@plainconceptsplatform/workflows 0.20.1 → 0.20.3

package/loops/scripts/compile-agent-workflows.mjs

@@ -1,331 +1,331 @@
-// Managed by @plainconceptsplatform/workflows. Source: loops/scripts/compile-agent-workflows.mjs. Update with `workflows update --force`; consumer edits may be overwritten.
-
-const OPENCODE_VERSION = '1.18.23'
-import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
-import { existsSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
-import { join } from "node:path";
-
-const workflowDirectory = existsSync("loops/workflows") ? "loops/workflows" : ".github/workflows";
-
-// On Windows, `gh` resolves to a shim that spawnSync cannot find without a shell.
-// Resolve the full path via `where` so spawnSync works with shell: false (security-safe).
-function resolveGhPath() {
-  if (process.platform !== "win32") return "gh";
-  const result = spawnSync("where", ["gh"], { encoding: "utf8", shell: false });
-  if (result.status === 0) {
-    const first = result.stdout.split("\n").map((s) => s.trim()).find(Boolean);
-    if (first) return first;
-  }
-  return "gh";
-}
-
-// gh-aw folds a workflow's top-level `if:` into the activation job but computes activation.needs
-// on its own, so a compiled `if:` can read `needs.<job>` for a job activation never waits for.
-// GitHub does not reject that: the reference resolves to '' at runtime and the clause is silently
-// true (agent-merge-gate's protected_changes guard, Pliny-Bot run 34042143350). actionlint would
-// flag it, but it is deliberately not run on generated files (it does not model concurrency.queue
-// or job.workflow_*). This is the one check that reads the locks, and it needs no dependency:
-// gh-aw emits jobs at two spaces, job keys at four, list items at six.
-function undeclaredNeeds(lock) {
-  const violations = [];
-  let inJobs = false;
-  let job = null;
-  let inList = false;
-  let jobs = 0;
-  let needs = new Set();
-  let refs = new Set();
-  const flush = () => {
-    if (!job) return;
-    for (const ref of refs) if (!needs.has(ref)) violations.push({ job, ref, needs: [...needs].sort() });
-  };
-  for (const line of lock.split("\n")) {
-    if (/^jobs:\s*$/.test(line)) { inJobs = true; continue; }
-    if (inJobs && /^[^\s#]/.test(line)) inJobs = false;
-    if (!inJobs) continue;
-    const start = line.match(/^  ([a-z_][a-zA-Z0-9_-]*):\s*$/);
-    if (start) { flush(); job = start[1]; jobs += 1; needs = new Set(); refs = new Set(); inList = false; continue; }
-    if (!job) continue;
-    if (/^    needs:\s*$/.test(line)) { inList = true; continue; }
-    const inline = line.match(/^    needs:\s*(.+?)\s*$/);
-    if (inline) {
-      for (const n of inline[1].replace(/[\[\]]/g, "").split(",")) if (n.trim()) needs.add(n.trim());
-      inList = false;
-      continue;
-    }
-    if (inList) {
-      const item = line.match(/^      - (\S+)\s*$/);
-      if (item) { needs.add(item[1]); continue; }
-      inList = false;
-    }
-    for (const m of line.matchAll(/needs\.([a-z_][a-zA-Z0-9_-]*)\./g)) refs.add(m[1]);
-  }
-  flush();
-  return { jobs, violations };
-}
-
-const compile = spawnSync(resolveGhPath(), ["aw", "compile", "--strict", "--dir", workflowDirectory], {
-  stdio: "inherit",
-  shell: false,
-});
-
-if (compile.error?.code === "ENOENT" || compile.status === null) {
-  process.stderr.write("Could not run `gh aw compile`. Install githubnext/gh-aw first.\n");
-  process.exit(1);
-}
-
-if (compile.status !== 0) process.exit(compile.status ?? 1);
-
-function lintLock(file, text) {
-  const lint = undeclaredNeeds(text);
-  if (lint.jobs === 0) {
-    process.stderr.write(
-      `${file}: the needs lint found no jobs; the gh-aw lock layout changed. ` +
-      `Re-anchor undeclaredNeeds() in loops/scripts/compile-agent-workflows.mjs.\n`,
-    );
-    process.exitCode = 1;
-  }
-  for (const v of lint.violations) {
-    process.stderr.write(
-      `${file}: job "${v.job}" reads needs.${v.ref} but its needs are [${v.needs.join(", ")}]; ` +
-      `the reference resolves to '' at runtime. For activation, list the job under on.needs in the ` +
-      `source frontmatter; for a custom job, add it to that job's needs.\n`,
-    );
-    process.exitCode = 1;
-  }
-}
-
-// gh aw compile leaves a lock alone when its frontmatter and body hashes still match the source.
-// This script then ran over a lock it had already patched: AGENTMEMORY_URL was inserted a second
-// time, the opencode install line was wrapped in itself, and the consumer freshness check could
-// never be clean (Pliny-Bot agentics-checks run 33963600563). The sentinel marks a processed
-// lock; a lock that carries it is linted and otherwise left as it is.
-const SENTINEL = "# post-processed by scripts/compile-agent-workflows.mjs; run it again and nothing changes";
-
-for (const file of readdirSync(workflowDirectory)) {
-  if (!file.endsWith(".lock.yml")) continue;
-
-  const path = join(workflowDirectory, file);
-  const content = readFileSync(path, "utf8");
-  if (content.includes(SENTINEL)) {
-    lintLock(file, content);
-    continue;
-  }
-  const patched = content
-    .replace(/^(# This file was automatically generated by gh-aw[^\n]*\n)/m, `$1${SENTINEL}\n`)
-    .replaceAll("opencode run --print-logs --log-level DEBUG", "opencode run --log-level ERROR")
-    .replaceAll("opencode run --print-logs --log-level ERROR", "opencode run --log-level ERROR")
-    .replaceAll("opencode run --log-level ERROR", "opencode run --log-level ERROR")
-    .replaceAll("--log-level DEBUG", "--log-level ERROR")
-    .replace(/GH_AW_INFO_MODEL: "[^"]*"/g, 'GH_AW_INFO_MODEL: "per-agent"')
-    .replace(/OPENCODE_MODEL: [^\n]+/g, "OPENCODE_MODEL: ''")
-    .replace(/GH_AW_INFO_MODEL_COSTS: '[^']*'/g, 'GH_AW_INFO_MODEL_COSTS: \'{"providers":{}}\'')
-    // The MCP gateway is the only thing the agent publishes on the host loopback, so it is the
-    // one thing two runners on the same machine cannot share. Honour an inherited port so each
-    // runner service can pick its own; everything else is namespaced by its Docker daemon.
-    // awf names its containers awf-agent, awf-squid and awf-api-proxy with no way to change
-    // them, so two agent jobs on one host recreate each other's containers and the first dies
-    // with exit 137. Giving each runner its own user and daemon isolated the containers but
-    // broke everything the runners share through the filesystem: awf and gh-aw both write
-    // fixed-name files into /tmp, and a file one user creates cannot be overwritten by the
-    // next. Six separate failures came from that. One host lock is the smaller trade: agent
-    // jobs run one at a time, every other job still uses all the runners, and every user is
-    // the same again. The chain is serial anyway, so in practice this only queues one consumer behind
-    // the other. Held for the whole agent run, which is deliberate. The lock lives outside the
-    // /tmp/gh-aw namespace on purpose: the keying rewrite below would otherwise make the lock
-    // file per job, which is silently no lock at all.
-    // Agent jobs run in parallel again. Each runner has its own Docker-in-Docker daemon, so
-    // awf's fixed container names (awf-agent, awf-squid, awf-api-proxy, awmg-mcpg) live in
-    // separate namespaces and cannot recreate each other. gh-aw detects the tcp DOCKER_HOST
-    // and switches to its ARC/DinD path by itself, so no flag is needed here. The host-wide
-    // flock this replaces made every agent job wait for the previous one.
-    // Three host-global resources were left, and concurrent agent jobs fought over all of them.
-    // The global npm install rewrote the opencode binary another job was executing and killed it
-    // with SIGKILL mid-run; the warm server and its data directory were shared by every runner.
-    //
-    // All of these sites are step-level run: or env:, where the runner context is available. It
-    // is not available at workflow level, which is what broke the staging path earlier.
-    //
-    // Install only when the pinned version is missing, and take a lock so two jobs starting at
-    // once cannot both write the global prefix.
-    // gh-aw pins opencode-ai 1.2.14 at every release checked, up to v0.87.5. That version is
-    // from 2026-02-25. The harness expects 1.18.9 and this is the current release, so a gh-aw
-    // upgrade does not move it and the pin is ours to choose.
-    // gh-aw defaults NPM_CONFIG_MIN_RELEASE_AGE to 3 days, which blocks any package
-    // published in the last three days with ETARGET "No matching version found ... with a
-    // date before". Lowered to 1 so a fix released yesterday is usable. This is a
-    // supply-chain cooldown: shortening it accepts a newer package sooner.
-    .replace(/NPM_CONFIG_MIN_RELEASE_AGE: ['\"]?3['\"]?/g, "NPM_CONFIG_MIN_RELEASE_AGE: '1'")
-    // The MCP gateway runs inside a per-runner Docker-in-Docker daemon. gh-aw publishes it on
-    // 127.0.0.1, which is the DinD container's own loopback, while the outer publish forwards to
-    // that container's eth0, so the two never meet and gh-aw's health check fails 120 times with
-    // ECONNREFUSED. Binding 0.0.0.0 inside the daemon connects them. The host still exposes the
-    // port on loopback only, because the DinD container is published as 127.0.0.1:<port>.
-    .replaceAll("-p 127.0.0.1:'\"${MCP_GATEWAY_PORT}\"':", "-p '\"${MCP_GATEWAY_PORT}\"':")
-    // Each runner needs its own gateway port: four DinD daemons publish through to one host
-    // loopback, so two jobs on 8080 would collide. The runner sets it in .env.
-    // awf chroots into the Docker daemon's filesystem and requires it to be the runner's own
-    // glibc host. A Docker-in-Docker daemon fails with "Detected Alpine/musl host filesystem
-    // under /host", and no dind image fixes it: the agent needs the runner's toolchain and
-    // workspace, which a separate daemon container never has. So every agent job shares one
-    // daemon, awf's container names are fixed, and the jobs must be serialised.
-    .replaceAll('          awf --config', '          flock /tmp/agentic-awf.lock awf --config')
-    .replaceAll('export MCP_GATEWAY_PORT="8080"', 'export MCP_GATEWAY_PORT="${MCP_GATEWAY_PORT:-8080}"')
-    // The agent's safe outputs land in safeoutputs.jsonl, but the collector reads
-    // agent_output.json, and nothing in the generated workflow converts one to the other.
-    // With the OpenCode engine the tool calls go through the MCP server rather than stdout,
-    // so the log parser never produces agent_output.json and the placeholder step writes
-    // {"items":[]} over a run that did real work: the job goes green and the pull request
-    // is silently dropped. Build the collector's input from what the agent actually emitted.
-    .replaceAll("echo '{\"items\":[]}' > /tmp/gh-aw-${{ github.run_id }}/agent_output.json", "if [ -s /tmp/gh-aw-${{ github.run_id }}/safeoutputs.jsonl ]; then jq -s '{items: .}' /tmp/gh-aw-${{ github.run_id }}/safeoutputs.jsonl > /tmp/gh-aw-${{ github.run_id }}/agent_output.json; else echo '{\"items\":[]}' > /tmp/gh-aw-${{ github.run_id }}/agent_output.json; fi")
-    // The "Copy Safe Outputs" step runs on the host after the awf container exits. At that
-    // point /tmp/gh-aw/ IS the host's /tmp/gh-aw/, where the safeoutputs MCP container wrote
-    // patch and bundle files (via the MCP gateway's -v /tmp:/tmp:rw mount). Extend the step
-    // to also copy those files to RUNNER_TEMP/gh-aw/ so the upload step can include them.
-    // Without this, the upload step's glob /tmp/gh-aw/aw-*.patch runs inside the awf chroot
-    // (where /tmp/gh-aw is a different path) and finds nothing. The safe_outputs and conclude
-    // jobs then receive no patches in the artifact and silently skip the push.
-    .replace(
-      '          cp "$GH_AW_SAFE_OUTPUTS" /tmp/gh-aw/safeoutputs.jsonl 2>/dev/null || true\n',
-      '          cp "$GH_AW_SAFE_OUTPUTS" /tmp/gh-aw/safeoutputs.jsonl 2>/dev/null || true\n' +
-      '          # Copy patch/bundle files generated by the safeoutputs MCP container to\n' +
-      '          # RUNNER_TEMP/gh-aw/ so the upload step includes them in the artifact.\n' +
-      '          mkdir -p "${RUNNER_TEMP}/gh-aw"\n' +
-      '          ls -la /tmp/gh-aw/ 2>/dev/null || true\n' +
-      '          cp /tmp/gh-aw/aw-*.patch "${RUNNER_TEMP}/gh-aw/" 2>/dev/null || true\n' +
-      '          cp /tmp/gh-aw/aw-*.bundle "${RUNNER_TEMP}/gh-aw/" 2>/dev/null || true\n' +
-      '          ls -la "${RUNNER_TEMP}/gh-aw/"aw-* 2>/dev/null || true\n')
-    // Add patch/bundle paths to the upload glob so the agent artifact carries what
-    // push-agent-branch needs. The anchor is the two adjacent path lines of the
-    // "...agent" upload step; the "...agent-output-fallback" upload lists them in the
-    // opposite order, so it cannot match. Anchoring matters: the first bare
-    // '/tmp/gh-aw/agent_output.json\n' in the file is the placeholder step's echo line,
-    // and replacing there corrupted the placeholder into executing the globs as
-    // commands while the upload list stayed without bundles. The artifact then carried
-    // no bundle, push-agent-branch silently skipped the push, and the gate reported
-    // "remediated" on a pull request that was never touched.
-    // Only the /tmp/gh-aw globs may be added: a ${{ runner.temp }} path as well would
-    // move the upload's least-common-ancestor from /tmp/gh-aw to /, and every file in
-    // the artifact (agent_output.json included) would gain a prefix that
-    // download-agent-output does not look for.
-    .replace(
-      '            /tmp/gh-aw/safeoutputs.jsonl\n            /tmp/gh-aw/agent_output.json\n',
-      '            /tmp/gh-aw/safeoutputs.jsonl\n' +
-      '            /tmp/gh-aw/aw-*.patch\n' +
-      '            /tmp/gh-aw/aw-*.bundle\n' +
-      '            /tmp/gh-aw/agent_output.json\n')
-    // "A failed run is already a red run": report-failure-as-issue: false and
-    // GH_AW_REPORT_FAILED_JOBS: "false" were supposed to silence issue creation, but
-    // 0.87.5's engine-failure reporter files an "[aw] ... failed" issue anyway (seen as
-    // Pliny-Bot #57: an OOM-killed gate produced a fresh issue nobody needs, while the
-    // retry belt is the actual remediation). `if: false` keeps the step compiled but
-    // never runs it, so the failure stays visible in the run and in the belt's attempt
-    // comment, and out of the issue tracker.
-    .replace(
-      /^([ \t]+)- name: Report failed jobs\n([ \t]*)id: report_failed_jobs\n[ \t]*if: always\(\)\n/m,
-      '$1- name: Report failed jobs\n$2id: report_failed_jobs\n$2if: false # never: failures surface in the run and the retry belt\n')
-
-    // v0.87.5's arc-dind mode stages the engine CLI to a daemon-visible path but assumes the
-    // Copilot engine: command -v copilot is empty under engine: opencode and cp "" fails the
-    // job before the agent starts. OpenCode needs no staging, because npm -g installs it under
-    // the tool-cache prefix inside _work, which the dind daemon shares.
-    // Centralised AgentMemory: an always-on App Service; the shim proxies to it when the
-    // URL is set and authenticates with the HMAC secret. Local development leaves both
-    // unset and keeps the local per-run store.
-    .replace(/^env:\n/m, 'env:\n  AGENTMEMORY_URL: https://agentmemory-pro-01.azurewebsites.net\n')
-    // the secret is scoped to the one step that runs the agent (semgrep: a secret in
-    // workflow-level env is visible to every job and step)
-    .replaceAll('          OPENAI_BASE_URL: https://forge.plainconcepts.com/v1',
-      '          OPENAI_BASE_URL: https://forge.plainconcepts.com/v1' + '\n' +
-      '          AGENTMEMORY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.AGENTMEMORY_SECRET }}')
-    // the router passes secrets explicitly (semgrep flags secrets: inherit as over-broad),
-    // so the callee must declare everything it accepts
-    .replace(/^      COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN:/m,
-      '      AGENTMEMORY_SECRET:' + '\n' + '        required: false' + '\n' + '      COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN:')
-    .replaceAll('          COPILOT_SRC="$(command -v copilot)"',
-      '          command -v copilot >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "no copilot binary (engine is opencode); skipping"; exit 0; }' + '\n' +
-      '          COPILOT_SRC="$(command -v copilot)"')
-    // "A failed run is already a red run": report-failure-as-issue: false silences one
-    // reporter, but gh-aw hardcodes a second one (report_failed_jobs) that files an
-    // "[aw] Failed jobs" issue per red run. Same philosophy, same off switch.
-    .replaceAll('GH_AW_REPORT_FAILED_JOBS: "true"', 'GH_AW_REPORT_FAILED_JOBS: "false"')
-    // gh-aw sees a custom step calling dotnet and injects its own setup-dotnet, which carries
-    // no DOTNET_INSTALL_DIR and so tries to write /usr/share/dotnet. The runner user has no
-    // sudo, so the job dies with "Permission denied" before the agent starts. The shared
-    // baseline step already redirects to the tool cache; this gives every other one the same
-    // env, including ones a future gh-aw release injects.
-    .replace(
-      /^( +)- name: Setup \.NET\n\1  uses: actions\/setup-dotnet@[^\n]*\n\1  with:\n((?:\1    [^\n]*\n)+)(?!\1  env:)/gm,
-      (_m, indent, withBody) =>
-        indent + '- name: Setup .NET\n' + indent + '  uses: actions/setup-dotnet@a98b56852c35b8e3190ac28c8c2271da59106c68 # v6.0.0\n' +
-        indent + '  with:\n' + withBody +
-        indent + '  env:\n' + indent + '    DOTNET_INSTALL_DIR: ${{ runner.tool_cache }}/dotnet\n')
-    .replace(/opencode-ai@[0-9][0-9.]*/g, 'opencode-ai@' + OPENCODE_VERSION)
-    // gh-aw installs with --ignore-scripts, which blocks opencode's own postinstall. That
-    // script downloads the platform binary, so 1.18 fails at first use with "opencode-ai's
-    // postinstall script was not run". 1.2.14 did not need it. Run only opencode's postinstall
-    // explicitly, so every other package's scripts stay blocked.
-    .replace(
-      /npm install --ignore-scripts -g opencode-ai@([0-9][0-9.]*)/g,
-      (_m, v) =>
-        "opencode --version 2>/dev/null | grep -qF '" + v + "' || " +
-        "flock /tmp/opencode-install.lock sh -c 'npm install --ignore-scripts -g opencode-ai@" + v +
-        " && cd \"$(npm root -g)/opencode-ai\" && node postinstall.mjs' # opencode-ai@" + v)
-    // One warm server per runner, on its own port, with its own data directory. Keyed on the
-    // runner rather than the run so a runner keeps its server warm between its own jobs.
-    // No double quotes here: the enclosing run: is a double-quoted YAML scalar, so a quote
-    // would have to be escaped. The default has no spaces, so bare is safe shell.
-    .replace(/\/tmp\/opencode-data(?!-\$\{\{)/g, () => '/tmp/opencode-data-${{ runner.name }}');
-
-  let rewritten = patched;
-  // A queued implement executes hours after its run was created, but actions/checkout
-  // without a ref checks out github.sha, which GitHub pins at run creation. Five children
-  // queued together at 02:01 all carried the 02:01 base; once the first sibling merged,
-  // every later push became a rebase onto a moved parent, which gh-aw's signed-commit
-  // push cannot do (it dies with "cannot rebase: You have unstaged changes" and files the
-  // pull request as an issue instead of a pull request). Checking out the branch tip at
-  // execution time makes the commit parent current main; the implement-global queue
-  // already keeps sibling merges out of the window while the agent runs.
-  if (file === "agent-implement.lock.yml") {
-    const start = rewritten.indexOf("\n  agent:\n");
-    const rest = start === -1 ? "" : rewritten.slice(start + 1);
-    const next = rest.search(/\n  [a-z_][a-zA-Z_-]*:\n/);
-    if (start !== -1 && next !== -1) {
-      const end = start + 1 + next;
-      const span = rewritten.slice(start, end).replace(
-        /(uses: actions\/checkout@[^\n]*\n(\s+)with:\n(?:\2  [^\n]+\n)*)/,
-        (whole, _block, indent) =>
-          whole.includes("ref:") ? whole : whole + indent + "  ref: ${{ github.event.repository.default_branch }}\n",
-      );
-      rewritten = rewritten.slice(0, start) + span + rewritten.slice(end);
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Guard the two rewrites the compiled agent jobs cannot work without. The anchors are
-  // upstream template text: when a gh-aw upgrade reshapes either step, the silent
-  // failure mode returns (an artifact with no bundle, a skipped push, a green gate on
-  // an untouched pull request). Failing the compile is the only loud signal there is.
-  for (const check of [
-    { name: "bundle upload glob", ok: /\n( +)- name: Upload agent artifacts\n\1  if: always\(\)\n\1  continue-on-error: true\n\1  uses: actions\/upload-artifact@[^\n]*\n\1  with:\n\1    name: \$\{\{ needs\.activation\.outputs\.artifact_prefix \}\}agent\n\1    path: \|\n(?:\1      [^\n]*\n)*\1      \/tmp\/gh-aw\/aw-\*\.bundle\n/ },
-    { name: "placeholder step intact", ok: /\n( +)- name: Write agent output placeholder if missing\n\1  if: always\(\)\n\1  run: \|\n\1    if \[ ! -f \/tmp\/gh-aw\/agent_output\.json \]; then\n\1      echo '\{"items":\[\]\}' > \/tmp\/gh-aw\/agent_output\.json\n\1    fi\n/ },
-    { name: "failed-jobs reporter disabled", ok: /- name: Report failed jobs\n[ \t]*id: report_failed_jobs\n[ \t]*if: false[^\n]*\n/ },
-  ]) {
-    if (!check.ok.test(rewritten)) {
-      process.stderr.write(
-        `compile patch "${check.name}" no longer matches in ${file}: the gh-aw template changed. ` +
-        `Re-anchor the rewrite in loops/scripts/compile-agent-workflows.mjs, or agent pushes are silently dropped.\n`,
-      );
-      process.exitCode = 1;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (!rewritten.includes(SENTINEL)) {
-    process.stderr.write(
-      `${file}: the generated-file header changed and the post-processing sentinel was not placed; ` +
-      `re-anchor the SENTINEL insert in loops/scripts/compile-agent-workflows.mjs.\n`,
-    );
-    process.exitCode = 1;
-  }
-  lintLock(file, rewritten);
-
-  if (rewritten !== content) writeFileSync(path, rewritten);
-}
+// Managed by @plainconceptsplatform/workflows. Source: loops/scripts/compile-agent-workflows.mjs. Update with `workflows update --force`; consumer edits may be overwritten.
+
+const OPENCODE_VERSION = '1.18.23'
+import { spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
+import { existsSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
+import { join } from "node:path";
+
+const workflowDirectory = existsSync("loops/workflows") ? "loops/workflows" : ".github/workflows";
+
+// On Windows, `gh` resolves to a shim that spawnSync cannot find without a shell.
+// Resolve the full path via `where` so spawnSync works with shell: false (security-safe).
+function resolveGhPath() {
+  if (process.platform !== "win32") return "gh";
+  const result = spawnSync("where", ["gh"], { encoding: "utf8", shell: false });
+  if (result.status === 0) {
+    const first = result.stdout.split("\n").map((s) => s.trim()).find(Boolean);
+    if (first) return first;
+  }
+  return "gh";
+}
+
+// gh-aw folds a workflow's top-level `if:` into the activation job but computes activation.needs
+// on its own, so a compiled `if:` can read `needs.<job>` for a job activation never waits for.
+// GitHub does not reject that: the reference resolves to '' at runtime and the clause is silently
+// true (agent-merge-gate's protected_changes guard, Pliny-Bot run 34042143350). actionlint would
+// flag it, but it is deliberately not run on generated files (it does not model concurrency.queue
+// or job.workflow_*). This is the one check that reads the locks, and it needs no dependency:
+// gh-aw emits jobs at two spaces, job keys at four, list items at six.
+function undeclaredNeeds(lock) {
+  const violations = [];
+  let inJobs = false;
+  let job = null;
+  let inList = false;
+  let jobs = 0;
+  let needs = new Set();
+  let refs = new Set();
+  const flush = () => {
+    if (!job) return;
+    for (const ref of refs) if (!needs.has(ref)) violations.push({ job, ref, needs: [...needs].sort() });
+  };
+  for (const line of lock.split("\n")) {
+    if (/^jobs:\s*$/.test(line)) { inJobs = true; continue; }
+    if (inJobs && /^[^\s#]/.test(line)) inJobs = false;
+    if (!inJobs) continue;
+    const start = line.match(/^  ([a-z_][a-zA-Z0-9_-]*):\s*$/);
+    if (start) { flush(); job = start[1]; jobs += 1; needs = new Set(); refs = new Set(); inList = false; continue; }
+    if (!job) continue;
+    if (/^    needs:\s*$/.test(line)) { inList = true; continue; }
+    const inline = line.match(/^    needs:\s*(.+?)\s*$/);
+    if (inline) {
+      for (const n of inline[1].replace(/[\[\]]/g, "").split(",")) if (n.trim()) needs.add(n.trim());
+      inList = false;
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (inList) {
+      const item = line.match(/^      - (\S+)\s*$/);
+      if (item) { needs.add(item[1]); continue; }
+      inList = false;
+    }
+    for (const m of line.matchAll(/needs\.([a-z_][a-zA-Z0-9_-]*)\./g)) refs.add(m[1]);
+  }
+  flush();
+  return { jobs, violations };
+}
+
+const compile = spawnSync(resolveGhPath(), ["aw", "compile", "--strict", "--dir", workflowDirectory], {
+  stdio: "inherit",
+  shell: false,
+});
+
+if (compile.error?.code === "ENOENT" || compile.status === null) {
+  process.stderr.write("Could not run `gh aw compile`. Install githubnext/gh-aw first.\n");
+  process.exit(1);
+}
+
+if (compile.status !== 0) process.exit(compile.status ?? 1);
+
+function lintLock(file, text) {
+  const lint = undeclaredNeeds(text);
+  if (lint.jobs === 0) {
+    process.stderr.write(
+      `${file}: the needs lint found no jobs; the gh-aw lock layout changed. ` +
+      `Re-anchor undeclaredNeeds() in loops/scripts/compile-agent-workflows.mjs.\n`,
+    );
+    process.exitCode = 1;
+  }
+  for (const v of lint.violations) {
+    process.stderr.write(
+      `${file}: job "${v.job}" reads needs.${v.ref} but its needs are [${v.needs.join(", ")}]; ` +
+      `the reference resolves to '' at runtime. For activation, list the job under on.needs in the ` +
+      `source frontmatter; for a custom job, add it to that job's needs.\n`,
+    );
+    process.exitCode = 1;
+  }
+}
+
+// gh aw compile leaves a lock alone when its frontmatter and body hashes still match the source.
+// This script then ran over a lock it had already patched: AGENTMEMORY_URL was inserted a second
+// time, the opencode install line was wrapped in itself, and the consumer freshness check could
+// never be clean (Pliny-Bot agentics-checks run 33963600563). The sentinel marks a processed
+// lock; a lock that carries it is linted and otherwise left as it is.
+const SENTINEL = "# post-processed by scripts/compile-agent-workflows.mjs; run it again and nothing changes";
+
+for (const file of readdirSync(workflowDirectory)) {
+  if (!file.endsWith(".lock.yml")) continue;
+
+  const path = join(workflowDirectory, file);
+  const content = readFileSync(path, "utf8");
+  if (content.includes(SENTINEL)) {
+    lintLock(file, content);
+    continue;
+  }
+  const patched = content
+    .replace(/^(# This file was automatically generated by gh-aw[^\n]*\n)/m, `$1${SENTINEL}\n`)
+    .replaceAll("opencode run --print-logs --log-level DEBUG", "opencode run --log-level ERROR")
+    .replaceAll("opencode run --print-logs --log-level ERROR", "opencode run --log-level ERROR")
+    .replaceAll("opencode run --log-level ERROR", "opencode run --log-level ERROR")
+    .replaceAll("--log-level DEBUG", "--log-level ERROR")
+    .replace(/GH_AW_INFO_MODEL: "[^"]*"/g, 'GH_AW_INFO_MODEL: "per-agent"')
+    .replace(/OPENCODE_MODEL: [^\n]+/g, "OPENCODE_MODEL: ''")
+    .replace(/GH_AW_INFO_MODEL_COSTS: '[^']*'/g, 'GH_AW_INFO_MODEL_COSTS: \'{"providers":{}}\'')
+    // The MCP gateway is the only thing the agent publishes on the host loopback, so it is the
+    // one thing two runners on the same machine cannot share. Honour an inherited port so each
+    // runner service can pick its own; everything else is namespaced by its Docker daemon.
+    // awf names its containers awf-agent, awf-squid and awf-api-proxy with no way to change
+    // them, so two agent jobs on one host recreate each other's containers and the first dies
+    // with exit 137. Giving each runner its own user and daemon isolated the containers but
+    // broke everything the runners share through the filesystem: awf and gh-aw both write
+    // fixed-name files into /tmp, and a file one user creates cannot be overwritten by the
+    // next. Six separate failures came from that. One host lock is the smaller trade: agent
+    // jobs run one at a time, every other job still uses all the runners, and every user is
+    // the same again. The chain is serial anyway, so in practice this only queues one consumer behind
+    // the other. Held for the whole agent run, which is deliberate. The lock lives outside the
+    // /tmp/gh-aw namespace on purpose: the keying rewrite below would otherwise make the lock
+    // file per job, which is silently no lock at all.
+    // Agent jobs run in parallel again. Each runner has its own Docker-in-Docker daemon, so
+    // awf's fixed container names (awf-agent, awf-squid, awf-api-proxy, awmg-mcpg) live in
+    // separate namespaces and cannot recreate each other. gh-aw detects the tcp DOCKER_HOST
+    // and switches to its ARC/DinD path by itself, so no flag is needed here. The host-wide
+    // flock this replaces made every agent job wait for the previous one.
+    // Three host-global resources were left, and concurrent agent jobs fought over all of them.
+    // The global npm install rewrote the opencode binary another job was executing and killed it
+    // with SIGKILL mid-run; the warm server and its data directory were shared by every runner.
+    //
+    // All of these sites are step-level run: or env:, where the runner context is available. It
+    // is not available at workflow level, which is what broke the staging path earlier.
+    //
+    // Install only when the pinned version is missing, and take a lock so two jobs starting at
+    // once cannot both write the global prefix.
+    // gh-aw pins opencode-ai 1.2.14 at every release checked, up to v0.87.5. That version is
+    // from 2026-02-25. The harness expects 1.18.9 and this is the current release, so a gh-aw
+    // upgrade does not move it and the pin is ours to choose.
+    // gh-aw defaults NPM_CONFIG_MIN_RELEASE_AGE to 3 days, which blocks any package
+    // published in the last three days with ETARGET "No matching version found ... with a
+    // date before". Lowered to 1 so a fix released yesterday is usable. This is a
+    // supply-chain cooldown: shortening it accepts a newer package sooner.
+    .replace(/NPM_CONFIG_MIN_RELEASE_AGE: ['\"]?3['\"]?/g, "NPM_CONFIG_MIN_RELEASE_AGE: '1'")
+    // The MCP gateway runs inside a per-runner Docker-in-Docker daemon. gh-aw publishes it on
+    // 127.0.0.1, which is the DinD container's own loopback, while the outer publish forwards to
+    // that container's eth0, so the two never meet and gh-aw's health check fails 120 times with
+    // ECONNREFUSED. Binding 0.0.0.0 inside the daemon connects them. The host still exposes the
+    // port on loopback only, because the DinD container is published as 127.0.0.1:<port>.
+    .replaceAll("-p 127.0.0.1:'\"${MCP_GATEWAY_PORT}\"':", "-p '\"${MCP_GATEWAY_PORT}\"':")
+    // Each runner needs its own gateway port: four DinD daemons publish through to one host
+    // loopback, so two jobs on 8080 would collide. The runner sets it in .env.
+    // awf chroots into the Docker daemon's filesystem and requires it to be the runner's own
+    // glibc host. A Docker-in-Docker daemon fails with "Detected Alpine/musl host filesystem
+    // under /host", and no dind image fixes it: the agent needs the runner's toolchain and
+    // workspace, which a separate daemon container never has. So every agent job shares one
+    // daemon, awf's container names are fixed, and the jobs must be serialised.
+    .replaceAll('          awf --config', '          flock /tmp/agentic-awf.lock awf --config')
+    .replaceAll('export MCP_GATEWAY_PORT="8080"', 'export MCP_GATEWAY_PORT="${MCP_GATEWAY_PORT:-8080}"')
+    // The agent's safe outputs land in safeoutputs.jsonl, but the collector reads
+    // agent_output.json, and nothing in the generated workflow converts one to the other.
+    // With the OpenCode engine the tool calls go through the MCP server rather than stdout,
+    // so the log parser never produces agent_output.json and the placeholder step writes
+    // {"items":[]} over a run that did real work: the job goes green and the pull request
+    // is silently dropped. Build the collector's input from what the agent actually emitted.
+    .replaceAll("echo '{\"items\":[]}' > /tmp/gh-aw-${{ github.run_id }}/agent_output.json", "if [ -s /tmp/gh-aw-${{ github.run_id }}/safeoutputs.jsonl ]; then jq -s '{items: .}' /tmp/gh-aw-${{ github.run_id }}/safeoutputs.jsonl > /tmp/gh-aw-${{ github.run_id }}/agent_output.json; else echo '{\"items\":[]}' > /tmp/gh-aw-${{ github.run_id }}/agent_output.json; fi")
+    // The "Copy Safe Outputs" step runs on the host after the awf container exits. At that
+    // point /tmp/gh-aw/ IS the host's /tmp/gh-aw/, where the safeoutputs MCP container wrote
+    // patch and bundle files (via the MCP gateway's -v /tmp:/tmp:rw mount). Extend the step
+    // to also copy those files to RUNNER_TEMP/gh-aw/ so the upload step can include them.
+    // Without this, the upload step's glob /tmp/gh-aw/aw-*.patch runs inside the awf chroot
+    // (where /tmp/gh-aw is a different path) and finds nothing. The safe_outputs and conclude
+    // jobs then receive no patches in the artifact and silently skip the push.
+    .replace(
+      '          cp "$GH_AW_SAFE_OUTPUTS" /tmp/gh-aw/safeoutputs.jsonl 2>/dev/null || true\n',
+      '          cp "$GH_AW_SAFE_OUTPUTS" /tmp/gh-aw/safeoutputs.jsonl 2>/dev/null || true\n' +
+      '          # Copy patch/bundle files generated by the safeoutputs MCP container to\n' +
+      '          # RUNNER_TEMP/gh-aw/ so the upload step includes them in the artifact.\n' +
+      '          mkdir -p "${RUNNER_TEMP}/gh-aw"\n' +
+      '          ls -la /tmp/gh-aw/ 2>/dev/null || true\n' +
+      '          cp /tmp/gh-aw/aw-*.patch "${RUNNER_TEMP}/gh-aw/" 2>/dev/null || true\n' +
+      '          cp /tmp/gh-aw/aw-*.bundle "${RUNNER_TEMP}/gh-aw/" 2>/dev/null || true\n' +
+      '          ls -la "${RUNNER_TEMP}/gh-aw/"aw-* 2>/dev/null || true\n')
+    // Add patch/bundle paths to the upload glob so the agent artifact carries what
+    // push-agent-branch needs. The anchor is the two adjacent path lines of the
+    // "...agent" upload step; the "...agent-output-fallback" upload lists them in the
+    // opposite order, so it cannot match. Anchoring matters: the first bare
+    // '/tmp/gh-aw/agent_output.json\n' in the file is the placeholder step's echo line,
+    // and replacing there corrupted the placeholder into executing the globs as
+    // commands while the upload list stayed without bundles. The artifact then carried
+    // no bundle, push-agent-branch silently skipped the push, and the gate reported
+    // "remediated" on a pull request that was never touched.
+    // Only the /tmp/gh-aw globs may be added: a ${{ runner.temp }} path as well would
+    // move the upload's least-common-ancestor from /tmp/gh-aw to /, and every file in
+    // the artifact (agent_output.json included) would gain a prefix that
+    // download-agent-output does not look for.
+    .replace(
+      '            /tmp/gh-aw/safeoutputs.jsonl\n            /tmp/gh-aw/agent_output.json\n',
+      '            /tmp/gh-aw/safeoutputs.jsonl\n' +
+      '            /tmp/gh-aw/aw-*.patch\n' +
+      '            /tmp/gh-aw/aw-*.bundle\n' +
+      '            /tmp/gh-aw/agent_output.json\n')
+    // "A failed run is already a red run": report-failure-as-issue: false and
+    // GH_AW_REPORT_FAILED_JOBS: "false" were supposed to silence issue creation, but
+    // 0.87.5's engine-failure reporter files an "[aw] ... failed" issue anyway (seen as
+    // Pliny-Bot #57: an OOM-killed gate produced a fresh issue nobody needs, while the
+    // retry belt is the actual remediation). `if: false` keeps the step compiled but
+    // never runs it, so the failure stays visible in the run and in the belt's attempt
+    // comment, and out of the issue tracker.
+    .replace(
+      /^([ \t]+)- name: Report failed jobs\n([ \t]*)id: report_failed_jobs\n[ \t]*if: always\(\)\n/m,
+      '$1- name: Report failed jobs\n$2id: report_failed_jobs\n$2if: false # never: failures surface in the run and the retry belt\n')
+
+    // v0.87.5's arc-dind mode stages the engine CLI to a daemon-visible path but assumes the
+    // Copilot engine: command -v copilot is empty under engine: opencode and cp "" fails the
+    // job before the agent starts. OpenCode needs no staging, because npm -g installs it under
+    // the tool-cache prefix inside _work, which the dind daemon shares.
+    // Centralised AgentMemory: an always-on App Service; the shim proxies to it when the
+    // URL is set and authenticates with the HMAC secret. Local development leaves both
+    // unset and keeps the local per-run store.
+    .replace(/^env:\n/m, 'env:\n  AGENTMEMORY_URL: https://agentmemory-pro-01.azurewebsites.net\n')
+    // the secret is scoped to the one step that runs the agent (semgrep: a secret in
+    // workflow-level env is visible to every job and step)
+    .replaceAll('          OPENAI_BASE_URL: https://forge.plainconcepts.com/v1',
+      '          OPENAI_BASE_URL: https://forge.plainconcepts.com/v1' + '\n' +
+      '          AGENTMEMORY_SECRET: ${{ secrets.AGENTMEMORY_SECRET }}')
+    // the router passes secrets explicitly (semgrep flags secrets: inherit as over-broad),
+    // so the callee must declare everything it accepts
+    .replace(/^      COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN:/m,
+      '      AGENTMEMORY_SECRET:' + '\n' + '        required: false' + '\n' + '      COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN:')
+    .replaceAll('          COPILOT_SRC="$(command -v copilot)"',
+      '          command -v copilot >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "no copilot binary (engine is opencode); skipping"; exit 0; }' + '\n' +
+      '          COPILOT_SRC="$(command -v copilot)"')
+    // "A failed run is already a red run": report-failure-as-issue: false silences one
+    // reporter, but gh-aw hardcodes a second one (report_failed_jobs) that files an
+    // "[aw] Failed jobs" issue per red run. Same philosophy, same off switch.
+    .replaceAll('GH_AW_REPORT_FAILED_JOBS: "true"', 'GH_AW_REPORT_FAILED_JOBS: "false"')
+    // gh-aw sees a custom step calling dotnet and injects its own setup-dotnet, which carries
+    // no DOTNET_INSTALL_DIR and so tries to write /usr/share/dotnet. The runner user has no
+    // sudo, so the job dies with "Permission denied" before the agent starts. The shared
+    // baseline step already redirects to the tool cache; this gives every other one the same
+    // env, including ones a future gh-aw release injects.
+    .replace(
+      /^( +)- name: Setup \.NET\n\1  uses: actions\/setup-dotnet@[^\n]*\n\1  with:\n((?:\1    [^\n]*\n)+)(?!\1  env:)/gm,
+      (_m, indent, withBody) =>
+        indent + '- name: Setup .NET\n' + indent + '  uses: actions/setup-dotnet@a98b56852c35b8e3190ac28c8c2271da59106c68 # v6.0.0\n' +
+        indent + '  with:\n' + withBody +
+        indent + '  env:\n' + indent + '    DOTNET_INSTALL_DIR: ${{ runner.tool_cache }}/dotnet\n')
+    .replace(/opencode-ai@[0-9][0-9.]*/g, 'opencode-ai@' + OPENCODE_VERSION)
+    // gh-aw installs with --ignore-scripts, which blocks opencode's own postinstall. That
+    // script downloads the platform binary, so 1.18 fails at first use with "opencode-ai's
+    // postinstall script was not run". 1.2.14 did not need it. Run only opencode's postinstall
+    // explicitly, so every other package's scripts stay blocked.
+    .replace(
+      /npm install --ignore-scripts -g opencode-ai@([0-9][0-9.]*)/g,
+      (_m, v) =>
+        "opencode --version 2>/dev/null | grep -qF '" + v + "' || " +
+        "flock /tmp/opencode-install.lock sh -c 'npm install --ignore-scripts -g opencode-ai@" + v +
+        " && cd \"$(npm root -g)/opencode-ai\" && node postinstall.mjs' # opencode-ai@" + v)
+    // One warm server per runner, on its own port, with its own data directory. Keyed on the
+    // runner rather than the run so a runner keeps its server warm between its own jobs.
+    // No double quotes here: the enclosing run: is a double-quoted YAML scalar, so a quote
+    // would have to be escaped. The default has no spaces, so bare is safe shell.
+    .replace(/\/tmp\/opencode-data(?!-\$\{\{)/g, () => '/tmp/opencode-data-${{ runner.name }}');
+
+  let rewritten = patched;
+  // A queued implement executes hours after its run was created, but actions/checkout
+  // without a ref checks out github.sha, which GitHub pins at run creation. Five children
+  // queued together at 02:01 all carried the 02:01 base; once the first sibling merged,
+  // every later push became a rebase onto a moved parent, which gh-aw's signed-commit
+  // push cannot do (it dies with "cannot rebase: You have unstaged changes" and files the
+  // pull request as an issue instead of a pull request). Checking out the branch tip at
+  // execution time makes the commit parent current main; the implement-global queue
+  // already keeps sibling merges out of the window while the agent runs.
+  if (file === "agent-implement.lock.yml") {
+    const start = rewritten.indexOf("\n  agent:\n");
+    const rest = start === -1 ? "" : rewritten.slice(start + 1);
+    const next = rest.search(/\n  [a-z_][a-zA-Z_-]*:\n/);
+    if (start !== -1 && next !== -1) {
+      const end = start + 1 + next;
+      const span = rewritten.slice(start, end).replace(
+        /(uses: actions\/checkout@[^\n]*\n(\s+)with:\n(?:\2  [^\n]+\n)*)/,
+        (whole, _block, indent) =>
+          whole.includes("ref:") ? whole : whole + indent + "  ref: ${{ github.event.repository.default_branch }}\n",
+      );
+      rewritten = rewritten.slice(0, start) + span + rewritten.slice(end);
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Guard the two rewrites the compiled agent jobs cannot work without. The anchors are
+  // upstream template text: when a gh-aw upgrade reshapes either step, the silent
+  // failure mode returns (an artifact with no bundle, a skipped push, a green gate on
+  // an untouched pull request). Failing the compile is the only loud signal there is.
+  for (const check of [
+    { name: "bundle upload glob", ok: /\n( +)- name: Upload agent artifacts\n\1  if: always\(\)\n\1  continue-on-error: true\n\1  uses: actions\/upload-artifact@[^\n]*\n\1  with:\n\1    name: \$\{\{ needs\.activation\.outputs\.artifact_prefix \}\}agent\n\1    path: \|\n(?:\1      [^\n]*\n)*\1      \/tmp\/gh-aw\/aw-\*\.bundle\n/ },
+    { name: "placeholder step intact", ok: /\n( +)- name: Write agent output placeholder if missing\n\1  if: always\(\)\n\1  run: \|\n\1    if \[ ! -f \/tmp\/gh-aw\/agent_output\.json \]; then\n\1      echo '\{"items":\[\]\}' > \/tmp\/gh-aw\/agent_output\.json\n\1    fi\n/ },
+    { name: "failed-jobs reporter disabled", ok: /- name: Report failed jobs\n[ \t]*id: report_failed_jobs\n[ \t]*if: false[^\n]*\n/ },
+  ]) {
+    if (!check.ok.test(rewritten)) {
+      process.stderr.write(
+        `compile patch "${check.name}" no longer matches in ${file}: the gh-aw template changed. ` +
+        `Re-anchor the rewrite in loops/scripts/compile-agent-workflows.mjs, or agent pushes are silently dropped.\n`,
+      );
+      process.exitCode = 1;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!rewritten.includes(SENTINEL)) {
+    process.stderr.write(
+      `${file}: the generated-file header changed and the post-processing sentinel was not placed; ` +
+      `re-anchor the SENTINEL insert in loops/scripts/compile-agent-workflows.mjs.\n`,
+    );
+    process.exitCode = 1;
+  }
+  lintLock(file, rewritten);
+
+  if (rewritten !== content) writeFileSync(path, rewritten);
+}