@privacyscrubber/sdk 2.4.4 → 2.4.5

package/cli.js

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ for (const a of rawArgs) {
   }
 }
 
-let sdkVersion = '2.4.4';
+let sdkVersion = '2.4.5';
 try {
   const pkg = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, 'package.json'), 'utf8'));
   sdkVersion = pkg.version || sdkVersion;

package/examples/python-bridge/bridge_daemon.cjs

@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ rl.on('line', (line) => {
                 sendResponse(id, {
                     pong: true,
                     engine: 'PrivacyScrubber ZTDS',
-                    version: '2.4.4',
+                    version: '2.4.5',
                     uptime: process.uptime()
                 });
                 break;

package/examples/python-bridge/fastapi_example.py

@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ if FASTAPI_AVAILABLE:
     app = FastAPI(
         title="PrivacyScrubber ZTDS Sidecar Proxy",
         description="Zero-Trust Data Sanitization & In-Memory PII Shield for LLM Pipelines",
-        version="2.4.4"
+        version="2.4.5"
     )
 
     @app.on_event("startup")

package/examples/python-bridge/privacyscrubber/__init__.py

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ from privacyscrubber.exceptions import (
     PrivacyScrubberLicenseError,
 )
 
-__version__ = "2.4.4"
+__version__ = "2.4.5"
 __author__ = "Ilya Sibiryakov (BrandMeWeb)"
 __license__ = "Proprietary"
 

package/examples/python-bridge/privacyscrubber/bridge_daemon.cjs

@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ rl.on('line', (line) => {
                 sendResponse(id, {
                     pong: true,
                     engine: 'PrivacyScrubber ZTDS',
-                    version: '2.4.4',
+                    version: '2.4.5',
                     uptime: process.uptime()
                 });
                 break;

package/examples/python-bridge/privacyscrubber/cli.py

@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ def main() -> None:
     args = parser.parse_args()
 
     if args.version:
-        print("PrivacyScrubber ZTDS Python SDK v2.4.4")
+        print("PrivacyScrubber ZTDS Python SDK v2.4.5")
         sys.exit(0)
 
     if not args.command:

package/examples/python-bridge/pyproject.toml

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ build-backend = "setuptools.build_meta"
 
 [project]
 name = "privacyscrubber"
-version = "2.4.4"
+version = "2.4.5"
 description = "Zero-Trust Data Sanitization & In-Memory PII Shield for Python AI Pipelines (ZTDS RFC v1.0)"
 readme = "README.md"
 requires-python = ">=3.8"

package/examples/python-bridge/setup.py

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ with open(os.path.join(here, "README.md"), encoding="utf-8") as f:
 
 setup(
     name="privacyscrubber",
-    version="2.4.4",
+    version="2.4.5",
     description="Zero-Trust Data Sanitization & In-Memory PII Shield for Python AI Pipelines (ZTDS RFC v1.0)",
     long_description=long_description,
     long_description_content_type="text/markdown",

package/examples/python-bridge/test_python_bridge.py

@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ class TestPrivacyScrubberBridge(unittest.TestCase):
             cwd=bridge_dir,
             env=sub_env
         )
-        self.assertIn("2.4.4", ver_out)
+        self.assertIn("2.4.5", ver_out)
 
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":

package/index.cjs

@@ -540,8 +540,17 @@ function sanitize(text, options = {}) {
         wasTruncated = true;
     }
 
+    // Filter user-supplied custom rules against catastrophic backtracking (PS-VDP-2026-10-002 parity)
+    const nestedQuantifierRegex = /\([^)]*(\+|\*|\{\d+,?\d*\})\)[+*]|\([^)]*(\+|\*|\{\d+,?\d*\})\)\{\d+,?\d*\}|\([^)]*\|[^)]*\)(?:[+*]|\{\d+,?\d*\})/;
+    const safeCustomRules = (Array.isArray(customRules) ? customRules : []).filter(r => {
+        const pat = typeof r === 'string' ? r : (r && (r.pattern || (r.regex && r.regex.source)));
+        if (!pat || typeof pat !== 'string' || pat.length > 500) return false;
+        if (nestedQuantifierRegex.test(pat)) return false;
+        return true;
+    });
+
     // Auto-inject DevOps Secrets rules when in Dev profile or when detectSecrets is requested
-    const activeRules = [...customRules];
+    const activeRules = [...safeCustomRules];
     if (profile.toLowerCase() === 'dev' || detectSecrets === true) {
         DEVOPS_SECRETS_DETECTOR.forEach(rule => {
             activeRules.push({
@@ -1952,7 +1961,7 @@ function formatCefEvent(eventData = {}) {
     const {
         vendor = 'PrivacyScrubber',
         product = 'ZTDS',
-        version = '2.4.4',
+        version = '2.4.5',
         eventClassId = 'PII_REDACTION',
         eventName = 'Zero-Trust PII Sanitization Executed',
         riskLevel = 'LOW EXPOSURE',
@@ -2021,7 +2030,7 @@ function formatSyslogEvent(eventData = {}) {
 function formatJsonlEvent(eventData = {}) {
     const {
         timestamp = new Date().toISOString(),
-        version = '2.4.4',
+        version = '2.4.5',
         protocol = 'ZTDS',
         event = 'sanitization',
         riskLevel = 'LOW EXPOSURE',
@@ -2465,6 +2474,32 @@ function createGuardedTools(engineOrOptions = {}, toolConfig = {}) {
 
     const baseCwd = toolConfig.cwd || process.cwd();
     const defaultProfile = toolConfig.profile || engine.defaultProfile || 'Dev';
+    const allowOutsideWorkspace = toolConfig.allowOutsideWorkspace === true;
+
+    function resolveSafeToolPath(inputPath, toolName, paramName = 'filePath') {
+        const workspaceRoot = fs.existsSync(baseCwd) ? fs.realpathSync(baseCwd) : path.resolve(baseCwd);
+        const resolvedPath = path.resolve(workspaceRoot, inputPath);
+        if (allowOutsideWorkspace) return resolvedPath;
+
+        const relToRoot = path.relative(workspaceRoot, resolvedPath);
+        if (relToRoot.startsWith('..') || path.isAbsolute(relToRoot)) {
+            throw new Error(`[${toolName}] Security policy violation — target '${paramName}' resolves outside the active workspace directory (path traversal blocked).`);
+        }
+        let checkCursor = resolvedPath;
+        while (!fs.existsSync(checkCursor)) {
+            const parentCursor = path.dirname(checkCursor);
+            if (parentCursor === checkCursor) break;
+            checkCursor = parentCursor;
+        }
+        if (fs.existsSync(checkCursor)) {
+            const realCheck = fs.realpathSync(checkCursor);
+            const relReal = path.relative(workspaceRoot, realCheck);
+            if (relReal.startsWith('..') || path.isAbsolute(relReal)) {
+                throw new Error(`[${toolName}] Security policy violation — target path symlink escapes the active workspace directory.`);
+            }
+        }
+        return resolvedPath;
+    }
 
     const tools = {
         guardExec: {
@@ -2484,7 +2519,7 @@ function createGuardedTools(engineOrOptions = {}, toolConfig = {}) {
                 if (!command || typeof command !== 'string') {
                     throw new Error('[guard_exec] Missing or invalid parameter: command must be a string.');
                 }
-                const execCwd = cwd ? path.resolve(baseCwd, cwd) : baseCwd;
+                const execCwd = cwd ? resolveSafeToolPath(cwd, 'guard_exec', 'cwd') : baseCwd;
                 let stdout = '';
                 let stderr = '';
                 let exitCode = 0;
@@ -2548,7 +2583,7 @@ function createGuardedTools(engineOrOptions = {}, toolConfig = {}) {
                 if (!filePath || typeof filePath !== 'string') {
                     throw new Error('[guard_read_file] Missing or invalid parameter: filePath must be a string.');
                 }
-                const resolved = path.resolve(baseCwd, filePath);
+                const resolved = resolveSafeToolPath(filePath, 'guard_read_file', 'filePath');
                 if (!fs.existsSync(resolved)) {
                     throw new Error(`[guard_read_file] File not found: ${resolved}`);
                 }
@@ -2639,7 +2674,8 @@ function createGuardedTools(engineOrOptions = {}, toolConfig = {}) {
                 required: ['filePath', 'content']
             },
             execute: async ({ filePath, content, createBackup = true } = {}) => {
-                const patchResult = applyPatch(filePath, content, {
+                const safeFilePath = resolveSafeToolPath(filePath, 'guard_apply_patch', 'filePath');
+                const patchResult = applyPatch(safeFilePath, content, {
                     tokenMap: engine.sessionMap,
                     createBackup
                 });
@@ -2670,7 +2706,7 @@ function createGuardedTools(engineOrOptions = {}, toolConfig = {}) {
                 required: []
             },
             execute: async ({ staged = false, cwd, profile = defaultProfile } = {}) => {
-                const repoCwd = cwd ? path.resolve(baseCwd, cwd) : baseCwd;
+                const repoCwd = cwd ? resolveSafeToolPath(cwd, 'guard_git_diff', 'cwd') : baseCwd;
                 const gitCmd = staged ? 'git diff --cached' : 'git diff';
                 let diffOutput = '';
 

package/index.js

@@ -542,8 +542,17 @@ export function sanitize(text, options = {}) {
         wasTruncated = true;
     }
 
+    // Filter user-supplied custom rules against catastrophic backtracking (PS-VDP-2026-10-002 parity)
+    const nestedQuantifierRegex = /\([^)]*(\+|\*|\{\d+,?\d*\})\)[+*]|\([^)]*(\+|\*|\{\d+,?\d*\})\)\{\d+,?\d*\}|\([^)]*\|[^)]*\)(?:[+*]|\{\d+,?\d*\})/;
+    const safeCustomRules = (Array.isArray(customRules) ? customRules : []).filter(r => {
+        const pat = typeof r === 'string' ? r : (r && (r.pattern || (r.regex && r.regex.source)));
+        if (!pat || typeof pat !== 'string' || pat.length > 500) return false;
+        if (nestedQuantifierRegex.test(pat)) return false;
+        return true;
+    });
+
     // Auto-inject DevOps Secrets rules when in Dev profile or when detectSecrets is requested
-    const activeRules = [...customRules];
+    const activeRules = [...safeCustomRules];
     if (profile.toLowerCase() === 'dev' || detectSecrets === true) {
         DEVOPS_SECRETS_DETECTOR.forEach(rule => {
             activeRules.push({
@@ -1954,7 +1963,7 @@ export function formatCefEvent(eventData = {}) {
     const {
         vendor = 'PrivacyScrubber',
         product = 'ZTDS',
-        version = '2.4.4',
+        version = '2.4.5',
         eventClassId = 'PII_REDACTION',
         eventName = 'Zero-Trust PII Sanitization Executed',
         riskLevel = 'LOW EXPOSURE',
@@ -2023,7 +2032,7 @@ export function formatSyslogEvent(eventData = {}) {
 export function formatJsonlEvent(eventData = {}) {
     const {
         timestamp = new Date().toISOString(),
-        version = '2.4.4',
+        version = '2.4.5',
         protocol = 'ZTDS',
         event = 'sanitization',
         riskLevel = 'LOW EXPOSURE',
@@ -2467,6 +2476,32 @@ export function createGuardedTools(engineOrOptions = {}, toolConfig = {}) {
 
     const baseCwd = toolConfig.cwd || process.cwd();
     const defaultProfile = toolConfig.profile || engine.defaultProfile || 'Dev';
+    const allowOutsideWorkspace = toolConfig.allowOutsideWorkspace === true;
+
+    function resolveSafeToolPath(inputPath, toolName, paramName = 'filePath') {
+        const workspaceRoot = fs.existsSync(baseCwd) ? fs.realpathSync(baseCwd) : path.resolve(baseCwd);
+        const resolvedPath = path.resolve(workspaceRoot, inputPath);
+        if (allowOutsideWorkspace) return resolvedPath;
+
+        const relToRoot = path.relative(workspaceRoot, resolvedPath);
+        if (relToRoot.startsWith('..') || path.isAbsolute(relToRoot)) {
+            throw new Error(`[${toolName}] Security policy violation — target '${paramName}' resolves outside the active workspace directory (path traversal blocked).`);
+        }
+        let checkCursor = resolvedPath;
+        while (!fs.existsSync(checkCursor)) {
+            const parentCursor = path.dirname(checkCursor);
+            if (parentCursor === checkCursor) break;
+            checkCursor = parentCursor;
+        }
+        if (fs.existsSync(checkCursor)) {
+            const realCheck = fs.realpathSync(checkCursor);
+            const relReal = path.relative(workspaceRoot, realCheck);
+            if (relReal.startsWith('..') || path.isAbsolute(relReal)) {
+                throw new Error(`[${toolName}] Security policy violation — target path symlink escapes the active workspace directory.`);
+            }
+        }
+        return resolvedPath;
+    }
 
     const tools = {
         guardExec: {
@@ -2486,7 +2521,7 @@ export function createGuardedTools(engineOrOptions = {}, toolConfig = {}) {
                 if (!command || typeof command !== 'string') {
                     throw new Error('[guard_exec] Missing or invalid parameter: command must be a string.');
                 }
-                const execCwd = cwd ? path.resolve(baseCwd, cwd) : baseCwd;
+                const execCwd = cwd ? resolveSafeToolPath(cwd, 'guard_exec', 'cwd') : baseCwd;
                 let stdout = '';
                 let stderr = '';
                 let exitCode = 0;
@@ -2550,7 +2585,7 @@ export function createGuardedTools(engineOrOptions = {}, toolConfig = {}) {
                 if (!filePath || typeof filePath !== 'string') {
                     throw new Error('[guard_read_file] Missing or invalid parameter: filePath must be a string.');
                 }
-                const resolved = path.resolve(baseCwd, filePath);
+                const resolved = resolveSafeToolPath(filePath, 'guard_read_file', 'filePath');
                 if (!fs.existsSync(resolved)) {
                     throw new Error(`[guard_read_file] File not found: ${resolved}`);
                 }
@@ -2641,7 +2676,8 @@ export function createGuardedTools(engineOrOptions = {}, toolConfig = {}) {
                 required: ['filePath', 'content']
             },
             execute: async ({ filePath, content, createBackup = true } = {}) => {
-                const patchResult = applyPatch(filePath, content, {
+                const safeFilePath = resolveSafeToolPath(filePath, 'guard_apply_patch', 'filePath');
+                const patchResult = applyPatch(safeFilePath, content, {
                     tokenMap: engine.sessionMap,
                     createBackup
                 });
@@ -2672,7 +2708,7 @@ export function createGuardedTools(engineOrOptions = {}, toolConfig = {}) {
                 required: []
             },
             execute: async ({ staged = false, cwd, profile = defaultProfile } = {}) => {
-                const repoCwd = cwd ? path.resolve(baseCwd, cwd) : baseCwd;
+                const repoCwd = cwd ? resolveSafeToolPath(cwd, 'guard_git_diff', 'cwd') : baseCwd;
                 const gitCmd = staged ? 'git diff --cached' : 'git diff';
                 let diffOutput = '';
 

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@privacyscrubber/sdk",
-  "version": "2.4.4",
+  "version": "2.4.5",
   "description": "In-process consumer privacy defense and pre-emptive PII interception SDK for Node.js, Next.js, and AI pipelines. Zero data loss, zero third parties, sub-millisecond in-memory execution.",
   "main": "index.cjs",
   "module": "index.js",