@qduc/term2 0.6.0 → 0.6.1

package/dist/utils/command-safety/path-analysis.js

@@ -10,10 +10,98 @@ const nullLoggingService = {
     getCorrelationId: () => undefined,
     clearCorrelationId: () => { },
 };
-const SENSITIVE_LOCAL_PATH_SEGMENTS = new Set(['.ssh', '.gnupg', '.aws', '.kube', '.git', '.config', '.env']);
+// Dot-directories that almost always contain credentials, private keys, or secrets.
+// Access to these should be blocked (RED) regardless of the specific file inside.
+const HIGHLY_SENSITIVE_HOME_DIRS = new Set([
+    '.ssh',
+    '.gnupg',
+    '.gpg',
+    '.aws',
+    '.azure',
+    '.gcloud',
+    '.config/gcloud',
+    '.kube',
+    '.docker',
+    '.netrc',
+    '.pgpass',
+    '.password-store',
+    '.cert',
+    '.certs',
+    '.keys',
+    '.secrets',
+]);
+// Sensitive dotfiles at the root of the home directory (RED).
+const HIGHLY_SENSITIVE_HOME_FILES = new Set([
+    '.netrc',
+    '.pgpass',
+    '.npmrc', // can contain auth tokens
+    '.pypirc', // can contain auth tokens
+    '.gitconfig', // may contain credentials / signing keys
+    '.git-credentials',
+    '.bash_history',
+    '.zsh_history',
+    '.python_history',
+    '.node_repl_history',
+    '.mysql_history',
+    '.psql_history',
+    '.lesshst',
+]);
+// Dot-directories that are commonly used as working/cache/data directories.
+// These should NOT be RED — they're YELLOW at worst, often GREEN-ish.
+// Users frequently work in these (installing tools, inspecting caches, etc.).
+const COMMON_WORKING_DOT_DIRS = new Set([
+    '.local',
+    '.cache',
+    '.config', // root .config is broad; specific sensitive subdirs handled above
+    '.npm',
+    '.yarn',
+    '.pnpm',
+    '.nvm',
+    '.node_modules',
+    '.vscode',
+    '.idea',
+    '.cursor',
+    '.vim',
+    '.emacs.d',
+    '.mozilla',
+    '.themes',
+    '.icons',
+    '.fonts',
+    '.gradle',
+    '.m2',
+    '.cargo',
+    '.rustup',
+    '.pyenv',
+    '.rbenv',
+    '.virtualenvs',
+    '.docker-desktop',
+]);
+const SENSITIVE_LOCAL_PATH_SEGMENTS = new Set(['.ssh', '.gnupg', '.aws', '.kube', '.git', '.env']);
 function getLogger(loggingService) {
     return loggingService ?? nullLoggingService;
 }
+/**
+ * Given a sliced home-relative path (e.g. "/.ssh/id_rsa" or "/.local/bin/foo"),
+ * return the first dot-segment (e.g. ".ssh", ".local") or undefined.
+ */
+function firstDotSegment(sliced) {
+    const segments = sliced.split('/').filter(Boolean);
+    const first = segments[0];
+    return first && first.startsWith('.') ? first : undefined;
+}
+/**
+ * Check whether a sliced home path falls within a highly sensitive directory.
+ * Handles nested keys like ".config/gcloud".
+ */
+function isInHighlySensitiveDir(sliced) {
+    const trimmed = sliced.replace(/^\/+/, '');
+    for (const dir of HIGHLY_SENSITIVE_HOME_DIRS) {
+        if (trimmed === dir || trimmed.startsWith(dir + '/')) {
+            return true;
+        }
+    }
+    return false;
+}
 export function analyzePathRisk(inputPath, loggingService) {
     const logger = getLogger(loggingService);
     const candidate = inputPath?.trim();
@@ -46,48 +134,74 @@ export function analyzePathRisk(inputPath, loggingService) {
         // Plain home directory access without any suffix is broad and privacy-sensitive,
         // but not inherently destructive. Let the model judge the task context.
         if (sliced === '' || sliced === '/') {
-            logger.security('Path risk: home directory access', {
-                path: candidate,
-            });
+            logger.security('Path risk: home directory access', { path: candidate });
             return SafetyStatus.YELLOW;
         }
-        // Check for sensitive dotfiles and directories
-        if (/^\/\.\w+/.test(sliced) || SENSITIVE_PATHS.some((sensitive) => sliced.includes(sensitive))) {
-            logger.security('Path risk: home dotfile or config', {
-                path: candidate,
-            });
+        const filename = path.basename(candidate);
+        const topDot = firstDotSegment(sliced);
+        // RED: highly sensitive credential directories (anywhere inside)
+        if (isInHighlySensitiveDir(sliced)) {
+            logger.security('Path risk: sensitive credential directory', { path: candidate });
             return SafetyStatus.RED;
         }
-        // Check if filename in home directory is suspicious (credentials, secrets, etc.)
-        const filename = path.basename(candidate);
+        // RED: highly sensitive dotfiles at home root
+        // (only when the file sits directly under home, not deep inside another dir)
+        const slicedSegments = sliced.split('/').filter(Boolean);
+        if (slicedSegments.length === 1 && HIGHLY_SENSITIVE_HOME_FILES.has(slicedSegments[0])) {
+            logger.security('Path risk: sensitive home dotfile', { path: candidate });
+            return SafetyStatus.RED;
+        }
+        // Legacy explicit sensitive-path substring match (kept for back-compat with constants.ts)
+        if (SENSITIVE_PATHS.some((sensitive) => sliced.includes(sensitive))) {
+            logger.security('Path risk: known sensitive path', { path: candidate });
+            return SafetyStatus.RED;
+        }
+        // Suspicious filename patterns (credentials.json, *_token.json, etc.) anywhere in home -> RED
         if (/\.json$/i.test(filename) && SUSPICIOUS_JSON_PATTERNS.some((pattern) => pattern.test(filename))) {
             logger.security('Path risk: suspicious JSON file in home directory', { path: candidate });
             return SafetyStatus.RED;
         }
-        // Check for other sensitive extensions in home directory
+        // Sensitive extensions (private keys, pem, etc.) anywhere in home -> RED
         if (SENSITIVE_EXTENSIONS.some((ext) => filename.endsWith(ext))) {
-            logger.security('Path risk: sensitive file in home directory', {
-                path: candidate,
-            });
+            logger.security('Path risk: sensitive file in home directory', { path: candidate });
             return SafetyStatus.RED;
         }
+        // YELLOW: common working dot-directories (~/.local, ~/.cache, ~/.config/..., etc.)
+        // Users legitimately operate here often — flag as cautious, not blocked.
+        if (topDot && COMMON_WORKING_DOT_DIRS.has(topDot)) {
+            logger.security('Path risk: home working dot-directory', { path: candidate, segment: topDot });
+            return SafetyStatus.YELLOW;
+        }
+        // YELLOW: any other unknown dotfile/dotdir directly under home — be cautious
+        // but don't block, since many tools create custom dot-directories.
+        if (topDot) {
+            logger.security('Path risk: unknown home dot-entry', { path: candidate, segment: topDot });
+            return SafetyStatus.YELLOW;
+        }
+        // Non-dot files/folders inside home -> YELLOW (privacy-sensitive but not destructive)
+        logger.security('Path risk: home directory file', { path: candidate });
+        return SafetyStatus.YELLOW;
     }
     // YELLOW: Absolute System Paths
     if (path.isAbsolute(candidate)) {
         if (SYSTEM_PATHS.some((sys) => candidate.startsWith(sys))) {
-            logger.security('Path risk: absolute system path', {
-                path: candidate,
-            });
+            logger.security('Path risk: absolute system path', { path: candidate });
             return SafetyStatus.YELLOW;
         }
-        // Home dotfiles when absolute
-        if (/^\/(home|Users)\/[^/]+\/\.\w+/.test(candidate) ||
-            candidate.includes('/.ssh') ||
-            candidate.includes('/.gitconfig')) {
-            logger.security('Path risk: absolute home dotfile', {
-                path: candidate,
-            });
-            return SafetyStatus.RED;
+        // Absolute paths into highly sensitive home dirs are still RED
+        const absHomeMatch = candidate.match(/^\/(?:home|Users)\/[^/]+(\/.*)?$/) ||
+            (candidate.startsWith('/root') ? [candidate, candidate.slice(5)] : null);
+        if (absHomeMatch) {
+            const tail = absHomeMatch[1] ?? '';
+            if (isInHighlySensitiveDir(tail)) {
+                logger.security('Path risk: absolute sensitive home dir', { path: candidate });
+                return SafetyStatus.RED;
+            }
+            const tailSegments = tail.split('/').filter(Boolean);
+            if (tailSegments.length === 1 && HIGHLY_SENSITIVE_HOME_FILES.has(tailSegments[0])) {
+                logger.security('Path risk: absolute sensitive home file', { path: candidate });
+                return SafetyStatus.RED;
+            }
         }
         // Check if absolute path is within current project directory or in a safe temporary directory
         const isTempDir = normalizedCandidate === '/tmp' ||
@@ -96,9 +210,7 @@ export function analyzePathRisk(inputPath, loggingService) {
             normalizedCandidate.startsWith('/private/tmp' + path.sep);
         if (!isWithinProject && !isTempDir) {
             // Absolute paths outside project are suspicious -> audit
-            logger.security('Path risk: absolute non-system path', {
-                path: candidate,
-            });
+            logger.security('Path risk: absolute non-system path', { path: candidate });
             return SafetyStatus.YELLOW;
         }
         // If within project, continue with normal flow (treat like relative path)
@@ -106,16 +218,12 @@ export function analyzePathRisk(inputPath, loggingService) {
     }
     // YELLOW: Directory Traversal
     if (candidate.includes('..')) {
-        logger.security('Path risk: directory traversal detected', {
-            path: candidate,
-        });
+        logger.security('Path risk: directory traversal detected', { path: candidate });
         return SafetyStatus.YELLOW;
     }
     const pathSegments = normalizedCandidate.split(/[\\/]+/).filter(Boolean);
     if (pathSegments.some((segment) => SENSITIVE_LOCAL_PATH_SEGMENTS.has(segment))) {
-        logger.security('Path risk: sensitive local dot-directory', {
-            path: candidate,
-        });
+        logger.security('Path risk: sensitive local dot-directory', { path: candidate });
         return SafetyStatus.YELLOW;
     }
     const filename = path.basename(candidate);

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package/dist/utils/command-safety.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+/**
+ * Validate command safety using an AST parser.
+ * Returns true when a command requires user approval.
+ * Throws for invalid/empty inputs.
+ */
+export declare enum SafetyStatus {
+    GREEN = "GREEN",
+    YELLOW = "YELLOW",
+    RED = "RED"
+}
+/**
+ * Classify command into a SafetyStatus (GREEN/YELLOW/RED)
+ */
+export declare function classifyCommand(commandString: string): SafetyStatus;
+/**
+ * Validate command safety using an AST parser.
+ * Returns true when a command requires user approval.
+ * Throws for invalid/empty inputs OR hard-blocked RED classifications.
+ */
+export declare function validateCommandSafety(command: string): boolean;
+//# sourceMappingURL=command-safety.d.ts.map

package/dist/utils/command-safety.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"command-safety.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../source/utils/command-safety.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAuDA;;;;GAIG;AACH,oBAAY,YAAY;IACpB,KAAK,UAAU;IACf,MAAM,WAAW;IACjB,GAAG,QAAQ;CACd;AAyGD;;GAEG;AACH,wBAAgB,eAAe,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,YAAY,CAyMnE;AAED;;;;GAIG;AACH,wBAAgB,qBAAqB,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,CAyB9D"}

package/dist/utils/command-safety.devnull.test.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+export {};
+//# sourceMappingURL=command-safety.devnull.test.d.ts.map

package/dist/utils/command-safety.devnull.test.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"command-safety.devnull.test.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../source/utils/command-safety.devnull.test.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":""}

package/dist/utils/command-safety.devnull.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+import test from 'ava';
+import { analyzePathRisk } from './command-safety/path-analysis.js';
+import { SafetyStatus, classifyCommand } from './command-safety/index.js';
+test('analyzePathRisk - /dev/null should be GREEN', t => {
+    const result = analyzePathRisk('/dev/null');
+    t.is(result, SafetyStatus.GREEN, '/dev/null should be considered safe');
+});
+test('classifyCommand - cat prod.sh 2>/dev/null | head -200 should be GREEN', t => {
+    const command = 'cat prod.sh 2>/dev/null | head -200';
+    const status = classifyCommand(command);
+    t.is(status, SafetyStatus.GREEN, 'command with /dev/null redirection should be GREEN');
+});
+//# sourceMappingURL=command-safety.devnull.test.js.map

package/dist/utils/command-safety.devnull.test.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/utils/command-safety.js

@@ -0,0 +1,348 @@
+import parse from 'bash-parser';
+import path from 'path';
+import { loggingService } from '../services/logging-service.js';
+// 1. CONSTANTS
+// Note: 'sed' is useful for read-only transformations. We allow it by default
+// but add guards below to prevent in-place edits (-i) and unapproved redirections.
+const ALLOWED_COMMANDS = new Set([
+    'ls',
+    'pwd',
+    'grep',
+    'cat',
+    'echo',
+    'head',
+    'tail',
+    'sed',
+]);
+const BLOCKED_COMMANDS = new Set([
+    // Filesystem
+    'rm',
+    'rmdir',
+    'mkfs',
+    'dd',
+    'mv',
+    'cp',
+    // System
+    'sudo',
+    'su',
+    'chmod',
+    'chown',
+    'shutdown',
+    'reboot',
+    // Network/Web
+    'curl',
+    'wget',
+    'ssh',
+    'scp',
+    'netstat',
+    // Package Managers / installers
+    'apt',
+    'yum',
+    'npm',
+    'yarn',
+    'pnpm',
+    'pip',
+    'gem',
+    // Dangerous wrappers / misc
+    'eval',
+    'exec',
+    'kill',
+    'killall',
+]);
+/* legacy containsDangerousCommand removed — replaced by classifyCommand + path analysis */
+/**
+ * Validate command safety using an AST parser.
+ * Returns true when a command requires user approval.
+ * Throws for invalid/empty inputs.
+ */
+export var SafetyStatus;
+(function (SafetyStatus) {
+    SafetyStatus["GREEN"] = "GREEN";
+    SafetyStatus["YELLOW"] = "YELLOW";
+    SafetyStatus["RED"] = "RED";
+})(SafetyStatus || (SafetyStatus = {}));
+// Extract a best-effort string for a word/arg node, including expansions.
+function extractWordText(word) {
+    if (!word)
+        return undefined;
+    if (typeof word === 'string')
+        return word;
+    if (typeof word.text === 'string')
+        return word.text;
+    if (typeof word.value === 'string')
+        return word.value;
+    if (typeof word.content === 'string')
+        return word.content;
+    if (word.parameter)
+        return `$${word.parameter}`;
+    if (Array.isArray(word.parts)) {
+        return word.parts
+            .map((part) => extractWordText(part) ?? '')
+            .join('');
+    }
+    return undefined;
+}
+// 2. PATH ANALYSIS HELPER
+function analyzePathRisk(inputPath) {
+    const candidate = inputPath?.trim();
+    if (!candidate)
+        return SafetyStatus.GREEN;
+    // RED: Explicit home-dotfiles (.ssh, .env, etc.) even before expansion
+    if (candidate.startsWith('~') ||
+        candidate.startsWith('$HOME') ||
+        candidate.startsWith('${HOME}')) {
+        const sliced = candidate.replace(/^~/, '').replace(/^\$\{?HOME\}?/, '');
+        // Check for dotfiles after home prefix
+        if (/^\/\.\w+/.test(sliced) ||
+            sliced.includes('/.ssh') ||
+            sliced.includes('/.env')) {
+            loggingService.security('Path risk: home dotfile', {
+                path: candidate,
+            });
+            return SafetyStatus.RED;
+        }
+    }
+    // RED: Absolute System Paths
+    if (path.isAbsolute(candidate)) {
+        const SYSTEM_PATHS = [
+            '/etc',
+            '/dev',
+            '/proc',
+            '/var',
+            '/usr',
+            '/boot',
+            '/bin',
+        ];
+        if (SYSTEM_PATHS.some(sys => candidate.startsWith(sys))) {
+            loggingService.security('Path risk: absolute system path', {
+                path: candidate,
+            });
+            return SafetyStatus.RED;
+        }
+        // Home dotfiles when absolute
+        if (/^\/(home|Users)\/[^/]+\/\.\w+/.test(candidate) ||
+            candidate.includes('/.ssh') ||
+            candidate.includes('/.gitconfig')) {
+            loggingService.security('Path risk: absolute home dotfile', {
+                path: candidate,
+            });
+            return SafetyStatus.RED;
+        }
+        // Other absolute paths are suspicious -> audit
+        loggingService.security('Path risk: absolute non-system path', {
+            path: candidate,
+        });
+        return SafetyStatus.YELLOW;
+    }
+    // RED: Directory Traversal
+    if (candidate.includes('..')) {
+        loggingService.security('Path risk: directory traversal detected', {
+            path: candidate,
+        });
+        return SafetyStatus.RED;
+    }
+    // Hidden files -> YELLOW
+    const filename = path.basename(candidate);
+    if (filename.startsWith('.')) {
+        loggingService.security('Path risk: hidden file', { path: candidate });
+        return SafetyStatus.YELLOW;
+    }
+    // Sensitive extensions
+    const SENSITIVE_EXTENSIONS = ['.env', '.pem', '.key', '.json'];
+    if (SENSITIVE_EXTENSIONS.some(ext => filename.endsWith(ext))) {
+        loggingService.security('Path risk: sensitive extension', {
+            path: candidate,
+        });
+        return SafetyStatus.YELLOW;
+    }
+    return SafetyStatus.GREEN;
+}
+/**
+ * Classify command into a SafetyStatus (GREEN/YELLOW/RED)
+ */
+export function classifyCommand(commandString) {
+    try {
+        const reasons = [];
+        const truncatedCommand = commandString.substring(0, 200);
+        loggingService.security('Classifying command safety', {
+            command: truncatedCommand,
+        });
+        const ast = parse(commandString, { mode: 'bash' });
+        let worstStatus = SafetyStatus.GREEN;
+        function upgradeStatus(s, reason) {
+            if (worstStatus === SafetyStatus.RED)
+                return;
+            if (s === SafetyStatus.RED)
+                worstStatus = SafetyStatus.RED;
+            else if (s === SafetyStatus.YELLOW &&
+                worstStatus === SafetyStatus.GREEN)
+                worstStatus = SafetyStatus.YELLOW;
+            if (reason)
+                reasons.push(`${s}: ${reason}`);
+        }
+        function traverse(node) {
+            if (!node)
+                return;
+            if (Array.isArray(node))
+                return node.forEach(traverse);
+            if (node.type === 'Command') {
+                const name = node.name?.text ||
+                    (node.name &&
+                        node.name.parts &&
+                        node.name.parts.map((p) => p.text).join(''));
+                if (typeof name === 'string') {
+                    if (BLOCKED_COMMANDS.has(name)) {
+                        upgradeStatus(SafetyStatus.RED, `blocked command: ${name}`);
+                        return;
+                    }
+                    if (!ALLOWED_COMMANDS.has(name)) {
+                        upgradeStatus(SafetyStatus.YELLOW, `unknown or unlisted command: ${name}`);
+                    }
+                }
+                const cmdName = typeof name === 'string' ? name : undefined;
+                if (node.suffix) {
+                    let hasOutputRedirect = false;
+                    let hasInPlaceEdit = false;
+                    // First pass: detect dangerous sed patterns
+                    for (const arg of node.suffix) {
+                        if (arg?.type === 'Redirect') {
+                            // Check if it's an output redirect (>, >>)
+                            const op = arg.op?.text || arg.op;
+                            if (op === '>' || op === '>>') {
+                                hasOutputRedirect = true;
+                            }
+                        }
+                        const argText = extractWordText(arg);
+                        if (argText && argText.startsWith('-')) {
+                            if (cmdName === 'sed' && argText.startsWith('-i')) {
+                                hasInPlaceEdit = true;
+                            }
+                        }
+                    }
+                    // Second pass: classify arguments
+                    for (const arg of node.suffix) {
+                        // Redirects: analyze path risk. For `sed`, only mark output redirects as YELLOW
+                        if (arg?.type === 'Redirect') {
+                            const fileText = extractWordText(arg.file ?? arg);
+                            const op = arg.op?.text || arg.op;
+                            if (cmdName === 'sed' &&
+                                (op === '>' || op === '>>')) {
+                                upgradeStatus(SafetyStatus.YELLOW, `sed with output redirection to ${fileText ?? '<unknown>'}`);
+                            }
+                            const pathStatus = analyzePathRisk(fileText);
+                            upgradeStatus(pathStatus, `redirect to ${fileText ?? '<unknown>'}`);
+                            continue;
+                        }
+                        const argText = extractWordText(arg);
+                        // Flags are normally ignored, but for `sed` the -i flag is dangerous
+                        // because it performs in-place edits. Detect -i and variants (e.g. -i, -i.bak, -i'')
+                        if (argText && argText.startsWith('-')) {
+                            if (cmdName === 'sed' && argText.startsWith('-i')) {
+                                upgradeStatus(SafetyStatus.RED, `sed in-place edit detected: ${argText}`);
+                                continue;
+                            }
+                            continue; // other flags ignored
+                        }
+                        const pathStatus = analyzePathRisk(argText);
+                        // For `sed`, file arguments are only risky if combined with dangerous operations
+                        if (cmdName === 'sed' && argText) {
+                            // If there's an in-place edit or output redirect, path risk matters
+                            // Otherwise, reading files with sed is safe (GREEN)
+                            if (hasInPlaceEdit || hasOutputRedirect) {
+                                if (pathStatus === SafetyStatus.RED)
+                                    upgradeStatus(pathStatus, `sed file argument ${argText}`);
+                                else
+                                    upgradeStatus(SafetyStatus.YELLOW, `sed file argument ${argText}`);
+                            }
+                            else {
+                                // Read-only sed: only escalate if path itself is risky
+                                if (pathStatus !== SafetyStatus.GREEN) {
+                                    upgradeStatus(pathStatus, `sed file argument ${argText}`);
+                                }
+                                // Otherwise GREEN - read-only sed is safe
+                            }
+                            continue;
+                        }
+                        // Unknown/opaque args fall back to YELLOW
+                        if (!argText)
+                            upgradeStatus(SafetyStatus.YELLOW, 'opaque or unparseable argument');
+                        else
+                            upgradeStatus(pathStatus, `argument ${argText}`);
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            // recurse common shapes
+            if (node.type === 'LogicalExpression') {
+                traverse(node.left);
+                traverse(node.right);
+                return;
+            }
+            if (node.type === 'Pipeline') {
+                (node.commands || []).forEach(traverse);
+                return;
+            }
+            if (node.type === 'Subshell') {
+                traverse(node.list);
+                return;
+            }
+            if (node.type === 'CommandSubstitution') {
+                (node.commands || []).forEach(traverse);
+                return;
+            }
+            if (node.type === 'Script' || node.type === 'Program') {
+                (node.commands || []).forEach(traverse);
+                return;
+            }
+            for (const k of Object.keys(node)) {
+                const v = node[k];
+                if (v && typeof v === 'object')
+                    traverse(v);
+            }
+        }
+        if (ast && ast.commands) {
+            ast.commands.forEach(traverse);
+        }
+        loggingService.security('Command classification result', {
+            command: truncatedCommand,
+            status: worstStatus,
+            reasons,
+        });
+        return worstStatus;
+    }
+    catch (e) {
+        // Fail-safe: unparsable -> audit
+        loggingService.warn('Failed to parse command, classifying as YELLOW', {
+            command: commandString.substring(0, 200),
+            error: e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e),
+        });
+        return SafetyStatus.YELLOW;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Validate command safety using an AST parser.
+ * Returns true when a command requires user approval.
+ * Throws for invalid/empty inputs OR hard-blocked RED classifications.
+ */
+export function validateCommandSafety(command) {
+    if (!command ||
+        typeof command !== 'string' ||
+        command.trim().length === 0) {
+        throw new Error('Command cannot be empty');
+    }
+    loggingService.security('Validating command safety', {
+        command: command.substring(0, 200),
+    });
+    const status = classifyCommand(command);
+    if (status === SafetyStatus.RED) {
+        loggingService.security('Command validation failed: RED (forbidden)', {
+            command: command.substring(0, 200),
+        });
+        throw new Error('Command classified as RED (forbidden)');
+    }
+    loggingService.security('Validation result', {
+        command: command.substring(0, 200),
+        status,
+    });
+    return status === SafetyStatus.YELLOW;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=command-safety.js.map