@pugi/cli 0.1.0-beta.5 → 0.1.0-beta.50

package/dist/core/output-style/state.js

@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+/**
+ * Leak L18 (2026-05-27) — Output-style state persistence.
+ *
+ * Two-tier storage:
+ *
+ *   1. **Workspace** — `<workspaceRoot>/.pugi/config.json`. Set by
+ *      `/style <name>` from inside the REPL or `pugi style <name>`
+ *      without `--persist`. Overrides the user default for the
+ *      current workspace only. Survives sessions because the same
+ *      `.pugi/` survives sessions.
+ *
+ *   2. **User default** — `~/.pugi/config.json` (PUGI_HOME-aware).
+ *      Set by `pugi style <name> --persist` or
+ *      `/style <name> --persist`. Applies to every workspace that
+ *      has no workspace-level override.
+ *
+ * Precedence (highest → lowest):
+ *
+ *   workspace value > user value > DEFAULT_OUTPUT_STYLE ('default')
+ *
+ * Both files live under the same `pugi-config-v1` JSON envelope as
+ * other settings (permissionMode, privacy, model, preferredEndpoint).
+ * The schema is intentionally NOT shared with `runtime/commands/config.ts`'s
+ * strict Zod schema — `outputStyle` is read/written ONLY through this
+ * module so `pugi config set outputStyle=…` is NOT a supported path
+ * (it would silently bypass the slug validator). Operators get a
+ * single surface: `/style` + `pugi style`.
+ *
+ * File layout (one config.json, multiple keys; this module owns the
+ * `outputStyle` key only):
+ *
+ *   {
+ *     "permissionMode": "ask",
+ *     "outputStyle": "terse",
+ *     ...
+ *   }
+ *
+ * The reader tolerates:
+ *   - missing file (returns the default slug),
+ *   - empty file (returns the default slug),
+ *   - malformed JSON (returns the default slug — DO NOT crash REPL
+ *     boot because of a hand-edited config),
+ *   - unknown slug (returns the default slug + emits no error; the
+ *     operator can `/style` to see the table and re-set).
+ *
+ * The writer is a read-modify-write to preserve neighbouring keys
+ * (permissionMode etc.) — overwriting the whole file would clobber
+ * the other tier's settings.
+ *
+ * Test surface: `test/commands/output-style-state.spec.ts` exercises
+ * precedence, malformed-config tolerance, persistence across reads,
+ * the `--persist` (user-default) path, and reset semantics.
+ */
+import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, } from 'node:fs';
+import { homedir } from 'node:os';
+import { dirname, resolve } from 'node:path';
+import { DEFAULT_OUTPUT_STYLE, isOutputStyleSlug, } from './presets.js';
+/**
+ * Env override for `~/.pugi` so the spec can sandbox both tiers
+ * without touching the developer's real config. Matches the existing
+ * `runtime/commands/config.ts` convention.
+ */
+export const PUGI_HOME_ENV = 'PUGI_HOME';
+/**
+ * Resolve the active output style for the workspace, applying the
+ * precedence ladder (workspace > user > default).
+ *
+ * Pure read. Never writes, never throws — every IO failure degrades
+ * to the default slug. The function returns the source label too so
+ * the CLI surface can show the operator where the value came from.
+ */
+export function resolveOutputStyle(io) {
+    const workspaceSlug = readSlugFromFile(workspaceConfigPath(io.workspaceRoot));
+    if (workspaceSlug)
+        return { slug: workspaceSlug, source: 'workspace' };
+    const userSlug = readSlugFromFile(userConfigPath(io.env ?? process.env));
+    if (userSlug)
+        return { slug: userSlug, source: 'user' };
+    return { slug: DEFAULT_OUTPUT_STYLE, source: 'default' };
+}
+/**
+ * Write `slug` to the workspace tier. Creates `<workspaceRoot>/.pugi/`
+ * if missing. Preserves neighbouring config keys via read-modify-write.
+ */
+export function setWorkspaceOutputStyle(slug, io) {
+    writeSlugToFile(workspaceConfigPath(io.workspaceRoot), slug);
+}
+/**
+ * Write `slug` to the user tier (`~/.pugi/config.json`).
+ *
+ * Mirrors the workspace writer's read-modify-write so the user's
+ * `permissionMode` / `privacy` / `model` keys survive a style flip.
+ */
+export function setUserOutputStyle(slug, io) {
+    writeSlugToFile(userConfigPath(io.env ?? process.env), slug);
+}
+/**
+ * Clear the workspace tier's `outputStyle` key. The user tier (and
+ * therefore the eventual resolved style) is left untouched.
+ *
+ * Used by `/style --reset` so the operator can revert a workspace
+ * override without nuking the rest of their workspace config.
+ */
+export function clearWorkspaceOutputStyle(io) {
+    clearSlugInFile(workspaceConfigPath(io.workspaceRoot));
+}
+/**
+ * Clear the user tier's `outputStyle` key. Lower-blast-radius reset
+ * for operators who want every workspace to fall back to `default`
+ * unless an explicit workspace value is set.
+ */
+export function clearUserOutputStyle(io) {
+    clearSlugInFile(userConfigPath(io.env ?? process.env));
+}
+/**
+ * Workspace config path. Exported for the spec; production callers
+ * should use the `setWorkspace…` / `resolveOutputStyle` helpers.
+ */
+export function workspaceConfigPath(workspaceRoot) {
+    return resolve(workspaceRoot, '.pugi', 'config.json');
+}
+/**
+ * User config path resolved against `PUGI_HOME` (or `~/.pugi`).
+ * Exported for the spec.
+ */
+export function userConfigPath(env = process.env) {
+    const home = env[PUGI_HOME_ENV] ?? resolve(homedir(), '.pugi');
+    return resolve(home, 'config.json');
+}
+/**
+ * Read + parse a config file. Returns an empty object on any IO or
+ * parse error. Caller-provided JSON must be a plain object; arrays /
+ * scalars / null are treated as "no config" so a hand-edited file
+ * never crashes the REPL.
+ */
+function readConfigFile(path) {
+    if (!existsSync(path))
+        return {};
+    let raw;
+    try {
+        raw = readFileSync(path, 'utf8');
+    }
+    catch {
+        return {};
+    }
+    if (raw.trim().length === 0)
+        return {};
+    let parsed;
+    try {
+        parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return {};
+    }
+    if (!parsed || typeof parsed !== 'object' || Array.isArray(parsed))
+        return {};
+    return parsed;
+}
+function writeConfigFile(path, config) {
+    mkdirSync(dirname(path), { recursive: true });
+    // 0o600 mirrors `runtime/commands/config.ts` — the config file may
+    // hold `preferredEndpoint` URLs that should not be world-readable.
+    writeFileSync(path, `${JSON.stringify(config, null, 2)}\n`, {
+        encoding: 'utf8',
+        mode: 0o600,
+    });
+}
+function readSlugFromFile(path) {
+    const config = readConfigFile(path);
+    const candidate = config.outputStyle;
+    return isOutputStyleSlug(candidate) ? candidate : null;
+}
+function writeSlugToFile(path, slug) {
+    const config = readConfigFile(path);
+    config.outputStyle = slug;
+    writeConfigFile(path, config);
+}
+function clearSlugInFile(path) {
+    const config = readConfigFile(path);
+    if (!('outputStyle' in config))
+        return;
+    delete config.outputStyle;
+    writeConfigFile(path, config);
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=state.js.map

package/dist/core/path-security.js

@@ -1,5 +1,41 @@
-import { realpathSync } from 'node:fs';
-import { basename, relative, resolve } from 'node:path';
+/**
+ * Path-security gate for Pugi CLI file operations.
+ *
+ * The original `resolveWorkspacePath` (preserved below) is the read-path
+ * gate: it stops relative-path traversal, URL-encoded traversal, and
+ * symlink escapes at the leaf. It is kept as the existing call surface
+ * for `read` and other non-mutating tools.
+ *
+ * `assertSafeWritePath` is a stricter, write-only gate ported from
+ * KeiSeiLab/KeiSeiKit's Rust `path_guard.rs` (Apache-2.0). It adds:
+ *
+ *   1. `..` segment rejection BEFORE any filesystem touch.
+ *   2. Walk-up canonicalize: finds the deepest existing ancestor,
+ *      canonicalizes it (resolving every symlink in the existing
+ *      prefix), then reattaches the non-existent tail. This closes
+ *      the "parent's parent is a symlink" bypass that catches naive
+ *      canonicalize-the-parent implementations.
+ *   3. Leaf-symlink reject: refuse to write through a symlink even
+ *      when the file already exists. Covers dangling symlinks too.
+ *   4. Fail-CLOSED on empty allowed roots: an empty PUGI_ALLOWED_ROOTS
+ *      means "no writes anywhere" rather than "writes allowed
+ *      everywhere".
+ *   5. Containment check against canonicalized allowed roots.
+ *   6. Denylist of system, credential, and shell-init paths even
+ *      when they sit inside an allowed root (defense in depth — a
+ *      misconfigured root pointing at `$HOME` still cannot clobber
+ *      `~/.ssh/id_ed25519`).
+ *
+ * ---
+ * Portions of `assertSafeWritePath` and `canonicalizeWithWalkUp` are
+ * derived from KeiSeiLab/KeiSeiKit `kei-mcp/src/handlers/safe_tools/
+ * path_guard.rs` (Apache-2.0). See `licenses/keiseikit-LICENSE-NOTICE.md`
+ * at the repo root for attribution and the full upstream license
+ * reference.
+ */
+import { existsSync, lstatSync, realpathSync, } from 'node:fs';
+import { homedir } from 'node:os';
+import { basename, dirname, isAbsolute, relative, resolve, sep, } from 'node:path';
 /**
  * Resolve and validate that an inputPath stays within the workspace.
  *
@@ -60,4 +96,250 @@ function isInsideWorkspace(child, workspaceRoot) {
     const rel = relative(workspaceRoot, child);
     return Boolean(rel) && !rel.startsWith('..') && rel !== '..';
 }
+/**
+ * Apply the full KeiSei write-path guard. Returns the canonical
+ * absolute path on success, throws on rejection.
+ *
+ * Use this for any operation that mutates the filesystem (`write`,
+ * `edit`, atomic-rename targets). The error message is safe to surface
+ * to the operator — it never echoes filesystem secrets.
+ */
+export function assertSafeWritePath(inputPath, options = {}) {
+    if (typeof inputPath !== 'string' || inputPath.length === 0) {
+        throw new Error('file_path: empty');
+    }
+    if (inputPath.includes('\0')) {
+        throw new Error('file_path: null byte rejected');
+    }
+    // KeiSei step #1: reject `..` segments before any FS work. We split on
+    // both `/` and the platform separator so a Windows-style `..\foo`
+    // input cannot smuggle a traversal through on macOS test paths.
+    const decoded = decodeURIComponent(inputPath);
+    const segments = decoded.split(/[/\\]/);
+    if (segments.some((seg) => seg === '..')) {
+        throw new Error(`file_path: '..' segment not allowed in ${inputPath}`);
+    }
+    // KeiSei step #3: refuse to write through a symlink leaf. We must
+    // check the LITERAL input path (pre-canonicalize) because `realpath`
+    // unconditionally resolves symlinks — so by the time we have the
+    // canonical path the symlink fingerprint is already gone. `lstatSync`
+    // does NOT follow symlinks, which is exactly what we need.
+    const cwdRoot = options.root ?? process.cwd();
+    const literalAbsolute = isAbsolute(decoded) ? decoded : resolve(cwdRoot, decoded);
+    try {
+        const meta = lstatSync(literalAbsolute);
+        if (meta.isSymbolicLink()) {
+            throw new Error(`file_path: leaf is a symlink (refusing to follow): ${literalAbsolute}`);
+        }
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        const code = error.code;
+        if (code !== 'ENOENT' && code !== 'ENOTDIR')
+            throw error;
+        // ENOENT/ENOTDIR is fine — the leaf simply does not exist yet
+        // (write-create path). The walk-up canonicalize below handles it.
+    }
+    const canonical = canonicalizeWithWalkUp(decoded, cwdRoot);
+    // KeiSei step #4: fail-CLOSED on empty allowed roots.
+    const roots = computeAllowedRoots(options);
+    if (roots.length === 0) {
+        throw new Error("file_path: allowed_roots is empty — refusing all writes " +
+            '(set PUGI_ALLOWED_ROOTS to a non-empty value or run from a real cwd)');
+    }
+    // KeiSei step #5: containment check against canonicalized allowed
+    // roots. Each root is normalized to end in `sep` so `/tmp/wsX` does
+    // not accidentally pass containment for `/tmp/ws`.
+    const inAllowedRoot = roots.some((r) => isContainedIn(canonical, r));
+    if (!inAllowedRoot) {
+        throw new Error(`file_path: outside allowed roots ${JSON.stringify(roots)}: ${canonical}`);
+    }
+    // KeiSei step #6: denylist. Applied AFTER containment so a
+    // misconfigured root pointing at `/` or `$HOME` still cannot clobber
+    // sensitive files. We canonicalize HOME so a $HOME that lives under
+    // a symlinked prefix (macOS /var → /private/var, Linux /home →
+    // /usr/home on some FreeBSD-style mounts) still matches the
+    // canonical write target.
+    assertNotDenylisted(canonical, canonicalizeHomeDir(options.homeDir ?? homedir()));
+    return canonical;
+}
+function canonicalizeHomeDir(raw) {
+    if (!raw)
+        return raw;
+    try {
+        return realpathSync.native(raw);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return raw;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Ported from KeiSeiKit `canonicalize_with_walk_up`. Finds the deepest
+ * existing ancestor, canonicalizes it (resolving every symlink in the
+ * existing prefix), then reattaches the non-existent tail components.
+ *
+ * This closes the "parent's parent is a symlink" bypass where naive
+ * implementations canonicalize only the immediate parent.
+ */
+export function canonicalizeWithWalkUp(inputPath, cwd) {
+    const absolute = isAbsolute(inputPath) ? inputPath : resolve(cwd, inputPath);
+    let current = absolute;
+    const tail = [];
+    // Hard cap on walk-up iterations — defense against pathological
+    // inputs that somehow evade `dirname` termination.
+    const maxIterations = 4096;
+    let iterations = 0;
+    while (true) {
+        iterations += 1;
+        if (iterations > maxIterations) {
+            throw new Error(`file_path: walk-up exceeded ${maxIterations} iterations: ${absolute}`);
+        }
+        if (existsSync(current)) {
+            let canonicalExisting;
+            try {
+                canonicalExisting = realpathSync.native(current);
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw new Error(`file_path: canonicalize ${current}: ${error.message}`);
+            }
+            // Reattach tail in original order (we pushed leaf-first).
+            let result = canonicalExisting;
+            for (let i = tail.length - 1; i >= 0; i -= 1) {
+                result = resolve(result, tail[i]);
+            }
+            return result;
+        }
+        const name = basename(current);
+        const parent = dirname(current);
+        if (!name || parent === current) {
+            throw new Error(`file_path: walked to root without finding existing dir: ${absolute}`);
+        }
+        tail.push(name);
+        current = parent;
+    }
+}
+function computeAllowedRoots(options) {
+    const envValue = options.allowedRootsEnv ?? process.env.PUGI_ALLOWED_ROOTS;
+    if (envValue !== undefined) {
+        return envValue
+            .split(':')
+            .filter((s) => s.length > 0)
+            .map(canonicalizeRoot)
+            .filter((s) => s !== null);
+    }
+    // No env override: implicit root is the caller-supplied cwd (defaults
+    // to `process.cwd()`).
+    const cwd = options.root ?? process.cwd();
+    const canon = canonicalizeRoot(cwd);
+    return canon ? [canon] : [];
+}
+function canonicalizeRoot(raw) {
+    if (!raw)
+        return null;
+    let canon;
+    try {
+        canon = realpathSync.native(raw);
+    }
+    catch {
+        canon = resolve(raw);
+    }
+    if (!canon)
+        return null;
+    return canon.endsWith(sep) ? canon : canon + sep;
+}
+function isContainedIn(canonicalChild, rootWithSep) {
+    const rootNoSep = rootWithSep.endsWith(sep)
+        ? rootWithSep.slice(0, -1)
+        : rootWithSep;
+    if (canonicalChild === rootNoSep)
+        return true;
+    return canonicalChild.startsWith(rootWithSep);
+}
+function assertNotDenylisted(canonical, homeDir) {
+    // System paths — match as prefix-with-separator so `/etc-fake/` is
+    // not denied while `/etc/passwd` is.
+    const systemDenyPrefixes = [
+        '/etc/',
+        '/usr/',
+        '/System/',
+        '/Library/Application Support/',
+        '/var/db/',
+        '/var/log/',
+        '/var/root/',
+        '/private/etc/',
+        '/private/usr/',
+        '/private/var/db/',
+        '/private/var/log/',
+        '/private/var/root/',
+        '/root/',
+        '/bin/',
+        '/sbin/',
+    ];
+    for (const prefix of systemDenyPrefixes) {
+        if (canonical.startsWith(prefix)) {
+            throw new Error(`file_path: denied (system dir): ${canonical}`);
+        }
+    }
+    if (!homeDir)
+        return;
+    // Credential and substrate directories.
+    const homeDirSecrets = [
+        '.ssh/',
+        '.aws/',
+        '.gnupg/',
+        '.config/gcloud/',
+        '.kube/',
+        '.docker/',
+        '.claude/',
+        '.grok/',
+        '.gemini/',
+        '.copilot/',
+        '.kimi/',
+        '.pugi/credentials/',
+    ];
+    for (const secret of homeDirSecrets) {
+        const full = joinHome(homeDir, secret);
+        if (canonical.startsWith(full)) {
+            throw new Error(`file_path: denied (secret/substrate dir): ${canonical}`);
+        }
+    }
+    // Credential files (exact match).
+    const homeFileSecrets = [
+        '.npmrc',
+        '.cargo/credentials',
+        '.cargo/credentials.toml',
+        '.docker/config.json',
+        '.netrc',
+        '.pgpass',
+    ];
+    for (const secret of homeFileSecrets) {
+        const full = joinHome(homeDir, secret);
+        if (canonical === full) {
+            throw new Error(`file_path: denied (credential file): ${canonical}`);
+        }
+    }
+    // Shell-init files (exact match).
+    const initFiles = [
+        '.zshrc',
+        '.bashrc',
+        '.profile',
+        '.bash_profile',
+        '.zprofile',
+        '.zshenv',
+        '.bash_login',
+        '.bash_logout',
+        '.inputrc',
+        '.gitconfig',
+        '.config/fish/config.fish',
+    ];
+    for (const file of initFiles) {
+        const full = joinHome(homeDir, file);
+        if (canonical === full) {
+            throw new Error(`file_path: denied (shell-init file): ${canonical}`);
+        }
+    }
+}
+function joinHome(homeDir, rest) {
+    const trimmedHome = homeDir.endsWith(sep) ? homeDir.slice(0, -1) : homeDir;
+    return `${trimmedHome}${sep}${rest}`;
+}
 //# sourceMappingURL=path-security.js.map

package/dist/core/permissions/auto-classifier.js

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+/**
+ * Auto-mode classifier — Wave 7 Phase 1 (regex allowlist + denylist).
+ *
+ * `permissionMode === 'auto'` is the Claude Code parity mode where the
+ * classifier decides safe-vs-unsafe per call. Phase 1 ships without
+ * ML — just two curated regex lists covering the 80% of "obviously
+ * safe" and "obviously catastrophic" patterns. Anything that doesn't
+ * match either list returns `ask`, so the operator stays in the loop
+ * для the ambiguous middle.
+ *
+ * Phase 2 (deferred, NOT in this PR): semantic classifier consulting
+ * the model with a tight system prompt. The interface (`AutoVerdict`)
+ * is stable so we can swap implementations without touching the gate.
+ *
+ * Design notes:
+ *
+ *   - Patterns are conservative: a read-only command is only
+ *     allow-listed когда its argv shape is unambiguous (no `-exec`,
+ *     no `--delete`, no `|` к shell). When в doubt, fall back to ask.
+ *   - The denylist matches catastrophic patterns even в auto-mode so
+ *     a misclick can't shred the workspace. The circuit-breaker
+ *     (`circuit-breaker.ts`) covers the same surface для bypass-mode;
+ *     this denylist is the auto-mode equivalent.
+ *   - All matches operate on the FULL command string, not parsed
+ *     argv. This is deliberately permissive on whitespace but strict
+ *     on operator characters (`|`, `&`, `;`, `>`, backticks) — a
+ *     pipe-into-shell или command-chain forces fallback к ask.
+ */
+/**
+ * Catastrophic patterns — the auto-mode regex denylist. Each entry
+ * carries a human-readable reason surfaced в the deny payload so the
+ * operator + audit log see why the gate refused. Order matters: most-
+ * specific первой так "rm -rf /" reports as that, не the generic
+ * "rm -rf".
+ */
+const AUTO_DENY_PATTERNS = [
+    { pattern: /\brm\s+(-[a-z]*r[a-z]*f|-[a-z]*f[a-z]*r)\b/i, reason: 'rm -rf (recursive force-delete)' },
+    { pattern: /\bgit\s+push\s+(-{1,2}force\b|\-f\b)/i, reason: 'git push --force (history rewrite)' },
+    { pattern: /\bgit\s+reset\s+--hard\b/i, reason: 'git reset --hard (uncommitted-work loss)' },
+    { pattern: /\bdd\s+if=\/(dev|)/i, reason: 'dd if=/dev/* (raw device read/write)' },
+    { pattern: /\bmkfs(\.|\s|$)/i, reason: 'mkfs (filesystem format)' },
+    { pattern: /\bchmod\s+-R\s+777\b/i, reason: 'chmod -R 777 (world-writable recursive)' },
+    { pattern: /\bchown\s+-R\b/i, reason: 'chown -R (recursive ownership change)' },
+    { pattern: /:\(\)\s*\{\s*:\s*\|\s*:\s*&\s*\}\s*;?\s*:/, reason: 'fork bomb signature' },
+    { pattern: /\bsudo\b/i, reason: 'sudo (privilege escalation)' },
+    { pattern: /\b(npm|pnpm|yarn)\s+publish\b/i, reason: 'package publish (irreversible npm release)' },
+    { pattern: /\b(curl|wget)\b[^|;&]*\|\s*(sh|bash|zsh)\b/i, reason: 'pipe-to-shell installer (curl … | sh)' },
+];
+/**
+ * Safe-by-default patterns — auto-mode regex allowlist. Each regex
+ * must match the FULL command (with `^…$` anchors) so a leading
+ * `sudo ls` или a trailing `; rm -rf /` does NOT slip through. The
+ * caller passes the trimmed command string; whitespace around argv
+ * tokens is tolerated.
+ */
+const AUTO_ALLOW_PATTERNS = [
+    { pattern: /^ls(\s+-[a-zA-Z]+)*(\s+[^|;&`>$()\\]+)?$/, reason: 'ls (directory listing)' },
+    { pattern: /^pwd\s*$/, reason: 'pwd (working directory)' },
+    { pattern: /^cat\s+[^|;&`>$()\\]+$/, reason: 'cat (file read)' },
+    { pattern: /^head(\s+-n?\s*\d+)?\s+[^|;&`>$()\\]+$/, reason: 'head (file preview)' },
+    { pattern: /^tail(\s+-n?\s*\d+)?\s+[^|;&`>$()\\]+$/, reason: 'tail (file preview)' },
+    { pattern: /^wc(\s+-[a-z]+)?\s+[^|;&`>$()\\]+$/, reason: 'wc (line/word count)' },
+    { pattern: /^du\s+-sh?\s+[^|;&`>$()\\]+$/, reason: 'du -sh (disk usage summary)' },
+    { pattern: /^df\s+-h\s*$/, reason: 'df -h (filesystem free space)' },
+    { pattern: /^git\s+status(\s+--short|\s+-s)?\s*$/, reason: 'git status' },
+    { pattern: /^git\s+diff(\s+[a-zA-Z0-9_./~^-]+)*\s*$/, reason: 'git diff (read-only)' },
+    { pattern: /^git\s+log(\s+[a-zA-Z0-9_./~^-]+)*\s*$/, reason: 'git log (read-only)' },
+    { pattern: /^git\s+branch(\s+-[a-z]+)?\s*$/, reason: 'git branch (read-only)' },
+    { pattern: /^git\s+remote\s+-v\s*$/, reason: 'git remote -v (read-only)' },
+    { pattern: /^pnpm\s+(typecheck|lint|test\s+--run|test\s+--watch=false)\s*$/, reason: 'pnpm read-only build check' },
+    { pattern: /^npm\s+(--version|-v|run\s+typecheck|run\s+lint)\s*$/, reason: 'npm read-only check' },
+    { pattern: /^node\s+--version\s*$/, reason: 'node --version' },
+    { pattern: /^pnpm\s+--version\s*$/, reason: 'pnpm --version' },
+    { pattern: /^which\s+[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+\s*$/, reason: 'which (command lookup)' },
+    { pattern: /^find\s+\.\s+-type\s+f(\s+-name\s+[^|;&`>$()\\]+)?\s*$/, reason: 'find -type f (read-only)' },
+    { pattern: /^(rg|ripgrep|grep)\s+(-[a-z]+\s+)*[^|;&`>$()\\]+(\s+[^|;&`>$()\\]+)?\s*$/, reason: 'grep/ripgrep (read-only search)' },
+];
+/**
+ * Classify an auto-mode command. Order:
+ *   1. Catastrophic deny patterns — surface the explicit deny reason.
+ *   2. Safe allow patterns — surface the matched reason.
+ *   3. Fallback к ask.
+ *
+ * The order matters: a destructive pattern that ALSO looks like a
+ * read-only token (e.g. `git diff ; rm -rf .`) hits deny first because
+ * the allow patterns require `^…$` anchors that the chained command
+ * fails to satisfy. Belt + suspenders.
+ */
+export function classifyAutoMode(command) {
+    const trimmed = command.trim();
+    if (trimmed.length === 0)
+        return { verdict: 'ask' };
+    for (const entry of AUTO_DENY_PATTERNS) {
+        if (entry.pattern.test(trimmed)) {
+            return {
+                verdict: 'deny',
+                reason: entry.reason,
+                pattern: entry.pattern.source,
+            };
+        }
+    }
+    for (const entry of AUTO_ALLOW_PATTERNS) {
+        if (entry.pattern.test(trimmed)) {
+            return {
+                verdict: 'allow',
+                reason: entry.reason,
+                pattern: entry.pattern.source,
+            };
+        }
+    }
+    return { verdict: 'ask' };
+}
+/**
+ * Diagnostic accessors — exposed для doctor surfaces + spec coverage.
+ * The arrays are frozen at module load so callers can iterate without
+ * mutating the source-of-truth.
+ */
+export function listAutoAllowPatterns() {
+    return AUTO_ALLOW_PATTERNS.map((e) => ({ pattern: e.pattern.source, reason: e.reason }));
+}
+export function listAutoDenyPatterns() {
+    return AUTO_DENY_PATTERNS.map((e) => ({ pattern: e.pattern.source, reason: e.reason }));
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=auto-classifier.js.map

package/dist/core/permissions/circuit-breaker.js

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+/**
+ * bypassPermissions circuit-breaker — Wave 7.
+ *
+ * `bypassPermissions` is "skip ALL checks" for trusted scripted runs.
+ * Even so, certain commands are catastrophic enough that the gate
+ * MUST refuse regardless of mode. This module owns that short list.
+ *
+ * The breaker is conservative on purpose:
+ *   - rm -rf against `/`, `~`, or workspace root (`.`)
+ *   - fork bomb signature (`:(){:|:&};:`)
+ *   - dd if=/ (raw block-device read or write)
+ *
+ * False positives are acceptable here — an operator who really wants
+ * to nuke their root filesystem can switch to `dontAsk` and re-issue;
+ * the breaker is the "are you sure you typed this correctly?" guard,
+ * not a hard policy boundary.
+ *
+ * `evaluateCircuitBreaker` is pure regex matching — no IO, no state.
+ * It's called by the gate before any other routing so a bypass-mode
+ * session that types `rm -rf /` sees the deny path first.
+ */
+/**
+ * Pattern list — kept narrow on purpose. Each entry must match the
+ * canonical destructive shape; argv variants without the exact form
+ * fall through к the regular `dontAsk` / `bypassPermissions` allow
+ * path, which is what the operator opted into.
+ */
+const CIRCUIT_BREAKER_PATTERNS = [
+    // rm -rf against absolute root, $HOME, ~, $WORKSPACE_ROOT, or `.`
+    // with no further token. The negative lookahead на `[/~.]\S` makes
+    // sure `rm -rf /tmp/foo` (specific subtree) doesn't trip — only the
+    // catastrophic `rm -rf /` or `rm -rf ~` or `rm -rf .` shapes do.
+    {
+        pattern: /\brm\s+(-[a-z]*r[a-z]*f|-[a-z]*f[a-z]*r)\s+(\/|~|\$HOME|\$\{HOME\}|\.)\s*$/i,
+        reason: 'rm -rf against /, $HOME, ~, or workspace root',
+    },
+    // Fork bomb signature. Whitespace-tolerant но shape-strict.
+    {
+        pattern: /:\s*\(\s*\)\s*\{\s*:\s*\|\s*:\s*&\s*\}\s*;?\s*:/,
+        reason: 'fork bomb (`:(){ :|:& };:`)',
+    },
+    // dd to/from raw devices. Either direction is catastrophic enough
+    // to warrant the breaker (read of /dev/random into a workspace file
+    // can fill the disk, write to /dev/sda destroys the disk).
+    {
+        pattern: /\bdd\b[^|;&]*\b(if|of)=\/dev\//i,
+        reason: 'dd reading/writing /dev/* (catastrophic IO)',
+    },
+    // mkfs against any disk — single regex covers ext*, xfs, btrfs, vfat.
+    {
+        pattern: /\bmkfs(\.[a-z0-9]+)?\s+\/dev\//i,
+        reason: 'mkfs against /dev/* (filesystem format)',
+    },
+];
+/**
+ * Test the command against every circuit-breaker pattern. Returns the
+ * first match (most-catastrophic-first ordering is encoded в the array
+ * order); when no pattern matches, the breaker is `tripped: false` so
+ * the caller proceeds to the regular gate decision.
+ *
+ * Pure function — no IO, no module-scoped state. Safe to call from any
+ * surface (gate, doctor command, audit replay).
+ */
+export function evaluateCircuitBreaker(command) {
+    const trimmed = command.trim();
+    if (trimmed.length === 0)
+        return { tripped: false, reason: '' };
+    for (const entry of CIRCUIT_BREAKER_PATTERNS) {
+        if (entry.pattern.test(trimmed)) {
+            return { tripped: true, reason: entry.reason };
+        }
+    }
+    return { tripped: false, reason: '' };
+}
+/**
+ * Diagnostic accessor — exposed для doctor surfaces + spec coverage so
+ * the test layer can iterate the full list and assert each entry trips
+ * on representative input.
+ */
+export function listCircuitBreakerPatterns() {
+    return CIRCUIT_BREAKER_PATTERNS.map((e) => ({ pattern: e.pattern.source, reason: e.reason }));
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=circuit-breaker.js.map