@profullstack/threatcrush 0.5.1 → 0.6.0

package/dist/daemon.js

@@ -4431,8 +4431,14 @@ var UNTRUSTED_PY = /\brequest\b|\bparams\b|\bflask\b|\bsys\.argv\b|\bos\.environ
 var UNTRUSTED_RB = /\bparams\s*\[|\brequest\b|\bcookies\s*\[/;
 var UNTRUSTED_GO = /\br\s*\.\s*(?:URL|Form|Body|Header|PostForm)\b|\bFormValue\s*\(|\bQuery\s*\(\s*\)\s*\.\s*Get\s*\(|\bmux\.Vars\s*\(/;
 var UNTRUSTED_JAVA = /\bgetParameter\s*\(|\bgetQueryString\s*\(|\bgetHeader\s*\(|\bgetInputStream\s*\(|\bgetCookies\s*\(|\b@RequestParam\b|\b@PathVariable\b/;
+var UNTRUSTED_SH = /\$\{?[1-9]\d*\b|\$[@*]|\$\{@\}|\bread\s+(?:-\S+\s+)*[A-Za-z_]\w*|\$\{?REPLY\b|\$\{?QUERY_STRING\b/;
+var UNTRUSTED_PHP = /\$_(?:GET|POST|REQUEST|COOKIE|FILES|SERVER)\b|\bphp:\/\/input\b|\bgetallheaders\s*\(/;
 function untrustedPatternFor(language) {
   switch (language) {
+    case "php":
+      return UNTRUSTED_PHP;
+    case "shell":
+      return UNTRUSTED_SH;
     case "python":
       return UNTRUSTED_PY;
     case "ruby":
@@ -4457,6 +4463,7 @@ var GENERIC_GUARD = (
   /\ballow(?:ed|list|_list|ed_hosts)?\b|\bwhitelist\b|\b\w{0,6}[Ee]sc(?:ape)?(?:[Hh]tml|HTML|[Xx]ml|XML|[Ss]ql|[Aa]ttr|[Jj]s|[Uu]ri|[Uu]rl)?\s*\(|\bhtml_escape\b|\bhtmlspecialchars\s*\(|\bsanitiz\w*\b|\bencoded\b|\brealpath\b|\bcommonpath\b|\bresolve\(\)\.startsWith\b|\bprocess\.env\b|\bos\.environ\b|\bgetenv\b|\bENV\s*\[|setObjectInputFilter|ObjectInputFilter/i
 );
 var XXE_GUARD = /FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING|setExpandEntityReferences|disallow-doctype-decl|external-general-entities|external-parameter-entities|setXIncludeAware\s*\(\s*false/;
+var XML_PARSING_FILE = /\b(?:javax\.xml|org\.xml\.sax|org\.w3c\.dom|org\.jdom2?|org\.dom4j|XmlPullParser|DocumentBuilderFactory|DocumentBuilder|SAXParserFactory|SAXParser|XMLInputFactory|XMLReaderFactory|XMLReader|SAXBuilder|SAXReader)\b/;
 var CODE_SINK = /\bglobalThis\s*\[|\bconstructor\b|\beval\b|\bFunction\b|\brun\s*\(|\bvm\s*\.\s*run/;
 var EXFIL_SINK = /\bconsole\s*\.\s*(?:log|debug|info|warn|error)\s*\(|\bfetch\s*\(|\baxios\b|\brequest\s*\(|\.\s*send\s*\(/;
 var SQL_KEYWORDS = "SELECT|INSERT\\s+INTO|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE\\s+FROM|DELETE|DROP|UNION\\s+SELECT";
@@ -4731,6 +4738,16 @@ var CODE_RULES = [
     pattern: /\byaml\s*\.\s*load\s*\((?![^)]*safe)|\bloadAll\s*\([^)]*unsafe/i
   },
   // ── XML external entities ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  //
+  // Evidence that a file parses XML at all. The XXE rules match on receiver
+  // *names* — `builder.parse(is)` is the shape the vulnerability actually takes,
+  // and the declared type is rarely on that line — so without this the pattern
+  // reads any `.parse()` on anything suffixed Builder, Parser or Reader as XML.
+  // In practice that meant a hostname-mask parser (`HostMask.Parser.parse(...)`)
+  // was reported as CWE-611 at high severity.
+  //
+  // An import is the cheapest honest signal: a file that parses XML says so at
+  // the top, and one that never mentions XML is not parsing it.
   {
     id: "java-xxe-parser-defaults",
     title: "XML parser left on its insecure defaults",
@@ -4751,7 +4768,10 @@ var CODE_RULES = [
     severity: "high",
     languages: ["java"],
     // Receiver-qualified so `LocalDate.parse(s)` and friends stay out of it.
+    // The suffix alone is not enough — plenty of parsers parse things that are
+    // not XML — so `fileRequires` decides whether the file is in scope at all.
     pattern: /\b\w*(?:[Bb]uilder|[Pp]arser|[Rr]eader)\s*\.\s*parse\s*\(/,
+    fileRequires: XML_PARSING_FILE,
     guard: XXE_GUARD,
     guardBack: 6,
     guardForward: 4
@@ -4873,6 +4893,212 @@ var CODE_RULES = [
     severity: "high",
     languages: ["javascript", "typescript"],
     pattern: /\[\s*['"]__proto__['"]\s*\]|\bObject\s*\.\s*assign\s*\(\s*[\w.$]*\.prototype\b|\.\s*__proto__\s*=/
+  },
+  // ── Shell ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  //
+  // `shell` was a language the type system knew about and no rule targeted, so
+  // a repository written entirely in bash got secret detection and nothing
+  // else. Installers, CI helpers and packaging scripts are where a great deal
+  // of privileged work actually happens, and they run as whoever invoked them.
+  {
+    id: "sh-remote-script-execution",
+    title: "network output piped into a shell",
+    consequence: "Whatever that URL serves at the moment this runs is executed as the invoking user. There is no version, no signature, and no review \u2014 a compromise of the host, or anyone able to answer for it, is a compromise of every machine that runs the script.",
+    cwe: "CWE-494",
+    severity: "high",
+    languages: ["shell"],
+    // The pipe must be the *next* thing: `curl -o f url && sh f` is a different
+    // (and checkable) shape, and `curl url | jq` is not an execution at all.
+    pattern: /\b(?:curl|wget)\b[^|\n]*\|\s*(?:sudo\s+(?:-\S+\s+)*)?(?:\/bin\/|\/usr\/bin\/)?(?:ba|da|k|z|a)?sh\b/,
+    // Nothing on this line can exonerate it. Integrity checking happens in a
+    // separate step by construction, so a window guard would only mislead.
+    guard: false
+  },
+  {
+    id: "sh-eval-expansion",
+    title: "eval on an expanded string",
+    consequence: "The expansion is re-parsed as shell source, so a `;` or `$(\u2026)` anywhere in the value runs as a command rather than arriving as data.",
+    cwe: "CWE-78",
+    severity: "high",
+    languages: ["shell"],
+    // Matched against eval's *argument*, not against the rest of the line.
+    //
+    // `\beval\b.*\$` looks equivalent and is not: bash's ordinary dynamic-range
+    // idiom, `eval echo {$((k + 1))..$((k + n))}`, contains `$k` inside the
+    // arithmetic, so a line-wide search finds an expansion in a construct that
+    // cannot carry a command — `$((…))` is parsed as an expression, where a `;`
+    // is a syntax error rather than a second command. That spelling reported
+    // 355 findings in one 3,500-line script, all of them the same safe loop.
+    //
+    // What is left is the form where eval is handed a value directly —
+    // `eval "$cmd"`, `eval $cmd`, `eval "$(…)"` — which is the shape that
+    // actually re-parses untrusted text as source. `eval echo $x` is not
+    // covered; catching it without also catching the range idiom needs to know
+    // which expansions are arithmetic, which is parsing, not matching.
+    pattern: /\beval\s+(?:-\S+\s+)*(?:"\s*)?\$(?:\{?[A-Za-z_]\w*|\((?!\())/,
+    // The shell-init idiom `eval "$(tool init -)"` is the documented interface
+    // of most version managers. It is still eval of program output, but the
+    // program is a fixed local binary, and flagging it reports every developer
+    // dotfile in existence.
+    lineGuard: /\beval\s+"?\$\(\s*(?:ssh-agent|dircolors|direnv|rbenv|pyenv|nodenv|goenv|jenv|tfenv|opam|luarocks|conda|mamba|zoxide|starship|mise|asdf|fnm|nvm|brew|thefuck|register-python-argcomplete|_\w+_completion)\b/
+  },
+  {
+    id: "sh-unquoted-expansion-destructive",
+    title: "unquoted expansion in a destructive command",
+    consequence: "An unquoted expansion is word-split and glob-expanded before the command sees it. A value with a space removes two paths instead of one; an empty value removes the argument entirely, which is how `rm -rf $DIR/` becomes `rm -rf /`.",
+    cwe: "CWE-78",
+    severity: "high",
+    languages: ["shell"],
+    // `[^"'\n]*?` cannot cross a quote, so `rm -rf "$dir"` — the correct form —
+    // never reaches the `$` and never matches. Only a genuinely bare expansion
+    // does. Restricted to recursive/forced removal: a bare `$f` in `rm $f` is
+    // sloppy, but it is not the shape that erases a filesystem.
+    pattern: /\brm\s+(?:-[a-zA-Z-]*[rRf][a-zA-Z-]*\s+)+[^"'\n]*?\$\{?[A-Za-z_]/
+  },
+  {
+    id: "sh-insecure-transport-flag",
+    title: "certificate verification disabled",
+    consequence: "Anyone positioned between this host and the server can substitute the response. When the response is a package, a key or a script, that is remote code execution with the transport doing nothing to stop it.",
+    cwe: "CWE-295",
+    severity: "high",
+    languages: ["shell"],
+    pattern: /\b(?:curl|wget)\b[^\n|]*(?:\s-k(?=\s|$)|\s--insecure\b|\s--no-check-certificate\b)/,
+    // Over plain HTTP there is no certificate to skip, so the flag is inert and
+    // this rule has nothing to say — `sh-plaintext-download` is the finding
+    // that fits. Reporting both put two entries on one line, one of which
+    // recommended a fix that would change nothing.
+    lineGuard: /^(?!.*https:\/\/).*\bhttp:\/\//
+  },
+  {
+    id: "sh-plaintext-download",
+    title: "download over plain HTTP",
+    consequence: "The response arrives unauthenticated over a channel any intermediary can rewrite. Where the payload is an archive, a package list or a key, substituting it is straightforward and leaves nothing for the script to notice.",
+    cwe: "CWE-319",
+    severity: "high",
+    languages: ["shell"],
+    pattern: /\b(?:curl|wget)\b[^\n|]*\bhttp:\/\//,
+    // Loopback and link-local are not carried over a network anyone can sit on.
+    lineGuard: /http:\/\/(?:localhost|127\.0\.0\.1|0\.0\.0\.0|\[::1\]|169\.254\.|host\.docker\.internal)\b/
+  },
+  {
+    id: "sh-world-writable-permissions",
+    title: "world-writable permissions",
+    consequence: "Any local account can rewrite the file. If it is a script, a config or anything on a privileged path, the next process to read it runs someone else\u2019s content.",
+    cwe: "CWE-732",
+    severity: "medium",
+    languages: ["shell"],
+    pattern: /\bchmod\s+(?:-[a-zA-Z-]+\s+)*(?:0?777|a\+rwx|ugo\+rwx|a=rwx)\b/
+  },
+  {
+    id: "sh-predictable-temp-path",
+    title: "predictable temporary file",
+    consequence: "The name is guessable, so a local attacker can create it first \u2014 as a symlink to somewhere that matters \u2014 and the script writes through it with its own privileges.",
+    cwe: "CWE-377",
+    severity: "medium",
+    languages: ["shell"],
+    // Redirection or an explicit write into a literal `/tmp` path. A `$$` or
+    // `$RANDOM` suffix is still predictable, so it is not treated as a fix;
+    // `mktemp` is, and it is the guard below.
+    pattern: /(?:>{1,2}\s*|\b(?:tee|touch|cp|mv|install)\s+(?:-\S+\s+)*)\/tmp\/[\w.$-]+/,
+    guard: /\bmktemp\b/,
+    guardBack: 6,
+    guardForward: 2
+  },
+  // ── PHP ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  //
+  // `php` was the second language in `ScanLanguage` that no rule targeted, for
+  // the same reason `shell` was: nothing checks the two lists against each
+  // other. `LANGUAGE_COVERAGE` in the tests does now.
+  {
+    id: "php-sql-interpolation",
+    title: "SQL assembled by interpolation",
+    consequence: "PHP interpolates variables inside double-quoted strings, so the value is part of the statement before the driver ever sees it. A quote in the value ends the literal and the rest is parsed as SQL.",
+    cwe: "CWE-89",
+    severity: "critical",
+    languages: ["php"],
+    // Interpolation (`"… $id …"`, `"… {$id} …"`) or concatenation onto a SQL
+    // string. A prepared statement passes placeholders and binds separately,
+    // so its query string contains neither.
+    pattern: new RegExp(
+      `\\b(?:mysqli_query|mysql_query|pg_query|->\\s*(?:query|exec|unprepared))\\s*\\([^)]*(?:"[^"\\n]*(?:${SQL_KEYWORDS})\\b[^"\\n]*(?:\\$\\w+|\\{\\$)|${SQL_STRING}\\s*\\.)`,
+      "i"
+    )
+  },
+  {
+    id: "php-shell-exec-interpolation",
+    title: "shell command built from a variable",
+    consequence: "The string is handed to `/bin/sh`, which interprets `;`, `|` and `$(\u2026)` in whatever the variable held.",
+    cwe: "CWE-78",
+    severity: "critical",
+    languages: ["php"],
+    pattern: /\b(?:exec|system|shell_exec|passthru|popen|proc_open|pcntl_exec)\s*\(\s*(?:"[^"\n]*(?:\$\w+|\{\$)|'[^'\n]*'\s*\.|\$\w+\s*\.)/,
+    // `escapeshellarg`/`escapeshellcmd` are the correct answer and are usually
+    // applied inline, so a line-scoped guard is the right shape.
+    lineGuard: /\bescapeshell(?:arg|cmd)\s*\(/
+  },
+  {
+    id: "php-dynamic-code-execution",
+    title: "dynamic code execution",
+    consequence: "Whatever reaches this call is executed as PHP source with the privileges of the web process.",
+    cwe: "CWE-95",
+    severity: "critical",
+    languages: ["php"],
+    pattern: /\b(?:eval|assert|create_function)\s*\(\s*(?:\$\w+|"[^"\n]*(?:\$\w+|\{\$))/,
+    guard: false
+  },
+  {
+    id: "php-dynamic-file-inclusion",
+    title: "include path built from a variable",
+    consequence: "The included file is executed, not read. A traversal sequence reaches any file the process can open, and with a remote wrapper enabled the path need not be local at all.",
+    cwe: "CWE-98",
+    severity: "critical",
+    languages: ["php"],
+    pattern: /\b(?:include|include_once|require|require_once)\s*(?:\(\s*)?(?:\$\w+|"[^"\n]*(?:\$\w+|\{\$)|'[^'\n]*'\s*\.)/,
+    // A basename-and-allow-list is the standard fix; `basename` alone still
+    // leaves the extension open, but it defeats traversal, which is the part
+    // this rule is about.
+    lineGuard: /\bbasename\s*\(/
+  },
+  {
+    id: "php-unserialize-untrusted",
+    title: "unserialize on request data",
+    consequence: "PHP object deserialisation instantiates classes and runs their magic methods. With a suitable class in scope this is remote code execution, and no `unserialize` option short of `allowed_classes => false` prevents it.",
+    cwe: "CWE-502",
+    severity: "critical",
+    languages: ["php"],
+    pattern: /\bunserialize\s*\(\s*(?:\$_(?:GET|POST|REQUEST|COOKIE)\b|\$\w+)/,
+    // The key is an array key and is normally quoted: `['allowed_classes' => false]`.
+    lineGuard: /["']?allowed_classes["']?\s*=>\s*(?:false|\[)/,
+    needsContext: true
+  },
+  {
+    id: "php-unescaped-output",
+    title: "request data echoed without escaping",
+    consequence: "The value is written into the response verbatim, so markup in it becomes markup in the page \u2014 script that runs with the victim\u2019s session.",
+    cwe: "CWE-79",
+    severity: "high",
+    languages: ["php"],
+    pattern: /\b(?:echo|print)\s+[^;\n]*\$_(?:GET|POST|REQUEST|COOKIE|SERVER)\b|<\?=\s*\$_(?:GET|POST|REQUEST|COOKIE)\b/
+  },
+  {
+    id: "php-request-path-traversal",
+    title: "file path taken from the request",
+    consequence: "A `../` sequence in the value walks out of the intended directory, and the process reads or writes wherever it lands.",
+    cwe: "CWE-22",
+    severity: "high",
+    languages: ["php"],
+    pattern: /\b(?:file_get_contents|file_put_contents|fopen|readfile|unlink|copy|rename|opendir|scandir)\s*\(\s*[^)\n]*\$_(?:GET|POST|REQUEST|COOKIE)\b/,
+    lineGuard: /\bbasename\s*\(|\brealpath\s*\(/
+  },
+  {
+    id: "php-variable-injection",
+    title: "request data expanded into local variables",
+    consequence: "`extract` creates a variable per key, so a request can overwrite any local already in scope \u2014 including the one a subsequent authorisation check reads.",
+    cwe: "CWE-621",
+    severity: "high",
+    languages: ["php"],
+    pattern: /\bextract\s*\(\s*\$_(?:GET|POST|REQUEST|COOKIE)\b|\bimport_request_variables\s*\(/,
+    guard: false
   }
 ];
 var COMMENT_PREFIX = /^\s*(?:\/\/|\/\*|\*|#|--|<!--)/;
@@ -4914,11 +5140,21 @@ function windowText(lines, index, back, forward, prose) {
   }
   return collected.join("\n");
 }
+var FILE_TEXT = /* @__PURE__ */ new WeakMap();
+function fileTextOf(lines) {
+  let text = FILE_TEXT.get(lines);
+  if (text === void 0) {
+    text = lines.join("\n");
+    FILE_TEXT.set(lines, text);
+  }
+  return text;
+}
 function evaluateRule(rule, ctx) {
   if (rule.languages && !rule.languages.includes(ctx.language)) return null;
   const line = ctx.lines[ctx.index] ?? "";
   if (isComment(line) || ctx.prose?.has(ctx.index)) return null;
   if (!rule.pattern.test(line)) return null;
+  if (rule.fileRequires && !rule.fileRequires.test(fileTextOf(ctx.lines))) return null;
   const back = rule.guardBack ?? 8;
   const forward = rule.guardForward ?? 0;
   const context = windowText(ctx.lines, ctx.index, back, forward, ctx.prose);
@@ -5089,7 +5325,8 @@ function editDistance(a, b, cap = 3) {
 }
 function detectTyposquat(name, ecosystem) {
   const popular = ecosystem === "npm" ? POPULAR_NPM : POPULAR_PYPI;
-  const lower = name.toLowerCase().replace(/^@[^/]+\//, "");
+  const lower = name.toLowerCase();
+  if (/^@[^/]+\//.test(lower)) return null;
   if (popular.includes(lower)) return null;
   if (lower.length < 4) return null;
   const normalized = normalizeName(lower);
@@ -5501,6 +5738,33 @@ function languageOf(filename) {
   if (filename.startsWith(".env") || filename.endsWith(".env")) return "config";
   return LANGUAGE_BY_EXTENSION[(0, import_node_path6.extname)(filename).toLowerCase()] ?? "other";
 }
+var LANGUAGE_BY_INTERPRETER = {
+  sh: "shell",
+  bash: "shell",
+  zsh: "shell",
+  dash: "shell",
+  ksh: "shell",
+  ash: "shell",
+  python: "python",
+  python2: "python",
+  python3: "python",
+  ruby: "ruby",
+  node: "javascript",
+  nodejs: "javascript",
+  deno: "javascript",
+  bun: "javascript",
+  php: "php"
+};
+function languageOfShebang(firstLine) {
+  const match = /^#!\s*(\S+)(?:\s+(\S+))?/.exec(firstLine);
+  if (!match) return null;
+  const command = (0, import_node_path6.basename)(match[1]);
+  const name = command === "env" && match[2] ? (0, import_node_path6.basename)(match[2]) : command;
+  const exact = LANGUAGE_BY_INTERPRETER[name];
+  if (exact) return exact;
+  const stripped = name.replace(/[\d.]+$/, "");
+  return (stripped ? LANGUAGE_BY_INTERPRETER[stripped] : void 0) ?? null;
+}
 var SUPPRESS_NEXT = /threatcrush-disable-next-line(?:\s+([\w-]+))?/;
 var SUPPRESS_LINE = /threatcrush-disable-line(?:\s+([\w-]+))?/;
 function collectSuppressions(lines) {
@@ -5617,12 +5881,14 @@ function scanPath(targetPath, options = {}) {
     const extension = (0, import_node_path6.extname)(filename).toLowerCase();
     const isManifest = filename === "package.json" || filename === "requirements.txt";
     const scannable = SCAN_EXTENSIONS.has(extension) || filename.startsWith(".env");
-    if (!scannable && !isManifest) {
+    const mayDeclareInterpreter = !scannable && !isManifest && extension === "";
+    if (!scannable && !isManifest && !mayDeclareInterpreter) {
       recordSensitiveFile(filename, relativePath, findings, []);
       return;
     }
     let text;
     let handle;
+    let declared = null;
     try {
       handle = (0, import_node_fs11.openSync)(fullPath, "r");
     } catch {
@@ -5631,6 +5897,12 @@ function scanPath(targetPath, options = {}) {
     }
     try {
       if ((0, import_node_fs11.fstatSync)(handle).size > maxFileBytes) return;
+      if (mayDeclareInterpreter) {
+        const prefix = Buffer.alloc(128);
+        const read = (0, import_node_fs11.readSync)(handle, prefix, 0, prefix.length, 0);
+        declared = languageOfShebang(prefix.subarray(0, read).toString("utf-8").split("\n", 1)[0] ?? "");
+        if (!declared) return;
+      }
       text = (0, import_node_fs11.readFileSync)(handle, "utf-8");
     } catch {
       unreadable.push(relativePath);
@@ -5645,7 +5917,7 @@ function scanPath(targetPath, options = {}) {
     options.onFile?.(relativePath);
     suppressed += collectSuppressions(text.split("\n")).count;
     const fileFindings = [
-      ...scanText(relativePath, text, languageOf(filename)),
+      ...scanText(relativePath, text, declared ?? languageOf(filename)),
       ...isManifest ? scanManifest(relativePath, filename, text) : []
     ];
     findings.push(...fileFindings);