@plainconceptsplatform/workflows 1.2.1 → 1.2.3

package/loops/actions/classify-route/classify-route.sh

@@ -43,8 +43,8 @@ classify_route() {
         if has_label refine || has_label implement; then
           error="issue opened with a work label; triage skipped"
         else
-          # Issue opened by an outside collaborator → triage. The authorize job
-          # gates the caller on is_outside_collaborator; this routes unconditionally
+          # Issue opened by a read-only outside collaborator → triage. The authorize
+          # job gates the caller on is_outside_collaborator; this routes unconditionally
           # so write+ openers classify to triage but the caller job skips them.
           route="triage"
           triage_mode="first"

package/loops/docs/diagrams.md

@@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ without touching the others.
 flowchart TD
     ev{"One GitHub event"} --> classify
     classify["classify (rung 1)<br/>pure shell, no network<br/>one event in, one route out"] --> authorize
-    authorize{"authorize (rung 1)<br/>Write permission, and is the<br/>actor one of the org's own?"}
+    authorize{"authorize (rung 1)<br/>Write permission, or<br/>read only?"}
     authorize -->|"human, trusted"| work
-    authorize -->|"outside collaborator"| triageOnly
+    authorize -->|"read only"| triageOnly
     authorize -.->|"no permission"| idle
     work{"route"} -->|refine| wRefine
     work -->|implement| wImpl
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ fewer events, not adding more guards.
 ```mermaid
 flowchart LR
     open("Issue opened") --> triage
-    triage{"triage<br/>outside collaborator"} -->|pass| refine
+    triage{"triage<br/>read-only opener"} -->|pass| refine
     triage -.->|block| closed(("Closed"))
     triage -.->|needs-info| author("Author replies") --> triage
     write("Write+ user<br/>self-labels") --> refine
@@ -114,9 +114,9 @@ instead of one pull request that has to fix them all.
 
 ## agent-triage.md
 
-The front door for issues opened from outside the organisation. The gate is membership, not permission
-level: an org member with write skips triage and self-labels into the pipeline, while an outside
-collaborator goes through it even when they hold write.
+The front door for issues opened by people with read-only access. The gate is permission level, not
+membership: anybody with write skips triage and self-labels into the pipeline, org member or not, while
+a read-only outside collaborator goes through it.
 
 Four outcomes, and only one of them closes anything. `needs-maintainer` is the one worth knowing: the
 request is legitimate but addressed to the wrong intake, so the issue stays open with `review` and a
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ maintainer takes it on by adding `refine`.
 ```mermaid
 flowchart TD
     triStart("Work Router<br/>triage route") --> triPick
-    triPick{"Opened by an<br/>outside collaborator?"} -->|yes| triReserve
+    triPick{"Opened by a read-only<br/>outside collaborator?"} -->|yes| triReserve
     triPick -.->|"no, write+ user"| triIdle
     triReserve("Reserve (rung 4)<br/>bot-working + triage") --> triFacts
     triFacts("Facts (rung 3)<br/>Issue, comments and every open<br/>issue written to disk") --> triRound

package/loops/templates/ci/app-ci-dotnet-next.yml

@@ -276,6 +276,9 @@ jobs:
         with:
           format: cyclonedx-json
           artifact-name: ${{ env.SBOM_ARTIFACT_NAME }}
+          # On a tag that already has a GitHub Release the action attaches the SBOM to it, which
+          # needs contents: write this workflow does not have, and fails the run that gates deploy.
+          upload-release-assets: false
 
   # A bot pull request is opened with GITHUB_TOKEN, and GitHub delivers no workflow_run event
   # for the CI runs that follow (the run's actor is the bot). The router's CI-completion route

package/loops/templates/ci/app-ci-node-monorepo.yml

@@ -206,6 +206,9 @@ jobs:
         with:
           format: cyclonedx-json
           artifact-name: ${{ env.SBOM_ARTIFACT_NAME }}
+          # On a tag that already has a GitHub Release the action attaches the SBOM to it, which
+          # needs contents: write this workflow does not have, and fails the run that gates deploy.
+          upload-release-assets: false
 
   # A bot pull request is opened with GITHUB_TOKEN, and GitHub delivers no workflow_run event
   # for the CI runs that follow (the run's actor is the bot). The router's CI-completion route

package/loops/workflows/agent-triage.md

@@ -54,11 +54,9 @@ description: |
   cannot be done, is a security risk, is too dangerous, or is still ambiguous after
   three rounds.
 
-  The gate is organisation membership, not permission level. The authorize job sets
-  is_outside_collaborator for read permission, and also for write or better when the
-  author association is COLLABORATOR repository access without being one of the
-  organisation's own. An org member with write skips triage; an outside collaborator
-  with write does not.
+  The gate is permission level, not organisation membership. The authorize job sets
+  is_outside_collaborator for read permission only. Anybody with write or better skips
+  triage, org member or not: an outside collaborator given write is a colleague.
 
   Router-only worker: triggered exclusively via workflow_call from work-router.yml.
   Contract inputs: issue-number, mode(first|retriage).

package/loops/workflows/work-router.yml

@@ -287,11 +287,6 @@ jobs:
           GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
           ACTOR: ${{ github.actor }}
           EVENT: ${{ github.event_name }}
-          # Who GitHub says this person is relative to the repository, straight from the
-          # payload. OWNER and MEMBER are the organisation's own; COLLABORATOR is repository
-          # access without organisation membership, which is what triage is for. Read from
-          # here because a repository-scoped GITHUB_TOKEN cannot query org membership.
-          AUTHOR_ASSOCIATION: ${{ github.event.issue.author_association || github.event.comment.author_association || github.event.pull_request.author_association }}
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
 
@@ -320,48 +315,14 @@ jobs:
           permission=$(gh api "repos/$GITHUB_REPOSITORY/collaborators/$ACTOR/permission" \
             --jq '.permission' 2>/dev/null || echo "none")
 
-          # Is this person one of the organisation's own, or somebody with repository access
-          # from outside it? Triage exists for the second kind.
-          #
-          # The payload answers it. The org API cannot: `orgs/{org}/members/{user}` needs an
-          # org-scoped token and GITHUB_TOKEN is scoped to this repository, so that call failed
-          # for everybody and every admin who opened an issue was declared an outside
-          # collaborator and triaged. It is kept only as a fallback for events that carry no
-          # association, and it can no longer decide "outside" on its own.
-          org=$(echo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" | cut -d/ -f1)
-          case "${AUTHOR_ASSOCIATION:-}" in
-            OWNER | MEMBER)
-              is_member=true
-              ;;
-            COLLABORATOR)
-              is_member=false
-              ;;
-            *)
-              # No association in this payload. Ask the org, and believe a yes rather than a
-              # no: a failed call here is indistinguishable from a real non-member.
-              if gh api "orgs/$org/members/$ACTOR" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-                is_member=true
-              else
-                is_member=unknown
-              fi
-              ;;
-          esac
-
           case "$permission" in
             admin | maintain | write)
-              # "unknown" counts as inside. Somebody with write or better whose membership
-              # cannot be established is far more likely to be a colleague than an outside
-              # collaborator, and treating them as outside starts a triage agent nobody asked
-              # for - which, with a four-hour timeout, holds a runner for the afternoon.
-              if [ "$is_member" != "false" ]; then
-                echo "trusted=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-                echo "is_outside_collaborator=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-                echo "::notice::$ACTOR has $permission permission and is an org member."
-              else
-                echo "trusted=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-                echo "is_outside_collaborator=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-                echo "::notice::$ACTOR has $permission permission but is NOT an org member (outside collaborator). Triage route eligible."
-              fi
+              # Write or better is a colleague, org member or not: an outside collaborator who
+              # was given write is somebody the team chose to work with, and triaging what they
+              # open starts an agent nobody asked for. Only read access is the outside door.
+              echo "trusted=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+              echo "is_outside_collaborator=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
+              echo "::notice::$ACTOR has $permission permission."
               ;;
             read)
               echo "trusted=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
@@ -553,7 +514,7 @@ jobs:
 
   call-triage:
     needs: [classify, authorize]
-    # Triage on issue open is for outside collaborators only (handled by dispatch-triage).
+    # Triage on issue open is for read-only outside collaborators only (handled by dispatch-triage).
     # A trusted actor who opens an issue should not start triage - they can add refine/implement/direct
     # labels or manually dispatch triage. All other triage routes (labeled, comment, dispatch) are trusted.
     if: needs.classify.outputs.route == 'triage' && needs.authorize.outputs.trusted == 'true' && !(github.event_name == 'issues' && github.event.action == 'opened')

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@plainconceptsplatform/workflows",
-  "version": "1.2.1",
+  "version": "1.2.3",
   "description": "Install and update Platform GitHub agentic workflows.",
   "keywords": [
     "github-actions",