@plasius/oauth2-core 0.1.6 → 0.1.8
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/CHANGELOG.md
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@@ -2,6 +2,38 @@
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## Unreleased
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- **Changed**
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- **Fixed**
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- **Security**
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- (placeholder)
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## [0.1.8] - 2026-10-21
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- Restore trusted push-only self-hosted CI on the approved quarantined runner group, retain strict install/coverage/artifact gates, and document reviewed branch admission and rollback. Hosted exact-main production OIDC publication remains unchanged.
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- **Added**
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- (placeholder)
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- **Changed**
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- **Fixed**
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- **Security**
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- (placeholder)
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## [0.1.7] - 2026-10-18
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- Refresh npm dependency lockfile to current supported stable versions (weekly maintenance, 2026-10-18).
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- **Added**
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[0.1.4]: https://github.com/Plasius-LTD/oauth2-core/releases/tag/v0.1.4
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[0.1.5]: https://github.com/Plasius-LTD/oauth2-core/releases/tag/v0.1.5
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[0.1.6]: https://github.com/Plasius-LTD/oauth2-core/releases/tag/v0.1.6
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[0.1.7]: https://github.com/Plasius-LTD/oauth2-core/releases/tag/v0.1.7
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[0.1.8]: https://github.com/Plasius-LTD/oauth2-core/releases/tag/v0.1.8
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package/README.md
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## Development
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```bash
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npm
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npm ci
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npm run build
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npm test
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npm run test:coverage
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## Release integrity
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CI keeps the administrative contributor registry outside Git and npm package
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artifacts using exact, case-normalised path checks. CI
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artifacts using exact, case-normalised path checks. Both CI jobs run only for pushes in this repository on the approved
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`Public CI - Quarantined` group with explicit `[self-hosted, Linux, X64]`
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labels. Pull-request, target, dispatch and reusable-call entry points are
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absent. The group admits only selected repositories and reviewed workflow
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refs; there is no hosted fallback or caller-controlled runner selector.
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Checkout credentials are not persisted, package-manager cache finalization
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is disabled, and jobs have 15/10 minute limits. Strict `npm ci`, lint, types,
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audit, build, 80% LCOV, source/index admission and final package checks remain
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mandatory.
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Publication uses the GitHub-hosted `production` job with Node 24 and a pinned
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npm 11.6.2 client. It is token-free and proceeds only while the prepared SHA
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is the exact `main` head after successful push-triggered CI. Do not dispatch CD
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until the npm trusted-publisher binding is verified.
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Before pushing a source branch, review its workflow and temporarily admit only
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that exact branch workflow ref in the existing restricted group. Remove the
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temporary entry after its checks finish and it is merged. For a pipeline-created
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release metadata PR, verify its App author, base, preparation run, head SHA and
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version/lockfile/CHANGELOG-only diff, then admit that exact branch while it is
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available. Preserve it until CI finishes. If required reviews/checks block merge,
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complete them before allowing preparation to continue; never bypass protection.
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Keep the group's selected repositories, public policy and other refs unchanged.
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This recovery inherits `platform.public-artifact-integrity.enabled` from Feature
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#1597: enabled permits verified staged promotion; disabled stops promotion;
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rollback disables the affected workflow/distribution channel. The governed
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platform store evaluates the flag, with no package-local flag or capability.
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Source, index and package admission remain mandatory in all three states. Never
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restore the administrative registry, introduce a token fallback or reuse a
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removed npm version. See [ADR-0003](docs/adrs/adr-0003-quarantined-public-ci.md).
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<!-- END PLASIUS RELEASE INTEGRITY -->
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Publish only from the GitHub-hosted `production` job using npm trusted
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publishing. Prove the prepared SHA is still the exact remote `main` head and
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that push-triggered `ci.yml` succeeded for it. Require Node 24 and npm 11.5.1 or
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newer, request provenance, and prohibit npm write-token fallbacks.
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uses
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newer, request provenance, and prohibit npm write-token fallbacks. CI validation
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uses the approved quarantined self-hosted runner group under
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[ADR-0003](adr-0003-quarantined-public-ci.md); only trusted repository pushes
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are admitted. Publication remains hosted.
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## Consequences
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# ADR-0003: Quarantined public CI with hosted package publication
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- Status: Accepted
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- Date: 2026-10-21
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- Project: oauth2-core#5; plasius-ltd-site#1626; Feature #1597
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- Supersedes: ADR-0002's CI runner policy only
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## Context
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The public oauth2-core repository must satisfy its Project requirement for approved
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self-hosted validation without allowing external-fork code onto organisation
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capacity. Hosted OIDC publication is a separate, existing trust boundary.
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## Decision
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Accept only push events from the literal `Plasius-LTD/oauth2-core` repository.
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Both CI jobs use the literal `Public CI - Quarantined` group and
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`[self-hosted, Linux, X64]` labels. The group's selected repository/workflow
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allowlist admits main and only specifically reviewed source branches while
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needed. No pull-request/target/dispatch/call trigger, dynamic selector or hosted
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fallback exists. Checkout does not persist credentials, package-manager cache
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finalization is disabled, and validation is bounded to 15/10 minutes.
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Use clean `npm ci` and keep lint, types, runtime audit, build, 80% LCOV,
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source/index artifact admission and final package-manifest checks. Reuse the
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existing validators rather than introducing a second admission implementation.
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No package dependencies, runtime source or public API change.
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Keep ADR-0002's hosted exact-main production OIDC publication unchanged. Before
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release verify visibility, production, publisher identity and an unused patch
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version, then use only main's approved two-phase cd.yml. The preparation
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pipeline owns version/changelog metadata and tags; exact-main push CI gates
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publication. Verify registry bytes, provenance, signatures and public release.
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The inherited `platform.public-artifact-integrity.enabled` flag is evaluated
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by the platform's governed store. Enabled permits staged verified promotion;
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disabled stops it. Mandatory integrity gates remain active in either state.
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This library needs no capability, runtime flag evaluation or env override.
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## Alternatives
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Hosted CI contradicts the tracked acceptance criteria. Public PR-head
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execution, caller-selected runner inputs and automatic hosted fallbacks weaken
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the intended admission boundary. A new shared package or runtime flag would
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add an unnecessary package boundary for repository workflow configuration.
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## Impact and tests
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Workflow regressions first demonstrate failures for event admission, runner
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isolation and reproducible quality/artifact gates, then enforce both jobs and
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the unchanged hosted production OIDC/exact-SHA boundary. Run full package
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validation and actionlint, source/main CI, and approved CD. Runtime source is
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unchanged, so changed-runtime-file LCOV is N/A; retain overall 80% coverage.
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No UI, browser, SEO, backend deployment or ACA secret-reference change applies.
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Bounded jobs and explicit logs support reliability and observability.
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## Rollback
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Disable the affected CI/CD workflow or distribution channel and stop promotion;
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remove temporary source-branch workflow admission after merge/checks. Retain
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source, index and package admission; never restore the administrative registry,
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fall back to a long-lived npm token, or reuse a removed version.
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package/docs/adrs/index.md
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- [ADR 0001: OAuth 2 Core Package Boundary](./adr-0001-oauth2-core-package-boundary.md)
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- [ADR-0002: Hosted OIDC Package Publication](./adr-0002-hosted-oidc-package-publication.md)
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- [ADR-0003: Quarantined public CI with hosted package publication](./adr-0003-quarantined-public-ci.md)
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