@pulse-compute/crypto 1.0.0-beta.5 → 1.0.0-beta.6

package/guests/es256-rustcrypto/source/bearssl/inc/bearssl_x509.h

@@ -0,0 +1,1397 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Thomas Pornin <pornin@bolet.org>
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining 
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be 
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, 
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND 
+ * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef BR_BEARSSL_X509_H__
+#define BR_BEARSSL_X509_H__
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#include "bearssl_ec.h"
+#include "bearssl_hash.h"
+#include "bearssl_rsa.h"
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/** \file bearssl_x509.h
+ *
+ * # X.509 Certificate Chain Processing
+ *
+ * An X.509 processing engine receives an X.509 chain, chunk by chunk,
+ * as received from a SSL/TLS client or server (the client receives the
+ * server's certificate chain, and the server receives the client's
+ * certificate chain if it requested a client certificate). The chain
+ * is thus injected in the engine in SSL order (end-entity first).
+ *
+ * The engine's job is to return the public key to use for SSL/TLS.
+ * How exactly that key is obtained and verified is entirely up to the
+ * engine.
+ *
+ * **The "known key" engine** returns a public key which is already known
+ * from out-of-band information (e.g. the client _remembers_ the key from
+ * a previous connection, as in the usual SSH model). This is the simplest
+ * engine since it simply ignores the chain, thereby avoiding the need
+ * for any decoding logic.
+ *
+ * **The "minimal" engine** implements minimal X.509 decoding and chain
+ * validation:
+ *
+ *   - The provided chain should validate "as is". There is no attempt
+ *     at reordering, skipping or downloading extra certificates.
+ *
+ *   - X.509 v1, v2 and v3 certificates are supported.
+ *
+ *   - Trust anchors are a DN and a public key. Each anchor is either a
+ *     "CA" anchor, or a non-CA.
+ *
+ *   - If the end-entity certificate matches a non-CA anchor (subject DN
+ *     is equal to the non-CA name, and public key is also identical to
+ *     the anchor key), then this is a _direct trust_ case and the
+ *     remaining certificates are ignored.
+ *
+ *   - Unless direct trust is applied, the chain must be verifiable up to
+ *     a certificate whose issuer DN matches the DN from a "CA" trust anchor,
+ *     and whose signature is verifiable against that anchor's public key.
+ *     Subsequent certificates in the chain are ignored.
+ *
+ *   - The engine verifies subject/issuer DN matching, and enforces
+ *     processing of Basic Constraints and Key Usage extensions. The
+ *     Authority Key Identifier, Subject Key Identifier, Issuer Alt Name,
+ *     Subject Directory Attribute, CRL Distribution Points, Freshest CRL,
+ *     Authority Info Access and Subject Info Access extensions are
+ *     ignored. The Subject Alt Name is decoded for the end-entity
+ *     certificate under some conditions (see below). Other extensions
+ *     are ignored if non-critical, or imply chain rejection if critical.
+ *
+ *   - The Subject Alt Name extension is parsed for names of type `dNSName`
+ *     when decoding the end-entity certificate, and only if there is a
+ *     server name to match. If there is no SAN extension, then the
+ *     Common Name from the subjectDN is used. That name matching is
+ *     case-insensitive and honours a single starting wildcard (i.e. if
+ *     the name in the certificate starts with "`*.`" then this matches
+ *     any word as first element). Note: this name matching is performed
+ *     also in the "direct trust" model.
+ *
+ *   - DN matching is byte-to-byte equality (a future version might
+ *     include some limited processing for case-insensitive matching and
+ *     whitespace normalisation).
+ *
+ *   - Successful validation produces a public key type but also a set
+ *     of allowed usages (`BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX` and/or `BR_KEYTYPE_SIGN`).
+ *     The caller is responsible for checking that the key type and
+ *     usages are compatible with the expected values (e.g. with the
+ *     selected cipher suite, when the client validates the server's
+ *     certificate).
+ *
+ * **Important caveats:**
+ *
+ *   - The "minimal" engine does not check revocation status. The relevant
+ *     extensions are ignored, and CRL or OCSP responses are not gathered
+ *     or checked.
+ *
+ *   - The "minimal" engine does not currently support Name Constraints
+ *     (some basic functionality to handle sub-domains may be added in a
+ *     later version).
+ *
+ *   - The decoder is not "validating" in the sense that it won't reject
+ *     some certificates with invalid field values when these fields are
+ *     not actually processed.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * X.509 error codes are in the 32..63 range.
+ */
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: validation was successful; this is not actually
+    an error. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_OK                    32
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: invalid value in an ASN.1 structure. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_INVALID_VALUE         33
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: truncated certificate. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_TRUNCATED             34
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: empty certificate chain (no certificate at all). */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_EMPTY_CHAIN           35
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: decoding error: inner element extends beyond
+    outer element size. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_INNER_TRUNC           36
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: decoding error: unsupported tag class (application
+    or private). */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_BAD_TAG_CLASS         37
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: decoding error: unsupported tag value. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_BAD_TAG_VALUE         38
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: decoding error: indefinite length. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_INDEFINITE_LENGTH     39
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: decoding error: extraneous element. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_EXTRA_ELEMENT         40
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: decoding error: unexpected element. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_UNEXPECTED            41
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: decoding error: expected constructed element, but
+    is primitive. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_NOT_CONSTRUCTED       42
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: decoding error: expected primitive element, but
+    is constructed. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_NOT_PRIMITIVE         43
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: decoding error: BIT STRING length is not multiple
+    of 8. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_PARTIAL_BYTE          44
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: decoding error: BOOLEAN value has invalid length. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_BAD_BOOLEAN           45
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: decoding error: value is off-limits. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_OVERFLOW              46
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: invalid distinguished name. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_BAD_DN                47
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: invalid date/time representation. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_BAD_TIME              48
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: certificate contains unsupported features that
+    cannot be ignored. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_UNSUPPORTED           49
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: key or signature size exceeds internal limits. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_LIMIT_EXCEEDED        50
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: key type does not match that which was expected. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_WRONG_KEY_TYPE        51
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: signature is invalid. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_BAD_SIGNATURE         52
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: validation time is unknown. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_TIME_UNKNOWN          53
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: certificate is expired or not yet valid. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_EXPIRED               54
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: issuer/subject DN mismatch in the chain. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_DN_MISMATCH           55
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: expected server name was not found in the chain. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_BAD_SERVER_NAME       56
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: unknown critical extension in certificate. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_CRITICAL_EXTENSION    57
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: not a CA, or path length constraint violation */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_NOT_CA                58
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: Key Usage extension prohibits intended usage. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_FORBIDDEN_KEY_USAGE   59
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: public key found in certificate is too small. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_WEAK_PUBLIC_KEY       60
+
+/** \brief X.509 status: chain could not be linked to a trust anchor. */
+#define BR_ERR_X509_NOT_TRUSTED           62
+
+/**
+ * \brief Aggregate structure for public keys.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+	/** \brief Key type: `BR_KEYTYPE_RSA` or `BR_KEYTYPE_EC` */
+	unsigned char key_type;
+	/** \brief Actual public key. */
+	union {
+		/** \brief RSA public key. */
+		br_rsa_public_key rsa;
+		/** \brief EC public key. */
+		br_ec_public_key ec;
+	} key;
+} br_x509_pkey;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Distinguished Name (X.500) structure.
+ *
+ * The DN is DER-encoded.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+	/** \brief Encoded DN data. */
+	unsigned char *data;
+	/** \brief Encoded DN length (in bytes). */
+	size_t len;
+} br_x500_name;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Trust anchor structure.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+	/** \brief Encoded DN (X.500 name). */
+	br_x500_name dn;
+	/** \brief Anchor flags (e.g. `BR_X509_TA_CA`). */
+	unsigned flags;
+	/** \brief Anchor public key. */
+	br_x509_pkey pkey;
+} br_x509_trust_anchor;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Trust anchor flag: CA.
+ *
+ * A "CA" anchor is deemed fit to verify signatures on certificates.
+ * A "non-CA" anchor is accepted only for direct trust (server's
+ * certificate name and key match the anchor).
+ */
+#define BR_X509_TA_CA        0x0001
+
+/*
+ * Key type: combination of a basic key type (low 4 bits) and some
+ * optional flags.
+ *
+ * For a public key, the basic key type only is set.
+ *
+ * For an expected key type, the flags indicate the intended purpose(s)
+ * for the key; the basic key type may be set to 0 to indicate that any
+ * key type compatible with the indicated purpose is acceptable.
+ */
+/** \brief Key type: algorithm is RSA. */
+#define BR_KEYTYPE_RSA    1
+/** \brief Key type: algorithm is EC. */
+#define BR_KEYTYPE_EC     2
+
+/**
+ * \brief Key type: usage is "key exchange".
+ *
+ * This value is combined (with bitwise OR) with the algorithm
+ * (`BR_KEYTYPE_RSA` or `BR_KEYTYPE_EC`) when informing the X.509
+ * validation engine that it should find a public key of that type,
+ * fit for key exchanges (e.g. `TLS_RSA_*` and `TLS_ECDH_*` cipher
+ * suites).
+ */
+#define BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX   0x10
+
+/**
+ * \brief Key type: usage is "signature".
+ *
+ * This value is combined (with bitwise OR) with the algorithm
+ * (`BR_KEYTYPE_RSA` or `BR_KEYTYPE_EC`) when informing the X.509
+ * validation engine that it should find a public key of that type,
+ * fit for signatures (e.g. `TLS_ECDHE_*` cipher suites).
+ */
+#define BR_KEYTYPE_SIGN   0x20
+
+/*
+ * start_chain   Called when a new chain is started. If 'server_name'
+ *               is not NULL and non-empty, then it is a name that
+ *               should be looked for in the EE certificate (in the
+ *               SAN extension as dNSName, or in the subjectDN's CN
+ *               if there is no SAN extension).
+ *               The caller ensures that the provided 'server_name'
+ *               pointer remains valid throughout validation.
+ *
+ * start_cert    Begins a new certificate in the chain. The provided
+ *               length is in bytes; this is the total certificate length.
+ *
+ * append        Get some additional bytes for the current certificate.
+ *
+ * end_cert      Ends the current certificate.
+ *
+ * end_chain     Called at the end of the chain. Returned value is
+ *               0 on success, or a non-zero error code.
+ *
+ * get_pkey      Returns the EE certificate public key.
+ *
+ * For a complete chain, start_chain() and end_chain() are always
+ * called. For each certificate, start_cert(), some append() calls, then
+ * end_cert() are called, in that order. There may be no append() call
+ * at all if the certificate is empty (which is not valid but may happen
+ * if the peer sends exactly that).
+ *
+ * get_pkey() shall return a pointer to a structure that is valid as
+ * long as a new chain is not started. This may be a sub-structure
+ * within the context for the engine. This function MAY return a valid
+ * pointer to a public key even in some cases of validation failure,
+ * depending on the validation engine.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class type for an X.509 engine.
+ *
+ * A certificate chain validation uses a caller-allocated context, which
+ * contains the running state for that validation. Methods are called
+ * in due order:
+ *
+ *   - `start_chain()` is called at the start of the validation.
+ *   - Certificates are processed one by one, in SSL order (end-entity
+ *     comes first). For each certificate, the following methods are
+ *     called:
+ *
+ *       - `start_cert()` at the beginning of the certificate.
+ *       - `append()` is called zero, one or more times, to provide
+ *         the certificate (possibly in chunks).
+ *       - `end_cert()` at the end of the certificate.
+ *
+ *   - `end_chain()` is called when the last certificate in the chain
+ *     was processed.
+ *   - `get_pkey()` is called after chain processing, if the chain
+ *     validation was successful.
+ *
+ * A context structure may be reused; the `start_chain()` method shall
+ * ensure (re)initialisation.
+ */
+typedef struct br_x509_class_ br_x509_class;
+struct br_x509_class_ {
+	/**
+	 * \brief X.509 context size, in bytes.
+	 */
+	size_t context_size;
+
+	/**
+	 * \brief Start a new chain.
+	 *
+	 * This method shall set the vtable (first field) of the context
+	 * structure.
+	 *
+	 * The `server_name`, if not `NULL`, will be considered as a
+	 * fully qualified domain name, to be matched against the `dNSName`
+	 * elements of the end-entity certificate's SAN extension (if there
+	 * is no SAN, then the Common Name from the subjectDN will be used).
+	 * If `server_name` is `NULL` then no such matching is performed.
+	 *
+	 * \param ctx           validation context.
+	 * \param server_name   server name to match (or `NULL`).
+	 */
+	void (*start_chain)(const br_x509_class **ctx,
+		const char *server_name);
+
+	/**
+	 * \brief Start a new certificate.
+	 *
+	 * \param ctx      validation context.
+	 * \param length   new certificate length (in bytes).
+	 */
+	void (*start_cert)(const br_x509_class **ctx, uint32_t length);
+
+	/**
+	 * \brief Receive some bytes for the current certificate.
+	 *
+	 * This function may be called several times in succession for
+	 * a given certificate. The caller guarantees that for each
+	 * call, `len` is not zero, and the sum of all chunk lengths
+	 * for a certificate matches the total certificate length which
+	 * was provided in the previous `start_cert()` call.
+	 *
+	 * If the new certificate is empty (no byte at all) then this
+	 * function won't be called at all.
+	 *
+	 * \param ctx   validation context.
+	 * \param buf   certificate data chunk.
+	 * \param len   certificate data chunk length (in bytes).
+	 */
+	void (*append)(const br_x509_class **ctx,
+		const unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
+
+	/**
+	 * \brief Finish the current certificate.
+	 *
+	 * This function is called when the end of the current certificate
+	 * is reached.
+	 *
+	 * \param ctx   validation context.
+	 */
+	void (*end_cert)(const br_x509_class **ctx);
+
+	/**
+	 * \brief Finish the chain.
+	 *
+	 * This function is called at the end of the chain. It shall
+	 * return either 0 if the validation was successful, or a
+	 * non-zero error code. The `BR_ERR_X509_*` constants are
+	 * error codes, though other values may be possible.
+	 *
+	 * \param ctx   validation context.
+	 * \return  0 on success, or a non-zero error code.
+	 */
+	unsigned (*end_chain)(const br_x509_class **ctx);
+
+	/**
+	 * \brief Get the resulting end-entity public key.
+	 *
+	 * The decoded public key is returned. The returned pointer
+	 * may be valid only as long as the context structure is
+	 * unmodified, i.e. it may cease to be valid if the context
+	 * is released or reused.
+	 *
+	 * This function _may_ return `NULL` if the validation failed.
+	 * However, returning a public key does not mean that the
+	 * validation was wholly successful; some engines may return
+	 * a decoded public key even if the chain did not end on a
+	 * trusted anchor.
+	 *
+	 * If validation succeeded and `usage` is not `NULL`, then
+	 * `*usage` is filled with a combination of `BR_KEYTYPE_SIGN`
+	 * and/or `BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX` that specifies the validated key
+	 * usage types. It is the caller's responsibility to check
+	 * that value against the intended use of the public key.
+	 *
+	 * \param ctx   validation context.
+	 * \return  the end-entity public key, or `NULL`.
+	 */
+	const br_x509_pkey *(*get_pkey)(
+		const br_x509_class *const *ctx, unsigned *usages);
+};
+
+/**
+ * \brief The "known key" X.509 engine structure.
+ *
+ * The structure contents are opaque (they shall not be accessed directly),
+ * except for the first field (the vtable).
+ *
+ * The "known key" engine returns an externally configured public key,
+ * and totally ignores the certificate contents.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+	/** \brief Reference to the context vtable. */
+	const br_x509_class *vtable;
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+	br_x509_pkey pkey;
+	unsigned usages;
+#endif
+} br_x509_knownkey_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class instance for the "known key" X.509 engine.
+ */
+extern const br_x509_class br_x509_knownkey_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize a "known key" X.509 engine with a known RSA public key.
+ *
+ * The `usages` parameter indicates the allowed key usages for that key
+ * (`BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX` and/or `BR_KEYTYPE_SIGN`).
+ *
+ * The provided pointers are linked in, not copied, so they must remain
+ * valid while the public key may be in usage.
+ *
+ * \param ctx      context to initialise.
+ * \param pk       known public key.
+ * \param usages   allowed key usages.
+ */
+void br_x509_knownkey_init_rsa(br_x509_knownkey_context *ctx,
+	const br_rsa_public_key *pk, unsigned usages);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialize a "known key" X.509 engine with a known EC public key.
+ *
+ * The `usages` parameter indicates the allowed key usages for that key
+ * (`BR_KEYTYPE_KEYX` and/or `BR_KEYTYPE_SIGN`).
+ *
+ * The provided pointers are linked in, not copied, so they must remain
+ * valid while the public key may be in usage.
+ *
+ * \param ctx      context to initialise.
+ * \param pk       known public key.
+ * \param usages   allowed key usages.
+ */
+void br_x509_knownkey_init_ec(br_x509_knownkey_context *ctx,
+	const br_ec_public_key *pk, unsigned usages);
+
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+/*
+ * The minimal X.509 engine has some state buffers which must be large
+ * enough to simultaneously accommodate:
+ * -- the public key extracted from the current certificate;
+ * -- the signature on the current certificate or on the previous
+ *    certificate;
+ * -- the public key extracted from the EE certificate.
+ *
+ * We store public key elements in their raw unsigned big-endian
+ * encoding. We want to support up to RSA-4096 with a short (up to 64
+ * bits) public exponent, thus a buffer for a public key must have
+ * length at least 520 bytes. Similarly, a RSA-4096 signature has length
+ * 512 bytes.
+ *
+ * Though RSA public exponents can formally be as large as the modulus
+ * (mathematically, even larger exponents would work, but PKCS#1 forbids
+ * them), exponents that do not fit on 32 bits are extremely rare,
+ * notably because some widespread implementations (e.g. Microsoft's
+ * CryptoAPI) don't support them. Moreover, large public exponent do not
+ * seem to imply any tangible security benefit, and they increase the
+ * cost of public key operations. The X.509 "minimal" engine will tolerate
+ * public exponents of arbitrary size as long as the modulus and the
+ * exponent can fit together in the dedicated buffer.
+ *
+ * EC public keys are shorter than RSA public keys; even with curve
+ * NIST P-521 (the largest curve we care to support), a public key is
+ * encoded over 133 bytes only.
+ */
+#define BR_X509_BUFSIZE_KEY   520
+#define BR_X509_BUFSIZE_SIG   512
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * \brief Type for receiving a name element.
+ *
+ * An array of such structures can be provided to the X.509 decoding
+ * engines. If the specified elements are found in the certificate
+ * subject DN or the SAN extension, then the name contents are copied
+ * as zero-terminated strings into the buffer.
+ *
+ * The decoder converts TeletexString and BMPString to UTF8String, and
+ * ensures that the resulting string is zero-terminated. If the string
+ * does not fit in the provided buffer, then the copy is aborted and an
+ * error is reported.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+	/**
+	 * \brief Element OID.
+	 *
+	 * For X.500 name elements (to be extracted from the subject DN),
+	 * this is the encoded OID for the requested name element; the
+	 * first byte shall contain the length of the DER-encoded OID
+	 * value, followed by the OID value (for instance, OID 2.5.4.3,
+	 * for id-at-commonName, will be `03 55 04 03`). This is
+	 * equivalent to full DER encoding with the length but without
+	 * the tag.
+	 *
+	 * For SAN name elements, the first byte (`oid[0]`) has value 0,
+	 * followed by another byte that matches the expected GeneralName
+	 * tag. Allowed second byte values are then:
+	 *
+	 *   - 1: `rfc822Name`
+	 *
+	 *   - 2: `dNSName`
+	 *
+	 *   - 6: `uniformResourceIdentifier`
+	 *
+	 *   - 0: `otherName`
+	 *
+	 * If first and second byte are 0, then this is a SAN element of
+	 * type `otherName`; the `oid[]` array should then contain, right
+	 * after the two bytes of value 0, an encoded OID (with the same
+	 * conventions as for X.500 name elements). If a match is found
+	 * for that OID, then the corresponding name element will be
+	 * extracted, as long as it is a supported string type.
+	 */
+	const unsigned char *oid;
+
+	/**
+	 * \brief Destination buffer.
+	 */
+	char *buf;
+
+	/**
+	 * \brief Length (in bytes) of the destination buffer.
+	 *
+	 * The buffer MUST NOT be smaller than 1 byte.
+	 */
+	size_t len;
+
+	/**
+	 * \brief Decoding status.
+	 *
+	 * Status is 0 if the name element was not found, 1 if it was
+	 * found and decoded, or -1 on error. Error conditions include
+	 * an unrecognised encoding, an invalid encoding, or a string
+	 * too large for the destination buffer.
+	 */
+	int status;
+
+} br_name_element;
+
+/**
+ * \brief The "minimal" X.509 engine structure.
+ *
+ * The structure contents are opaque (they shall not be accessed directly),
+ * except for the first field (the vtable).
+ *
+ * The "minimal" engine performs a rudimentary but serviceable X.509 path
+ * validation.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+	const br_x509_class *vtable;
+
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+	/* Structure for returning the EE public key. */
+	br_x509_pkey pkey;
+
+	/* CPU for the T0 virtual machine. */
+	struct {
+		uint32_t *dp;
+		uint32_t *rp;
+		const unsigned char *ip;
+	} cpu;
+	uint32_t dp_stack[32];
+	uint32_t rp_stack[32];
+	int err;
+
+	/* Server name to match with the SAN / CN of the EE certificate. */
+	const char *server_name;
+
+	/* Validated key usages. */
+	unsigned char key_usages;
+
+	/* Explicitly set date and time. */
+	uint32_t days, seconds;
+
+	/* Current certificate length (in bytes). Set to 0 when the
+	   certificate has been fully processed. */
+	uint32_t cert_length;
+
+	/* Number of certificates processed so far in the current chain.
+	   It is incremented at the end of the processing of a certificate,
+	   so it is 0 for the EE. */
+	uint32_t num_certs;
+
+	/* Certificate data chunk. */
+	const unsigned char *hbuf;
+	size_t hlen;
+
+	/* The pad serves as destination for various operations. */
+	unsigned char pad[256];
+
+	/* Buffer for EE public key data. */
+	unsigned char ee_pkey_data[BR_X509_BUFSIZE_KEY];
+
+	/* Buffer for currently decoded public key. */
+	unsigned char pkey_data[BR_X509_BUFSIZE_KEY];
+
+	/* Signature type: signer key type, offset to the hash
+	   function OID (in the T0 data block) and hash function
+	   output length (TBS hash length). */
+	unsigned char cert_signer_key_type;
+	uint16_t cert_sig_hash_oid;
+	unsigned char cert_sig_hash_len;
+
+	/* Current/last certificate signature. */
+	unsigned char cert_sig[BR_X509_BUFSIZE_SIG];
+	uint16_t cert_sig_len;
+
+	/* Minimum RSA key length (difference in bytes from 128). */
+	int16_t min_rsa_size;
+
+	/* Configured trust anchors. */
+	const br_x509_trust_anchor *trust_anchors;
+	size_t trust_anchors_num;
+
+	/*
+	 * Multi-hasher for the TBS.
+	 */
+	unsigned char do_mhash;
+	br_multihash_context mhash;
+	unsigned char tbs_hash[64];
+
+	/*
+	 * Simple hasher for the subject/issuer DN.
+	 */
+	unsigned char do_dn_hash;
+	const br_hash_class *dn_hash_impl;
+	br_hash_compat_context dn_hash;
+	unsigned char current_dn_hash[64];
+	unsigned char next_dn_hash[64];
+	unsigned char saved_dn_hash[64];
+
+	/*
+	 * Name elements to gather.
+	 */
+	br_name_element *name_elts;
+	size_t num_name_elts;
+
+	/*
+	 * Public key cryptography implementations (signature verification).
+	 */
+	br_rsa_pkcs1_vrfy irsa;
+	br_ecdsa_vrfy iecdsa;
+	const br_ec_impl *iec;
+#endif
+
+} br_x509_minimal_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Class instance for the "minimal" X.509 engine.
+ */
+extern const br_x509_class br_x509_minimal_vtable;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialise a "minimal" X.509 engine.
+ *
+ * The `dn_hash_impl` parameter shall be a hash function internally used
+ * to match X.500 names (subject/issuer DN, and anchor names). Any standard
+ * hash function may be used, but a collision-resistant hash function is
+ * advised.
+ *
+ * After initialization, some implementations for signature verification
+ * (hash functions and signature algorithms) MUST be added.
+ *
+ * \param ctx                 context to initialise.
+ * \param dn_hash_impl        hash function for DN comparisons.
+ * \param trust_anchors       trust anchors.
+ * \param trust_anchors_num   number of trust anchors.
+ */
+void br_x509_minimal_init(br_x509_minimal_context *ctx,
+	const br_hash_class *dn_hash_impl,
+	const br_x509_trust_anchor *trust_anchors, size_t trust_anchors_num);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set a supported hash function in an X.509 "minimal" engine.
+ *
+ * Hash functions are used with signature verification algorithms.
+ * Once initialised (with `br_x509_minimal_init()`), the context must
+ * be configured with the hash functions it shall support for that
+ * purpose. The hash function identifier MUST be one of the standard
+ * hash function identifiers (1 to 6, for MD5, SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256,
+ * SHA-384 and SHA-512).
+ *
+ * If `impl` is `NULL`, this _removes_ support for the designated
+ * hash function.
+ *
+ * \param ctx    validation context.
+ * \param id     hash function identifier (from 1 to 6).
+ * \param impl   hash function implementation (or `NULL`).
+ */
+static inline void
+br_x509_minimal_set_hash(br_x509_minimal_context *ctx,
+	int id, const br_hash_class *impl)
+{
+	br_multihash_setimpl(&ctx->mhash, id, impl);
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set a RSA signature verification implementation in the X.509
+ * "minimal" engine.
+ *
+ * Once initialised (with `br_x509_minimal_init()`), the context must
+ * be configured with the signature verification implementations that
+ * it is supposed to support. If `irsa` is `0`, then the RSA support
+ * is disabled.
+ *
+ * \param ctx    validation context.
+ * \param irsa   RSA signature verification implementation (or `0`).
+ */
+static inline void
+br_x509_minimal_set_rsa(br_x509_minimal_context *ctx,
+	br_rsa_pkcs1_vrfy irsa)
+{
+	ctx->irsa = irsa;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set a ECDSA signature verification implementation in the X.509
+ * "minimal" engine.
+ *
+ * Once initialised (with `br_x509_minimal_init()`), the context must
+ * be configured with the signature verification implementations that
+ * it is supposed to support.
+ *
+ * If `iecdsa` is `0`, then this call disables ECDSA support; in that
+ * case, `iec` may be `NULL`. Otherwise, `iecdsa` MUST point to a function
+ * that verifies ECDSA signatures with format "asn1", and it will use
+ * `iec` as underlying elliptic curve support.
+ *
+ * \param ctx      validation context.
+ * \param iec      elliptic curve implementation (or `NULL`).
+ * \param iecdsa   ECDSA implementation (or `0`).
+ */
+static inline void
+br_x509_minimal_set_ecdsa(br_x509_minimal_context *ctx,
+	const br_ec_impl *iec, br_ecdsa_vrfy iecdsa)
+{
+	ctx->iecdsa = iecdsa;
+	ctx->iec = iec;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialise a "minimal" X.509 engine with default algorithms.
+ *
+ * This function performs the same job as `br_x509_minimal_init()`, but
+ * also sets implementations for RSA, ECDSA, and the standard hash
+ * functions.
+ *
+ * \param ctx                 context to initialise.
+ * \param trust_anchors       trust anchors.
+ * \param trust_anchors_num   number of trust anchors.
+ */
+void br_x509_minimal_init_full(br_x509_minimal_context *ctx,
+	const br_x509_trust_anchor *trust_anchors, size_t trust_anchors_num);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the validation time for the X.509 "minimal" engine.
+ *
+ * The validation time is set as two 32-bit integers, for days and
+ * seconds since a fixed epoch:
+ *
+ *   - Days are counted in a proleptic Gregorian calendar since
+ *     January 1st, 0 AD. Year "0 AD" is the one that preceded "1 AD";
+ *     it is also traditionally known as "1 BC".
+ *
+ *   - Seconds are counted since midnight, from 0 to 86400 (a count of
+ *     86400 is possible only if a leap second happened).
+ *
+ * The validation date and time is understood in the UTC time zone.
+ *
+ * If the validation date and time are not explicitly set, but BearSSL
+ * was compiled with support for the system clock on the underlying
+ * platform, then the current time will automatically be used. Otherwise,
+ * not setting the validation date and time implies a validation
+ * failure (except in case of direct trust of the EE key).
+ *
+ * \param ctx       validation context.
+ * \param days      days since January 1st, 0 AD (Gregorian calendar).
+ * \param seconds   seconds since midnight (0 to 86400).
+ */
+static inline void
+br_x509_minimal_set_time(br_x509_minimal_context *ctx,
+	uint32_t days, uint32_t seconds)
+{
+	ctx->days = days;
+	ctx->seconds = seconds;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the minimal acceptable length for RSA keys (X.509 "minimal"
+ * engine).
+ *
+ * The RSA key length is expressed in bytes. The default minimum key
+ * length is 128 bytes, corresponding to 1017 bits. RSA keys shorter
+ * than the configured length will be rejected, implying validation
+ * failure. This setting applies to keys extracted from certificates
+ * (both end-entity, and intermediate CA) but not to "CA" trust anchors.
+ *
+ * \param ctx           validation context.
+ * \param byte_length   minimum RSA key length, **in bytes** (not bits).
+ */
+static inline void
+br_x509_minimal_set_minrsa(br_x509_minimal_context *ctx, int byte_length)
+{
+	ctx->min_rsa_size = (int16_t)(byte_length - 128);
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Set the name elements to gather.
+ *
+ * The provided array is linked in the context. The elements are
+ * gathered from the EE certificate. If the same element type is
+ * requested several times, then the relevant structures will be filled
+ * in the order the matching values are encountered in the certificate.
+ *
+ * \param ctx        validation context.
+ * \param elts       array of name element structures to fill.
+ * \param num_elts   number of name element structures to fill.
+ */
+static inline void
+br_x509_minimal_set_name_elements(br_x509_minimal_context *ctx,
+	br_name_element *elts, size_t num_elts)
+{
+	ctx->name_elts = elts;
+	ctx->num_name_elts = num_elts;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief X.509 decoder context.
+ *
+ * This structure is _not_ for X.509 validation, but for extracting
+ * names and public keys from encoded certificates. Intended usage is
+ * to use (self-signed) certificates as trust anchors.
+ *
+ * Contents are opaque and shall not be accessed directly.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+	/* Structure for returning the public key. */
+	br_x509_pkey pkey;
+
+	/* CPU for the T0 virtual machine. */
+	struct {
+		uint32_t *dp;
+		uint32_t *rp;
+		const unsigned char *ip;
+	} cpu;
+	uint32_t dp_stack[32];
+	uint32_t rp_stack[32];
+	int err;
+
+	/* The pad serves as destination for various operations. */
+	unsigned char pad[256];
+
+	/* Flag set when decoding succeeds. */
+	unsigned char decoded;
+
+	/* Validity dates. */
+	uint32_t notbefore_days, notbefore_seconds;
+	uint32_t notafter_days, notafter_seconds;
+
+	/* The "CA" flag. This is set to true if the certificate contains
+	   a Basic Constraints extension that asserts CA status. */
+	unsigned char isCA;
+
+	/* DN processing: the subject DN is extracted and pushed to the
+	   provided callback. */
+	unsigned char copy_dn;
+	void *append_dn_ctx;
+	void (*append_dn)(void *ctx, const void *buf, size_t len);
+
+	/* Certificate data chunk. */
+	const unsigned char *hbuf;
+	size_t hlen;
+
+	/* Buffer for decoded public key. */
+	unsigned char pkey_data[BR_X509_BUFSIZE_KEY];
+
+	/* Type of key and hash function used in the certificate signature. */
+	unsigned char signer_key_type;
+	unsigned char signer_hash_id;
+#endif
+
+} br_x509_decoder_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialise an X.509 decoder context for processing a new
+ * certificate.
+ *
+ * The `append_dn()` callback (with opaque context `append_dn_ctx`)
+ * will be invoked to receive, chunk by chunk, the certificate's
+ * subject DN. If `append_dn` is `0` then the subject DN will be
+ * ignored.
+ *
+ * \param ctx             X.509 decoder context to initialise.
+ * \param append_dn       DN receiver callback (or `0`).
+ * \param append_dn_ctx   context for the DN receiver callback.
+ */
+void br_x509_decoder_init(br_x509_decoder_context *ctx,
+	void (*append_dn)(void *ctx, const void *buf, size_t len),
+	void *append_dn_ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Push some certificate bytes into a decoder context.
+ *
+ * If `len` is non-zero, then that many bytes are pushed, from address
+ * `data`, into the provided decoder context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx    X.509 decoder context.
+ * \param data   certificate data chunk.
+ * \param len    certificate data chunk length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_x509_decoder_push(br_x509_decoder_context *ctx,
+	const void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Obtain the decoded public key.
+ *
+ * Returned value is a pointer to a structure internal to the decoder
+ * context; releasing or reusing the decoder context invalidates that
+ * structure.
+ *
+ * If decoding was not finished, or failed, then `NULL` is returned.
+ *
+ * \param ctx   X.509 decoder context.
+ * \return  the public key, or `NULL` on unfinished/error.
+ */
+static inline br_x509_pkey *
+br_x509_decoder_get_pkey(br_x509_decoder_context *ctx)
+{
+	if (ctx->decoded && ctx->err == 0) {
+		return &ctx->pkey;
+	} else {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get decoder error status.
+ *
+ * If no error was reported yet but the certificate decoding is not
+ * finished, then the error code is `BR_ERR_X509_TRUNCATED`. If decoding
+ * was successful, then 0 is returned.
+ *
+ * \param ctx   X.509 decoder context.
+ * \return  0 on successful decoding, or a non-zero error code.
+ */
+static inline int
+br_x509_decoder_last_error(br_x509_decoder_context *ctx)
+{
+	if (ctx->err != 0) {
+		return ctx->err;
+	}
+	if (!ctx->decoded) {
+		return BR_ERR_X509_TRUNCATED;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the "isCA" flag from an X.509 decoder context.
+ *
+ * This flag is set if the decoded certificate claims to be a CA through
+ * a Basic Constraints extension. This flag should not be read before
+ * decoding completed successfully.
+ *
+ * \param ctx   X.509 decoder context.
+ * \return  the "isCA" flag.
+ */
+static inline int
+br_x509_decoder_isCA(br_x509_decoder_context *ctx)
+{
+	return ctx->isCA;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the issuing CA key type (type of algorithm used to sign the
+ * decoded certificate).
+ *
+ * This is `BR_KEYTYPE_RSA` or `BR_KEYTYPE_EC`. The value 0 is returned
+ * if the signature type was not recognised.
+ *
+ * \param ctx   X.509 decoder context.
+ * \return  the issuing CA key type.
+ */
+static inline int
+br_x509_decoder_get_signer_key_type(br_x509_decoder_context *ctx)
+{
+	return ctx->signer_key_type;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the identifier for the hash function used to sign the decoded
+ * certificate.
+ *
+ * This is 0 if the hash function was not recognised.
+ *
+ * \param ctx   X.509 decoder context.
+ * \return  the signature hash function identifier.
+ */
+static inline int
+br_x509_decoder_get_signer_hash_id(br_x509_decoder_context *ctx)
+{
+	return ctx->signer_hash_id;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Type for an X.509 certificate (DER-encoded).
+ */
+typedef struct {
+	/** \brief The DER-encoded certificate data. */
+	unsigned char *data;
+	/** \brief The DER-encoded certificate length (in bytes). */
+	size_t data_len;
+} br_x509_certificate;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Private key decoder context.
+ *
+ * The private key decoder recognises RSA and EC private keys, either in
+ * their raw, DER-encoded format, or wrapped in an unencrypted PKCS#8
+ * archive (again DER-encoded).
+ *
+ * Structure contents are opaque and shall not be accessed directly.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+#ifndef BR_DOXYGEN_IGNORE
+	/* Structure for returning the private key. */
+	union {
+		br_rsa_private_key rsa;
+		br_ec_private_key ec;
+	} key;
+
+	/* CPU for the T0 virtual machine. */
+	struct {
+		uint32_t *dp;
+		uint32_t *rp;
+		const unsigned char *ip;
+	} cpu;
+	uint32_t dp_stack[32];
+	uint32_t rp_stack[32];
+	int err;
+
+	/* Private key data chunk. */
+	const unsigned char *hbuf;
+	size_t hlen;
+
+	/* The pad serves as destination for various operations. */
+	unsigned char pad[256];
+
+	/* Decoded key type; 0 until decoding is complete. */
+	unsigned char key_type;
+
+	/* Buffer for the private key elements. It shall be large enough
+	   to accommodate all elements for a RSA-4096 private key (roughly
+	   five 2048-bit integers, possibly a bit more). */
+	unsigned char key_data[3 * BR_X509_BUFSIZE_SIG];
+#endif
+} br_skey_decoder_context;
+
+/**
+ * \brief Initialise a private key decoder context.
+ *
+ * \param ctx   key decoder context to initialise.
+ */
+void br_skey_decoder_init(br_skey_decoder_context *ctx);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Push some data bytes into a private key decoder context.
+ *
+ * If `len` is non-zero, then that many data bytes, starting at address
+ * `data`, are pushed into the decoder.
+ *
+ * \param ctx    key decoder context.
+ * \param data   private key data chunk.
+ * \param len    private key data chunk length (in bytes).
+ */
+void br_skey_decoder_push(br_skey_decoder_context *ctx,
+	const void *data, size_t len);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the decoding status for a private key.
+ *
+ * Decoding status is 0 on success, or a non-zero error code. If the
+ * decoding is unfinished when this function is called, then the
+ * status code `BR_ERR_X509_TRUNCATED` is returned.
+ *
+ * \param ctx   key decoder context.
+ * \return  0 on successful decoding, or a non-zero error code.
+ */
+static inline int
+br_skey_decoder_last_error(const br_skey_decoder_context *ctx)
+{
+	if (ctx->err != 0) {
+		return ctx->err;
+	}
+	if (ctx->key_type == 0) {
+		return BR_ERR_X509_TRUNCATED;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the decoded private key type.
+ *
+ * Private key type is `BR_KEYTYPE_RSA` or `BR_KEYTYPE_EC`. If decoding is
+ * not finished or failed, then 0 is returned.
+ *
+ * \param ctx   key decoder context.
+ * \return  decoded private key type, or 0.
+ */
+static inline int
+br_skey_decoder_key_type(const br_skey_decoder_context *ctx)
+{
+	if (ctx->err == 0) {
+		return ctx->key_type;
+	} else {
+		return 0;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the decoded RSA private key.
+ *
+ * This function returns `NULL` if the decoding failed, or is not
+ * finished, or the key is not RSA. The returned pointer references
+ * structures within the context that can become invalid if the context
+ * is reused or released.
+ *
+ * \param ctx   key decoder context.
+ * \return  decoded RSA private key, or `NULL`.
+ */
+static inline const br_rsa_private_key *
+br_skey_decoder_get_rsa(const br_skey_decoder_context *ctx)
+{
+	if (ctx->err == 0 && ctx->key_type == BR_KEYTYPE_RSA) {
+		return &ctx->key.rsa;
+	} else {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Get the decoded EC private key.
+ *
+ * This function returns `NULL` if the decoding failed, or is not
+ * finished, or the key is not EC. The returned pointer references
+ * structures within the context that can become invalid if the context
+ * is reused or released.
+ *
+ * \param ctx   key decoder context.
+ * \return  decoded EC private key, or `NULL`.
+ */
+static inline const br_ec_private_key *
+br_skey_decoder_get_ec(const br_skey_decoder_context *ctx)
+{
+	if (ctx->err == 0 && ctx->key_type == BR_KEYTYPE_EC) {
+		return &ctx->key.ec;
+	} else {
+		return NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * \brief Encode an RSA private key (raw DER format).
+ *
+ * This function encodes the provided key into the "raw" format specified
+ * in PKCS#1 (RFC 8017, Appendix C, type `RSAPrivateKey`), with DER
+ * encoding rules.
+ *
+ * The key elements are:
+ *
+ *  - `sk`: the private key (`p`, `q`, `dp`, `dq` and `iq`)
+ *
+ *  - `pk`: the public key (`n` and `e`)
+ *
+ *  - `d` (size: `dlen` bytes): the private exponent
+ *
+ * The public key elements, and the private exponent `d`, can be
+ * recomputed from the private key (see `br_rsa_compute_modulus()`,
+ * `br_rsa_compute_pubexp()` and `br_rsa_compute_privexp()`).
+ *
+ * If `dest` is not `NULL`, then the encoded key is written at that
+ * address, and the encoded length (in bytes) is returned. If `dest` is
+ * `NULL`, then nothing is written, but the encoded length is still
+ * computed and returned.
+ *
+ * \param dest   the destination buffer (or `NULL`).
+ * \param sk     the RSA private key.
+ * \param pk     the RSA public key.
+ * \param d      the RSA private exponent.
+ * \param dlen   the RSA private exponent length (in bytes).
+ * \return  the encoded key length (in bytes).
+ */
+size_t br_encode_rsa_raw_der(void *dest, const br_rsa_private_key *sk,
+	const br_rsa_public_key *pk, const void *d, size_t dlen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Encode an RSA private key (PKCS#8 DER format).
+ *
+ * This function encodes the provided key into the PKCS#8 format
+ * (RFC 5958, type `OneAsymmetricKey`). It wraps around the "raw DER"
+ * format for the RSA key, as implemented by `br_encode_rsa_raw_der()`.
+ *
+ * The key elements are:
+ *
+ *  - `sk`: the private key (`p`, `q`, `dp`, `dq` and `iq`)
+ *
+ *  - `pk`: the public key (`n` and `e`)
+ *
+ *  - `d` (size: `dlen` bytes): the private exponent
+ *
+ * The public key elements, and the private exponent `d`, can be
+ * recomputed from the private key (see `br_rsa_compute_modulus()`,
+ * `br_rsa_compute_pubexp()` and `br_rsa_compute_privexp()`).
+ *
+ * If `dest` is not `NULL`, then the encoded key is written at that
+ * address, and the encoded length (in bytes) is returned. If `dest` is
+ * `NULL`, then nothing is written, but the encoded length is still
+ * computed and returned.
+ *
+ * \param dest   the destination buffer (or `NULL`).
+ * \param sk     the RSA private key.
+ * \param pk     the RSA public key.
+ * \param d      the RSA private exponent.
+ * \param dlen   the RSA private exponent length (in bytes).
+ * \return  the encoded key length (in bytes).
+ */
+size_t br_encode_rsa_pkcs8_der(void *dest, const br_rsa_private_key *sk,
+	const br_rsa_public_key *pk, const void *d, size_t dlen);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Encode an EC private key (raw DER format).
+ *
+ * This function encodes the provided key into the "raw" format specified
+ * in RFC 5915 (type `ECPrivateKey`), with DER encoding rules.
+ *
+ * The private key is provided in `sk`, the public key being `pk`. If
+ * `pk` is `NULL`, then the encoded key will not include the public key
+ * in its `publicKey` field (which is nominally optional).
+ *
+ * If `dest` is not `NULL`, then the encoded key is written at that
+ * address, and the encoded length (in bytes) is returned. If `dest` is
+ * `NULL`, then nothing is written, but the encoded length is still
+ * computed and returned.
+ *
+ * If the key cannot be encoded (e.g. because there is no known OBJECT
+ * IDENTIFIER for the used curve), then 0 is returned.
+ *
+ * \param dest   the destination buffer (or `NULL`).
+ * \param sk     the EC private key.
+ * \param pk     the EC public key (or `NULL`).
+ * \return  the encoded key length (in bytes), or 0.
+ */
+size_t br_encode_ec_raw_der(void *dest,
+	const br_ec_private_key *sk, const br_ec_public_key *pk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief Encode an EC private key (PKCS#8 DER format).
+ *
+ * This function encodes the provided key into the PKCS#8 format
+ * (RFC 5958, type `OneAsymmetricKey`). The curve is identified
+ * by an OID provided as parameters to the `privateKeyAlgorithm`
+ * field. The private key value (contents of the `privateKey` field)
+ * contains the DER encoding of the `ECPrivateKey` type defined in
+ * RFC 5915, without the `parameters` field (since they would be
+ * redundant with the information in `privateKeyAlgorithm`).
+ *
+ * The private key is provided in `sk`, the public key being `pk`. If
+ * `pk` is not `NULL`, then the encoded public key is included in the
+ * `publicKey` field of the private key value (but not in the `publicKey`
+ * field of the PKCS#8 `OneAsymmetricKey` wrapper).
+ *
+ * If `dest` is not `NULL`, then the encoded key is written at that
+ * address, and the encoded length (in bytes) is returned. If `dest` is
+ * `NULL`, then nothing is written, but the encoded length is still
+ * computed and returned.
+ *
+ * If the key cannot be encoded (e.g. because there is no known OBJECT
+ * IDENTIFIER for the used curve), then 0 is returned.
+ *
+ * \param dest   the destination buffer (or `NULL`).
+ * \param sk     the EC private key.
+ * \param pk     the EC public key (or `NULL`).
+ * \return  the encoded key length (in bytes), or 0.
+ */
+size_t br_encode_ec_pkcs8_der(void *dest,
+	const br_ec_private_key *sk, const br_ec_public_key *pk);
+
+/**
+ * \brief PEM banner for RSA private key (raw).
+ */
+#define BR_ENCODE_PEM_RSA_RAW      "RSA PRIVATE KEY"
+
+/**
+ * \brief PEM banner for EC private key (raw).
+ */
+#define BR_ENCODE_PEM_EC_RAW       "EC PRIVATE KEY"
+
+/**
+ * \brief PEM banner for an RSA or EC private key in PKCS#8 format.
+ */
+#define BR_ENCODE_PEM_PKCS8        "PRIVATE KEY"
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif