@profullstack/threatcrush 0.2.2 → 0.4.0

package/dist/daemon.js

@@ -1639,20 +1639,20 @@ var require_parse_async = __commonJS({
       const index = 0;
       const blocksize = opts.blocksize || 40960;
       const parser = new TOMLParser();
-      return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
-        setImmediate(parseAsyncNext, index, blocksize, resolve, reject);
+      return new Promise((resolve3, reject) => {
+        setImmediate(parseAsyncNext, index, blocksize, resolve3, reject);
       });
-      function parseAsyncNext(index2, blocksize2, resolve, reject) {
+      function parseAsyncNext(index2, blocksize2, resolve3, reject) {
         if (index2 >= str.length) {
           try {
-            return resolve(parser.finish());
+            return resolve3(parser.finish());
           } catch (err) {
             return reject(prettyError(err, str));
           }
         }
         try {
           parser.parse(str.slice(index2, index2 + blocksize2));
-          setImmediate(parseAsyncNext, index2 + blocksize2, blocksize2, resolve, reject);
+          setImmediate(parseAsyncNext, index2 + blocksize2, blocksize2, resolve3, reject);
         } catch (err) {
           reject(prettyError(err, str));
         }
@@ -1678,7 +1678,7 @@ var require_parse_stream = __commonJS({
     function parseReadable(stm) {
       const parser = new TOMLParser();
       stm.setEncoding("utf8");
-      return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+      return new Promise((resolve3, reject) => {
         let readable;
         let ended = false;
         let errored = false;
@@ -1686,7 +1686,7 @@ var require_parse_stream = __commonJS({
           ended = true;
           if (readable) return;
           try {
-            resolve(parser.finish());
+            resolve3(parser.finish());
           } catch (err) {
             reject(err);
           }
@@ -2022,8 +2022,8 @@ var require_toml = __commonJS({
 });
 
 // src/daemon/index.ts
-var import_node_fs13 = require("fs");
-var import_node_path7 = require("path");
+var import_node_fs15 = require("fs");
+var import_node_path10 = require("path");
 
 // src/daemon/paths.ts
 var import_node_fs = require("fs");
@@ -2310,7 +2310,7 @@ var IpcServer = class {
       } catch {
       }
     }
-    return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    return new Promise((resolve3, reject) => {
       this.server = (0, import_node_net.createServer)((sock) => this.handleClient(sock));
       this.server.on("error", reject);
       this.server.listen(PATHS.socket, () => {
@@ -2327,7 +2327,7 @@ var IpcServer = class {
           } catch {
           }
         }
-        resolve();
+        resolve3();
       });
     });
   }
@@ -2339,20 +2339,20 @@ var IpcServer = class {
       }
     }
     this.clients.clear();
-    return new Promise((resolve) => {
+    return new Promise((resolve3) => {
       if (!this.server) {
         try {
           if ((0, import_node_fs3.existsSync)(PATHS.socket)) (0, import_node_fs3.unlinkSync)(PATHS.socket);
         } catch {
         }
-        return resolve();
+        return resolve3();
       }
       this.server.close(() => {
         try {
           if ((0, import_node_fs3.existsSync)(PATHS.socket)) (0, import_node_fs3.unlinkSync)(PATHS.socket);
         } catch {
         }
-        resolve();
+        resolve3();
       });
     });
   }
@@ -2469,6 +2469,7 @@ var NGINX_REGEX = /^(\S+) \S+ \S+ \[([^\]]+)\] "(\S+) (\S+) \S+" (\d{3}) (\d+) "
 var AUTH_REGEX = /^(\w+\s+\d+\s+[\d:]+)\s+\S+\s+(\S+?)(?:\[\d+\])?:\s+(.*)/;
 var SYSLOG_REGEX = /^(\w+\s+\d+\s+[\d:]+)\s+\S+\s+(\S+?)(?:\[\d+\])?:\s+(.*)/;
 var IP_REGEX = /(?:from|FROM)\s+(\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3})/;
+var INVALID_USER_REGEX = /(?:for\s+invalid\s+user)\s+(\S+?)(?:\s+from|\s*$)/;
 var USER_REGEX = /(?:for|user)\s+(\S+?)(?:\s+from|\s*$)/;
 var ATTACK_PATTERNS = {
   sqli: [
@@ -2522,7 +2523,7 @@ function parseAuthLog(line) {
   const match = line.match(AUTH_REGEX);
   if (!match) return null;
   const ipMatch = match[3].match(IP_REGEX);
-  const userMatch = match[3].match(USER_REGEX);
+  const userMatch = match[3].match(INVALID_USER_REGEX) || match[3].match(USER_REGEX);
   return {
     timestamp: parseSyslogTimestamp(match[1]),
     raw: line,
@@ -2550,10 +2551,25 @@ function parseSyslog(line) {
   };
 }
 function detectAttackPattern(path) {
+  const candidates = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([path]);
+  let current = path;
+  for (let i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+    let decoded = null;
+    try {
+      decoded = decodeURIComponent(current);
+    } catch {
+      decoded = null;
+    }
+    if (decoded === null || decoded === current) break;
+    candidates.add(decoded);
+    current = decoded;
+  }
   for (const [type, patterns] of Object.entries(ATTACK_PATTERNS)) {
     for (const pattern of patterns) {
-      if (pattern.test(path)) {
-        return type;
+      for (const candidate of candidates) {
+        if (pattern.test(candidate)) {
+          return type;
+        }
       }
     }
   }
@@ -2567,20 +2583,19 @@ function autoDetectParser(line) {
   return parseSyslog(line);
 }
 function parseNginxTimestamp(s) {
-  try {
-    const cleaned = s.replace(/(\d{2})\/(\w{3})\/(\d{4}):/, "$2 $1, $3 ");
-    return new Date(cleaned);
-  } catch {
-    return /* @__PURE__ */ new Date();
-  }
+  const cleaned = s.replace(/(\d{2})\/(\w{3})\/(\d{4}):/, "$2 $1, $3 ");
+  const d = new Date(cleaned);
+  return Number.isNaN(d.getTime()) ? /* @__PURE__ */ new Date() : d;
 }
 function parseSyslogTimestamp(s) {
-  try {
-    const withYear = `${s} ${(/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).getFullYear()}`;
-    return new Date(withYear);
-  } catch {
-    return /* @__PURE__ */ new Date();
-  }
+  const now = /* @__PURE__ */ new Date();
+  let d = /* @__PURE__ */ new Date(`${s} ${now.getFullYear()}`);
+  if (Number.isNaN(d.getTime())) return now;
+  if (d.getTime() > now.getTime()) {
+    const prev = /* @__PURE__ */ new Date(`${s} ${now.getFullYear() - 1}`);
+    if (!Number.isNaN(prev.getTime())) d = prev;
+  }
+  return d;
 }
 
 // src/daemon/watchers/log-watcher.ts
@@ -3768,8 +3783,8 @@ function authHeaders() {
 }
 
 // src/commands/scan.ts
-var import_node_fs10 = require("fs");
-var import_node_path5 = require("path");
+var import_node_fs12 = require("fs");
+var import_node_path8 = require("path");
 
 // ../../node_modules/.pnpm/chalk@5.6.2/node_modules/chalk/source/vendor/ansi-styles/index.js
 var ANSI_BACKGROUND_OFFSET = 10;
@@ -4295,58 +4310,1134 @@ function workerId() {
   return `${import_node_os4.default.hostname()}/${process.pid}`;
 }
 
-// src/commands/scan.ts
-var SECRET_PATTERNS = [
-  { name: "AWS Access Key", pattern: /(?:AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16})/g, severity: "critical" },
-  { name: "AWS Secret Key", pattern: /(?:aws_secret_access_key|AWS_SECRET)\s*[=:]\s*['"]?([A-Za-z0-9/+=]{40})['"]?/gi, severity: "critical" },
-  { name: "GitHub Token", pattern: /(?:ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{82})/g, severity: "critical" },
-  { name: "Generic API Key", pattern: /(?:api[_-]?key|apikey)\s*[=:]\s*['"]([A-Za-z0-9\-_]{20,})['"]?/gi, severity: "high" },
-  { name: "Generic Secret", pattern: /(?:secret|password|passwd|pwd)\s*[=:]\s*['"]([^'"]{8,})['"]?/gi, severity: "high" },
-  { name: "Private Key", pattern: /-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |DSA )?PRIVATE KEY-----/g, severity: "critical" },
-  { name: "JWT Token", pattern: /eyJ[A-Za-z0-9-_]+\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9-_]+\.[A-Za-z0-9-_.+/=]*/g, severity: "high" },
-  { name: "Slack Token", pattern: /xox[bpors]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/g, severity: "critical" },
-  { name: "Stripe Key", pattern: /(?:sk_live_|pk_live_|sk_test_|pk_test_)[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g, severity: "critical" },
-  { name: "Database URL", pattern: /(?:postgres|mysql|mongodb|redis):\/\/[^\s'"]+/gi, severity: "high" },
-  { name: "Bearer Token", pattern: /Bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9\-_\.]{20,}/g, severity: "medium" },
-  { name: "Hex Token (32+)", pattern: /(?:token|key|secret|auth)\s*[=:]\s*['"]?([0-9a-f]{32,})['"]?/gi, severity: "medium" }
+// src/scan/dependencies.ts
+var import_node_fs10 = require("fs");
+var import_node_path5 = require("path");
+var LOCKFILES = [
+  { file: "package-lock.json", ecosystem: "npm" },
+  { file: "pnpm-lock.yaml", ecosystem: "npm" },
+  { file: "yarn.lock", ecosystem: "npm" },
+  { file: "requirements.txt", ecosystem: "PyPI" },
+  { file: "Pipfile.lock", ecosystem: "PyPI" }
 ];
-var MISCONFIG_FILES = [
-  { pattern: ".env", message: ".env file found \u2014 may contain secrets" },
-  { pattern: ".env.local", message: ".env.local file found \u2014 may contain secrets" },
-  { pattern: ".env.production", message: ".env.production file found \u2014 may contain secrets" },
-  { pattern: "id_rsa", message: "Private SSH key found" },
-  { pattern: "id_ed25519", message: "Private SSH key found" },
-  { pattern: ".pem", message: "PEM certificate/key file found" },
-  { pattern: ".p12", message: "PKCS#12 keystore found" },
-  { pattern: ".keystore", message: "Keystore file found" }
+var MAX_DEPS_PER_LOCKFILE = 50;
+async function scanDependencies(targetPath) {
+  const findings = [];
+  for (const { file, ecosystem } of LOCKFILES) {
+    const lockPath = (0, import_node_path5.join)(targetPath, file);
+    if (!(0, import_node_fs10.existsSync)(lockPath)) continue;
+    let deps;
+    try {
+      deps = parseDependencies(lockPath, file);
+    } catch {
+      continue;
+    }
+    for (const dep of deps.slice(0, MAX_DEPS_PER_LOCKFILE)) {
+      let vulns;
+      try {
+        vulns = await queryOsv(dep.name, dep.version, ecosystem);
+      } catch {
+        continue;
+      }
+      for (const vuln of vulns) {
+        const cvss = vuln.severity?.find((entry) => entry.type === "CVSS_V3")?.score;
+        findings.push({
+          ruleId: "dependency-known-vulnerability",
+          title: "Dependency CVE",
+          file,
+          line: 1,
+          severity: severityFromCvss(cvss),
+          confidence: "evidence",
+          message: `${dep.name}@${dep.version}: ${vuln.summary ?? vuln.id}`,
+          consequence: "A published advisory exists for the exact version resolved in this lockfile.",
+          excerpt: `${vuln.id}${cvss ? ` (CVSS: ${cvss})` : ""}`,
+          category: "dependency"
+        });
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  return findings;
+}
+function severityFromCvss(score) {
+  if (!score) return "medium";
+  const value = Number.parseFloat(score);
+  if (Number.isNaN(value)) return "medium";
+  if (value >= 9) return "critical";
+  if (value >= 7) return "high";
+  if (value >= 4) return "medium";
+  return "low";
+}
+function parseDependencies(lockPath, filename) {
+  const deps = [];
+  if (filename === "package-lock.json") {
+    const lock = JSON.parse((0, import_node_fs10.readFileSync)(lockPath, "utf-8"));
+    const packages = lock.packages ?? lock.dependencies ?? {};
+    for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(packages)) {
+      const name = key.replace(/^node_modules\//, "");
+      const version = value?.version;
+      if (name && version && !name.startsWith(".")) deps.push({ name, version });
+    }
+    return deps;
+  }
+  if (filename === "requirements.txt") {
+    for (const line of (0, import_node_fs10.readFileSync)(lockPath, "utf-8").split("\n")) {
+      const match = /^([a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+)==([0-9.]+)/.exec(line);
+      if (match?.[1] && match[2]) deps.push({ name: match[1], version: match[2] });
+    }
+  }
+  return deps;
+}
+function isValidPackageName(name) {
+  return /^[@a-zA-Z0-9_.\-/]{1,214}$/.test(name);
+}
+function isValidVersion(version) {
+  return /^[0-9a-zA-Z._\-+]{1,50}$/.test(version);
+}
+async function queryOsv(name, version, ecosystem) {
+  if (!isValidPackageName(name) || !isValidVersion(version)) return [];
+  try {
+    const response = await fetch("https://api.osv.dev/v1/query", {
+      method: "POST",
+      headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
+      body: JSON.stringify({ package: { name, ecosystem }, version }),
+      signal: AbortSignal.timeout(5e3)
+    });
+    if (!response.ok) return [];
+    const data = await response.json();
+    return data.vulns ?? [];
+  } catch {
+    return [];
+  }
+}
+
+// src/scan/engine.ts
+var import_node_fs11 = require("fs");
+var import_node_path6 = require("path");
+
+// src/scan/types.ts
+var SEVERITY_ORDER = ["info", "low", "medium", "high", "critical"];
+function severityRank(severity) {
+  const index = SEVERITY_ORDER.indexOf(severity);
+  return index === -1 ? 0 : index;
+}
+function severityFor(declared, confidence) {
+  if (confidence !== "pattern") return declared;
+  return severityRank(declared) > severityRank("medium") ? "medium" : declared;
+}
+
+// src/scan/code-rules.ts
+var UNTRUSTED_JS = /\b(?:req|request|ctx|context)\s*\.\s*(?:body|query|params|param|headers|cookies|url|files)\b|\bprocess\.argv\b|\bwindow\.location\b|\bdocument\.location\b|\blocation\.(?:search|hash|href)\b|\bsearchParams\s*\.\s*(?:get|getAll|has|entries|keys|values|forEach)\b|\bgetParameter\s*\(|\bgetQueryString\s*\(|\bgetInputStream\s*\(/;
+var UNTRUSTED_PY = /\brequest\b|\bparams\b|\bflask\b|\bsys\.argv\b|\bos\.environ\b\s*\[/;
+var UNTRUSTED_RB = /\bparams\s*\[|\brequest\b|\bcookies\s*\[/;
+var UNTRUSTED_GO = /\br\s*\.\s*(?:URL|Form|Body|Header|PostForm)\b|\bFormValue\s*\(|\bQuery\s*\(\s*\)\s*\.\s*Get\s*\(|\bmux\.Vars\s*\(/;
+var UNTRUSTED_JAVA = /\bgetParameter\s*\(|\bgetQueryString\s*\(|\bgetHeader\s*\(|\bgetInputStream\s*\(|\bgetCookies\s*\(|\b@RequestParam\b|\b@PathVariable\b/;
+function untrustedPatternFor(language) {
+  switch (language) {
+    case "python":
+      return UNTRUSTED_PY;
+    case "ruby":
+      return UNTRUSTED_RB;
+    case "go":
+      return UNTRUSTED_GO;
+    case "java":
+      return UNTRUSTED_JAVA;
+    default:
+      return UNTRUSTED_JS;
+  }
+}
+var GENERIC_GUARD = (
+  // `esc(`, `aEsc(`, `htmlEscape(`, `escapeHtml(` — the escaper is almost
+  // never *named* `escapeHtml` in real code. It gets aliased to something
+  // short because it is called on nearly every interpolation, so matching only
+  // the long spellings reported the codebases that escape most rigorously.
+  //
+  // The identifier must END at the escaper (with at most a known output-context
+  // suffix). An earlier, looser form also matched `describe(`, which would have
+  // silenced findings across every test file in every repository.
+  /\ballow(?:ed|list|_list|ed_hosts)?\b|\bwhitelist\b|\b\w{0,6}[Ee]sc(?:ape)?(?:[Hh]tml|HTML|[Xx]ml|XML|[Ss]ql|[Aa]ttr|[Jj]s|[Uu]ri|[Uu]rl)?\s*\(|\bhtml_escape\b|\bhtmlspecialchars\s*\(|\bsanitiz\w*\b|\bencoded\b|\brealpath\b|\bcommonpath\b|\bresolve\(\)\.startsWith\b|\bprocess\.env\b|\bos\.environ\b|\bgetenv\b|\bENV\s*\[|setObjectInputFilter|ObjectInputFilter/i
+);
+var XXE_GUARD = /FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING|setExpandEntityReferences|disallow-doctype-decl|external-general-entities|external-parameter-entities|setXIncludeAware\s*\(\s*false/;
+var CODE_SINK = /\bglobalThis\s*\[|\bconstructor\b|\beval\b|\bFunction\b|\brun\s*\(|\bvm\s*\.\s*run/;
+var EXFIL_SINK = /\bconsole\s*\.\s*(?:log|debug|info|warn|error)\s*\(|\bfetch\s*\(|\baxios\b|\brequest\s*\(|\.\s*send\s*\(/;
+var SQL_KEYWORDS = "SELECT|INSERT\\s+INTO|INSERT|UPDATE|DELETE\\s+FROM|DELETE|DROP|UNION\\s+SELECT";
+var SQL_IN_DOUBLE = `"[^"\\n]*(?:${SQL_KEYWORDS})\\b[^"\\n]*"`;
+var SQL_IN_SINGLE = `'[^'\\n]*(?:${SQL_KEYWORDS})\\b[^'\\n]*'`;
+var SQL_STRING = `(?:${SQL_IN_DOUBLE}|${SQL_IN_SINGLE})`;
+var CODE_RULES = [
+  // ── Injection: SQL ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  {
+    id: "sql-string-concatenation",
+    title: "SQL assembled by concatenation or interpolation",
+    consequence: "A quote in the interpolated value changes the query\u2019s meaning \u2014 the query runs as the attacker wrote it, not as you wrote it.",
+    cwe: "CWE-89",
+    severity: "critical",
+    // The tail is what distinguishes assembly from parameterisation. A bound
+    // query leaves a comma after the closing quote (`"… = $1", [id]`) and
+    // matches none of these.
+    pattern: new RegExp(
+      `${SQL_STRING}\\s*\\+|${SQL_STRING}\\s*%\\s*[\\w(]|${SQL_STRING}\\s*\\.\\s*format\\s*\\(|\\+\\s*(?:"[^"\\n]*|'[^'\\n]*)(?:WHERE|ORDER\\s+BY|VALUES|SET)\\b`,
+      "i"
+    )
+  },
+  {
+    id: "sql-template-interpolation",
+    title: "SQL built from a template literal or f-string",
+    consequence: "Template interpolation is string concatenation with nicer syntax \u2014 it binds nothing and escapes nothing.",
+    cwe: "CWE-89",
+    severity: "critical",
+    pattern: new RegExp(
+      `\`[^\`\\n]*(?:${SQL_KEYWORDS})\\b[^\`\\n]*\\$\\{|\\bf"[^"\\n]*(?:${SQL_KEYWORDS})\\b[^"\\n]*\\{|\\bf'[^'\\n]*(?:${SQL_KEYWORDS})\\b[^'\\n]*\\{`,
+      "i"
+    )
+  },
+  {
+    id: "sql-format-call",
+    title: "SQL text produced by a format helper",
+    consequence: "`Sprintf`/`String.format` substitute without quoting; the resulting string is concatenated SQL by another name.",
+    cwe: "CWE-89",
+    severity: "critical",
+    languages: ["go", "java"],
+    pattern: new RegExp(
+      `\\b(?:fmt\\.Sprintf|String\\.format)\\s*\\(\\s*"[^"\\n]*(?:${SQL_KEYWORDS})\\b`,
+      "i"
+    )
+  },
+  {
+    id: "rb-sql-interpolation",
+    title: "ActiveRecord query built by string interpolation",
+    consequence: '`where("\u2026 #{value}")` interpolates before the adapter sees it, so no binding ever happens.',
+    cwe: "CWE-89",
+    severity: "critical",
+    languages: ["ruby"],
+    pattern: /\b(?:where|find_by_sql|execute|select_all|select_values|order|group|pluck)\s*[( ]\s*(?:"[^"\n]*|'[^'\n]*)#\{/
+  },
+  // ── Injection: OS command ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  {
+    id: "js-shell-exec-interpolation",
+    title: "shell execution with an interpolated string",
+    consequence: "A `;` or `$(\u2026)` in the interpolated value runs as the server user.",
+    cwe: "CWE-78",
+    severity: "critical",
+    languages: ["javascript", "typescript"],
+    pattern: /\b(?:exec|execSync|spawn|spawnSync)\s*\(\s*(?:`[^`]*\$\{|['"][^'"]*['"]\s*\+|[a-zA-Z_$][\w$]*\s*\+)/
+  },
+  {
+    id: "py-shell-command-string",
+    title: "shell command built from a string",
+    consequence: "`os.system` and `shell=True` hand the string to `/bin/sh`, which happily interprets metacharacters.",
+    cwe: "CWE-78",
+    severity: "critical",
+    languages: ["python"],
+    pattern: /\bos\.(?:system|popen)\s*\(\s*(?:f?['"][^'"]*['"]\s*(?:\+|%|\.\s*format)|f['"]|[a-zA-Z_]\w*\s*[,)])|\bsubprocess\.(?:run|call|check_call|check_output|Popen)\s*\([^)]*\bshell\s*=\s*True/
+  },
+  {
+    id: "go-shell-exec-command",
+    title: "exec.Command invoking a shell",
+    consequence: "Passing `sh -c` re-introduces the shell that `exec.Command`\u2019s argv interface exists to avoid.",
+    cwe: "CWE-78",
+    severity: "critical",
+    languages: ["go"],
+    pattern: /\bexec\.Command(?:Context)?\s*\(\s*(?:ctx\s*,\s*)?"(?:\/bin\/)?(?:sh|bash|zsh|cmd|powershell)"\s*,\s*"(?:-c|\/c)"/
+  },
+  {
+    id: "rb-backtick-interpolation",
+    title: "backtick command with interpolation",
+    consequence: "Ruby backticks are a shell invocation; `#{}` inside one is command injection.",
+    cwe: "CWE-78",
+    severity: "critical",
+    languages: ["ruby"],
+    pattern: /`[^`\n]*#\{|\bsystem\s*\(\s*["'][^"'\n]*#\{|%x\[[^\]]*#\{/
+  },
+  // ── Injection: dynamic code ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+  {
+    id: "js-dynamic-code-execution",
+    title: "dynamic code execution",
+    consequence: "Any string reaching this call executes as code with the process\u2019 privileges.",
+    cwe: "CWE-95",
+    severity: "critical",
+    languages: ["javascript", "typescript"],
+    pattern: /\beval\s*\(|\bnew\s+Function\s*\(|\bvm\s*\.\s*run(?:InThisContext|InNewContext|InContext)\s*\(|\bset(?:Timeout|Interval)\s*\(\s*(?:['"`]|(?:req|request|ctx|params|query|body)\b)/
+  },
+  {
+    id: "js-indirect-code-sink",
+    title: "code sink reached indirectly",
+    consequence: "Resolving `eval`/`Function` through `globalThis[\u2026]` or `.constructor` hides the sink from literal matching. Legitimate code has no reason to.",
+    cwe: "CWE-506",
+    severity: "high",
+    languages: ["javascript", "typescript"],
+    pattern: /\bglobalThis\s*\[\s*[a-zA-Z_$][\w$]*\s*\]|\(\s*function\s*\(\s*\)\s*\{\s*\}\s*\)\s*\.\s*constructor/
+  },
+  {
+    id: "js-encoded-payload-execution",
+    title: "encoded blob decoded next to a code sink",
+    consequence: "A base64 literal that is decoded and executed is the standard shape of a planted backdoor; the encoding exists to defeat review.",
+    cwe: "CWE-506",
+    severity: "critical",
+    languages: ["javascript", "typescript"],
+    pattern: /\bBuffer\.from\s*\(\s*[\w.$]+\s*,\s*['"]base64['"]\s*\)|\batob\s*\(\s*[\w.$]+\s*\)/,
+    requires: CODE_SINK,
+    guardBack: 6,
+    guardForward: 3
+  },
+  {
+    id: "py-dynamic-code-execution",
+    title: "dynamic code execution",
+    consequence: "Any string reaching this call executes as Python with the process\u2019 privileges.",
+    cwe: "CWE-95",
+    severity: "critical",
+    languages: ["python"],
+    pattern: /\b(?:eval|exec)\s*\(\s*(?!['"]\s*\))[a-zA-Z_(f'"]/,
+    needsContext: true
+  },
+  {
+    id: "rb-dynamic-dispatch",
+    title: "dynamic code execution or unrestricted #send",
+    consequence: "`eval` runs arbitrary Ruby; unrestricted `#send` lets the caller invoke any method on the receiver, including private ones.",
+    cwe: "CWE-95",
+    severity: "critical",
+    languages: ["ruby"],
+    pattern: /\beval\s*\(|\binstance_eval\s*\(|\bclass_eval\s*\(|\.\s*send\s*\(\s*(?:params|request|args)\b/
+  },
+  // ── Cross-site scripting ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  {
+    id: "js-unescaped-html-sink",
+    title: "unescaped HTML rendering",
+    consequence: "A script tag in the value executes in the victim\u2019s session \u2014 stored or reflected XSS.",
+    cwe: "CWE-79",
+    severity: "high",
+    languages: ["javascript", "typescript"],
+    pattern: /\bdangerouslySetInnerHTML\s*=|\.\s*(?:innerHTML|outerHTML)\s*=\s*(?!\s*['"`]\s*['"`]\s*;?\s*$)|\bdocument\s*\.\s*write(?:ln)?\s*\(|\.\s*insertAdjacentHTML\s*\(/,
+    /**
+     * A whole-statement assignment of a string with no interpolation and no
+     * concatenation carries no data, so it cannot carry attacker data. This
+     * was the single largest source of noise: a codebase that builds its UI
+     * with innerHTML reports every static heading and spinner as XSS, and a
+     * rule that flags 40 safe lines to catch one real one gets switched off.
+     *
+     * Line-scoped on purpose — see `lineGuard`.
+     */
+    lineGuard: /(?:innerHTML|outerHTML)\s*=\s*(?:'[^'\\]*'|"[^"\\]*"|`[^`$\\]*`)\s*;?\s*$/
+  },
+  {
+    id: "java-html-writer-concatenation",
+    title: "HTML written to the response by concatenation",
+    consequence: "The servlet writer performs no encoding; a value concatenated into markup is rendered as markup.",
+    cwe: "CWE-79",
+    severity: "high",
+    languages: ["java"],
+    pattern: /\b(?:println|print|write)\s*\(\s*"[^"\n]*<[^"\n]*"\s*\+/
+  },
+  {
+    id: "rb-unescaped-output",
+    title: "Rails output escaping bypassed",
+    consequence: "`html_safe` and `raw` tell Rails the string is already safe. If it came from a parameter, it is not.",
+    cwe: "CWE-79",
+    severity: "high",
+    languages: ["ruby"],
+    pattern: /\.\s*html_safe\b|\braw\s*\(\s*(?:params|request|@)|\blink_to\s+[^,\n]+,\s*params\s*\[/
+  },
+  {
+    id: "py-template-autoescape-off",
+    title: "template rendering with escaping disabled",
+    consequence: "With autoescape off \u2014 or a `|safe` filter \u2014 every interpolated value is rendered as markup.",
+    cwe: "CWE-79",
+    severity: "high",
+    languages: ["python"],
+    pattern: /\bEnvironment\s*\([^)]*\bautoescape\s*=\s*False|\|\s*safe\b|\bMarkup\s*\(\s*(?!['"])/
+  },
+  {
+    id: "py-template-from-input",
+    title: "template compiled from a non-literal source",
+    consequence: "Server-side template injection. In Jinja2 the sandbox is escapable, so this escalates from XSS to remote code execution.",
+    cwe: "CWE-1336",
+    severity: "critical",
+    languages: ["python"],
+    pattern: /\bTemplate\s*\(\s*(?!['"])[a-zA-Z_]/,
+    needsContext: true
+  },
+  // ── Server-side request forgery ──────────────────────────────────────────
+  {
+    id: "js-ssrf-outbound-request",
+    title: "outbound request to a non-constant URL",
+    consequence: "An attacker who controls the URL reaches the cloud metadata endpoint, localhost, and every service on the private network.",
+    cwe: "CWE-918",
+    severity: "high",
+    languages: ["javascript", "typescript"],
+    pattern: /\bfetch\s*\(\s*[a-zA-Z_$][\w$]*\s*[,)]|\bhttps?\s*\.\s*(?:get|request)\s*\(\s*[a-zA-Z_$][\w$]*\s*[,)]|\baxios\s*\.\s*get\s*\(\s*[a-zA-Z_$][\w$]*\s*[,)]/,
+    needsContext: true
+  },
+  {
+    id: "py-ssrf-outbound-request",
+    title: "outbound request to a non-constant URL",
+    consequence: "An attacker who controls the URL reaches the cloud metadata endpoint, localhost, and every service on the private network.",
+    cwe: "CWE-918",
+    severity: "high",
+    languages: ["python"],
+    pattern: /\brequests\.(?:get|request|head)\s*\(\s*[a-zA-Z_]\w*\s*[,)]|\burlopen\s*\(\s*[a-zA-Z_]\w*\s*[,)]|\bhttpx\.get\s*\(\s*[a-zA-Z_]\w*\s*[,)]/,
+    needsContext: true
+  },
+  {
+    id: "go-ssrf-outbound-request",
+    title: "outbound request to a non-constant URL",
+    consequence: "An attacker who controls the URL reaches the cloud metadata endpoint, localhost, and every service on the private network.",
+    cwe: "CWE-918",
+    severity: "high",
+    languages: ["go"],
+    pattern: /\bhttp\.(?:Get|Post|Head)\s*\(\s*(?:[a-zA-Z_]\w*\s*[,)]|"[^"]*"\s*\+)/,
+    needsContext: true
+  },
+  // ── Open redirect ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  {
+    id: "js-open-redirect",
+    title: "redirect to a non-constant destination",
+    consequence: "Your domain becomes the credible first hop of a phishing chain; the victim sees your hostname in the link they clicked.",
+    cwe: "CWE-601",
+    severity: "medium",
+    languages: ["javascript", "typescript"],
+    pattern: /\b(?:res|response)\s*\.\s*redirect\s*\(\s*[a-zA-Z_$][\w$]*\s*\)|\bwindow\s*\.\s*location(?:\s*\.\s*(?:href|replace))?\s*(?:=\s*[a-zA-Z_$]|\(\s*[a-zA-Z_$][\w$]*\s*\))/,
+    needsContext: true
+  },
+  // ── Deserialisation ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  {
+    id: "py-unsafe-deserialization",
+    title: "deserialisation of untrusted data",
+    consequence: "`pickle` and `yaml.load` instantiate arbitrary types during parsing \u2014 a crafted payload is remote code execution, not a parse error.",
+    cwe: "CWE-502",
+    severity: "critical",
+    languages: ["python"],
+    pattern: /\bpickle\.loads?\s*\(|\bcPickle\.loads?\s*\(|\bmarshal\.loads\s*\(|\byaml\.load\s*\(|\bjsonpickle\.decode\s*\(/
+  },
+  {
+    id: "java-unsafe-deserialization",
+    title: "Java deserialisation without a class filter",
+    consequence: "A gadget chain in the classpath turns `readObject()` on attacker bytes into remote code execution.",
+    cwe: "CWE-502",
+    severity: "critical",
+    languages: ["java"],
+    pattern: /\breadObject\s*\(\s*\)|\bnew\s+ObjectInputStream\s*\(/,
+    guardBack: 8,
+    // The stream is constructed, *then* filtered. Without a forward window the
+    // guarded case matches on its constructor line and reports a correct
+    // implementation as a finding.
+    guardForward: 6
+  },
+  {
+    id: "js-unsafe-yaml-load",
+    title: "YAML parsed with type resolution enabled",
+    consequence: "A crafted document can instantiate arbitrary types during parsing.",
+    cwe: "CWE-502",
+    severity: "high",
+    languages: ["javascript", "typescript"],
+    pattern: /\byaml\s*\.\s*load\s*\((?![^)]*safe)|\bloadAll\s*\([^)]*unsafe/i
+  },
+  // ── XML external entities ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  {
+    id: "java-xxe-parser-defaults",
+    title: "XML parser left on its insecure defaults",
+    consequence: "External entity expansion reads local files and makes outbound requests on the parser\u2019s behalf \u2014 file disclosure and SSRF from a document.",
+    cwe: "CWE-611",
+    severity: "high",
+    languages: ["java"],
+    pattern: /\b(?:DocumentBuilderFactory|SAXParserFactory|XMLInputFactory|TransformerFactory|SchemaFactory)\s*\.\s*newInstance\s*\(\s*\)/,
+    guard: XXE_GUARD,
+    guardBack: 4,
+    guardForward: 8
+  },
+  {
+    id: "java-xxe-parse-call",
+    title: "XML parsed by a builder that was never hardened",
+    consequence: "The expansion happens at `parse()`. Flagging only the factory misses the line where the document is actually read.",
+    cwe: "CWE-611",
+    severity: "high",
+    languages: ["java"],
+    // Receiver-qualified so `LocalDate.parse(s)` and friends stay out of it.
+    pattern: /\b\w*(?:[Bb]uilder|[Pp]arser|[Rr]eader)\s*\.\s*parse\s*\(/,
+    guard: XXE_GUARD,
+    guardBack: 6,
+    guardForward: 4
+  },
+  // ── Path traversal ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  {
+    id: "py-path-traversal",
+    title: "file opened at a path built from input",
+    consequence: "A `../` sequence \u2014 or an absolute path \u2014 reads or writes outside the intended directory.",
+    cwe: "CWE-22",
+    severity: "high",
+    languages: ["python"],
+    pattern: /\bopen\s*\(\s*(?:os\.path\.join\s*\(|[a-zA-Z_]\w*\s*\+|f['"])/,
+    needsContext: true
+  },
+  {
+    id: "js-path-traversal",
+    title: "file path built from a variable",
+    consequence: "A `../` sequence in the value reads or writes outside the intended directory.",
+    cwe: "CWE-22",
+    severity: "medium",
+    languages: ["javascript", "typescript"],
+    pattern: /\b(?:readFile|readFileSync|writeFile|writeFileSync|createReadStream|createWriteStream|unlink|unlinkSync|sendFile)\s*\(\s*(?:`[^`]*\$\{|[a-zA-Z_$][\w$]*\s*\+|path\.join\s*\([^)]*(?:req|request)\b)/,
+    needsContext: true
+  },
+  // ── Cryptography, tokens, randomness ─────────────────────────────────────
+  {
+    id: "js-jwt-decode-without-verify",
+    title: "JWT decoded without verifying the signature",
+    consequence: "`decode` parses the claims and checks nothing. Anyone can mint a token with any `sub` and any `role`.",
+    cwe: "CWE-347",
+    severity: "critical",
+    languages: ["javascript", "typescript"],
+    pattern: /\bjwt\s*\.\s*decode\s*\(|\bjsonwebtoken\s*\.\s*decode\s*\(|\bdecodeJwt\s*\(/
+  },
+  {
+    id: "tls-verification-disabled",
+    title: "TLS certificate verification disabled",
+    consequence: "Every connection made this way is trivially interceptable; the encryption is decorative.",
+    cwe: "CWE-295",
+    severity: "high",
+    pattern: /rejectUnauthorized\s*:\s*false|NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED\s*[=:]\s*['"]?0|strictSSL\s*:\s*false|\bverify\s*=\s*False\b|InsecureSkipVerify\s*:\s*true/
+  },
+  {
+    id: "weak-hash-on-credential",
+    title: "broken hash used on a credential",
+    consequence: "MD5 and SHA-1 are fast and collision-prone; hashed passwords are recoverable.",
+    cwe: "CWE-327",
+    severity: "high",
+    pattern: /(?:createHash|hashlib|MessageDigest\.getInstance|Digest::)\s*[.(]?\s*['"]?(?:md5|MD5|sha1|SHA-?1)['"]?\s*\)?[\s\S]{0,80}(?:password|passwd|secret|token|credential)/i
+  },
+  {
+    id: "insecure-randomness-for-secret",
+    title: "predictable randomness used for a security value",
+    consequence: "`Math.random`/`random.random` are predictable; tokens, session ids and reset codes built from them are guessable.",
+    cwe: "CWE-338",
+    severity: "high",
+    pattern: /(?:token|secret|password|salt|nonce|session|otp|reset|apikey|api_key)[\w]*\s*[:=][^;\n]{0,60}(?:Math\s*\.\s*random\s*\(|\brandom\s*\.\s*(?:random|randint|choice)\s*\(|\brand\s*\()/i
+  },
+  {
+    id: "redos-nested-quantifier",
+    title: "regex with nested unbounded quantifiers",
+    consequence: "Catastrophic backtracking: a crafted input of a few dozen characters pins a CPU core for minutes.",
+    cwe: "CWE-1333",
+    severity: "medium",
+    pattern: /\([^)\n]*[+*]\s*\)\s*[+*]|\([^)\n]*\{\d+,\}\s*\)\s*[+*{]/
+  },
+  // ── Temporary files ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  {
+    id: "insecure-temp-file",
+    title: "predictable temporary file path",
+    consequence: "A predictable name in a world-writable directory is a symlink attack: an attacker pre-creates the path and your process writes through it.",
+    cwe: "CWE-377",
+    severity: "medium",
+    // A hardcoded path under /tmp is the finding whether or not it is
+    // formatted: `"/tmp/application.log.tmp"` is worse than the PID-based one,
+    // because every process on the host can predict it exactly.
+    pattern: /\btempfile\.mktemp\s*\(|\bos\.tmpnam\s*\(|['"]\/tmp\/[^'"\n]+['"]|['"]\/tmp\/[^'"\n]*\{|\bFile\.createTempFile\s*\(/
+  },
+  // ── Information exposure ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  {
+    id: "py-stack-trace-returned",
+    title: "stack trace returned to the caller",
+    consequence: "Tracebacks leak absolute paths, dependency versions and source fragments \u2014 the reconnaissance an attacker would otherwise have to guess at.",
+    cwe: "CWE-209",
+    severity: "medium",
+    languages: ["python"],
+    pattern: /\breturn\b[^\n]*\btraceback\.(?:format_exc|format_exception|print_exc)\s*\(|\breturn\b[^\n]*\bstr\s*\(\s*e\s*\)/
+  },
+  {
+    id: "js-environment-exfiltration",
+    title: "process environment serialised into a payload",
+    consequence: "The environment is where every secret lives. Serialising it whole into a request body is credential exfiltration regardless of the endpoint.",
+    cwe: "CWE-532",
+    severity: "critical",
+    languages: ["javascript", "typescript"],
+    pattern: /\bJSON\.stringify\s*\(\s*\{?[^)]*\bprocess\.env\b(?!\s*\.)/,
+    guard: false
+  },
+  {
+    id: "js-credential-logged",
+    title: "credential read from the environment into a log sink",
+    consequence: "CI retains job logs, and on public forks it publishes them. A token printed once is a token leaked permanently.",
+    cwe: "CWE-532",
+    severity: "high",
+    languages: ["javascript", "typescript"],
+    pattern: /\b(?:token|apiKey|api_key|secret|password|credential|auth)\w*\s*:\s*process\.env\.\w+/i,
+    requires: EXFIL_SINK,
+    guard: false,
+    guardBack: 4,
+    guardForward: 1
+  },
+  // ── Prototype pollution ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  {
+    id: "js-prototype-pollution",
+    title: "write to a prototype-reachable key",
+    consequence: "An attacker-supplied `__proto__` key changes behaviour for every object in the process, including ones it never touched.",
+    cwe: "CWE-1321",
+    severity: "high",
+    languages: ["javascript", "typescript"],
+    pattern: /\[\s*['"]__proto__['"]\s*\]|\bObject\s*\.\s*assign\s*\(\s*[\w.$]*\.prototype\b|\.\s*__proto__\s*=/
+  }
+];
+var COMMENT_PREFIX = /^\s*(?:\/\/|\/\*|\*|#|--|<!--)/;
+var DEFINITION_PREFIX = /^\s*(?:(?:export|public|private|protected|static|final|async|abstract)\s+)*(?:def|function|func|class|module|interface|struct|impl|fn|sub)\b/;
+function isComment(line) {
+  return COMMENT_PREFIX.test(line);
+}
+function proseLines(lines) {
+  const inside = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+  let delimiter = null;
+  lines.forEach((line, index) => {
+    if (delimiter) {
+      inside.add(index);
+      if (line.includes(delimiter)) delimiter = null;
+      return;
+    }
+    for (const candidate of ['"""', "'''"]) {
+      const start = line.indexOf(candidate);
+      if (start === -1) continue;
+      if (line.indexOf(candidate, start + candidate.length) !== -1) return;
+      delimiter = candidate;
+      inside.add(index);
+      return;
+    }
+  });
+  return inside;
+}
+function skippable(line, index, prose) {
+  return isComment(line) || DEFINITION_PREFIX.test(line) || (prose?.has(index) ?? false);
+}
+function windowText(lines, index, back, forward, prose) {
+  const from = Math.max(0, index - back);
+  const to = Math.min(lines.length - 1, index + forward);
+  const collected = [];
+  for (let i = from; i <= to; i += 1) {
+    const line = lines[i] ?? "";
+    if (i !== index && skippable(line, i, prose)) continue;
+    collected.push(line);
+  }
+  return collected.join("\n");
+}
+function evaluateRule(rule, ctx) {
+  if (rule.languages && !rule.languages.includes(ctx.language)) return null;
+  const line = ctx.lines[ctx.index] ?? "";
+  if (isComment(line) || ctx.prose?.has(ctx.index)) return null;
+  if (!rule.pattern.test(line)) return null;
+  const back = rule.guardBack ?? 8;
+  const forward = rule.guardForward ?? 0;
+  const context = windowText(ctx.lines, ctx.index, back, forward, ctx.prose);
+  if (rule.requires && !rule.requires.test(context)) return null;
+  if (rule.lineGuard?.test(line)) return null;
+  const guard = rule.guard === void 0 ? GENERIC_GUARD : rule.guard;
+  if (guard && (guard.test(line) || guard.test(context))) return null;
+  const untrusted = untrustedPatternFor(ctx.language);
+  const contextual = untrusted.test(line) || untrusted.test(context);
+  if (rule.needsContext && !contextual) return null;
+  const confidence = contextual ? "contextual" : "pattern";
+  return { rule, confidence, severity: severityFor(rule.severity, confidence) };
+}
+
+// src/scan/manifest-rules.ts
+var POPULAR_NPM = [
+  "react",
+  "react-dom",
+  "lodash",
+  "express",
+  "axios",
+  "chalk",
+  "commander",
+  "debug",
+  "moment",
+  "dayjs",
+  "uuid",
+  "dotenv",
+  "typescript",
+  "webpack",
+  "vite",
+  "rollup",
+  "eslint",
+  "prettier",
+  "jest",
+  "vitest",
+  "mocha",
+  "chai",
+  "sinon",
+  "request",
+  "node-fetch",
+  "cross-env",
+  "rimraf",
+  "glob",
+  "minimist",
+  "yargs",
+  "inquirer",
+  "colors",
+  "ora",
+  "semver",
+  "ws",
+  "socket.io",
+  "mongoose",
+  "sequelize",
+  "knex",
+  "pg",
+  "mysql",
+  "mysql2",
+  "redis",
+  "ioredis",
+  "jsonwebtoken",
+  "bcrypt",
+  "passport",
+  "cors",
+  "helmet",
+  "morgan",
+  "body-parser",
+  "multer",
+  "nodemailer",
+  "puppeteer",
+  "playwright",
+  "cheerio",
+  "sharp",
+  "canvas",
+  "esbuild",
+  "babel",
+  "postcss",
+  "tailwindcss",
+  "next",
+  "nuxt",
+  "vue",
+  "svelte",
+  "angular",
+  "rxjs",
+  "zod"
+];
+var POPULAR_PYPI = [
+  "requests",
+  "urllib3",
+  "numpy",
+  "pandas",
+  "scipy",
+  "flask",
+  "django",
+  "fastapi",
+  "sqlalchemy",
+  "pydantic",
+  "click",
+  "jinja2",
+  "pyyaml",
+  "boto3",
+  "botocore",
+  "setuptools",
+  "wheel",
+  "pip",
+  "six",
+  "certifi",
+  "idna",
+  "chardet",
+  "attrs",
+  "python-dateutil",
+  "pytz",
+  "pytest",
+  "tox",
+  "black",
+  "flake8",
+  "mypy",
+  "isort",
+  "beautifulsoup4",
+  "lxml",
+  "pillow",
+  "matplotlib",
+  "seaborn",
+  "scikit-learn",
+  "tensorflow",
+  "torch",
+  "transformers",
+  "openai",
+  "anthropic",
+  "httpx",
+  "aiohttp",
+  "celery",
+  "redis",
+  "psycopg2",
+  "pymongo",
+  "cryptography",
+  "paramiko",
+  "colorama"
 ];
+var INTERNAL_MARKER = /(?:^|[-_/@])(?:internal|private|corp|intranet|inhouse|confidential)(?:$|[-_/])/i;
+function normalizeName(name) {
+  return name.toLowerCase().replace(/^@/, "").replace(/[-_.\s]/g, "");
+}
+function editDistance(a, b, cap = 3) {
+  if (a === b) return 0;
+  if (Math.abs(a.length - b.length) > cap) return cap + 1;
+  const rows = [];
+  for (let i = 0; i <= a.length; i += 1) {
+    rows.push(new Array(b.length + 1).fill(0));
+    rows[i][0] = i;
+  }
+  for (let j = 0; j <= b.length; j += 1) rows[0][j] = j;
+  for (let i = 1; i <= a.length; i += 1) {
+    for (let j = 1; j <= b.length; j += 1) {
+      const cost = a[i - 1] === b[j - 1] ? 0 : 1;
+      let best = Math.min(
+        rows[i - 1][j] + 1,
+        rows[i][j - 1] + 1,
+        rows[i - 1][j - 1] + cost
+      );
+      if (i > 1 && j > 1 && a[i - 1] === b[j - 2] && a[i - 2] === b[j - 1]) {
+        best = Math.min(best, rows[i - 2][j - 2] + 1);
+      }
+      rows[i][j] = best;
+    }
+  }
+  return rows[a.length][b.length];
+}
+function detectTyposquat(name, ecosystem) {
+  const popular = ecosystem === "npm" ? POPULAR_NPM : POPULAR_PYPI;
+  const lower = name.toLowerCase().replace(/^@[^/]+\//, "");
+  if (popular.includes(lower)) return null;
+  if (lower.length < 4) return null;
+  const normalized = normalizeName(lower);
+  for (const candidate of popular) {
+    const candidateNormalized = normalizeName(candidate);
+    if (normalized === candidateNormalized) return { impersonates: candidate, kind: "separator" };
+    if (editDistance(normalized, candidateNormalized, 1) === 1) {
+      return { impersonates: candidate, kind: "edit" };
+    }
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+var LIFECYCLE_SCRIPTS = ["preinstall", "install", "postinstall", "prepare", "prepublish"];
+function scanPackageJson(text) {
+  const findings = [];
+  const lines = text.split("\n");
+  let parsed;
+  try {
+    parsed = JSON.parse(text);
+  } catch {
+    return findings;
+  }
+  const lineOf = (needle) => {
+    const index = lines.findIndex((line) => line.includes(`"${needle}"`));
+    return index === -1 ? 1 : index + 1;
+  };
+  const depBuckets = ["dependencies", "devDependencies", "optionalDependencies", "peerDependencies"];
+  for (const bucket of depBuckets) {
+    const deps = parsed[bucket];
+    if (!deps || typeof deps !== "object") continue;
+    for (const name of Object.keys(deps)) {
+      const line = lineOf(name);
+      if (INTERNAL_MARKER.test(name)) {
+        findings.push({
+          ruleId: "manifest-dependency-confusion",
+          title: "internal-looking package resolved from a public registry",
+          line,
+          severity: "critical",
+          cwe: "CWE-1357",
+          message: `"${name}" names itself as internal but carries no registry pin`,
+          consequence: "Whoever registers this name publicly first wins the resolution, and their code runs in your build.",
+          excerpt: (lines[line - 1] ?? "").trim()
+        });
+        continue;
+      }
+      const squat = detectTyposquat(name, "npm");
+      if (squat) {
+        findings.push({
+          ruleId: "manifest-typosquat",
+          title: "dependency name close to a popular package",
+          line,
+          severity: "high",
+          cwe: "CWE-1357",
+          message: squat.kind === "separator" ? `"${name}" differs from "${squat.impersonates}" only in punctuation` : `"${name}" is one edit from "${squat.impersonates}"`,
+          consequence: "A reviewer scanning a diff reads the name they expected. The package that installs is the one that was written.",
+          excerpt: (lines[line - 1] ?? "").trim()
+        });
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  const scripts = parsed.scripts;
+  if (scripts && typeof scripts === "object") {
+    for (const [name, body] of Object.entries(scripts)) {
+      if (!LIFECYCLE_SCRIPTS.includes(name)) continue;
+      findings.push({
+        ruleId: "manifest-install-lifecycle-script",
+        title: "install-time lifecycle script",
+        line: lineOf(name),
+        severity: "medium",
+        cwe: "CWE-506",
+        message: `"${name}" runs automatically on install: ${String(body).slice(0, 120)}`,
+        consequence: "Lifecycle scripts run with the installing user\u2019s privileges and network access, before any code is reviewed. It is the execution vector every notable npm compromise has used.",
+        excerpt: (lines[lineOf(name) - 1] ?? "").trim()
+      });
+    }
+  }
+  return findings;
+}
+function scanRequirementsTxt(text) {
+  const findings = [];
+  const lines = text.split("\n");
+  lines.forEach((raw, index) => {
+    const line = raw.trim();
+    if (!line || line.startsWith("#") || line.startsWith("-")) return;
+    const match = /^([A-Za-z0-9_.-]+)\s*(?:[=<>!~]=|@|$)/.exec(line);
+    const name = match?.[1];
+    if (!name) return;
+    if (INTERNAL_MARKER.test(name)) {
+      findings.push({
+        ruleId: "manifest-dependency-confusion",
+        title: "internal-looking package resolved from a public index",
+        line: index + 1,
+        severity: "critical",
+        cwe: "CWE-1357",
+        message: `"${name}" names itself as internal but carries no index pin`,
+        consequence: "pip resolves the highest version across every configured index, so a public package of the same name shadows the private one.",
+        excerpt: line
+      });
+      return;
+    }
+    const squat = detectTyposquat(name, "pypi");
+    if (squat) {
+      findings.push({
+        ruleId: "manifest-typosquat",
+        title: "dependency name close to a popular package",
+        line: index + 1,
+        severity: "high",
+        cwe: "CWE-1357",
+        message: squat.kind === "separator" ? `"${name}" differs from "${squat.impersonates}" only in punctuation` : `"${name}" is one edit from "${squat.impersonates}"`,
+        consequence: "A reviewer scanning a diff reads the name they expected. The package that installs is the one that was written.",
+        excerpt: line
+      });
+    }
+  });
+  return findings;
+}
+
+// src/scan/secret-rules.ts
+var SECRET_RULES = [
+  {
+    id: "secret-aws-access-key",
+    name: "AWS Access Key",
+    pattern: /\b(?:AKIA|ASIA|ABIA|ACCA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b/,
+    severity: "critical",
+    cwe: "CWE-798",
+    consequence: "Paired with a secret key, grants the API access of whatever IAM principal issued it."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "secret-aws-secret-key",
+    name: "AWS Secret Access Key",
+    pattern: /(?:aws_secret_access_key|AWS_SECRET(?:_ACCESS_KEY)?)\s*[=:]\s*['"]?([A-Za-z0-9/+=]{40})['"]?/i,
+    severity: "critical",
+    cwe: "CWE-798",
+    consequence: "The other half of an AWS credential pair; on its own it is still the hard half to guess."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "secret-github-token",
+    name: "GitHub Token",
+    pattern: /\b(?:ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}|gho_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}|ghu_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}|ghs_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}|ghr_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{60,})\b/,
+    severity: "critical",
+    cwe: "CWE-798",
+    consequence: "Repository read or write as the issuing account, including the ability to push workflow changes."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "secret-npm-token",
+    name: "npm Token",
+    pattern: /\bnpm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}\b/,
+    severity: "critical",
+    cwe: "CWE-798",
+    consequence: "Publish rights to every package the account owns \u2014 a supply-chain compromise in one command."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "secret-private-key",
+    name: "Private Key",
+    pattern: /-----BEGIN (?:RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH |PGP )?PRIVATE KEY(?: BLOCK)?-----/,
+    severity: "critical",
+    cwe: "CWE-798",
+    consequence: "Key material, committed. Rotation is the only remediation."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "secret-slack-token",
+    name: "Slack Token",
+    pattern: /\bxox[bpoasr]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}/,
+    severity: "critical",
+    cwe: "CWE-798",
+    consequence: "Read and post access to the workspace as the installing app."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "secret-slack-webhook",
+    name: "Slack Webhook URL",
+    pattern: /https:\/\/hooks\.slack\.com\/services\/[A-Za-z0-9_+\/-]{6,}/,
+    severity: "high",
+    cwe: "CWE-798",
+    consequence: "The URL *is* the credential \u2014 anyone holding it can post to that channel."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "secret-stripe-key",
+    name: "Stripe Key",
+    pattern: /\b(?:sk_live_|rk_live_|sk_test_|rk_test_)[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\b/,
+    severity: "critical",
+    cwe: "CWE-798",
+    consequence: "Charge, refund and customer-data access against the account."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "secret-sendgrid-key",
+    name: "SendGrid API Key",
+    pattern: /\bSG\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}\b/,
+    severity: "critical",
+    cwe: "CWE-798",
+    consequence: "Send mail as the domain \u2014 the credential behind most convincing phishing from a real sender."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "secret-google-api-key",
+    name: "Google API Key",
+    pattern: /\bAIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}\b/,
+    severity: "high",
+    cwe: "CWE-798",
+    consequence: "Quota theft at minimum; API access to whatever the key was scoped to at worst."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "secret-openai-key",
+    name: "OpenAI API Key",
+    pattern: /\bsk-(?:proj-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{32,}\b/,
+    severity: "critical",
+    cwe: "CWE-798",
+    consequence: "Billed inference against the owner\u2019s account, with no per-key spend limit by default."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "secret-anthropic-key",
+    name: "Anthropic API Key",
+    pattern: /\bsk-ant-(?:api\d{2}-)?[A-Za-z0-9_-]{32,}\b/,
+    severity: "critical",
+    cwe: "CWE-798",
+    consequence: "Billed inference against the owner\u2019s account."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "secret-database-url",
+    name: "Database URL with credentials",
+    // Requires a credential segment before the `@` — `postgres://localhost/db`
+    // is a hostname, not a secret.
+    pattern: /\b(?:postgres(?:ql)?|mysql|mongodb(?:\+srv)?|redis|amqp|clickhouse):\/\/[^\s'"@\/]*:[^\s'"@\/]*@[^\s'"]+/i,
+    severity: "high",
+    cwe: "CWE-798",
+    consequence: "Direct database access, usually bypassing every application-level authorisation check."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "secret-jwt",
+    name: "JSON Web Token",
+    pattern: /\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_.+/=-]*/,
+    severity: "medium",
+    cwe: "CWE-798",
+    consequence: "Session or service identity until it expires \u2014 and committed tokens are usually long-lived."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "secret-generic-api-key",
+    name: "Generic API Key",
+    // Quoted assignment only. An unquoted value in a `.env` is covered by the
+    // vendor-prefixed rules above; matching it here is what starts flagging
+    // ARNs and parameter-store paths.
+    pattern: /(?:api[_-]?key|apikey|access[_-]?token|auth[_-]?token)\s*[=:]\s*['"]([A-Za-z0-9\-_.]{20,})['"]/i,
+    severity: "high",
+    cwe: "CWE-798",
+    consequence: "Whatever the third-party service lets the key do, for as long as it stays valid."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "secret-generic-credential",
+    name: "Hardcoded Credential",
+    pattern: /(?:secret|password|passwd|pwd|token)\s*[=:]\s*['"]([^'"\s]{8,})['"]/i,
+    severity: "high",
+    cwe: "CWE-798",
+    consequence: "A password in source is a password in every clone, fork and CI cache of that source."
+  },
+  {
+    id: "secret-hex-token",
+    name: "High-entropy Hex Token",
+    pattern: /(?:token|key|secret|auth|signing)\w*\s*[=:]\s*['"]?([0-9a-f]{32,})['"]?/i,
+    severity: "medium",
+    cwe: "CWE-798",
+    consequence: "Signing secrets and session keys are usually hex; a leaked one forges anything they sign."
+  }
+];
+var KNOWN_PLACEHOLDERS = [
+  // Deliberately NOT here: AWS's published documentation key/secret pair
+  // (`AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE`, `wJalrXUtnFEMI/…`). GitHub allow-lists them, and
+  // the argument for following suit is that they authenticate nothing. The
+  // argument against is stronger: they appear in a repository because someone
+  // pasted a credentials template and left it there, and the remediation —
+  // move this to the secret manager — is identical to the one for a live key.
+  // Exempting them means the scanner goes quiet on the file most likely to
+  // acquire a real key next.
+  /\bEXAMPLE_?KEY\b/i,
+  /\bYOUR_[A-Z_]*(?:KEY|TOKEN|SECRET|PASSWORD)\b/,
+  /\b(?:xxx+|X{4,}|\*{4,}|<[a-z-]+>)\b/,
+  /\bchangeme\b/i
+];
+function isKnownPlaceholder(text) {
+  return KNOWN_PLACEHOLDERS.some((pattern) => pattern.test(text));
+}
+function redactSecret(line) {
+  return line.replace(/([A-Za-z0-9+/=_.-]{12,})/g, (match) => {
+    if (match.length <= 12) return match;
+    return `${match.slice(0, 3)}${"*".repeat(Math.min(16, match.length - 3))}`;
+  });
+}
+var SENSITIVE_FILES = [
+  { pattern: ".env", message: "Environment file committed \u2014 the usual home of every runtime credential", severity: "high" },
+  { pattern: ".env.local", message: "Local environment file committed", severity: "high" },
+  { pattern: ".env.production", message: "Production environment file committed", severity: "critical" },
+  { pattern: "id_rsa", message: "Private SSH key committed", severity: "critical" },
+  { pattern: "id_ed25519", message: "Private SSH key committed", severity: "critical" },
+  { pattern: "id_ecdsa", message: "Private SSH key committed", severity: "critical" },
+  { pattern: ".pem", message: "PEM certificate or key file committed", severity: "high" },
+  { pattern: ".p12", message: "PKCS#12 keystore committed", severity: "high" },
+  { pattern: ".pfx", message: "PKCS#12 keystore committed", severity: "high" },
+  { pattern: ".keystore", message: "Java keystore committed", severity: "high" }
+  // Deliberately not `.npmrc`. Its presence is normal; only an `_authToken`
+  // line in it is a credential, and that is a content match, not a filename
+  // match. Reporting the file itself trades a real finding for a chore.
+];
+
+// src/scan/engine.ts
 var SKIP_DIRS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
   "node_modules",
   ".git",
   ".next",
+  ".nuxt",
   "dist",
   "build",
+  "out",
   "__pycache__",
   ".venv",
+  "venv",
   "vendor",
   ".terraform",
   "coverage",
-  ".cache"
+  ".cache",
+  ".pnpm-store",
+  "target",
+  ".gradle",
+  ".idea",
+  ".vscode",
+  "bower_components",
+  ".svelte-kit"
 ]);
 var SCAN_EXTENSIONS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
   ".ts",
   ".js",
   ".tsx",
   ".jsx",
+  ".mjs",
+  ".cjs",
+  ".mts",
+  ".cts",
   ".py",
   ".rb",
   ".go",
   ".java",
+  ".kt",
+  ".scala",
   ".php",
   ".rs",
   ".c",
+  ".cc",
   ".cpp",
   ".h",
+  ".hpp",
+  ".cs",
+  ".swift",
   ".yml",
   ".yaml",
   ".json",
@@ -4357,191 +5448,324 @@ var SCAN_EXTENSIONS = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([
   ".env",
   ".sh",
   ".bash",
+  ".zsh",
   ".tf",
   ".hcl",
   ".xml",
   ".properties",
-  ".gradle"
+  ".gradle",
+  ".txt",
+  ".md",
+  ".sql",
+  ".erb",
+  ".ejs",
+  ".vue",
+  ".svelte"
 ]);
-async function runScan(targetPath) {
-  const findings = [];
-  try {
-    scanDirectory(targetPath, targetPath, findings, () => {
-    });
-    const depFindings = await scanDependencies(targetPath);
-    findings.push(...depFindings);
-  } catch (err) {
-    return {
-      type: "scan",
-      target: targetPath,
-      findings: [],
-      severity_summary: { critical: 0, high: 0, medium: 0, low: 0, info: 0 },
-      summary: `Scan failed: ${err.message}`,
-      error: err.message
-    };
-  }
-  const structured = findings.map((f) => ({
-    type: f.type,
-    severity: f.severity,
-    message: f.message,
-    location: `${f.file}:${f.line}`,
-    details: { file: f.file, line: f.line, snippet: f.snippet }
-  }));
-  const summary = summarize(structured);
-  return {
-    type: "scan",
-    target: targetPath,
-    findings: structured,
-    severity_summary: summary,
-    summary: findings.length === 0 ? "No security issues found" : `${findings.length} issue(s): ${summary.critical}C ${summary.high}H ${summary.medium}M ${summary.low}L`
+var LANGUAGE_BY_EXTENSION = {
+  ".js": "javascript",
+  ".jsx": "javascript",
+  ".mjs": "javascript",
+  ".cjs": "javascript",
+  ".ts": "typescript",
+  ".tsx": "typescript",
+  ".mts": "typescript",
+  ".cts": "typescript",
+  ".vue": "javascript",
+  ".svelte": "javascript",
+  ".ejs": "javascript",
+  ".py": "python",
+  ".rb": "ruby",
+  ".erb": "ruby",
+  ".go": "go",
+  ".java": "java",
+  ".kt": "java",
+  ".scala": "java",
+  ".php": "php",
+  ".sh": "shell",
+  ".bash": "shell",
+  ".zsh": "shell",
+  ".yml": "config",
+  ".yaml": "config",
+  ".json": "config",
+  ".toml": "config",
+  ".ini": "config",
+  ".cfg": "config",
+  ".conf": "config",
+  ".env": "config",
+  ".tf": "config",
+  ".hcl": "config",
+  ".properties": "config"
+};
+function languageOf(filename) {
+  if (filename.startsWith(".env") || filename.endsWith(".env")) return "config";
+  return LANGUAGE_BY_EXTENSION[(0, import_node_path6.extname)(filename).toLowerCase()] ?? "other";
+}
+var SUPPRESS_NEXT = /threatcrush-disable-next-line(?:\s+([\w-]+))?/;
+var SUPPRESS_LINE = /threatcrush-disable-line(?:\s+([\w-]+))?/;
+function collectSuppressions(lines) {
+  const byLine = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+  let count = 0;
+  const add = (index, ruleId) => {
+    const existing = byLine.get(index) ?? /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+    existing.add(ruleId ?? "*");
+    byLine.set(index, existing);
+    count += 1;
   };
+  lines.forEach((line, index) => {
+    const next = SUPPRESS_NEXT.exec(line);
+    if (next) add(index + 1, next[1]);
+    const same = SUPPRESS_LINE.exec(line);
+    if (same && !next) add(index, same[1]);
+  });
+  return { byLine, count };
 }
-function scanDirectory(basePath, currentPath, findings, onFile) {
-  let entries;
-  try {
-    entries = (0, import_node_fs10.readdirSync)(currentPath, { withFileTypes: true });
-  } catch {
-    return;
-  }
-  for (const entry of entries) {
-    const fullPath = (0, import_node_path5.join)(currentPath, entry.name);
-    if (entry.isDirectory()) {
-      if (SKIP_DIRS.has(entry.name)) continue;
-      scanDirectory(basePath, fullPath, findings, onFile);
-      continue;
+function isSuppressed(suppressions, index, ruleId) {
+  const rules = suppressions.byLine.get(index);
+  if (!rules) return false;
+  return rules.has("*") || rules.has(ruleId);
+}
+function isTestPath(relativePath) {
+  const p = relativePath.replace(/\\/g, "/");
+  return /(?:^|\/)(?:tests?|__tests__|__mocks__|spec|specs|fixtures?|mocks?|e2e|testdata)\//i.test(p) || /(?:^|\/)(?:test|conftest)_[^/]+$/i.test(p) || /[._-](?:test|spec)\.[a-z]+$/i.test(p) || /_test\.[a-z]+$/i.test(p);
+}
+function scanText(relativePath, text, language = languageOf(relativePath)) {
+  const findings = [];
+  const lines = text.split("\n");
+  const suppressions = collectSuppressions(lines);
+  const inTests = isTestPath(relativePath);
+  lines.forEach((line, index) => {
+    for (const rule of SECRET_RULES) {
+      const match = rule.pattern.exec(line);
+      if (!match) continue;
+      if (isKnownPlaceholder(match[0])) continue;
+      if (isSuppressed(suppressions, index, rule.id)) continue;
+      findings.push({
+        ruleId: rule.id,
+        title: rule.name,
+        file: relativePath,
+        line: index + 1,
+        // Reported but not blocking in tests — see isTestPath.
+        severity: inTests ? "low" : rule.severity,
+        // A matched credential format is the finding, not a proxy for one.
+        confidence: "evidence",
+        message: inTests ? `Possible ${rule.name} detected in a test file \u2014 usually a fixture, still worth confirming it is not a live credential` : `Possible ${rule.name} detected`,
+        consequence: rule.consequence,
+        cwe: rule.cwe,
+        excerpt: redactSecret(line.trim()).slice(0, 200),
+        sensitive: true,
+        category: "secret"
+      });
     }
-    if (!entry.isFile()) continue;
-    for (const mc of MISCONFIG_FILES) {
-      if (entry.name === mc.pattern || entry.name.endsWith(mc.pattern)) {
-        findings.push({
-          file: (0, import_node_path5.relative)(basePath, fullPath),
-          line: 0,
-          type: "Sensitive File",
-          severity: "high",
-          message: mc.message,
-          snippet: ""
-        });
-      }
+  });
+  const prose = proseLines(lines);
+  lines.forEach((_line, index) => {
+    for (const rule of CODE_RULES) {
+      if (isSuppressed(suppressions, index, rule.id)) continue;
+      const match = evaluateRule(rule, { lines, index, language, prose });
+      if (!match) continue;
+      findings.push({
+        ruleId: rule.id,
+        title: rule.title,
+        file: relativePath,
+        line: index + 1,
+        severity: match.severity,
+        confidence: match.confidence,
+        message: `${rule.title} (${rule.cwe})`,
+        consequence: rule.consequence,
+        cwe: rule.cwe,
+        excerpt: (lines[index] ?? "").trim().slice(0, 200),
+        category: "code"
+      });
     }
-    const ext = (0, import_node_path5.extname)(entry.name).toLowerCase();
-    if (!SCAN_EXTENSIONS.has(ext) && !entry.name.startsWith(".env")) continue;
+  });
+  return findings;
+}
+function scanManifest(relativePath, filename, text) {
+  const manifestFindings = filename === "package.json" ? scanPackageJson(text) : filename === "requirements.txt" ? scanRequirementsTxt(text) : [];
+  return manifestFindings.map((finding) => ({
+    ruleId: finding.ruleId,
+    title: finding.title,
+    file: relativePath,
+    line: finding.line,
+    severity: finding.severity,
+    confidence: "evidence",
+    message: finding.message,
+    consequence: finding.consequence,
+    cwe: finding.cwe,
+    excerpt: finding.excerpt.slice(0, 200),
+    category: "manifest"
+  }));
+}
+function scanPath(targetPath, options = {}) {
+  const maxFileBytes = options.maxFileBytes ?? 1024 * 1024;
+  const allowed = options.categories ? new Set(options.categories) : null;
+  const findings = [];
+  const unreadable = [];
+  let filesScanned = 0;
+  let suppressed = 0;
+  const rootIsDirectory = (() => {
     try {
-      const stat = (0, import_node_fs10.statSync)(fullPath);
-      if (stat.size > 1024 * 1024) continue;
+      return (0, import_node_fs11.statSync)(targetPath).isDirectory();
     } catch {
-      continue;
+      return true;
+    }
+  })();
+  const walkRoot = rootIsDirectory ? targetPath : (0, import_node_path6.dirname)(targetPath);
+  const scanFile = (fullPath, filename) => {
+    const relativePath = toRelative(walkRoot, fullPath);
+    const extension = (0, import_node_path6.extname)(filename).toLowerCase();
+    const isManifest = filename === "package.json" || filename === "requirements.txt";
+    const scannable = SCAN_EXTENSIONS.has(extension) || filename.startsWith(".env");
+    if (!scannable && !isManifest) {
+      recordSensitiveFile(filename, relativePath, findings, []);
+      return;
     }
-    onFile();
-    let content;
+    let text;
+    let handle;
     try {
-      content = (0, import_node_fs10.readFileSync)(fullPath, "utf-8");
+      handle = (0, import_node_fs11.openSync)(fullPath, "r");
     } catch {
-      continue;
+      unreadable.push(relativePath);
+      return;
     }
-    const lines = content.split("\n");
-    for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
-      const line = lines[i];
-      if (line.trim().startsWith("//") && !line.includes("password") && !line.includes("secret")) continue;
-      for (const pattern of SECRET_PATTERNS) {
-        pattern.pattern.lastIndex = 0;
-        if (pattern.pattern.test(line)) {
-          findings.push({
-            file: (0, import_node_path5.relative)(basePath, fullPath),
-            line: i + 1,
-            type: pattern.name,
-            severity: pattern.severity,
-            message: `Possible ${pattern.name} detected`,
-            snippet: line.length > 120 ? line.slice(0, 120) + "..." : line
-          });
-        }
+    try {
+      if ((0, import_node_fs11.fstatSync)(handle).size > maxFileBytes) return;
+      text = (0, import_node_fs11.readFileSync)(handle, "utf-8");
+    } catch {
+      unreadable.push(relativePath);
+      return;
+    } finally {
+      try {
+        (0, import_node_fs11.closeSync)(handle);
+      } catch {
       }
     }
-  }
-}
-async function scanDependencies(targetPath) {
-  const findings = [];
-  const lockfiles = [
-    { file: "package-lock.json", ecosystem: "npm" },
-    { file: "pnpm-lock.yaml", ecosystem: "npm" },
-    { file: "yarn.lock", ecosystem: "npm" },
-    { file: "requirements.txt", ecosystem: "PyPI" },
-    { file: "Pipfile.lock", ecosystem: "PyPI" }
-  ];
-  for (const { file, ecosystem } of lockfiles) {
-    const lockPath = (0, import_node_path5.join)(targetPath, file);
-    if (!(0, import_node_fs10.existsSync)(lockPath)) continue;
+    filesScanned += 1;
+    options.onFile?.(relativePath);
+    suppressed += collectSuppressions(text.split("\n")).count;
+    const fileFindings = [
+      ...scanText(relativePath, text, languageOf(filename)),
+      ...isManifest ? scanManifest(relativePath, filename, text) : []
+    ];
+    findings.push(...fileFindings);
+    recordSensitiveFile(filename, relativePath, findings, fileFindings);
+  };
+  const walk = (currentPath) => {
+    let entries;
     try {
-      const deps = parseDependencies(lockPath, file, ecosystem);
-      for (const dep of deps.slice(0, 50)) {
-        try {
-          const vulns = await queryOsv(dep.name, dep.version, ecosystem);
-          for (const vuln of vulns) {
-            const cvssScore = vuln.severity?.find((s) => s.type === "CVSS_V3")?.score;
-            const severity = cvssScore ? parseFloat(cvssScore) >= 9 ? "critical" : parseFloat(cvssScore) >= 7 ? "high" : parseFloat(cvssScore) >= 4 ? "medium" : "low" : "medium";
-            findings.push({
-              file,
-              line: 0,
-              type: "Dependency CVE",
-              severity,
-              message: `${dep.name}@${dep.version}: ${vuln.summary || vuln.id}`,
-              snippet: `${vuln.id}${cvssScore ? ` (CVSS: ${cvssScore})` : ""}`
-            });
-          }
-        } catch {
-        }
-      }
+      entries = (0, import_node_fs11.readdirSync)(currentPath, { withFileTypes: true });
     } catch {
+      unreadable.push(toRelative(walkRoot, currentPath));
+      return;
     }
-  }
-  return findings;
-}
-function parseDependencies(lockPath, filename, ecosystem) {
-  const deps = [];
-  if (filename === "package-lock.json") {
-    try {
-      const lock = JSON.parse((0, import_node_fs10.readFileSync)(lockPath, "utf-8"));
-      const packages = lock.packages || lock.dependencies || {};
-      for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(packages)) {
-        const name = key.replace(/^node_modules\//, "");
-        const version = value.version;
-        if (name && version && !name.startsWith(".")) {
-          deps.push({ name, version });
-        }
+    for (const entry of entries) {
+      const fullPath = (0, import_node_path6.join)(currentPath, entry.name);
+      if (entry.isDirectory()) {
+        if (SKIP_DIRS.has(entry.name)) continue;
+        walk(fullPath);
+        continue;
       }
-    } catch {
+      if (!entry.isFile()) continue;
+      scanFile(fullPath, entry.name);
     }
-  } else if (filename === "requirements.txt") {
+  };
+  if (rootIsDirectory) {
+    walk(targetPath);
+  } else {
+    scanFile(targetPath, (0, import_node_path6.basename)(targetPath));
+  }
+  const filtered = allowed ? findings.filter((f) => allowed.has(f.category)) : findings;
+  filtered.sort(
+    (a, b) => severityRank(b.severity) - severityRank(a.severity) || a.file.localeCompare(b.file) || a.line - b.line
+  );
+  return { findings: filtered, filesScanned, unreadable, suppressed, root: walkRoot };
+}
+function recordSensitiveFile(filename, relativePath, sink, fileFindings) {
+  if (fileFindings.length > 0) return;
+  for (const sensitive of SENSITIVE_FILES) {
+    const matches = filename === sensitive.pattern || filename.endsWith(sensitive.pattern);
+    if (!matches) continue;
+    sink.push({
+      ruleId: "sensitive-file-committed",
+      title: "Sensitive file",
+      file: relativePath,
+      line: 1,
+      severity: sensitive.severity,
+      confidence: "evidence",
+      message: sensitive.message,
+      consequence: "Anything in this file is in every clone, fork and CI cache of the repository.",
+      cwe: "CWE-538",
+      excerpt: "",
+      sensitive: true,
+      category: "file"
+    });
+    return;
+  }
+}
+function toRelative(base, target) {
+  const rel = (0, import_node_path6.relative)(base, target);
+  return (rel === "" ? target : rel).split(import_node_path6.sep).join("/");
+}
+
+// src/scan/sarif.ts
+var import_node_path7 = require("path");
+
+// src/commands/scan.ts
+function readVersion() {
+  for (const candidate of [
+    (0, import_node_path8.join)(__dirname, "..", "package.json"),
+    (0, import_node_path8.join)(__dirname, "..", "..", "package.json")
+  ]) {
     try {
-      const content = (0, import_node_fs10.readFileSync)(lockPath, "utf-8");
-      for (const line of content.split("\n")) {
-        const match = line.match(/^([a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+)==([0-9.]+)/);
-        if (match) deps.push({ name: match[1], version: match[2] });
-      }
+      return JSON.parse((0, import_node_fs12.readFileSync)(candidate, "utf-8")).version ?? "0.0.0";
     } catch {
     }
   }
-  return deps;
+  return "0.0.0";
 }
-function isValidPackageName(name) {
-  return /^[@a-zA-Z0-9_.\-/]{1,214}$/.test(name);
+var PKG_VERSION = readVersion();
+function toRunResult(targetPath, findings, filesScanned) {
+  const structured = findings.map((finding) => ({
+    type: finding.title,
+    severity: finding.severity,
+    message: finding.message,
+    location: `${finding.file}:${finding.line}`,
+    details: {
+      file: finding.file,
+      line: finding.line,
+      snippet: finding.excerpt,
+      ruleId: finding.ruleId,
+      confidence: finding.confidence,
+      ...finding.cwe ? { cwe: finding.cwe } : {}
+    }
+  }));
+  const counts = summarize(structured);
+  return {
+    type: "scan",
+    target: targetPath,
+    findings: structured,
+    severity_summary: counts,
+    summary: findings.length === 0 ? `No issues found across ${filesScanned} files` : `${findings.length} issue(s): ${counts.critical}C ${counts.high}H ${counts.medium}M ${counts.low}L`
+  };
 }
-function isValidVersion(version) {
-  return /^[0-9a-zA-Z._\-+]{1,50}$/.test(version);
+function failedResult(targetPath, message) {
+  return {
+    type: "scan",
+    target: targetPath,
+    findings: [],
+    severity_summary: { critical: 0, high: 0, medium: 0, low: 0, info: 0 },
+    summary: `Scan failed: ${message}`,
+    error: message
+  };
 }
-async function queryOsv(name, version, ecosystem) {
-  if (!isValidPackageName(name) || !isValidVersion(version)) return [];
+async function runScan(targetPath) {
   try {
-    const res = await fetch("https://api.osv.dev/v1/query", {
-      method: "POST",
-      headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
-      body: JSON.stringify({ package: { name, ecosystem }, version }),
-      signal: AbortSignal.timeout(5e3)
-    });
-    if (!res.ok) return [];
-    const data = await res.json();
-    return data.vulns || [];
-  } catch {
-    return [];
+    const report = scanPath(targetPath);
+    const findings = [...report.findings, ...await scanDependencies(targetPath)];
+    return toRunResult(targetPath, findings, report.filesScanned);
+  } catch (err) {
+    return failedResult(targetPath, err.message);
   }
 }
 
@@ -4955,8 +6179,8 @@ var RuleEngine = class {
 };
 
 // src/daemon/rules/loader.ts
-var import_node_fs11 = require("fs");
-var import_node_path6 = require("path");
+var import_node_fs13 = require("fs");
+var import_node_path9 = require("path");
 
 // src/daemon/rules/default-rules.ts
 var DEFAULT_RULES = [
@@ -5240,11 +6464,11 @@ var RULES_DIR = "/etc/threatcrush/rules.d";
 function loadAllRules(customDir) {
   const rules = [...DEFAULT_RULES];
   const dir = customDir || RULES_DIR;
-  if ((0, import_node_fs11.existsSync)(dir)) {
-    const files = (0, import_node_fs11.readdirSync)(dir).filter((f) => f.endsWith(".json"));
+  if ((0, import_node_fs13.existsSync)(dir)) {
+    const files = (0, import_node_fs13.readdirSync)(dir).filter((f) => f.endsWith(".json"));
     for (const file of files) {
       try {
-        const raw = (0, import_node_fs11.readFileSync)((0, import_node_path6.join)(dir, file), "utf-8");
+        const raw = (0, import_node_fs13.readFileSync)((0, import_node_path9.join)(dir, file), "utf-8");
         const parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
         const customRules = Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : [parsed];
         for (const rule of customRules) {
@@ -5269,6 +6493,12 @@ function loadAllRules(customDir) {
 
 // src/daemon/firewall/adapters.ts
 var import_node_child_process3 = require("child_process");
+var import_node_net2 = require("net");
+function assertValidFirewallIp(ip) {
+  if ((0, import_node_net2.isIP)(ip) !== 4) {
+    throw new Error(`Invalid IPv4 address: ${ip}`);
+  }
+}
 var NftablesAdapter = class {
   name = "nftables";
   table = "threatcrush";
@@ -5288,16 +6518,19 @@ var NftablesAdapter = class {
     }
   }
   async block(ip) {
+    assertValidFirewallIp(ip);
     this.ensureSetup();
     (0, import_node_child_process3.execSync)(`nft add element inet ${this.table} ${this.set} '{ ${ip} }'`);
   }
   async unblock(ip) {
+    assertValidFirewallIp(ip);
     try {
       (0, import_node_child_process3.execSync)(`nft delete element inet ${this.table} ${this.set} '{ ${ip} }'`);
     } catch {
     }
   }
   async isBlocked(ip) {
+    assertValidFirewallIp(ip);
     try {
       const output = (0, import_node_child_process3.execSync)(`nft list set inet ${this.table} ${this.set}`, { encoding: "utf-8" });
       return output.includes(ip);
@@ -5332,17 +6565,20 @@ var IptablesAdapter = class {
     }
   }
   async block(ip) {
+    assertValidFirewallIp(ip);
     this.ensureChain();
     if (await this.isBlocked(ip)) return;
     (0, import_node_child_process3.execSync)(`iptables -A ${this.chain} -s ${ip} -j DROP`);
   }
   async unblock(ip) {
+    assertValidFirewallIp(ip);
     try {
       (0, import_node_child_process3.execSync)(`iptables -D ${this.chain} -s ${ip} -j DROP`);
     } catch {
     }
   }
   async isBlocked(ip) {
+    assertValidFirewallIp(ip);
     try {
       const output = (0, import_node_child_process3.execSync)(`iptables -n -L ${this.chain}`, { encoding: "utf-8" });
       return output.includes(ip);
@@ -5371,12 +6607,15 @@ var DryRunAdapter = class {
     return true;
   }
   async block(ip) {
+    assertValidFirewallIp(ip);
     this.blocked.add(ip);
   }
   async unblock(ip) {
+    assertValidFirewallIp(ip);
     this.blocked.delete(ip);
   }
   async isBlocked(ip) {
+    assertValidFirewallIp(ip);
     return this.blocked.has(ip);
   }
   async listBlocked() {
@@ -5392,7 +6631,7 @@ function detectFirewallAdapter() {
 }
 
 // src/daemon/firewall/remediation.ts
-var import_node_fs12 = require("fs");
+var import_node_fs14 = require("fs");
 var DEFAULT_CONFIG2 = {
   enabled: true,
   dry_run: true,
@@ -5547,7 +6786,7 @@ var RemediationManager = class {
   }
   logLine(line) {
     try {
-      (0, import_node_fs12.appendFileSync)(PATHS.logFile, `${(/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString()} ${line}
+      (0, import_node_fs14.appendFileSync)(PATHS.logFile, `${(/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString()} ${line}
 `);
     } catch {
     }
@@ -5601,9 +6840,9 @@ async function flushTelemetry(timeoutMs = 2e3) {
 }
 
 // src/daemon/index.ts
-function readVersion() {
+function readVersion2() {
   try {
-    const pkg = JSON.parse((0, import_node_fs13.readFileSync)((0, import_node_path7.join)(__dirname, "..", "package.json"), "utf-8"));
+    const pkg = JSON.parse((0, import_node_fs15.readFileSync)((0, import_node_path10.join)(__dirname, "..", "package.json"), "utf-8"));
     return pkg.version || "0.0.0";
   } catch {
     return "0.0.0";
@@ -5611,7 +6850,7 @@ function readVersion() {
 }
 function logLine(line) {
   try {
-    (0, import_node_fs13.appendFileSync)(PATHS.logFile, `${(/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString()} ${line}
+    (0, import_node_fs15.appendFileSync)(PATHS.logFile, `${(/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString()} ${line}
 `);
   } catch {
   }
@@ -5632,14 +6871,14 @@ async function runDaemon() {
     logLine(`[daemon] unhandledRejection: ${String(reason)}`);
     captureException(reason);
   });
-  const version = readVersion();
+  const version = readVersion2();
   logLine(`[daemon] starting threatcrushd v${version} mode=${PATHS.mode}`);
   try {
     initStateDB(PATHS.stateDb);
   } catch (err) {
     logLine(`[daemon] state db unavailable: ${err.message}`);
   }
-  const config = loadConfig((0, import_node_fs13.existsSync)(PATHS.configFile) ? PATHS.configFile : void 0);
+  const config = loadConfig((0, import_node_fs15.existsSync)(PATHS.configFile) ? PATHS.configFile : void 0);
   bus.on("event", (event) => {
     logLine(`[event] ${event.severity} ${event.module} ${event.message}`);
   });