@pithy-sh/auth 0.7.0 → 0.9.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +4 -0
- package/dist/caller/certificate.d.ts +83 -0
- package/dist/caller/certificate.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/caller/certificate.js +92 -0
- package/dist/caller/request.d.ts +66 -0
- package/dist/caller/request.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/caller/request.js +71 -0
- package/dist/caller/token.d.ts +130 -0
- package/dist/caller/token.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/caller/token.js +207 -0
- package/dist/capability.d.ts +44 -1
- package/dist/capability.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/capability.js +7 -4
- package/dist/data/betterAuth.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/data/betterAuth.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/data/betterAuth.js +1 -1
- package/dist/data/tables.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/http/adminRoutes.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/http/adminRoutes.js +39 -8
- package/dist/http/credentialResign.d.ts +46 -0
- package/dist/http/credentialResign.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/http/credentialResign.js +203 -0
- package/dist/http/devLoginRoute.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/http/devLoginRoute.js +12 -5
- package/dist/http/errorCallbackUrl.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/http/errorCallbackUrl.js +15 -9
- package/dist/http/middleware.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/http/middleware.js +66 -15
- package/dist/http/providerRefusal.d.ts +8 -7
- package/dist/http/providerRefusal.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/http/providerRefusal.js +29 -32
- package/dist/http/resolve.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/http/resolve.js +18 -3
- package/dist/http/responses.d.ts +52 -0
- package/dist/http/responses.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/http/responses.js +25 -1
- package/dist/http/routes.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/http/routes.js +60 -9
- package/dist/http/schemas.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/http/schemas.js +1 -1
- package/dist/instance/auth.d.ts +1225 -2
- package/dist/instance/auth.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/instance/auth.js +6 -2
- package/dist/instance/jwksReencryption.d.ts +75 -0
- package/dist/instance/jwksReencryption.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/instance/jwksReencryption.js +160 -0
- package/dist/instance/providerSignInGate.d.ts +7 -6
- package/dist/instance/providerSignInGate.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/instance/providerSignInGate.js +16 -14
- package/dist/instance/providers.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/instance/providers.js +2 -1
- package/dist/instance/secrets.d.ts +168 -1
- package/dist/instance/secrets.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/instance/secrets.js +86 -3
- package/dist/instance/sessionSecrets.d.ts +45 -0
- package/dist/instance/sessionSecrets.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/instance/sessionSecrets.js +29 -0
- package/dist/migrations/0001_init.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/migrations/0003_account_issuer_nullable.d.ts +5 -0
- package/dist/migrations/0003_account_issuer_nullable.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/migrations/0003_account_issuer_nullable.js +131 -0
- package/dist/migrations/set.d.ts +2 -1
- package/dist/migrations/set.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/migrations/set.js +4 -2
- package/dist/seeds/devSession.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/seeds/devSession.js +2 -1
- package/dist/test-utils/liveApp.d.ts +5 -0
- package/dist/test-utils/liveApp.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/test-utils/liveApp.js +3 -3
- package/dist/test-utils/schemaDrift.d.ts +49 -0
- package/dist/test-utils/schemaDrift.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/test-utils/schemaDrift.js +35 -0
- package/dist/test-utils/scopedBackend.d.ts +183 -0
- package/dist/test-utils/scopedBackend.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/test-utils/scopedBackend.js +160 -0
- package/dist/version.generated.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/version.generated.js +1 -1
- package/docs/server-authoritative.md +182 -0
- package/package.json +14 -11
- package/src/caller/certificate.ts +133 -0
- package/src/caller/request.ts +84 -0
- package/src/caller/token.ts +276 -0
- package/src/capability.ts +65 -4
- package/src/data/betterAuth.ts +2 -1
- package/src/http/adminRoutes.ts +46 -10
- package/src/http/credentialResign.ts +268 -0
- package/src/http/devLoginRoute.ts +19 -6
- package/src/http/errorCallbackUrl.ts +21 -13
- package/src/http/middleware.ts +100 -35
- package/src/http/providerRefusal.ts +30 -32
- package/src/http/resolve.ts +27 -3
- package/src/http/responses.ts +54 -0
- package/src/http/routes.ts +97 -11
- package/src/http/schemas.ts +1 -1
- package/src/instance/auth.ts +22 -4
- package/src/instance/jwksReencryption.ts +206 -0
- package/src/instance/providerSignInGate.ts +23 -21
- package/src/instance/providers.ts +2 -1
- package/src/instance/secrets.ts +94 -1
- package/src/instance/sessionSecrets.ts +64 -0
- package/src/migrations/0001_init.ts +8 -10
- package/src/migrations/0003_account_issuer_nullable.ts +199 -0
- package/src/migrations/set.ts +3 -1
- package/src/seeds/devSession.ts +2 -1
- package/src/test-utils/liveApp.ts +8 -6
- package/src/test-utils/schemaDrift.ts +82 -0
- package/src/test-utils/scopedBackend.ts +136 -0
- package/src/version.generated.ts +1 -1
package/src/instance/auth.ts
CHANGED
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@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ import {
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type SocialProviderId,
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unavailableProviderFor,
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} from "./providers";
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import { betterAuthSecrets, type SessionSecretVersions } from "./sessionSecrets";
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/**
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* Build the `socialProviders` block from whichever provider credentials were resolved. Exported so the
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@@ -206,8 +207,15 @@ export interface AuthInstanceDeps<Plugins extends readonly BetterAuthPlugin[] =
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extends ResolvedProviders {
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/** The shared Kysely over the `pithy_auth_*` tables (carries `CamelCasePlugin`). */
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db: AuthDatabase;
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/** The Better-Auth signing/encryption secret, sourced from `@pithy-sh/secrets
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/** The Better-Auth signing/encryption secret, sourced from `@pithy-sh/secrets` — the current version. */
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secret: string;
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/**
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* Every retained version of the session secret, when the caller resolved them (#602). Given, Better Auth
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* gets the whole version set — newest first — so a value sealed under the previous version still opens
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* through a rotation's overlap; see `./sessionSecrets.ts`. Absent, it gets `secret` alone, which is what an
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* instance built outside a request (a seed, a test) has always had.
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*/
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sessionSecrets?: SessionSecretVersions;
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/** The public base URL of this environment's auth worker (no trailing slash). */
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baseURL: string;
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/** The mount path; must equal the Hono route the handler is mounted under. */
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@@ -314,13 +322,23 @@ export function makeAuth<const Plugins extends readonly BetterAuthPlugin[]>(deps
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appName: "Pithy",
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baseURL: deps.baseURL,
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basePath: deps.basePath,
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-
secret: deps.secret,
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...(deps.sessionSecrets === undefined ? { secret: deps.secret } : betterAuthSecrets(deps.sessionSecrets)),
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telemetry: { enabled: false },
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trustedOrigins: deps.trustedOrigins,
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database: { db: deps.db, type: "sqlite", transaction: false },
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advanced: {
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-
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-
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database: {
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// WebCrypto UUID ids for every model — anti-enumeration, Workers-safe.
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generateId: () => crypto.randomUUID(),
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// **Off at runtime, and checked in CI instead (#787).** Better Auth 1.7.3 compares its schema with
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// the database when an instance initializes and refuses requests on a mismatch. Its verdict is
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// cached per instance, and this instance is built per request (`../http/resolve.ts`), so the check
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// would run on every request: eight more D1 statements on top of the five an authenticated request
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// costs, measured by `http/scopes.workers.test.ts`. The kit owns these tables through its own
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// migrations, and `migrations/betterAuthSchemaDrift.workers.test.ts` runs Better Auth's own check
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// against them at the lockfile's version and at the newest the range admits.
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validateSchema: false,
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},
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},
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// Better Auth's errors bubble out of `handler` so the Hono boundary maps them to PithyError.
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//
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@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
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// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Pithy
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
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import type { D1Database } from "@cloudflare/workers-types";
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import { createDatabase } from "@pithy-sh/core/src/data/db";
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import type { Logger } from "@pithy-sh/core/src/logger/logger";
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import { secretsTables } from "@pithy-sh/secrets/src/data/tables";
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import {
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claimReencryption,
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currentSealedVersion,
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recordReencryption,
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recordSoleVersion,
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} from "@pithy-sh/secrets/src/rotation/reencryption";
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import { parseEnvelope, type SecretConfig, symmetricDecrypt, symmetricEncrypt } from "better-auth/crypto";
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import type { AuthDatabase } from "../data/tables";
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import { AUTH_JWKS_DEPENDENT, AUTH_SESSION_SECRET } from "./secrets";
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import { betterAuthSecrets, type SessionSecretVersions } from "./sessionSecrets";
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/**
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* **The JWKS private keys, moved under the session secret's newest version before the old one retires (#602).**
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*
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* Better Auth seals every key in `pithy_auth_jwks` under the session secret (`plugins/jwt/utils.mjs`), and a
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* key has no expiry that would make it safe to stop being able to open it. An unattended rotation of
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* `auth-session-secret` therefore waits, before it retires the previous version, for this Worker to say the
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* keys have moved — the secret's registry entry names them as `auth-jwks` — and this is where they move.
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*
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* Each key is opened under whichever retained version it names (`$ba$<version>$…`), or — for one sealed
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* before the kit handed Better Auth a version set, which carries no envelope — under each retained version
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* in turn, oldest first. It is sealed again under the current version and written back only if the row
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* still holds what was read, so two isolates moving the same key cannot interleave into a value neither
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* wrote. Then the move is recorded in the secrets D1, where the manager reads it.
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*
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* **It never makes a key unopenable.** A key no retained version opens is left exactly as it is and
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* counted; it was already lost, and nothing here can lose it further. It does not hold the record back,
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* because waiting cannot make it open — and a retirement held forever over a key that will never be used
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* is an envelope that grows on every rotation.
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*/
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/** What one pass did, in counts. */
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export interface JwksReencryption {
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/** Keys sealed again under the current version. */
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moved: number;
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/** Keys already under it. */
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current: number;
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/** Keys no retained version opens. Left as they were. */
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unopenable: number;
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}
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/** Better Auth's own key structure for a version set, built the way `buildSecretConfig` builds it. */
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function secretConfig(versions: SessionSecretVersions): SecretConfig {
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const { secrets } = betterAuthSecrets(versions);
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return {
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keys: new Map(secrets.map((one) => [one.version, one.value])),
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currentVersion: Number(versions.currentVersion),
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};
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}
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/** Open one stored private key, or `null` when no retained version opens it. */
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async function opened(stored: string, versions: SessionSecretVersions, config: SecretConfig): Promise<string | null> {
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if (parseEnvelope(stored) !== null) {
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return await symmetricDecrypt({ key: config, data: stored }).catch(() => null);
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}
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// A bare ciphertext, from before the version set: sealed under whichever value was current then.
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const oldestFirst = [...betterAuthSecrets(versions).secrets].sort((left, right) => left.version - right.version);
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for (const candidate of oldestFirst) {
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const plain = await symmetricDecrypt({ key: candidate.value, data: stored }).catch(() => null);
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if (plain !== null) return plain;
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}
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return null;
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}
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/** Move every JWKS private key under the current version of the session secret. */
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export async function reencryptJwks(db: AuthDatabase, versions: SessionSecretVersions): Promise<JwksReencryption> {
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const config = secretConfig(versions);
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const current = Number(versions.currentVersion);
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const result: JwksReencryption = { moved: 0, current: 0, unopenable: 0 };
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const rows = await db.selectFrom("pithyAuthJwks").select(["id", "privateKey"]).execute();
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for (const row of rows) {
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let stored: unknown;
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try {
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stored = JSON.parse(row.privateKey);
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} catch {
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stored = undefined;
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}
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if (typeof stored !== "string") {
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result.unopenable += 1;
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continue;
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}
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if (parseEnvelope(stored)?.version === current) {
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result.current += 1;
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continue;
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}
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const plain = await opened(stored, versions, config);
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if (plain === null) {
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result.unopenable += 1;
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continue;
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}
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const sealed = JSON.stringify(await symmetricEncrypt({ key: config, data: plain }));
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await db
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.updateTable("pithyAuthJwks")
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.set({ privateKey: sealed })
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.where("id", "=", row.id)
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.where("privateKey", "=", row.privateKey)
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.execute();
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result.moved += 1;
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}
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return result;
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}
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/**
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* The versions this isolate has finished with — moved, or failed to — keyed by version and fingerprint, so a
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* version key reused after an `update` is a new version here too.
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*/
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const settled = new Set<string>();
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/** The versions this isolate was told to wait on, with when to ask again. */
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const waiting = new Map<string, number>();
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/** Forget what this isolate has settled or is waiting on. For tests. */
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export function resetJwksReencryption(): void {
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settled.clear();
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waiting.clear();
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}
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/** What {@link ensureJwksSealedUnderCurrent} needs. */
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export interface EnsureJwksDeps {
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/** The application database the JWKS keys live in. */
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db: AuthDatabase;
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/**
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* That database's binding name — `auth({ database })`. The holder the move is recorded under, so two auth
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* Workers over two databases are waited for one by one rather than one answering for both.
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*/
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holder: string;
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/** The secrets D1 the move is recorded in. */
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secrets: D1Database;
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/** The session secret's retained versions, as this request resolved them. */
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versions: SessionSecretVersions;
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/** Where a failure is said. Never fatal. */
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log: Logger;
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/** The clock. Defaults to now. */
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now?: Date;
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}
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/**
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* Make sure the JWKS keys are sealed under the current version, and that the secrets D1 says so — once per
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* version per isolate.
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*
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* **Recorded with one version too.** While the secret holds one version there is nothing to move, and the
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* record says the keys are under it ({@link recordSoleVersion}). That is how the manager knows this database
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* holds keys before the first rotation: a holder it has never heard from is one it cannot wait for.
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*
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* **Not on the first request that sees the version.** Another isolate may still hold the envelope it cached
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* before the append, with no key for the new version; a key re-sealed under it now would fail there. So the
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* first sight is recorded, and the move waits until every cache filled before it has expired
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* (`claimReencryption`, `REENCRYPTION_SETTLE_MS`). An isolate told to wait does not ask again until then.
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*
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* **Never fatal.** It runs on a request, and the request it rides on is somebody signing in; a failure here
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* leaves the keys where they were — still opening, since the previous version is still held — and the
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* retirement waiting. The next isolate tries again.
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|
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|
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*/
|
|
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|
+
export async function ensureJwksSealedUnderCurrent(deps: EnsureJwksDeps): Promise<void> {
|
|
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|
+
const { versions } = deps;
|
|
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|
+
const sole = Object.keys(versions.versions).length < 2;
|
|
164
|
+
const now = deps.now ?? new Date();
|
|
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|
+
try {
|
|
166
|
+
const sealed = await currentSealedVersion(versions);
|
|
167
|
+
const key = `${deps.holder}:${sole ? "sole" : "rotating"}:${sealed.version}:${sealed.fingerprint}`;
|
|
168
|
+
if (settled.has(key) || (waiting.get(key) ?? 0) > now.getTime()) return;
|
|
169
|
+
try {
|
|
170
|
+
const secretsDb = createDatabase(deps.secrets, secretsTables);
|
|
171
|
+
const where = { name: AUTH_SESSION_SECRET, dependent: AUTH_JWKS_DEPENDENT, holder: deps.holder };
|
|
172
|
+
if (sole) {
|
|
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|
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settled.add(key);
|
|
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|
+
await recordSoleVersion(secretsDb, { ...where, sealed, now });
|
|
175
|
+
return;
|
|
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|
+
}
|
|
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|
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const claim = await claimReencryption(secretsDb, { ...where, sealed, now });
|
|
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|
+
if (claim.state === "moved") {
|
|
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|
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settled.add(key);
|
|
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|
+
return;
|
|
181
|
+
}
|
|
182
|
+
if (claim.state === "settling") {
|
|
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|
+
waiting.set(key, claim.until.getTime());
|
|
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|
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return;
|
|
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|
+
}
|
|
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|
+
settled.add(key);
|
|
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|
+
const moved = await reencryptJwks(deps.db, versions);
|
|
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|
+
await recordReencryption(secretsDb, { ...where, ...sealed, now });
|
|
189
|
+
deps.log.info("jwks re-encrypted under the current session secret", { version: sealed.version, ...moved });
|
|
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|
+
if (moved.unopenable > 0) {
|
|
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|
+
deps.log.warn("jwks keys no retained session secret opens were left as they were", {
|
|
192
|
+
unopenable: moved.unopenable,
|
|
193
|
+
});
|
|
194
|
+
}
|
|
195
|
+
} catch (error) {
|
|
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|
+
// Settled for this isolate, so a failing database is not asked again on every request it serves.
|
|
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|
+
// Another isolate tries; until one finishes, retirement waits and the previous version keeps opening.
|
|
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|
+
settled.add(key);
|
|
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|
+
throw error;
|
|
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|
+
}
|
|
201
|
+
} catch (error) {
|
|
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|
+
deps.log.warn("jwks re-encryption did not finish; the previous session secret stays until it does", {
|
|
203
|
+
reason: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error),
|
|
204
|
+
});
|
|
205
|
+
}
|
|
206
|
+
}
|
|
@@ -25,9 +25,10 @@ import { NEUTRAL_PROVIDER_REFUSAL } from "../http/providerRefusal";
|
|
|
25
25
|
* The mitigating fact is that it requires a provider-signed, audience-bound assertion of the address,
|
|
26
26
|
* so it is not an address an attacker picks — which is why the claim above says *the redirect
|
|
27
27
|
* callback* and not *provider sign-in*.
|
|
28
|
-
* - **A plugin that calls `handleOAuthUserInfo`
|
|
29
|
-
*
|
|
30
|
-
*
|
|
28
|
+
* - **A plugin that calls `handleOAuthUserInfo` outside the redirect callback.** `plugins/one-tap/index.mjs:64`
|
|
29
|
+
* resolves a verified Google id token through Google's own `getUserInfo` with no OAuth state, which
|
|
30
|
+
* this gate passes through, or builds the user info itself when Google is not configured;
|
|
31
|
+
* `plugins/oauth-proxy/index.mjs:127` lifts it out of an encrypted proxy payload. The kit composes
|
|
31
32
|
* neither. `./refusalTransport` is where a composed plugin is ruled on.
|
|
32
33
|
* - **An adopter plugin that replaces `ctx.socialProviders` in its own `init`.** Kit plugins run first
|
|
33
34
|
* by contract (`./auth.ts` composes them ahead of the adopter's), so the wrap is installed before
|
|
@@ -47,8 +48,8 @@ import { NEUTRAL_PROVIDER_REFUSAL } from "../http/providerRefusal";
|
|
|
47
48
|
* | 4 | Not attached, no account at that address | Refused |
|
|
48
49
|
*
|
|
49
50
|
* Rows 3 and 4 differ only in whether a row exists at an address **the caller chose**, and Better Auth
|
|
50
|
-
* answers them with two different codes — `account_not_linked` (`oauth2/link-account.mjs:
|
|
51
|
-
* only inside `if (dbUser)`) and `signup_disabled` (`:
|
|
51
|
+
* answers them with two different codes — `account_not_linked` (`oauth2/link-account.mjs:142`, returned
|
|
52
|
+
* only inside `if (dbUser)`) and `signup_disabled` (`:257`, the `else` of that same branch). Both reach
|
|
52
53
|
* the browser as `?error=<code>`. That is an account-enumeration oracle needing one provider account,
|
|
53
54
|
* none on the target, and no page render.
|
|
54
55
|
*
|
|
@@ -58,7 +59,7 @@ import { NEUTRAL_PROVIDER_REFUSAL } from "../http/providerRefusal";
|
|
|
58
59
|
* another, and the last keyed on a value `callbackURL` supplies, so it rewrote *successful* sign-ins.
|
|
59
60
|
* By the time a response exists the fact that distinguished the two cases is gone and what is left is
|
|
60
61
|
* partly the caller's. `getUserInfo` is the last seam that holds the fact itself: `callback.mjs:120`
|
|
61
|
-
* calls it, `:
|
|
62
|
+
* calls it, `:172` calls `handleOAuthUserInfo`, and **nothing between them reads a user row** — so a refusal thrown
|
|
62
63
|
* here means neither of those two lines is ever reached and there is no pair left to collapse.
|
|
63
64
|
*
|
|
64
65
|
* ## Why a wrapper, and not a `getUserInfo` supplied in the config block
|
|
@@ -134,8 +135,8 @@ type UserInfoResult = Awaited<ReturnType<OAuthProvider["getUserInfo"]>>;
|
|
|
134
135
|
* than asserted:** `providerSignInGate.workers.test.ts` drives a refusal the dependency still emits
|
|
135
136
|
* (`email_not_found`) beside one this gate emits and requires the two `Location` headers to differ in
|
|
136
137
|
* nothing but the code. `ctx.redirect(url)` is itself only `new APIError("FOUND", undefined, headers)`
|
|
137
|
-
* with `location` set (`better-call/dist/context.mjs:
|
|
138
|
-
* straight through its `onError` to `toResponse` (`api/index.mjs:
|
|
138
|
+
* with `location` set (`better-call/dist/context.mjs:62`), and better-auth's router passes a `FOUND`
|
|
139
|
+
* straight through its `onError` to `toResponse` (`api/index.mjs:196`), so this is the same object the
|
|
139
140
|
* dependency would have thrown — built without the endpoint context `getUserInfo` is not handed.
|
|
140
141
|
*
|
|
141
142
|
* The value being appended to is the OAuth state's own `errorURL`, which is where `redirectOnError`
|
|
@@ -165,12 +166,13 @@ function refusalWithoutRedirect(): APIError {
|
|
|
165
166
|
/**
|
|
166
167
|
* Is this provider identity already attached to some account here? Row 1.
|
|
167
168
|
*
|
|
168
|
-
* **Keyed on `(providerId, accountId)`, which is
|
|
169
|
-
*
|
|
170
|
-
*
|
|
171
|
-
*
|
|
172
|
-
*
|
|
173
|
-
* which is
|
|
169
|
+
* **Keyed on `(providerId, accountId)`, which is Better Auth's own account key.** 1.7.0–1.7.2 keyed an
|
|
170
|
+
* account on `(issuer, accountId)` instead, and this gate read the wider pair rather than copy how Better
|
|
171
|
+
* Auth derived an issuer. 1.7.3 reverted to the 1.6 model (better-auth/better-auth#11153), and the lookup
|
|
172
|
+
* the callback makes is now `findAccountOwnerByKey({ providerId, accountId })` (`link-account.mjs:80`), so
|
|
173
|
+
* the two ask the same question of the same columns (#787). A false match here would pass the attempt
|
|
174
|
+
* through and let Better Auth decide, which is the safe direction; a false *miss* is what would be
|
|
175
|
+
* dangerous, and an identical key cannot cause one.
|
|
174
176
|
*
|
|
175
177
|
* It reads no address and no verified flag, which is what keeps an `allowDifferentEmails` link signing in.
|
|
176
178
|
*
|
|
@@ -214,13 +216,13 @@ async function gateProviderSignIn(args: {
|
|
|
214
216
|
}): Promise<void> {
|
|
215
217
|
const { ctx, provider, token, result, deps } = args;
|
|
216
218
|
|
|
217
|
-
// No OAuth state: `/link-social` and `/account-info` with an id token (`api/routes/account.mjs:
|
|
218
|
-
// `:
|
|
219
|
+
// No OAuth state: `/link-social` and `/account-info` with an id token (`api/routes/account.mjs:172`,
|
|
220
|
+
// `:604`), which never generate one, and `/sign-in/social`'s own id-token branch, which returns before
|
|
219
221
|
// `generateState`. The first two must be untouched — linking from inside the account is a different
|
|
220
222
|
// flow with both sides already proven — and the third is the uncovered path named in the reach section.
|
|
221
223
|
//
|
|
222
224
|
// **`getOAuthState()` throws where no request state was established**, which is every caller reaching
|
|
223
|
-
// a provider object by hand rather than through an endpoint (`to-auth-endpoints.mjs:
|
|
225
|
+
// a provider object by hand rather than through an endpoint (`to-auth-endpoints.mjs:52` wraps them
|
|
224
226
|
// all, `auth.api.*` included). Deliberately not caught: a missing store cannot be a callback today,
|
|
225
227
|
// and swallowing it would turn a dependency that stopped establishing one into a silent pass-through
|
|
226
228
|
// instead of a loud failure. There is no such caller in this kit.
|
|
@@ -234,7 +236,7 @@ async function gateProviderSignIn(args: {
|
|
|
234
236
|
// Verified, load-bearing, and planted against — the gate keys on this field.
|
|
235
237
|
if (state.link !== undefined && state.link !== null) return;
|
|
236
238
|
|
|
237
|
-
// No address at all. Better Auth answers `email_not_found` from `callback.mjs:
|
|
239
|
+
// No address at all. Better Auth answers `email_not_found` from `callback.mjs:168`, which is the same
|
|
238
240
|
// string on both sides of the fork, so there is nothing here to collapse and nothing to decide. The
|
|
239
241
|
// kit's own GitHub resolver fails closed to exactly this shape (`./githubUserInfo.ts`).
|
|
240
242
|
const email = result.user.email;
|
|
@@ -245,7 +247,7 @@ async function gateProviderSignIn(args: {
|
|
|
245
247
|
|
|
246
248
|
const local = await ctx.internalAdapter.findUserByEmail(email);
|
|
247
249
|
|
|
248
|
-
// Row 2, as the two halves of `link-account.mjs:
|
|
250
|
+
// Row 2, as the two halves of `link-account.mjs:139` — read from the dependency's own resolved values
|
|
249
251
|
// rather than restated. `emailVerified` here is the **effective** flag: this is the return of the
|
|
250
252
|
// provider's own `getUserInfo`, so `mapProfileToUser` has already run and Facebook's forced `true` is
|
|
251
253
|
// already in it.
|
|
@@ -268,10 +270,10 @@ async function gateProviderSignIn(args: {
|
|
|
268
270
|
// every first provider sign-up into a refusal. Three ways the refusal is certain:
|
|
269
271
|
//
|
|
270
272
|
// - **A local row exists.** Better Auth never creates a user when one matched, and row 2 has just
|
|
271
|
-
// failed, so `link-account.mjs:
|
|
273
|
+
// failed, so `link-account.mjs:142` is where that attempt ends.
|
|
272
274
|
// - **Sign-up is disabled for this provider** — `provider.options.disableSignUp`, which is the kit's
|
|
273
275
|
// own `signUpOption()` output (`./auth.ts`) read back off the object rather than restated.
|
|
274
|
-
// `callback.mjs:
|
|
276
|
+
// `callback.mjs:181` also ORs in `disableImplicitSignUp && !requestSignUp`; ignoring that half is
|
|
275
277
|
// deliberate, since the kit never sets it and ignoring it can only cause a pass-through.
|
|
276
278
|
// - **The address is not verified**, which the kit's own `user.create.before` hook refuses anyway.
|
|
277
279
|
const certain = local !== null || provider.options?.disableSignUp === true || result.user.emailVerified !== true;
|
|
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Pithy
|
|
2
2
|
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
|
|
3
3
|
|
|
4
|
+
import { pithyCommand } from "@pithy-sh/core/src/cli/command";
|
|
4
5
|
import { PithyError } from "@pithy-sh/core/src/error/pithyError";
|
|
5
6
|
import { z } from "zod";
|
|
6
7
|
import type {
|
|
@@ -179,7 +180,7 @@ export function providerUnavailable(provider: SocialProviderId): PithyError {
|
|
|
179
180
|
code: "auth/provider_unavailable",
|
|
180
181
|
status: 503,
|
|
181
182
|
message: `Signing in with ${provider} is unavailable right now. Use a magic link instead.`,
|
|
182
|
-
action: `Provision \`auth-${provider}-credentials\` for this environment with
|
|
183
|
+
action: `Provision \`auth-${provider}-credentials\` for this environment with \`${pithyCommand("secrets create", { args: [`auth-${provider}-credentials`] })}\`, or set \`${provider}.enabled\` to false in pithy.config.ts.`,
|
|
183
184
|
detail: `provider ${provider} is enabled and its credential could not be resolved; the instance was built without it`,
|
|
184
185
|
});
|
|
185
186
|
}
|
package/src/instance/secrets.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Pithy
|
|
2
2
|
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
|
|
3
3
|
|
|
4
|
+
import { ValidationError } from "@pithy-sh/core/src/error/pithyError";
|
|
4
5
|
import type { SecretsStoreEnv } from "@pithy-sh/secrets/src/env/bindings";
|
|
5
6
|
import { defineSecretRegistry } from "@pithy-sh/secrets/src/registry";
|
|
6
7
|
import { sharedSecretsStore } from "@pithy-sh/secrets/src/sharedSecretsStore";
|
|
7
8
|
import { z } from "zod";
|
|
9
|
+
import type { SessionSecretVersions } from "./sessionSecrets";
|
|
8
10
|
|
|
9
11
|
/**
|
|
10
12
|
* The secrets `@pithy-sh/auth` reads, declared as a minimal registry. The secret name is the join key:
|
|
@@ -31,6 +33,41 @@ export const AUTH_APPLE_CREDENTIALS = "auth-apple-credentials";
|
|
|
31
33
|
export const AUTH_FACEBOOK_CREDENTIALS = "auth-facebook-credentials";
|
|
32
34
|
export const AUTH_GITHUB_CREDENTIALS = "auth-github-credentials";
|
|
33
35
|
|
|
36
|
+
/**
|
|
37
|
+
* The JWKS private keys, as `auth-session-secret`'s overlap names them (#602).
|
|
38
|
+
*
|
|
39
|
+
* Better Auth encrypts every key in `pithy_auth_jwks` under the session secret, and a key never expires —
|
|
40
|
+
* so retiring the version one is sealed under would leave a signing key nothing can open. The session
|
|
41
|
+
* secret's registry entry names this dependent, `instance/jwksReencryption.ts` moves the keys under the
|
|
42
|
+
* newest version and records it, and the secrets manager retires nothing until it has.
|
|
43
|
+
*/
|
|
44
|
+
export const AUTH_JWKS_DEPENDENT = "auth-jwks";
|
|
45
|
+
|
|
46
|
+
/**
|
|
47
|
+
* The Better Auth plugins that seal rows of their own under the session secret, by id.
|
|
48
|
+
*
|
|
49
|
+
* `two-factor` seals every TOTP secret with `symmetricEncrypt({ key: ctx.context.secretConfig })`, and its
|
|
50
|
+
* backup codes the same way under `storeBackupCodes: "encrypted"` (`plugins/two-factor/index.mjs`,
|
|
51
|
+
* `backup-codes/index.mjs`). Neither expires. Nothing in the kit re-encrypts them, so an unattended rotation
|
|
52
|
+
* beside one is refused at `auth()` rather than allowed to retire the version they are sealed under.
|
|
53
|
+
*/
|
|
54
|
+
export const SESSION_SECRET_SEALING_PLUGINS: readonly string[] = ["two-factor"];
|
|
55
|
+
|
|
56
|
+
/** Seconds in a day. */
|
|
57
|
+
const DAY_SECONDS = 86_400;
|
|
58
|
+
|
|
59
|
+
/**
|
|
60
|
+
* How many days a replaced session secret keeps verifying: the session's own lifetime, rounded up.
|
|
61
|
+
*
|
|
62
|
+
* **That is the whole of the overlap's argument.** A session in use is re-signed on its next request
|
|
63
|
+
* (`http/credentialResign.ts`), and its expiry slides forward on use — so a session that goes the whole
|
|
64
|
+
* overlap without one request has expired by the time the overlap ends. Any shorter, and a session used
|
|
65
|
+
* yesterday is signed out when the old version retires.
|
|
66
|
+
*/
|
|
67
|
+
export function sessionSecretOverlapDays(sessionExpiresIn: number): number {
|
|
68
|
+
return Math.max(1, Math.ceil(sessionExpiresIn / DAY_SECONDS));
|
|
69
|
+
}
|
|
70
|
+
|
|
34
71
|
/** The Google OAuth credential pair, stored as one typed JSON secret. */
|
|
35
72
|
export const GoogleOAuthCredentials = z
|
|
36
73
|
.object({
|
|
@@ -135,6 +172,9 @@ export const authSecretsRegistry = defineSecretRegistry({
|
|
|
135
172
|
// a session signature, so the kit both makes it and replaces it.
|
|
136
173
|
origin: { kind: "minted", recipe: { kind: "random", bytes: 32, encoding: "base64url" } },
|
|
137
174
|
rotation: { kind: "local" },
|
|
175
|
+
// The default session lifetime's overlap, and the JWKS keys sealed under it (#602). `auth()` declares
|
|
176
|
+
// its own from the configured `sessionExpiresIn`; this is what a module reading the secret sees.
|
|
177
|
+
overlap: { days: 7, minimumDays: 7, reencrypt: [AUTH_JWKS_DEPENDENT] },
|
|
138
178
|
},
|
|
139
179
|
// The four below are `obtained` and rotate `manual`, and each names the page rather than the product.
|
|
140
180
|
// An adopter searching Google's console for which of four credential types "client secret" means is the
|
|
@@ -177,6 +217,49 @@ export const authSecretsRegistry = defineSecretRegistry({
|
|
|
177
217
|
},
|
|
178
218
|
});
|
|
179
219
|
|
|
220
|
+
/**
|
|
221
|
+
* **The registry `auth()` contributes, from its own configuration (#602).**
|
|
222
|
+
*
|
|
223
|
+
* The session secret's overlap follows the configured session lifetime — {@link sessionSecretOverlapDays} —
|
|
224
|
+
* and it is both the overlap and its floor: an adopter who lengthens sessions lengthens the overlap with
|
|
225
|
+
* them, rather than holding a seven-day overlap against a thirty-day session. `rotateEveryDays` is
|
|
226
|
+
* `sessionSecretRotateEveryDays`, and only an adopter sets it: the kit turns no unattended rotation on.
|
|
227
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*
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* Checked by `defineSecretRegistry` like every registry, so a period no longer than the session lifetime is
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* refused here, at `auth()`, naming the secret — rather than at a 03:00 cron that could only skip it.
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*
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* **A period is refused beside a plugin that seals rows under the session secret** —
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* {@link SESSION_SECRET_SEALING_PLUGINS}. Only the JWKS keys are moved before a retirement; a plugin's own
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* sealed rows would be left under the retired version, and nothing could open them again.
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*/
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export function authSecretsRegistryFor(config: {
|
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sessionExpiresIn: number;
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+
sessionSecretRotateEveryDays?: number;
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plugins?: readonly { id: string }[];
|
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}) {
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if (config.sessionSecretRotateEveryDays !== undefined) {
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const sealing = (config.plugins ?? []).find((plugin) => SESSION_SECRET_SEALING_PLUGINS.includes(plugin.id));
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if (sealing !== undefined) {
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throw new ValidationError({
|
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message: `${AUTH_SESSION_SECRET} cannot rotate unattended while the Better Auth "${sealing.id}" plugin is composed.`,
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action: `Remove sessionSecretRotateEveryDays from auth({ ... }), or remove ${sealing.id}() from auth({ plugins: [...] }). ${sealing.id}() seals its secrets under ${AUTH_SESSION_SECRET}, and a rotation retires the version they are sealed under with nothing to move them first.`,
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detail: `sessionSecretRotateEveryDays set with plugin "${sealing.id}", which seals rows under ${AUTH_SESSION_SECRET}`,
|
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+
});
|
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}
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|
+
}
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|
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|
+
const days = sessionSecretOverlapDays(config.sessionExpiresIn);
|
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+
return defineSecretRegistry({
|
|
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+
...authSecretsRegistry,
|
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|
+
[AUTH_SESSION_SECRET]: {
|
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+
...authSecretsRegistry[AUTH_SESSION_SECRET],
|
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+
overlap: { days, minimumDays: days, reencrypt: [AUTH_JWKS_DEPENDENT] },
|
|
256
|
+
...(config.sessionSecretRotateEveryDays === undefined
|
|
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+
? {}
|
|
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+
: { rotateEveryDays: config.sessionSecretRotateEveryDays }),
|
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+
},
|
|
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|
+
});
|
|
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|
+
}
|
|
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+
|
|
180
263
|
/**
|
|
181
264
|
* Which provider a credential belongs to — the join the CLI must never make by spelling (#541).
|
|
182
265
|
*
|
|
@@ -217,12 +300,22 @@ export function inapplicableProviderSecrets(providers: AuthProviderToggles): Rec
|
|
|
217
300
|
return declared;
|
|
218
301
|
}
|
|
219
302
|
|
|
220
|
-
/** Resolve the Better Auth session secret for this invocation. */
|
|
303
|
+
/** Resolve the Better Auth session secret for this invocation — the current version alone. */
|
|
221
304
|
export async function resolveSessionSecret(env: SecretsStoreEnv): Promise<string> {
|
|
222
305
|
const secrets = await sharedSecretsStore(env, authSecretsRegistry);
|
|
223
306
|
return secrets.get(AUTH_SESSION_SECRET);
|
|
224
307
|
}
|
|
225
308
|
|
|
309
|
+
/**
|
|
310
|
+
* Resolve every retained version of the session secret (#602) — what an instance needs to open values sealed
|
|
311
|
+
* under the previous version, and what a credential signed under it is verified against. One read through
|
|
312
|
+
* the same cached accessor as {@link resolveSessionSecret}.
|
|
313
|
+
*/
|
|
314
|
+
export async function resolveSessionSecrets(env: SecretsStoreEnv): Promise<SessionSecretVersions> {
|
|
315
|
+
const secrets = await sharedSecretsStore(env, authSecretsRegistry);
|
|
316
|
+
return secrets.getVersions(AUTH_SESSION_SECRET);
|
|
317
|
+
}
|
|
318
|
+
|
|
226
319
|
/** Resolve the Google OAuth credential pair for this invocation (only call when Google is enabled). */
|
|
227
320
|
export async function resolveGoogleCredentials(env: SecretsStoreEnv): Promise<GoogleOAuthCredentials> {
|
|
228
321
|
const secrets = await sharedSecretsStore(env, authSecretsRegistry);
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Pithy
|
|
2
|
+
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
|
|
3
|
+
|
|
4
|
+
/**
|
|
5
|
+
* **The session secret as Better Auth needs it across a rotation (#602): every retained version.**
|
|
6
|
+
*
|
|
7
|
+
* `auth-session-secret` is `rotatable: true`, and an unattended rotation appends a version and keeps the
|
|
8
|
+
* previous one for the overlap. The kit used to hand Better Auth one value — the current one — which made
|
|
9
|
+
* the overlap decorative: the moment the version changed, the JWKS private keys were sealed under a value
|
|
10
|
+
* the instance no longer held. Better Auth 1.7 takes a version set instead (`secrets: [{ version, value }]`,
|
|
11
|
+
* newest first): it encrypts under the first and decrypts under whichever version a ciphertext names
|
|
12
|
+
* (`$ba$<version>$…`, `better-auth/dist/crypto/index.mjs`).
|
|
13
|
+
*
|
|
14
|
+
* **It versions encryption and not signatures.** With `secrets` set, `ctx.secret` is the first entry alone
|
|
15
|
+
* (`context/create-context.mjs:75`), and the session cookie is signed and verified under `ctx.secret`
|
|
16
|
+
* (`cookies/index.mjs:172`). So a cookie signed under the previous version still fails after a rotation;
|
|
17
|
+
* `http/credentialResign.ts` is what verifies it under a retained version and re-signs it.
|
|
18
|
+
*
|
|
19
|
+
* **`secret` is the oldest retained version, and that is deliberate.** With a version set, Better Auth reads
|
|
20
|
+
* `secret` only as the *legacy* secret — the one it tries on a bare ciphertext with no `$ba$` envelope. Every
|
|
21
|
+
* JWKS key written before the kit passed a version set is one of those, sealed under the value that was
|
|
22
|
+
* current then, which is the oldest the envelope still holds. Re-encryption moves them into the envelope;
|
|
23
|
+
* until it has, this is what opens them.
|
|
24
|
+
*/
|
|
25
|
+
|
|
26
|
+
/** A secret's retained versions, as `secretsStore(…).getVersions` answers. */
|
|
27
|
+
export interface SessionSecretVersions {
|
|
28
|
+
/** The version key reads resolve to. */
|
|
29
|
+
currentVersion: string;
|
|
30
|
+
/** Every retained version: version key → value. */
|
|
31
|
+
versions: Readonly<Record<string, string>>;
|
|
32
|
+
}
|
|
33
|
+
|
|
34
|
+
/** What `betterAuth()` is handed: the version set, newest first, and the legacy secret. */
|
|
35
|
+
export interface BetterAuthSecretOptions {
|
|
36
|
+
/** Every retained version, current first, then the rest newest first. */
|
|
37
|
+
secrets: { version: number; value: string }[];
|
|
38
|
+
/** The oldest retained version — Better Auth's legacy secret, for a ciphertext sealed before versions existed. */
|
|
39
|
+
secret: string;
|
|
40
|
+
}
|
|
41
|
+
|
|
42
|
+
/** The retained versions, current first and the rest in descending numeric order. */
|
|
43
|
+
function ordered(versions: SessionSecretVersions): { version: number; value: string }[] {
|
|
44
|
+
const prior = Object.entries(versions.versions)
|
|
45
|
+
.filter(([version]) => version !== versions.currentVersion)
|
|
46
|
+
.map(([version, value]) => ({ version: Number(version), value }))
|
|
47
|
+
.sort((left, right) => right.version - left.version);
|
|
48
|
+
const current = versions.versions[versions.currentVersion];
|
|
49
|
+
return current === undefined ? prior : [{ version: Number(versions.currentVersion), value: current }, ...prior];
|
|
50
|
+
}
|
|
51
|
+
|
|
52
|
+
/** The version set and legacy secret for `betterAuth()`. */
|
|
53
|
+
export function betterAuthSecrets(versions: SessionSecretVersions): BetterAuthSecretOptions {
|
|
54
|
+
const secrets = ordered(versions);
|
|
55
|
+
const oldest = [...secrets].sort((left, right) => left.version - right.version)[0];
|
|
56
|
+
return { secrets, secret: oldest?.value ?? "" };
|
|
57
|
+
}
|
|
58
|
+
|
|
59
|
+
/** Every retained value but the current one, newest first — what a credential signed before a rotation is tried under. */
|
|
60
|
+
export function priorSessionSecrets(versions: SessionSecretVersions): string[] {
|
|
61
|
+
return ordered(versions)
|
|
62
|
+
.filter((one) => String(one.version) !== versions.currentVersion)
|
|
63
|
+
.map((one) => one.value);
|
|
64
|
+
}
|
|
@@ -82,12 +82,11 @@ export const auth_0001_init: Migration = {
|
|
|
82
82
|
await db.schema
|
|
83
83
|
.createTable("pithyAuthAccounts")
|
|
84
84
|
.addColumn("id", "text", (c) => c.primaryKey())
|
|
85
|
-
// `issuer`
|
|
86
|
-
// (#451)
|
|
87
|
-
//
|
|
88
|
-
//
|
|
89
|
-
//
|
|
90
|
-
// `local:oauth:<id>` for an OAuth provider that publishes none.
|
|
85
|
+
// `issuer` was Better Auth 1.7.0–1.7.2's account identity, `required: true` in its model then
|
|
86
|
+
// (#451), with an account the pair `(issuer, accountId)`. 1.7.3 reverted to the 1.6 model, which
|
|
87
|
+
// identifies an account by `(providerId, accountId)` and never writes this column
|
|
88
|
+
// (better-auth/better-auth#11153). This `NOT NULL` is history: `0003_account_issuer_nullable`
|
|
89
|
+
// relaxes it and drops the index below, and the column stays only to keep what 1.7.1 wrote (#787).
|
|
91
90
|
.addColumn("issuer", "text", (c) => c.notNull())
|
|
92
91
|
.addColumn("accountId", "text", (c) => c.notNull())
|
|
93
92
|
.addColumn("providerId", "text", (c) => c.notNull())
|
|
@@ -168,10 +167,9 @@ export const auth_0001_init: Migration = {
|
|
|
168
167
|
await db.schema.createIndex("pithyAuthSessionsUserIdIdx").on("pithyAuthSessions").column("userId").execute();
|
|
169
168
|
await db.schema.createIndex("pithyAuthSessionsDeviceIdIdx").on("pithyAuthSessions").column("deviceId").execute();
|
|
170
169
|
await db.schema.createIndex("pithyAuthAccountsUserIdIdx").on("pithyAuthAccounts").column("userId").execute();
|
|
171
|
-
// The identity 1.7
|
|
172
|
-
//
|
|
173
|
-
// Better Auth's
|
|
174
|
-
// here rather than backfilled, because nothing is published and no row predates it.
|
|
170
|
+
// The identity 1.7.0–1.7.2 looked an account up by, unique because the pair was the identity (#451).
|
|
171
|
+
// 1.7.3 looks an account up by `(providerId, accountId)` again, and `0003_account_issuer_nullable`
|
|
172
|
+
// drops this index first, as Better Auth's 1.7 upgrade guide orders it (#787).
|
|
175
173
|
await db.schema
|
|
176
174
|
.createIndex("pithyAuthAccountsIssuerAccountIdIdx")
|
|
177
175
|
.on("pithyAuthAccounts")
|