@prismshadow/penguin-server 0.2.7 → 0.2.9

package/dist/auth-token.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+/** An hour: long enough for a controller to finish, short enough to forget. */
+declare const CLI_TOKEN_TTL_MS: number;
+/**
+ * Ceiling on a caller-supplied `--ttl-seconds`, matching the default session TTL (config.ts):
+ * a token that lives in a file must not outlive an ordinary browser session.
+ */
+declare const CLI_TOKEN_MAX_TTL_MS: number;
+type MintTokenResult = {
+    outcome: "minted";
+    token: string;
+    userId: string;
+    expiresAt: string;
+}
+/** No web.db on this root — the server has never run here, so there is no account to mint for. */
+ | {
+    outcome: "no_server";
+} | {
+    outcome: "failed";
+    detail: string;
+};
+/** Issues an API session token for the data root at `root`. */
+declare function mintApiToken(root: string, opts?: {
+    userId?: string;
+    ttlMs?: number;
+    dbPath?: string;
+    now?: Date;
+}): MintTokenResult;
+
+export { CLI_TOKEN_MAX_TTL_MS, CLI_TOKEN_TTL_MS, type MintTokenResult, mintApiToken };

package/dist/auth-token.js

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+import {
+  AuthSessionsRepo,
+  UsersRepo,
+  openExistingDatabase
+} from "./chunk-WL5FUO3A.js";
+
+// src/auth-token.ts
+import path from "path";
+import fs from "fs";
+var CLI_TOKEN_TTL_MS = 60 * 6e4;
+var CLI_TOKEN_MAX_TTL_MS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 6e4;
+function explain(err, dbPath) {
+  const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
+  if (message.includes("no column named via")) {
+    return `${dbPath} predates this release \u2014 start the server once (\`penguin web\`) to upgrade it`;
+  }
+  if (message.includes("unable to open database")) {
+    return `cannot open ${dbPath} \u2014 minting needs the data root's own OS account; otherwise sign in with \`penguin auth login --server <url>\``;
+  }
+  return message;
+}
+function mintApiToken(root, opts = {}) {
+  const userId = opts.userId ?? "admin";
+  const dbPath = opts.dbPath ?? path.join(root, "web.db");
+  if (!fs.existsSync(dbPath)) return { outcome: "no_server" };
+  let db = null;
+  try {
+    db = openExistingDatabase(dbPath);
+    if (new UsersRepo(db).findById(userId) === null) {
+      return { outcome: "failed", detail: `no such account: ${userId}` };
+    }
+    const { token, expiresAt } = new AuthSessionsRepo(db).issue({
+      userId,
+      via: "cli",
+      now: opts.now ?? /* @__PURE__ */ new Date(),
+      ttlMs: opts.ttlMs ?? CLI_TOKEN_TTL_MS,
+      maxTtlMs: CLI_TOKEN_MAX_TTL_MS
+    });
+    return { outcome: "minted", token, userId, expiresAt };
+  } catch (err) {
+    return { outcome: "failed", detail: explain(err, dbPath) };
+  } finally {
+    db?.close();
+  }
+}
+export {
+  CLI_TOKEN_MAX_TTL_MS,
+  CLI_TOKEN_TTL_MS,
+  mintApiToken
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=auth-token.js.map

package/dist/auth-token.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/auth-token.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Mints an API session by inserting a row into the root's `web.db` — no running server needed.\n * Authorized by being able to read and write that root, which already holds every credential\n * the token could reach. On a multi-user box that means the OS account running the server;\n * everyone else signs in with `penguin auth login --server <url>`.\n */\nimport path from \"node:path\";\nimport fs from \"node:fs\";\nimport { openExistingDatabase } from \"./db/database.js\";\nimport { AuthSessionsRepo } from \"./db/repos/auth-sessions.js\";\nimport { UsersRepo } from \"./db/repos/users.js\";\n\n/** An hour: long enough for a controller to finish, short enough to forget. */\nexport const CLI_TOKEN_TTL_MS = 60 * 60_000;\n\n/**\n * Ceiling on a caller-supplied `--ttl-seconds`, matching the default session TTL (config.ts):\n * a token that lives in a file must not outlive an ordinary browser session.\n */\nexport const CLI_TOKEN_MAX_TTL_MS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60_000;\n\nexport type MintTokenResult =\n  | { outcome: \"minted\"; token: string; userId: string; expiresAt: string }\n  /** No web.db on this root — the server has never run here, so there is no account to mint for. */\n  | { outcome: \"no_server\" }\n  | { outcome: \"failed\"; detail: string };\n\n/**\n * Turns a failure into something the person at the terminal can act on. Both cases are\n * ordinary situations, not crashes: a database owned by another OS account, and one written\n * by an older release (minting deliberately does not migrate — see openExistingDatabase).\n */\nfunction explain(err: unknown, dbPath: string): string {\n  const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);\n  if (message.includes(\"no column named via\")) {\n    return `${dbPath} predates this release — start the server once (\\`penguin web\\`) to upgrade it`;\n  }\n  if (message.includes(\"unable to open database\")) {\n    return (\n      `cannot open ${dbPath} — minting needs the data root's own OS account; ` +\n      \"otherwise sign in with `penguin auth login --server <url>`\"\n    );\n  }\n  return message;\n}\n\n/** Issues an API session token for the data root at `root`. */\nexport function mintApiToken(\n  root: string,\n  opts: { userId?: string; ttlMs?: number; dbPath?: string; now?: Date } = {},\n): MintTokenResult {\n  const userId = opts.userId ?? \"admin\";\n  const dbPath = opts.dbPath ?? path.join(root, \"web.db\");\n  // Existence check first: openExistingDatabase would otherwise create an empty file, and a\n  // root with no web.db has no account to mint for.\n  if (!fs.existsSync(dbPath)) return { outcome: \"no_server\" };\n\n  let db: ReturnType<typeof openExistingDatabase> | null = null;\n  try {\n    db = openExistingDatabase(dbPath);\n    if (new UsersRepo(db).findById(userId) === null) {\n      return { outcome: \"failed\", detail: `no such account: ${userId}` };\n    }\n    // The repo is the single minting point (token shape, hash, TTL ceiling), so a CLI-minted\n    // row cannot drift from one the server issues itself.\n    const { token, expiresAt } = new AuthSessionsRepo(db).issue({\n      userId,\n      via: \"cli\",\n      now: opts.now ?? new Date(),\n      ttlMs: opts.ttlMs ?? CLI_TOKEN_TTL_MS,\n      maxTtlMs: CLI_TOKEN_MAX_TTL_MS,\n    });\n    return { outcome: \"minted\", token, userId, expiresAt };\n  } catch (err) {\n    return { outcome: \"failed\", detail: explain(err, dbPath) };\n  } finally {\n    db?.close();\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;AAMA,OAAO,UAAU;AACjB,OAAO,QAAQ;AAMR,IAAM,mBAAmB,KAAK;AAM9B,IAAM,uBAAuB,KAAK,KAAK,KAAK;AAanD,SAAS,QAAQ,KAAc,QAAwB;AACrD,QAAM,UAAU,eAAe,QAAQ,IAAI,UAAU,OAAO,GAAG;AAC/D,MAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,qBAAqB,GAAG;AAC3C,WAAO,GAAG,MAAM;AAAA,EAClB;AACA,MAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,yBAAyB,GAAG;AAC/C,WACE,eAAe,MAAM;AAAA,EAGzB;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAGO,SAAS,aACd,MACA,OAAyE,CAAC,GACzD;AACjB,QAAM,SAAS,KAAK,UAAU;AAC9B,QAAM,SAAS,KAAK,UAAU,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM,QAAQ;AAGtD,MAAI,CAAC,GAAG,WAAW,MAAM,EAAG,QAAO,EAAE,SAAS,YAAY;AAE1D,MAAI,KAAqD;AACzD,MAAI;AACF,SAAK,qBAAqB,MAAM;AAChC,QAAI,IAAI,UAAU,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM;AAC/C,aAAO,EAAE,SAAS,UAAU,QAAQ,oBAAoB,MAAM,GAAG;AAAA,IACnE;AAGA,UAAM,EAAE,OAAO,UAAU,IAAI,IAAI,iBAAiB,EAAE,EAAE,MAAM;AAAA,MAC1D;AAAA,MACA,KAAK;AAAA,MACL,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,oBAAI,KAAK;AAAA,MAC1B,OAAO,KAAK,SAAS;AAAA,MACrB,UAAU;AAAA,IACZ,CAAC;AACD,WAAO,EAAE,SAAS,UAAU,OAAO,QAAQ,UAAU;AAAA,EACvD,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,WAAO,EAAE,SAAS,UAAU,QAAQ,QAAQ,KAAK,MAAM,EAAE;AAAA,EAC3D,UAAE;AACA,QAAI,MAAM;AAAA,EACZ;AACF;","names":[]}

package/dist/chunk-K4ZSUT72.js

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+// src/initial-password.ts
+import fs from "fs";
+import path from "path";
+function initialAdminPasswordPath(root) {
+  return path.join(root, "initial-admin-password");
+}
+function clearInitialAdminPassword(root) {
+  try {
+    fs.rmSync(initialAdminPasswordPath(root), { force: true });
+  } catch {
+  }
+}
+var NOTICE_PADDING = 3;
+function renderFirstLoginNotice(url) {
+  const lines = [
+    "This server has no admin password yet. Open this link to claim it:",
+    "",
+    `  ${url}`,
+    "",
+    "The link lasts 30 days or until a password is set; restarting prints a fresh one."
+  ];
+  const width = Math.max(...lines.map((line) => line.length));
+  const bar = `+${"-".repeat(width + NOTICE_PADDING * 2)}+`;
+  const pad = " ".repeat(NOTICE_PADDING);
+  const body = lines.map((line) => `|${pad}${line.padEnd(width)}${pad}|`);
+  return [bar, ...body, bar].join("\n");
+}
+
+export {
+  initialAdminPasswordPath,
+  clearInitialAdminPassword,
+  renderFirstLoginNotice
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-K4ZSUT72.js.map

package/dist/chunk-K4ZSUT72.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/initial-password.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/** The framed first-run notice carrying the first-login link (minted in auth/service.ts). */\nimport fs from \"node:fs\";\nimport path from \"node:path\";\n\nexport function initialAdminPasswordPath(root: string): string {\n  return path.join(root, \"initial-admin-password\");\n}\n\n/**\n * Removes the plaintext an older build stored here; nothing writes it any more.\n *\n * TODO(compat): goes once no supported upgrade path can carry an `initial-admin-password`.\n */\nexport function clearInitialAdminPassword(root: string): void {\n  try {\n    fs.rmSync(initialAdminPasswordPath(root), { force: true });\n  } catch {\n    // Best-effort: a leftover file only re-prints a password that no longer works.\n  }\n}\n\nconst NOTICE_PADDING = 3;\n\n/**\n * Plain ASCII rather than box-drawing characters: a non-UTF-8 console (legacy Windows above\n * all) would mangle the frame around exactly the line it exists to highlight.\n */\nexport function renderFirstLoginNotice(url: string): string {\n  const lines = [\n    \"This server has no admin password yet. Open this link to claim it:\",\n    \"\",\n    `  ${url}`,\n    \"\",\n    \"The link lasts 30 days or until a password is set; restarting prints a fresh one.\",\n  ];\n  const width = Math.max(...lines.map((line) => line.length));\n  const bar = `+${\"-\".repeat(width + NOTICE_PADDING * 2)}+`;\n  const pad = \" \".repeat(NOTICE_PADDING);\n  const body = lines.map((line) => `|${pad}${line.padEnd(width)}${pad}|`);\n  return [bar, ...body, bar].join(\"\\n\");\n}\n"],"mappings":";AACA,OAAO,QAAQ;AACf,OAAO,UAAU;AAEV,SAAS,yBAAyB,MAAsB;AAC7D,SAAO,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM,wBAAwB;AACjD;AAOO,SAAS,0BAA0B,MAAoB;AAC5D,MAAI;AACF,OAAG,OAAO,yBAAyB,IAAI,GAAG,EAAE,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;AAAA,EAC3D,QAAQ;AAAA,EAER;AACF;AAEA,IAAM,iBAAiB;AAMhB,SAAS,uBAAuB,KAAqB;AAC1D,QAAM,QAAQ;AAAA,IACZ;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,KAAK,GAAG;AAAA,IACR;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,EACF;AACA,QAAM,QAAQ,KAAK,IAAI,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC;AAC1D,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,OAAO,QAAQ,iBAAiB,CAAC,CAAC;AACtD,QAAM,MAAM,IAAI,OAAO,cAAc;AACrC,QAAM,OAAO,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,IAAI,GAAG,GAAG,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,GAAG,GAAG;AACtE,SAAO,CAAC,KAAK,GAAG,MAAM,GAAG,EAAE,KAAK,IAAI;AACtC;","names":[]}

package/dist/chunk-OTYHSDV7.js

@@ -0,0 +1,374 @@
+import {
+  sessionTokenHash
+} from "./chunk-WL5FUO3A.js";
+
+// src/auth/password.ts
+import { randomBytes, scrypt, timingSafeEqual } from "crypto";
+var SCRYPT_COST = 16384;
+var SCRYPT_R = 8;
+var SCRYPT_P = 1;
+var SALT_BYTES = 16;
+var KEY_BYTES = 64;
+function scryptAsync(password, salt, keyLen, n, r, p) {
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    scrypt(password, salt, keyLen, { N: n, r, p, maxmem: 128 * 1024 * 1024 }, (err, key) => {
+      if (err) reject(err);
+      else resolve(key);
+    });
+  });
+}
+async function hashPassword(password, cost = SCRYPT_COST) {
+  const salt = randomBytes(SALT_BYTES);
+  const key = await scryptAsync(password, salt, KEY_BYTES, cost, SCRYPT_R, SCRYPT_P);
+  return [
+    "scrypt",
+    String(cost),
+    String(SCRYPT_R),
+    String(SCRYPT_P),
+    salt.toString("base64"),
+    key.toString("base64")
+  ].join("$");
+}
+async function verifyPassword(password, stored) {
+  const parts = stored.split("$");
+  if (parts.length !== 6 || parts[0] !== "scrypt") return false;
+  const n = Number(parts[1]);
+  const r = Number(parts[2]);
+  const p = Number(parts[3]);
+  if (!Number.isInteger(n) || !Number.isInteger(r) || !Number.isInteger(p)) return false;
+  let salt;
+  let expected;
+  try {
+    salt = Buffer.from(parts[4], "base64");
+    expected = Buffer.from(parts[5], "base64");
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (salt.length === 0 || expected.length === 0) return false;
+  let actual;
+  try {
+    actual = await scryptAsync(password, salt, expected.length, n, r, p);
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return actual.length === expected.length && timingSafeEqual(actual, expected);
+}
+
+// src/auth/service.ts
+import { randomBytes as randomBytes3 } from "crypto";
+
+// src/auth/api-token.ts
+import { createHash, randomBytes as randomBytes2, timingSafeEqual as timingSafeEqual2 } from "crypto";
+import fs from "fs";
+import path from "path";
+function apiTokenPath(root) {
+  return path.join(root, "api-token");
+}
+function mintApiToken() {
+  return randomBytes2(32).toString("base64url");
+}
+function storeApiToken(root, token) {
+  try {
+    fs.mkdirSync(root, { recursive: true });
+    const target = apiTokenPath(root);
+    const tmp = `${target}.${process.pid}.tmp`;
+    fs.writeFileSync(tmp, `${token}
+`, { mode: 384 });
+    fs.renameSync(tmp, target);
+  } catch {
+  }
+}
+function tokensEqual(a, b) {
+  const digest = (v) => createHash("sha256").update(v).digest();
+  return timingSafeEqual2(digest(a), digest(b));
+}
+
+// src/http/errors.ts
+var HttpError = class extends Error {
+  constructor(status, code, message) {
+    super(message);
+    this.status = status;
+    this.code = code;
+    this.name = "HttpError";
+  }
+  status;
+  code;
+};
+function errorBody(code, message) {
+  return { error: { code, message } };
+}
+function isMissingCredential(err) {
+  const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
+  return /missing credentials|api[_ ]?key/i.test(message);
+}
+function modelCredentialMissing(modelId) {
+  return new HttpError(
+    400,
+    "model_credential_missing",
+    `Model ${modelId} has no API key yet. Configure it on the Models page first.`
+  );
+}
+function handleError(err, c) {
+  if (err instanceof HttpError) {
+    return c.json(errorBody(err.code, err.message), err.status);
+  }
+  console.error(`[server] Unhandled exception: ${err.stack ?? err.message}`);
+  return c.json(errorBody("internal", "Internal server error."), 500);
+}
+
+// src/auth/service.ts
+var MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH = 8;
+var ADMIN_USER_ID = "admin";
+var LOGIN_FREE_ATTEMPTS = 5;
+var LOGIN_BACKOFF_START_MS = 1e3;
+var LOGIN_BACKOFF_CAP_MS = 6e4;
+var LOGIN_FAILURE_IDLE_MS = 15 * 6e4;
+var SEED_PASSWORD_CHARS = 24;
+function generateInitialAdminPassword() {
+  return randomBytes3(SEED_PASSWORD_CHARS).toString("base64url").slice(0, SEED_PASSWORD_CHARS);
+}
+function toUserInfo(row) {
+  return {
+    userId: row.userId,
+    isAdmin: row.isAdmin,
+    passwordIsInitial: row.passwordIsInitial,
+    createdAt: row.createdAt
+  };
+}
+var AuthService = class {
+  constructor(deps) {
+    this.deps = deps;
+    this.now = deps.now ?? (() => /* @__PURE__ */ new Date());
+    this.hashCost = deps.passwordHashCost ?? SCRYPT_COST;
+    this.deps.authSessions.deleteExpired(this.now().toISOString());
+  }
+  deps;
+  now;
+  hashCost;
+  /** Session lifetime, for the cookie that must expire WITH the session, not before it. */
+  get sessionTtlMs() {
+    return this.deps.sessionTtlMs;
+  }
+  /**
+   * Null once the server is claimed, so the only setup session that exists is a printed one.
+   * On demand rather than in the constructor: seedAdmin() runs after it, so "claimed?" has no
+   * answer there. A cached link whose row is gone is re-minted, not handed out dead.
+   */
+  mintFirstLogin() {
+    if (!this.adminPasswordIsInitial()) return null;
+    if (this.deps.state.firstLoginToken !== null && this.authenticateWithMeta(this.deps.state.firstLoginToken) === null) {
+      this.deps.state.firstLoginToken = null;
+    }
+    this.deps.state.firstLoginToken ??= this.issueSession(ADMIN_USER_ID, "setup");
+    return this.deps.state.firstLoginToken;
+  }
+  /**
+   * For the startup notice's pinned-seed gate (index.ts): a pin usually means the operator
+   * knows the password, but an offline reset makes it stale, and the gate must see through
+   * that or the rescue link stays suppressed.
+   */
+  async adminPasswordIs(password) {
+    const row = this.deps.users.findById(ADMIN_USER_ID);
+    return row !== null && await verifyPassword(password, row.passwordHash);
+  }
+  /**
+   * Startup seeding (idempotent): creates the built-in admin and adopts default_project when
+   * the users table is empty; if the initial Project fails, the user row is rolled back and
+   * the server retries on next startup.
+   */
+  async seedAdmin() {
+    if (this.deps.users.count() > 0) return;
+    const password = this.deps.seedAdminPassword ?? generateInitialAdminPassword();
+    if (password.length < MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH) {
+      throw new Error(
+        `PENGUIN_SEED_ADMIN_PASSWORD must be at least ${MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH} characters.`
+      );
+    }
+    const user = {
+      userId: ADMIN_USER_ID,
+      passwordHash: await hashPassword(password, this.hashCost),
+      isAdmin: true,
+      passwordIsInitial: true,
+      createdAt: this.now().toISOString()
+    };
+    this.deps.users.insert(user);
+    try {
+      await this.deps.provisionInitialProject(user, true);
+    } catch (err) {
+      this.deps.users.delete(user.userId);
+      throw err;
+    }
+  }
+  /**
+   * Compared against the printed value, not merely verified: a cookie made out of ANY valid
+   * token would let one person hand another a link into the sender's account. Not single-use,
+   * because a prefetching browser would burn it before its reader clicked.
+   */
+  redeemFirstLogin(given) {
+    const expected = this.deps.state.firstLoginToken;
+    if (expected === null || given === "" || !tokensEqual(given, expected)) return null;
+    return this.authenticateWithMeta(expected) === null ? null : expected;
+  }
+  /** Whether the built-in admin still runs on its initial password (gates the first-login link). */
+  adminPasswordIsInitial() {
+    return this.deps.users.findById(ADMIN_USER_ID)?.passwordIsInitial === true;
+  }
+  /** Consecutive login failures per userId (see the throttling comment on the constants). */
+  loginFailures = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+  /** The wait imposed after `failures` consecutive failures (0 while within the free attempts). */
+  loginDelayMs(failures) {
+    const excess = failures - LOGIN_FREE_ATTEMPTS;
+    if (excess <= 0) return 0;
+    return Math.min(LOGIN_BACKOFF_START_MS * 2 ** (excess - 1), LOGIN_BACKOFF_CAP_MS);
+  }
+  async login(userId, password) {
+    const nowMs = this.now().getTime();
+    for (const [key, entry] of this.loginFailures) {
+      if (nowMs - entry.lastFailureAt > LOGIN_FAILURE_IDLE_MS) this.loginFailures.delete(key);
+    }
+    const failed = this.loginFailures.get(userId);
+    if (failed) {
+      const readyAt = failed.lastFailureAt + this.loginDelayMs(failed.failures);
+      if (nowMs < readyAt) {
+        throw new HttpError(
+          429,
+          "too_many_attempts",
+          `Too many failed sign-in attempts. Try again in ${Math.ceil((readyAt - nowMs) / 1e3)}s.`
+        );
+      }
+    }
+    const row = this.deps.users.findById(userId);
+    const ok = row !== null && await verifyPassword(password, row.passwordHash);
+    if (!row || !ok) {
+      this.loginFailures.set(userId, {
+        failures: (failed?.failures ?? 0) + 1,
+        lastFailureAt: this.now().getTime()
+      });
+      throw new HttpError(401, "invalid_credentials", "Incorrect username or password.");
+    }
+    this.loginFailures.delete(userId);
+    this.deps.authSessions.deleteExpired(this.now().toISOString());
+    return { user: toUserInfo(row), token: this.issueSession(row.userId, "password") };
+  }
+  /**
+   * Desktop-mode sign-in: an admin session with no password check — the claim route already
+   * redeemed the shell's one-shot token, which is the credential here. Throws only on a
+   * broken deployment (seeding runs before the route exists).
+   */
+  loginDesktop() {
+    const row = this.deps.users.findById(ADMIN_USER_ID);
+    if (!row) {
+      throw new HttpError(500, "internal", "Built-in admin has not been seeded.");
+    }
+    return { user: toUserInfo(row), token: this.issueSession(row.userId, "desktop") };
+  }
+  /** Self password change (user settings): validates the old password first; the current session stays valid. */
+  async changePassword(userId, oldPassword, newPassword) {
+    const row = this.deps.users.findById(userId);
+    if (!row || !await verifyPassword(oldPassword, row.passwordHash)) {
+      throw new HttpError(400, "password_mismatch", "Current password is incorrect.");
+    }
+    await this.setPassword(userId, newPassword);
+  }
+  /** No old-password check; the me route gates which sessions may call this. */
+  async setInitialPassword(userId, newPassword) {
+    await this.setPassword(userId, newPassword);
+  }
+  /**
+   * Validation comes FIRST, so a rejected password leaves the first-login link alive: burning
+   * it on a typo would strand the claimer until a restart.
+   */
+  async setPassword(userId, newPassword) {
+    if (newPassword.length < MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH) {
+      throw new HttpError(400, "invalid_password", "Password must be at least 8 characters.");
+    }
+    this.deps.users.updatePassword(userId, await hashPassword(newPassword, this.hashCost), false);
+    this.loginFailures.delete(userId);
+    if (userId === ADMIN_USER_ID) {
+      this.deps.authSessions.deleteByUserAndVia(userId, "setup");
+      this.deps.state.firstLoginToken = null;
+    }
+  }
+  /** Ends a session: the row is the session, so logout deletes it. Unknown token is a no-op. */
+  logout(token) {
+    this.deps.authSessions.delete(sessionTokenHash(token));
+  }
+  /**
+   * The current boot's local API token (what control-env injection hands to tool
+   * subprocesses); null when none was minted. It lives on the runtime state, not on this
+   * service: the token was written to `<root>/api-token` by the process, so it must
+   * outlive the App a push replaces (auth/runtime-state.ts).
+   */
+  localApiToken() {
+    return this.deps.state.apiToken;
+  }
+  /**
+   * Validates a Bearer token against the boot's local API token (constant-time compare):
+   * a match authenticates as the built-in admin — holding the token proves filesystem
+   * access to the data root, which is admin authority (see auth/api-token.ts). Returns
+   * null on mismatch, when no token was minted, or when the admin row is missing.
+   */
+  authenticateApiToken(token) {
+    const apiToken = this.deps.state.apiToken;
+    if (apiToken === null || token.length === 0) return null;
+    if (!tokensEqual(token, apiToken)) return null;
+    const user = this.deps.users.findById(ADMIN_USER_ID);
+    return user === null ? null : { user, via: "token" };
+  }
+  /**
+   * Validates the cookie token. Sliding renewal tops the expiry up IN PLACE, so the cookie
+   * value never changes and there is no second identity to revoke. Only a session whose own
+   * span reaches the renewal window slides — a one-hour minted token must expire at its hour,
+   * not stretch by being used.
+   */
+  authenticateWithMeta(token) {
+    const tokenHash = sessionTokenHash(token);
+    const session = this.deps.authSessions.findByTokenHash(tokenHash);
+    if (!session) return null;
+    const now = this.now();
+    const expiresAt = Date.parse(session.expiresAt);
+    if (expiresAt <= now.getTime()) {
+      this.deps.authSessions.delete(tokenHash);
+      return null;
+    }
+    const user = this.deps.users.findById(session.userId);
+    if (!user) return null;
+    const renewable = expiresAt - Date.parse(session.createdAt) >= this.deps.sessionRenewMs;
+    let renewed = false;
+    if (renewable && expiresAt - now.getTime() < this.deps.sessionRenewMs) {
+      this.deps.authSessions.touch(
+        tokenHash,
+        new Date(now.getTime() + this.deps.sessionTtlMs).toISOString()
+      );
+      renewed = true;
+    }
+    const via = session.via === "desktop" ? "desktop" : session.via === "setup" ? "setup" : "password";
+    return { user, via, renewed };
+  }
+  issueSession(userId, via) {
+    return this.deps.authSessions.issue({
+      userId,
+      via,
+      now: this.now(),
+      ttlMs: this.deps.sessionTtlMs
+    }).token;
+  }
+};
+
+export {
+  HttpError,
+  errorBody,
+  isMissingCredential,
+  modelCredentialMissing,
+  handleError,
+  mintApiToken,
+  storeApiToken,
+  SCRYPT_COST,
+  hashPassword,
+  MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH,
+  ADMIN_USER_ID,
+  generateInitialAdminPassword,
+  toUserInfo,
+  AuthService
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-OTYHSDV7.js.map

package/dist/chunk-OTYHSDV7.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/auth/password.ts","../src/auth/service.ts","../src/auth/api-token.ts","../src/http/errors.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Password hashing (slow-hash storage).\n *\n * Uses node:crypto's scrypt (built-in, no extra dependency, meets the same\n * slow-hash requirement as bcrypt/argon2). Storage format:\n * `scrypt$N$r$p$<salt b64>$<hash b64>` — parameters are stored alongside the hash,\n * so old hashes remain verifiable after future parameter tuning; comparison uses\n * timingSafeEqual to guard against timing side-channels.\n */\nimport { randomBytes, scrypt, timingSafeEqual } from \"node:crypto\";\n\n/**\n * Work factor for new hashes. `hashPassword` takes it as a defaulted argument so the server's\n * own test suite can hash at a token cost: almost every case there seeds an admin, provisions\n * users and logs them in, and one derivation at this strength costs on the order of 100ms.\n * Nothing on the production path passes the argument, and no configuration reaches it —\n * `buildAppDeps`, which carries the test override, is not part of this package's exports.\n */\nexport const SCRYPT_COST = 16384;\nconst SCRYPT_R = 8;\nconst SCRYPT_P = 1;\nconst SALT_BYTES = 16;\nconst KEY_BYTES = 64;\n\nfunction scryptAsync(\n  password: string,\n  salt: Buffer,\n  keyLen: number,\n  n: number,\n  r: number,\n  p: number,\n): Promise<Buffer> {\n  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n    scrypt(password, salt, keyLen, { N: n, r, p, maxmem: 128 * 1024 * 1024 }, (err, key) => {\n      if (err) reject(err);\n      else resolve(key);\n    });\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Generates a password hash in `scrypt$N$r$p$salt$hash` format. `cost` is scrypt's N and\n * is recorded in the hash, so `verifyPassword` re-derives at whatever cost produced the\n * stored string.\n */\nexport async function hashPassword(password: string, cost: number = SCRYPT_COST): Promise<string> {\n  const salt = randomBytes(SALT_BYTES);\n  const key = await scryptAsync(password, salt, KEY_BYTES, cost, SCRYPT_R, SCRYPT_P);\n  return [\n    \"scrypt\",\n    String(cost),\n    String(SCRYPT_R),\n    String(SCRYPT_P),\n    salt.toString(\"base64\"),\n    key.toString(\"base64\"),\n  ].join(\"$\");\n}\n\n/** Verifies a password; returns false if the stored string has an invalid format (never throws, so the login path can uniformly treat it as a credential error). */\nexport async function verifyPassword(password: string, stored: string): Promise<boolean> {\n  const parts = stored.split(\"$\");\n  if (parts.length !== 6 || parts[0] !== \"scrypt\") return false;\n  const n = Number(parts[1]);\n  const r = Number(parts[2]);\n  const p = Number(parts[3]);\n  if (!Number.isInteger(n) || !Number.isInteger(r) || !Number.isInteger(p)) return false;\n  let salt: Buffer;\n  let expected: Buffer;\n  try {\n    salt = Buffer.from(parts[4]!, \"base64\");\n    expected = Buffer.from(parts[5]!, \"base64\");\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n  if (salt.length === 0 || expected.length === 0) return false;\n  let actual: Buffer;\n  try {\n    actual = await scryptAsync(password, salt, expected.length, n, r, p);\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n  return actual.length === expected.length && timingSafeEqual(actual, expected);\n}\n","/**\n * Auth service: admin seeding / login / logout / password change / session validation.\n *\n * No open registration: an empty users table seeds `admin` with a random password hashed and\n * discarded unseen, claimed through the first-login link; every other user is created by an\n * admin. Sessions are rows in auth_sessions (cookie holds the token, the row its sha256), so\n * they outlive a restart and renew in place.\n */\nimport { randomBytes } from \"node:crypto\";\nimport { tokensEqual } from \"./api-token.js\";\nimport type { UserInfo } from \"../api/types.js\";\nimport { HttpError } from \"../http/errors.js\";\nimport type { UserRow, UsersRepo } from \"../db/repos/users.js\";\nimport { sessionTokenHash } from \"../db/repos/auth-sessions.js\";\nimport type { SessionViaValue } from \"../db/repos/auth-sessions.js\";\nimport type { AuthRuntimeState } from \"./runtime-state.js\";\nimport type { AuthSessionsRepo } from \"../db/repos/auth-sessions.js\";\nimport { SCRYPT_COST, hashPassword, verifyPassword } from \"./password.js\";\n\nexport const MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH = 8;\n\n/** Built-in admin user_id. */\nexport const ADMIN_USER_ID = \"admin\";\n\n/**\n * Login throttling, per userId. After LOGIN_FREE_ATTEMPTS failures each attempt waits an\n * exponentially growing delay (1s doubling to a 60s cap), settling at a guess per minute.\n * Kept for nonexistent userIds too, so it is not an account-existence oracle. Deliberately NOT\n * covered: a concurrent burst before the first failure lands, and guesses spread across many\n * accounts.\n */\nconst LOGIN_FREE_ATTEMPTS = 5;\nconst LOGIN_BACKOFF_START_MS = 1000;\nconst LOGIN_BACKOFF_CAP_MS = 60_000;\n/** Failure entries idle longer than this are swept (bounds the map; far above the cap). */\nconst LOGIN_FAILURE_IDLE_MS = 15 * 60_000;\n\n/** Characters of base64url in a seeded password — 18 random bytes, 144 bits. */\nconst SEED_PASSWORD_CHARS = 24;\n\n/**\n * Never read or typed — hashed at once and discarded — which is what lets it be long enough\n * that the login endpoint, reachable the moment the account exists, has no search space.\n */\nexport function generateInitialAdminPassword(): string {\n  return randomBytes(SEED_PASSWORD_CHARS).toString(\"base64url\").slice(0, SEED_PASSWORD_CHARS);\n}\n\n/**\n * \"desktop\" and \"setup\" may set a password without the old one (theirs is random and was never\n * shown); desktop-only routes open to \"desktop\" alone. \"token\" is the local API token's Bearer\n * header — per request, never a stored row. Anything else reads as \"password\".\n */\nexport type SessionVia = \"password\" | \"desktop\" | \"setup\" | \"token\";\n\nexport function toUserInfo(row: UserRow): UserInfo {\n  return {\n    userId: row.userId,\n    isAdmin: row.isAdmin,\n    passwordIsInitial: row.passwordIsInitial,\n    createdAt: row.createdAt,\n  };\n}\n\nexport interface AuthServiceDeps {\n  users: UsersRepo;\n  authSessions: AuthSessionsRepo;\n  /**\n   * Process-scoped auth values (runtime-state.ts). Held by the RUNTIME so the link a boot\n   * printed survives a platform push; everything else about auth is rebuilt with the App.\n   */\n  state: AuthRuntimeState;\n  /** Provisions the initial Project at signup (injected by project-service, to avoid a circular dependency). */\n  provisionInitialProject: (user: UserRow, isAdmin: boolean) => Promise<void>;\n  /** Fixed initial password for the seeded admin (config.seedAdminPassword); null generates a random one at seed time. */\n  seedAdminPassword: string | null;\n  sessionTtlMs: number;\n  sessionRenewMs: number;\n  /** Test double: scrypt work factor for hashes this service writes (SCRYPT_COST in production). */\n  passwordHashCost?: number;\n  now?: () => Date;\n}\n\nexport class AuthService {\n  private readonly now: () => Date;\n  private readonly hashCost: number;\n  /** Session lifetime, for the cookie that must expire WITH the session, not before it. */\n  get sessionTtlMs(): number {\n    return this.deps.sessionTtlMs;\n  }\n\n  constructor(private readonly deps: AuthServiceDeps) {\n    this.now = deps.now ?? (() => new Date());\n    this.hashCost = deps.passwordHashCost ?? SCRYPT_COST;\n    this.deps.authSessions.deleteExpired(this.now().toISOString());\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Null once the server is claimed, so the only setup session that exists is a printed one.\n   * On demand rather than in the constructor: seedAdmin() runs after it, so \"claimed?\" has no\n   * answer there. A cached link whose row is gone is re-minted, not handed out dead.\n   */\n  mintFirstLogin(): string | null {\n    if (!this.adminPasswordIsInitial()) return null;\n    if (\n      this.deps.state.firstLoginToken !== null &&\n      this.authenticateWithMeta(this.deps.state.firstLoginToken) === null\n    ) {\n      this.deps.state.firstLoginToken = null;\n    }\n    this.deps.state.firstLoginToken ??= this.issueSession(ADMIN_USER_ID, \"setup\");\n    return this.deps.state.firstLoginToken;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * For the startup notice's pinned-seed gate (index.ts): a pin usually means the operator\n   * knows the password, but an offline reset makes it stale, and the gate must see through\n   * that or the rescue link stays suppressed.\n   */\n  async adminPasswordIs(password: string): Promise<boolean> {\n    const row = this.deps.users.findById(ADMIN_USER_ID);\n    return row !== null && (await verifyPassword(password, row.passwordHash));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Startup seeding (idempotent): creates the built-in admin and adopts default_project when\n   * the users table is empty; if the initial Project fails, the user row is rolled back and\n   * the server retries on next startup.\n   */\n  async seedAdmin(): Promise<void> {\n    if (this.deps.users.count() > 0) return;\n    const password = this.deps.seedAdminPassword ?? generateInitialAdminPassword();\n    // A pinned override must meet the same policy as every other password — rejected before\n    // any insert, so a configuration typo cannot create a trivially weak privileged account.\n    if (password.length < MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `PENGUIN_SEED_ADMIN_PASSWORD must be at least ${MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH} characters.`,\n      );\n    }\n    const user: UserRow = {\n      userId: ADMIN_USER_ID,\n      passwordHash: await hashPassword(password, this.hashCost),\n      isAdmin: true,\n      passwordIsInitial: true,\n      createdAt: this.now().toISOString(),\n    };\n    this.deps.users.insert(user);\n    try {\n      await this.deps.provisionInitialProject(user, true);\n    } catch (err) {\n      this.deps.users.delete(user.userId);\n      throw err;\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Compared against the printed value, not merely verified: a cookie made out of ANY valid\n   * token would let one person hand another a link into the sender's account. Not single-use,\n   * because a prefetching browser would burn it before its reader clicked.\n   */\n  redeemFirstLogin(given: string): string | null {\n    const expected = this.deps.state.firstLoginToken;\n    if (expected === null || given === \"\" || !tokensEqual(given, expected)) return null;\n    return this.authenticateWithMeta(expected) === null ? null : expected;\n  }\n\n  /** Whether the built-in admin still runs on its initial password (gates the first-login link). */\n  adminPasswordIsInitial(): boolean {\n    return this.deps.users.findById(ADMIN_USER_ID)?.passwordIsInitial === true;\n  }\n\n  /** Consecutive login failures per userId (see the throttling comment on the constants). */\n  private readonly loginFailures = new Map<string, { failures: number; lastFailureAt: number }>();\n\n  /** The wait imposed after `failures` consecutive failures (0 while within the free attempts). */\n  private loginDelayMs(failures: number): number {\n    const excess = failures - LOGIN_FREE_ATTEMPTS;\n    if (excess <= 0) return 0;\n    return Math.min(LOGIN_BACKOFF_START_MS * 2 ** (excess - 1), LOGIN_BACKOFF_CAP_MS);\n  }\n\n  async login(userId: string, password: string): Promise<{ user: UserInfo; token: string }> {\n    const nowMs = this.now().getTime();\n    for (const [key, entry] of this.loginFailures) {\n      if (nowMs - entry.lastFailureAt > LOGIN_FAILURE_IDLE_MS) this.loginFailures.delete(key);\n    }\n    const failed = this.loginFailures.get(userId);\n    if (failed) {\n      const readyAt = failed.lastFailureAt + this.loginDelayMs(failed.failures);\n      if (nowMs < readyAt) {\n        throw new HttpError(\n          429,\n          \"too_many_attempts\",\n          `Too many failed sign-in attempts. Try again in ${Math.ceil((readyAt - nowMs) / 1000)}s.`,\n        );\n      }\n    }\n    const row = this.deps.users.findById(userId);\n    const ok = row !== null && (await verifyPassword(password, row.passwordHash));\n    if (!row || !ok) {\n      this.loginFailures.set(userId, {\n        failures: (failed?.failures ?? 0) + 1,\n        lastFailureAt: this.now().getTime(),\n      });\n      throw new HttpError(401, \"invalid_credentials\", \"Incorrect username or password.\");\n    }\n    this.loginFailures.delete(userId);\n    this.deps.authSessions.deleteExpired(this.now().toISOString());\n    return { user: toUserInfo(row), token: this.issueSession(row.userId, \"password\") };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Desktop-mode sign-in: an admin session with no password check — the claim route already\n   * redeemed the shell's one-shot token, which is the credential here. Throws only on a\n   * broken deployment (seeding runs before the route exists).\n   */\n  loginDesktop(): { user: UserInfo; token: string } {\n    const row = this.deps.users.findById(ADMIN_USER_ID);\n    if (!row) {\n      throw new HttpError(500, \"internal\", \"Built-in admin has not been seeded.\");\n    }\n    return { user: toUserInfo(row), token: this.issueSession(row.userId, \"desktop\") };\n  }\n\n  /** Self password change (user settings): validates the old password first; the current session stays valid. */\n  async changePassword(userId: string, oldPassword: string, newPassword: string): Promise<void> {\n    const row = this.deps.users.findById(userId);\n    if (!row || !(await verifyPassword(oldPassword, row.passwordHash))) {\n      throw new HttpError(400, \"password_mismatch\", \"Current password is incorrect.\");\n    }\n    await this.setPassword(userId, newPassword);\n  }\n\n  /** No old-password check; the me route gates which sessions may call this. */\n  async setInitialPassword(userId: string, newPassword: string): Promise<void> {\n    await this.setPassword(userId, newPassword);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Validation comes FIRST, so a rejected password leaves the first-login link alive: burning\n   * it on a typo would strand the claimer until a restart.\n   */\n  private async setPassword(userId: string, newPassword: string): Promise<void> {\n    if (newPassword.length < MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH) {\n      throw new HttpError(400, \"invalid_password\", \"Password must be at least 8 characters.\");\n    }\n    this.deps.users.updatePassword(userId, await hashPassword(newPassword, this.hashCost), false);\n    // A successful set proves at least what the successful login that resets the counter\n    // proves (the old password, or a desktop/setup session), so it resets it too. Without\n    // this, anyone spamming the login endpoint holds the backoff window open, and the sign-in\n    // that follows a first-login claim (routes/me.ts) would 429 AFTER the password committed —\n    // reporting failure for a change that took, with the claimer's setup session already gone.\n    this.loginFailures.delete(userId);\n    // EVERY first-login session for this account, not just the link this process printed: an\n    // earlier boot's link can still be live in a terminal scrollback, and a `setup` session is\n    // allowed to change the password without knowing the old one — so one left behind is an\n    // account takeover waiting to happen.\n    if (userId === ADMIN_USER_ID) {\n      this.deps.authSessions.deleteByUserAndVia(userId, \"setup\");\n      this.deps.state.firstLoginToken = null;\n    }\n  }\n\n  /** Ends a session: the row is the session, so logout deletes it. Unknown token is a no-op. */\n  logout(token: string): void {\n    this.deps.authSessions.delete(sessionTokenHash(token));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * The current boot's local API token (what control-env injection hands to tool\n   * subprocesses); null when none was minted. It lives on the runtime state, not on this\n   * service: the token was written to `<root>/api-token` by the process, so it must\n   * outlive the App a push replaces (auth/runtime-state.ts).\n   */\n  localApiToken(): string | null {\n    return this.deps.state.apiToken;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Validates a Bearer token against the boot's local API token (constant-time compare):\n   * a match authenticates as the built-in admin — holding the token proves filesystem\n   * access to the data root, which is admin authority (see auth/api-token.ts). Returns\n   * null on mismatch, when no token was minted, or when the admin row is missing.\n   */\n  authenticateApiToken(token: string): { user: UserRow; via: SessionVia } | null {\n    const apiToken = this.deps.state.apiToken;\n    if (apiToken === null || token.length === 0) return null;\n    if (!tokensEqual(token, apiToken)) return null;\n    const user = this.deps.users.findById(ADMIN_USER_ID);\n    return user === null ? null : { user, via: \"token\" };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Validates the cookie token. Sliding renewal tops the expiry up IN PLACE, so the cookie\n   * value never changes and there is no second identity to revoke. Only a session whose own\n   * span reaches the renewal window slides — a one-hour minted token must expire at its hour,\n   * not stretch by being used.\n   */\n  authenticateWithMeta(token: string): { user: UserRow; via: SessionVia; renewed: boolean } | null {\n    const tokenHash = sessionTokenHash(token);\n    const session = this.deps.authSessions.findByTokenHash(tokenHash);\n    if (!session) return null;\n    const now = this.now();\n    const expiresAt = Date.parse(session.expiresAt);\n    if (expiresAt <= now.getTime()) {\n      this.deps.authSessions.delete(tokenHash);\n      return null;\n    }\n    const user = this.deps.users.findById(session.userId);\n    if (!user) return null;\n    const renewable = expiresAt - Date.parse(session.createdAt) >= this.deps.sessionRenewMs;\n    let renewed = false;\n    if (renewable && expiresAt - now.getTime() < this.deps.sessionRenewMs) {\n      this.deps.authSessions.touch(\n        tokenHash,\n        new Date(now.getTime() + this.deps.sessionTtlMs).toISOString(),\n      );\n      renewed = true;\n    }\n    const via: SessionVia =\n      session.via === \"desktop\" ? \"desktop\" : session.via === \"setup\" ? \"setup\" : \"password\";\n    return { user, via, renewed };\n  }\n\n  private issueSession(userId: string, via: SessionViaValue): string {\n    return this.deps.authSessions.issue({\n      userId,\n      via,\n      now: this.now(),\n      ttlMs: this.deps.sessionTtlMs,\n    }).token;\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Local API token (`<root>/api-token`): the machine-local credential behind\n * `Authorization: Bearer`.\n *\n * Minted fresh at every server boot (same recipe as auth-session tokens) and written to\n * the data root with owner-only permissions, so anything that can read the file can call\n * the API as the admin. That equivalence is the authorization model, not an accident:\n * local filesystem access to the data root already IS admin authority — the same rule\n * `penguin server reset-admin-password` stands on (whoever can run it owns web.db\n * anyway) — and agents driving their own harness through the CLI is the product feature\n * this token exists for (server-driven Sessions hand it to tool subprocesses as\n * PENGUIN_API_TOKEN). Rotation per boot bounds the life of any leaked copy to the\n * process that minted it.\n */\nimport { createHash, randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from \"node:crypto\";\nimport fs from \"node:fs\";\nimport path from \"node:path\";\n\nexport function apiTokenPath(root: string): string {\n  return path.join(root, \"api-token\");\n}\n\n/** Mints a boot-scoped local API token (the auth-session token recipe). */\nexport function mintApiToken(): string {\n  return randomBytes(32).toString(\"base64url\");\n}\n\n/**\n * Persists the boot token (owner-only file, tmp + rename so a concurrent reader never\n * sees a partial write). Best-effort like the initial-password file: an exotic read-only\n * root must not stop the server — local CLI callers then fall back to\n * PENGUIN_API_TOKEN.\n */\nexport function storeApiToken(root: string, token: string): void {\n  try {\n    fs.mkdirSync(root, { recursive: true });\n    const target = apiTokenPath(root);\n    const tmp = `${target}.${process.pid}.tmp`;\n    fs.writeFileSync(tmp, `${token}\\n`, { mode: 0o600 });\n    fs.renameSync(tmp, target);\n  } catch {\n    // Best-effort: Bearer auth still works for callers holding the token some other way.\n  }\n}\n\n/** The stored token, or null when absent/unreadable/empty (shared with the CLI's file fallback). */\nexport function readApiToken(root: string): string | null {\n  try {\n    const value = fs.readFileSync(apiTokenPath(root), \"utf8\").trim();\n    return value === \"\" ? null : value;\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Constant-time equality for token checks: both sides are reduced to fixed-size sha256\n * digests first, so the comparison's timing depends on neither the content nor the\n * length of an attacker-supplied value.\n */\nexport function tokensEqual(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  const digest = (v: string): Buffer => createHash(\"sha256\").update(v).digest();\n  return timingSafeEqual(digest(a), digest(b));\n}\n","/**\n * Unified HTTP error: `{error: {code, message}}` response body,\n * with message in English.\n *\n * Routes and services express business errors via throw HttpError; app-level onError\n * uniformly converges these into a JSON response, with unknown errors converged to 500\n * (never leaking internal details to the client).\n */\nimport type { Context } from \"hono\";\nimport type { ErrorBody } from \"../api/types.js\";\n\nexport class HttpError extends Error {\n  constructor(\n    readonly status: number,\n    readonly code: string,\n    message: string,\n  ) {\n    super(message);\n    this.name = \"HttpError\";\n  }\n}\n\nexport function errorBody(code: string, message: string): ErrorBody {\n  return { error: { code, message } };\n}\n\n/**\n * Model missing a credential: the provider SDK throws this at **client-construction\n * time** (hit by both creating a Session and resuming a Session); the original message\n * is full of environment variable names, meaningless to a user — uniformly replaced\n * with a single actionable sentence. The frontend produces localized text by code\n * (message is only a fallback); see web's lib/api-error.ts.\n */\nexport function isMissingCredential(err: unknown): boolean {\n  const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);\n  return /missing credentials|api[_ ]?key/i.test(message);\n}\n\nexport function modelCredentialMissing(modelId: string): HttpError {\n  return new HttpError(\n    400,\n    \"model_credential_missing\",\n    `Model ${modelId} has no API key yet. 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