@produtype/core 0.7.1 → 0.8.1

package/dist/analyzer/detectUploads.js

@@ -44,7 +44,38 @@ async function detectUploads(ctx) {
         routeSignals.push(...findExpressUploadsRoutes(text, file));
     }
     const source = ctx.files.source;
-    const djangoPublicSignals = await (0, textSearch_1.searchInFiles)(ctx.root, source, [/MEDIA_ROOT/i, /MEDIA_URL/i], 15);
+    /**
+     * Django media served to the public, which is a route and not a setting.
+     *
+     * This matched `MEDIA_URL` and `MEDIA_ROOT` — two lines in settings.py that say where
+     * uploaded files live on disk and under which prefix they *would* be served. Neither
+     * serves anything. Django exposes them only when a URL pattern says so, and the
+     * idiomatic one is wrapped in `if settings.DEBUG`.
+     *
+     * A real report on a real school platform called its uploads publicly exposed on the
+     * strength of those two lines, with no pattern serving media anywhere in the project.
+     */
+    const djangoPublicSignals = await (0, textSearch_1.searchInFiles)(ctx.root, source, [
+        /static\s*\(\s*settings\.MEDIA_URL/i,
+        /document_root\s*=/i,
+        /re_path\s*\(\s*r?['"][^'"]*media/i,
+        /url\s*\(\s*r?['"][^'"]*media/i,
+    ], 15);
+    /**
+     * Django's own way of protecting a view: a decorator or a mixin, not middleware on a
+     * route. The Express-shaped route scan cannot see either, so a project whose upload
+     * view is `@login_required` read as having no protection at all.
+     */
+    const djangoProtectionSignals = await (0, textSearch_1.searchInFiles)(ctx.root, source, [
+        /@login_required/,
+        /LoginRequiredMixin/,
+        /PermissionRequiredMixin/,
+        /@user_passes_test/,
+        /@permission_required/,
+    ], 15);
+    for (const m of djangoProtectionSignals) {
+        evidence.push({ type: 'snippet', value: m.snippet, file: m.file, line: m.line });
+    }
     const validationSignals = await (0, textSearch_1.searchInFiles)(ctx.root, source, [/file-type/i, /mime/i, /content-type/i], 15);
     const protectedRoutes = routeSignals.filter((r) => r.protected);
     const unprotectedRoutes = routeSignals.filter((r) => !r.protected);
@@ -56,6 +87,7 @@ async function detectUploads(ctx) {
     for (const m of validationSignals)
         evidence.push({ type: 'snippet', value: m.snippet, file: m.file, line: m.line });
     const publicExposure = unprotectedRoutes.length > 0 || djangoPublicSignals.length > 0;
+    const protectedSomehow = protectedRoutes.length > 0 || djangoProtectionSignals.length > 0;
     return {
         key: 'uploads.exposure',
         present: uploadDeps.length > 0 || routeSignals.length > 0 || djangoPublicSignals.length > 0,
@@ -63,7 +95,7 @@ async function detectUploads(ctx) {
         evidence,
         details: {
             publicExposure,
-            protectedUploads: protectedRoutes.length > 0,
+            protectedUploads: protectedSomehow,
             protectedUploadsSameRoute: protectedRoutes.length > 0,
             unprotectedUploadRoutes: unprotectedRoutes.length,
             validation: validationSignals.length > 0,

package/dist/expectations/evaluateExpectations.js

@@ -96,7 +96,20 @@ function deriveStatus(analysis, capability) {
                 return 'present';
             if (loose)
                 return 'partial';
-            return 'missing';
+            /**
+             * A cross-origin policy is only a question for something that answers
+             * cross-origin requests.
+             *
+             * A server-rendered monolith with no API, no CORS library installed and no
+             * cross-origin handling anywhere is not missing a policy — the browser's own
+             * default already refuses those requests, and the absence *is* the safe
+             * configuration. Reporting it as a critical gap rewards adding middleware that
+             * can only loosen what is currently closed.
+             *
+             * An independent review of a report on a Django school platform put it as
+             * "not applicable, and inverted". It was right.
+             */
+            return servesCrossOrigin(analysis) ? 'missing' : 'not_applicable';
         }
         case 'security.rate-limit': {
             return boolDetail(sec, 'rateLimit') ? 'present' : 'missing';
@@ -275,6 +288,22 @@ function evidenceFor(analysis, capability) {
         .map((key) => detector(analysis, key))
         .filter(Boolean);
 }
+/**
+ * Whether anything here could receive a cross-origin request.
+ *
+ * An API surface, a framework built to serve one, or a CORS library someone installed
+ * on purpose. None of the three means the question does not arise.
+ */
+function servesCrossOrigin(analysis) {
+    // Somebody wrote cross-origin handling, however badly: the question plainly arises.
+    const sec = detector(analysis, 'security.core');
+    if (sec?.evidence.some((item) => /cors/i.test(String(item.value))))
+        return true;
+    // An API meant for other callers.
+    if (detector(analysis, 'auth.apiKeys')?.present)
+        return true;
+    return analysis.files.source.some((file) => /(^|\/)(api|routes?|controllers?|serializers?|graphql)(\/|\.)/i.test(file));
+}
 function evidenceQualityFor(detectors) {
     if (detectors.some((detectorResult) => detectorResult.evidence.some((item) => item.type === 'file' && typeof item.line === 'number'))) {
         return 'strong';
@@ -287,19 +316,51 @@ function evidenceQualityFor(detectors) {
     }
     return 'weak';
 }
-function confidenceFor(status, profileMode, evidenceQuality) {
-    if (profileMode !== 'observed-only' && profileMode !== 'auto' && status !== 'unknown') {
-        return 'high';
-    }
-    if (profileMode === 'auto') {
-        return evidenceQuality === 'strong' ? 'medium' : 'low';
-    }
+/**
+ * How sure the analyzer is about *this* finding.
+ *
+ * It used to fold in how the profile was chosen: on `auto` — which is what the hosted
+ * product uses by default — every finding came out low or medium however strong its
+ * evidence. Two different uncertainties were being multiplied into one number, and the
+ * profile's own uncertainty is already reported separately as `inferenceConfidence`.
+ *
+ * An independent review of a real report put it plainly: eleven findings of
+ * thirty-two carried "no direct evidence captured" at low confidence and weak
+ * evidence, and still arrived as critical or high.
+ */
+function confidenceFor(status, evidenceQuality) {
+    // Nothing was determined, so there is nothing to be confident about.
+    if (status === 'unknown')
+        return 'low';
     if (evidenceQuality === 'strong')
         return 'high';
     if (evidenceQuality === 'medium')
         return 'medium';
     return 'low';
 }
+/**
+ * Severity says how bad it would be if true. Confidence says whether it is.
+ *
+ * A reader treats `critical` as "stop and fix this", and spending that word on a claim
+ * the analyzer itself is unsure of is how a tool becomes a checklist nobody trusts.
+ * The claim stays, at the weight the evidence supports.
+ */
+function severityForConfidence(severity, confidence) {
+    if (confidence !== 'low')
+        return severity;
+    /**
+     * `critical` only. Not a ceiling at `medium`, which was the first attempt and was
+     * wrong for a reason worth writing down: a missing capability cannot carry direct
+     * evidence — there is no line to point at for something that is not there — so every
+     * absence reads as low confidence, and capping them all at `medium` would leave the
+     * report unable to say anything is serious.
+     *
+     * What it can stop doing is shouting. `critical` is read as "stop and fix this
+     * before anything else", and the analyzer should not spend that word on a claim it
+     * could not evidence.
+     */
+    return severity === 'critical' ? 'high' : severity;
+}
 /**
  * Which capabilities each declaration makes required.
  *
@@ -390,10 +451,11 @@ function evaluateExpectedCapabilities(args) {
             effectiveImportance = 'not_applicable';
         }
         const findingId = toFindingId(cap, effectiveImportance);
-        const severity = severityFor(cap, status, effectiveImportance);
+        const claimedSeverity = severityFor(cap, status, effectiveImportance);
         const detectorEvidence = evidenceFor(args.analysis, cap).flatMap((d) => d.evidence);
         const quality = evidenceQualityFor(evidenceFor(args.analysis, cap));
-        const confidence = confidenceFor(status, args.requestedProfile, quality);
+        const confidence = confidenceFor(status, quality);
+        const severity = severityForConfidence(claimedSeverity, confidence);
         const evaluation = {
             capabilityId: cap.id,
             title: cap.title,

package/dist/report/categoryScores.js

@@ -52,7 +52,16 @@ function buildCategoryScores(findings) {
             findingCount: actionable.length,
             criticalCount: actionable.filter((finding) => finding.severity === 'critical').length,
             highCount: actionable.filter((finding) => finding.severity === 'high').length,
-            notAssessed: categoryFindings.length === 0,
+            /**
+             * "I don't know" is not an assessment.
+             *
+             * This was `categoryFindings.length === 0`, so a single `info` finding with
+             * status `unknown` — the analyzer recording that it could not tell — made the
+             * category count as assessed, with zero actionable findings and a score of 100.
+             * A Django school platform with no payments anywhere was reported as having
+             * "no issues found in taking payments", as a strength.
+             */
+            notAssessed: categoryFindings.every((finding) => finding.status === 'unknown'),
         };
     });
 }

package/dist/report/executiveSummary.js

@@ -83,8 +83,19 @@ function buildVerdict(args) {
 }
 function buildStrengths(categoryScores, findings) {
     const passed = findings.filter((finding) => finding.status === 'passed');
+    /**
+     * A strength is something verified, not something absent.
+     *
+     * Filtering on "assessed, scoring well, nothing open" let a category qualify on the
+     * strength of having nothing to say about it. Requiring a passed check means the
+     * report only calls something a strength when it watched it work.
+     */
+    const passedCategories = new Set(passed.map((finding) => finding.category));
     const strongCategories = categoryScores
-        .filter((entry) => !entry.notAssessed && entry.score >= 80 && entry.findingCount === 0)
+        .filter((entry) => !entry.notAssessed
+        && entry.score >= 80
+        && entry.findingCount === 0
+        && passedCategories.has(entry.category))
         .map((entry) => CATEGORY_LABEL[entry.category]);
     const strengths = strongCategories.slice(0, 3).map((label) => `no issues found in ${label}`);
     if (strengths.length === 0 && passed.length > 0) {

package/dist/rules/rules.js

@@ -46,6 +46,23 @@ function evidenceQualityFor(evidence) {
     }
     return 'weak';
 }
+/** Severity is capped by how sure the analyzer is. See the note where it is used. */
+function severityForConfidence(severity, confidence) {
+    if (confidence !== 'low')
+        return severity;
+    /**
+     * `critical` only. Not a ceiling at `medium`, which was the first attempt and was
+     * wrong for a reason worth writing down: a missing capability cannot carry direct
+     * evidence — there is no line to point at for something that is not there — so every
+     * absence reads as low confidence, and capping them all at `medium` would leave the
+     * report unable to say anything is serious.
+     *
+     * What it can stop doing is shouting. `critical` is read as "stop and fix this
+     * before anything else", and the analyzer should not spend that word on a claim it
+     * could not evidence.
+     */
+    return severity === 'critical' ? 'high' : severity;
+}
 function confidenceFor(status, evidenceQuality) {
     if (status === 'passed' && evidenceQuality === 'strong') {
         return 'high';
@@ -60,16 +77,24 @@ function confidenceFor(status, evidenceQuality) {
 }
 function mkFinding(args) {
     const evidenceQuality = evidenceQualityFor(args.evidence);
+    const confidence = confidenceFor(args.status, evidenceQuality);
     return {
         id: args.id,
         title: args.title,
         category: args.category,
         status: args.status,
-        severity: args.severity,
+        /**
+         * The same rule the expectations follow: severity says how bad it would be if true,
+         * confidence says whether it is, and a reader treats `critical` as "stop and fix
+         * this". Spending that word on something the analyzer is unsure of is how a report
+         * stops being believed — and it was doing it on both sides of the report, not only
+         * in the expectation half.
+         */
+        severity: severityForConfidence(args.severity, confidence),
         description: args.description,
         recommendation: args.recommendation,
         evidence: detectorEvidence(args.evidence),
-        confidence: confidenceFor(args.status, evidenceQuality),
+        confidence,
         evidenceQuality,
     };
 }

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@produtype/core",
-  "version": "0.7.1",
+  "version": "0.8.1",
   "description": "Deterministic CLI and library that analyzes a web application repository and reports how far it is from production-ready for the kind of product it is meant to be.",
   "license": "MIT",
   "bin": {