@produtype/core 0.88.0 → 0.89.0

package/dist/analyzer/detectAuth.js

@@ -74,6 +74,22 @@ async function detectAuth(ctx) {
         'passport',
     ]);
     const managedAuthPyDeps = (0, detectContext_1.hasAnyPyDep)(ctx, ['django-allauth', 'authlib', 'python-jose', 'fastapi-users', 'flask-login']);
+    /** Identity handed to somebody else, in every ecosystem this analyzer reads. */
+    const externalIdentityProviders = [
+        ...managedAuthDeps,
+        ...(0, detectContext_1.hasAnyPyDep)(ctx, ['django-allauth', 'authlib', 'social-auth-app-django']),
+        ...(0, detectContext_1.hasAnyRustDep)(ctx, ['oauth2', 'openidconnect']),
+        ...(0, detectContext_1.hasAnyGradleDep)(ctx, ['spring-boot-starter-oauth2-client', 'com.okta.spring']),
+        ...(0, detectContext_1.hasAnyDotnetDep)(ctx, ['Microsoft.AspNetCore.Authentication.OpenIdConnect', 'Microsoft.Identity.Web']),
+    ];
+    /** And a password of its own, which is what makes a reset flow something to have. */
+    const storesAPasswordItself = [
+        ...(0, detectContext_1.hasAnyDep)(ctx, ['bcrypt', 'bcryptjs', 'argon2', 'scrypt-kdf', 'passport-local']),
+        ...(0, detectContext_1.hasAnyPyDep)(ctx, ['django', 'passlib', 'bcrypt', 'argon2-cffi', 'werkzeug']),
+        ...(0, detectContext_1.hasAnyRustDep)(ctx, ['argon2', 'rust-argon2', 'bcrypt', 'scrypt', 'password-hash', 'pbkdf2']),
+        ...(0, detectContext_1.hasAnyGradleDep)(ctx, ['spring-security-crypto', 'org.mindrot:jbcrypt']),
+        ...(0, detectContext_1.hasAnyDotnetDep)(ctx, ['Microsoft.AspNetCore.Identity']),
+    ];
     /**
      * The packages that do the authenticating, as distinct from the words people use
      * around them.
@@ -399,12 +415,25 @@ async function detectAuth(ctx) {
             // makes password reset not applicable rather than missing — there is no
             // password to reset.
             key: 'auth.externalIdentityOnly',
-            present: managedAuthDeps.length > 0 &&
-                (0, detectContext_1.hasAnyDep)(ctx, ['bcrypt', 'bcryptjs', 'argon2', 'scrypt-kdf', 'passport-local']).length === 0 &&
+            /**
+             * Read from npm alone, so only a JavaScript project could ever reach it.
+             *
+             * crates.io authenticates through GitHub and nothing else: `oauth2` in its
+             * Cargo.toml, no password-hashing crate anywhere, no reset route. It was told
+             * at `high` to build a password reset flow for passwords it does not have.
+             *
+             * The disqualifying half matters more than the qualifying one, so it is the
+             * wider of the two: anything that hashes a password, in any of these
+             * ecosystems, means there is a password to reset. Django is on that list as
+             * itself — `django-allauth` sits on top of Django's own user model, and those
+             * projects can almost always reset a password.
+             */
+            present: externalIdentityProviders.length > 0 &&
+                storesAPasswordItself.length === 0 &&
                 passwordResetSignals.length === 0 &&
                 passwordResetFiles.length === 0,
-            evidence: depEvidence(managedAuthDeps),
-            details: { managedProviders: managedAuthDeps.length },
+            evidence: depEvidence(externalIdentityProviders),
+            details: { managedProviders: externalIdentityProviders.length },
         },
         {
             key: 'auth.2fa',

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@produtype/core",
-  "version": "0.88.0",
+  "version": "0.89.0",
   "description": "Deterministic CLI and library that analyzes a web application repository and reports how far it is from production-ready for the kind of product it is meant to be.",
   "license": "MIT",
   "bin": {