@pugi/cli 0.1.0-beta.7 → 0.1.0-beta.87

package/dist/core/output-style/state.js

@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+/**
+ * — Output-style state persistence.
+ *
+ * Two-tier storage:
+ *
+ *  1. **Workspace** — `<workspaceRoot>/.pugi/config.json`. Set by
+ *     `/style <name>` from inside the REPL or `pugi style <name>`
+ *     without `--persist`. Overrides the user default for the
+ *     current workspace only. Survives sessions because the same
+ *     `.pugi/` survives sessions.
+ *
+ *  2. **User default** — `~/.pugi/config.json` (PUGI_HOME-aware).
+ *     Set by `pugi style <name> --persist` or
+ *     `/style <name> --persist`. Applies to every workspace that
+ *     has no workspace-level override.
+ *
+ * Precedence (highest → lowest):
+ *
+ *  workspace value > user value > DEFAULT_OUTPUT_STYLE ('default')
+ *
+ * Both files live under the same `pugi-config-v1` JSON envelope as
+ * other settings (permissionMode, privacy, model, preferredEndpoint).
+ * The schema is intentionally NOT shared with `runtime/commands/config.ts`'s
+ * strict Zod schema — `outputStyle` is read/written ONLY through this
+ * module so `pugi config set outputStyle=…` is NOT a supported path
+ * (it would silently bypass the slug validator). Operators get a
+ * single surface: `/style` + `pugi style`.
+ *
+ * File layout (one config.json, multiple keys; this module owns the
+ * `outputStyle` key only):
+ *
+ *  {
+ *    "permissionMode": "ask",
+ *    "outputStyle": "terse",
+ *    ...
+ *  }
+ *
+ * The reader tolerates:
+ *  - missing file (returns the default slug),
+ *  - empty file (returns the default slug),
+ *  - malformed JSON (returns the default slug — DO NOT crash REPL
+ *    boot because of a hand-edited config),
+ *  - unknown slug (returns the default slug + emits no error; the
+ *    operator can `/style` to see the table and re-set).
+ *
+ * The writer is a read-modify-write to preserve neighbouring keys
+ * (permissionMode etc.) — overwriting the whole file would clobber
+ * the other tier's settings.
+ *
+ * Test surface: `test/commands/output-style-state.spec.ts` exercises
+ * precedence, malformed-config tolerance, persistence across reads,
+ * the `--persist` (user-default) path, and reset semantics.
+ */
+import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, } from 'node:fs';
+import { homedir } from 'node:os';
+import { dirname, resolve } from 'node:path';
+import { DEFAULT_OUTPUT_STYLE, isOutputStyleSlug, } from './presets.js';
+/**
+ * Env override for `~/.pugi` so the spec can sandbox both tiers
+ * without touching the developer's real config. Matches the existing
+ * `runtime/commands/config.ts` convention.
+ */
+export const PUGI_HOME_ENV = 'PUGI_HOME';
+/**
+ * Resolve the active output style for the workspace, applying the
+ * precedence ladder (workspace > user > default).
+ *
+ * Pure read. Never writes, never throws — every IO failure degrades
+ * to the default slug. The function returns the source label too so
+ * the CLI surface can show the operator where the value came from.
+ */
+export function resolveOutputStyle(io) {
+    const workspaceSlug = readSlugFromFile(workspaceConfigPath(io.workspaceRoot));
+    if (workspaceSlug)
+        return { slug: workspaceSlug, source: 'workspace' };
+    const userSlug = readSlugFromFile(userConfigPath(io.env ?? process.env));
+    if (userSlug)
+        return { slug: userSlug, source: 'user' };
+    return { slug: DEFAULT_OUTPUT_STYLE, source: 'default' };
+}
+/**
+ * Write `slug` to the workspace tier. Creates `<workspaceRoot>/.pugi/`
+ * if missing. Preserves neighbouring config keys via read-modify-write.
+ */
+export function setWorkspaceOutputStyle(slug, io) {
+    writeSlugToFile(workspaceConfigPath(io.workspaceRoot), slug);
+}
+/**
+ * Write `slug` to the user tier (`~/.pugi/config.json`).
+ *
+ * Mirrors the workspace writer's read-modify-write so the user's
+ * `permissionMode` / `privacy` / `model` keys survive a style flip.
+ */
+export function setUserOutputStyle(slug, io) {
+    writeSlugToFile(userConfigPath(io.env ?? process.env), slug);
+}
+/**
+ * Clear the workspace tier's `outputStyle` key. The user tier (and
+ * therefore the eventual resolved style) is left untouched.
+ *
+ * Used by `/style --reset` so the operator can revert a workspace
+ * override without nuking the rest of their workspace config.
+ */
+export function clearWorkspaceOutputStyle(io) {
+    clearSlugInFile(workspaceConfigPath(io.workspaceRoot));
+}
+/**
+ * Clear the user tier's `outputStyle` key. Lower-blast-radius reset
+ * for operators who want every workspace to fall back to `default`
+ * unless an explicit workspace value is set.
+ */
+export function clearUserOutputStyle(io) {
+    clearSlugInFile(userConfigPath(io.env ?? process.env));
+}
+/**
+ * Workspace config path. Exported for the spec; production callers
+ * should use the `setWorkspace…` / `resolveOutputStyle` helpers.
+ */
+export function workspaceConfigPath(workspaceRoot) {
+    return resolve(workspaceRoot, '.pugi', 'config.json');
+}
+/**
+ * User config path resolved against `PUGI_HOME` (or `~/.pugi`).
+ * Exported for the spec.
+ */
+export function userConfigPath(env = process.env) {
+    const home = env[PUGI_HOME_ENV] ?? resolve(homedir(), '.pugi');
+    return resolve(home, 'config.json');
+}
+/**
+ * Read + parse a config file. Returns an empty object on any IO or
+ * parse error. Caller-provided JSON must be a plain object; arrays /
+ * scalars / null are treated as "no config" so a hand-edited file
+ * never crashes the REPL.
+ */
+function readConfigFile(path) {
+    if (!existsSync(path))
+        return {};
+    let raw;
+    try {
+        raw = readFileSync(path, 'utf8');
+    }
+    catch {
+        return {};
+    }
+    if (raw.trim().length === 0)
+        return {};
+    let parsed;
+    try {
+        parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return {};
+    }
+    if (!parsed || typeof parsed !== 'object' || Array.isArray(parsed))
+        return {};
+    return parsed;
+}
+function writeConfigFile(path, config) {
+    mkdirSync(dirname(path), { recursive: true });
+    // 0o600 mirrors `runtime/commands/config.ts` — the config file may
+    // hold `preferredEndpoint` URLs that should not be world-readable.
+    writeFileSync(path, `${JSON.stringify(config, null, 2)}\n`, {
+        encoding: 'utf8',
+        mode: 0o600,
+    });
+}
+function readSlugFromFile(path) {
+    const config = readConfigFile(path);
+    const candidate = config.outputStyle;
+    return isOutputStyleSlug(candidate) ? candidate : null;
+}
+function writeSlugToFile(path, slug) {
+    const config = readConfigFile(path);
+    config.outputStyle = slug;
+    writeConfigFile(path, config);
+}
+function clearSlugInFile(path) {
+    const config = readConfigFile(path);
+    if (!('outputStyle' in config))
+        return;
+    delete config.outputStyle;
+    writeConfigFile(path, config);
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=state.js.map

package/dist/core/path-security.js

@@ -1,12 +1,48 @@
-import { realpathSync } from 'node:fs';
-import { basename, relative, resolve } from 'node:path';
+/**
+ * Path-security gate for Pugi CLI file operations.
+ *
+ * The original `resolveWorkspacePath` (preserved below) is the read-path
+ * gate: it stops relative-path traversal, URL-encoded traversal, and
+ * symlink escapes at the leaf. It is kept as the existing call surface
+ * for `read` and other non-mutating tools.
+ *
+ * `assertSafeWritePath` is a stricter, write-only gate ported from
+ * external's Rust `path_guard.rs` (Apache-2.0). It adds:
+ *
+ *  1. `..` segment rejection BEFORE any filesystem touch.
+ *  2. Walk-up canonicalize: finds the deepest existing ancestor,
+ *     canonicalizes it (resolving every symlink in the existing
+ *     prefix), then reattaches the non-existent tail. This closes
+ *     the "parent's parent is a symlink" bypass that catches naive
+ *     canonicalize-the-parent implementations.
+ *  3. Leaf-symlink reject: refuse to write through a symlink even
+ *     when the file already exists. Covers dangling symlinks too.
+ *  4. Fail-CLOSED on empty allowed roots: an empty PUGI_ALLOWED_ROOTS
+ *     means "no writes anywhere" rather than "writes allowed
+ *     everywhere".
+ *  5. Containment check against canonicalized allowed roots.
+ *  6. Denylist of system, credential, and shell-init paths even
+ *     when they sit inside an allowed root (defense in depth — a
+ *     misconfigured root pointing at `$HOME` still cannot clobber
+ *     `~/.ssh/id_ed25519`).
+ *
+ * ---
+ * Portions of `assertSafeWritePath` and `canonicalizeWithWalkUp` are
+ * derived from external `kei-mcp/src/handlers/safe_tools/
+ * path_guard.rs` (Apache-2.0). See `licenses/EXTERNAL-LICENSE-NOTICE.md`
+ * at the repo root for attribution and the full upstream license
+ * reference.
+ */
+import { existsSync, lstatSync, realpathSync, } from 'node:fs';
+import { homedir } from 'node:os';
+import { basename, dirname, isAbsolute, relative, resolve, sep, } from 'node:path';
 /**
  * Resolve and validate that an inputPath stays within the workspace.
  *
  * Defends against:
- *   1. relative-path traversal (`../etc/passwd`)
- *   2. URL-encoded traversal (`..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd`)
- *   3. symlink escapes at the target itself (`alias-link -> /etc/passwd`)
+ *  1. relative-path traversal (`../etc/passwd`)
+ *  2. URL-encoded traversal (`..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd`)
+ *  3. symlink escapes at the target itself (`alias-link -> /etc/passwd`)
  *
  * The previous implementation also resolved the parent's realpath and
  * compared to the workspace root. That broke `pugi explain .` on macOS
@@ -60,4 +96,250 @@ function isInsideWorkspace(child, workspaceRoot) {
     const rel = relative(workspaceRoot, child);
     return Boolean(rel) && !rel.startsWith('..') && rel !== '..';
 }
+/**
+ * Apply the strict write-path guard. Returns the canonical
+ * absolute path on success, throws on rejection.
+ *
+ * Use this for any operation that mutates the filesystem (`write`,
+ * `edit`, atomic-rename targets). The error message is safe to surface
+ * to the operator — it never echoes filesystem secrets.
+ */
+export function assertSafeWritePath(inputPath, options = {}) {
+    if (typeof inputPath !== 'string' || inputPath.length === 0) {
+        throw new Error('file_path: empty');
+    }
+    if (inputPath.includes('\0')) {
+        throw new Error('file_path: null byte rejected');
+    }
+    // step: reject `..` segments before any FS work. We split on
+    // both `/` and the platform separator so a Windows-style `..\foo`
+    // input cannot smuggle a traversal through on macOS test paths.
+    const decoded = decodeURIComponent(inputPath);
+    const segments = decoded.split(/[/\\]/);
+    if (segments.some((seg) => seg === '..')) {
+        throw new Error(`file_path: '..' segment not allowed in ${inputPath}`);
+    }
+    // step: refuse to write through a symlink leaf. We must
+    // check the LITERAL input path (pre-canonicalize) because `realpath`
+    // unconditionally resolves symlinks — so by the time we have the
+    // canonical path the symlink fingerprint is already gone. `lstatSync`
+    // does NOT follow symlinks, which is exactly what we need.
+    const cwdRoot = options.root ?? process.cwd();
+    const literalAbsolute = isAbsolute(decoded) ? decoded : resolve(cwdRoot, decoded);
+    try {
+        const meta = lstatSync(literalAbsolute);
+        if (meta.isSymbolicLink()) {
+            throw new Error(`file_path: leaf is a symlink (refusing to follow): ${literalAbsolute}`);
+        }
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        const code = error.code;
+        if (code !== 'ENOENT' && code !== 'ENOTDIR')
+            throw error;
+        // ENOENT/ENOTDIR is fine — the leaf simply does not exist yet
+        // (write-create path). The walk-up canonicalize below handles it.
+    }
+    const canonical = canonicalizeWithWalkUp(decoded, cwdRoot);
+    // step: fail-CLOSED on empty allowed roots.
+    const roots = computeAllowedRoots(options);
+    if (roots.length === 0) {
+        throw new Error("file_path: allowed_roots is empty — refusing all writes " +
+            '(set PUGI_ALLOWED_ROOTS to a non-empty value or run from a real cwd)');
+    }
+    // step: containment check against canonicalized allowed
+    // roots. Each root is normalized to end in `sep` so `/tmp/wsX` does
+    // not accidentally pass containment for `/tmp/ws`.
+    const inAllowedRoot = roots.some((r) => isContainedIn(canonical, r));
+    if (!inAllowedRoot) {
+        throw new Error(`file_path: outside allowed roots ${JSON.stringify(roots)}: ${canonical}`);
+    }
+    // step: denylist. Applied AFTER containment so a
+    // misconfigured root pointing at `/` or `$HOME` still cannot clobber
+    // sensitive files. We canonicalize HOME so a $HOME that lives under
+    // a symlinked prefix (macOS /var → /private/var, Linux /home →
+    // /usr/home on some FreeBSD-style mounts) still matches the
+    // canonical write target.
+    assertNotDenylisted(canonical, canonicalizeHomeDir(options.homeDir ?? homedir()));
+    return canonical;
+}
+function canonicalizeHomeDir(raw) {
+    if (!raw)
+        return raw;
+    try {
+        return realpathSync.native(raw);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return raw;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Ported from an external utility. Finds the deepest
+ * existing ancestor, canonicalizes it (resolving every symlink in the
+ * existing prefix), then reattaches the non-existent tail components.
+ *
+ * This closes the "parent's parent is a symlink" bypass where naive
+ * implementations canonicalize only the immediate parent.
+ */
+export function canonicalizeWithWalkUp(inputPath, cwd) {
+    const absolute = isAbsolute(inputPath) ? inputPath : resolve(cwd, inputPath);
+    let current = absolute;
+    const tail = [];
+    // Hard cap on walk-up iterations — defense against pathological
+    // inputs that somehow evade `dirname` termination.
+    const maxIterations = 4096;
+    let iterations = 0;
+    while (true) {
+        iterations += 1;
+        if (iterations > maxIterations) {
+            throw new Error(`file_path: walk-up exceeded ${maxIterations} iterations: ${absolute}`);
+        }
+        if (existsSync(current)) {
+            let canonicalExisting;
+            try {
+                canonicalExisting = realpathSync.native(current);
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw new Error(`file_path: canonicalize ${current}: ${error.message}`);
+            }
+            // Reattach tail in original order (we pushed leaf-first).
+            let result = canonicalExisting;
+            for (let i = tail.length - 1; i >= 0; i -= 1) {
+                result = resolve(result, tail[i]);
+            }
+            return result;
+        }
+        const name = basename(current);
+        const parent = dirname(current);
+        if (!name || parent === current) {
+            throw new Error(`file_path: walked to root without finding existing dir: ${absolute}`);
+        }
+        tail.push(name);
+        current = parent;
+    }
+}
+function computeAllowedRoots(options) {
+    const envValue = options.allowedRootsEnv ?? process.env.PUGI_ALLOWED_ROOTS;
+    if (envValue !== undefined) {
+        return envValue
+            .split(':')
+            .filter((s) => s.length > 0)
+            .map(canonicalizeRoot)
+            .filter((s) => s !== null);
+    }
+    // No env override: implicit root is the caller-supplied cwd (defaults
+    // to `process.cwd()`).
+    const cwd = options.root ?? process.cwd();
+    const canon = canonicalizeRoot(cwd);
+    return canon ? [canon] : [];
+}
+function canonicalizeRoot(raw) {
+    if (!raw)
+        return null;
+    let canon;
+    try {
+        canon = realpathSync.native(raw);
+    }
+    catch {
+        canon = resolve(raw);
+    }
+    if (!canon)
+        return null;
+    return canon.endsWith(sep) ? canon : canon + sep;
+}
+function isContainedIn(canonicalChild, rootWithSep) {
+    const rootNoSep = rootWithSep.endsWith(sep)
+        ? rootWithSep.slice(0, -1)
+        : rootWithSep;
+    if (canonicalChild === rootNoSep)
+        return true;
+    return canonicalChild.startsWith(rootWithSep);
+}
+function assertNotDenylisted(canonical, homeDir) {
+    // System paths — match as prefix-with-separator so `/etc-fake/` is
+    // not denied while `/etc/passwd` is.
+    const systemDenyPrefixes = [
+        '/etc/',
+        '/usr/',
+        '/System/',
+        '/Library/Application Support/',
+        '/var/db/',
+        '/var/log/',
+        '/var/root/',
+        '/private/etc/',
+        '/private/usr/',
+        '/private/var/db/',
+        '/private/var/log/',
+        '/private/var/root/',
+        '/root/',
+        '/bin/',
+        '/sbin/',
+    ];
+    for (const prefix of systemDenyPrefixes) {
+        if (canonical.startsWith(prefix)) {
+            throw new Error(`file_path: denied (system dir): ${canonical}`);
+        }
+    }
+    if (!homeDir)
+        return;
+    // Credential and substrate directories.
+    const homeDirSecrets = [
+        '.ssh/',
+        '.aws/',
+        '.gnupg/',
+        '.config/gcloud/',
+        '.kube/',
+        '.docker/',
+        '.claude/',
+        '.grok/',
+        '.gemini/',
+        '.copilot/',
+        '.kimi/',
+        '.pugi/credentials/',
+    ];
+    for (const secret of homeDirSecrets) {
+        const full = joinHome(homeDir, secret);
+        if (canonical.startsWith(full)) {
+            throw new Error(`file_path: denied (secret/substrate dir): ${canonical}`);
+        }
+    }
+    // Credential files (exact match).
+    const homeFileSecrets = [
+        '.npmrc',
+        '.cargo/credentials',
+        '.cargo/credentials.toml',
+        '.docker/config.json',
+        '.netrc',
+        '.pgpass',
+    ];
+    for (const secret of homeFileSecrets) {
+        const full = joinHome(homeDir, secret);
+        if (canonical === full) {
+            throw new Error(`file_path: denied (credential file): ${canonical}`);
+        }
+    }
+    // Shell-init files (exact match).
+    const initFiles = [
+        '.zshrc',
+        '.bashrc',
+        '.profile',
+        '.bash_profile',
+        '.zprofile',
+        '.zshenv',
+        '.bash_login',
+        '.bash_logout',
+        '.inputrc',
+        '.gitconfig',
+        '.config/fish/config.fish',
+    ];
+    for (const file of initFiles) {
+        const full = joinHome(homeDir, file);
+        if (canonical === full) {
+            throw new Error(`file_path: denied (shell-init file): ${canonical}`);
+        }
+    }
+}
+function joinHome(homeDir, rest) {
+    const trimmedHome = homeDir.endsWith(sep) ? homeDir.slice(0, -1) : homeDir;
+    return `${trimmedHome}${sep}${rest}`;
+}
 //# sourceMappingURL=path-security.js.map

package/dist/core/permission.js

@@ -68,8 +68,8 @@ const protectedSuffixes = ['.pem', '.key', '.crt', '.p12', '.dump', '.sql'];
  * it as a list for callers (doctor, debug tooling) that need to
  * audit the rule set without re-running `classifyBash`.
  *
- * Code Reviewer P2 retro 2026-05-23: previously this list was
- * duplicated here as `destructiveBashPatterns`. Sprint α5.2 moves it
+ * Code Reviewer P2 retro: previously this list was
+ * duplicated here as `destructiveBashPatterns`. Sprint moves it
  * into the classifier so the permission engine and the doctor surface
  * cannot drift.
  */
@@ -79,23 +79,23 @@ export function destructiveBashPatternsList() {
 /**
  * Class-aware bash permission decision. The matrix:
  *
- *                     | plan | ask | acceptEdits | auto       | dontAsk | bypass
- *  read               | allow| allow| allow      | allow      | allow   | allow
- *  build_test         | deny | ask  | ask        | allow      | allow*  | allow
- *  network            | deny | ask  | ask        | ask        | allow*  | allow
- *  write_workspace    | deny | ask  | allow      | allow      | allow*  | allow
- *  write_protected    | deny | ask  | ask        | ask        | deny    | ask
- *  destructive        | deny | deny | deny       | deny       | deny    | deny**
- *  unknown            | deny | ask  | ask        | ask        | deny    | ask
+ *                    | plan | ask | acceptEdits | auto      | dontAsk | bypass
+ * read              | allow| allow| allow     | allow     | allow  | allow
+ * build_test        | deny | ask | ask       | allow     | allow* | allow
+ * network           | deny | ask | ask       | ask       | allow* | allow
+ * write_workspace   | deny | ask | allow     | allow     | allow* | allow
+ * write_protected   | deny | ask | ask       | ask       | deny   | ask
+ * destructive       | deny | deny | deny      | deny      | deny   | deny**
+ * unknown           | deny | ask | ask       | ask       | deny   | ask
  *
- *  * dontAsk allows non-destructive classes when no settings rule
- *    contradicts; the bare-mode policy is encoded in the table below.
- *  ** destructive can be unlocked ONLY when ALL three hold:
- *      - mode === 'bypassPermissions'
- *      - PUGI_DESTRUCTIVE_OVERRIDE === '1'
- *      - source === 'human'
- *    The agent loop never sets `source: 'human'`, so even a runaway
- *    agent in bypass mode cannot trigger a destructive deletion.
+ * * dontAsk allows non-destructive classes when no settings rule
+ *   contradicts; the bare-mode policy is encoded in the table below.
+ * ** destructive can be unlocked ONLY when ALL three hold:
+ *     - mode === 'bypassPermissions'
+ *     - PUGI_DESTRUCTIVE_OVERRIDE === '1'
+ *     - source === 'human'
+ *   The agent loop never sets `source: 'human'`, so even a runaway
+ *   agent in bypass mode cannot trigger a destructive deletion.
  */
 export function evaluateBashPermission(cmd, mode, ctx) {
     const classification = classifyBash(cmd, {
@@ -236,6 +236,18 @@ export function decidePermission(action, settings, root) {
     if (protectedReason) {
         return decisionForMode(settings.permissions.mode, protectedReason, 'protected_file', 'high');
     }
+    // task — operator-declared read-only paths gate edits
+    // and writes ahead of the generic deny check so the audit trail
+    // shows `source: 'readonly_paths'` (operator intent), not
+    // `settings.deny` (generic rule). Reads always pass through; the
+    // contract is "you can look but не touch".
+    if (action.kind === 'edit' && matchesAny(action.target, settings.permissions.readonlyPaths)) {
+        return {
+            decision: 'deny',
+            reason: `Read-only path: ${action.target}`,
+            source: 'readonly_paths',
+        };
+    }
     const signature = `${action.kind}:${action.target}`;
     if (matchesAny(signature, settings.permissions.deny)) {
         return { decision: 'deny', reason: `Denied by rule: ${signature}`, source: 'settings.deny' };
@@ -297,13 +309,61 @@ function riskForAction(action) {
         return 'medium';
     return 'medium';
 }
+/**
+ * Expand `${VAR}` and `$VAR` references in a rule string against
+ * `process.env`. Unknown variables expand к the empty string so a
+ * typo'd `${HMOE}` cannot accidentally match every signature via a
+ * literal `${HMOE}` substring; the expanded `mcp:fs/` is innocuous.
+ *
+ * task #23 — operator wants `mcp:secrets/${USER}-*`
+ * style rules so a single settings file fits multiple machines.
+ *
+ * The implementation deliberately avoids shell-style features like
+ * `$()` or default-value `${VAR:-x}`; permission rules should be
+ * easy to reason about at audit time.
+ */
+export function expandEnvVars(rule, env = process.env) {
+    // Single combined regex. Sequential `${VAR}` then `$VAR` passes are
+    // unsafe — if `${X}` expands to a value containing `$Y`, the second
+    // pass would also expand that. An attacker controlling one env var
+    // could rewrite permission rules. Substitute each variable exactly
+    // once by matching both forms in a single sweep.
+    return rule.replace(/\$(?:\{([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)\}|([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*))/g, (_m, braced, bare) => {
+        const name = braced ?? bare ?? '';
+        return env[name] ?? '';
+    });
+}
+/**
+ * Convert a glob-style rule to a RegExp anchored full-string.
+ * Supports: `*` (greedy any), `?` (single char), all other regex
+ * metacharacters escaped. The simpler tail-`*` form remains valid —
+ * `mcp:fs/ *` works the same way as before, just via regex instead of
+ * the old `startsWith` branch. Power users get `mcp:* / write*` style
+ * cross-server denies.
+ */
+const REGEX_META = new Set(['\\', '^', '$', '.', '|', '+', '(', ')', '[', ']', '{', '}']);
+function ruleToRegExp(rule) {
+    let out = '';
+    for (const ch of rule) {
+        if (ch === '*')
+            out += '.*';
+        else if (ch === '?')
+            out += '.';
+        else if (REGEX_META.has(ch))
+            out += '\\' + ch;
+        else
+            out += ch;
+    }
+    return new RegExp('^' + out + '$');
+}
 function matchesAny(value, rules) {
     return rules.some((rule) => {
-        if (rule === value)
+        const expanded = expandEnvVars(rule);
+        if (expanded === value)
             return true;
-        if (rule.endsWith('*'))
-            return value.startsWith(rule.slice(0, -1));
-        return false;
+        if (!expanded.includes('*') && !expanded.includes('?'))
+            return false;
+        return ruleToRegExp(expanded).test(value);
     });
 }
 //# sourceMappingURL=permission.js.map