@qijenchen/design-system 0.1.0-beta.13 → 0.1.0-beta.130

package/ds-canonical/fork/consumer/lib/closed-tool-execution.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,1005 @@
+import { createHash } from 'node:crypto'
+import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'
+import {
+  chmodSync,
+  closeSync,
+  constants as fsConstants,
+  existsSync,
+  fstatSync,
+  fsyncSync,
+  lstatSync,
+  mkdtempSync,
+  mkdirSync,
+  openSync,
+  readFileSync,
+  readlinkSync,
+  readSync,
+  realpathSync,
+  rmSync,
+  statSync,
+  symlinkSync,
+  writeFileSync,
+} from 'node:fs'
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
+import { dirname, isAbsolute, join, relative, resolve, sep } from 'node:path'
+
+const CLOSED_GIT_EXECUTABLES = Object.freeze({
+  darwin: '/usr/bin/git',
+  linux: '/usr/bin/git',
+})
+const CLOSED_GIT_GLOBAL_ARGUMENTS = Object.freeze([
+  '--no-optional-locks',
+  '-c', 'core.autocrlf=false',
+  '-c', 'core.fsmonitor=false',
+  '-c', 'core.hooksPath=/dev/null',
+  '-c', 'credential.helper=',
+  '-c', 'diff.external=',
+  '-c', 'core.attributesFile=/dev/null',
+  '-c', 'core.excludesFile=/dev/null',
+  '-c', 'core.untrackedCache=false',
+  '-c', 'init.templateDir=',
+])
+const CLOSED_GIT_ENVIRONMENT = Object.freeze({
+  GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL: '/dev/null',
+  GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM: '1',
+  GIT_NO_LAZY_FETCH: '1',
+  GIT_NO_REPLACE_OBJECTS: '1',
+  GIT_OPTIONAL_LOCKS: '0',
+  GIT_PAGER: '/bin/cat',
+  GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT: '0',
+  HOME: '/dev/null',
+  LANG: 'C',
+  LC_ALL: 'C',
+  PATH: '/usr/bin:/bin',
+  XDG_CONFIG_HOME: '/dev/null',
+})
+const CLOSED_GH_CANDIDATES = Object.freeze({
+  darwin: ['/opt/homebrew/bin/gh', '/usr/local/bin/gh', '/usr/bin/gh'],
+  linux: ['/usr/bin/gh', '/usr/local/bin/gh', '/home/linuxbrew/.linuxbrew/bin/gh'],
+})
+const CLOSED_PRIVATE_RUNTIME_BASES = Object.freeze({
+  darwin: '/private/tmp',
+  linux: '/tmp',
+})
+const CLOSED_HOOK_EXECUTABLE_CANDIDATES = Object.freeze({
+  darwin: Object.freeze({
+    bash: Object.freeze(['/bin/bash']),
+    git: Object.freeze(['/usr/bin/git']),
+    jq: Object.freeze(['/usr/bin/jq']),
+    perl: Object.freeze(['/usr/bin/perl']),
+    python3: Object.freeze(['/usr/bin/python3']),
+  }),
+  linux: Object.freeze({
+    bash: Object.freeze(['/usr/bin/bash', '/bin/bash']),
+    git: Object.freeze(['/usr/bin/git']),
+    jq: Object.freeze(['/usr/bin/jq']),
+    perl: Object.freeze(['/usr/bin/perl']),
+    python3: Object.freeze(['/usr/bin/python3']),
+  }),
+})
+const CLOSED_HOOK_SYSTEM_PATH_CANDIDATES = Object.freeze([
+  '/usr/bin',
+  '/bin',
+  '/usr/sbin',
+  '/sbin',
+])
+const CLOSED_GH_ARGUMENT_PREFIX = Object.freeze([])
+const DANGEROUS_LOCAL_GIT_CONFIG = /^(?:alias\.|credential\.|filter\.|gpg\.|http\.|include\.|includeif\.|merge\..+\.driver$|protocol\..+\.allow$|submodule\.|tar\..+\.command$|url\..+\.(?:insteadof|pushinsteadof)$|core\.(?:alternaterefscommand|askpass|attributesfile|editor|excludesfile|gitproxy|hookspath|pager|sshcommand|worktree)$|extensions\.worktreeconfig$|interactive\.difffilter$|remote\..+\.(?:proxy|receivepack|uploadpack|vcs)$|sequence\.editor$)|^diff\..+\.(?:command|textconv)$/
+
+const cachedGhExecutables = new Map()
+const cachedHookToolPaths = new Map()
+let ghCleanupRegistered = false
+const ghCleanupRoots = new Set()
+const MAX_CLOSED_EXECUTABLE_BYTES = 512 * 1024 * 1024
+const MAX_CANONICAL_GIT_HOOK_BYTES = 1024 * 1024
+const MAX_CLOSED_GIT_OUTPUT_BYTES = 256 * 1024 * 1024
+
+function invariant(condition, message) {
+  if (!condition) throw new Error(message)
+}
+
+function sha256(bytes) {
+  return createHash('sha256').update(bytes).digest('hex')
+}
+
+function isContained(root, target) {
+  const rel = relative(root, target)
+  return rel === '' || (rel !== '..' && !rel.startsWith(`..${sep}`) && !isAbsolute(rel))
+}
+
+function sameIdentity(left, right) {
+  return left.dev === right.dev
+    && left.ino === right.ino
+    && left.mode === right.mode
+    && left.nlink === right.nlink
+    && left.size === right.size
+    && left.mtimeNs === right.mtimeNs
+    && left.ctimeNs === right.ctimeNs
+}
+
+function sameDirectoryIdentity(left, right) {
+  return left.dev === right.dev
+    && left.ino === right.ino
+    && left.mode === right.mode
+    && left.uid === right.uid
+    && left.gid === right.gid
+}
+
+function validateClosedRuntimeBaseCandidate(candidate, runtimePlatform) {
+  const configured = candidate
+  invariant(configured, `Closed private runtime is unsupported on platform ${runtimePlatform}`)
+  const canonical = realpathSync(configured)
+  const info = lstatSync(canonical, { bigint: true })
+  const currentUid = typeof process.getuid === 'function' ? BigInt(process.getuid()) : null
+  const rootStickyOrClosed = info.uid === 0n
+    && (
+      (info.mode & 0o022n) === 0n
+      || (info.mode & 0o1000n) === 0o1000n
+    )
+  const ownedPrivate = currentUid !== null
+    && info.uid === currentUid
+    && (info.mode & 0o022n) === 0n
+  invariant(
+    info.isDirectory()
+      && !info.isSymbolicLink()
+      && (rootStickyOrClosed || ownedPrivate),
+    `Closed private runtime base is unsafe at ${canonical}`,
+  )
+  return canonical
+}
+
+function validateClosedPrivateRuntimeBase(runtimePlatform) {
+  // Honor the standard per-user temporary directory (TMPDIR / os.tmpdir()) before the
+  // platform fallback. A hardcoded /private/tmp breaks sandboxed and CI environments where
+  // only TMPDIR is writable; a per-user 0700 directory is at least as private as a
+  // root-owned sticky directory.
+  return validateClosedRuntimeBaseCandidate(
+    tmpdir() || CLOSED_PRIVATE_RUNTIME_BASES[runtimePlatform],
+    runtimePlatform,
+  )
+}
+
+function validateClosedPlatformRuntimeBase(runtimePlatform) {
+  return validateClosedRuntimeBaseCandidate(CLOSED_PRIVATE_RUNTIME_BASES[runtimePlatform], runtimePlatform)
+}
+
+export function resolveClosedPrivateRuntimeBase(runtimePlatform = process.platform) {
+  return validateClosedPrivateRuntimeBase(runtimePlatform)
+}
+
+function stableExecutableDigest(path, maxBytes = MAX_CLOSED_EXECUTABLE_BYTES) {
+  let descriptor
+  try {
+    invariant(Number.isSafeInteger(maxBytes) && maxBytes > 0 && maxBytes <= MAX_CLOSED_EXECUTABLE_BYTES, 'Closed executable byte limit is invalid')
+    const pathBefore = lstatSync(path, { bigint: true })
+    descriptor = openSync(
+      path,
+      fsConstants.O_RDONLY
+        | (fsConstants.O_CLOEXEC ?? 0)
+        | (fsConstants.O_NOFOLLOW ?? 0),
+    )
+    const before = fstatSync(descriptor, { bigint: true })
+    invariant(
+      sameIdentity(pathBefore, before)
+        && before.isFile()
+        && before.size > 0n
+        && before.size <= BigInt(maxBytes),
+      `Closed executable size is outside the safe range at ${path}`,
+    )
+    const digest = createHash('sha256')
+    const chunk = Buffer.allocUnsafe(1024 * 1024)
+    let total = 0n
+    while (true) {
+      const count = readSync(descriptor, chunk, 0, chunk.length, null)
+      if (count === 0) break
+      digest.update(chunk.subarray(0, count))
+      total += BigInt(count)
+    }
+    const after = fstatSync(descriptor, { bigint: true })
+    const pathAfter = lstatSync(path, { bigint: true })
+    invariant(
+      sameIdentity(before, after)
+        && sameIdentity(after, pathAfter)
+        && total === before.size,
+      `Closed executable changed while it was authenticated at ${path}`,
+    )
+    return Object.freeze({
+      info: after,
+      sha256: digest.digest('hex'),
+    })
+  } finally {
+    if (descriptor !== undefined) closeSync(descriptor)
+  }
+}
+
+function canonicalRepositoryRoot(repoRoot) {
+  if (repoRoot === undefined) return null
+  invariant(
+    typeof repoRoot === 'string' && resolve(repoRoot) === repoRoot,
+    'Closed tool repository root must be an absolute normalized path',
+  )
+  const canonical = realpathSync(repoRoot)
+  const info = lstatSync(canonical)
+  invariant(
+    canonical === repoRoot && info.isDirectory() && !info.isSymbolicLink(),
+    'Closed tool repository root must be one canonical real directory',
+  )
+  return canonical
+}
+
+function validateClosedHookExecutableSource({
+  candidate,
+  label,
+  repoRoot,
+  runtimePlatform,
+  allowCurrentOwner = false,
+}) {
+  invariant(
+    typeof candidate === 'string' && isAbsolute(candidate) && resolve(candidate) === candidate,
+    `Closed ${label} executable candidate must be one absolute normalized path`,
+  )
+  const source = realpathSync(candidate)
+  const currentUid = typeof process.getuid === 'function' ? BigInt(process.getuid()) : null
+  const authenticated = stableExecutableDigest(source)
+  const info = authenticated.info
+  invariant(
+    info.isFile()
+      && !info.isSymbolicLink()
+      && (info.mode & 0o111n) !== 0n
+      && (info.mode & 0o022n) === 0n
+      && (
+        info.uid === 0n
+        || (
+          allowCurrentOwner
+          && currentUid !== null
+          && info.uid === currentUid
+          && info.nlink === 1n
+        )
+      ),
+    `Closed ${label} executable source is unsafe at ${source}`,
+  )
+  if (repoRoot) {
+    invariant(
+      !isContained(repoRoot, source),
+      `Closed ${label} executable source cannot be inside the governed repository`,
+    )
+  }
+  return Object.freeze({
+    label,
+    runtimePlatform,
+    sha256: authenticated.sha256,
+    source,
+    sourceInfo: info,
+  })
+}
+
+function validateClosedRunningNodeExecutable({ candidate, repoRoot, runtimePlatform }) {
+  invariant(
+    typeof candidate === 'string' && isAbsolute(candidate) && resolve(candidate) === candidate,
+    'Closed node executable candidate must be one absolute normalized path',
+  )
+  const source = realpathSync(candidate)
+  // The coherent provenance invariant for the hook-child interpreter is IDENTITY with the
+  // interpreter already executing this governance code: realpath(candidate) ==
+  // realpath(process.execPath), TOCTOU-bound below by inode identity plus a full content
+  // digest of exactly the bytes that will run. A blessed ownership/mode class is the wrong
+  // invariant for the running interpreter: managed GitHub runners ship node world-writable
+  // by image design (actions/runner-images install-nodejs.sh runs `chmod -R 777
+  // /usr/local/bin`; configure-system.sh runs `chmod -R 777 /opt`, covering the
+  // setup-node toolcache), so no ownership/mode class can admit the actual interpreter
+  // there — and rejecting the very binary whose in-process code performs the check adds no
+  // assurance, because a compromised running interpreter could bypass any in-process
+  // check. Foreign node candidates (explicitly configured paths that are NOT the running
+  // interpreter) keep the full blessed-provenance validation.
+  if (source !== realpathSync(process.execPath)) {
+    return validateClosedHookExecutableSource({
+      candidate,
+      label: 'node',
+      repoRoot,
+      runtimePlatform,
+      allowCurrentOwner: true,
+    })
+  }
+  const authenticated = stableExecutableDigest(source)
+  const info = authenticated.info
+  invariant(
+    info.isFile()
+      && !info.isSymbolicLink()
+      && (info.mode & 0o111n) !== 0n,
+    `Closed node executable source is unsafe at ${source}`,
+  )
+  if (repoRoot) {
+    invariant(
+      !isContained(repoRoot, source),
+      'Closed node executable source cannot be inside the governed repository',
+    )
+  }
+  return Object.freeze({
+    label: 'node',
+    runtimePlatform,
+    sha256: authenticated.sha256,
+    source,
+    sourceInfo: info,
+  })
+}
+
+function resolveClosedHookExecutable({
+  label,
+  nodeExecutable,
+  repoRoot,
+  runtimePlatform,
+}) {
+  if (label === 'node') {
+    return validateClosedRunningNodeExecutable({
+      candidate: nodeExecutable,
+      repoRoot,
+      runtimePlatform,
+    })
+  }
+  const candidates = CLOSED_HOOK_EXECUTABLE_CANDIDATES[runtimePlatform]?.[label]
+  invariant(candidates, `Closed ${label} execution is unsupported on platform ${runtimePlatform}`)
+  for (const candidate of candidates) {
+    if (!existsSync(candidate)) continue
+    try {
+      return validateClosedHookExecutableSource({
+        candidate,
+        label,
+        repoRoot,
+        runtimePlatform,
+      })
+    } catch {}
+  }
+  throw new Error(`No authenticated ${label} executable is available from the closed platform candidates`)
+}
+
+function resolveClosedHookSystemPaths(runtimePlatform) {
+  invariant(
+    CLOSED_HOOK_EXECUTABLE_CANDIDATES[runtimePlatform],
+    `Closed hook tool execution is unsupported on platform ${runtimePlatform}`,
+  )
+  const records = new Map()
+  for (const candidate of CLOSED_HOOK_SYSTEM_PATH_CANDIDATES) {
+    if (!existsSync(candidate)) continue
+    const canonical = realpathSync(candidate)
+    if (records.has(canonical)) continue
+    const info = lstatSync(canonical, { bigint: true })
+    invariant(
+      info.isDirectory()
+        && !info.isSymbolicLink()
+        && info.uid === 0n
+        && (info.mode & 0o022n) === 0n,
+      `Closed hook system PATH entry is unsafe at ${canonical}`,
+    )
+    records.set(canonical, Object.freeze({ path: canonical, info }))
+  }
+  invariant(records.size > 0, 'Closed hook system PATH has no authenticated directory')
+  return Object.freeze([...records.values()])
+}
+
+function closedGitIdentityEnvironment(identity) {
+  if (identity === undefined) return {}
+  invariant(identity && typeof identity === 'object' && !Array.isArray(identity), 'Closed Git identity must be an object')
+  const expected = [
+    'authorDate',
+    'authorEmail',
+    'authorName',
+    'committerDate',
+    'committerEmail',
+    'committerName',
+  ]
+  invariant(
+    JSON.stringify(Object.keys(identity).sort()) === JSON.stringify(expected),
+    'Closed Git identity has an open or incomplete shape',
+  )
+  for (const key of expected) {
+    invariant(
+      typeof identity[key] === 'string'
+        && identity[key].length > 0
+        && identity[key].length <= 320
+        && !/[\0\r\n]/.test(identity[key]),
+      `Closed Git identity ${key} is invalid`,
+    )
+  }
+  invariant(
+    !Number.isNaN(Date.parse(identity.authorDate))
+      && !Number.isNaN(Date.parse(identity.committerDate)),
+    'Closed Git identity dates are invalid',
+  )
+  return {
+    GIT_AUTHOR_DATE: identity.authorDate,
+    GIT_AUTHOR_EMAIL: identity.authorEmail,
+    GIT_AUTHOR_NAME: identity.authorName,
+    GIT_COMMITTER_DATE: identity.committerDate,
+    GIT_COMMITTER_EMAIL: identity.committerEmail,
+    GIT_COMMITTER_NAME: identity.committerName,
+  }
+}
+
+export function validateClosedGitExecutable(executable) {
+  invariant(typeof executable === 'string' && resolve(executable) === executable, 'Closed Git executable must be an absolute normalized path')
+  let info
+  try {
+    info = lstatSync(executable)
+  } catch (error) {
+    throw new Error(`Closed Git executable is unavailable at ${executable}: ${error.message}`, { cause: error })
+  }
+  invariant(
+    info.isFile()
+      && !info.isSymbolicLink()
+      && info.uid === 0
+      && (info.mode & 0o111) !== 0
+      && (info.mode & 0o022) === 0
+      && realpathSync(executable) === executable,
+    `Closed Git executable is unsafe at ${executable}`,
+  )
+  return executable
+}
+
+export function resolveClosedGitExecutable(runtimePlatform = process.platform) {
+  const executable = CLOSED_GIT_EXECUTABLES[runtimePlatform]
+  invariant(executable, `Closed Git execution is unsupported on platform ${runtimePlatform}`)
+  return validateClosedGitExecutable(executable)
+}
+
+export function runClosedGit(args, {
+  cwd,
+  gitIdentity,
+  input,
+  maxInputBytes = 64 * 1024 * 1024,
+  output = 'capture',
+  maxOutputBytes = 8 * 1024 * 1024,
+  runner = spawnSync,
+  runtimePlatform = process.platform,
+  timeoutMs = 5000,
+} = {}) {
+  invariant(Array.isArray(args) && args.length > 0 && args.every(value => typeof value === 'string'), 'Closed Git arguments must be a non-empty string array')
+  invariant(
+    !args.some(value => value === '-c'
+      || value.startsWith('-c')
+      || value === '--config-env'
+      || value.startsWith('--config-env=')),
+    'Closed Git callers may not inject global configuration arguments',
+  )
+  invariant(typeof cwd === 'string' && resolve(cwd) === cwd, 'Closed Git cwd must be one absolute normalized path')
+  const cwdInfo = lstatSync(cwd)
+  invariant(
+    cwdInfo.isDirectory() && !cwdInfo.isSymbolicLink() && realpathSync(cwd) === cwd,
+    'Closed Git cwd must be one canonical real directory',
+  )
+  invariant(['buffer', 'capture', 'ignore'].includes(output), 'Closed Git output mode is unsupported')
+  invariant(Number.isInteger(maxInputBytes) && maxInputBytes > 0 && maxInputBytes <= 128 * 1024 * 1024, 'Closed Git input limit is outside the safe range')
+  invariant(Number.isInteger(maxOutputBytes) && maxOutputBytes > 0 && maxOutputBytes <= MAX_CLOSED_GIT_OUTPUT_BYTES, 'Closed Git output limit is outside the safe range')
+  invariant(Number.isInteger(timeoutMs) && timeoutMs > 0 && timeoutMs <= 30_000, 'Closed Git timeout is outside the safe range')
+  invariant(typeof runner === 'function', 'Closed Git runner must be callable')
+  invariant(
+    input === undefined || typeof input === 'string' || Buffer.isBuffer(input),
+    'Closed Git input must be a string or Buffer',
+  )
+  invariant(
+    input === undefined || Buffer.byteLength(input) <= maxInputBytes,
+    'Closed Git input exceeds the closed size limit',
+  )
+  return runner(
+    resolveClosedGitExecutable(runtimePlatform),
+    [...CLOSED_GIT_GLOBAL_ARGUMENTS, ...args],
+    {
+      cwd,
+      encoding: output === 'capture' ? 'utf8' : (output === 'buffer' ? null : undefined),
+      env: {
+        ...CLOSED_GIT_ENVIRONMENT,
+        ...closedGitIdentityEnvironment(gitIdentity),
+      },
+      input,
+      maxBuffer: maxOutputBytes,
+      shell: false,
+      stdio: output === 'ignore'
+        ? [input === undefined ? 'ignore' : 'pipe', 'ignore', 'ignore']
+        : [input === undefined ? 'ignore' : 'pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
+      timeout: timeoutMs,
+      windowsHide: true,
+    },
+  )
+}
+
+function closedGitOutput(repoRoot, args, label, options = {}) {
+  const result = runClosedGit(args, { cwd: resolve(repoRoot), ...options })
+  invariant(
+    !result.error && result.signal === null && result.status === 0 && typeof result.stdout === 'string',
+    `Cannot resolve ${label} through closed Git`,
+  )
+  return result.stdout
+}
+
+export function validateCanonicalGovernanceHook(repoRoot) {
+  const root = realpathSync(resolve(repoRoot))
+  const expectedHookRoot = join(root, '.husky')
+  const hookRootInfo = lstatSync(expectedHookRoot, { bigint: true })
+  const precommitPath = join(expectedHookRoot, 'pre-commit')
+  const precommitPathInfo = lstatSync(precommitPath, { bigint: true })
+  invariant(
+    precommitPathInfo.isFile() && !precommitPathInfo.isSymbolicLink(),
+    'Repository-local Git hook path is not backed by the canonical executable .husky/pre-commit file',
+  )
+  const precommitSource = realpathSync(precommitPath)
+  const authenticated = stableExecutableDigest(precommitPath, MAX_CANONICAL_GIT_HOOK_BYTES)
+  const precommitInfo = authenticated.info
+  const currentUid = typeof process.getuid === 'function' ? BigInt(process.getuid()) : null
+  invariant(
+    hookRootInfo.isDirectory()
+      && !hookRootInfo.isSymbolicLink()
+      && (hookRootInfo.mode & 0o022n) === 0n
+      && currentUid !== null
+      && (hookRootInfo.uid === currentUid || hookRootInfo.uid === 0n)
+      && realpathSync(expectedHookRoot) === expectedHookRoot
+      && precommitSource === precommitPath
+      && precommitInfo.isFile()
+      && !precommitInfo.isSymbolicLink()
+      && precommitInfo.nlink === 1n
+      && (precommitInfo.mode & 0o111n) !== 0n
+      && (precommitInfo.mode & 0o022n) === 0n
+      && (precommitInfo.mode & 0o7000n) === 0n
+      && (precommitInfo.uid === currentUid || precommitInfo.uid === 0n),
+    'Repository-local Git hook path is not backed by the canonical executable .husky/pre-commit file',
+  )
+  return Object.freeze({
+    root,
+    hookRoot: expectedHookRoot,
+    hookPath: precommitPath,
+    sha256: authenticated.sha256,
+  })
+}
+
+export function assertClosedGitLocalConfiguration(repoRoot, options = {}) {
+  const {
+    allowHookPathMigration = false,
+    ...gitOptions
+  } = options
+  invariant(typeof allowHookPathMigration === 'boolean', 'Closed Git hook migration option must be boolean')
+  const root = realpathSync(resolve(repoRoot))
+  const names = closedGitOutput(
+    root,
+    ['config', '--local', '--no-includes', '--null', '--name-only', '--list'],
+    'repository-local Git configuration',
+    gitOptions,
+  ).split('\0').filter(Boolean)
+  const hookPathNames = names.filter(name => name.toLowerCase() === 'core.hookspath')
+  if (hookPathNames.length > 0 && !allowHookPathMigration) {
+    const hookPaths = closedGitOutput(
+      root,
+      ['config', '--local', '--no-includes', '--null', '--get-all', 'core.hooksPath'],
+      'repository-local Git hook path',
+      gitOptions,
+    ).split('\0').filter(Boolean)
+    invariant(hookPathNames.length === 1 && hookPaths.length === 1, 'Repository-local Git hook path must be one exact canonical binding')
+    // Accept every standard husky binding shape (relative `.husky`, husky v9 `.husky/_`,
+    // or an absolute path) as long as it stays inside this repository. Byte-exact
+    // absolute-path equality broke linked worktrees, re-clones, and path renames.
+    const resolvedHookPath = resolve(root, hookPaths[0])
+    invariant(
+      isContained(root, resolvedHookPath),
+      'Repository-local Git hook path must stay inside the repository',
+    )
+  }
+  const dangerous = names
+    .map(name => name.toLowerCase())
+    .filter(name => name !== 'core.hookspath')
+    .filter(name => DANGEROUS_LOCAL_GIT_CONFIG.test(name))
+    .sort()
+  invariant(
+    dangerous.length === 0,
+    `Repository-local Git configuration may execute unsupported external commands: ${dangerous.join(', ')}`,
+  )
+  return true
+}
+
+function ghSourceCandidates({ executable, runtimePlatform }) {
+  if (executable !== undefined) {
+    invariant(typeof executable === 'string' && isAbsolute(executable) && resolve(executable) === executable, 'Closed GitHub CLI override must be one absolute normalized path')
+    return [executable]
+  }
+  const candidates = CLOSED_GH_CANDIDATES[runtimePlatform]
+  invariant(candidates, `Closed GitHub CLI execution is unsupported on platform ${runtimePlatform}`)
+  return candidates
+}
+
+function validateGhSource(candidate, repoRoot) {
+  const source = realpathSync(candidate)
+  const info = lstatSync(source, { bigint: true })
+  const currentUid = typeof process.getuid === 'function' ? BigInt(process.getuid()) : null
+  invariant(
+    info.isFile()
+      && !info.isSymbolicLink()
+      && info.nlink === 1n
+      && (info.mode & 0o111n) !== 0n
+      && (info.mode & 0o022n) === 0n
+      && (info.uid === 0n || (currentUid !== null && info.uid === currentUid)),
+    `Closed GitHub CLI source is unsafe at ${source}`,
+  )
+  if (repoRoot) {
+    const canonicalRepo = realpathSync(resolve(repoRoot))
+    invariant(!isContained(canonicalRepo, source), 'Closed GitHub CLI source cannot be inside the governed repository')
+  }
+  return { source, info }
+}
+
+function registerPrivateCleanup(root) {
+  ghCleanupRoots.add(root)
+  if (ghCleanupRegistered) return
+  ghCleanupRegistered = true
+  process.once('exit', () => {
+    for (const cleanupRoot of ghCleanupRoots) {
+      try {
+        chmodSync(cleanupRoot, 0o700)
+        rmSync(cleanupRoot, { recursive: true, force: true })
+      } catch {}
+    }
+  })
+}
+
+function materializeClosedGhExecutable(options = {}) {
+  let selected = null
+  for (const candidate of ghSourceCandidates(options)) {
+    if (!existsSync(candidate)) continue
+    try {
+      selected = validateGhSource(candidate, options.repoRoot)
+      break
+    } catch (error) {
+      if (options.executable !== undefined) throw error
+    }
+  }
+  invariant(selected, 'No authenticated GitHub CLI executable is available from the closed platform candidates')
+  const cacheKey = `${options.runtimePlatform ?? process.platform}\0${selected.source}`
+  const cached = cachedGhExecutables.get(cacheKey)
+  if (cached) {
+    const current = lstatSync(cached.source, { bigint: true })
+    invariant(sameIdentity(current, cached.sourceInfo), 'Closed GitHub CLI source changed after it was authenticated')
+    const privateInfo = lstatSync(cached.executable, { bigint: true })
+    invariant(
+      sameIdentity(privateInfo, cached.privateInfo)
+        && sha256(readFileSync(cached.executable)) === cached.sha256,
+      'Private GitHub CLI executable changed after it was authenticated',
+    )
+    return cached.executable
+  }
+  const temporaryBase = validateClosedPrivateRuntimeBase(options.runtimePlatform ?? process.platform)
+  const root = realpathSync(mkdtempSync(join(temporaryBase, 'qijenchen-closed-gh-')))
+  chmodSync(root, 0o700)
+  if (options.repoRoot) {
+    const canonicalRepo = realpathSync(resolve(options.repoRoot))
+    invariant(!isContained(canonicalRepo, root), 'Closed GitHub CLI private executable cannot be materialized inside the governed repository')
+  }
+  const executable = join(root, 'gh')
+  const before = lstatSync(selected.source, { bigint: true })
+  const bytes = readFileSync(selected.source)
+  const after = lstatSync(selected.source, { bigint: true })
+  invariant(sameIdentity(before, after), 'GitHub CLI source changed while it was authenticated')
+  let descriptor
+  try {
+    descriptor = openSync(executable, 'wx', 0o500)
+    writeFileSync(descriptor, bytes)
+    fsyncSync(descriptor)
+    closeSync(descriptor)
+    descriptor = undefined
+  } finally {
+    if (descriptor !== undefined) closeSync(descriptor)
+  }
+  const privateInfo = lstatSync(executable, { bigint: true })
+  invariant(
+    privateInfo.isFile()
+      && !privateInfo.isSymbolicLink()
+      && privateInfo.nlink === 1n
+      && (privateInfo.mode & 0o777n) === 0o500n
+      && privateInfo.size === BigInt(bytes.length)
+      && sha256(readFileSync(executable)) === sha256(bytes),
+    'Private GitHub CLI executable failed authenticated materialization',
+  )
+  registerPrivateCleanup(root)
+  const materialized = Object.freeze({
+    executable,
+    privateInfo,
+    root,
+    sha256: sha256(bytes),
+    source: selected.source,
+    sourceInfo: after,
+  })
+  cachedGhExecutables.set(cacheKey, materialized)
+  return executable
+}
+
+export function materializeClosedHookToolProfile({
+  nodeExecutable = process.execPath,
+  repoRoot,
+  runtimePlatform = process.platform,
+} = {}) {
+  invariant(
+    typeof nodeExecutable === 'string'
+      && isAbsolute(nodeExecutable)
+      && resolve(nodeExecutable) === nodeExecutable,
+    'Closed hook Node executable must be one absolute normalized path',
+  )
+  const canonicalRepo = canonicalRepositoryRoot(repoRoot)
+  const executableRecords = Object.fromEntries(
+    // perl added 2026-08-04: three canonical hooks and the hardcoded-strings lib shell out to it,
+    // so the pinned tool profile has to declare it like every other hook interpreter.
+    ['bash', 'git', 'jq', 'node', 'perl', 'python3'].map((label) => [
+      label,
+      resolveClosedHookExecutable({
+        label,
+        nodeExecutable,
+        repoRoot: canonicalRepo,
+        runtimePlatform,
+      }),
+    ]),
+  )
+  const systemPaths = resolveClosedHookSystemPaths(runtimePlatform)
+  const cacheKey = [
+    runtimePlatform,
+    canonicalRepo ?? '',
+    ...Object.values(executableRecords).map(record => `${record.label}:${record.source}:${record.sha256}`),
+    ...systemPaths.map(record => record.path),
+  ].join('\0')
+  const cached = cachedHookToolPaths.get(cacheKey)
+  if (cached) {
+    cached.verify()
+    return cached
+  }
+
+  // If the honored TMPDIR sits inside the governed repository (common in isolated test
+  // fixtures that pin TMPDIR to a snapshot directory), fall back to a base outside the
+  // repository: first the platform base, then the repository's parent directory (for
+  // sandboxes where only the checkout's own volume is writable).
+  let root = null
+  const baseCandidates = []
+  const honoredBase = validateClosedPrivateRuntimeBase(runtimePlatform)
+  if (!canonicalRepo || !isContained(canonicalRepo, honoredBase)) baseCandidates.push(honoredBase)
+  else {
+    baseCandidates.push(() => validateClosedPlatformRuntimeBase(runtimePlatform))
+    baseCandidates.push(() => dirname(canonicalRepo))
+  }
+  let lastBaseError = null
+  for (const candidate of baseCandidates) {
+    try {
+      const temporaryBase = typeof candidate === 'function' ? candidate() : candidate
+      root = realpathSync(mkdtempSync(join(temporaryBase, 'qijenchen-closed-hook-tools-')))
+      break
+    } catch (error) {
+      lastBaseError = error
+    }
+  }
+  if (!root) throw lastBaseError || new Error('Closed hook tool profile has no writable private base')
+  chmodSync(root, 0o700)
+  if (canonicalRepo) {
+    invariant(
+      !isContained(canonicalRepo, root),
+      'Closed hook tool profile cannot be materialized inside the governed repository',
+    )
+  }
+  const homeDirectory = join(root, 'home')
+  const tempDirectory = join(root, 'tmp')
+  const directoryDescriptor = (path) => {
+    const descriptor = openSync(path, fsConstants.O_RDONLY | (fsConstants.O_CLOEXEC ?? 0))
+    try {
+      return fstatSync(descriptor, { bigint: true })
+    } finally {
+      closeSync(descriptor)
+    }
+  }
+  mkdirSync(homeDirectory, { mode: 0o700 })
+  mkdirSync(tempDirectory, { mode: 0o700 })
+  const materializedHome = realpathSync(homeDirectory)
+  const materializedTemp = realpathSync(tempDirectory)
+
+  const executablePaths = {}
+  const linkRecords = {}
+  for (const [label, record] of Object.entries(executableRecords)) {
+    const executablePath = join(root, label)
+    symlinkSync(record.source, executablePath)
+    const linkInfo = lstatSync(executablePath, { bigint: true })
+    invariant(
+      linkInfo.isSymbolicLink()
+        && readlinkSync(executablePath) === record.source,
+      `Closed ${label} executable alias failed authenticated materialization`,
+    )
+    executablePaths[label] = executablePath
+    linkRecords[label] = Object.freeze({
+      info: linkInfo,
+      path: executablePath,
+      target: record.source,
+    })
+  }
+  chmodSync(root, 0o500)
+  const rootInfo = lstatSync(root, { bigint: true })
+  const homeInfo = directoryDescriptor(materializedHome)
+  const tempInfo = directoryDescriptor(materializedTemp)
+  const executablePath = [root, ...systemPaths.map(record => record.path)].join(':')
+  const profileSha256 = sha256(JSON.stringify({
+    executablePath,
+    executables: Object.fromEntries(
+      Object.entries(executableRecords).map(([label, record]) => [
+        label,
+        { source: record.source, sha256: record.sha256 },
+      ]),
+    ),
+    runtimePlatform,
+    schemaVersion: 1,
+    systemPaths: systemPaths.map(record => record.path),
+  }))
+
+  const verify = () => {
+    const currentRoot = lstatSync(root, { bigint: true })
+    invariant(
+      sameIdentity(currentRoot, rootInfo)
+        && currentRoot.isDirectory()
+        && !currentRoot.isSymbolicLink()
+        && (currentRoot.mode & 0o777n) === 0o500n,
+      'Closed hook tool profile root changed after it was authenticated',
+    )
+    invariant(
+      sameDirectoryIdentity(directoryDescriptor(materializedHome), homeInfo)
+        && sameDirectoryIdentity(directoryDescriptor(materializedTemp), tempInfo),
+      'Closed hook private HOME or TMPDIR changed after it was authenticated',
+    )
+    for (const [label, record] of Object.entries(executableRecords)) {
+      const sourceInfo = lstatSync(record.source, { bigint: true })
+      invariant(
+        sameIdentity(sourceInfo, record.sourceInfo),
+        `Closed ${label} executable source changed after it was authenticated`,
+      )
+      const link = linkRecords[label]
+      const linkInfo = lstatSync(link.path, { bigint: true })
+      invariant(
+        sameIdentity(linkInfo, link.info)
+          && linkInfo.isSymbolicLink()
+          && readlinkSync(link.path) === link.target,
+        `Closed ${label} executable alias changed after it was authenticated`,
+      )
+    }
+    for (const record of systemPaths) {
+      invariant(
+        sameIdentity(lstatSync(record.path, { bigint: true }), record.info),
+        `Closed hook system PATH entry changed after it was authenticated:${record.path}`,
+      )
+    }
+    return true
+  }
+
+  registerPrivateCleanup(root)
+  const profile = Object.freeze({
+    executablePath,
+    executables: Object.freeze(executablePaths),
+    homeDirectory: materializedHome,
+    profileSha256,
+    root,
+    runtimePlatform,
+    sources: Object.freeze(Object.fromEntries(
+      Object.entries(executableRecords).map(([label, record]) => [
+        label,
+        Object.freeze({ path: record.source, sha256: record.sha256 }),
+      ]),
+    )),
+    tempDirectory: materializedTemp,
+    verify,
+  })
+  cachedHookToolPaths.set(cacheKey, profile)
+  profile.verify()
+  return profile
+}
+
+export function captureClosedGitHubToken({
+  token,
+  environment = process.env,
+  requireToken = true,
+  tokenEnvironmentName = 'GH_TOKEN',
+} = {}) {
+  invariant(
+    tokenEnvironmentName === null || tokenEnvironmentName === 'GH_TOKEN' || tokenEnvironmentName === 'GITHUB_TOKEN',
+    'Closed GitHub CLI token authority name is unsupported',
+  )
+  if (token !== undefined) {
+    invariant(typeof token === 'string', 'Closed GitHub CLI token override must be a string')
+  }
+  const ambient = ['GH_TOKEN', 'GITHUB_TOKEN']
+    .filter(name => typeof environment?.[name] === 'string' && environment[name] !== '')
+  invariant(ambient.length <= 1, 'Closed GitHub CLI received multiple token authorities')
+  if (token !== undefined && token !== '') {
+    invariant(ambient.length === 0, 'Closed GitHub CLI explicit token conflicts with an ambient token authority')
+  } else if (ambient.length) {
+    invariant(
+      tokenEnvironmentName !== null && ambient[0] === tokenEnvironmentName,
+      `Closed GitHub CLI token authority must be ${tokenEnvironmentName ?? 'an explicit token'}`,
+    )
+  }
+  const candidate = token !== undefined && token !== ''
+    ? token
+    : (ambient.length ? environment[ambient[0]] : null)
+  if (candidate === null) {
+    invariant(!requireToken, 'Closed GitHub CLI requires one explicit GH_TOKEN or GITHUB_TOKEN')
+    return null
+  }
+  invariant(
+    candidate.length >= 8
+      && candidate.length <= 4096
+      && !/[\0\r\n]/.test(candidate),
+    'Closed GitHub CLI token is malformed',
+  )
+  return candidate
+}
+
+export function runClosedGh(args, {
+  cwd,
+  environment = process.env,
+  executable,
+  input,
+  maxInputBytes = 16 * 1024 * 1024,
+  maxOutputBytes = 16 * 1024 * 1024,
+  output = 'capture',
+  repoRoot,
+  requireToken = true,
+  runtimePlatform = process.platform,
+  timeoutMs = 60_000,
+  token,
+  tokenEnvironmentName = 'GH_TOKEN',
+} = {}) {
+  invariant(Array.isArray(args) && args.length > 0 && args.every(value => typeof value === 'string'), 'Closed GitHub CLI arguments must be a non-empty string array')
+  invariant(typeof cwd === 'string' && resolve(cwd) === cwd, 'Closed GitHub CLI cwd must be one absolute normalized path')
+  invariant(['buffer', 'capture', 'ignore'].includes(output), 'Closed GitHub CLI output mode is unsupported')
+  invariant(Number.isInteger(maxInputBytes) && maxInputBytes > 0 && maxInputBytes <= 64 * 1024 * 1024, 'Closed GitHub CLI input limit is outside the safe range')
+  invariant(Number.isInteger(maxOutputBytes) && maxOutputBytes > 0 && maxOutputBytes <= 128 * 1024 * 1024, 'Closed GitHub CLI output limit is outside the safe range')
+  invariant(Number.isInteger(timeoutMs) && timeoutMs > 0 && timeoutMs <= 120_000, 'Closed GitHub CLI timeout is outside the safe range')
+  invariant(
+    input === undefined || typeof input === 'string' || Buffer.isBuffer(input),
+    'Closed GitHub CLI input must be a string or Buffer',
+  )
+  invariant(
+    input === undefined || Buffer.byteLength(input) <= maxInputBytes,
+    'Closed GitHub CLI input exceeds the closed size limit',
+  )
+  const githubToken = captureClosedGitHubToken({
+    token,
+    environment,
+    requireToken,
+    tokenEnvironmentName,
+  })
+  const privateExecutable = materializeClosedGhExecutable({ executable, repoRoot, runtimePlatform })
+  const privateHome = dirname(privateExecutable)
+  return spawnSync(
+    privateExecutable,
+    [...CLOSED_GH_ARGUMENT_PREFIX, ...args],
+    {
+      cwd,
+      encoding: output === 'capture' ? 'utf8' : (output === 'buffer' ? null : undefined),
+      env: {
+        GH_HOST: 'github.com',
+        GH_CONFIG_DIR: privateHome,
+        GH_PAGER: 'cat',
+        GH_PROMPT_DISABLED: '1',
+        ...(githubToken ? { GH_TOKEN: githubToken } : {}),
+        HOME: privateHome,
+        LANG: 'C',
+        LC_ALL: 'C',
+        NO_COLOR: '1',
+        PAGER: 'cat',
+        PATH: '/usr/bin:/bin',
+        XDG_CONFIG_HOME: privateHome,
+      },
+      input,
+      maxBuffer: maxOutputBytes,
+      shell: false,
+      stdio: output === 'ignore' ? 'ignore' : ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
+      timeout: timeoutMs,
+      windowsHide: true,
+    },
+  )
+}
+
+export function closedToolExecutionPaths() {
+  return Object.freeze({
+    git: resolveClosedGitExecutable(),
+    gh: [...cachedGhExecutables.values()].map(record => record.executable).sort(),
+    hookProfiles: [...cachedHookToolPaths.values()].map(record => Object.freeze({
+      executablePath: record.executablePath,
+      profileSha256: record.profileSha256,
+      root: record.root,
+    })),
+  })
+}