@prismshadow/penguin-server 0.2.13 → 0.2.15

package/dist/chunk-5Z4UCHDB.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/auth/password.ts","../src/auth/service.ts","../src/auth/api-token.ts"],"sourcesContent":["import { Component, Interface } from \"@prismshadow/penguin-core/kernel\";\n/**\n * Password hashing (slow-hash storage).\n *\n * Uses node:crypto's scrypt (built-in, no extra dependency, meets the same\n * slow-hash requirement as bcrypt/argon2). Storage format:\n * `scrypt$N$r$p$<salt b64>$<hash b64>` — parameters are stored alongside the hash,\n * so old hashes remain verifiable after future parameter tuning; comparison uses\n * timingSafeEqual to guard against timing side-channels, and a sign-in for an account\n * that does not exist costs the same derivation as a wrong password\n * (verifyAccountPassword).\n */\nimport { randomBytes, scrypt, timingSafeEqual } from \"node:crypto\";\n\n/**\n * Work factor for new hashes. `hashPassword` takes it as a defaulted argument so the server's\n * own test suite can hash at a token cost: almost every case there seeds an admin, provisions\n * users and logs them in, and one derivation at this strength costs on the order of 100ms.\n * Nothing on the production path passes the argument, and no configuration reaches it —\n * `buildAppDeps`, which carries the test override, is not part of this package's exports.\n */\nexport const SCRYPT_COST = 16384;\nconst SCRYPT_R = 8;\nconst SCRYPT_P = 1;\nconst SALT_BYTES = 16;\nconst KEY_BYTES = 64;\n\nfunction scryptAsync(\n  password: string,\n  salt: Buffer,\n  keyLen: number,\n  n: number,\n  r: number,\n  p: number,\n): Promise<Buffer> {\n  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n    scrypt(password, salt, keyLen, { N: n, r, p, maxmem: 128 * 1024 * 1024 }, (err, key) => {\n      if (err) reject(err);\n      else resolve(key);\n    });\n  });\n}\n\n/**\n * Generates a password hash in `scrypt$N$r$p$salt$hash` format. `cost` is scrypt's N and\n * is recorded in the hash, so `verifyPassword` re-derives at whatever cost produced the\n * stored string.\n */\nexport async function hashPassword(password: string, cost: number = SCRYPT_COST): Promise<string> {\n  const salt = randomBytes(SALT_BYTES);\n  const key = await scryptAsync(password, salt, KEY_BYTES, cost, SCRYPT_R, SCRYPT_P);\n  return [\n    \"scrypt\",\n    String(cost),\n    String(SCRYPT_R),\n    String(SCRYPT_P),\n    salt.toString(\"base64\"),\n    key.toString(\"base64\"),\n  ].join(\"$\");\n}\n\n/**\n * What checking a password against a stored string found. `match` and `mismatch` each cost one\n * scrypt derivation; `unverifiable` — not the `scrypt$N$r$p$salt$hash` format, or parameters\n * scrypt refuses — cost none.\n */\nexport type PasswordCheck = \"match\" | \"mismatch\" | \"unverifiable\";\n\n/** Checks a password against a stored hash. Never throws. */\nexport async function checkPassword(password: string, stored: string): Promise<PasswordCheck> {\n  const parts = stored.split(\"$\");\n  if (parts.length !== 6 || parts[0] !== \"scrypt\") return \"unverifiable\";\n  const n = Number(parts[1]);\n  const r = Number(parts[2]);\n  const p = Number(parts[3]);\n  if (!Number.isInteger(n) || !Number.isInteger(r) || !Number.isInteger(p)) return \"unverifiable\";\n  const salt = Buffer.from(parts[4]!, \"base64\");\n  const expected = Buffer.from(parts[5]!, \"base64\");\n  if (salt.length === 0 || expected.length === 0) return \"unverifiable\";\n  let actual: Buffer;\n  try {\n    actual = await scryptAsync(password, salt, expected.length, n, r, p);\n  } catch {\n    return \"unverifiable\";\n  }\n  return timingSafeEqual(actual, expected) ? \"match\" : \"mismatch\";\n}\n\n/** Verifies a password; returns false if the stored string has an invalid format (never throws, so the login path can uniformly treat it as a credential error). */\nexport async function verifyPassword(password: string, stored: string): Promise<boolean> {\n  return (await checkPassword(password, stored)) === \"match\";\n}\n\n/**\n * Verifies a sign-in password for an account that may not exist, at the cost a real account's\n * check has. `stored` is the account's hash, or null when there is no such account. When there is\n * nothing to derive against — no account, an empty hash, or one `checkPassword` finds\n * unverifiable — the password is checked against `dummyHash` instead and the result is false, so\n * every call runs exactly one scrypt derivation and how long a failure takes does not tell a\n * missing username from a wrong password. `check` is a parameter so a test can count the\n * derivations.\n */\nexport async function verifyAccountPassword(\n  password: string,\n  stored: string | null,\n  dummyHash: () => Promise<string>,\n  check: (password: string, stored: string) => Promise<PasswordCheck> = checkPassword,\n): Promise<boolean> {\n  const outcome = stored === null ? \"unverifiable\" : await check(password, stored);\n  if (outcome !== \"unverifiable\") return outcome === \"match\";\n  await check(password, await dummyHash());\n  return false;\n}\n\n/** Hashes the passwords this server writes; a test stands in a cheap one. */\n@Interface()\nexport abstract class PasswordHasher {\n  abstract hash(password: string): Promise<string>;\n}\n\n/** scrypt at full strength. */\n@Component()\nexport class ScryptHasher implements PasswordHasher {\n  hash(password: string): Promise<string> {\n    return hashPassword(password, SCRYPT_COST);\n  }\n}\n","/**\n * Auth service: admin seeding / login / logout / password change / session validation.\n *\n * No open registration: an empty users table seeds `admin` with a random password hashed and\n * discarded unseen, claimed through the first-login link; every other user is created by an\n * admin. Sessions are rows in auth_sessions (cookie holds the token, the row its sha256), so\n * they outlive a restart and renew in place.\n */\nimport { randomBytes } from \"node:crypto\";\nimport { tokensEqual } from \"./api-token.js\";\nimport type { UserInfo } from \"../api/types.js\";\nimport { HttpError } from \"../http/errors.js\";\nimport type { UserRow } from \"../db/repos/users.js\";\nimport { sessionTokenHash } from \"../db/repos/auth-sessions.js\";\nimport type { SessionViaValue, AuthSessionsRepo } from \"../db/repos/auth-sessions.js\";\nimport type { AuthRuntimeState } from \"./runtime-state.js\";\nimport { verifyAccountPassword, verifyPassword } from \"./password.js\";\nimport type { PasswordHasher } from \"./password.js\";\nimport { Component, Use, Interface } from \"@prismshadow/penguin-core/kernel\";\nimport type { AuthState, Clock, Config } from \"../hmr/capabilities.js\";\nimport type { Auth, AuthSessions, Users } from \"../mechanisms/identity.js\";\n\nexport const MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH = 8;\n\n/** Built-in admin user_id. */\nexport const ADMIN_USER_ID = \"admin\";\n\n/**\n * Login throttling, per userId. After LOGIN_FREE_ATTEMPTS failures each attempt waits an\n * exponentially growing delay (1s doubling to a 60s cap), settling at a guess per minute.\n * Kept for nonexistent userIds too, so it is not an account-existence oracle — and neither is\n * the time a failure takes: a nonexistent userId is checked against a dummy hash (loginDummyHash).\n * Deliberately NOT covered: a concurrent burst before the first failure lands, and guesses\n * spread across many accounts.\n */\nconst LOGIN_FREE_ATTEMPTS = 5;\nconst LOGIN_BACKOFF_START_MS = 1000;\nconst LOGIN_BACKOFF_CAP_MS = 60_000;\n/** Failure entries idle longer than this are swept (bounds the map; far above the cap). */\nconst LOGIN_FAILURE_IDLE_MS = 15 * 60_000;\n\n/** Characters of base64url in a seeded password — 18 random bytes, 144 bits. */\nconst SEED_PASSWORD_CHARS = 24;\n\n/**\n * Never read or typed — hashed at once and discarded — which is what lets it be long enough\n * that the login endpoint, reachable the moment the account exists, has no search space.\n */\nexport function generateInitialAdminPassword(): string {\n  return randomBytes(SEED_PASSWORD_CHARS).toString(\"base64url\").slice(0, SEED_PASSWORD_CHARS);\n}\n\n/**\n * \"desktop\" and \"setup\" may set a password without the old one (theirs is random and was never\n * shown); desktop-only routes open to \"desktop\" alone. \"token\" is the local API token's Bearer\n * header — per request, never a stored row. Anything else reads as \"password\".\n */\nexport type SessionVia = \"password\" | \"desktop\" | \"setup\" | \"token\";\n\n/** Row -> DTO. The two profile columns are omitted rather than sent as null when unset. */\nexport function toUserInfo(row: UserRow): UserInfo {\n  return {\n    userId: row.userId,\n    isAdmin: row.isAdmin,\n    passwordIsInitial: row.passwordIsInitial,\n    ...(row.displayName !== null ? { displayName: row.displayName } : {}),\n    ...(row.avatar !== null ? { avatar: row.avatar } : {}),\n    createdAt: row.createdAt,\n  };\n}\n\n@Component()\nexport class AuthService implements Auth {\n  @Use() private readonly users!: Users;\n  @Use() private readonly authSessions!: AuthSessions;\n  /**\n   * Process-scoped auth values (runtime-state.ts). Held by the RUNTIME so the link a boot\n   * printed survives a platform push; everything else about auth is rebuilt with the App.\n   */\n  @Use() private readonly state!: AuthState;\n  /** Provisions the initial Project at signup — declared at the consumer, below. */\n  @Use() private readonly provisioner!: InitialProjectProvisioner;\n  @Use() private readonly config!: Config;\n  @Use() private readonly clock!: Clock;\n  @Use() private readonly hasher!: PasswordHasher;\n  /** Session lifetime, for the cookie that must expire WITH the session, not before it. */\n  get sessionTtlMs(): number {\n    return this.config.authSessionTtlMs;\n  }\n  private get sessionRenewMs(): number {\n    return this.config.authSessionRenewMs;\n  }\n  /** Fixed initial password for the seeded admin; null generates a random one at seed time. */\n  private get seedAdminPassword(): string | null {\n    return this.config.seedAdminPassword;\n  }\n\n  setup(): void {\n    this.authSessions.deleteExpired(this.clock.now().toISOString());\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Null once the server is claimed, so the only setup session that exists is a printed one.\n   * On demand rather than in the constructor: seedAdmin() runs after it, so \"claimed?\" has no\n   * answer there. A cached link whose row is gone is re-minted, not handed out dead.\n   */\n  mintFirstLogin(): string | null {\n    if (!this.adminPasswordIsInitial()) return null;\n    if (\n      this.state.firstLoginToken !== null &&\n      this.authenticateWithMeta(this.state.firstLoginToken) === null\n    ) {\n      this.state.firstLoginToken = null;\n    }\n    this.state.firstLoginToken ??= this.issueSession(ADMIN_USER_ID, \"setup\");\n    return this.state.firstLoginToken;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * For the startup notice's pinned-seed gate (index.ts): a pin usually means the operator\n   * knows the password, but an offline reset makes it stale, and the gate must see through\n   * that or the rescue link stays suppressed.\n   */\n  async adminPasswordIs(password: string): Promise<boolean> {\n    const row = this.users.findById(ADMIN_USER_ID);\n    return row !== null && (await verifyPassword(password, row.passwordHash));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Startup seeding (idempotent): creates the built-in admin and adopts default_project when\n   * the users table is empty; if the initial Project fails, the user row is rolled back and\n   * the server retries on next startup.\n   */\n  async seedAdmin(): Promise<void> {\n    if (this.users.count() > 0) return;\n    const password = this.seedAdminPassword ?? generateInitialAdminPassword();\n    // A pinned override must meet the same policy as every other password — rejected before\n    // any insert, so a configuration typo cannot create a trivially weak privileged account.\n    if (password.length < MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH) {\n      throw new Error(\n        `PENGUIN_SEED_ADMIN_PASSWORD must be at least ${MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH} characters.`,\n      );\n    }\n    const user: UserRow = {\n      userId: ADMIN_USER_ID,\n      passwordHash: await this.hasher.hash(password),\n      isAdmin: true,\n      passwordIsInitial: true,\n      displayName: null,\n      avatar: null,\n      createdAt: this.clock.now().toISOString(),\n    };\n    this.users.insert(user);\n    try {\n      await this.provisioner.provisionInitialProject(user, true);\n    } catch (err) {\n      this.users.delete(user.userId);\n      throw err;\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Compared against the printed value, not merely verified: a cookie made out of ANY valid\n   * token would let one person hand another a link into the sender's account. Not single-use,\n   * because a prefetching browser would burn it before its reader clicked.\n   */\n  redeemFirstLogin(given: string): string | null {\n    const expected = this.state.firstLoginToken;\n    if (expected === null || given === \"\" || !tokensEqual(given, expected)) return null;\n    return this.authenticateWithMeta(expected) === null ? null : expected;\n  }\n\n  /** Whether the built-in admin still runs on its initial password (gates the first-login link). */\n  adminPasswordIsInitial(): boolean {\n    return this.users.findById(ADMIN_USER_ID)?.passwordIsInitial === true;\n  }\n\n  /** Consecutive login failures per userId (see the throttling comment on the constants). */\n  private readonly loginFailures = new Map<string, { failures: number; lastFailureAt: number }>();\n\n  /** Cache for loginDummyHash. */\n  private dummyHash: string | null = null;\n\n  /**\n   * The hash a sign-in with no account to check is verified against (verifyAccountPassword), so\n   * it costs what a wrong password costs. Made by this server's own hasher, hence at the cost its\n   * real hashes carry, from a random password nobody holds; computed on the first such sign-in\n   * and kept.\n   */\n  private async loginDummyHash(): Promise<string> {\n    this.dummyHash ??= await this.hasher.hash(randomBytes(18).toString(\"base64url\"));\n    return this.dummyHash;\n  }\n\n  /** The wait imposed after `failures` consecutive failures (0 while within the free attempts). */\n  private loginDelayMs(failures: number): number {\n    const excess = failures - LOGIN_FREE_ATTEMPTS;\n    if (excess <= 0) return 0;\n    return Math.min(LOGIN_BACKOFF_START_MS * 2 ** (excess - 1), LOGIN_BACKOFF_CAP_MS);\n  }\n\n  async login(userId: string, password: string): Promise<{ user: UserInfo; token: string }> {\n    const nowMs = this.clock.now().getTime();\n    for (const [key, entry] of this.loginFailures) {\n      if (nowMs - entry.lastFailureAt > LOGIN_FAILURE_IDLE_MS) this.loginFailures.delete(key);\n    }\n    const failed = this.loginFailures.get(userId);\n    if (failed) {\n      const readyAt = failed.lastFailureAt + this.loginDelayMs(failed.failures);\n      if (nowMs < readyAt) {\n        throw new HttpError(\n          429,\n          \"too_many_attempts\",\n          `Too many failed sign-in attempts. Try again in ${Math.ceil((readyAt - nowMs) / 1000)}s.`,\n        );\n      }\n    }\n    const row = this.users.findById(userId);\n    // A missing account, or one whose hash cannot be checked, still costs one scrypt\n    // derivation, and fails with the same 401 as a wrong password.\n    const ok = await verifyAccountPassword(password, row?.passwordHash ?? null, () =>\n      this.loginDummyHash(),\n    );\n    if (!row || !ok) {\n      this.loginFailures.set(userId, {\n        failures: (failed?.failures ?? 0) + 1,\n        lastFailureAt: this.clock.now().getTime(),\n      });\n      throw new HttpError(401, \"invalid_credentials\", \"Incorrect username or password.\");\n    }\n    this.loginFailures.delete(userId);\n    this.authSessions.deleteExpired(this.clock.now().toISOString());\n    return { user: toUserInfo(row), token: this.issueSession(row.userId, \"password\") };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Whether a user is an admin, by id — for a caller that has a user's NAME rather than an\n   * authenticated request: the terminal relay reads the owner out of a pty reference the\n   * runtime has already matched against the signed-in user (machines/terminal-relay.ts), and\n   * what is left to decide is whether that user may reach machines at all. Unknown users are\n   * not admins.\n   */\n  isAdmin(userId: string): boolean {\n    return this.users.findById(userId)?.isAdmin === true;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Desktop-mode sign-in: an admin session with no password check — the claim route already\n   * redeemed the shell's one-shot token, which is the credential here. Throws only on a\n   * broken deployment (seeding runs before the route exists).\n   */\n  loginDesktop(): { user: UserInfo; token: string } {\n    const row = this.users.findById(ADMIN_USER_ID);\n    if (!row) {\n      throw new HttpError(500, \"internal\", \"Built-in admin has not been seeded.\");\n    }\n    return { user: toUserInfo(row), token: this.issueSession(row.userId, \"desktop\") };\n  }\n\n  /** Self password change (user settings): validates the old password first; the current session stays valid. */\n  async changePassword(userId: string, oldPassword: string, newPassword: string): Promise<void> {\n    const row = this.users.findById(userId);\n    if (!row || !(await verifyPassword(oldPassword, row.passwordHash))) {\n      throw new HttpError(400, \"password_mismatch\", \"Current password is incorrect.\");\n    }\n    await this.setPassword(userId, newPassword);\n  }\n\n  /** No old-password check; the me route gates which sessions may call this. */\n  async setInitialPassword(userId: string, newPassword: string): Promise<void> {\n    await this.setPassword(userId, newPassword);\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Validation comes FIRST, so a rejected password leaves the first-login link alive: burning\n   * it on a typo would strand the claimer until a restart.\n   */\n  private async setPassword(userId: string, newPassword: string): Promise<void> {\n    if (newPassword.length < MIN_PASSWORD_LENGTH) {\n      throw new HttpError(400, \"invalid_password\", \"Password must be at least 8 characters.\");\n    }\n    this.users.updatePassword(userId, await this.hasher.hash(newPassword), false);\n    // A successful set proves at least what the successful login that resets the counter\n    // proves (the old password, or a desktop/setup session), so it resets it too. Without\n    // this, anyone spamming the login endpoint holds the backoff window open, and the sign-in\n    // that follows a first-login claim (routes/me.ts) would 429 AFTER the password committed —\n    // reporting failure for a change that took, with the claimer's setup session already gone.\n    this.loginFailures.delete(userId);\n    // EVERY first-login session for this account, not just the link this process printed: an\n    // earlier boot's link can still be live in a terminal scrollback, and a `setup` session is\n    // allowed to change the password without knowing the old one — so one left behind is an\n    // account takeover waiting to happen.\n    if (userId === ADMIN_USER_ID) {\n      this.authSessions.deleteByUserAndVia(userId, \"setup\");\n      this.state.firstLoginToken = null;\n    }\n  }\n\n  /** Ends a session: the row is the session, so logout deletes it. Unknown token is a no-op. */\n  logout(token: string): void {\n    this.authSessions.delete(sessionTokenHash(token));\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * The current boot's local API token (what control-env injection hands to tool\n   * subprocesses); null when none was minted. It lives on the runtime state, not on this\n   * service: the token was written to `<root>/api-token` by the process, so it must\n   * outlive the App a push replaces (auth/runtime-state.ts).\n   */\n  localApiToken(): string | null {\n    return this.state.apiToken;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Validates a Bearer token against the boot's local API token (constant-time compare):\n   * a match authenticates as the built-in admin — holding the token proves filesystem\n   * access to the data root, which is admin authority (see auth/api-token.ts). Returns\n   * null on mismatch, when no token was minted, or when the admin row is missing.\n   */\n  authenticateApiToken(token: string): { user: UserRow; via: SessionVia } | null {\n    const apiToken = this.state.apiToken;\n    if (apiToken === null || token.length === 0) return null;\n    if (!tokensEqual(token, apiToken)) return null;\n    const user = this.users.findById(ADMIN_USER_ID);\n    return user === null ? null : { user, via: \"token\" };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Validates the cookie token. Sliding renewal tops the expiry up IN PLACE, so the cookie\n   * value never changes and there is no second identity to revoke. Only a session whose own\n   * span reaches the renewal window slides — a one-hour minted token must expire at its hour,\n   * not stretch by being used.\n   */\n  authenticateWithMeta(token: string): { user: UserRow; via: SessionVia; renewed: boolean } | null {\n    const tokenHash = sessionTokenHash(token);\n    const session = this.authSessions.findByTokenHash(tokenHash);\n    if (!session) return null;\n    const now = this.clock.now();\n    const expiresAt = Date.parse(session.expiresAt);\n    if (expiresAt <= now.getTime()) {\n      this.authSessions.delete(tokenHash);\n      return null;\n    }\n    const user = this.users.findById(session.userId);\n    if (!user) return null;\n    const renewable = expiresAt - Date.parse(session.createdAt) >= this.sessionRenewMs;\n    let renewed = false;\n    if (renewable && expiresAt - now.getTime() < this.sessionRenewMs) {\n      this.authSessions.touch(tokenHash, new Date(now.getTime() + this.sessionTtlMs).toISOString());\n      renewed = true;\n    }\n    const via: SessionVia =\n      session.via === \"desktop\" ? \"desktop\" : session.via === \"setup\" ? \"setup\" : \"password\";\n    return { user, via, renewed };\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Whether the session behind a cookie token still exists and has not expired — the same\n   * two facts {@link authenticateWithMeta} establishes, without its sliding renewal or its\n   * user lookup. A connection that outlives the request that opened it has to re-ask\n   * periodically (the SSE heartbeat does, once per beat), and asking through the renewing\n   * path would top the expiry up every time: a window nobody has touched since last week\n   * would stay signed in purely because it is still connected.\n   */\n  sessionIsLive(token: string): boolean {\n    const session = this.authSessions.findByTokenHash(sessionTokenHash(token));\n    if (!session) return false;\n    return Date.parse(session.expiresAt) > this.clock.now().getTime();\n  }\n\n  private issueSession(userId: string, via: SessionViaValue): string {\n    return this.authSessions.issue({\n      userId,\n      via,\n      now: this.clock.now(),\n      ttlMs: this.sessionTtlMs,\n    }).token;\n  }\n}\n\n/** What signing a new user in needs of project administration — declared at the consumer. */\n@Interface()\nexport abstract class InitialProjectProvisioner {\n  abstract provisionInitialProject(user: UserRow, isAdmin: boolean): Promise<void>;\n}\n","/**\n * Local API token (`<root>/api-token`): the machine-local credential behind\n * `Authorization: Bearer`.\n *\n * Minted fresh at every server boot (same recipe as auth-session tokens) and written to\n * the data root with owner-only permissions, so anything that can read the file can call\n * the API as the admin. That equivalence is the authorization model, not an accident:\n * local filesystem access to the data root already IS admin authority — the same rule\n * `penguin server reset-admin-password` stands on (whoever can run it owns web.db\n * anyway) — and agents driving their own harness through the CLI is the product feature\n * this token exists for (server-driven Sessions hand it to tool subprocesses as\n * PENGUIN_API_TOKEN). Rotation per boot bounds the life of any leaked copy to the\n * process that minted it.\n */\nimport { createHash, randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from \"node:crypto\";\nimport fs from \"node:fs\";\nimport path from \"node:path\";\n\nexport function apiTokenPath(root: string): string {\n  return path.join(root, \"api-token\");\n}\n\n/** Mints a boot-scoped local API token (the auth-session token recipe). */\nexport function mintApiToken(): string {\n  return randomBytes(32).toString(\"base64url\");\n}\n\n/**\n * Persists the boot token (owner-only file, tmp + rename so a concurrent reader never\n * sees a partial write). Best-effort like the initial-password file: an exotic read-only\n * root must not stop the server — local CLI callers then fall back to\n * PENGUIN_API_TOKEN.\n */\nexport function storeApiToken(root: string, token: string): void {\n  try {\n    fs.mkdirSync(root, { recursive: true });\n    const target = apiTokenPath(root);\n    const tmp = `${target}.${process.pid}.tmp`;\n    fs.writeFileSync(tmp, `${token}\\n`, { mode: 0o600 });\n    fs.renameSync(tmp, target);\n  } catch {\n    // Best-effort: Bearer auth still works for callers holding the token some other way.\n  }\n}\n\n/** The stored token, or null when absent/unreadable/empty (shared with the CLI's file fallback). */\nexport function readApiToken(root: string): string | null {\n  try {\n    const value = fs.readFileSync(apiTokenPath(root), \"utf8\").trim();\n    return value === \"\" ? null : value;\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Constant-time equality for token checks: both sides are reduced to fixed-size sha256\n * digests first, so the comparison's timing depends on neither the content nor the\n * length of an attacker-supplied value.\n */\nexport function tokensEqual(a: string, b: string): boolean {\n  const digest = (v: string): Buffer => createHash(\"sha256\").update(v).digest();\n  return timingSafeEqual(digest(a), 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package/dist/chunk-HX3WBUYX.js

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+// src/secret-file.ts
+import fs from "fs";
+function writeSecretFile(filePath, contents) {
+  fs.rmSync(filePath, { force: true });
+  const flags = fs.constants.O_WRONLY | fs.constants.O_CREAT | fs.constants.O_EXCL | (fs.constants.O_NOFOLLOW ?? 0);
+  const fd = fs.openSync(filePath, flags, 384);
+  try {
+    fs.fchmodSync(fd, 384);
+    fs.writeSync(fd, contents);
+  } finally {
+    fs.closeSync(fd);
+  }
+}
+
+export {
+  writeSecretFile
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-HX3WBUYX.js.map

package/dist/chunk-HX3WBUYX.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/secret-file.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Writes a bearer secret to a 0600 file, refusing to follow a symlink parked at the path:\n * someone who can write the directory but not read the file could otherwise redirect the write\n * into a file they CAN read. Hence unlink + exclusive create, and chmod on the fd rather than\n * the path. Exported as `@prismshadow/penguin-server/secret-file` so the CLI shares it.\n */\nimport fs from \"node:fs\";\n\nexport function writeSecretFile(filePath: string, contents: string): void {\n  fs.rmSync(filePath, { force: true });\n  const flags =\n    fs.constants.O_WRONLY |\n    fs.constants.O_CREAT |\n    fs.constants.O_EXCL |\n    (fs.constants.O_NOFOLLOW ?? 0);\n  const fd = fs.openSync(filePath, flags, 0o600);\n  try {\n    fs.fchmodSync(fd, 0o600);\n    fs.writeSync(fd, contents);\n  } finally {\n    fs.closeSync(fd);\n  }\n}\n"],"mappings":";AAMA,OAAO,QAAQ;AAER,SAAS,gBAAgB,UAAkB,UAAwB;AACxE,KAAG,OAAO,UAAU,EAAE,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;AACnC,QAAM,QACJ,GAAG,UAAU,WACb,GAAG,UAAU,UACb,GAAG,UAAU,UACZ,GAAG,UAAU,cAAc;AAC9B,QAAM,KAAK,GAAG,SAAS,UAAU,OAAO,GAAK;AAC7C,MAAI;AACF,OAAG,WAAW,IAAI,GAAK;AACvB,OAAG,UAAU,IAAI,QAAQ;AAAA,EAC3B,UAAE;AACA,OAAG,UAAU,EAAE;AAAA,EACjB;AACF;","names":[]}

package/dist/chunk-JKJXQTHH.js

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+// src/api/types.ts
+var MACHINE_PHASES = [
+  "build",
+  "check",
+  "install",
+  "handover",
+  "restart",
+  "connect",
+  "sync",
+  "stop",
+  "remove"
+];
+var TICKET_SLUG_PATTERN = /^[a-z]+(?:-[a-z]+)*$/;
+
+export {
+  MACHINE_PHASES,
+  TICKET_SLUG_PATTERN
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-JKJXQTHH.js.map