@prismshadow/penguin-server 0.2.4 → 0.2.5

package/dist/{chunk-KQQ3HSTK.js → chunk-WKJ3ANJP.js}

@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS error_records (     -- server-side error capture (the
   project_id TEXT,                     -- nullable: sign-in/registration and process-level errors have no Project context
   agent_id   TEXT,
   session_id TEXT,
-  source     TEXT NOT NULL,            -- http | session | usage | title | subagent | process | llm | environment | compaction | schedule
+  source     TEXT NOT NULL,            -- http | session | usage | title | subagent | process | llm | environment | compaction | schedule | messaging
   kind       TEXT NOT NULL,            -- expected (HttpError, business 4xx) | unexpected (500/runtime)
   code       TEXT NOT NULL,            -- HttpError.code / internal / session_run_failed / ...
   status     INTEGER,                  -- HTTP status code; NULL for non-HTTP sources
@@ -113,6 +113,19 @@ CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS goal_state (        -- goal-mode runtime state (GOAL.
   updated_at  TEXT NOT NULL
 );
 CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_goal_session ON goal_state(session_id);
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS messaging_bindings ( -- Session \u2194 messaging-channel bot bindings (runtime/messaging/ holds the long connections)
+  session_id       TEXT NOT NULL,              -- a Session keeps at most one saved config PER channel (composite PK below); at most ONE of them is enabled at a time (route-enforced, 409 another_channel_enabled)
+  channel          TEXT NOT NULL,              -- messaging channel discriminator ('feishu' | 'telegram')
+  account_id       TEXT NOT NULL,              -- channel-scoped bot/app identity (feishu: app_id; telegram: the bot token's numeric id); one binding per account per channel (idx_messaging_account: one account has one event stream, two Sessions would race it)
+  config_json      TEXT NOT NULL,              -- channel-specific credentials/config JSON (feishu: appId/appSecret/baseDomain; telegram: botToken); secrets plaintext at rest (same trade-off as the proxy address in server_settings), masked at every API surface; a cleared secret is stored as "" (the row and its account identity stay)
+  enabled          INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, -- INTENT state (the connection's runtime status stays in memory): new bindings start disabled \u2014 saving credentials never opens a connection, the explicit state toggle does
+  last_chat_id     TEXT,                       -- most recent inbound chat (NULL until the bot is messaged once; replies and test messages target it)
+  last_chat_is_direct INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1, -- 1 = direct chat (reply by chat id), 0 = group chat (prefer reply-to-message)
+  created_at       TEXT NOT NULL,
+  updated_at       TEXT NOT NULL,
+  PRIMARY KEY (session_id, channel)
+);
+CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_messaging_account ON messaging_bindings(channel, account_id);
 CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS ui_prefs (
   user_id    TEXT PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES users(user_id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
   prefs_json TEXT NOT NULL                    -- {theme?, lastProjectId?, ...} free-form JSON
@@ -333,7 +346,33 @@ async function verifyPassword(password, stored) {
 }
 
 // src/auth/service.ts
-import { createHash, randomBytes as randomBytes2, randomInt } from "crypto";
+import { createHash as createHash2, randomBytes as randomBytes3, randomInt } from "crypto";
+
+// src/auth/api-token.ts
+import { createHash, randomBytes as randomBytes2, timingSafeEqual as timingSafeEqual2 } from "crypto";
+import fs from "fs";
+import path2 from "path";
+function apiTokenPath(root) {
+  return path2.join(root, "api-token");
+}
+function mintApiToken() {
+  return randomBytes2(32).toString("base64url");
+}
+function storeApiToken(root, token) {
+  try {
+    fs.mkdirSync(root, { recursive: true });
+    const target = apiTokenPath(root);
+    const tmp = `${target}.${process.pid}.tmp`;
+    fs.writeFileSync(tmp, `${token}
+`, { mode: 384 });
+    fs.renameSync(tmp, target);
+  } catch {
+  }
+}
+function tokensEqual(a, b) {
+  const digest = (v) => createHash("sha256").update(v).digest();
+  return timingSafeEqual2(digest(a), digest(b));
+}
 
 // src/http/errors.ts
 var HttpError = class extends Error {
@@ -379,7 +418,7 @@ function generateInitialAdminPassword() {
   return "penguin-" + String(randomInt(0, 1e4)).padStart(4, "0");
 }
 function sha256Hex(value) {
-  return createHash("sha256").update(value).digest("hex");
+  return createHash2("sha256").update(value).digest("hex");
 }
 function toUserInfo(row) {
   return {
@@ -392,10 +431,19 @@ function toUserInfo(row) {
 var AuthService = class {
   constructor(deps) {
     this.deps = deps;
+    this.provisioner = deps.provisionInitialProject;
     this.now = deps.now ?? (() => /* @__PURE__ */ new Date());
     this.hashCost = deps.passwordHashCost ?? SCRYPT_COST;
   }
   deps;
+  /**
+   * What a fresh user is provisioned with is business policy, answered by the CURRENT
+   * App: the platform installs its answer at create over the claimed auth capability
+   * (ordinary capability use, not a registry entry), and each swap's successor overwrites
+   * it. Starts as the constructor-supplied fallback so standalone/test constructions
+   * keep working unchanged.
+   */
+  provisioner;
   now;
   hashCost;
   /**
@@ -423,13 +471,17 @@ var AuthService = class {
     };
     this.deps.users.insert(user);
     try {
-      await this.deps.provisionInitialProject(user, true);
+      await this.provisioner(user, true);
     } catch (err) {
       this.deps.users.delete(user.userId);
       throw err;
     }
     return password;
   }
+  /** Installs the current App's provisioning policy (see the `provisioner` field). */
+  setProvisioner(provision) {
+    this.provisioner = provision;
+  }
   /** Whether the built-in admin still runs on its initial password (drives the startup reminder notice). */
   adminPasswordIsInitial() {
     return this.deps.users.findById(ADMIN_USER_ID)?.passwordIsInitial === true;
@@ -513,6 +565,33 @@ var AuthService = class {
   logout(token) {
     this.deps.authSessions.delete(sha256Hex(token));
   }
+  /**
+   * The boot-scoped local API token (`<root>/api-token`, see auth/api-token.ts): held in
+   * memory by the process that minted it. Null until the startup assembly installs it
+   * (standalone/test constructions without one simply never authenticate a Bearer
+   * header).
+   */
+  apiToken = null;
+  /** Installs the boot's local API token (called once by the startup assembly). */
+  setLocalApiToken(token) {
+    this.apiToken = token;
+  }
+  /** The current boot's local API token (what control-env injection hands to tool subprocesses); null when none was installed. */
+  localApiToken() {
+    return this.apiToken;
+  }
+  /**
+   * Validates a Bearer token against the boot's local API token (constant-time compare):
+   * a match authenticates as the built-in admin — holding the token proves filesystem
+   * access to the data root, which is admin authority (see auth/api-token.ts). Returns
+   * null on mismatch, when no token is installed, or when the admin row is missing.
+   */
+  authenticateApiToken(token) {
+    if (this.apiToken === null || token.length === 0) return null;
+    if (!tokensEqual(token, this.apiToken)) return null;
+    const user = this.deps.users.findById(ADMIN_USER_ID);
+    return user === null ? null : { user, via: "token" };
+  }
   /** Validates the cookie token: returns null if expired/unknown; sliding renewal once less than 6 days remain. */
   authenticateWithMeta(token) {
     const tokenHash = sha256Hex(token);
@@ -535,7 +614,7 @@ var AuthService = class {
     return { user, via: session.via === "desktop" ? "desktop" : "password" };
   }
   issueSession(userId, via) {
-    const token = randomBytes2(32).toString("base64url");
+    const token = randomBytes3(32).toString("base64url");
     const now = this.now();
     this.deps.authSessions.insert({
       tokenHash: sha256Hex(token),
@@ -557,6 +636,8 @@ export {
   isMissingCredential,
   modelCredentialMissing,
   handleError,
+  mintApiToken,
+  storeApiToken,
   SCRYPT_COST,
   hashPassword,
   MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH,
@@ -565,4 +646,4 @@ export {
   toUserInfo,
   AuthService
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-KQQ3HSTK.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-WKJ3ANJP.js.map

package/dist/chunk-WKJ3ANJP.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/db/database.ts","../src/db/schema.ts","../src/db/repos/auth-sessions.ts","../src/db/repos/users.ts","../src/auth/password.ts","../src/auth/service.ts","../src/auth/api-token.ts","../src/http/errors.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * SQLite connection & initialization (node:sqlite DatabaseSync).\n *\n * Single process, single writer: a synchronous API is sufficient and avoids a connection\n * pool; WAL mode and foreign key constraints are enabled. Table-creation SQL runs on open\n * (idempotent), with no migration branches (product not yet released).\n */\nimport { mkdirSync } from \"node:fs\";\nimport path from \"node:path\";\nimport type { DatabaseSync } from \"node:sqlite\";\nimport { SCHEMA_SQL } from \"./schema.js\";\n\n// Fetch the runtime module via process.getBuiltinModule (node >=22.3): avoids static\n// resolution of `node:sqlite` by bundlers/vite (some tools' builtin lists don't yet\n// recognize this experimental module).\nconst sqlite = process.getBuiltinModule(\"node:sqlite\");\n\n/** Open (creating if necessary) the database: ensure the parent directory exists, set PRAGMAs, run table creation. */\nexport function openDatabase(dbPath: string): DatabaseSync {\n  if (dbPath !== \":memory:\") {\n    mkdirSync(path.dirname(dbPath), { recursive: true });\n  }\n  const db = new sqlite.DatabaseSync(dbPath);\n  db.exec(\"PRAGMA journal_mode = WAL;\");\n  db.exec(\"PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON;\");\n  db.exec(SCHEMA_SQL);\n  // Columns added to the schema after a web.db was formed: CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS never\n  // touches an existing table, so they are ALTERed in here. Keep the list in sync with\n  // schema.ts; drop entries only in a release allowed to break existing web.db files.\n  ensureColumn(db, \"sessions\", \"client\", \"TEXT\");\n  ensureColumn(db, \"sessions\", \"has_trace\", \"INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0\");\n  ensureColumn(db, \"sessions\", \"fork_count\", \"INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0\");\n  ensureColumn(db, \"sessions\", \"thinking_level\", \"TEXT\");\n  ensureColumn(db, \"auth_sessions\", \"via\", \"TEXT\");\n  ensureColumn(db, \"trace_files\", \"page_stats\", \"TEXT\");\n  // Superseded by idx_usage_session_ts (session_id, ts), which SCHEMA_SQL just created on\n  // this database: the old index is a strict prefix of it, so every query it served is\n  // served identically. Dropping is safe — an index is derived, never data.\n  db.exec(\"DROP INDEX IF EXISTS idx_usage_session\");\n  upgradeLastActiveAt(db);\n  return db;\n}\n\n/**\n * One-time `sessions.last_active_at` upgrade, ALTER + backfill in a single transaction.\n *\n * The backfill runs **only in the open that actually adds the column** (SQLite's ALTER\n * TABLE ADD COLUMN is transactional, so a crash mid-upgrade rolls back to \"no column\" and\n * the next open redoes both halves — never a half-migrated table, and never a full\n * `sessions` scan on the millions of opens that follow). Legacy rows take the session's\n * most recent request timestamp — usage_records, covered by idx_usage_session_ts, the\n * closest persisted proxy for \"last Trace activity\" — else their own created_at.\n */\nfunction upgradeLastActiveAt(db: DatabaseSync): void {\n  db.exec(\"BEGIN\");\n  try {\n    if (ensureColumn(db, \"sessions\", \"last_active_at\", \"TEXT\")) {\n      db.exec(\n        `UPDATE sessions SET last_active_at = COALESCE(\n           (SELECT MAX(ts) FROM usage_records WHERE usage_records.session_id = sessions.session_id),\n           created_at\n         )`,\n      );\n    }\n    db.exec(\"COMMIT\");\n  } catch (err) {\n    db.exec(\"ROLLBACK\");\n    throw err;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Idempotent per-column upgrade for databases formed before the column existed.\n * Returns whether this call actually ALTERed the table (false = the column was already\n * there), so a caller can gate one-time backfill work on it.\n */\nfunction ensureColumn(db: DatabaseSync, table: string, column: string, ddl: string): boolean {\n  const cols = db.prepare(`PRAGMA table_info(${table})`).all() as { name: string }[];\n  if (cols.some((c) => c.name === column)) return false;\n  db.exec(`ALTER TABLE ${table} ADD COLUMN ${column} ${ddl}`);\n  return true;\n}\n","/**\n * SQLite table-creation SQL.\n *\n * SQLite stores only indexes and aggregates: users / login sessions / Project authorization /\n * Agent & Session indexes / usage summaries / error records / UI preferences. Agent State,\n * Trace, and Workspace still follow the local directory-based storage rules.\n * Product not yet released: no migration branches — everything is CREATE IF NOT EXISTS, formed\n * once. The one exception: columns added to an existing table after release of a web.db are\n * ALTERed in by the idempotent per-column guard in database.ts (ensureColumn), since CREATE\n * TABLE IF NOT EXISTS never touches an existing table. A *reshaped* index follows the same\n * rule under a new name, with the superseded one dropped on open (idx_usage_session →\n * idx_usage_session_ts): CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS never rebuilds an existing index either.\n */\n\nexport const SCHEMA_SQL = `\nCREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS users (\n  user_id             TEXT PRIMARY KEY,            -- semantic id doubles as login name: ^[a-z][a-z0-9_-]{1,31}$\n  password_hash       TEXT NOT NULL,               -- scrypt$N$r$p$salt$hash(base64)\n  is_admin            INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,  -- 1 for the built-in admin (seeded at startup)\n  password_is_initial INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,  -- 1=initial password (seeded/admin-set); cleared once the user changes it\n  created_at          TEXT NOT NULL\n);\nCREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS auth_sessions (\n  token_hash TEXT PRIMARY KEY,               -- sha256(token) hex; the cookie stores only the raw token\n  user_id    TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES users(user_id) ON DELETE CASCADE,\n  created_at TEXT NOT NULL,\n  expires_at TEXT NOT NULL,                  -- 7-day sliding renewal (topped up when <6 days remain)\n  via        TEXT                            -- 'password' | 'desktop'; NULL = legacy row (password)\n);\nCREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS projects (\n  project_id    TEXT PRIMARY KEY,            -- directory name doubles as id; display name lives in project_config.toml\n  owner_user_id TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES users(user_id),\n  created_at    TEXT NOT NULL\n);\nCREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS project_members (  -- member grants only; owners are not stored here\n  project_id TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES projects(project_id) ON DELETE CASCADE,\n  user_id    TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES users(user_id) ON DELETE CASCADE,\n  created_at TEXT NOT NULL,\n  PRIMARY KEY (project_id, user_id)\n);\nCREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS agents (           -- index only; name/description live in system_config.yaml\n  project_id TEXT NOT NULL,\n  agent_id   TEXT NOT NULL,\n  created_at TEXT NOT NULL,\n  PRIMARY KEY (project_id, agent_id)\n);\nCREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS sessions (\n  session_id    TEXT PRIMARY KEY,\n  project_id    TEXT NOT NULL,\n  agent_id      TEXT NOT NULL,\n  provider      TEXT NOT NULL,                     -- provider group of the session model (paired with model_id as a model reference)\n  model_id      TEXT NOT NULL,                     -- upstream model id (sent to AgentHub as-is; never concatenate <provider>/<id>)\n  workspace     TEXT NOT NULL,\n  approval_mode TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'allow-all',   -- allow-all|deny-all|read-only|always-ask\n  thinking_level TEXT,                               -- level pinned for THIS session (none|low|medium|high|xhigh|max); NULL=not pinned, runs follow the Agent config\n  title         TEXT,                                -- auto-generated by the model after the first exchange; NULL=not yet (frontend shows \"New chat\")\n  archived_at   TEXT,                                -- archive time; NULL=not archived (shown by default; archived ones move under \"Archived\")\n  client        TEXT,                                -- creating client: 'web' (created via the Web App) | 'cli' (adopted from a CLI Trace); NULL = legacy row, treated as web\n  has_trace     INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,          -- cache: a Trace record exists (set at task start / adoption / subagent registration; lazily backfilled by list hydration)\n  fork_count    INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,          -- monotonically allocated child-fork number for this source Session; never decremented when a fork is deleted\n  last_active_at TEXT,                               -- last activity this server drove for the session (ISO; stamped once when a run starts and once when it ends, initialized to created_at); monotonic, never moves backwards; NULL only before openDatabase's one-time backfill\n  created_at    TEXT NOT NULL\n);                                            -- the schedule/subagent SOURCE is NOT stored: session_meta in the Trace is the single source of truth (see runtime/session-sources.ts); \"client\" is a different, DB-only axis (who created the row)\nCREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_sessions_agent_created ON sessions(project_id, agent_id, created_at DESC);\nCREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS usage_records (\n  id                INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,\n  ts                TEXT NOT NULL,\n  date              TEXT NOT NULL,            -- local date yyyy-mm-dd (aggregation key; same convention as Trace date directories)\n  project_id        TEXT NOT NULL,\n  agent_id          TEXT NOT NULL,\n  session_id        TEXT NOT NULL,            -- top-level Session (child-session usage counts toward its main Session)\n  origin_session_id TEXT,                     -- immediate source child Session (last of the origin chain); NULL=main session\n  provider          TEXT NOT NULL,            -- provider group: paired with model_id as the attribution key; always GROUP BY provider, model_id\n  model_id          TEXT NOT NULL,            -- upstream model id (paired with provider; same model_id across providers aggregates separately)\n  cache_read        INTEGER NOT NULL,\n  cache_write       INTEGER NOT NULL,\n  output            INTEGER NOT NULL,\n  total             INTEGER NOT NULL,         -- from token_usage.request (one row per Request)\n  status            TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'completed'  -- request outcome: completed=success (with tokens); others=failure (0 tokens, for success rate)\n);                                            -- cost is not stored: computed at query time from current pricing\nCREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_usage_project_date ON usage_records(project_id, date);\nCREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_usage_session_ts ON usage_records(session_id, ts);  -- (session_id) alone was idx_usage_session (dropped on open): ts makes the last_active_at backfill's MAX(ts) a covering index scan instead of a random row lookup per usage record\nCREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS error_records (     -- server-side error capture (the Costs page's \"Errors\" tab)\n  id         INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,\n  ts         TEXT NOT NULL,\n  date       TEXT NOT NULL,            -- local date yyyy-mm-dd (same convention as usage_records)\n  project_id TEXT,                     -- nullable: sign-in/registration and process-level errors have no Project context\n  agent_id   TEXT,\n  session_id TEXT,\n  source     TEXT NOT NULL,            -- http | session | usage | title | subagent | process | llm | environment | compaction | schedule | messaging\n  kind       TEXT NOT NULL,            -- expected (HttpError, business 4xx) | unexpected (500/runtime)\n  code       TEXT NOT NULL,            -- HttpError.code / internal / session_run_failed / ...\n  status     INTEGER,                  -- HTTP status code; NULL for non-HTTP sources\n  message    TEXT NOT NULL             -- truncated to 500 chars (no stack stored: stacks go to logs only)\n);\nCREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_error_project_date ON error_records(project_id, date);\nCREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS schedule_state (    -- schedule runtime state (files are declarative intent; the system never writes back)\n  project_id      TEXT NOT NULL,\n  agent_id        TEXT NOT NULL,\n  name            TEXT NOT NULL,               -- file name (without .toml) doubles as the identifier\n  creator_user_id TEXT,                        -- creator (recorded on API create; hand-edited file reconciliation falls back to the Project owner)\n  start_at_ms     INTEGER NOT NULL,            -- defines identity: a start_at change counts as a new task instance, resetting fire state\n  def_hash        TEXT NOT NULL,               -- file content fingerprint: any change clears the invalid flag (the file takes effect again after edits)\n  last_slot_ms    INTEGER,                     -- latest due slot already consumed (advances on fire or skip; no re-fire across restarts)\n  last_fired_at   TEXT,                        -- last actual fire time (for display)\n  fired_once      INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,  -- one-shot task has fired\n  missed          INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,  -- one-shot task was missed (flagged by startup/registration reconciliation; not backfilled)\n  invalid_reason  TEXT,                        -- invalidation reason (e.g. the bound Session was deleted); NULL=healthy\n  PRIMARY KEY (project_id, agent_id, name)\n);\nCREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS goal_state (        -- goal-mode runtime state (GOAL.yaml on disk is the model-facing protocol; this row is what the UI reads)\n  id          INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,  -- one row per goal run; a Session may run goals repeatedly, latest row wins for display\n  session_id  TEXT NOT NULL,\n  project_id  TEXT NOT NULL,\n  agent_id    TEXT NOT NULL,\n  objective   TEXT NOT NULL,\n  status      TEXT NOT NULL,               -- active | complete | blocked | budget_limited | aborted (aborted is server-side only; on-disk status stays active)\n  budget      INTEGER NOT NULL,            -- token budget; -1 = unlimited\n  used        INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,  -- uncached input + output, refreshed per round (mirrors the runner's accounting)\n  rounds      INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,\n  created_at  TEXT NOT NULL,\n  updated_at  TEXT NOT NULL\n);\nCREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_goal_session ON goal_state(session_id);\nCREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS messaging_bindings ( -- Session ↔ messaging-channel bot bindings (runtime/messaging/ holds the long connections)\n  session_id       TEXT NOT NULL,              -- a Session keeps at most one saved config PER channel (composite PK below); at most ONE of them is enabled at a time (route-enforced, 409 another_channel_enabled)\n  channel          TEXT NOT NULL,              -- messaging channel discriminator ('feishu' | 'telegram')\n  account_id       TEXT NOT NULL,              -- channel-scoped bot/app identity (feishu: app_id; telegram: the bot token's numeric id); one binding per account per channel (idx_messaging_account: one account has one event stream, two Sessions would race it)\n  config_json      TEXT NOT NULL,              -- channel-specific credentials/config JSON (feishu: appId/appSecret/baseDomain; telegram: botToken); secrets plaintext at rest (same trade-off as the proxy address in server_settings), masked at every API surface; a cleared secret is stored as \"\" (the row and its account identity stay)\n  enabled          INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0, -- INTENT state (the connection's runtime status stays in memory): new bindings start disabled — saving credentials never opens a connection, the explicit state toggle does\n  last_chat_id     TEXT,                       -- most recent inbound chat (NULL until the bot is messaged once; replies and test messages target it)\n  last_chat_is_direct INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1, -- 1 = direct chat (reply by chat id), 0 = group chat (prefer reply-to-message)\n  created_at       TEXT NOT NULL,\n  updated_at       TEXT NOT NULL,\n  PRIMARY KEY (session_id, channel)\n);\nCREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_messaging_account ON messaging_bindings(channel, account_id);\nCREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS ui_prefs (\n  user_id    TEXT PRIMARY KEY REFERENCES users(user_id) ON DELETE CASCADE,\n  prefs_json TEXT NOT NULL                    -- {theme?, lastProjectId?, ...} free-form JSON\n);\nCREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS server_settings (   -- admin-level server-global settings (GET/PUT /api/admin/settings)\n  key   TEXT PRIMARY KEY,                     -- setting name, e.g. 'proxy_for_app'\n  value TEXT NOT NULL                         -- JSON-encoded value; an absent row means the setting's built-in default\n);\nCREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS trace_files (       -- DERIVED CACHE of the on-disk Trace tree (services/trace-index.ts): the directories stay the single source of truth, every row is rebuildable from disk, and a row is never authority for absence — consumers reconcile + retry on a miss, so a stale index costs one extra scan, never a false 404\n  project_id TEXT NOT NULL,\n  agent_id   TEXT NOT NULL,\n  session_id TEXT NOT NULL,\n  file_index INTEGER NOT NULL,               -- shard index NNN of <session_id>_NNN.jsonl (name/path are reconstructed from the row, never stored: the data root may move)\n  date       TEXT NOT NULL,                  -- date directory name (local yyyy-mm-dd)\n  size_bytes INTEGER NOT NULL,               -- last observed size (listings stat-refresh the returned page and write back; an actively-appended shard may lag in between)\n  page_stats TEXT,                           -- cached message-window scan state at this shard's END (services/message-window.ts ShardPrefixRecord JSON); immutable shards only, NULL = not yet computed, nulled whenever size_bytes changes\n  PRIMARY KEY (project_id, agent_id, session_id, file_index)\n);\nCREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_trace_files_agent_date ON trace_files(project_id, agent_id, date);\nCREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_trace_files_session ON trace_files(session_id);\nCREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS trace_sessions (    -- per-session facts read ONCE at registration from the earliest shard's head (same derived-cache rules as trace_files; listing needs zero head-reads)\n  session_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,\n  project_id TEXT NOT NULL,\n  agent_id   TEXT NOT NULL,\n  source     TEXT,                           -- session_meta origin: 'subagent' | 'schedule' | NULL = user-created (or head not yet readable)\n  workspace  TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '',\n  title      TEXT,                           -- first-prompt fallback title (sessions.title always wins when present)\n  provider   TEXT,                           -- model reference from session_meta (CLI adoption reads it from here; NULL = meta unreadable / legacy without provider)\n  model_id   TEXT,\n  first_ts   TEXT,                           -- first record's timestamp (adoption's createdAt fallback when the id embeds no time)\n  meta_read  INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0      -- 1 once the head parsed; 0 = facts unknown, retried by the next reconcile that touches the session\n);\nCREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_trace_sessions_agent ON trace_sessions(project_id, agent_id);\n`;\n","/**\n * auth_sessions table repo (server-side sessions backing the HttpOnly cookie).\n *\n * Stores only the sha256(token) hex hash; the raw token appears only in the cookie.\n */\nimport type { DatabaseSync } from \"node:sqlite\";\n\nexport interface AuthSessionRow {\n  tokenHash: string;\n  userId: string;\n  createdAt: string;\n  expiresAt: string;\n  /** How the session was established (\"password\" | \"desktop\"); null on rows formed before the column existed (treated as \"password\"). */\n  via: string | null;\n}\n\nexport class AuthSessionsRepo {\n  constructor(private readonly db: DatabaseSync) {}\n\n  insert(row: AuthSessionRow): void {\n    this.db\n      .prepare(\n        \"INSERT INTO auth_sessions (token_hash, user_id, created_at, expires_at, via) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)\",\n      )\n      .run(row.tokenHash, row.userId, row.createdAt, row.expiresAt, row.via);\n  }\n\n  findByTokenHash(tokenHash: string): AuthSessionRow | null {\n    const r = this.db.prepare(\"SELECT * FROM auth_sessions WHERE token_hash = ?\").get(tokenHash);\n    if (!r) return null;\n    return {\n      tokenHash: r.token_hash as string,\n      userId: r.user_id as string,\n      createdAt: r.created_at as string,\n      expiresAt: r.expires_at as string,\n      via: (r.via as string | null) ?? null,\n    };\n  }\n\n  /** Sliding renewal: update the expiration time. */\n  touch(tokenHash: string, expiresAt: string): void {\n    this.db\n      .prepare(\"UPDATE auth_sessions SET expires_at = ? WHERE token_hash = ?\")\n      .run(expiresAt, tokenHash);\n  }\n\n  delete(tokenHash: string): void {\n    this.db.prepare(\"DELETE FROM auth_sessions WHERE token_hash = ?\").run(tokenHash);\n  }\n\n  /** Opportunistically clean up expired sessions (called during login/validation). */\n  deleteExpired(nowIso: string): void {\n    this.db.prepare(\"DELETE FROM auth_sessions WHERE expires_at < ?\").run(nowIso);\n  }\n\n  /** Clear all sessions for a user (forces re-login after an admin resets the password). */\n  deleteByUser(userId: string): void {\n    this.db.prepare(\"DELETE FROM auth_sessions WHERE user_id = ?\").run(userId);\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * users table repo: pure SQL wrapper, no business rules.\n * user_id is the login name (a semantic id, specified at creation, immutable).\n */\nimport type { DatabaseSync } from \"node:sqlite\";\n\nexport interface UserRow {\n  userId: string;\n  passwordHash: string;\n  isAdmin: boolean;\n  /** Still using the initial password (seeded / set by an admin); cleared to 0 once the user changes it. */\n  passwordIsInitial: boolean;\n  createdAt: string;\n}\n\nfunction mapRow(r: Record<string, unknown>): UserRow {\n  return {\n    userId: r.user_id as string,\n    passwordHash: r.password_hash as string,\n    isAdmin: (r.is_admin as number) === 1,\n    passwordIsInitial: (r.password_is_initial as number) === 1,\n    createdAt: r.created_at as string,\n  };\n}\n\nexport class UsersRepo {\n  constructor(private readonly db: DatabaseSync) {}\n\n  insert(row: UserRow): void {\n    this.db\n      .prepare(\n        \"INSERT INTO users (user_id, password_hash, is_admin, password_is_initial, created_at) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?)\",\n      )\n      .run(\n        row.userId,\n        row.passwordHash,\n        row.isAdmin ? 1 : 0,\n        row.passwordIsInitial ? 1 : 0,\n        row.createdAt,\n      );\n  }\n\n  findById(userId: string): UserRow | null {\n    const r = this.db.prepare(\"SELECT * FROM users WHERE user_id = ?\").get(userId);\n    return r ? mapRow(r) : null;\n  }\n\n  /** All users (for the admin user backend), ordered by creation time ascending. */\n  list(): UserRow[] {\n    const rows = this.db.prepare(\"SELECT * FROM users ORDER BY created_at ASC, user_id ASC\").all();\n    return rows.map(mapRow);\n  }\n\n  count(): number {\n    const r = this.db.prepare(\"SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM users\").get();\n    return (r?.n as number) ?? 0;\n  }\n\n  /** Update the password hash; isInitial marks whether the password was set by someone else (seed / admin). */\n  updatePassword(userId: string, passwordHash: string, isInitial: boolean): void {\n    this.db\n      .prepare(\"UPDATE users SET password_hash = ?, password_is_initial = ? WHERE user_id = ?\")\n      .run(passwordHash, isInitial ? 1 : 0, userId);\n  }\n\n  /** Used by admin user deletion and account-creation compensation paths (owned Projects must be cleaned up first). */\n  delete(userId: string): void {\n    this.db.prepare(\"DELETE FROM users WHERE user_id = ?\").run(userId);\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Password hashing (slow-hash storage).\n *\n * Uses node:crypto's scrypt (built-in, no extra dependency, meets the same\n * slow-hash requirement as bcrypt/argon2). Storage format:\n * `scrypt$N$r$p$<salt b64>$<hash b64>` — parameters are stored alongside the hash,\n * so old hashes remain verifiable after future parameter tuning; comparison uses\n * timingSafeEqual to guard against timing side-channels.\n */\nimport { randomBytes, scrypt, timingSafeEqual } from \"node:crypto\";\n\n/**\n * Work factor for new hashes. `hashPassword` takes it as a defaulted argument so the server's\n * own test suite can hash at a token cost: almost every case there seeds an admin, provisions\n * users and logs them in, and one derivation at this strength costs on the order of 100ms.\n * Nothing on the production path passes the argument, and no configuration reaches it —\n * `buildAppDeps`, which carries the test override, is not part of this package's exports.\n */\nexport const SCRYPT_COST = 16384;\nconst SCRYPT_R = 8;\nconst SCRYPT_P = 1;\nconst SALT_BYTES = 16;\nconst KEY_BYTES = 64;\n\nfunction scryptAsync(\n  password: string,\n  salt: Buffer,\n  keyLen: number,\n  n: number,\n  r: number,\n  p: number,\n): Promise<Buffer> {\n  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n    scrypt(password, salt, keyLen, { N: n, r, p, maxmem: 128 * 1024 * 1024 }, (err, key) => {\n      if (err) reject(err);\n      else resolve(key);\n    });\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Generates a password hash in `scrypt$N$r$p$salt$hash` format. `cost` is scrypt's N and\n * is recorded in the hash, so `verifyPassword` re-derives at whatever cost produced the\n * stored string.\n */\nexport async function hashPassword(password: string, cost: number = SCRYPT_COST): Promise<string> {\n  const salt = randomBytes(SALT_BYTES);\n  const key = await scryptAsync(password, salt, KEY_BYTES, cost, SCRYPT_R, SCRYPT_P);\n  return [\n    \"scrypt\",\n    String(cost),\n    String(SCRYPT_R),\n    String(SCRYPT_P),\n    salt.toString(\"base64\"),\n    key.toString(\"base64\"),\n  ].join(\"$\");\n}\n\n/** Verifies a password; returns false if the stored string has an invalid format (never throws, so the login path can uniformly treat it as a credential error). */\nexport async function verifyPassword(password: string, stored: string): Promise<boolean> {\n  const parts = stored.split(\"$\");\n  if (parts.length !== 6 || parts[0] !== \"scrypt\") return false;\n  const n = Number(parts[1]);\n  const r = Number(parts[2]);\n  const p = Number(parts[3]);\n  if (!Number.isInteger(n) || !Number.isInteger(r) || !Number.isInteger(p)) return false;\n  let salt: Buffer;\n  let expected: Buffer;\n  try {\n    salt = Buffer.from(parts[4]!, \"base64\");\n    expected = Buffer.from(parts[5]!, \"base64\");\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n  if (salt.length === 0 || expected.length === 0) return false;\n  let actual: Buffer;\n  try {\n    actual = await scryptAsync(password, salt, expected.length, n, r, p);\n  } catch {\n    return false;\n  }\n  return actual.length === expected.length && timingSafeEqual(actual, expected);\n}\n","/**\n * Auth service: built-in admin seeding /\n * login / logout / password change / session validation.\n *\n * - No open registration: on startup, if there are no users at all, the built-in\n *   admin `admin` is seeded with a random `penguin-<4 digits>` initial password\n *   (printed once by the startup entrypoint; PENGUIN_SEED_ADMIN_PASSWORD injects\n *   a fixed one for tests/e2e), and it adopts `default_project`; all other users\n *   are created by an admin via the user backend (admin-service).\n * - An initial password (whether seeded or set by an admin) is flagged with\n *   password_is_initial, which the frontend uses to prompt for a password change soon.\n * - Sessions: a 32-byte random token, with only its sha256 hash stored in the DB;\n *   valid for 7 days, with sliding renewal once less than 6 days remain.\n */\nimport { createHash, randomBytes, randomInt } from \"node:crypto\";\nimport { tokensEqual } from \"./api-token.js\";\nimport type { UserInfo } from \"../api/types.js\";\nimport { HttpError } from \"../http/errors.js\";\nimport type { AuthSessionsRepo } from \"../db/repos/auth-sessions.js\";\nimport type { UserRow, UsersRepo } from \"../db/repos/users.js\";\nimport { SCRYPT_COST, hashPassword, verifyPassword } from \"./password.js\";\n\nexport const MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH = 8;\n\n/** Built-in admin user_id. */\nexport const ADMIN_USER_ID = \"admin\";\n\n/**\n * Login throttling (per userId): the seeded initial password is `penguin-<4 digits>` —\n * 10,000 combinations — so unthrottled guessing would enumerate it in minutes. After\n * LOGIN_FREE_ATTEMPTS consecutive failures, the next attempt is admitted only after an\n * exponentially growing delay from the last failure (1s, 2s, … capped at 60s; attempts\n * inside the window are 429 `too_many_attempts` and do not extend it). Beyond ~40\n * failures that is one guess per minute, so the 10k space stops being enumerable, while\n * a legitimate user who mistyped a few times never waits more than the cap. A successful\n * login clears the counter. Counters are process memory (a restart clears them —\n * restarting is slower than waiting out the cap) and are kept for nonexistent userIds\n * too, so throttling is not an account-existence oracle. Known limit: a concurrent burst\n * can slip in before its first failure is recorded; the steady-state backoff still\n * dominates the search space.\n */\nconst LOGIN_FREE_ATTEMPTS = 5;\nconst LOGIN_BACKOFF_START_MS = 1000;\nconst LOGIN_BACKOFF_CAP_MS = 60_000;\n/** Failure entries idle longer than this are swept (bounds the map; far above the cap). */\nconst LOGIN_FAILURE_IDLE_MS = 15 * 60_000;\n\n/**\n * Random initial password for the seeded admin: `penguin-<4 digits>` — brand-related and\n * easy to type, shown once in the server startup output (the README, docs and login-page\n * hint all describe this form).\n */\nexport function generateInitialAdminPassword(): string {\n  return \"penguin-\" + String(randomInt(0, 10000)).padStart(4, \"0\");\n}\n\nfunction sha256Hex(value: string): string {\n  return createHash(\"sha256\").update(value).digest(\"hex\");\n}\n\n/**\n * How a session was established: \"password\" via the login form, \"desktop\" via the\n * desktop shell's one-shot token, \"token\" via the local API token's Bearer header (no\n * stored session — the value is per request). Persisted per session (Bearer excepted) so\n * desktop-specific allowances (password change without the old password) apply only to\n * sessions the shell itself opened. Legacy rows (NULL) read as \"password\".\n */\nexport type SessionVia = \"password\" | \"desktop\" | \"token\";\n\nexport function toUserInfo(row: UserRow): UserInfo {\n  return {\n    userId: row.userId,\n    isAdmin: row.isAdmin,\n    passwordIsInitial: row.passwordIsInitial,\n    createdAt: row.createdAt,\n  };\n}\n\nexport interface AuthServiceDeps {\n  users: UsersRepo;\n  authSessions: AuthSessionsRepo;\n  /** Provisions the initial Project at signup (injected by project-service, to avoid a circular dependency). */\n  provisionInitialProject: (user: UserRow, isAdmin: boolean) => Promise<void>;\n  /** Fixed initial password for the seeded admin (config.seedAdminPassword); null generates a random one at seed time. */\n  seedAdminPassword: string | null;\n  /**\n   * Fired after any successful password update (self change / desktop set). The server\n   * wires it to drop the stored initial-password plaintext once it goes stale (see\n   * initial-password.ts); standalone/test constructions may omit it.\n   */\n  onPasswordChanged?: (userId: string) => void;\n  sessionTtlMs: number;\n  sessionRenewMs: number;\n  /**\n   * Test double: scrypt work factor for hashes this service writes. Omitted in\n   * production, where {@link SCRYPT_COST} applies.\n   */\n  passwordHashCost?: number;\n  now?: () => Date;\n}\n\nexport class AuthService {\n  /**\n   * What a fresh user is provisioned with is business policy, answered by the CURRENT\n   * App: the platform installs its answer at create over the claimed auth capability\n   * (ordinary capability use, not a registry entry), and each swap's successor overwrites\n   * it. Starts as the constructor-supplied fallback so standalone/test constructions\n   * keep working unchanged.\n   */\n  private provisioner: (user: UserRow, isAdmin: boolean) => Promise<void>;\n\n  private readonly now: () => Date;\n  private readonly hashCost: number;\n\n  constructor(private readonly deps: AuthServiceDeps) {\n    this.provisioner = deps.provisionInitialProject;\n    this.now = deps.now ?? (() => new Date());\n    this.hashCost = deps.passwordHashCost ?? SCRYPT_COST;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Startup seeding (idempotent): creates the built-in admin and adopts\n   * default_project when the users table is empty; if the initial Project fails,\n   * the user row is rolled back and the server retries on next startup.\n   * Returns the initial password when it actually seeded — the caller prints it,\n   * the only place a generated password is ever shown — and null when users\n   * already exist.\n   */\n  async seedAdmin(): Promise<string | null> {\n    if (this.deps.users.count() > 0) return null;\n    const password = this.deps.seedAdminPassword ?? generateInitialAdminPassword();\n    // The override (PENGUIN_SEED_ADMIN_PASSWORD) must meet the same policy as every\n    // other initial/reset password; rejecting it here, before any insert, keeps a\n    // configuration typo from creating a trivially weak privileged account. Generated\n    // passwords are always 12 characters and never trip this.\n    if (password.length < MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `PENGUIN_SEED_ADMIN_PASSWORD must be at least ${MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH} characters.`,\n      );\n    }\n    const user: UserRow = {\n      userId: ADMIN_USER_ID,\n      passwordHash: await hashPassword(password, this.hashCost),\n      isAdmin: true,\n      passwordIsInitial: true,\n      createdAt: this.now().toISOString(),\n    };\n    this.deps.users.insert(user);\n    try {\n      await this.provisioner(user, true);\n    } catch (err) {\n      this.deps.users.delete(user.userId);\n      throw err;\n    }\n    return password;\n  }\n\n  /** Installs the current App's provisioning policy (see the `provisioner` field). */\n  setProvisioner(provision: (user: UserRow, isAdmin: boolean) => Promise<void>): void {\n    this.provisioner = provision;\n  }\n\n  /** Whether the built-in admin still runs on its initial password (drives the startup reminder notice). */\n  adminPasswordIsInitial(): boolean {\n    return this.deps.users.findById(ADMIN_USER_ID)?.passwordIsInitial === true;\n  }\n\n  /** Consecutive login failures per userId (see the throttling comment on the constants). */\n  private readonly loginFailures = new Map<string, { failures: number; lastFailureAt: number }>();\n\n  /** The wait imposed after `failures` consecutive failures (0 while within the free attempts). */\n  private loginDelayMs(failures: number): number {\n    const excess = failures - LOGIN_FREE_ATTEMPTS;\n    if (excess <= 0) return 0;\n    return Math.min(LOGIN_BACKOFF_START_MS * 2 ** (excess - 1), LOGIN_BACKOFF_CAP_MS);\n  }\n\n  async login(userId: string, password: string): Promise<{ user: UserInfo; token: string }> {\n    const nowMs = this.now().getTime();\n    for (const [key, entry] of this.loginFailures) {\n      if (nowMs - entry.lastFailureAt > LOGIN_FAILURE_IDLE_MS) this.loginFailures.delete(key);\n    }\n    const failed = this.loginFailures.get(userId);\n    if (failed) {\n      const readyAt = failed.lastFailureAt + this.loginDelayMs(failed.failures);\n      if (nowMs < readyAt) {\n        throw new HttpError(\n          429,\n          \"too_many_attempts\",\n          `Too many failed sign-in attempts. Try again in ${Math.ceil((readyAt - nowMs) / 1000)}s.`,\n        );\n      }\n    }\n    const row = this.deps.users.findById(userId);\n    const ok = row !== null && (await verifyPassword(password, row.passwordHash));\n    if (!row || !ok) {\n      this.loginFailures.set(userId, {\n        failures: (failed?.failures ?? 0) + 1,\n        lastFailureAt: this.now().getTime(),\n      });\n      throw new HttpError(401, \"invalid_credentials\", \"Incorrect username or password.\");\n    }\n    this.loginFailures.delete(userId);\n    this.deps.authSessions.deleteExpired(this.now().toISOString());\n    return { user: toUserInfo(row), token: this.issueSession(row.userId, \"password\") };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Desktop-mode sign-in: issues an admin session WITHOUT a password check — the caller\n   * (the desktop-login route) has already redeemed the shell's one-shot token, which is\n   * the credential here. Throws if the admin has not been seeded yet (desktop-login runs\n   * after startup seeding, so this only trips on a broken deployment).\n   */\n  loginDesktop(): { user: UserInfo; token: string } {\n    const row = this.deps.users.findById(ADMIN_USER_ID);\n    if (!row) {\n      throw new HttpError(500, \"internal\", \"Built-in admin has not been seeded.\");\n    }\n    this.deps.authSessions.deleteExpired(this.now().toISOString());\n    return { user: toUserInfo(row), token: this.issueSession(row.userId, \"desktop\") };\n  }\n\n  /** Self password change (user settings): validates the old password, and on success clears the initial-password flag; the current session remains valid. */\n  async changePassword(userId: string, oldPassword: string, newPassword: string): Promise<void> {\n    const row = this.deps.users.findById(userId);\n    if (!row || !(await verifyPassword(oldPassword, row.passwordHash))) {\n      throw new HttpError(400, \"password_mismatch\", \"Current password is incorrect.\");\n    }\n    if (newPassword.length < MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH) {\n      throw new HttpError(400, \"invalid_password\", \"Password must be at least 8 characters.\");\n    }\n    this.deps.users.updatePassword(userId, await hashPassword(newPassword, this.hashCost), false);\n    this.deps.onPasswordChanged?.(userId);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Desktop-session password set: no old-password check. Only reachable for sessions\n   * established via desktop-login (the me route gates on sessionVia) — the seed password\n   * of a desktop-created root is random and never shown, so its holder has nothing to\n   * type into an old-password field; the shell's token already proved machine ownership.\n   */\n  async setPasswordDesktop(userId: string, newPassword: string): Promise<void> {\n    if (newPassword.length < MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH) {\n      throw new HttpError(400, \"invalid_password\", \"Password must be at least 8 characters.\");\n    }\n    this.deps.users.updatePassword(userId, await hashPassword(newPassword, this.hashCost), false);\n    this.deps.onPasswordChanged?.(userId);\n  }\n\n  logout(token: string): void {\n    this.deps.authSessions.delete(sha256Hex(token));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * The boot-scoped local API token (`<root>/api-token`, see auth/api-token.ts): held in\n   * memory by the process that minted it. Null until the startup assembly installs it\n   * (standalone/test constructions without one simply never authenticate a Bearer\n   * header).\n   */\n  private apiToken: string | null = null;\n\n  /** Installs the boot's local API token (called once by the startup assembly). */\n  setLocalApiToken(token: string): void {\n    this.apiToken = token;\n  }\n\n  /** The current boot's local API token (what control-env injection hands to tool subprocesses); null when none was installed. */\n  localApiToken(): string | null {\n    return this.apiToken;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Validates a Bearer token against the boot's local API token (constant-time compare):\n   * a match authenticates as the built-in admin — holding the token proves filesystem\n   * access to the data root, which is admin authority (see auth/api-token.ts). Returns\n   * null on mismatch, when no token is installed, or when the admin row is missing.\n   */\n  authenticateApiToken(token: string): { user: UserRow; via: SessionVia } | null {\n    if (this.apiToken === null || token.length === 0) return null;\n    if (!tokensEqual(token, this.apiToken)) return null;\n    const user = this.deps.users.findById(ADMIN_USER_ID);\n    return user === null ? null : { user, via: \"token\" };\n  }\n\n  /** Validates the cookie token: returns null if expired/unknown; sliding renewal once less than 6 days remain. */\n  authenticateWithMeta(token: string): { user: UserRow; via: SessionVia } | null {\n    const tokenHash = sha256Hex(token);\n    const session = this.deps.authSessions.findByTokenHash(tokenHash);\n    if (!session) return null;\n    const now = this.now();\n    const expiresAt = Date.parse(session.expiresAt);\n    if (!(expiresAt > now.getTime())) {\n      this.deps.authSessions.delete(tokenHash);\n      return null;\n    }\n    if (expiresAt - now.getTime() < this.deps.sessionRenewMs) {\n      this.deps.authSessions.touch(\n        tokenHash,\n        new Date(now.getTime() + this.deps.sessionTtlMs).toISOString(),\n      );\n    }\n    const user = this.deps.users.findById(session.userId);\n    if (!user) return null;\n    return { user, via: session.via === \"desktop\" ? \"desktop\" : \"password\" };\n  }\n\n  private issueSession(userId: string, via: SessionVia): string {\n    const token = randomBytes(32).toString(\"base64url\");\n    const now = this.now();\n    this.deps.authSessions.insert({\n      tokenHash: sha256Hex(token),\n      userId,\n      createdAt: now.toISOString(),\n      expiresAt: new Date(now.getTime() + this.deps.sessionTtlMs).toISOString(),\n      via,\n    });\n    return token;\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Local API token (`<root>/api-token`): the machine-local credential behind\n * `Authorization: Bearer`.\n *\n * Minted fresh at every server boot (same recipe as auth-session tokens) and written to\n * the data root with owner-only permissions, so anything that can read the file can call\n * the API as the admin. That equivalence is the authorization model, not an accident:\n * local filesystem access to the data root already IS admin authority — the same rule\n * `penguin server reset-admin-password` stands on (whoever can run it owns web.db\n * anyway) — and agents driving their own harness through the CLI is the product feature\n * this token exists for (server-driven Sessions hand it to tool subprocesses as\n * PENGUIN_API_TOKEN). Rotation per boot bounds the life of any leaked copy to the\n * process that minted it.\n */\nimport { createHash, randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from \"node:crypto\";\nimport fs from \"node:fs\";\nimport path from \"node:path\";\n\nexport function apiTokenPath(root: string): string {\n  return path.join(root, \"api-token\");\n}\n\n/** Mints a boot-scoped local API token (the auth-session token recipe). */\nexport function mintApiToken(): string {\n  return randomBytes(32).toString(\"base64url\");\n}\n\n/**\n * Persists the boot token (owner-only file, tmp + rename so a concurrent reader never\n * sees a partial write). 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package/dist/hmr/manifest.d.ts

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+import { HarnessInfo } from '@prismshadow/penguin-core';
+
 /**
  * The committed on-disk record: a runtime restart resumes exactly this CODE (platform,
  * cli, web). It carries no STATE — a restart always boots the resumed platform bundle
@@ -34,7 +36,28 @@ interface Manifest {
     assets?: {
         dir: string;
     };
+    /**
+     * Provenance of the push that produced this version, exactly as the pushing client sent
+     * it (scripts/deploy.mjs fills it from its own checkout). Recorded, never executed or
+     * resolved. Absent for a version pushed without it, and for every version committed
+     * before the field existed — which is why every reader treats it as optional.
+     */
+    source?: {
+        repo: string;
+        revision: string;
+    };
+    /** When this version was committed to the store (ISO 8601). Absent on older records. */
+    pushedAt?: string;
 }
+/**
+ * What the store has committed, for version reporting: provenance, commit time, and the
+ * three artifact pointers. Null when nothing has ever been pushed to this root.
+ *
+ * Read defensively rather than cast: harness.json is written only by persistVersion, but a
+ * truncated or hand-edited file must degrade a `penguin version` to missing fields, never
+ * crash it. A record missing every artifact pointer counts as nothing pushed.
+ */
+declare function readHarnessInfo(root: string): Promise<HarnessInfo | null>;
 /** Reads and parses `<root>/hmr/harness.json`; null when missing or corrupt (nothing committed yet). */
 declare function readManifest(root: string): Promise<Manifest | null>;
 /**
@@ -51,4 +74,4 @@ declare function readManifest(root: string): Promise<Manifest | null>;
  */
 declare function resolveCliBundlePath(root: string): Promise<string | null>;
 
-export { type Manifest, readManifest, resolveCliBundlePath };
+export { type Manifest, readHarnessInfo, readManifest, resolveCliBundlePath };

package/dist/hmr/manifest.js

@@ -1,26 +1,10 @@
-// src/hmr/manifest.ts
-import fs from "fs";
-import fsp from "fs/promises";
-import path from "path";
-async function readManifest(root) {
-  try {
-    const raw = await fsp.readFile(path.join(root, "hmr", "harness.json"), "utf8");
-    return JSON.parse(raw);
-  } catch {
-    return null;
-  }
-}
-async function resolveCliBundlePath(root) {
-  const manifest = await readManifest(root);
-  const bundle = manifest?.cli?.bundle;
-  if (typeof bundle !== "string" || bundle.length === 0) return null;
-  const hmrDir = path.join(root, "hmr");
-  const abs = path.resolve(hmrDir, bundle);
-  const withinHmrDir = abs === hmrDir || abs.startsWith(hmrDir + path.sep);
-  if (!withinHmrDir) return null;
-  return fs.existsSync(abs) ? abs : null;
-}
+import {
+  readHarnessInfo,
+  readManifest,
+  resolveCliBundlePath
+} from "../chunk-4SXGU7RO.js";
 export {
+  readHarnessInfo,
   readManifest,
   resolveCliBundlePath
 };

package/dist/hmr/manifest.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/hmr/manifest.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * The harness.json shape (`<root>/hmr/harness.json`) and pure readers over it.\n *\n * Split out of host.ts so a reader never needs a running HmrHost: `penguin` is a\n * separate, short-lived process per invocation (see packages/cli/src/index.ts) — it\n * has no host instance to ask, only the data root's own harness.json on disk.\n * `resolveCliBundlePath` is that reader: a plain disk read, no HTTP, no boot, no\n * in-memory state.\n *\n * ONE atomic version, THREE independent artifacts: `platform`, `cli`, and `web` are\n * always written together by HmrHost's single merged upgrade path (see host.ts's\n * persistVersion), but each is content-addressed and stored on its own — a push to\n * POST /api/hmr/upgrade carries `platform` and `cli` as two separate single-file ESM\n * sources, so `cli.bundle` points at its OWN file, a different sha from\n * `platform.bundle`. They are read back together too (see host.ts's restore): a\n * partial record (e.g. `platform` present but `web` or `cli` missing) is never\n * trusted — the whole version is treated as absent instead of partially applied.\n */\nimport fs from \"node:fs\";\nimport fsp from \"node:fs/promises\";\nimport path from \"node:path\";\n\n/**\n * The committed on-disk record: a runtime restart resumes exactly this CODE (platform,\n * cli, web). It carries no STATE — a restart always boots the resumed platform bundle\n * against its own fresh initial context (bundle.context, see host.ts's PlatformBundle),\n * never a document parked from a previous run (see host.ts's module doc for why: a\n * parked doc's live-resource handles die with the process anyway, so resuming one could\n * only ever produce handles that fail to reclaim). Paths are relative to hmrDir\n * (`<root>/hmr`).\n */\nexport interface Manifest {\n  platform?: { bundle: string };\n  /**\n   * The CLI's own bundle pointer — its own independent file (a different sha from\n   * `platform.bundle`; the two are separately compiled artifacts), kept as its own\n   * field so a reader that only wants \"which bundle does the CLI load right now\"\n   * never has to reach into `platform` at all.\n   */\n  cli?: { bundle: string };\n  /** One gzip(JSON.stringify({ files })) artifact, restored straight into memory. */\n  web?: { manifest: string };\n  /**\n   * Files the pushed platform needs as REAL files on disk, unpacked under this directory\n   * (relative to hmrDir). The web artifact stays in memory because it is only ever served\n   * as bytes; an asset is something the platform hands to the OS — a native `.node` the\n   * loader must resolve by path, a helper binary it execs — so it has to exist on the\n   * filesystem, with its exec bit intact.\n   */\n  assets?: { dir: string };\n}\n\n/** Reads and parses `<root>/hmr/harness.json`; null when missing or corrupt (nothing committed yet). */\nexport async function readManifest(root: string): Promise<Manifest | null> {\n  try {\n    const raw = await fsp.readFile(path.join(root, \"hmr\", \"harness.json\"), \"utf8\");\n    return JSON.parse(raw) as Manifest;\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Resolves the current CLI bundle's absolute path from a data root, or null when\n * nothing has been pushed yet: a fresh root, a missing/corrupt manifest, no `cli`\n * entry, a `cli.bundle` that isn't a non-empty string (e.g. `{\"cli\":{}}` — a\n * hand-edited or truncated harness.json), a path that resolves outside `<root>/hmr/`\n * (defense in depth: `manifest.cli.bundle` is trusted content today, written only by\n * this same process's persistVersion, but a reader must never let a malformed or\n * malicious manifest value walk it out of the store directory via `..` segments), or\n * a referenced file that no longer exists (e.g. pruned from the store — see host.ts's\n * pruneStore). A null return means \"use the packaged default\" to every caller;\n * nothing here ever throws for an ordinary unconfigured or malformed root.\n */\nexport async function resolveCliBundlePath(root: string): Promise<string | null> {\n  const manifest = await readManifest(root);\n  const bundle = manifest?.cli?.bundle;\n  if (typeof bundle !== \"string\" || bundle.length === 0) return null;\n  const hmrDir = path.join(root, \"hmr\");\n  const abs = path.resolve(hmrDir, bundle);\n  const withinHmrDir = abs === hmrDir || abs.startsWith(hmrDir + path.sep);\n  if (!withinHmrDir) return null;\n  return fs.existsSync(abs) ? abs : null;\n}\n"],"mappings":";AAkBA,OAAO,QAAQ;AACf,OAAO,SAAS;AAChB,OAAO,UAAU;AAiCjB,eAAsB,aAAa,MAAwC;AACzE,MAAI;AACF,UAAM,MAAM,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM,OAAO,cAAc,GAAG,MAAM;AAC7E,WAAO,KAAK,MAAM,GAAG;AAAA,EACvB,QAAQ;AACN,WAAO;AAAA,EACT;AACF;AAcA,eAAsB,qBAAqB,MAAsC;AAC/E,QAAM,WAAW,MAAM,aAAa,IAAI;AACxC,QAAM,SAAS,UAAU,KAAK;AAC9B,MAAI,OAAO,WAAW,YAAY,OAAO,WAAW,EAAG,QAAO;AAC9D,QAAM,SAAS,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM,KAAK;AACpC,QAAM,MAAM,KAAK,QAAQ,QAAQ,MAAM;AACvC,QAAM,eAAe,QAAQ,UAAU,IAAI,WAAW,SAAS,KAAK,GAAG;AACvE,MAAI,CAAC,aAAc,QAAO;AAC1B,SAAO,GAAG,WAAW,GAAG,IAAI,MAAM;AACpC;","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":[],"sourcesContent":[],"mappings":"","names":[]}