@prismshadow/penguin-server 0.2.7 → 0.2.8

package/dist/auth-token.js

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+import {
+  AuthSessionsRepo,
+  UsersRepo,
+  openExistingDatabase
+} from "./chunk-622KL7BQ.js";
+
+// src/auth-token.ts
+import path from "path";
+import fs from "fs";
+var CLI_TOKEN_TTL_MS = 60 * 6e4;
+var CLI_TOKEN_MAX_TTL_MS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 6e4;
+function explain(err, dbPath) {
+  const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
+  if (message.includes("no column named via")) {
+    return `${dbPath} predates this release \u2014 start the server once (\`penguin web\`) to upgrade it`;
+  }
+  if (message.includes("unable to open database")) {
+    return `cannot open ${dbPath} \u2014 minting needs the data root's own OS account; otherwise sign in with \`penguin auth login --server <url>\``;
+  }
+  return message;
+}
+function mintApiToken(root, opts = {}) {
+  const userId = opts.userId ?? "admin";
+  const dbPath = opts.dbPath ?? path.join(root, "web.db");
+  if (!fs.existsSync(dbPath)) return { outcome: "no_server" };
+  let db = null;
+  try {
+    db = openExistingDatabase(dbPath);
+    if (new UsersRepo(db).findById(userId) === null) {
+      return { outcome: "failed", detail: `no such account: ${userId}` };
+    }
+    const { token, expiresAt } = new AuthSessionsRepo(db).issue({
+      userId,
+      via: "cli",
+      now: opts.now ?? /* @__PURE__ */ new Date(),
+      ttlMs: opts.ttlMs ?? CLI_TOKEN_TTL_MS,
+      maxTtlMs: CLI_TOKEN_MAX_TTL_MS
+    });
+    return { outcome: "minted", token, userId, expiresAt };
+  } catch (err) {
+    return { outcome: "failed", detail: explain(err, dbPath) };
+  } finally {
+    db?.close();
+  }
+}
+export {
+  CLI_TOKEN_MAX_TTL_MS,
+  CLI_TOKEN_TTL_MS,
+  mintApiToken
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=auth-token.js.map

package/dist/auth-token.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/auth-token.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Mints an API session by inserting a row into the root's `web.db` — no running server needed.\n * Authorized by being able to read and write that root, which already holds every credential\n * the token could reach. On a multi-user box that means the OS account running the server;\n * everyone else signs in with `penguin auth login --server <url>`.\n */\nimport path from \"node:path\";\nimport fs from \"node:fs\";\nimport { openExistingDatabase } from \"./db/database.js\";\nimport { AuthSessionsRepo } from \"./db/repos/auth-sessions.js\";\nimport { UsersRepo } from \"./db/repos/users.js\";\n\n/** An hour: long enough for a controller to finish, short enough to forget. */\nexport const CLI_TOKEN_TTL_MS = 60 * 60_000;\n\n/**\n * Ceiling on a caller-supplied `--ttl-seconds`, matching the default session TTL (config.ts):\n * a token that lives in a file must not outlive an ordinary browser session.\n */\nexport const CLI_TOKEN_MAX_TTL_MS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60_000;\n\nexport type MintTokenResult =\n  | { outcome: \"minted\"; token: string; userId: string; expiresAt: string }\n  /** No web.db on this root — the server has never run here, so there is no account to mint for. */\n  | { outcome: \"no_server\" }\n  | { outcome: \"failed\"; detail: string };\n\n/**\n * Turns a failure into something the person at the terminal can act on. Both cases are\n * ordinary situations, not crashes: a database owned by another OS account, and one written\n * by an older release (minting deliberately does not migrate — see openExistingDatabase).\n */\nfunction explain(err: unknown, dbPath: string): string {\n  const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);\n  if (message.includes(\"no column named via\")) {\n    return `${dbPath} predates this release — start the server once (\\`penguin web\\`) to upgrade it`;\n  }\n  if (message.includes(\"unable to open database\")) {\n    return (\n      `cannot open ${dbPath} — minting needs the data root's own OS account; ` +\n      \"otherwise sign in with `penguin auth login --server <url>`\"\n    );\n  }\n  return message;\n}\n\n/** Issues an API session token for the data root at `root`. */\nexport function mintApiToken(\n  root: string,\n  opts: { userId?: string; ttlMs?: number; dbPath?: string; now?: Date } = {},\n): MintTokenResult {\n  const userId = opts.userId ?? \"admin\";\n  const dbPath = opts.dbPath ?? path.join(root, \"web.db\");\n  // Existence check first: openExistingDatabase would otherwise create an empty file, and a\n  // root with no web.db has no account to mint for.\n  if (!fs.existsSync(dbPath)) return { outcome: \"no_server\" };\n\n  let db: ReturnType<typeof openExistingDatabase> | null = null;\n  try {\n    db = openExistingDatabase(dbPath);\n    if (new UsersRepo(db).findById(userId) === null) {\n      return { outcome: \"failed\", detail: `no such account: ${userId}` };\n    }\n    // The repo is the single minting point (token shape, hash, TTL ceiling), so a CLI-minted\n    // row cannot drift from one the server issues itself.\n    const { token, expiresAt } = new AuthSessionsRepo(db).issue({\n      userId,\n      via: \"cli\",\n      now: opts.now ?? new Date(),\n      ttlMs: opts.ttlMs ?? CLI_TOKEN_TTL_MS,\n      maxTtlMs: CLI_TOKEN_MAX_TTL_MS,\n    });\n    return { outcome: \"minted\", token, userId, expiresAt };\n  } catch (err) {\n    return { outcome: \"failed\", detail: explain(err, dbPath) };\n  } finally {\n    db?.close();\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":";;;;;;;AAMA,OAAO,UAAU;AACjB,OAAO,QAAQ;AAMR,IAAM,mBAAmB,KAAK;AAM9B,IAAM,uBAAuB,KAAK,KAAK,KAAK;AAanD,SAAS,QAAQ,KAAc,QAAwB;AACrD,QAAM,UAAU,eAAe,QAAQ,IAAI,UAAU,OAAO,GAAG;AAC/D,MAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,qBAAqB,GAAG;AAC3C,WAAO,GAAG,MAAM;AAAA,EAClB;AACA,MAAI,QAAQ,SAAS,yBAAyB,GAAG;AAC/C,WACE,eAAe,MAAM;AAAA,EAGzB;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAGO,SAAS,aACd,MACA,OAAyE,CAAC,GACzD;AACjB,QAAM,SAAS,KAAK,UAAU;AAC9B,QAAM,SAAS,KAAK,UAAU,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM,QAAQ;AAGtD,MAAI,CAAC,GAAG,WAAW,MAAM,EAAG,QAAO,EAAE,SAAS,YAAY;AAE1D,MAAI,KAAqD;AACzD,MAAI;AACF,SAAK,qBAAqB,MAAM;AAChC,QAAI,IAAI,UAAU,EAAE,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,MAAM,MAAM;AAC/C,aAAO,EAAE,SAAS,UAAU,QAAQ,oBAAoB,MAAM,GAAG;AAAA,IACnE;AAGA,UAAM,EAAE,OAAO,UAAU,IAAI,IAAI,iBAAiB,EAAE,EAAE,MAAM;AAAA,MAC1D;AAAA,MACA,KAAK;AAAA,MACL,KAAK,KAAK,OAAO,oBAAI,KAAK;AAAA,MAC1B,OAAO,KAAK,SAAS;AAAA,MACrB,UAAU;AAAA,IACZ,CAAC;AACD,WAAO,EAAE,SAAS,UAAU,OAAO,QAAQ,UAAU;AAAA,EACvD,SAAS,KAAK;AACZ,WAAO,EAAE,SAAS,UAAU,QAAQ,QAAQ,KAAK,MAAM,EAAE;AAAA,EAC3D,UAAE;AACA,QAAI,MAAM;AAAA,EACZ;AACF;","names":[]}

package/dist/{chunk-WKJ3ANJP.js → chunk-622KL7BQ.js}

@@ -11,13 +11,21 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS users (
   password_is_initial INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,  -- 1=initial password (seeded/admin-set); cleared once the user changes it
   created_at          TEXT NOT NULL
 );
+-- Server-side sessions backing the HttpOnly cookie: the cookie carries a 32-byte random
+-- token, the row stores only its sha256. A session outlives a restart (it is on disk), which
+-- is why the model is a row and not a signed statement.
 CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS auth_sessions (
   token_hash TEXT PRIMARY KEY,               -- sha256(token) hex; the cookie stores only the raw token
   user_id    TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES users(user_id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
   created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
-  expires_at TEXT NOT NULL,                  -- 7-day sliding renewal (topped up when <6 days remain)
-  via        TEXT                            -- 'password' | 'desktop'; NULL = legacy row (password)
+  expires_at TEXT NOT NULL,                  -- 30-day sliding renewal, topped up in place when <29 days remain
+  via        TEXT                            -- 'password'|'desktop'|'setup'|'cli'; NULL = legacy (password)
 );
+-- deleteExpired runs on every login and mint, deleteByUser on every admin reset; without
+-- these both scan the whole table.
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_auth_sessions_expires ON auth_sessions(expires_at);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_auth_sessions_user ON auth_sessions(user_id);
+
 CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS projects (
   project_id    TEXT PRIMARY KEY,            -- directory name doubles as id; display name lives in project_config.toml
   owner_user_id TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES users(user_id),
@@ -114,18 +122,22 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS goal_state (        -- goal-mode runtime state (GOAL.
 );
 CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_goal_session ON goal_state(session_id);
 CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS messaging_bindings ( -- Session \u2194 messaging-channel bot bindings (runtime/messaging/ holds the long connections)
-  session_id       TEXT NOT NULL,              -- a Session keeps at most one saved config PER channel (composite PK below); at most ONE of them is enabled at a time (route-enforced, 409 another_channel_enabled)
-  channel          TEXT NOT NULL,              -- messaging channel discriminator ('feishu' | 'telegram')
-  account_id       TEXT NOT NULL,              -- channel-scoped bot/app identity (feishu: app_id; telegram: the bot token's numeric id); one binding per account per channel (idx_messaging_account: one account has one event stream, two Sessions would race it)
-  config_json      TEXT NOT NULL,              -- channel-specific credentials/config JSON (feishu: appId/appSecret/baseDomain; telegram: botToken); secrets plaintext at rest (same trade-off as the proxy address in server_settings), masked at every API surface; a cleared secret is stored as "" (the row and its account identity stay)
+  session_id       TEXT NOT NULL,              -- a Session keeps at most one saved config PER channel (composite PK below); at most ONE of them is enabled at a time (route-enforced, 409 another_channel_enabled), and enabling is what binds the account to this Session
+  channel          TEXT NOT NULL,              -- messaging channel discriminator ('feishu' | 'telegram' | 'qq')
+  account_id       TEXT NOT NULL,              -- channel-scoped bot/app identity (feishu: app_id; telegram: the bot token's numeric id; qq: the bot's App ID); NOT unique \u2014 any number of Sessions may keep the same account saved side by side, each with its own config and last-chat memory; only ENABLING is exclusive (route-enforced, 409 account_enabled_elsewhere: one account has one event stream, two live connections on it would race)
+  config_json      TEXT NOT NULL,              -- channel-specific credentials/config JSON (feishu: appId/appSecret/baseDomain; telegram: botToken; qq: appId/appSecret); secrets plaintext at rest (same trade-off as the proxy address in server_settings), masked at every API surface; a cleared secret is stored as "" (the row and its account identity stay)
   enabled          INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, -- INTENT state (the connection's runtime status stays in memory): new bindings start disabled \u2014 saving credentials never opens a connection, the explicit state toggle does
-  last_chat_id     TEXT,                       -- most recent inbound chat (NULL until the bot is messaged once; replies and test messages target it)
+  line_per_message INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, -- delivery preference: 1 = every non-blank line of a relayed assistant reply is sent as its own message (a reply written as spoken lines arrives as spoken lines), 0 = one message per reply. Channel-agnostic, so it lives here rather than in config_json, which each connector owns
+  final_reply_only INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, -- delivery preference: 1 = a run's intermediate assistant messages are held and only its LAST completed one is sent, at the run's end, 0 = every completed assistant message mirrors the moment it completes. Channel-agnostic like the column above and independent of it: with both set, that one final text is the one split per line
+  render_markdown  INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1, -- delivery preference: 1 = a relayed reply's Markdown is rendered in the channel's own markup (Telegram HTML, a Feishu card, QQ markdown), 0 = the reply's characters are sent as written. DEFAULT 1 because the model writes Markdown and showing it raw was the defect; the per-channel subsets and the plain-text fallback live in the connectors
+  last_chat_id     TEXT,                       -- most recent inbound chat (NULL until the bot is messaged once; replies and test messages target it); CONNECTOR-OPAQUE, not necessarily a bare chat id \u2014 telegram appends the forum topic (see telegram-connector.ts chatRefOf), so only that channel's connector may interpret it
   last_chat_is_direct INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1, -- 1 = direct chat (reply by chat id), 0 = group chat (prefer reply-to-message)
+  last_inbound_message_id TEXT,                 -- channel id of the most recently PROCESSED inbound message (NULL until one arrives); the durable half of the bridge's redelivery guard, so a channel replaying an event this server already turned into a Task after a restart does not run it twice
   created_at       TEXT NOT NULL,
   updated_at       TEXT NOT NULL,
   PRIMARY KEY (session_id, channel)
 );
-CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_messaging_account ON messaging_bindings(channel, account_id);
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_messaging_by_account ON messaging_bindings(channel, account_id);  -- serves the enable guard's by-account lookup; deliberately NOT unique, unlike its predecessor idx_messaging_account (dropped on open) which made an account exclusive to one Session forever
 CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS ui_prefs (
   user_id    TEXT PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES users(user_id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
   prefs_json TEXT NOT NULL                    -- {theme?, lastProjectId?, ...} free-form JSON
@@ -163,12 +175,19 @@ CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_trace_sessions_agent ON trace_sessions(project_id
 
 // src/db/database.ts
 var sqlite = process.getBuiltinModule("node:sqlite");
+function openExistingDatabase(dbPath) {
+  const db = new sqlite.DatabaseSync(dbPath);
+  db.exec("PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON;");
+  db.exec("PRAGMA busy_timeout = 5000;");
+  return db;
+}
 function openDatabase(dbPath) {
   if (dbPath !== ":memory:") {
     mkdirSync(path.dirname(dbPath), { recursive: true });
   }
   const db = new sqlite.DatabaseSync(dbPath);
   db.exec("PRAGMA journal_mode = WAL;");
+  db.exec("PRAGMA busy_timeout = 5000;");
   db.exec("PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON;");
   db.exec(SCHEMA_SQL);
   ensureColumn(db, "sessions", "client", "TEXT");
@@ -177,7 +196,12 @@ function openDatabase(dbPath) {
   ensureColumn(db, "sessions", "thinking_level", "TEXT");
   ensureColumn(db, "auth_sessions", "via", "TEXT");
   ensureColumn(db, "trace_files", "page_stats", "TEXT");
+  ensureColumn(db, "messaging_bindings", "line_per_message", "INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0");
+  ensureColumn(db, "messaging_bindings", "final_reply_only", "INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0");
+  ensureColumn(db, "messaging_bindings", "render_markdown", "INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1");
+  ensureColumn(db, "messaging_bindings", "last_inbound_message_id", "TEXT");
   db.exec("DROP INDEX IF EXISTS idx_usage_session");
+  db.exec("DROP INDEX IF EXISTS idx_messaging_account");
   upgradeLastActiveAt(db);
   return db;
 }
@@ -205,45 +229,6 @@ function ensureColumn(db, table, column, ddl) {
   return true;
 }
 
-// src/db/repos/auth-sessions.ts
-var AuthSessionsRepo = class {
-  constructor(db) {
-    this.db = db;
-  }
-  db;
-  insert(row) {
-    this.db.prepare(
-      "INSERT INTO auth_sessions (token_hash, user_id, created_at, expires_at, via) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)"
-    ).run(row.tokenHash, row.userId, row.createdAt, row.expiresAt, row.via);
-  }
-  findByTokenHash(tokenHash) {
-    const r = this.db.prepare("SELECT * FROM auth_sessions WHERE token_hash = ?").get(tokenHash);
-    if (!r) return null;
-    return {
-      tokenHash: r.token_hash,
-      userId: r.user_id,
-      createdAt: r.created_at,
-      expiresAt: r.expires_at,
-      via: r.via ?? null
-    };
-  }
-  /** Sliding renewal: update the expiration time. */
-  touch(tokenHash, expiresAt) {
-    this.db.prepare("UPDATE auth_sessions SET expires_at = ? WHERE token_hash = ?").run(expiresAt, tokenHash);
-  }
-  delete(tokenHash) {
-    this.db.prepare("DELETE FROM auth_sessions WHERE token_hash = ?").run(tokenHash);
-  }
-  /** Opportunistically clean up expired sessions (called during login/validation). */
-  deleteExpired(nowIso) {
-    this.db.prepare("DELETE FROM auth_sessions WHERE expires_at < ?").run(nowIso);
-  }
-  /** Clear all sessions for a user (forces re-login after an admin resets the password). */
-  deleteByUser(userId) {
-    this.db.prepare("DELETE FROM auth_sessions WHERE user_id = ?").run(userId);
-  }
-};
-
 // src/db/repos/users.ts
 function mapRow(r) {
   return {
@@ -293,357 +278,83 @@ var UsersRepo = class {
   }
 };
 
-// src/auth/password.ts
-import { randomBytes, scrypt, timingSafeEqual } from "crypto";
-var SCRYPT_COST = 16384;
-var SCRYPT_R = 8;
-var SCRYPT_P = 1;
-var SALT_BYTES = 16;
-var KEY_BYTES = 64;
-function scryptAsync(password, salt, keyLen, n, r, p) {
-  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
-    scrypt(password, salt, keyLen, { N: n, r, p, maxmem: 128 * 1024 * 1024 }, (err, key) => {
-      if (err) reject(err);
-      else resolve(key);
-    });
-  });
-}
-async function hashPassword(password, cost = SCRYPT_COST) {
-  const salt = randomBytes(SALT_BYTES);
-  const key = await scryptAsync(password, salt, KEY_BYTES, cost, SCRYPT_R, SCRYPT_P);
-  return [
-    "scrypt",
-    String(cost),
-    String(SCRYPT_R),
-    String(SCRYPT_P),
-    salt.toString("base64"),
-    key.toString("base64")
-  ].join("$");
-}
-async function verifyPassword(password, stored) {
-  const parts = stored.split("$");
-  if (parts.length !== 6 || parts[0] !== "scrypt") return false;
-  const n = Number(parts[1]);
-  const r = Number(parts[2]);
-  const p = Number(parts[3]);
-  if (!Number.isInteger(n) || !Number.isInteger(r) || !Number.isInteger(p)) return false;
-  let salt;
-  let expected;
-  try {
-    salt = Buffer.from(parts[4], "base64");
-    expected = Buffer.from(parts[5], "base64");
-  } catch {
-    return false;
-  }
-  if (salt.length === 0 || expected.length === 0) return false;
-  let actual;
-  try {
-    actual = await scryptAsync(password, salt, expected.length, n, r, p);
-  } catch {
-    return false;
-  }
-  return actual.length === expected.length && timingSafeEqual(actual, expected);
-}
-
-// src/auth/service.ts
-import { createHash as createHash2, randomBytes as randomBytes3, randomInt } from "crypto";
-
-// src/auth/api-token.ts
-import { createHash, randomBytes as randomBytes2, timingSafeEqual as timingSafeEqual2 } from "crypto";
-import fs from "fs";
-import path2 from "path";
-function apiTokenPath(root) {
-  return path2.join(root, "api-token");
-}
-function mintApiToken() {
-  return randomBytes2(32).toString("base64url");
-}
-function storeApiToken(root, token) {
-  try {
-    fs.mkdirSync(root, { recursive: true });
-    const target = apiTokenPath(root);
-    const tmp = `${target}.${process.pid}.tmp`;
-    fs.writeFileSync(tmp, `${token}
-`, { mode: 384 });
-    fs.renameSync(tmp, target);
-  } catch {
-  }
-}
-function tokensEqual(a, b) {
-  const digest = (v) => createHash("sha256").update(v).digest();
-  return timingSafeEqual2(digest(a), digest(b));
-}
-
-// src/http/errors.ts
-var HttpError = class extends Error {
-  constructor(status, code, message) {
-    super(message);
-    this.status = status;
-    this.code = code;
-    this.name = "HttpError";
-  }
-  status;
-  code;
-};
-function errorBody(code, message) {
-  return { error: { code, message } };
-}
-function isMissingCredential(err) {
-  const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
-  return /missing credentials|api[_ ]?key/i.test(message);
-}
-function modelCredentialMissing(modelId) {
-  return new HttpError(
-    400,
-    "model_credential_missing",
-    `Model ${modelId} has no API key yet. Configure it on the Models page first.`
-  );
-}
-function handleError(err, c) {
-  if (err instanceof HttpError) {
-    return c.json(errorBody(err.code, err.message), err.status);
-  }
-  console.error(`[server] Unhandled exception: ${err.stack ?? err.message}`);
-  return c.json(errorBody("internal", "Internal server error."), 500);
-}
-
-// src/auth/service.ts
-var MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH = 8;
-var ADMIN_USER_ID = "admin";
-var LOGIN_FREE_ATTEMPTS = 5;
-var LOGIN_BACKOFF_START_MS = 1e3;
-var LOGIN_BACKOFF_CAP_MS = 6e4;
-var LOGIN_FAILURE_IDLE_MS = 15 * 6e4;
-function generateInitialAdminPassword() {
-  return "penguin-" + String(randomInt(0, 1e4)).padStart(4, "0");
-}
-function sha256Hex(value) {
-  return createHash2("sha256").update(value).digest("hex");
-}
-function toUserInfo(row) {
-  return {
-    userId: row.userId,
-    isAdmin: row.isAdmin,
-    passwordIsInitial: row.passwordIsInitial,
-    createdAt: row.createdAt
-  };
+// src/db/repos/auth-sessions.ts
+import { createHash, randomBytes } from "crypto";
+function sessionTokenHash(token) {
+  return createHash("sha256").update(token).digest("hex");
 }
-var AuthService = class {
-  constructor(deps) {
-    this.deps = deps;
-    this.provisioner = deps.provisionInitialProject;
-    this.now = deps.now ?? (() => /* @__PURE__ */ new Date());
-    this.hashCost = deps.passwordHashCost ?? SCRYPT_COST;
+var AuthSessionsRepo = class {
+  constructor(db) {
+    this.db = db;
   }
-  deps;
-  /**
-   * What a fresh user is provisioned with is business policy, answered by the CURRENT
-   * App: the platform installs its answer at create over the claimed auth capability
-   * (ordinary capability use, not a registry entry), and each swap's successor overwrites
-   * it. Starts as the constructor-supplied fallback so standalone/test constructions
-   * keep working unchanged.
-   */
-  provisioner;
-  now;
-  hashCost;
+  db;
   /**
-   * Startup seeding (idempotent): creates the built-in admin and adopts
-   * default_project when the users table is empty; if the initial Project fails,
-   * the user row is rolled back and the server retries on next startup.
-   * Returns the initial password when it actually seeded — the caller prints it,
-   * the only place a generated password is ever shown — and null when users
-   * already exist.
+   * Mints a session and returns the raw token for a cookie or the terminal. `maxTtlMs` caps a
+   * caller-supplied lifetime (`--ttl-seconds`): one longer than an ordinary session would make
+   * a leaked token file outlive every other credential, sliding forever. Expired rows are
+   * swept here too, so a cron that only mints does not accumulate them.
    */
-  async seedAdmin() {
-    if (this.deps.users.count() > 0) return null;
-    const password = this.deps.seedAdminPassword ?? generateInitialAdminPassword();
-    if (password.length < MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH) {
-      throw new Error(
-        `PENGUIN_SEED_ADMIN_PASSWORD must be at least ${MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH} characters.`
-      );
-    }
-    const user = {
-      userId: ADMIN_USER_ID,
-      passwordHash: await hashPassword(password, this.hashCost),
-      isAdmin: true,
-      passwordIsInitial: true,
-      createdAt: this.now().toISOString()
-    };
-    this.deps.users.insert(user);
-    try {
-      await this.provisioner(user, true);
-    } catch (err) {
-      this.deps.users.delete(user.userId);
-      throw err;
-    }
-    return password;
-  }
-  /** Installs the current App's provisioning policy (see the `provisioner` field). */
-  setProvisioner(provision) {
-    this.provisioner = provision;
-  }
-  /** Whether the built-in admin still runs on its initial password (drives the startup reminder notice). */
-  adminPasswordIsInitial() {
-    return this.deps.users.findById(ADMIN_USER_ID)?.passwordIsInitial === true;
-  }
-  /** Consecutive login failures per userId (see the throttling comment on the constants). */
-  loginFailures = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
-  /** The wait imposed after `failures` consecutive failures (0 while within the free attempts). */
-  loginDelayMs(failures) {
-    const excess = failures - LOGIN_FREE_ATTEMPTS;
-    if (excess <= 0) return 0;
-    return Math.min(LOGIN_BACKOFF_START_MS * 2 ** (excess - 1), LOGIN_BACKOFF_CAP_MS);
-  }
-  async login(userId, password) {
-    const nowMs = this.now().getTime();
-    for (const [key, entry] of this.loginFailures) {
-      if (nowMs - entry.lastFailureAt > LOGIN_FAILURE_IDLE_MS) this.loginFailures.delete(key);
-    }
-    const failed = this.loginFailures.get(userId);
-    if (failed) {
-      const readyAt = failed.lastFailureAt + this.loginDelayMs(failed.failures);
-      if (nowMs < readyAt) {
-        throw new HttpError(
-          429,
-          "too_many_attempts",
-          `Too many failed sign-in attempts. Try again in ${Math.ceil((readyAt - nowMs) / 1e3)}s.`
-        );
-      }
-    }
-    const row = this.deps.users.findById(userId);
-    const ok = row !== null && await verifyPassword(password, row.passwordHash);
-    if (!row || !ok) {
-      this.loginFailures.set(userId, {
-        failures: (failed?.failures ?? 0) + 1,
-        lastFailureAt: this.now().getTime()
-      });
-      throw new HttpError(401, "invalid_credentials", "Incorrect username or password.");
-    }
-    this.loginFailures.delete(userId);
-    this.deps.authSessions.deleteExpired(this.now().toISOString());
-    return { user: toUserInfo(row), token: this.issueSession(row.userId, "password") };
+  issue(opts) {
+    const ttlMs = Math.max(1e3, Math.min(opts.ttlMs, opts.maxTtlMs ?? opts.ttlMs));
+    const token = randomBytes(32).toString("base64url");
+    const createdAt = opts.now.toISOString();
+    const expiresAt = new Date(opts.now.getTime() + ttlMs).toISOString();
+    this.deleteExpired(createdAt);
+    this.insert({
+      tokenHash: sessionTokenHash(token),
+      userId: opts.userId,
+      createdAt,
+      expiresAt,
+      via: opts.via
+    });
+    return { token, expiresAt };
   }
-  /**
-   * Desktop-mode sign-in: issues an admin session WITHOUT a password check — the caller
-   * (the desktop-login route) has already redeemed the shell's one-shot token, which is
-   * the credential here. Throws if the admin has not been seeded yet (desktop-login runs
-   * after startup seeding, so this only trips on a broken deployment).
-   */
-  loginDesktop() {
-    const row = this.deps.users.findById(ADMIN_USER_ID);
-    if (!row) {
-      throw new HttpError(500, "internal", "Built-in admin has not been seeded.");
-    }
-    this.deps.authSessions.deleteExpired(this.now().toISOString());
-    return { user: toUserInfo(row), token: this.issueSession(row.userId, "desktop") };
+  insert(row) {
+    this.db.prepare(
+      "INSERT INTO auth_sessions (token_hash, user_id, created_at, expires_at, via) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)"
+    ).run(row.tokenHash, row.userId, row.createdAt, row.expiresAt, row.via);
   }
-  /** Self password change (user settings): validates the old password, and on success clears the initial-password flag; the current session remains valid. */
-  async changePassword(userId, oldPassword, newPassword) {
-    const row = this.deps.users.findById(userId);
-    if (!row || !await verifyPassword(oldPassword, row.passwordHash)) {
-      throw new HttpError(400, "password_mismatch", "Current password is incorrect.");
-    }
-    if (newPassword.length < MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH) {
-      throw new HttpError(400, "invalid_password", "Password must be at least 8 characters.");
-    }
-    this.deps.users.updatePassword(userId, await hashPassword(newPassword, this.hashCost), false);
-    this.deps.onPasswordChanged?.(userId);
+  findByTokenHash(tokenHash) {
+    const r = this.db.prepare("SELECT * FROM auth_sessions WHERE token_hash = ?").get(tokenHash);
+    if (!r) return null;
+    return {
+      tokenHash: r.token_hash,
+      userId: r.user_id,
+      createdAt: r.created_at,
+      expiresAt: r.expires_at,
+      via: r.via ?? null
+    };
   }
-  /**
-   * Desktop-session password set: no old-password check. Only reachable for sessions
-   * established via desktop-login (the me route gates on sessionVia) — the seed password
-   * of a desktop-created root is random and never shown, so its holder has nothing to
-   * type into an old-password field; the shell's token already proved machine ownership.
-   */
-  async setPasswordDesktop(userId, newPassword) {
-    if (newPassword.length < MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH) {
-      throw new HttpError(400, "invalid_password", "Password must be at least 8 characters.");
-    }
-    this.deps.users.updatePassword(userId, await hashPassword(newPassword, this.hashCost), false);
-    this.deps.onPasswordChanged?.(userId);
+  /** Sliding renewal: update the expiration time. */
+  touch(tokenHash, expiresAt) {
+    this.db.prepare("UPDATE auth_sessions SET expires_at = ? WHERE token_hash = ?").run(expiresAt, tokenHash);
   }
-  logout(token) {
-    this.deps.authSessions.delete(sha256Hex(token));
+  delete(tokenHash) {
+    this.db.prepare("DELETE FROM auth_sessions WHERE token_hash = ?").run(tokenHash);
   }
-  /**
-   * The boot-scoped local API token (`<root>/api-token`, see auth/api-token.ts): held in
-   * memory by the process that minted it. Null until the startup assembly installs it
-   * (standalone/test constructions without one simply never authenticate a Bearer
-   * header).
-   */
-  apiToken = null;
-  /** Installs the boot's local API token (called once by the startup assembly). */
-  setLocalApiToken(token) {
-    this.apiToken = token;
+  /** Opportunistically clean up expired sessions (called during login/validation). */
+  deleteExpired(nowIso) {
+    this.db.prepare("DELETE FROM auth_sessions WHERE expires_at < ?").run(nowIso);
   }
-  /** The current boot's local API token (what control-env injection hands to tool subprocesses); null when none was installed. */
-  localApiToken() {
-    return this.apiToken;
+  /** Clear all sessions for a user (forces re-login after an admin resets the password). */
+  deleteByUser(userId) {
+    this.db.prepare("DELETE FROM auth_sessions WHERE user_id = ?").run(userId);
   }
   /**
-   * Validates a Bearer token against the boot's local API token (constant-time compare):
-   * a match authenticates as the built-in admin — holding the token proves filesystem
-   * access to the data root, which is admin authority (see auth/api-token.ts). Returns
-   * null on mismatch, when no token is installed, or when the admin row is missing.
+   * Clear a user's sessions of one kind. Used to end EVERY first-login session when a password
+   * is set: an earlier boot's link may still be live in someone's scrollback, and a `setup`
+   * session may change the password without knowing the old one.
    */
-  authenticateApiToken(token) {
-    if (this.apiToken === null || token.length === 0) return null;
-    if (!tokensEqual(token, this.apiToken)) return null;
-    const user = this.deps.users.findById(ADMIN_USER_ID);
-    return user === null ? null : { user, via: "token" };
-  }
-  /** Validates the cookie token: returns null if expired/unknown; sliding renewal once less than 6 days remain. */
-  authenticateWithMeta(token) {
-    const tokenHash = sha256Hex(token);
-    const session = this.deps.authSessions.findByTokenHash(tokenHash);
-    if (!session) return null;
-    const now = this.now();
-    const expiresAt = Date.parse(session.expiresAt);
-    if (!(expiresAt > now.getTime())) {
-      this.deps.authSessions.delete(tokenHash);
-      return null;
-    }
-    if (expiresAt - now.getTime() < this.deps.sessionRenewMs) {
-      this.deps.authSessions.touch(
-        tokenHash,
-        new Date(now.getTime() + this.deps.sessionTtlMs).toISOString()
-      );
-    }
-    const user = this.deps.users.findById(session.userId);
-    if (!user) return null;
-    return { user, via: session.via === "desktop" ? "desktop" : "password" };
-  }
-  issueSession(userId, via) {
-    const token = randomBytes3(32).toString("base64url");
-    const now = this.now();
-    this.deps.authSessions.insert({
-      tokenHash: sha256Hex(token),
-      userId,
-      createdAt: now.toISOString(),
-      expiresAt: new Date(now.getTime() + this.deps.sessionTtlMs).toISOString(),
-      via
-    });
-    return token;
+  deleteByUserAndVia(userId, via) {
+    this.db.prepare("DELETE FROM auth_sessions WHERE user_id = ? AND via = ?").run(userId, via);
   }
 };
 
 export {
+  openExistingDatabase,
   openDatabase,
-  AuthSessionsRepo,
   UsersRepo,
-  HttpError,
-  errorBody,
-  isMissingCredential,
-  modelCredentialMissing,
-  handleError,
-  mintApiToken,
-  storeApiToken,
-  SCRYPT_COST,
-  hashPassword,
-  MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH,
-  ADMIN_USER_ID,
-  generateInitialAdminPassword,
-  toUserInfo,
-  AuthService
+  sessionTokenHash,
+  AuthSessionsRepo
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-WKJ3ANJP.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-622KL7BQ.js.map