@produtype/core 0.8.0 → 0.8.1

package/dist/analyzer/detectUploads.js

@@ -44,7 +44,38 @@ async function detectUploads(ctx) {
         routeSignals.push(...findExpressUploadsRoutes(text, file));
     }
     const source = ctx.files.source;
-    const djangoPublicSignals = await (0, textSearch_1.searchInFiles)(ctx.root, source, [/MEDIA_ROOT/i, /MEDIA_URL/i], 15);
+    /**
+     * Django media served to the public, which is a route and not a setting.
+     *
+     * This matched `MEDIA_URL` and `MEDIA_ROOT` — two lines in settings.py that say where
+     * uploaded files live on disk and under which prefix they *would* be served. Neither
+     * serves anything. Django exposes them only when a URL pattern says so, and the
+     * idiomatic one is wrapped in `if settings.DEBUG`.
+     *
+     * A real report on a real school platform called its uploads publicly exposed on the
+     * strength of those two lines, with no pattern serving media anywhere in the project.
+     */
+    const djangoPublicSignals = await (0, textSearch_1.searchInFiles)(ctx.root, source, [
+        /static\s*\(\s*settings\.MEDIA_URL/i,
+        /document_root\s*=/i,
+        /re_path\s*\(\s*r?['"][^'"]*media/i,
+        /url\s*\(\s*r?['"][^'"]*media/i,
+    ], 15);
+    /**
+     * Django's own way of protecting a view: a decorator or a mixin, not middleware on a
+     * route. The Express-shaped route scan cannot see either, so a project whose upload
+     * view is `@login_required` read as having no protection at all.
+     */
+    const djangoProtectionSignals = await (0, textSearch_1.searchInFiles)(ctx.root, source, [
+        /@login_required/,
+        /LoginRequiredMixin/,
+        /PermissionRequiredMixin/,
+        /@user_passes_test/,
+        /@permission_required/,
+    ], 15);
+    for (const m of djangoProtectionSignals) {
+        evidence.push({ type: 'snippet', value: m.snippet, file: m.file, line: m.line });
+    }
     const validationSignals = await (0, textSearch_1.searchInFiles)(ctx.root, source, [/file-type/i, /mime/i, /content-type/i], 15);
     const protectedRoutes = routeSignals.filter((r) => r.protected);
     const unprotectedRoutes = routeSignals.filter((r) => !r.protected);
@@ -56,6 +87,7 @@ async function detectUploads(ctx) {
     for (const m of validationSignals)
         evidence.push({ type: 'snippet', value: m.snippet, file: m.file, line: m.line });
     const publicExposure = unprotectedRoutes.length > 0 || djangoPublicSignals.length > 0;
+    const protectedSomehow = protectedRoutes.length > 0 || djangoProtectionSignals.length > 0;
     return {
         key: 'uploads.exposure',
         present: uploadDeps.length > 0 || routeSignals.length > 0 || djangoPublicSignals.length > 0,
@@ -63,7 +95,7 @@ async function detectUploads(ctx) {
         evidence,
         details: {
             publicExposure,
-            protectedUploads: protectedRoutes.length > 0,
+            protectedUploads: protectedSomehow,
             protectedUploadsSameRoute: protectedRoutes.length > 0,
             unprotectedUploadRoutes: unprotectedRoutes.length,
             validation: validationSignals.length > 0,

package/dist/expectations/evaluateExpectations.js

@@ -96,7 +96,20 @@ function deriveStatus(analysis, capability) {
                 return 'present';
             if (loose)
                 return 'partial';
-            return 'missing';
+            /**
+             * A cross-origin policy is only a question for something that answers
+             * cross-origin requests.
+             *
+             * A server-rendered monolith with no API, no CORS library installed and no
+             * cross-origin handling anywhere is not missing a policy — the browser's own
+             * default already refuses those requests, and the absence *is* the safe
+             * configuration. Reporting it as a critical gap rewards adding middleware that
+             * can only loosen what is currently closed.
+             *
+             * An independent review of a report on a Django school platform put it as
+             * "not applicable, and inverted". It was right.
+             */
+            return servesCrossOrigin(analysis) ? 'missing' : 'not_applicable';
         }
         case 'security.rate-limit': {
             return boolDetail(sec, 'rateLimit') ? 'present' : 'missing';
@@ -275,6 +288,22 @@ function evidenceFor(analysis, capability) {
         .map((key) => detector(analysis, key))
         .filter(Boolean);
 }
+/**
+ * Whether anything here could receive a cross-origin request.
+ *
+ * An API surface, a framework built to serve one, or a CORS library someone installed
+ * on purpose. None of the three means the question does not arise.
+ */
+function servesCrossOrigin(analysis) {
+    // Somebody wrote cross-origin handling, however badly: the question plainly arises.
+    const sec = detector(analysis, 'security.core');
+    if (sec?.evidence.some((item) => /cors/i.test(String(item.value))))
+        return true;
+    // An API meant for other callers.
+    if (detector(analysis, 'auth.apiKeys')?.present)
+        return true;
+    return analysis.files.source.some((file) => /(^|\/)(api|routes?|controllers?|serializers?|graphql)(\/|\.)/i.test(file));
+}
 function evidenceQualityFor(detectors) {
     if (detectors.some((detectorResult) => detectorResult.evidence.some((item) => item.type === 'file' && typeof item.line === 'number'))) {
         return 'strong';

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@produtype/core",
-  "version": "0.8.0",
+  "version": "0.8.1",
   "description": "Deterministic CLI and library that analyzes a web application repository and reports how far it is from production-ready for the kind of product it is meant to be.",
   "license": "MIT",
   "bin": {