MAAM,IAAI,YAAY,CACpB,mBAAmB,EACnB,qCAAqC,IAAI,EAAE,EAC3C,QAAQ,CACT,CAAC;IACJ,CAAC;IAED,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;AAClD,CAAC"}
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
/**
|
|
2
|
+
* Executor functions for the four Gemini function-call tools used by
|
|
3
|
+
* `ask_agentic`. Each executor takes a workspace-rooted sandbox (from
|
|
4
|
+
* `./sandbox.ts`) and returns a JSON-serialisable result payload, or
|
|
5
|
+
* throws `SandboxError` on security violations / missing files.
|
|
6
|
+
*
|
|
7
|
+
* Hard size limits applied unconditionally (Codex PR2 review critical):
|
|
8
|
+
* - `read_file` per-file: ≤ 200 000 bytes returned (files over that
|
|
9
|
+
* get head-truncated and the response carries `truncated: true` + size
|
|
10
|
+
* metadata so the model can reason about the gap).
|
|
11
|
+
* - `grep` per-call response: ≤ 500 000 bytes of JSON body (matches
|
|
12
|
+
* truncated to fit, response carries `truncated: true`).
|
|
13
|
+
* - `list_directory` / `find_files`: capped by entry count (`MAX_LIST_ENTRIES`
|
|
14
|
+
* / `MAX_FIND_MATCHES`, both small integers) rather than a byte budget —
|
|
15
|
+
* each entry is a short record so the resulting JSON is bounded well
|
|
16
|
+
* under any per-call ceiling.
|
|
17
|
+
*
|
|
18
|
+
* Together these protect the per-iteration token budget from a single
|
|
19
|
+
* minified bundle or a massive listing burning output tokens on one call.
|
|
20
|
+
*/
|
|
21
|
+
export interface DirEntry {
|
|
22
|
+
relpath: string;
|
|
23
|
+
type: 'file' | 'dir';
|
|
24
|
+
size?: number;
|
|
25
|
+
}
|
|
26
|
+
export interface ListDirectoryResult {
|
|
27
|
+
path: string;
|
|
28
|
+
entries: DirEntry[];
|
|
29
|
+
truncated: boolean;
|
|
30
|
+
totalEntries: number;
|
|
31
|
+
}
|
|
32
|
+
/**
|
|
33
|
+
* List immediate children of `relPath` (non-recursive). Default-excluded
|
|
34
|
+
* dirs and denylisted filenames are silently omitted; the model sees only
|
|
35
|
+
* paths it is allowed to ask for via `read_file` / `grep`.
|
|
36
|
+
*/
|
|
37
|
+
export declare function listDirectoryExecutor(workspaceRoot: string, relPath: string): Promise<ListDirectoryResult>;
|
|
38
|
+
export interface FindFilesResult {
|
|
39
|
+
pattern: string;
|
|
40
|
+
matches: string[];
|
|
41
|
+
truncated: boolean;
|
|
42
|
+
totalMatches: number;
|
|
43
|
+
}
|
|
44
|
+
/**
|
|
45
|
+
* Recursive glob search inside the workspace. Respects default excludes +
|
|
46
|
+
* extension gating (same rules as the eager scanner, so the model never
|
|
47
|
+
* sees paths it couldn't `read_file` on anyway — avoids a foot-gun where
|
|
48
|
+
* the model tries to open a secret it saw in a `find_files` response).
|
|
49
|
+
*/
|
|
50
|
+
export declare function findFilesExecutor(workspaceRoot: string, pattern: string): Promise<FindFilesResult>;
|
|
51
|
+
export interface ReadFileResult {
|
|
52
|
+
relpath: string;
|
|
53
|
+
content: string;
|
|
54
|
+
startLine: number;
|
|
55
|
+
endLine: number;
|
|
56
|
+
totalLines: number;
|
|
57
|
+
truncated: boolean;
|
|
58
|
+
truncationReason?: 'max_lines' | 'max_bytes';
|
|
59
|
+
totalBytes: number;
|
|
60
|
+
}
|
|
61
|
+
/**
|
|
62
|
+
* Read a file with bounded bytes + lines. Every response includes enough
|
|
63
|
+
* metadata (`totalLines`, `totalBytes`, `truncated`, `truncationReason`) for
|
|
64
|
+
* the model to request the next slice intelligently.
|
|
65
|
+
*
|
|
66
|
+
* Slicing semantics:
|
|
67
|
+
* - `startLine` / `endLine` are 1-indexed inclusive ranges when given.
|
|
68
|
+
* - Omit both → return the first `DEFAULT_READ_LINE_LIMIT` lines, up to
|
|
69
|
+
* `MAX_READ_BYTES`, whichever hits first.
|
|
70
|
+
*/
|
|
71
|
+
export declare function readFileExecutor(workspaceRoot: string, relPath: string, startLine?: number, endLine?: number): Promise<ReadFileResult>;
|
|
72
|
+
export interface GrepMatch {
|
|
73
|
+
relpath: string;
|
|
74
|
+
line: number;
|
|
75
|
+
text: string;
|
|
76
|
+
}
|
|
77
|
+
export interface GrepResult {
|
|
78
|
+
pattern: string;
|
|
79
|
+
pathPrefix: string | null;
|
|
80
|
+
matches: GrepMatch[];
|
|
81
|
+
truncated: boolean;
|
|
82
|
+
totalMatches: number;
|
|
83
|
+
}
|
|
84
|
+
/**
|
|
85
|
+
* Recursive regex search. Supports a basic anchored `pathPrefix` so the
|
|
86
|
+
* model can scope to a subtree. Pattern is compiled as JS RegExp — the
|
|
87
|
+
* model can use standard metacharacters.
|
|
88
|
+
*
|
|
89
|
+
* Hard caps:
|
|
90
|
+
* - `MAX_GREP_MATCHES` matches returned
|
|
91
|
+
* - each match line truncated to 500 chars (guard against minified
|
|
92
|
+
* lines flooding the payload)
|
|
93
|
+
*/
|
|
94
|
+
export declare function grepExecutor(workspaceRoot: string, pattern: string, pathPrefix?: string): Promise<GrepResult>;
|
|
95
|
+
/** Export knobs for tests to reference without re-declaring numeric values. */
|
|
96
|
+
export declare const AGENTIC_LIMITS: Readonly<{
|
|
97
|
+
readonly MAX_READ_BYTES: 200000;
|
|
98
|
+
readonly MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES: 500000;
|
|
99
|
+
readonly DEFAULT_READ_LINE_LIMIT: 500;
|
|
100
|
+
readonly MAX_GREP_MATCHES: 100;
|
|
101
|
+
readonly MAX_LIST_ENTRIES: 200;
|
|
102
|
+
readonly MAX_FIND_MATCHES: 200;
|
|
103
|
+
}>;
|
|
104
|
+
//# sourceMappingURL=workspace-tools.d.ts.map
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
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|