@preventive/triage 1.0.0-alpha.4 → 1.0.0-alpha.40

package/{server → server-e2e}/objstore/init.ts

@@ -15,16 +15,22 @@ import { errStack } from '../util.ts'
 
 export type ObjstoreInitDeps = {
   // Pre-opened storage handle, sharing the SQLite connection with
-  // the workspace_revision handle in server/db.ts.
+  // the workspace_revision handle in server-e2e/db.ts.
   handle: Handle
   reapIntervalMs: number
+  // Automatic-sweep switch (OBJSTORE_REAP_DISABLED). When true, NEITHER the boot
+  // sweep nor the periodic timer runs: `startupReap` resolves immediately
+  // and no timer is installed. Orphaned/superseded blobs and stale
+  // staging rows then accumulate unbounded — only safe if an external job
+  // handles GC. Omitted/false → reaper runs (the default). See config.ts.
+  reapDisabled?: boolean
   send: (socket: WebSocket, msg: object) => void
   broadcast: (tag: string, msg: object, except: WebSocket | null) => void
   // Cross-instance pub/sub publishers. SQLite mode passes no-ops; Neon
   // mode passes Postgres LISTEN/NOTIFY-backed implementations. See
-  // server/pubsub.ts for the bus design.
+  // server-e2e/pubsub.ts for the bus design.
   publishObjPut: (tag: string, resourceTag: string) => void
-  publishObjDeleted: (tag: string, resourceTag: string, version: number) => void
+  publishObjDeleted: (tag: string, resourceTag: string, version: number, incarnation: string) => void
   getNonce: (socket: WebSocket) => string | undefined
   debug: boolean
   // Auth gate for the FIRST objstore-put-begin against a workspace
@@ -39,14 +45,21 @@ export type ObjstoreInitDeps = {
   // process behaviour). Multi-replica deployments MUST supply a
   // shared secret here so a token minted on one replica's WS plane
   // validates on another replica's REST plane (the WS-to-REST hop
-  // is not load-balancer-pinned). See server/index.ts boot logic
+  // is not load-balancer-pinned). See server-e2e/index.ts boot logic
   // for the env var (`OBJSTORE_TOKEN_SECRET`).
   tokenSecret?: TokenSecret
+  // New-workspace operator gate for the REST put-begin mint — returns
+  // `true` to DENY (password configured AND workspace new). The
+  // connection-independent analog of `authGate`; the client falls back to
+  // the in-band WS put-begin on a deny. Omitted → open (never deny),
+  // matching `authGate`'s no-config default.
+  restPutGate?: (workspaceTag: string) => Promise<boolean>
 }
 
 export type ObjstoreInit = {
   handlers: ObjstoreHandlers
   restDeps: ObjstoreRestDeps
+  reap: () => Promise<void>
   startupReap: Promise<void>
   // Cancels the periodic timer AND resolves only after any
   // currently-in-flight sweep has finished, so shutdown can safely
@@ -77,7 +90,10 @@ export function initObjstore(deps: ObjstoreInitDeps): ObjstoreInit {
     ...(deps.sendUnauthorized ? { sendUnauthorized: deps.sendUnauthorized } : {}),
   })
   const restDeps: ObjstoreRestDeps = {
-    handle, secret, broadcast: deps.broadcast, publishObjPut: deps.publishObjPut, debug: deps.debug,
+    handle, secret, broadcast: deps.broadcast,
+    publishObjPut: deps.publishObjPut, publishObjDeleted: deps.publishObjDeleted,
+    restPutGate: deps.restPutGate ?? (() => Promise.resolve(false)),
+    debug: deps.debug,
   }
   // Re-entrancy guard for periodic + startup sweeps. Kicking the
   // startup sweep through the same `enqueueSweep` path means the
@@ -87,21 +103,22 @@ export function initObjstore(deps: ObjstoreInitDeps): ObjstoreInit {
   let inFlight: Promise<void> | null = null
   function enqueueSweep(): Promise<void> {
     if (inFlight) return inFlight
-    // Log reaper failures unconditionally (not gated on `debug`) — a
-    // failed sweep means stranded files / staging rows that never get
-    // cleaned, and operators need to see it. Inner catch makes the
-    // promise resolve so callers (startupReap awaiter + setInterval)
-    // don't have to handle rejection.
-    const p = reapOrphans(handle).catch((err) => {
-      console.warn('objstore reaper error:', errStack(err))
-    }).finally(() => { if (inFlight === p) inFlight = null })
+    // Keep failures visible to explicit callers; automatic sweeps log them.
+    const p = reapOrphans(handle).finally(() => { if (inFlight === p) inFlight = null })
     inFlight = p
     return p
   }
+  const drain = async () => { if (inFlight) await inFlight.catch(() => {}) }
+  const automaticSweep = () => enqueueSweep().catch(err => console.warn('objstore reaper error:', errStack(err)))
+  // Explicit cleanup remains available when automatic sweeps are disabled.
+  if (deps.reapDisabled) {
+    console.warn('objstore: automatic reaper DISABLED (OBJSTORE_REAP_DISABLED) — use /api/reap or an external cleanup job')
+    return { handlers, restDeps, reap: enqueueSweep, startupReap: Promise.resolve(), stopReaper: drain }
+  }
   // Caller awaits this before accepting traffic so a fresh boot
   // can't hand out list / fetch / put-begin against a tag whose
   // on-disk state still has stranded files from a prior crash.
-  const startupReap = enqueueSweep()
+  const startupReap = automaticSweep()
   // Jittered start of the periodic timer. Multi-replica deploys
   // (Neon + Vercel Blob) commonly boot N replicas in tight lock-step
   // (deploy rollout, cluster restart), which would otherwise sync every
@@ -114,20 +131,20 @@ export function initObjstore(deps: ObjstoreInitDeps): ObjstoreInit {
   let reapTimer: ReturnType<typeof setInterval> | null = null
   const jitterMs = Math.floor(Math.random() * deps.reapIntervalMs)
   const firstTimer = setTimeout(() => {
-    enqueueSweep()
-    reapTimer = setInterval(enqueueSweep, deps.reapIntervalMs)
+    void automaticSweep()
+    reapTimer = setInterval(automaticSweep, deps.reapIntervalMs)
     reapTimer.unref?.()
   }, deps.reapIntervalMs + jitterMs)
   firstTimer.unref?.()
   return {
-    handlers, restDeps, startupReap,
+    handlers, restDeps, reap: enqueueSweep, startupReap,
     stopReaper: async () => {
       clearTimeout(firstTimer)
       if (reapTimer) clearInterval(reapTimer)
       // Drain whichever sweep is currently running (startup or
       // periodic) — either could be mid-readdir/unlink at SIGTERM
       // time and would otherwise outlive `handle.close()`.
-      if (inFlight) await inFlight.catch(() => {})
+      await drain()
     },
   }
 }

package/{server → server-e2e}/objstore/reaper.ts

@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ async function reapStaleStagingRows(handle: Handle, now: number, stagingTtlMs: n
   // Push the staleness filter into SQL so the
   // `workspace_object_staging_begun_at_idx` index handles the scan.
   // The snapshot is O(stale-rows) cluster-wide. DB-layout audit
-  // `server/objstore/store.ts`.
+  // `server-e2e/objstore/store.ts`.
   const staleBefore = now - stagingTtlMs
   const staging = await handle.listAllStaging.all(staleBefore) as StagingRow[]
   for (const s of staging) {

package/server-e2e/objstore/rest-deny.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+// Shared failure-response helpers for the objstore REST plane
+// (./rest.ts + ./rest-mint.ts). A uniform `{ error: <reason> }` JSON
+// envelope so clients parse one shape; the 409 variant additionally
+// carries the live version/incarnation so a PUT / put-begin can rebase.
+// Reasons (400/401/403/404/405/409/410/411/500/503) are documented in
+// server-e2e/README.md and the client decides recovery from the code —
+// probe-distinguishing defense isn't a goal: the richer PUT/GET reasons are
+// reachable only after the bearer-token check, while the public surfaces (an
+// unauthed GET/PUT, or the signature-authed POST mint) expose only
+// 400/401/404 — none of which gives a probe signal it couldn't already
+// enumerate.
+
+import type { ServerResponse } from 'node:http'
+
+export function deny(res: ServerResponse, status: number, body: string): void {
+  res.writeHead(status, { 'content-type': 'application/json' })
+  res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: body }))
+}
+
+// Variant of `deny` that augments the envelope with the live row's
+// `currentVersion` + `currentIncarnation` so a 409'd PUT / put-begin can
+// rebase onto the right precondition token rather than retry blindly
+// against an occupied slot. Symmetric with the WS plane's
+// `objstore-conflict` frame.
+export function denyConflict(res: ServerResponse, currentVersion: number | null, currentIncarnation: string | null): void {
+  res.writeHead(409, { 'content-type': 'application/json' })
+  res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: 'conflict', currentVersion, currentIncarnation }))
+}

package/server-e2e/objstore/rest-mint.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
+// REST endpoints for the objstore plane — the single-round-trip,
+// SSE-session-independent alternative to the WS `objstore-fetch` /
+// `objstore-put-begin` / `objstore-delete` handshakes (so these ops can't
+// be interrupted by an SSE replica hop). One route, `POST
+// /api/objstore/{tag}/{res}`, with a JSON body `{ op, ts, signature, ... }`:
+// the workspace signs the request (the workspaceTag IS the Ed25519 pubkey,
+// so verification is self-contained — no socket, no stored key), the server
+// verifies it + freshness/replay-guards (the connection-nonce stand-in).
+// fetch/put return the SAME token shape the WS path sends, for the UNCHANGED
+// bearer-token GET / PUT byte transfers; delete mutates in place and returns
+// `{ deletedVersion }` (no token — there are no bytes to move). See
+// server-e2e/README.md "REST endpoints & tokens".
+
+import type { IncomingMessage, ServerResponse } from 'node:http'
+import { Buffer } from 'node:buffer'
+
+import type { ObjstoreRestDeps, RouteMatch } from './rest.ts'
+import { deny, denyConflict } from './rest-deny.ts'
+import { MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH, beginPut, deleteObject, getLive, isValidContentHash, isValidIncarnation, isValidSignature, objectMetaWire } from './store.ts'
+import { mintGetToken, mintPutToken } from './tokens.ts'
+import { verifyObjstoreDeleteRestSig, verifyObjstoreFetchRestSig, verifyObjstorePutBeginRestSig } from './sign.ts'
+import { createFetchMintGuard } from './fetch-mint-guard.ts'
+
+// Per-process freshness + replay guard for the REST POSTs (fetch, put-begin,
+// delete). They have no connection nonce to bind, so they bind a client
+// timestamp — see ./fetch-mint-guard.ts. The three ops' signatures are
+// globally unique (distinct canonical domains), so one guard dedups all three.
+const mintGuard = createFetchMintGuard()
+
+// Hard cap on a mint JSON body. The put-begin body (op, ts, signature,
+// prevVersion, prevIncarnation, expectedLength, contentHash) is the larger
+// of the two and still only a few hundred bytes; 4 KiB is comfortable
+// headroom. Bounds the read so a hostile client can't stream an unbounded
+// body into memory before the parse.
+const MINT_BODY_MAX = 4096
+
+// Read a small JSON request body up to `maxBytes`, returning the parsed
+// value or null on overflow / parse failure / read error. Used only by
+// the mint POST; the PUT body is the raw blob and streams to disk via a
+// different path.
+async function readJsonBody(req: IncomingMessage, maxBytes: number): Promise<unknown> {
+  const chunks: Buffer[] = []
+  let total = 0
+  try {
+    for await (const chunk of req) {
+      const buf = chunk as Buffer
+      total += buf.length
+      if (total > maxBytes) return null
+      chunks.push(buf)
+    }
+  } catch { return null }
+  try { return JSON.parse(Buffer.concat(chunks).toString('utf8')) }
+  catch { return null }
+}
+
+// Extract + range-check the auth fields common to both mint ops. Gates the
+// signature to the wire shape (`isValidSignature`, matching the WS plane) so
+// an obviously-malformed sig is rejected up front rather than burning an
+// Ed25519 verify — and, since this runs before `mintGuard.admit`, a bad sig
+// never reaches the replay cache regardless.
+function parseMintAuth(body: object): { ts: number; signature: string } | null {
+  const ts = (body as { ts?: unknown }).ts
+  const signature = (body as { signature?: unknown }).signature
+  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(ts) || (ts as number) < 0) return null
+  if (!isValidSignature(signature)) return null
+  return { ts: ts as number, signature }
+}
+
+// Dispatch the mint by body `op`. Auth-proxy friendly: the signature rides
+// the JSON body (not a header or cookie, so it never collides with a
+// cookie-based proxy), and the response is JSON — no redirect, no token in
+// any URL. Client note: a replayed signature is rejected, so a retry MUST
+// re-sign with a fresh `ts` rather than resend the same body.
+export async function handleRestMint(
+  deps: ObjstoreRestDeps, req: IncomingMessage, res: ServerResponse, route: RouteMatch,
+): Promise<void> {
+  const body = await readJsonBody(req, MINT_BODY_MAX)
+  if (!body || typeof body !== 'object') { deny(res, 400, 'bad-request'); return }
+  const op = (body as { op?: unknown }).op
+  if (op === 'fetch') { await handleRestFetchMint(deps, res, route, body); return }
+  if (op === 'put') { await handleRestPutBegin(deps, res, route, body); return }
+  if (op === 'delete') { await handleRestDelete(deps, res, route, body); return }
+  deny(res, 400, 'bad-request')
+}
+
+// op:'fetch' — mirrors the WS `objstore-fetch` → `objstore-fetch-token`
+// handshake; returns `{ ...meta, urlPath, token, expiresAt }` for the
+// UNCHANGED bearer-token GET.
+async function handleRestFetchMint(
+  deps: ObjstoreRestDeps, res: ServerResponse, route: RouteMatch, body: object,
+): Promise<void> {
+  const auth = parseMintAuth(body)
+  if (!auth) { deny(res, 400, 'bad-request'); return }
+  // Verify the signature BEFORE touching the replay guard so a bad-sig
+  // request can't consume cache space. The signature commits to THIS `ts`.
+  if (!await verifyObjstoreFetchRestSig(route.tag, route.resourceTag, auth.ts, auth.signature)) {
+    deny(res, 401, 'unauthorized'); return
+  }
+  // Freshness window + single-use dedup (the connection-nonce stand-in).
+  // 'stale'/'replay' are both opaque 401s — the client re-signs with a
+  // fresh `ts` and retries.
+  if (mintGuard.admit(auth.signature, auth.ts) !== 'ok') { deny(res, 401, 'unauthorized'); return }
+  const row = await getLive(deps.handle, route.tag, route.resourceTag)
+  if (!row) { deny(res, 404, 'not-found'); return }
+  const { token, exp } = mintGetToken(deps.secret, route.tag, route.resourceTag, row.version, row.incarnation)
+  res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/json' })
+  res.end(JSON.stringify({
+    ...objectMetaWire(row),
+    urlPath: `/api/objstore/${route.tag}/${route.resourceTag}`,
+    token,
+    expiresAt: exp,
+  }))
+}
+
+// op:'put' — mirrors the WS `handlePutBegin`: verify the signed put fields,
+// freshness/replay-guard, the new-workspace operator gate, then `beginPut`
+// (advisory prev-check + staging row) and mint the put-token. Returns
+// `{ stagingId, urlPath, token, expiresAt }` for the UNCHANGED bearer-token
+// PUT; `409 conflict` (with current version/incarnation to rebase on) or
+// `403 workspace-full` map `beginPut`'s refusals.
+//
+// New-workspace gate: REST can't read a socket's operator-auth state, so
+// when a password is configured AND the workspace is never-before-seen this
+// returns 401 — the client falls back to the in-band WS put-begin (which
+// runs the operator auth flow). No-op for password-less deployments or
+// existing workspaces (the common case).
+async function handleRestPutBegin(
+  deps: ObjstoreRestDeps, res: ServerResponse, route: RouteMatch, body: object,
+): Promise<void> {
+  const auth = parseMintAuth(body)
+  if (!auth) { deny(res, 400, 'bad-request'); return }
+  // Field gates mirror `handlePutBegin`'s up-front rejects.
+  const expectedLength = (body as { expectedLength?: unknown }).expectedLength
+  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(expectedLength) || (expectedLength as number) < 0 || (expectedLength as number) > MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH) {
+    deny(res, 400, 'bad-request'); return
+  }
+  const prevVersionRaw = (body as { prevVersion?: unknown }).prevVersion
+  if (prevVersionRaw != null && (typeof prevVersionRaw !== 'number' || !Number.isSafeInteger(prevVersionRaw))) {
+    deny(res, 400, 'bad-request'); return
+  }
+  const prevVersion = typeof prevVersionRaw === 'number' ? prevVersionRaw : null
+  const prevIncarnationRaw = (body as { prevIncarnation?: unknown }).prevIncarnation
+  const prevIncarnation = typeof prevIncarnationRaw === 'string' ? prevIncarnationRaw : null
+  // prevVersion/prevIncarnation travel as a null-iff-null pair (matches the
+  // WS `validPrevPair`): a half-pair is malformed.
+  if ((prevVersion === null) !== (prevIncarnation === null)) { deny(res, 400, 'bad-request'); return }
+  // A non-null incarnation must be the wire shape (matches the WS path's
+  // `isValidIncarnation` gate). Signature-covered + CAS-checked regardless,
+  // but reject the obviously-malformed up front.
+  if (prevIncarnation !== null && !isValidIncarnation(prevIncarnation)) { deny(res, 400, 'bad-request'); return }
+  const contentHash = (body as { contentHash?: unknown }).contentHash
+  if (!isValidContentHash(contentHash)) { deny(res, 400, 'bad-request'); return }
+
+  const fields = {
+    workspaceTag: route.tag, resourceTag: route.resourceTag,
+    prevVersion, prevIncarnation, contentHash, expectedLength: expectedLength as number,
+  }
+  if (!await verifyObjstorePutBeginRestSig(fields, auth.ts, auth.signature)) { deny(res, 401, 'unauthorized'); return }
+  if (mintGuard.admit(auth.signature, auth.ts) !== 'ok') { deny(res, 401, 'unauthorized'); return }
+  // New-workspace operator gate — see the function header. Refusing here
+  // routes the client to its in-band WS put-begin fallback.
+  if (await deps.restPutGate(route.tag)) { deny(res, 401, 'unauthorized'); return }
+  const result = await beginPut(deps.handle, {
+    workspaceTag: route.tag, resourceTag: route.resourceTag,
+    prevVersion, prevIncarnation, expectedLength: expectedLength as number,
+    contentHash, signature: auth.signature,
+  })
+  if (!result.ok) {
+    if (result.reason === 'workspace-full') { deny(res, 403, 'workspace-full'); return }
+    denyConflict(res, result.conflict?.version ?? null, result.conflict?.incarnation ?? null); return
+  }
+  const { token, exp } = mintPutToken(deps.secret, route.tag, route.resourceTag, result.stagingId, expectedLength as number)
+  res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/json' })
+  res.end(JSON.stringify({
+    stagingId: result.stagingId,
+    urlPath: `/api/objstore/${route.tag}/${route.resourceTag}`,
+    token,
+    expiresAt: exp,
+  }))
+}
+
+// op:'delete' — mirrors the WS `handleDelete`: verify the signed delete
+// fields, freshness/replay-guard, then `deleteObject` (a precondition-checked
+// version-CAS drop). Unlike put, there is NO operator gate — delete is
+// signature-gated, idempotent, and creates nothing (the WS handleDelete has
+// no authGate either). Returns 200 `{ deletedVersion }` (0 = idempotent
+// no-op on a missing row with a null precondition); 409 conflict (stale
+// prevVersion/incarnation); 404 not-found (a non-null precondition against a
+// missing row). On a real drop it broadcasts `objstore-deleted` to
+// subscribers (+ cross-instance), exactly like the WS path.
+async function handleRestDelete(
+  deps: ObjstoreRestDeps, res: ServerResponse, route: RouteMatch, body: object,
+): Promise<void> {
+  const auth = parseMintAuth(body)
+  if (!auth) { deny(res, 400, 'bad-request'); return }
+  const prevVersionRaw = (body as { prevVersion?: unknown }).prevVersion
+  if (prevVersionRaw != null && (typeof prevVersionRaw !== 'number' || !Number.isSafeInteger(prevVersionRaw))) {
+    deny(res, 400, 'bad-request'); return
+  }
+  const prevVersion = typeof prevVersionRaw === 'number' ? prevVersionRaw : null
+  const prevIncarnationRaw = (body as { prevIncarnation?: unknown }).prevIncarnation
+  const prevIncarnation = typeof prevIncarnationRaw === 'string' ? prevIncarnationRaw : null
+  // null-iff-null pair (matches the WS `validPrevPair`); a non-null
+  // incarnation must be the wire shape.
+  if ((prevVersion === null) !== (prevIncarnation === null)) { deny(res, 400, 'bad-request'); return }
+  if (prevIncarnation !== null && !isValidIncarnation(prevIncarnation)) { deny(res, 400, 'bad-request'); return }
+
+  const fields = { workspaceTag: route.tag, resourceTag: route.resourceTag, prevVersion, prevIncarnation }
+  if (!await verifyObjstoreDeleteRestSig(fields, auth.ts, auth.signature)) { deny(res, 401, 'unauthorized'); return }
+  if (mintGuard.admit(auth.signature, auth.ts) !== 'ok') { deny(res, 401, 'unauthorized'); return }
+  const result = await deleteObject(deps.handle, route.tag, route.resourceTag, prevVersion, prevIncarnation)
+  if (!result.ok) {
+    if (result.reason === 'conflict') { denyConflict(res, result.conflict?.version ?? null, result.conflict?.incarnation ?? null); return }
+    deny(res, 404, 'not-found'); return
+  }
+  res.writeHead(200, { 'content-type': 'application/json' })
+  res.end(JSON.stringify({ deletedVersion: result.deletedVersion }))
+  // deletedVersion 0 = nothing was live → nothing to broadcast. A real drop
+  // fans out to subscribers (including the originator, matching the WS path's
+  // `except: null`) so peers' `onDeleted` fire.
+  if (result.deletedVersion === 0) return
+  deps.broadcast(route.tag, { type: 'objstore-deleted', workspaceTag: route.tag, resourceTag: route.resourceTag, version: result.deletedVersion, incarnation: prevIncarnation! }, null)
+  deps.publishObjDeleted(route.tag, route.resourceTag, result.deletedVersion, prevIncarnation!)
+}

package/{server → server-e2e}/objstore/rest.ts

@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ import {
 } from './store.ts'
 import type { LiveReader } from './blob.ts'
 import { type TokenSecret, extractBearer, verifyToken } from './tokens.ts'
+import { deny, denyConflict } from './rest-deny.ts'
+import { handleRestMint } from './rest-mint.ts'
 import { debugId, debugTag, errMsg, errStack } from '../util.ts'
 
 // Server-side fault codes that should surface as 500 `io-error`
@@ -66,6 +68,18 @@ export type ObjstoreRestDeps = {
   // workspace_object for the full metadata (version, hash, length,
   // signature). SQLite mode passes a no-op.
   publishObjPut: (tag: string, resourceTag: string) => void
+  // Cross-instance pub/sub for objstore-deleted — fired alongside the local
+  // `broadcast` after a successful REST delete mint, so peers on OTHER
+  // instances drop the resource in real time. Carries (tag, resourceTag,
+  // version, incarnation) inline (the row is gone post-delete). SQLite mode passes a no-op.
+  publishObjDeleted: (tag: string, resourceTag: string, version: number, incarnation: string) => void
+  // New-workspace operator gate for the REST put-begin mint — the
+  // connection-independent analog of the WS path's `authGate`. Returns
+  // `true` to DENY (a password is configured AND the workspace is
+  // never-before-seen), which routes the client to its in-band WS
+  // put-begin fallback (REST has no socket auth state to consult).
+  // No-config default is open (never deny), matching the WS authGate.
+  restPutGate: (workspaceTag: string) => Promise<boolean>
   debug: boolean
 }
 
@@ -91,7 +105,7 @@ export type ObjstoreRestDeps = {
 // concurrent same-token PUT is rejected (409) before it can open a
 // second writer. The slot is held only across body + commit, released
 // in a `finally`, and bounded by the REST idle-body timeout in
-// server/http.ts so a slow-loris can't pin it. NOT a commit lock —
+// server-e2e/http.ts so a slow-loris can't pin it. NOT a commit lock —
 // commits stay lock-free on the version-CAS above. Per-process: the
 // Vercel multi-replica path leans on `allowOverwrite: true` + the
 // commit CAS + content-addressing for cross-replica correctness (a
@@ -116,34 +130,21 @@ export function matchRoute(url: string | undefined): RouteMatch | null {
   return { tag: tag!, resourceTag: resourceTag! }
 }
 
-function deny(res: ServerResponse, status: number, body: string): void {
-  // Uniform `{ error: <reason> }` JSON envelope for every failure so
-  // clients parse one shape. Status + reason are NOT intentionally
-  // indistinguishable across causes — 401/404/405/410/411/500 each map
-  // to a documented reason in server/README.md and the client decides
-  // recovery from the code. Probe-distinguishing defense isn't a goal:
-  // every reason is reachable only after the route + bearer-token check
-  // passes (or as 401/404 from the public surface), so a probe gains no
-  // signal it couldn't otherwise enumerate.
-  res.writeHead(status, { 'content-type': 'application/json' })
-  res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: body }))
-}
-
-// Variant of `deny` that augments the JSON envelope with the live
-// row's `currentVersion` + `currentIncarnation` so a REST PUT 409 lets
-// the caller rebase onto the right precondition token. Without this the
-// client only learns the slot is occupied — not at what (version,
-// incarnation) — and retries blindly against a non-empty slot, looping
-// indefinitely against a live row. Symmetric with the WS plane's
-// `objstore-conflict` envelope.
-function denyConflict(res: ServerResponse, currentVersion: number | null, currentIncarnation: string | null): void {
-  res.writeHead(409, { 'content-type': 'application/json' })
-  res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: 'conflict', currentVersion, currentIncarnation }))
-}
-
 export async function handleRest(deps: ObjstoreRestDeps, req: IncomingMessage, res: ServerResponse): Promise<void> {
   const route = matchRoute(req.url)
   if (!route) { deny(res, 404, 'not-found'); return }
+  // POST = REST mint (fetch or put-begin, by body `op`; signature-authed
+  // via the JSON body, no bearer token). Dispatched before the bearer-token
+  // gate below, which guards the token-authed GET/PUT byte transfers.
+  if (req.method === 'POST') {
+    try { await handleRestMint(deps, req, res, route) }
+    catch (err: unknown) {
+      if (deps.debug) console.warn('objstore POST error:', errStack(err))
+      if (res.headersSent) res.destroy()
+      else deny(res, 500, 'internal')
+    }
+    return
+  }
   const token = extractBearer(req.headers['authorization'])
   if (!token) { deny(res, 401, 'unauthorized'); return }
   const payload = verifyToken(deps.secret, token)

package/{server → server-e2e}/objstore/sign.ts

@@ -10,6 +10,18 @@ import { isValidIncarnation } from './store.ts'
 const OBJSTORE_PUT_DOMAIN = 'deepview-objstore.v1.put'
 const OBJSTORE_DELETE_DOMAIN = 'deepview-objstore.v1.delete'
 const OBJSTORE_FETCH_DOMAIN = 'deepview-objstore.v1.fetch'
+// REST fetch-mint domain — MUST match the client's FETCH_REST_DOMAIN
+// (client/sync/objstore-crypto.ts). Distinct from OBJSTORE_FETCH_DOMAIN so
+// a WS-fetch signature can't be replayed against the REST mint endpoint.
+const OBJSTORE_FETCH_REST_DOMAIN = 'deepview-objstore.v1.fetch-rest'
+// REST put-begin domain — MUST match the client's PUT_REST_DOMAIN. Distinct
+// from OBJSTORE_PUT_DOMAIN so a WS put-begin signature can't be replayed
+// against the REST mint endpoint.
+const OBJSTORE_PUT_REST_DOMAIN = 'deepview-objstore.v1.put-rest'
+// REST delete domain — MUST match the client's DELETE_REST_DOMAIN. Distinct
+// from OBJSTORE_DELETE_DOMAIN so a WS delete signature can't be replayed
+// against the REST mint endpoint.
+const OBJSTORE_DELETE_REST_DOMAIN = 'deepview-objstore.v1.delete-rest'
 
 // Wire shapes the verifiers accept. Fields land here post-
 // `JSON.parse`, so every value starts life as `unknown` — strict
@@ -95,6 +107,38 @@ function canonicalObjstoreFetch(msg: ObjstoreFetchMsg, connectionNonce: string):
   ].join('\n'))
 }
 
+// REST fetch-mint canonical. Binds a client epoch-ms timestamp (string-
+// encoded to match the client) in place of the connection nonce; the REST
+// handler enforces the freshness window + replay dedup.
+function canonicalObjstoreFetchRest(workspaceTag: string, resourceTag: string, ts: number): Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> {
+  return encodeUtf8([
+    OBJSTORE_FETCH_REST_DOMAIN,
+    workspaceTag,
+    resourceTag,
+    String(ts),
+  ].join('\n'))
+}
+
+// REST put-begin canonical — the WS `canonicalObjstorePut` fields in the
+// same order/coercion (intOrEmpty / strOrEmpty), under the put-rest domain
+// and binding the client `ts` in place of the connection nonce.
+function canonicalObjstorePutRest(
+  workspaceTag: string, resourceTag: string,
+  prevVersion: number | null, prevIncarnation: string | null,
+  contentHash: string, expectedLength: number, ts: number,
+): Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> {
+  return encodeUtf8([
+    OBJSTORE_PUT_REST_DOMAIN,
+    workspaceTag,
+    resourceTag,
+    intOrEmpty(prevVersion),
+    strOrEmpty(prevIncarnation),
+    contentHash,
+    String(expectedLength),
+    String(ts),
+  ].join('\n'))
+}
+
 // `Number.isSafeInteger` rather than `Number.isInteger`: JSON numbers
 // are IEEE-754 and integers above 2^53-1 aren't precisely
 // representable. Accepting non-safe integers would let a signed
@@ -162,3 +206,64 @@ export function verifyObjstoreFetchSig(msg: ObjstoreFetchMsg, connectionNonce: u
   if (typeof msg.resourceTag !== 'string') return Promise.resolve(false)
   return verifyObjstoreSig(msg, connectionNonce, (nonce) => canonicalObjstoreFetch(msg, nonce))
 }
+
+// Verify a REST fetch-mint signature. Unlike the WS verifiers this takes
+// the already-validated fields directly (the REST handler parsed +
+// range-checked `ts` and `signature`) rather than a wire `msg` + socket
+// nonce. The workspaceTag IS the Ed25519 public key, so verification is
+// fully self-contained — no session or stored key needed. A throw from
+// the canonical build (lone surrogate, etc.) is treated as a verify
+// failure, never an escaping exception.
+export function verifyObjstoreFetchRestSig(
+  workspaceTag: string, resourceTag: string, ts: number, signature: string,
+): Promise<boolean> {
+  let payload: Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>
+  try { payload = canonicalObjstoreFetchRest(workspaceTag, resourceTag, ts) }
+  catch { return Promise.resolve(false) }
+  return verifyEd25519(workspaceTag, payload, signature)
+}
+
+// Verify a REST put-begin signature. Same self-contained shape as
+// `verifyObjstoreFetchRestSig` — the caller (rest.ts) has already
+// range-checked the put fields + `ts`. The workspaceTag IS the pubkey.
+export function verifyObjstorePutBeginRestSig(
+  fields: { workspaceTag: string; resourceTag: string; prevVersion: number | null; prevIncarnation: string | null; contentHash: string; expectedLength: number },
+  ts: number, signature: string,
+): Promise<boolean> {
+  let payload: Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>
+  try {
+    payload = canonicalObjstorePutRest(
+      fields.workspaceTag, fields.resourceTag, fields.prevVersion, fields.prevIncarnation,
+      fields.contentHash, fields.expectedLength, ts,
+    )
+  } catch { return Promise.resolve(false) }
+  return verifyEd25519(fields.workspaceTag, payload, signature)
+}
+
+// REST delete-mint canonical. WS `canonicalObjstoreDelete` fields, under the
+// delete-rest domain, binding the client `ts` in place of the nonce.
+function canonicalObjstoreDeleteRest(
+  workspaceTag: string, resourceTag: string,
+  prevVersion: number | null, prevIncarnation: string | null, ts: number,
+): Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer> {
+  return encodeUtf8([
+    OBJSTORE_DELETE_REST_DOMAIN,
+    workspaceTag,
+    resourceTag,
+    intOrEmpty(prevVersion),
+    strOrEmpty(prevIncarnation),
+    String(ts),
+  ].join('\n'))
+}
+
+// Verify a REST delete-mint signature. Self-contained (workspaceTag IS the
+// pubkey); the caller (rest.ts) has range-checked `ts` + the prev pair.
+export function verifyObjstoreDeleteRestSig(
+  fields: { workspaceTag: string; resourceTag: string; prevVersion: number | null; prevIncarnation: string | null },
+  ts: number, signature: string,
+): Promise<boolean> {
+  let payload: Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>
+  try { payload = canonicalObjstoreDeleteRest(fields.workspaceTag, fields.resourceTag, fields.prevVersion, fields.prevIncarnation, ts) }
+  catch { return Promise.resolve(false) }
+  return verifyEd25519(fields.workspaceTag, payload, signature)
+}

package/{server → server-e2e}/objstore/store-neon.ts

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 // dialect on the wire.
 //
 // `@neondatabase/serverless` is an OPTIONAL peer dep — selected by
-// the `DATABASE_URL` branch in `server/index.ts`. The peer dep
+// the configured database URL branch in `server-e2e/index.ts`. The peer dep
 // itself is loaded lazily inside `openNeonObjstore` below. A single
 // Neon project / database holds both `workspace_revision` and the
 // two objstore tables; each plane opens its own stateless
@@ -13,14 +13,10 @@
 // release.
 //
 // Byte plane: passed in as a `BlobBackend` (./blob.ts). The
-// supported pairings selected by server/index.ts are:
-//   - Neon + Vercel Blob Private Storage (multi-replica, the only
-//     pairing that survives a replica restart without local-disk
-//     coordination). Activated by setting BLOB_READ_WRITE_TOKEN
-//     alongside DATABASE_URL.
-//   - Neon + local FS (development / operator escape hatch — bytes
-//     still need to live on a shared filesystem if you run more
-//     than one replica).
+// supported Neon pairing selected by server-e2e/index.ts is Vercel
+// Blob Private Storage. DATABASE_URL or E2E_DATABASE_URL plus BLOB_READ_WRITE_TOKEN
+// is required; the launcher never selects Neon + local FS. Tests
+// can inject a local-FS backend directly through this adapter.
 
 import type { BlobBackend } from './blob.ts'
 import type { AllStmt, GetStmt, RunStmt } from '../db-stmt.ts'
@@ -309,7 +305,7 @@ export async function openNeonObjstore(connectionString: string, blob: BlobBacke
   // local `../neon-driver.ts` re-export wrapper so the peer dep stays
   // optional AND tests can mock the driver (a local path is always
   // resolvable; the bare specifier isn't when the dep is absent). See
-  // `server/neon-driver.ts`. Cast through `unknown` because the
+  // `server-e2e/neon-driver.ts`. Cast through `unknown` because the
   // wrapper's `export *` re-exports a `@ts-ignore`'d module.
   const mod = (await import('../neon-driver.ts')) as unknown as { neon: (url: string) => NeonSql }
   const sql: NeonSql = mod.neon(connectionString)