@pramen/auth 0.0.51 → 0.0.52

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -407,3 +407,4 @@ export interface EmailVerificationOptions {
  * later `changeEmail` invalidates it (verifyEmail rejects a token whose address no longer
  * matches). Spread `emailTokenSchema` into your schema and `.tasks` into your task map. */
 export declare function createEmailVerification(opts: EmailVerificationOptions): AuthModule;
+export { createOidcAuth, oidcHandlers, OIDC_UPSERT_HANDLER, type OidcOptions } from "./oidc.js";

package/dist/index.js

@@ -837,3 +837,5 @@ export function createEmailVerification(opts) {
     };
     return { handlers, tasks };
 }
+// --- OIDC (authorization code + PKCE) ---------------------------------------
+export { createOidcAuth, oidcHandlers, OIDC_UPSERT_HANDLER } from "./oidc.js";

package/dist/oidc.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+import type { HandlerMap, JsonObject } from "@pramen/server";
+import type { PublicRoute } from "@pramen/server/worker";
+export interface OidcOptions {
+    /** The provider's issuer URL. `/.well-known/openid-configuration` is fetched from it, so
+     * the endpoints and the JWKS location are never hand-copied. */
+    issuer: string;
+    clientId: string;
+    /** Confidential clients only. Omit for a public client — the exchange then relies on
+     * PKCE alone, which is the correct configuration for a SPA. */
+    clientSecret?: string;
+    /** Must match the redirect URI registered with the provider, exactly. */
+    redirectUri: string;
+    /** Where to send the browser after a successful login. The session token arrives in the
+     * URL FRAGMENT (`#token=…`), which — unlike a query parameter — is never sent to a
+     * server, kept in server logs, or included in a `Referer` header. */
+    successRedirect: string;
+    /** Default `["openid", "email", "profile"]`. */
+    scopes?: readonly string[];
+    /** The users table. Default `auth_users` (the `authSchema` shape). */
+    table?: string;
+    /** Roles for a first-time login when `mapRoles` yields none. Default `["user"]`. */
+    defaultRoles?: readonly string[];
+    /**
+     * Read roles out of the ID token's claims, for providers where the IdP is authoritative:
+     *
+     *   mapRoles: (c) => c["https://acme.com/roles"] as string[]   // Auth0/Okta
+     *   mapRoles: (c) => c.roles as string[]                       // Entra
+     *
+     * Return `undefined` to fall back to the roles stored on the user's row. Google Workspace
+     * ships no roles in the token, so omit this and manage them in pramen.
+     */
+    mapRoles?: (claims: JsonObject) => readonly string[] | undefined;
+    /**
+     * What identifies the account across logins.
+     *
+     * `"email"` (default) matches how the rest of `@pramen/auth` keys users, so an OIDC login
+     * lands on the SAME row as a magic-link or password login for that address. It is only
+     * honored when the provider asserts `email_verified` — an IdP that lets a user set an
+     * unverified address would otherwise be an account-takeover path into any existing
+     * email-keyed account.
+     *
+     * `"sub"` keys on the provider's opaque subject, namespaced by issuer. Immune to an email
+     * change, and to the above, but it will not link up with accounts created another way.
+     */
+    accountKey?: "email" | "sub";
+    sessionTtlSeconds?: number;
+    /** Where the flow is mounted. Defaults `/auth/oidc/start` and `/auth/oidc/callback`. */
+    startPath?: string;
+    callbackPath?: string;
+    /** How long an in-flight login may take. Default 600s. */
+    stateTtlSeconds?: number;
+}
+/**
+ * OIDC login for a pramen app. Spread the routes into `app.routes` (they are PRE-AUTH by
+ * design — a caller arriving here has no session yet):
+ *
+ *   const oidc = createOidcAuth({ issuer, clientId, clientSecret, redirectUri, successRedirect });
+ *   export const app = { schema, handlers, acl, routes: [...oidc.routes] };
+ *
+ * The browser goes to `/auth/oidc/start`, comes back to `/auth/oidc/callback`, and lands on
+ * `successRedirect#token=<pramen session>`.
+ */
+export declare function createOidcAuth(opts: OidcOptions): {
+    routes: PublicRoute[];
+};
+/** The name of the privileged handler the callback route calls. A route has no `ctx.db` — it
+ * runs in the Worker, before any tenant DO — so the write goes through `callPrivileged`,
+ * exactly as the CMS's preview route does. */
+export declare const OIDC_UPSERT_HANDLER = "__oidcUpsertUser";
+/** Handlers for `createOidcAuth`'s routes. Spread into `app.handlers`:
+ *
+ *   handlers: { ...authHandlers, ...oidcHandlers }
+ *
+ * `__oidcUpsertUser` is SYSTEM-only: `callPrivileged` reaches it from inside the Worker, and
+ * `auth: []` means no role satisfies it over `/rpc`, so it cannot be called from outside. */
+export declare const oidcHandlers: HandlerMap;

package/dist/oidc.js

@@ -0,0 +1,319 @@
+// OIDC login — authorization code + PKCE, exchanged for a PRAMEN session.
+//
+// pramen's core stays verify-only (BYO-IdP): `JwksStrategy` already verifies an RS256 token
+// against a remote JWKS, so a deployment whose frontend already holds an IdP token needs
+// nothing from this file. What was missing is the FLOW — the redirect dance that turns a
+// browser with no token into a session — and the claim mapping that makes an IdP's idea of
+// a user into pramen's.
+//
+// WHY IT MINTS A PRAMEN TOKEN rather than passing the IdP's through. The rest of the system
+// is built on pramen sessions: `refreshSession` re-reads roles without a re-login, the KV
+// denylist can revoke one mid-flight, and the ACL reads roles off the token. Forwarding a
+// provider token would give up all three and put role resolution on the hot path of every
+// request. So: the IdP proves WHO you are, once; pramen owns the session from there. Same
+// shape as `createMagicLinkAuth`, which exchanges a one-time link for the same thing.
+//
+// WHERE ROLES COME FROM, which differs per provider and is the part that silently fails:
+//   - Entra puts app roles in a top-level `roles` claim,
+//   - Auth0/Okta put them in a NAMESPACED claim (`https://example.com/roles`),
+//   - Google Workspace has none in the token at all.
+// So roles resolve in this order: `mapRoles(claims)` if you supply one (the IdP is
+// authoritative), else the roles stored on the user's row (pramen is authoritative — the
+// only workable answer for Google), else `defaultRoles` for a first login.
+import { JwksStrategy, Kv, mutation } from "@pramen/server";
+// The package's OWN HS256 signer — `@pramen/server`'s `signToken` mints the opaque
+// file/preview token, which the request verifier does not accept as a session.
+import { signToken } from "./index.js";
+const b64url = (bytes) => {
+    const b = bytes instanceof Uint8Array ? bytes : new Uint8Array(bytes);
+    return btoa(String.fromCharCode(...b)).replace(/\+/g, "-").replace(/\//g, "_").replace(/=+$/, "");
+};
+const randomB64 = (bytes = 32) => b64url(crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(bytes)));
+/** PKCE S256: the verifier stays server-side, only its hash goes to the provider, so an
+ * intercepted authorization code cannot be redeemed by whoever intercepted it. */
+async function challengeFor(verifier) {
+    return b64url(await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", new TextEncoder().encode(verifier)));
+}
+/** Discovery, cached per issuer for the isolate's life. The document is static in practice,
+ * and a fetch on every login would put the provider's availability on the login path twice. */
+const discoveryCache = new Map();
+function discover(issuer) {
+    const base = issuer.replace(/\/+$/, "");
+    let cached = discoveryCache.get(base);
+    if (!cached) {
+        cached = (async () => {
+            const res = await fetch(`${base}/.well-known/openid-configuration`);
+            if (!res.ok)
+                throw new Error(`@pramen/auth: OIDC discovery failed for ${base} (HTTP ${res.status})`);
+            const doc = (await res.json());
+            for (const field of ["issuer", "authorization_endpoint", "token_endpoint", "jwks_uri"]) {
+                if (typeof doc[field] !== "string")
+                    throw new Error(`@pramen/auth: OIDC discovery document from ${base} has no ${field}`);
+            }
+            // The document's own `issuer` is what ID tokens will carry, and it is what we verify
+            // against — a provider whose discovery URL and issuer differ (a tenant alias, say) is
+            // legitimate; a document claiming a DIFFERENT issuer than it was fetched from is not.
+            return doc;
+        })();
+        discoveryCache.set(base, cached);
+        void cached.catch(() => discoveryCache.delete(base)); // never cache a failure
+    }
+    return cached;
+}
+const sha256Hex = async (v) => [...new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", new TextEncoder().encode(v)))].map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")).join("");
+const BINDER_COOKIE = "pramen_oidc";
+function readCookie(request, name) {
+    const raw = request.headers.get("cookie");
+    if (!raw)
+        return null;
+    for (const part of raw.split(";")) {
+        const [k, ...v] = part.trim().split("=");
+        if (k === name)
+            return decodeURIComponent(v.join("="));
+    }
+    return null;
+}
+/** `SameSite=Lax` is what makes this work at all: the callback is a TOP-LEVEL GET navigation
+ * from the provider's origin, which Lax allows, while a cross-site POST or subresource would
+ * not carry it. `Secure` is set whenever the request is https — omitted on plain-http local
+ * dev, where the browser would otherwise drop the cookie entirely. */
+const binderCookie = (url, path, value, maxAge) => `${BINDER_COOKIE}=${encodeURIComponent(value)}; Path=${path}; Max-Age=${maxAge}; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax${url.protocol === "https:" ? "; Secure" : ""}`;
+const ESCAPES = { "&": "&amp;", "<": "&lt;", ">": "&gt;", '"': "&quot;", "'": "&#39;" };
+/** An error page. The message is ESCAPED here rather than at the call sites: this route is
+ * public, pre-auth, and reachable with arbitrary query parameters, so anything interpolated
+ * into it is attacker-controlled until proven otherwise. Escaping centrally means a future
+ * caller cannot reintroduce the hole by forgetting. */
+const html = (status, message) => new Response(`<!doctype html><meta charset="utf-8"><title>Sign-in</title><p>${message.replace(/[&<>"']/g, (c) => ESCAPES[c])}</p>`, { status, headers: { "content-type": "text/html; charset=utf-8", "cache-control": "no-store" } });
+/** OAuth error codes are a constrained vocabulary (RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1). Anything outside it
+ * is not a provider error worth echoing — it is someone probing this endpoint. */
+const safeErrorCode = (raw) => (/^[a-z_]{1,64}$/.test(raw) ? raw : "unspecified");
+/**
+ * OIDC login for a pramen app. Spread the routes into `app.routes` (they are PRE-AUTH by
+ * design — a caller arriving here has no session yet):
+ *
+ *   const oidc = createOidcAuth({ issuer, clientId, clientSecret, redirectUri, successRedirect });
+ *   export const app = { schema, handlers, acl, routes: [...oidc.routes] };
+ *
+ * The browser goes to `/auth/oidc/start`, comes back to `/auth/oidc/callback`, and lands on
+ * `successRedirect#token=<pramen session>`.
+ */
+export function createOidcAuth(opts) {
+    const scopes = opts.scopes ?? ["openid", "email", "profile"];
+    const table = opts.table ?? "auth_users";
+    const defaultRoles = opts.defaultRoles ?? ["user"];
+    const accountKey = opts.accountKey ?? "email";
+    const startPath = opts.startPath ?? "/auth/oidc/start";
+    const callbackPath = opts.callbackPath ?? "/auth/oidc/callback";
+    const stateTtl = opts.stateTtlSeconds ?? 600;
+    const sessionTtl = opts.sessionTtlSeconds ?? 3600;
+    // One verifier per issuer, so the JWKS cache and its key-rotation handling are shared
+    // across logins rather than rebuilt per request.
+    let verifier;
+    const idTokenVerifier = (jwksUri, issuer) => (verifier ??= new JwksStrategy(jwksUri, undefined, { requireExp: true, issuer, audience: opts.clientId }));
+    const start = {
+        method: "GET",
+        path: startPath,
+        handler: async (request, env) => {
+            const doc = await discover(opts.issuer);
+            const kv = new Kv(env.KV);
+            const state = randomB64();
+            const binder = randomB64();
+            const pending = {
+                verifier: randomB64(64),
+                nonce: randomB64(),
+                binderHash: await sha256Hex(binder),
+                // Where the user was going before they were bounced to sign in. Only ever a PATH:
+                // an absolute URL here would make this an open redirect.
+                returnTo: new URL(request.url).searchParams.get("returnTo") ?? undefined,
+            };
+            await kv.put(`oidc:${state}`, JSON.stringify(pending), { expirationTtl: stateTtl });
+            const url = new URL(doc.authorization_endpoint);
+            url.searchParams.set("response_type", "code");
+            url.searchParams.set("client_id", opts.clientId);
+            url.searchParams.set("redirect_uri", opts.redirectUri);
+            url.searchParams.set("scope", scopes.join(" "));
+            url.searchParams.set("state", state);
+            url.searchParams.set("nonce", pending.nonce);
+            url.searchParams.set("code_challenge", await challengeFor(pending.verifier));
+            url.searchParams.set("code_challenge_method", "S256");
+            return new Response(null, {
+                status: 302,
+                headers: {
+                    location: url.toString(),
+                    "cache-control": "no-store",
+                    "set-cookie": binderCookie(new URL(request.url), callbackPath, binder, stateTtl),
+                },
+            });
+        },
+    };
+    const callback = {
+        method: "GET",
+        path: callbackPath,
+        handler: async (request, env, ctx) => {
+            const url = new URL(request.url);
+            const kv = new Kv(env.KV);
+            // A provider that refuses (consent declined, unauthorized client) redirects back with
+            // `error` rather than `code`. Surface it instead of reporting "no code".
+            const providerError = url.searchParams.get("error");
+            if (providerError)
+                return html(400, `Sign-in was refused by the provider (${safeErrorCode(providerError)}).`);
+            const state = url.searchParams.get("state");
+            const code = url.searchParams.get("code");
+            if (!state || !code)
+                return html(400, "Sign-in link is incomplete. Start again.");
+            // SINGLE USE: read and delete before anything else, so a replayed callback — or two
+            // tabs racing the same code — cannot both proceed.
+            const pending = (await kv.get(`oidc:${state}`, "json"));
+            await kv.delete(`oidc:${state}`);
+            if (!pending)
+                return html(400, "Sign-in expired or was already used. Start again.");
+            // The state must belong to THIS browser. An attacker who starts their own login holds
+            // a perfectly valid state+code; without this check, feeding them to a victim's browser
+            // signs the victim in as the attacker.
+            const binder = readCookie(request, BINDER_COOKIE);
+            if (!binder || (await sha256Hex(binder)) !== pending.binderHash) {
+                return html(400, "This sign-in did not start in this browser. Start again.");
+            }
+            const doc = await discover(opts.issuer);
+            const body = new URLSearchParams({
+                grant_type: "authorization_code",
+                code,
+                redirect_uri: opts.redirectUri,
+                client_id: opts.clientId,
+                code_verifier: pending.verifier,
+            });
+            if (opts.clientSecret)
+                body.set("client_secret", opts.clientSecret);
+            const tokenRes = await fetch(doc.token_endpoint, {
+                method: "POST",
+                headers: { "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", accept: "application/json" },
+                body,
+            });
+            const tokens = (await tokenRes.json().catch(() => ({})));
+            if (!tokenRes.ok || typeof tokens.id_token !== "string") {
+                console.error(`pramen/auth: OIDC token exchange failed (HTTP ${tokenRes.status}${tokens.error ? `, ${tokens.error}` : ""})`);
+                return html(502, "Sign-in could not be completed. Try again.");
+            }
+            // Signature, issuer, audience and expiry — then the nonce, which is what binds this
+            // ID token to the authorization request WE started. Without it a token minted for a
+            // different session of the same client would be accepted here.
+            const claims = await idTokenVerifier(doc.jwks_uri, doc.issuer).verify(tokens.id_token);
+            if (!claims)
+                return html(401, "Sign-in token could not be verified.");
+            if (claims.nonce !== pending.nonce)
+                return html(401, "Sign-in token does not match this sign-in attempt.");
+            const sub = typeof claims.sub === "string" ? claims.sub : "";
+            const email = typeof claims.email === "string" ? claims.email.toLowerCase() : "";
+            const emailVerified = claims.email_verified === true;
+            if (!sub)
+                return html(401, "Sign-in token carries no subject.");
+            // See `accountKey`: keying on an UNVERIFIED email would let a provider that permits
+            // arbitrary addresses take over an existing account. Fail rather than silently
+            // falling back to `sub`, which would quietly create a second account for the user.
+            let username;
+            if (accountKey === "email") {
+                if (!email || !emailVerified) {
+                    return html(401, "This provider did not assert a verified email address, which this app uses to identify accounts.");
+                }
+                username = email;
+            }
+            else {
+                username = `${doc.issuer}#${sub}`;
+            }
+            const mapped = opts.mapRoles?.(claims);
+            const res = await ctx.callPrivileged({
+                name: OIDC_UPSERT_HANDLER,
+                input: { table, username, email: email || null, roles: mapped ? [...mapped] : null, defaultRoles: [...defaultRoles] },
+            });
+            const upserted = (await res.json().catch(() => ({})));
+            if (upserted.ok !== true || !upserted.result)
+                return html(500, "Sign-in could not be completed.");
+            // A deactivated account must not be revived by logging in through the IdP — the
+            // provider knows nothing about pramen's `active` flag.
+            if (upserted.result.active === false)
+                return html(403, "This account is deactivated.");
+            const secret = env.AUTH_SECRET;
+            if (typeof secret !== "string" || secret.length === 0) {
+                console.error("pramen/auth: OIDC callback cannot mint a session — AUTH_SECRET is not configured");
+                return html(500, "Sign-in could not be completed.");
+            }
+            const token = await signToken({ sub: username, roles: upserted.result.roles ?? [] }, secret, { ttlSeconds: sessionTtl });
+            const target = new URL(opts.successRedirect);
+            if (pending.returnTo?.startsWith("/") && !pending.returnTo.startsWith("//"))
+                target.searchParams.set("returnTo", pending.returnTo);
+            // FRAGMENT, not query: a fragment is never sent to a server, so the session token
+            // stays out of access logs, proxies and `Referer`.
+            target.hash = `token=${encodeURIComponent(token)}`;
+            return new Response(null, {
+                status: 302,
+                headers: {
+                    location: target.toString(),
+                    "cache-control": "no-store",
+                    // The binder is spent with the state it protected.
+                    "set-cookie": binderCookie(url, callbackPath, "", 0),
+                },
+            });
+        },
+    };
+    return { routes: [start, callback] };
+}
+/** The name of the privileged handler the callback route calls. A route has no `ctx.db` — it
+ * runs in the Worker, before any tenant DO — so the write goes through `callPrivileged`,
+ * exactly as the CMS's preview route does. */
+export const OIDC_UPSERT_HANDLER = "__oidcUpsertUser";
+/** Handlers for `createOidcAuth`'s routes. Spread into `app.handlers`:
+ *
+ *   handlers: { ...authHandlers, ...oidcHandlers }
+ *
+ * `__oidcUpsertUser` is SYSTEM-only: `callPrivileged` reaches it from inside the Worker, and
+ * `auth: []` means no role satisfies it over `/rpc`, so it cannot be called from outside. */
+export const oidcHandlers = {
+    [OIDC_UPSERT_HANDLER]: mutation(async (ctx, input) => {
+        const rows = (await ctx.db.exec(`SELECT username, roles, active FROM ${quoteIdent(input.table)} WHERE username = ? LIMIT 1`, input.username));
+        const existing = rows[0];
+        if (!existing) {
+            // First login. `passwordHash` is empty — the column is NOT NULL in `authSchema` and
+            // an empty hash never verifies, which is exactly how a magic-link user is created.
+            const roles = input.roles ?? input.defaultRoles;
+            await ctx.db.exec(`INSERT INTO ${quoteIdent(input.table)} (username, passwordHash, roles, email, emailVerified, active, createdAt) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`, input.username, "", JSON.stringify(roles), input.email, 
+            // The IdP asserted it (the route refuses an unverified address when keying on
+            // email), so it is verified here in a way a self-service signup never is.
+            input.email ? Date.now() : null, 1, Date.now());
+            return { roles, active: true };
+        }
+        // Returning user. Roles the IdP asserts overwrite the stored ones — that is what
+        // "the IdP is authoritative" means, including a role being REMOVED there. With no
+        // `mapRoles`, the stored roles stand and pramen owns them.
+        const stored = parseRoles(existing.roles);
+        const roles = input.roles ?? stored;
+        const active = existing.active !== 0 && existing.active !== false;
+        if (input.roles && JSON.stringify(roles) !== JSON.stringify(stored)) {
+            await ctx.db.exec(`UPDATE ${quoteIdent(input.table)} SET roles = ? WHERE username = ?`, JSON.stringify(roles), input.username);
+        }
+        return { roles, active };
+    }, 
+    // No role can satisfy an empty allow-list, so /rpc always 403s; callPrivileged runs as
+    // SYSTEM and bypasses it. The handler writes roles, so it must never be callable.
+    { auth: [] }),
+};
+/** The table name comes from the app's own options, never from a request — but it is
+ * interpolated into SQL, so it is quoted and constrained rather than trusted by convention. */
+function quoteIdent(table) {
+    if (!/^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$/.test(table))
+        throw new Error(`@pramen/auth: invalid table name ${JSON.stringify(table)}`);
+    return `"${table}"`;
+}
+function parseRoles(v) {
+    if (Array.isArray(v))
+        return v.map(String);
+    if (typeof v === "string") {
+        try {
+            const parsed = JSON.parse(v);
+            return Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed.map(String) : [];
+        }
+        catch {
+            return [];
+        }
+    }
+    return [];
+}

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@pramen/auth",
-  "version": "0.0.51",
+  "version": "0.0.52",
   "description": "Optional credential→JWT login for pramen — signup/login/me + PBKDF2 hashing, issuing HS256 tokens the pramen verifier accepts.",
   "license": "MIT",
   "repository": {
@@ -34,6 +34,6 @@
     "access": "public"
   },
   "dependencies": {
-    "@pramen/server": "0.0.51"
+    "@pramen/server": "0.0.52"
   }
 }

package/src/index.ts

@@ -1069,3 +1069,6 @@ export function createEmailVerification(opts: EmailVerificationOptions): AuthMod
 
   return { handlers, tasks };
 }
+
+// --- OIDC (authorization code + PKCE) ---------------------------------------
+export { createOidcAuth, oidcHandlers, OIDC_UPSERT_HANDLER, type OidcOptions } from "./oidc.js";

package/src/oidc.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,427 @@
+// OIDC login — authorization code + PKCE, exchanged for a PRAMEN session.
+//
+// pramen's core stays verify-only (BYO-IdP): `JwksStrategy` already verifies an RS256 token
+// against a remote JWKS, so a deployment whose frontend already holds an IdP token needs
+// nothing from this file. What was missing is the FLOW — the redirect dance that turns a
+// browser with no token into a session — and the claim mapping that makes an IdP's idea of
+// a user into pramen's.
+//
+// WHY IT MINTS A PRAMEN TOKEN rather than passing the IdP's through. The rest of the system
+// is built on pramen sessions: `refreshSession` re-reads roles without a re-login, the KV
+// denylist can revoke one mid-flight, and the ACL reads roles off the token. Forwarding a
+// provider token would give up all three and put role resolution on the hot path of every
+// request. So: the IdP proves WHO you are, once; pramen owns the session from there. Same
+// shape as `createMagicLinkAuth`, which exchanges a one-time link for the same thing.
+//
+// WHERE ROLES COME FROM, which differs per provider and is the part that silently fails:
+//   - Entra puts app roles in a top-level `roles` claim,
+//   - Auth0/Okta put them in a NAMESPACED claim (`https://example.com/roles`),
+//   - Google Workspace has none in the token at all.
+// So roles resolve in this order: `mapRoles(claims)` if you supply one (the IdP is
+// authoritative), else the roles stored on the user's row (pramen is authoritative — the
+// only workable answer for Google), else `defaultRoles` for a first login.
+
+import { JwksStrategy, Kv, mutation } from "@pramen/server";
+import type { EnvBag, HandlerContext, HandlerMap, JsonObject, Row } from "@pramen/server";
+import type { PublicRoute, RouteContext } from "@pramen/server/worker";
+// The package's OWN HS256 signer — `@pramen/server`'s `signToken` mints the opaque
+// file/preview token, which the request verifier does not accept as a session.
+import { signToken } from "./index.js";
+
+/** An OpenID Provider's discovery document — the fields this flow uses. */
+interface Discovery {
+  issuer: string;
+  authorization_endpoint: string;
+  token_endpoint: string;
+  jwks_uri: string;
+}
+
+export interface OidcOptions {
+  /** The provider's issuer URL. `/.well-known/openid-configuration` is fetched from it, so
+   * the endpoints and the JWKS location are never hand-copied. */
+  issuer: string;
+  clientId: string;
+  /** Confidential clients only. Omit for a public client — the exchange then relies on
+   * PKCE alone, which is the correct configuration for a SPA. */
+  clientSecret?: string;
+  /** Must match the redirect URI registered with the provider, exactly. */
+  redirectUri: string;
+  /** Where to send the browser after a successful login. The session token arrives in the
+   * URL FRAGMENT (`#token=…`), which — unlike a query parameter — is never sent to a
+   * server, kept in server logs, or included in a `Referer` header. */
+  successRedirect: string;
+  /** Default `["openid", "email", "profile"]`. */
+  scopes?: readonly string[];
+  /** The users table. Default `auth_users` (the `authSchema` shape). */
+  table?: string;
+  /** Roles for a first-time login when `mapRoles` yields none. Default `["user"]`. */
+  defaultRoles?: readonly string[];
+  /**
+   * Read roles out of the ID token's claims, for providers where the IdP is authoritative:
+   *
+   *   mapRoles: (c) => c["https://acme.com/roles"] as string[]   // Auth0/Okta
+   *   mapRoles: (c) => c.roles as string[]                       // Entra
+   *
+   * Return `undefined` to fall back to the roles stored on the user's row. Google Workspace
+   * ships no roles in the token, so omit this and manage them in pramen.
+   */
+  mapRoles?: (claims: JsonObject) => readonly string[] | undefined;
+  /**
+   * What identifies the account across logins.
+   *
+   * `"email"` (default) matches how the rest of `@pramen/auth` keys users, so an OIDC login
+   * lands on the SAME row as a magic-link or password login for that address. It is only
+   * honored when the provider asserts `email_verified` — an IdP that lets a user set an
+   * unverified address would otherwise be an account-takeover path into any existing
+   * email-keyed account.
+   *
+   * `"sub"` keys on the provider's opaque subject, namespaced by issuer. Immune to an email
+   * change, and to the above, but it will not link up with accounts created another way.
+   */
+  accountKey?: "email" | "sub";
+  sessionTtlSeconds?: number;
+  /** Where the flow is mounted. Defaults `/auth/oidc/start` and `/auth/oidc/callback`. */
+  startPath?: string;
+  callbackPath?: string;
+  /** How long an in-flight login may take. Default 600s. */
+  stateTtlSeconds?: number;
+}
+
+const b64url = (bytes: ArrayBuffer | Uint8Array): string => {
+  const b = bytes instanceof Uint8Array ? bytes : new Uint8Array(bytes);
+  return btoa(String.fromCharCode(...b)).replace(/\+/g, "-").replace(/\//g, "_").replace(/=+$/, "");
+};
+
+const randomB64 = (bytes = 32): string => b64url(crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(bytes)));
+
+/** PKCE S256: the verifier stays server-side, only its hash goes to the provider, so an
+ * intercepted authorization code cannot be redeemed by whoever intercepted it. */
+async function challengeFor(verifier: string): Promise<string> {
+  return b64url(await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", new TextEncoder().encode(verifier)));
+}
+
+/** Discovery, cached per issuer for the isolate's life. The document is static in practice,
+ * and a fetch on every login would put the provider's availability on the login path twice. */
+const discoveryCache = new Map<string, Promise<Discovery>>();
+function discover(issuer: string): Promise<Discovery> {
+  const base = issuer.replace(/\/+$/, "");
+  let cached = discoveryCache.get(base);
+  if (!cached) {
+    cached = (async () => {
+      const res = await fetch(`${base}/.well-known/openid-configuration`);
+      if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`@pramen/auth: OIDC discovery failed for ${base} (HTTP ${res.status})`);
+      const doc = (await res.json()) as Partial<Discovery>;
+      for (const field of ["issuer", "authorization_endpoint", "token_endpoint", "jwks_uri"] as const) {
+        if (typeof doc[field] !== "string") throw new Error(`@pramen/auth: OIDC discovery document from ${base} has no ${field}`);
+      }
+      // The document's own `issuer` is what ID tokens will carry, and it is what we verify
+      // against — a provider whose discovery URL and issuer differ (a tenant alias, say) is
+      // legitimate; a document claiming a DIFFERENT issuer than it was fetched from is not.
+      return doc as Discovery;
+    })();
+    discoveryCache.set(base, cached);
+    void cached.catch(() => discoveryCache.delete(base)); // never cache a failure
+  }
+  return cached;
+}
+
+/** One in-flight login. Held in KV under a random key so the browser carries only the
+ * lookup key, never the verifier. */
+interface PendingLogin {
+  verifier: string;
+  nonce: string;
+  returnTo?: string;
+  /** SHA-256 of the binder cookie handed to the browser that STARTED this login.
+   *
+   * Without it, `state` is just a random string an attacker can obtain by starting a login
+   * of their own: they then trick the victim's browser into loading the callback with their
+   * code+state, and the victim is silently signed in AS THE ATTACKER — everything the victim
+   * subsequently writes lands in the attacker's account. Requiring the cookie means the
+   * callback only completes in the browser the flow began in. */
+  binderHash: string;
+}
+
+const sha256Hex = async (v: string): Promise<string> =>
+  [...new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", new TextEncoder().encode(v)))].map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0")).join("");
+
+const BINDER_COOKIE = "pramen_oidc";
+
+function readCookie(request: Request, name: string): string | null {
+  const raw = request.headers.get("cookie");
+  if (!raw) return null;
+  for (const part of raw.split(";")) {
+    const [k, ...v] = part.trim().split("=");
+    if (k === name) return decodeURIComponent(v.join("="));
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
+/** `SameSite=Lax` is what makes this work at all: the callback is a TOP-LEVEL GET navigation
+ * from the provider's origin, which Lax allows, while a cross-site POST or subresource would
+ * not carry it. `Secure` is set whenever the request is https — omitted on plain-http local
+ * dev, where the browser would otherwise drop the cookie entirely. */
+const binderCookie = (url: URL, path: string, value: string, maxAge: number): string =>
+  `${BINDER_COOKIE}=${encodeURIComponent(value)}; Path=${path}; Max-Age=${maxAge}; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax${url.protocol === "https:" ? "; Secure" : ""}`;
+
+const ESCAPES: Record<string, string> = { "&": "&amp;", "<": "&lt;", ">": "&gt;", '"': "&quot;", "'": "&#39;" };
+
+/** An error page. The message is ESCAPED here rather than at the call sites: this route is
+ * public, pre-auth, and reachable with arbitrary query parameters, so anything interpolated
+ * into it is attacker-controlled until proven otherwise. Escaping centrally means a future
+ * caller cannot reintroduce the hole by forgetting. */
+const html = (status: number, message: string): Response =>
+  new Response(
+    `<!doctype html><meta charset="utf-8"><title>Sign-in</title><p>${message.replace(/[&<>"']/g, (c) => ESCAPES[c]!)}</p>`,
+    { status, headers: { "content-type": "text/html; charset=utf-8", "cache-control": "no-store" } },
+  );
+
+/** OAuth error codes are a constrained vocabulary (RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1). Anything outside it
+ * is not a provider error worth echoing — it is someone probing this endpoint. */
+const safeErrorCode = (raw: string): string => (/^[a-z_]{1,64}$/.test(raw) ? raw : "unspecified");
+
+/**
+ * OIDC login for a pramen app. Spread the routes into `app.routes` (they are PRE-AUTH by
+ * design — a caller arriving here has no session yet):
+ *
+ *   const oidc = createOidcAuth({ issuer, clientId, clientSecret, redirectUri, successRedirect });
+ *   export const app = { schema, handlers, acl, routes: [...oidc.routes] };
+ *
+ * The browser goes to `/auth/oidc/start`, comes back to `/auth/oidc/callback`, and lands on
+ * `successRedirect#token=<pramen session>`.
+ */
+export function createOidcAuth(opts: OidcOptions): { routes: PublicRoute[] } {
+  const scopes = opts.scopes ?? ["openid", "email", "profile"];
+  const table = opts.table ?? "auth_users";
+  const defaultRoles = opts.defaultRoles ?? ["user"];
+  const accountKey = opts.accountKey ?? "email";
+  const startPath = opts.startPath ?? "/auth/oidc/start";
+  const callbackPath = opts.callbackPath ?? "/auth/oidc/callback";
+  const stateTtl = opts.stateTtlSeconds ?? 600;
+  const sessionTtl = opts.sessionTtlSeconds ?? 3600;
+
+  // One verifier per issuer, so the JWKS cache and its key-rotation handling are shared
+  // across logins rather than rebuilt per request.
+  let verifier: JwksStrategy | undefined;
+  const idTokenVerifier = (jwksUri: string, issuer: string): JwksStrategy =>
+    (verifier ??= new JwksStrategy(jwksUri, undefined, { requireExp: true, issuer, audience: opts.clientId }));
+
+  const start: PublicRoute = {
+    method: "GET",
+    path: startPath,
+    handler: async (request: Request, env: EnvBag) => {
+      const doc = await discover(opts.issuer);
+      const kv = new Kv((env as EnvBag & { KV: KVNamespace }).KV);
+      const state = randomB64();
+      const binder = randomB64();
+      const pending: PendingLogin = {
+        verifier: randomB64(64),
+        nonce: randomB64(),
+        binderHash: await sha256Hex(binder),
+        // Where the user was going before they were bounced to sign in. Only ever a PATH:
+        // an absolute URL here would make this an open redirect.
+        returnTo: new URL(request.url).searchParams.get("returnTo") ?? undefined,
+      };
+      await kv.put(`oidc:${state}`, JSON.stringify(pending), { expirationTtl: stateTtl });
+
+      const url = new URL(doc.authorization_endpoint);
+      url.searchParams.set("response_type", "code");
+      url.searchParams.set("client_id", opts.clientId);
+      url.searchParams.set("redirect_uri", opts.redirectUri);
+      url.searchParams.set("scope", scopes.join(" "));
+      url.searchParams.set("state", state);
+      url.searchParams.set("nonce", pending.nonce);
+      url.searchParams.set("code_challenge", await challengeFor(pending.verifier));
+      url.searchParams.set("code_challenge_method", "S256");
+      return new Response(null, {
+        status: 302,
+        headers: {
+          location: url.toString(),
+          "cache-control": "no-store",
+          "set-cookie": binderCookie(new URL(request.url), callbackPath, binder, stateTtl),
+        },
+      });
+    },
+  };
+
+  const callback: PublicRoute = {
+    method: "GET",
+    path: callbackPath,
+    handler: async (request: Request, env: EnvBag, ctx: RouteContext) => {
+      const url = new URL(request.url);
+      const kv = new Kv((env as EnvBag & { KV: KVNamespace }).KV);
+
+      // A provider that refuses (consent declined, unauthorized client) redirects back with
+      // `error` rather than `code`. Surface it instead of reporting "no code".
+      const providerError = url.searchParams.get("error");
+      if (providerError) return html(400, `Sign-in was refused by the provider (${safeErrorCode(providerError)}).`);
+
+      const state = url.searchParams.get("state");
+      const code = url.searchParams.get("code");
+      if (!state || !code) return html(400, "Sign-in link is incomplete. Start again.");
+
+      // SINGLE USE: read and delete before anything else, so a replayed callback — or two
+      // tabs racing the same code — cannot both proceed.
+      const pending = (await kv.get(`oidc:${state}`, "json")) as PendingLogin | null;
+      await kv.delete(`oidc:${state}`);
+      if (!pending) return html(400, "Sign-in expired or was already used. Start again.");
+
+      // The state must belong to THIS browser. An attacker who starts their own login holds
+      // a perfectly valid state+code; without this check, feeding them to a victim's browser
+      // signs the victim in as the attacker.
+      const binder = readCookie(request, BINDER_COOKIE);
+      if (!binder || (await sha256Hex(binder)) !== pending.binderHash) {
+        return html(400, "This sign-in did not start in this browser. Start again.");
+      }
+
+      const doc = await discover(opts.issuer);
+      const body = new URLSearchParams({
+        grant_type: "authorization_code",
+        code,
+        redirect_uri: opts.redirectUri,
+        client_id: opts.clientId,
+        code_verifier: pending.verifier,
+      });
+      if (opts.clientSecret) body.set("client_secret", opts.clientSecret);
+      const tokenRes = await fetch(doc.token_endpoint, {
+        method: "POST",
+        headers: { "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", accept: "application/json" },
+        body,
+      });
+      const tokens = (await tokenRes.json().catch(() => ({}))) as { id_token?: string; error?: string };
+      if (!tokenRes.ok || typeof tokens.id_token !== "string") {
+        console.error(`pramen/auth: OIDC token exchange failed (HTTP ${tokenRes.status}${tokens.error ? `, ${tokens.error}` : ""})`);
+        return html(502, "Sign-in could not be completed. Try again.");
+      }
+
+      // Signature, issuer, audience and expiry — then the nonce, which is what binds this
+      // ID token to the authorization request WE started. Without it a token minted for a
+      // different session of the same client would be accepted here.
+      const claims = await idTokenVerifier(doc.jwks_uri, doc.issuer).verify(tokens.id_token);
+      if (!claims) return html(401, "Sign-in token could not be verified.");
+      if (claims.nonce !== pending.nonce) return html(401, "Sign-in token does not match this sign-in attempt.");
+
+      const sub = typeof claims.sub === "string" ? claims.sub : "";
+      const email = typeof claims.email === "string" ? claims.email.toLowerCase() : "";
+      const emailVerified = claims.email_verified === true;
+      if (!sub) return html(401, "Sign-in token carries no subject.");
+
+      // See `accountKey`: keying on an UNVERIFIED email would let a provider that permits
+      // arbitrary addresses take over an existing account. Fail rather than silently
+      // falling back to `sub`, which would quietly create a second account for the user.
+      let username: string;
+      if (accountKey === "email") {
+        if (!email || !emailVerified) {
+          return html(401, "This provider did not assert a verified email address, which this app uses to identify accounts.");
+        }
+        username = email;
+      } else {
+        username = `${doc.issuer}#${sub}`;
+      }
+
+      const mapped = opts.mapRoles?.(claims);
+      const res = await ctx.callPrivileged({
+        name: OIDC_UPSERT_HANDLER,
+        input: { table, username, email: email || null, roles: mapped ? [...mapped] : null, defaultRoles: [...defaultRoles] },
+      });
+      const upserted = (await res.json().catch(() => ({}))) as { ok?: boolean; result?: { roles?: string[]; active?: boolean } };
+      if (upserted.ok !== true || !upserted.result) return html(500, "Sign-in could not be completed.");
+      // A deactivated account must not be revived by logging in through the IdP — the
+      // provider knows nothing about pramen's `active` flag.
+      if (upserted.result.active === false) return html(403, "This account is deactivated.");
+
+      const secret = (env as EnvBag).AUTH_SECRET;
+      if (typeof secret !== "string" || secret.length === 0) {
+        console.error("pramen/auth: OIDC callback cannot mint a session — AUTH_SECRET is not configured");
+        return html(500, "Sign-in could not be completed.");
+      }
+      const token = await signToken({ sub: username, roles: upserted.result.roles ?? [] }, secret, { ttlSeconds: sessionTtl });
+      const target = new URL(opts.successRedirect);
+      if (pending.returnTo?.startsWith("/") && !pending.returnTo.startsWith("//")) target.searchParams.set("returnTo", pending.returnTo);
+      // FRAGMENT, not query: a fragment is never sent to a server, so the session token
+      // stays out of access logs, proxies and `Referer`.
+      target.hash = `token=${encodeURIComponent(token)}`;
+      return new Response(null, {
+        status: 302,
+        headers: {
+          location: target.toString(),
+          "cache-control": "no-store",
+          // The binder is spent with the state it protected.
+          "set-cookie": binderCookie(url, callbackPath, "", 0),
+        },
+      });
+    },
+  };
+
+  return { routes: [start, callback] };
+}
+
+/** The name of the privileged handler the callback route calls. A route has no `ctx.db` — it
+ * runs in the Worker, before any tenant DO — so the write goes through `callPrivileged`,
+ * exactly as the CMS's preview route does. */
+export const OIDC_UPSERT_HANDLER = "__oidcUpsertUser";
+
+/** Handlers for `createOidcAuth`'s routes. Spread into `app.handlers`:
+ *
+ *   handlers: { ...authHandlers, ...oidcHandlers }
+ *
+ * `__oidcUpsertUser` is SYSTEM-only: `callPrivileged` reaches it from inside the Worker, and
+ * `auth: []` means no role satisfies it over `/rpc`, so it cannot be called from outside. */
+export const oidcHandlers: HandlerMap = {
+  [OIDC_UPSERT_HANDLER]: mutation(
+    async (ctx: HandlerContext, input: { table: string; username: string; email: string | null; roles: string[] | null; defaultRoles: string[] }) => {
+      const rows = (await ctx.db.exec(`SELECT username, roles, active FROM ${quoteIdent(input.table)} WHERE username = ? LIMIT 1`, input.username)) as Row[];
+      const existing = rows[0];
+      if (!existing) {
+        // First login. `passwordHash` is empty — the column is NOT NULL in `authSchema` and
+        // an empty hash never verifies, which is exactly how a magic-link user is created.
+        const roles = input.roles ?? input.defaultRoles;
+        await ctx.db.exec(
+          `INSERT INTO ${quoteIdent(input.table)} (username, passwordHash, roles, email, emailVerified, active, createdAt) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`,
+          input.username,
+          "",
+          JSON.stringify(roles),
+          input.email,
+          // The IdP asserted it (the route refuses an unverified address when keying on
+          // email), so it is verified here in a way a self-service signup never is.
+          input.email ? Date.now() : null,
+          1,
+          Date.now(),
+        );
+        return { roles, active: true };
+      }
+      // Returning user. Roles the IdP asserts overwrite the stored ones — that is what
+      // "the IdP is authoritative" means, including a role being REMOVED there. With no
+      // `mapRoles`, the stored roles stand and pramen owns them.
+      const stored = parseRoles(existing.roles);
+      const roles = input.roles ?? stored;
+      const active = existing.active !== 0 && existing.active !== false;
+      if (input.roles && JSON.stringify(roles) !== JSON.stringify(stored)) {
+        await ctx.db.exec(`UPDATE ${quoteIdent(input.table)} SET roles = ? WHERE username = ?`, JSON.stringify(roles), input.username);
+      }
+      return { roles, active };
+    },
+    // No role can satisfy an empty allow-list, so /rpc always 403s; callPrivileged runs as
+    // SYSTEM and bypasses it. The handler writes roles, so it must never be callable.
+    { auth: [] },
+  ),
+};
+
+/** The table name comes from the app's own options, never from a request — but it is
+ * interpolated into SQL, so it is quoted and constrained rather than trusted by convention. */
+function quoteIdent(table: string): string {
+  if (!/^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$/.test(table)) throw new Error(`@pramen/auth: invalid table name ${JSON.stringify(table)}`);
+  return `"${table}"`;
+}
+
+function parseRoles(v: unknown): string[] {
+  if (Array.isArray(v)) return v.map(String);
+  if (typeof v === "string") {
+    try {
+      const parsed = JSON.parse(v) as unknown;
+      return Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed.map(String) : [];
+    } catch {
+      return [];
+    }
+  }
+  return [];
+}