@qduc/term2 0.7.3 → 0.9.0

package/dist/utils/shell/command-safety/path-analysis.js

@@ -0,0 +1,269 @@
+import path from 'path';
+import { SafetyStatus, SYSTEM_PATHS, SENSITIVE_EXTENSIONS, HOME_PATTERNS, SENSITIVE_PATHS, SAFE_JSON_FILES, SUSPICIOUS_JSON_PATTERNS, } from './constants.js';
+const nullLoggingService = {
+    info: () => { },
+    warn: () => { },
+    error: () => { },
+    debug: () => { },
+    security: () => { },
+    setCorrelationId: () => { },
+    getCorrelationId: () => undefined,
+    clearCorrelationId: () => { },
+};
+// Dot-directories that almost always contain credentials, private keys, or secrets.
+// Access to these should be blocked (RED) regardless of the specific file inside.
+const HIGHLY_SENSITIVE_HOME_DIRS = new Set([
+    '.ssh',
+    '.gnupg',
+    '.gpg',
+    '.aws',
+    '.azure',
+    '.gcloud',
+    '.config/gcloud',
+    '.kube',
+    '.docker',
+    '.netrc',
+    '.pgpass',
+    '.password-store',
+    '.cert',
+    '.certs',
+    '.keys',
+    '.secrets',
+]);
+// Sensitive dotfiles at the root of the home directory (RED).
+const HIGHLY_SENSITIVE_HOME_FILES = new Set([
+    '.netrc',
+    '.pgpass',
+    '.npmrc', // can contain auth tokens
+    '.pypirc', // can contain auth tokens
+    '.gitconfig', // may contain credentials / signing keys
+    '.git-credentials',
+    '.bash_history',
+    '.zsh_history',
+    '.python_history',
+    '.node_repl_history',
+    '.mysql_history',
+    '.psql_history',
+    '.lesshst',
+]);
+// Dot-directories that are commonly used as working/cache/data directories.
+// These should NOT be RED — they're YELLOW at worst, often GREEN-ish.
+// Users frequently work in these (installing tools, inspecting caches, etc.).
+const COMMON_WORKING_DOT_DIRS = new Set([
+    '.local',
+    '.cache',
+    '.config', // root .config is broad; specific sensitive subdirs handled above
+    '.npm',
+    '.yarn',
+    '.pnpm',
+    '.nvm',
+    '.node_modules',
+    '.vscode',
+    '.idea',
+    '.cursor',
+    '.vim',
+    '.emacs.d',
+    '.mozilla',
+    '.themes',
+    '.icons',
+    '.fonts',
+    '.gradle',
+    '.m2',
+    '.cargo',
+    '.rustup',
+    '.pyenv',
+    '.rbenv',
+    '.virtualenvs',
+    '.docker-desktop',
+]);
+const SENSITIVE_LOCAL_PATH_SEGMENTS = new Set(['.ssh', '.gnupg', '.aws', '.kube', '.git', '.env']);
+function getLogger(loggingService) {
+    return loggingService ?? nullLoggingService;
+}
+/**
+ * Given a sliced home-relative path (e.g. "/.ssh/id_rsa" or "/.local/bin/foo"),
+ * return the first dot-segment (e.g. ".ssh", ".local") or undefined.
+ */
+function firstDotSegment(sliced) {
+    const segments = sliced.split('/').filter(Boolean);
+    const first = segments[0];
+    return first && first.startsWith('.') ? first : undefined;
+}
+/**
+ * Check whether a sliced home path falls within a highly sensitive directory.
+ * Handles nested keys like ".config/gcloud".
+ */
+function isInHighlySensitiveDir(sliced) {
+    const trimmed = sliced.replace(/^\/+/, '');
+    for (const dir of HIGHLY_SENSITIVE_HOME_DIRS) {
+        if (trimmed === dir || trimmed.startsWith(dir + '/')) {
+            return true;
+        }
+    }
+    return false;
+}
+export function analyzePathRisk(inputPath, loggingService) {
+    const logger = getLogger(loggingService);
+    const candidate = inputPath?.trim();
+    if (!candidate)
+        return SafetyStatus.GREEN;
+    // GREEN: Safe pseudo-devices
+    const safeDevices = new Set(['/dev/null', '/dev/stdout', '/dev/stderr', '/dev/zero', '/dev/random', '/dev/urandom']);
+    if (safeDevices.has(candidate)) {
+        return SafetyStatus.GREEN;
+    }
+    // GREEN: the current directory itself ("." / "./"). Without this, the later
+    // "hidden file" check fires because path.basename('.') === '.' (starts with a dot),
+    // wrongly flagging read-only commands like `rg "x" .` or `grep -r "x" .` as YELLOW.
+    if (candidate === '.' || candidate === './') {
+        return SafetyStatus.GREEN;
+    }
+    const cwd = process.cwd();
+    // Pre-calculate project membership for absolute paths
+    const isAbsolute = path.isAbsolute(candidate);
+    const normalizedCandidate = path.normalize(candidate);
+    const normalizedCwd = path.normalize(cwd);
+    const isWithinProject = isAbsolute && (normalizedCandidate.startsWith(normalizedCwd + path.sep) || normalizedCandidate === normalizedCwd);
+    // RED: Home directory and sensitive paths
+    // Check for various home directory representations
+    const isHomeRelated = HOME_PATTERNS.some((pattern) => pattern.test(candidate));
+    if (isHomeRelated && !isWithinProject) {
+        // Extract the path after home prefix for further analysis
+        const sliced = candidate
+            .replace(/^~/, '')
+            .replace(/^\$\{?HOME\}?/, '')
+            .replace(/^\$\{?USER\}?/, '')
+            .replace(/^\$\{?LOGNAME\}?/, '')
+            .replace(/^\/home\/[^/]+/, '')
+            .replace(/^\/Users\/[^/]+/, '')
+            .replace(/^\/root/, '');
+        // Plain home directory access without any suffix is broad and privacy-sensitive,
+        // but not inherently destructive. Let the model judge the task context.
+        if (sliced === '' || sliced === '/') {
+            logger.security('Path risk: home directory access', { path: candidate });
+            return SafetyStatus.YELLOW;
+        }
+        const filename = path.basename(candidate);
+        const topDot = firstDotSegment(sliced);
+        // RED: highly sensitive credential directories (anywhere inside)
+        if (isInHighlySensitiveDir(sliced)) {
+            logger.security('Path risk: sensitive credential directory', { path: candidate });
+            return SafetyStatus.RED;
+        }
+        // RED: highly sensitive dotfiles at home root
+        // (only when the file sits directly under home, not deep inside another dir)
+        const slicedSegments = sliced.split('/').filter(Boolean);
+        if (slicedSegments.length === 1 && HIGHLY_SENSITIVE_HOME_FILES.has(slicedSegments[0])) {
+            logger.security('Path risk: sensitive home dotfile', { path: candidate });
+            return SafetyStatus.RED;
+        }
+        // Legacy explicit sensitive-path substring match (kept for back-compat with constants.ts)
+        if (SENSITIVE_PATHS.some((sensitive) => sliced.includes(sensitive))) {
+            logger.security('Path risk: known sensitive path', { path: candidate });
+            return SafetyStatus.RED;
+        }
+        // Suspicious filename patterns (credentials.json, *_token.json, etc.) anywhere in home -> RED
+        if (/\.json$/i.test(filename) && SUSPICIOUS_JSON_PATTERNS.some((pattern) => pattern.test(filename))) {
+            logger.security('Path risk: suspicious JSON file in home directory', { path: candidate });
+            return SafetyStatus.RED;
+        }
+        // Sensitive extensions (private keys, pem, etc.) anywhere in home -> RED
+        if (SENSITIVE_EXTENSIONS.some((ext) => filename.endsWith(ext))) {
+            logger.security('Path risk: sensitive file in home directory', { path: candidate });
+            return SafetyStatus.RED;
+        }
+        // YELLOW: common working dot-directories (~/.local, ~/.cache, ~/.config/..., etc.)
+        // Users legitimately operate here often — flag as cautious, not blocked.
+        if (topDot && COMMON_WORKING_DOT_DIRS.has(topDot)) {
+            logger.security('Path risk: home working dot-directory', { path: candidate, segment: topDot });
+            return SafetyStatus.YELLOW;
+        }
+        // YELLOW: any other unknown dotfile/dotdir directly under home — be cautious
+        // but don't block, since many tools create custom dot-directories.
+        if (topDot) {
+            logger.security('Path risk: unknown home dot-entry', { path: candidate, segment: topDot });
+            return SafetyStatus.YELLOW;
+        }
+        // Non-dot files/folders inside home -> YELLOW (privacy-sensitive but not destructive)
+        logger.security('Path risk: home directory file', { path: candidate });
+        return SafetyStatus.YELLOW;
+    }
+    // YELLOW: Absolute System Paths
+    if (path.isAbsolute(candidate)) {
+        if (SYSTEM_PATHS.some((sys) => candidate.startsWith(sys))) {
+            logger.security('Path risk: absolute system path', { path: candidate });
+            return SafetyStatus.YELLOW;
+        }
+        // Absolute paths into highly sensitive home dirs are still RED
+        const absHomeMatch = candidate.match(/^\/(?:home|Users)\/[^/]+(\/.*)?$/) ||
+            (candidate.startsWith('/root') ? [candidate, candidate.slice(5)] : null);
+        if (absHomeMatch) {
+            const tail = absHomeMatch[1] ?? '';
+            if (isInHighlySensitiveDir(tail)) {
+                logger.security('Path risk: absolute sensitive home dir', { path: candidate });
+                return SafetyStatus.RED;
+            }
+            const tailSegments = tail.split('/').filter(Boolean);
+            if (tailSegments.length === 1 && HIGHLY_SENSITIVE_HOME_FILES.has(tailSegments[0])) {
+                logger.security('Path risk: absolute sensitive home file', { path: candidate });
+                return SafetyStatus.RED;
+            }
+        }
+        // Check if absolute path is within current project directory or in a safe temporary directory
+        const isTempDir = normalizedCandidate === '/tmp' ||
+            normalizedCandidate.startsWith('/tmp' + path.sep) ||
+            normalizedCandidate === '/private/tmp' ||
+            normalizedCandidate.startsWith('/private/tmp' + path.sep);
+        if (!isWithinProject && !isTempDir) {
+            // Absolute paths outside project are suspicious -> audit
+            logger.security('Path risk: absolute non-system path', { path: candidate });
+            return SafetyStatus.YELLOW;
+        }
+        // If within project, continue with normal flow (treat like relative path)
+        // Fall through to continue checking for sensitive files, hidden files, etc.
+    }
+    // YELLOW: Directory Traversal
+    if (candidate.includes('..')) {
+        logger.security('Path risk: directory traversal detected', { path: candidate });
+        return SafetyStatus.YELLOW;
+    }
+    const pathSegments = normalizedCandidate.split(/[\\/]+/).filter(Boolean);
+    if (pathSegments.some((segment) => SENSITIVE_LOCAL_PATH_SEGMENTS.has(segment))) {
+        logger.security('Path risk: sensitive local dot-directory', { path: candidate });
+        return SafetyStatus.YELLOW;
+    }
+    const filename = path.basename(candidate);
+    // JSON files: check allowlist and suspicious patterns BEFORE hidden file check
+    // This ensures safe JSON files like .eslintrc.json are GREEN
+    // Use case-insensitive check for .json extension
+    if (/\.json$/i.test(filename)) {
+        // Safe project config files are always GREEN
+        // Check case-insensitively by converting to lowercase
+        if (SAFE_JSON_FILES.has(filename.toLowerCase())) {
+            return SafetyStatus.GREEN;
+        }
+        // Check for suspicious credential/token patterns
+        if (SUSPICIOUS_JSON_PATTERNS.some((pattern) => pattern.test(filename))) {
+            logger.security('Path risk: suspicious JSON filename', {
+                path: candidate,
+            });
+            return SafetyStatus.YELLOW;
+        }
+        // Other JSON files are GREEN by default (permissive)
+        return SafetyStatus.GREEN;
+    }
+    // Hidden files -> YELLOW
+    if (filename.startsWith('.')) {
+        logger.security('Path risk: hidden file', { path: candidate });
+        return SafetyStatus.YELLOW;
+    }
+    // Sensitive extensions
+    if (SENSITIVE_EXTENSIONS.some((ext) => filename.endsWith(ext))) {
+        logger.security('Path risk: sensitive extension', {
+            path: candidate,
+        });
+        return SafetyStatus.YELLOW;
+    }
+    return SafetyStatus.GREEN;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=path-analysis.js.map

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package/dist/utils/shell/command-safety/utils.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+export declare function extractWordText(word: any): string | undefined;
+//# sourceMappingURL=utils.d.ts.map

package/dist/utils/shell/command-safety/utils.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"utils.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../source/utils/shell/command-safety/utils.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AACA,wBAAgB,eAAe,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,GAAG,GAAG,MAAM,GAAG,SAAS,CAW7D"}

package/dist/utils/shell/command-safety/utils.js

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+// Extract a best-effort string for a word/arg node, including expansions.
+export function extractWordText(word) {
+    if (!word)
+        return undefined;
+    if (typeof word === 'string')
+        return word;
+    if (typeof word.value === 'string')
+        return word.value;
+    if (typeof word.text === 'string')
+        return word.text;
+    if (typeof word.content === 'string')
+        return word.content;
+    if (word.parameter)
+        return `$${word.parameter}`;
+    if (Array.isArray(word.parts)) {
+        return word.parts.map((part) => extractWordText(part) ?? '').join('');
+    }
+    return undefined;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=utils.js.map

package/dist/utils/shell/command-safety/utils.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"utils.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../source/utils/shell/command-safety/utils.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,0EAA0E;AAC1E,MAAM,UAAU,eAAe,CAAC,IAAS;IACvC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI;QAAE,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;IAC5B,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,KAAK,QAAQ;QAAE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;IAC1C,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,KAAK,QAAQ;QAAE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC;IACtD,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,QAAQ;QAAE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;IACpD,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,KAAK,QAAQ;QAAE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC;IAC1D,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS;QAAE,OAAO,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;IAChD,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QAC9B,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,IAAS,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IAC7E,CAAC;IACD,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;AACnB,CAAC"}

package/dist/utils/shell/command-safety.evaluator-false-positives.test.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+export {};
+//# sourceMappingURL=command-safety.evaluator-false-positives.test.d.ts.map

package/dist/utils/shell/command-safety.evaluator-false-positives.test.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"command-safety.evaluator-false-positives.test.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../source/utils/shell/command-safety.evaluator-false-positives.test.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":""}

package/dist/utils/shell/command-safety.evaluator-false-positives.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+import { it, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { classifyCommand, SafetyStatus } from './command-safety/index.js';
+import { analyzePathRisk } from './command-safety/path-analysis.js';
+// ============================================================================
+// Item 1: pure-safe / read-only commands should be GREEN (not "unlisted")
+// ============================================================================
+it('read-only and output-only commands classify GREEN', () => {
+    const greenCommands = [
+        'cd source',
+        "printf 'hello world'",
+        'true',
+        'false',
+        'which node',
+        'type ls',
+        'basename src/foo.ts',
+        'dirname src/foo.ts',
+        'realpath src/foo.ts',
+        'seq 1 10',
+        'comm a.txt b.txt',
+        'column -t data.txt',
+        'diff a.txt b.txt',
+        'xxd dist/bundle.bin',
+        'od -c file.bin',
+        'hexdump -C file.bin',
+        'du -sh node_modules',
+        'df -h',
+    ];
+    for (const command of greenCommands) {
+        expect(classifyCommand(command), `"${command}" should be GREEN`).toBe(SafetyStatus.GREEN);
+    }
+});
+it('compound of newly-allowed safe commands stays GREEN', () => {
+    expect(classifyCommand("cd source && printf 'done'")).toBe(SafetyStatus.GREEN);
+    expect(classifyCommand('cd source && ls')).toBe(SafetyStatus.GREEN);
+});
+it('dual-use commands are still NOT auto-allowed (remain YELLOW)', () => {
+    // These genuinely need the evaluator/human and must not be allow-listed.
+    for (const command of ['npm test', 'npx tsc', 'node script.js', 'cp a b']) {
+        expect(classifyCommand(command), `"${command}" should remain YELLOW`).toBe(SafetyStatus.YELLOW);
+    }
+});
+// ============================================================================
+// Item 2: the current directory "." should not be treated as a hidden file
+// ============================================================================
+it('current-directory path args are GREEN', () => {
+    expect(analyzePathRisk('.'), '"." should be GREEN').toBe(SafetyStatus.GREEN);
+    expect(analyzePathRisk('./'), '"./" should be GREEN').toBe(SafetyStatus.GREEN);
+});
+it('search tools over the current directory classify GREEN', () => {
+    expect(classifyCommand('rg -n "pattern" .')).toBe(SafetyStatus.GREEN);
+    expect(classifyCommand('grep -rn "foo" .')).toBe(SafetyStatus.GREEN);
+});
+// ============================================================================
+// Item 4: git global options that take a value must not be mistaken for the
+//         subcommand (e.g. `git -C <path> status`).
+// ============================================================================
+it('git global flags before a safe subcommand stay GREEN', () => {
+    const greenGit = [
+        'git -C /some/repo status',
+        'git -c user.name=alice log --oneline',
+        'git --git-dir=/repo/.git status',
+        'git -C source diff',
+    ];
+    for (const command of greenGit) {
+        expect(classifyCommand(command), `"${command}" should be GREEN`).toBe(SafetyStatus.GREEN);
+    }
+});
+it('git global flags before a write subcommand stay YELLOW', () => {
+    expect(classifyCommand('git -C /some/repo commit -m wip')).toBe(SafetyStatus.YELLOW);
+    expect(classifyCommand('git -C /some/repo reset --hard')).toBe(SafetyStatus.YELLOW);
+});
+//# sourceMappingURL=command-safety.evaluator-false-positives.test.js.map

package/dist/utils/shell/command-safety.evaluator-false-positives.test.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"command-safety.evaluator-false-positives.test.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../source/utils/shell/command-safety.evaluator-false-positives.test.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,EAAE,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC;AACpC,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,2BAA2B,CAAC;AAC1E,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,mCAAmC,CAAC;AAEpE,+EAA+E;AAC/E,0EAA0E;AAC1E,+EAA+E;AAE/E,EAAE,CAAC,mDAAmD,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE;IAC3D,MAAM,aAAa,GAAG;QACpB,WAAW;QACX,sBAAsB;QACtB,MAAM;QACN,OAAO;QACP,YAAY;QACZ,SAAS;QACT,qBAAqB;QACrB,oBAAoB;QACpB,qBAAqB;QACrB,UAAU;QACV,kBAAkB;QAClB,oBAAoB;QACpB,kBAAkB;QAClB,qBAAqB;QACrB,gBAAgB;QAChB,qBAAqB;QACrB,qBAAqB;QACrB,OAAO;KACR,CAAC;IAEF,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO,IAAI,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC;QACpC,MAAM,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,mBAAmB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;IAC5F,CAAC;AACH,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAEH,EAAE,CAAC,qDAAqD,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE;IAC7D,MAAM,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,4BAA4B,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;IAC/E,MAAM,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,iBAAiB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;AACtE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAEH,EAAE,CAAC,8DAA8D,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE;IACtE,yEAAyE;IACzE,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,gBAAgB,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QAC1E,MAAM,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,wBAAwB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;IAClG,CAAC;AACH,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAEH,+EAA+E;AAC/E,2EAA2E;AAC3E,+EAA+E;AAE/E,EAAE,CAAC,uCAAuC,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE;IAC/C,MAAM,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;IAC7E,MAAM,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,sBAAsB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;AACjF,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAEH,EAAE,CAAC,wDAAwD,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE;IAChE,MAAM,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,mBAAmB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;IACtE,MAAM,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;AACvE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAEH,+EAA+E;AAC/E,4EAA4E;AAC5E,oDAAoD;AACpD,+EAA+E;AAE/E,EAAE,CAAC,sDAAsD,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE;IAC9D,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG;QACf,0BAA0B;QAC1B,sCAAsC;QACtC,iCAAiC;QACjC,oBAAoB;KACrB,CAAC;IACF,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO,IAAI,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;QAC/B,MAAM,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,OAAO,mBAAmB,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;IAC5F,CAAC;AACH,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAEH,EAAE,CAAC,wDAAwD,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE;IAChE,MAAM,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,iCAAiC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;IACrF,MAAM,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC,gCAAgC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;AACtF,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC"}

package/dist/utils/shell/command-safety.find.test.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+export {};
+//# sourceMappingURL=command-safety.find.test.d.ts.map

package/dist/utils/shell/command-safety.find.test.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"command-safety.find.test.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../source/utils/shell/command-safety.find.test.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":""}