@qball-inc/the-bulwark 1.2.0 → 1.3.0

package/hooks/hooks.json

@@ -1,88 +1,100 @@
-{
-  "description": "The Bulwark quality enforcement hooks - Defense-in-Depth OUTER RING",
-  "hooks": {
-    "PostToolUse": [
-      {
-        "matcher": "Write|Edit|MultiEdit",
-        "hooks": [
-          {
-            "type": "command",
-            "command": "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/hooks/enforce-quality.sh",
-            "timeout": 60
-          }
-        ]
-      }
-    ],
-    "SubagentStart": [
-      {
-        "hooks": [
-          {
-            "type": "command",
-            "command": "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/hooks/track-pipeline-start.sh",
-            "timeout": 30
-          }
-        ]
-      }
-    ],
-    "SubagentStop": [
-      {
-        "hooks": [
-          {
-            "type": "command",
-            "command": "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/hooks/track-pipeline-stop.sh",
-            "timeout": 30
-          }
-        ]
-      }
-    ],
-    "Stop": [
-      {
-        "hooks": [
-          {
-            "type": "command",
-            "command": "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/hooks/suggest-pipeline-stop.sh",
-            "timeout": 30
-          }
-        ]
-      }
-    ],
-    "SessionStart": [
-      {
-        "hooks": [
-          {
-            "type": "command",
-            "command": "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/hooks/inject-protocol.sh",
-            "timeout": 5
-          }
-        ]
-      },
-      {
-        "hooks": [
-          {
-            "type": "command",
-            "command": "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/hooks/cleanup-stale.sh",
-            "timeout": 30
-          }
-        ]
-      },
-      {
-        "hooks": [
-          {
-            "type": "command",
-            "command": "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/hooks/cleanup-review-registry.sh",
-            "timeout": 5
-          }
-        ]
-      },
-      {
-        "hooks": [
-          {
-            "type": "command",
-            "command": "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/hooks/check-template-drift.sh",
-            "timeout": 5
-          }
-        ]
-      }
-    ]
-  }
-}
+{
+  "description": "The Bulwark quality enforcement hooks - Defense-in-Depth OUTER RING",
+  "hooks": {
+    "PreToolUse": [
+      {
+        "matcher": "Read|Edit|Bash",
+        "hooks": [
+          {
+            "type": "command",
+            "command": "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/hooks/bulwark-permission-hook.sh",
+            "timeout": 5
+          }
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "PostToolUse": [
+      {
+        "matcher": "Write|Edit|MultiEdit",
+        "hooks": [
+          {
+            "type": "command",
+            "command": "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/hooks/enforce-quality.sh",
+            "timeout": 60
+          }
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "SubagentStart": [
+      {
+        "hooks": [
+          {
+            "type": "command",
+            "command": "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/hooks/track-pipeline-start.sh",
+            "timeout": 30
+          }
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "SubagentStop": [
+      {
+        "hooks": [
+          {
+            "type": "command",
+            "command": "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/hooks/track-pipeline-stop.sh",
+            "timeout": 30
+          }
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "Stop": [
+      {
+        "hooks": [
+          {
+            "type": "command",
+            "command": "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/hooks/suggest-pipeline-stop.sh",
+            "timeout": 30
+          }
+        ]
+      }
+    ],
+    "SessionStart": [
+      {
+        "hooks": [
+          {
+            "type": "command",
+            "command": "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/hooks/inject-protocol.sh",
+            "timeout": 5
+          }
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "hooks": [
+          {
+            "type": "command",
+            "command": "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/hooks/cleanup-stale.sh",
+            "timeout": 30
+          }
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "hooks": [
+          {
+            "type": "command",
+            "command": "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/hooks/cleanup-review-registry.sh",
+            "timeout": 5
+          }
+        ]
+      },
+      {
+        "hooks": [
+          {
+            "type": "command",
+            "command": "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/hooks/check-template-drift.sh",
+            "timeout": 5
+          }
+        ]
+      }
+    ]
+  }
+}

package/package.json

@@ -1,46 +1,46 @@
-{
-  "name": "@qball-inc/the-bulwark",
-  "version": "1.2.0",
-  "description": "Full-lifecycle SDLC guardrailing framework for Claude Code — from product ideation and planning through implementation, code review, and test validation. Enterprise-grade skills and agents for AI-human peer collaboration.",
-  "license": "MIT",
-  "author": "Ashay Kubal <https://ashaykubal.com>",
-  "homepage": "https://github.com/QBall-Inc",
-  "repository": {
-    "type": "git",
-    "url": "https://github.com/QBall-Inc/the-bulwark.git"
-  },
-  "keywords": [
-    "claude-code",
-    "claude-code-plugin",
-    "sdlc",
-    "quality-enforcement",
-    "code-review",
-    "testing",
-    "governance",
-    "ideation",
-    "product-ideation",
-    "product-management",
-    "market-research",
-    "competitive-research",
-    "brainstorming",
-    "planning",
-    "plan-creation",
-    "agent-design",
-    "skill-design",
-    "test-audit",
-    "statusline",
-    "agent-teams"
-  ],
-  "scripts": {
-    "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
-    "lint": "eslint . --ext .ts"
-  },
-  "devDependencies": {
-    "@types/bun": "^1.3.13",
-    "@types/jest": "^29.5.0",
-    "@typescript-eslint/eslint-plugin": "^6.21.0",
-    "@typescript-eslint/parser": "^6.21.0",
-    "eslint": "^8.56.0",
-    "typescript": "^5.3.0"
-  }
-}
+{
+  "name": "@qball-inc/the-bulwark",
+  "version": "1.3.0",
+  "description": "Full-lifecycle SDLC guardrailing framework for Claude Code — from product ideation and planning through implementation, code review, and test validation. Enterprise-grade skills and agents for AI-human peer collaboration.",
+  "license": "MIT",
+  "author": "Ashay Kubal <https://ashaykubal.com>",
+  "homepage": "https://github.com/QBall-Inc",
+  "repository": {
+    "type": "git",
+    "url": "https://github.com/QBall-Inc/the-bulwark.git"
+  },
+  "keywords": [
+    "claude-code",
+    "claude-code-plugin",
+    "sdlc",
+    "quality-enforcement",
+    "code-review",
+    "testing",
+    "governance",
+    "ideation",
+    "product-ideation",
+    "product-management",
+    "market-research",
+    "competitive-research",
+    "brainstorming",
+    "planning",
+    "plan-creation",
+    "agent-design",
+    "skill-design",
+    "test-audit",
+    "statusline",
+    "agent-teams"
+  ],
+  "scripts": {
+    "typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
+    "lint": "eslint . --ext .ts"
+  },
+  "devDependencies": {
+    "@types/bun": "^1.3.13",
+    "@types/jest": "^29.5.0",
+    "@typescript-eslint/eslint-plugin": "^6.21.0",
+    "@typescript-eslint/parser": "^6.21.0",
+    "eslint": "^8.56.0",
+    "typescript": "^5.3.0"
+  }
+}

package/scripts/hooks/bulwark-permission-hook.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# bulwark-permission-hook.sh - PreToolUse permission-bypass for Bulwark bundled assets
+#
+# OPT-IN, DEFAULT OFF. Auto-approves Read/Edit/Bash operations whose target
+# resolves INSIDE a Bulwark plugin root, and passes through (no opinion) for
+# everything else. A scoped workaround for upstream CC permission-prompt bugs
+# on plugin-bundled assets the user already trusted at install time.
+#
+# Design + safety model: docs/internal/p10.8-hook-design.md
+# Brief:                 plans/task-briefs/P10.8-pretooluse-hook-permission-bypass.md
+#
+# Event:   PreToolUse, matcher "Read|Edit|Bash"
+# stdin:   PreToolUse event JSON (.tool_name, .tool_input.file_path | .command)
+# stdout:  hookSpecificOutput JSON for allow/deny; EMPTY for pass-through (defer)
+# exit:    always 0 — decisions are expressed in JSON, never via exit 2
+#
+# Decision model (all on the CANONICAL path, never the literal string):
+#   - target canonically under a plugin root        -> allow
+#   - target CLAIMS a plugin root but escapes it     -> deny (anti-spoof)
+#   - anything else                                  -> pass-through (defer)
+# Bash is the highest-risk surface: only SIMPLE commands (no shell
+# metacharacters) whose every path token sits under a plugin root are allowed.
+# Write is intentionally NOT matched -> writes always keep CC's default prompt.
+#
+# Opt-in gate (default OFF), CONTEXT-AWARE so default-OFF never depends on CC
+#   exporting a userConfig default:
+#   - Plugin context ($CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT set — installed plugin or --plugin-dir):
+#     require an EXPLICIT $CLAUDE_PLUGIN_OPTION_ENABLE_PERMISSION_BYPASS=true;
+#     unset / "false" / anything-else -> inert (fail-safe OFF). The plugin's
+#     userConfig.enable_permission_bypass (default false) drives this — and even
+#     if CC omits the var for an unchanged default, the hook stays OFF.
+#   - Project/scaffold context ($CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT unset): the hook's presence
+#     in the project's .claude/settings.json IS the opt-in, so an UNSET var is
+#     active; an explicit "false" still disables it.
+#
+# Portability: prefers GNU `realpath -m`; falls back to a pure-bash lexical
+#   `..`/`.` normalizer (no filesystem access) so behavior is identical on
+#   WSL/Linux/macOS. Canonicalization is fail-safe: a path it cannot resolve
+#   to an absolute form never matches a root (so it is never auto-approved).
+#
+# Usage: invoked by Claude Code as a PreToolUse hook; not run directly.
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Opt-in gate (default OFF) — context-aware (see header)
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+GATE="${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_OPTION_ENABLE_PERMISSION_BYPASS-__unset__}"
+if [ -n "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT-}" ]; then
+  # Plugin context: default-OFF must NOT depend on CC exporting the userConfig
+  # default, so require an EXPLICIT opt-in. unset/false/unknown -> inert.
+  case "$GATE" in
+    true|1|yes|on) : ;;
+    *) exit 0 ;;
+  esac
+else
+  # Project/scaffold context: presence in .claude/settings.json IS the opt-in,
+  # so an UNSET gate is active; an explicit "false" still disables.
+  case "$GATE" in
+    __unset__|true|1|yes|on) : ;;
+    *) exit 0 ;;
+  esac
+fi
+
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Decision emitters
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+emit_allow() {
+  printf '{"hookSpecificOutput":{"hookEventName":"PreToolUse","permissionDecision":"allow","permissionDecisionReason":"%s"}}\n' "$1"
+  exit 0
+}
+
+emit_deny() {
+  log_deny "$1" "${2:-}"
+  printf '{"hookSpecificOutput":{"hookEventName":"PreToolUse","permissionDecision":"deny","permissionDecisionReason":"%s"}}\n' "$1"
+  exit 0
+}
+
+# Deny is rare and security-relevant -> log it (allows/pass-throughs are hot-path,
+# not logged). Fully non-fatal; only appends if a logs/ dir already exists.
+log_deny() {
+  local reason="$1" detail="$2"
+  local logdir="${CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR:-.}/logs"
+  [ -d "$logdir" ] || return 0
+  # Sanitize the user-influenced detail before appending to the shared log:
+  # strip CR/LF (prevents log-line spoofing) and bound length (SEC-SUG-1).
+  detail="${detail//$'\n'/ }"
+  detail="${detail//$'\r'/ }"
+  detail="${detail:0:500}"
+  printf '[%s] PreToolUse bulwark-permission-hook: DENY %s (%s)\n' \
+    "$(date -Iseconds 2>/dev/null || echo now)" "$reason" "$detail" \
+    >> "$logdir/hooks.log" 2>/dev/null || true
+}
+
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Path expansion + canonicalization
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+# Expand a leading ~ and any literal $HOME / $CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT tokens the
+# Bash command string may carry unexpanded.
+expand_path() {
+  local p="$1"
+  # Match a LITERAL leading tilde in the input and expand it ourselves; tildes
+  # must NOT shell-expand inside these case patterns (SC2088 here is intentional).
+  # shellcheck disable=SC2088
+  case "$p" in
+    "~")    p="${HOME:-}" ;;
+    "~/"*)  p="${HOME:-}/${p#"~/"}" ;;
+  esac
+  p="${p//\$\{CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT\}/${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT:-}}"
+  p="${p//\$CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT/${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT:-}}"
+  p="${p//\$\{HOME\}/${HOME:-}}"
+  p="${p//\$HOME/${HOME:-}}"
+  printf '%s' "$p"
+}
+
+# Pure-bash lexical resolution of . and .. — no filesystem access, portable.
+# Only normalizes ABSOLUTE paths; a relative path is returned unchanged so it
+# can never match an absolute root (fail-safe).
+lexical_normalize() {
+  local path="$1"
+  case "$path" in
+    /*) ;;
+    *) printf '%s' "$path"; return 0 ;;
+  esac
+  local IFS='/' seg
+  local -a parts=() out=()
+  read -ra parts <<< "$path" || true
+  for seg in "${parts[@]}"; do
+    case "$seg" in
+      ''|'.') ;;                                   # drop empty + current-dir
+      '..') [ "${#out[@]}" -gt 0 ] && unset 'out[${#out[@]}-1]' && out=("${out[@]}") ;;
+      *) out+=("$seg") ;;
+    esac
+  done
+  local result=""
+  for seg in "${out[@]}"; do result="$result/$seg"; done
+  [ -n "$result" ] || result="/"
+  printf '%s' "$result"
+}
+
+# Canonicalize an absolute path (resolve .. and, when realpath is available,
+# symlinks). Relative paths are returned unchanged (never match a root).
+canonicalize() {
+  local p="$1" out
+  case "$p" in
+    /*) ;;
+    *) printf '%s' "$p"; return 0 ;;
+  esac
+  if out=$(realpath -m -- "$p" 2>/dev/null) && [ -n "$out" ]; then
+    printf '%s' "$out"; return 0
+  fi
+  lexical_normalize "$p"
+}
+
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Root membership (operate on canonical paths only)
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+# True if canonical path lives under ~/.claude/plugins/cache/<owner>/the-bulwark[-*]/...
+# Version-agnostic by design (#15642): the version segment is below the plugin dir.
+is_under_cache_root() {
+  local cp="$1" suffix owner rest plugin
+  case "$cp" in
+    *"/.claude/plugins/cache/"*) ;;
+    *) return 1 ;;
+  esac
+  suffix="${cp#*"/.claude/plugins/cache/"}"   # owner/plugin/version/...
+  owner="${suffix%%/*}"
+  [ -n "$owner" ] && [ "$owner" != "$suffix" ] || return 1
+  rest="${suffix#*/}"
+  plugin="${rest%%/*}"
+  case "$plugin" in
+    the-bulwark|the-bulwark-*) return 0 ;;
+  esac
+  return 1
+}
+
+# True if canonical path lives under the dev plugin root ($CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT, for --plugin-dir).
+is_under_dev_root() {
+  local cp="$1" droot
+  [ -n "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT:-}" ] || return 1
+  droot="$(canonicalize "$CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT")"
+  [ -n "$droot" ] || return 1
+  case "$cp" in
+    "$droot"|"$droot"/*) return 0 ;;
+  esac
+  return 1
+}
+
+is_under_root() {
+  is_under_cache_root "$1" || is_under_dev_root "$1"
+}
+
+# True if the RAW (pre-canonical) string references a plugin marker — used to
+# tell a traversal-spoof (deny) apart from an unrelated path (pass-through).
+claims_root() {
+  local raw="$1"
+  case "$raw" in
+    *".claude/plugins/cache/"*"the-bulwark"*) return 0 ;;
+  esac
+  # Match the literal, unexpanded $CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT token a raw command may
+  # carry; single quotes are intentional (SC2016 expected — we match literals).
+  # shellcheck disable=SC2016
+  case "$raw" in
+    *'${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}'*|*'$CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT'*) return 0 ;;
+  esac
+  if [ -n "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT:-}" ]; then
+    case "$raw" in
+      *"$CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT"*) return 0 ;;
+    esac
+  fi
+  return 1
+}
+
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Decision logic
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+# Read / Edit: decide on the single file path.
+decide_path() {
+  local raw="$1" canon
+  canon="$(canonicalize "$(expand_path "$raw")")"
+  if [ -n "$canon" ] && is_under_root "$canon"; then
+    emit_allow "bulwark-bundled-asset"
+  elif claims_root "$raw"; then
+    emit_deny "path escapes the Bulwark plugin root" "$raw"
+  fi
+  exit 0   # pass-through
+}
+
+# Bash: most conservative. Reject anything we cannot reason about simply, then
+# auto-approve ONLY a "run a plugin script" shape: the command verb is itself a
+# plugin-script path (direct exec) OR a bare bash/sh interpreter, AND every
+# path-like token sits under a plugin root. A non-script verb on a plugin path
+# (e.g. `rm <plugin-file>`) is NOT auto-approved — it falls through to CC's
+# default prompt (CR-SUG-1).
+decide_bash() {
+  local cmd="$1" expanded tok canon verb
+  # Literal shell metacharacters; single quotes are intentional (SC2016 expected).
+  # shellcheck disable=SC2016
+  case "$cmd" in
+    *'&&'*|*'||'*|*';'*|*'|'*|*'$('*|*'`'*|*'>'*|*'<'*|*'&'*|*$'\n'*)
+      exit 0 ;;   # compound / pipe / subshell / redirect / background -> pass-through
+  esac
+  expanded="$(expand_path "$cmd")"
+  # Word-split WITHOUT globbing (read -ra, default IFS) so a literal '*' in the
+  # command is never pathname-expanded during inspection. A path token containing
+  # spaces won't match a root cleanly -> falls through to pass-through (SEC-SUG-3).
+  local -a toks=()
+  read -ra toks <<< "$expanded" || true
+  [ "${#toks[@]}" -gt 0 ] || exit 0
+  # Command verb must be a plugin script (direct exec) or a bare bash/sh interpreter.
+  verb="${toks[0]}"
+  local verb_ok=0
+  case "$verb" in
+    bash|sh) verb_ok=1 ;;
+    */*)
+      canon="$(canonicalize "$verb")"
+      if [ -n "$canon" ] && is_under_root "$canon"; then verb_ok=1; fi
+      ;;
+  esac
+  local has_plugin_token=0 has_escape=0 has_external=0
+  for tok in "${toks[@]}"; do
+    case "$tok" in
+      */*) ;;          # path-like token
+      *) continue ;;   # flags / bare words -> ignore
+    esac
+    canon="$(canonicalize "$tok")"
+    if [ -n "$canon" ] && is_under_root "$canon"; then
+      has_plugin_token=1
+    elif claims_root "$tok"; then
+      has_escape=1
+    else
+      has_external=1
+    fi
+  done
+  if [ "$has_escape" -eq 1 ]; then
+    emit_deny "command path escapes the Bulwark plugin root" "$cmd"
+  elif [ "$verb_ok" -eq 1 ] && [ "$has_plugin_token" -eq 1 ] && [ "$has_external" -eq 0 ]; then
+    emit_allow "bulwark-bundled-script"
+  fi
+  exit 0   # pass-through
+}
+
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Main
+# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+INPUT="$(cat)"
+TOOL="$(printf '%s' "$INPUT" | jq -r '.tool_name // ""')"
+
+case "$TOOL" in
+  Read|Edit)
+    FP="$(printf '%s' "$INPUT" | jq -r '.tool_input.file_path // ""')"
+    [ -n "$FP" ] || exit 0
+    decide_path "$FP"
+    ;;
+  Bash)
+    CMD="$(printf '%s' "$INPUT" | jq -r '.tool_input.command // ""')"
+    [ -n "$CMD" ] || exit 0
+    decide_bash "$CMD"
+    ;;
+  *)
+    exit 0   # not a tool this hook decides on
+    ;;
+esac

package/skills/anthropic-validator/SKILL.md

@@ -3,6 +3,12 @@ name: anthropic-validator
 description: Validates Claude Code assets (skills, hooks, agents, commands, MCP servers, plugins) against official Anthropic standards. Fetches latest docs dynamically and produces structured validation reports.
 when_to_use: When validating Claude Code assets (skills, hooks, agents, commands, MCP servers, plugins) against official Anthropic standards before release, after creation, or when auditing for spec compliance.
 user-invocable: true
+allowed-tools:
+  - AskUserQuestion
+  - Glob
+  - Read
+  - Task
+  - Write
 version: 1.1.1
 author: "Ashay Kubal @ Qball Inc."
 ---

package/skills/anthropic-validator/references/skills-checklist.md

@@ -21,7 +21,8 @@ All skill frontmatter fields are technically optional per the Anthropic spec. `d
 | `arguments` | string or YAML list | Argument schema (space-separated string or list) |
 | `disable-model-invocation` | boolean | `true` blocks auto-invocation but keeps `/skill-name` working |
 | `user-invocable` | boolean | `true` to show in `/` menu, `false` to hide |
-| `allowed-tools` | string or YAML list | **Canonical tool restriction field for SKILLS** (NOT `tools`) |
+| `allowed-tools` | string or YAML list | **Pre-authorizes** listed tools (skips approval prompts); does NOT restrict tool availability (NOT `tools`) |
+| `disallowed-tools` | string or YAML list | **Restriction field for SKILLS**: removes tools from the available pool while the skill is active (clears on next message) |
 | `model` | string | `haiku`, `sonnet`, `opus` |
 | `agent` | string | Subagent name to delegate to |
 | `effort` | enum | `low`, `medium`, `high`, `xhigh`, `max` |

package/skills/anthropic-validator/references/skills-validation.md

@@ -47,7 +47,8 @@ Per-asset-type workflow + validation points for **skills** (`SKILL.md` files). L
 | `arguments` | space-separated string OR YAML list | Optional — argument schema |
 | `disable-model-invocation` | boolean | Optional — `true` blocks auto-invocation but keeps `/` invocation working |
 | `user-invocable` | boolean | Optional — controls `/` menu visibility |
-| `allowed-tools` | space-separated string OR YAML list | Optional — **canonical tool restriction field for SKILLS** (NOT `tools`; that field is for AGENTS) |
+| `allowed-tools` | space-separated string OR YAML list | Optional — **pre-authorizes** the listed tools (skips approval prompts while the skill is active); does NOT restrict which tools are available (NOT `tools`; that field is for AGENTS) |
+| `disallowed-tools` | space-separated/comma string OR YAML list | Optional — **the actual tool-restriction field for SKILLS**: removes the listed tools from Claude's available pool while the skill is active (restriction clears on the next user message) |
 | `model` | string | Optional — `haiku`, `sonnet`, `opus` |
 | `agent` | string (subagent name) | Optional — delegate to a named subagent |
 | `effort` | enum: `low`, `medium`, `high`, `xhigh`, `max` | Optional — model effort level |

package/skills/assertion-patterns/SKILL.md

@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
 name: assertion-patterns
 description: Real output verification vs mock calls. Use when transforming T1-T4 violating tests to verify observable behavior.
 user-invocable: false
+allowed-tools:
+  - Read
+  - Write
 version: 1.0.0
 author: "Ashay Kubal @ Qball Inc."
 ---

package/skills/bug-magnet-data/SKILL.md

@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
 name: bug-magnet-data
 description: Curated edge case test data for boundary testing, verification scripts, and test generation. Provides pre-curated reference data organized by data type with context-specific loading guidance.
 user-invocable: false
+allowed-tools:
+  - Read
+  - Write
 version: 1.0.0
 author: "Ashay Kubal @ Qball Inc."
 ---

package/skills/bulwark-brainstorm/SKILL.md

@@ -5,6 +5,14 @@ user-invocable: true
 argument-hint: "<topic, filepath, or directory> [--research <synthesis-file>] [--scoped | --exploratory]"
 skills:
   - subagent-prompting
+allowed-tools:
+  - AskUserQuestion
+  - Bash
+  - Glob
+  - Read
+  - Skill
+  - Task
+  - Write
 version: 1.0.1
 author: "Ashay Kubal @ Qball Inc."
 ---