@pithy-sh/auth 0.14.1 → 0.15.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +4 -0
- package/dist/audit/actions.d.ts +32 -28
- package/dist/audit/actions.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/audit/actions.js +32 -28
- package/dist/audit/emit.d.ts +40 -34
- package/dist/audit/emit.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/audit/emit.js +45 -32
- package/dist/capability.js +1 -1
- package/dist/http/middleware.js +1 -1
- package/dist/http/providerFreshness.d.ts +30 -31
- package/dist/http/providerFreshness.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/http/providerFreshness.js +26 -31
- package/dist/http/recentSignIn.d.ts +57 -0
- package/dist/http/recentSignIn.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/http/recentSignIn.js +88 -0
- package/dist/http/routes.js +2 -2
- package/dist/index.d.ts +4 -2
- package/dist/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.js +2 -1
- package/dist/instance/auth.js +2 -2
- package/dist/mcp/http/routes.js +2 -2
- package/dist/test-utils/dropOrder.d.ts +26 -0
- package/dist/test-utils/dropOrder.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/test-utils/dropOrder.js +120 -0
- package/dist/test-utils/scopedBackend.d.ts +10 -6
- package/dist/test-utils/scopedBackend.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/test-utils/scopedBackend.js +40 -12
- package/dist/version.generated.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/version.generated.js +1 -1
- package/docs/account-lifecycle.md +1 -1
- package/docs/recent-sign-in.md +90 -0
- package/package.json +5 -5
- package/pithy.manifest.json +4 -0
- package/pithy.mcp.manifest.json +1 -0
- package/src/audit/actions.ts +32 -28
- package/src/audit/emit.ts +50 -34
- package/src/http/providerFreshness.ts +40 -42
- package/src/http/recentSignIn.ts +114 -0
- package/src/index.ts +4 -2
- package/src/test-utils/dropOrder.ts +139 -0
- package/src/test-utils/scopedBackend.ts +51 -13
- package/src/version.generated.ts +1 -1
package/README.md
CHANGED
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@@ -60,6 +60,10 @@ So: **do not "improve" this by matching more addresses, and do not make the refu
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**Microsoft reaches row 3 more than any other provider, on purpose.** Entra ID cannot vouch for an email it did not verify: its `email` is a directory attribute a tenant admin sets to anything. So a Microsoft address is verified only by the `xms_edov` claim, the personal-accounts tenant, or — connecting from inside the account — matching the address the account already holds. `src/instance/microsoftEmail.ts` is the rule and `docs/microsoft-oauth.md` is the setup.
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## A recent sign-in for an app route
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`requireRecentSignIn({ maxAgeSeconds, purpose })` gates one app route on a sign-in within the window it names: revealing a stored secret, changing who can see something. It stacks after the route's own gates. A session signed in longer ago is refused with 403 `auth/recent_sign_in_required`, the same code on every gated route, and the refusal is recorded as `auth/recent_sign_in_refused` with your `purpose`. A bearer session and a cookie session are judged alike, and the remedy is the same for both: sign in again, then retry. Rotating a token never passes, because a rotation keeps the original sign-in time. [`docs/recent-sign-in.md`](docs/recent-sign-in.md) says when to use the gate and how a web and a phone client handle the refusal.
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## Account lifecycle
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An account can be suspended or deleted, and the kit refuses it at every door. An operator suspends and reinstates one through `POST /auth/admin/users/:userId/suspend` and `/reinstate`, under `auth:users:suspend`, with a reason the trail keeps. They delete one through `DELETE /auth/admin/users/:userId` — soft by default, restorable through `POST …/restore` until the purge window closes, or `mode: "hard"` to purge now — under `auth:users:delete`, and export everything the kit holds about one person through `POST …/export` with the reason in the body, under `auth:users:export`. A person deletes their own account with `DELETE /auth/account { confirm: true }`, which is what the App Store and Google Play require of an app with accounts. A purge Workflow, hosted by your own Worker, erases a deleted account from every capability that holds it, one step per capability; the four that keep a person's rows — payments, email, audit and the control plane's legal holds — say why, and the export says it with them. A legal hold on the account stops its purge until it is released, and when the Worker's `retention` block declares class ages, the daily pass soft-deletes an account inactive past them through this same lifecycle. Auth's own routes, sign-in and token refresh answer `auth/account_suspended` or `auth/account_deleted` (403); another capability's `requireAuth()` answers 401, and the client's next refresh gets the code. The admin user reads say where each account stands — `state`, `suspendedUntil` and `purgeAfter` — read the way enforcement reads them. [`docs/account-lifecycle.md`](docs/account-lifecycle.md) has the two states, the record, the scopes, the routes, the purge and the Workflow classes to export for it, the mail, the hooks, the screens, and the purge contribution a capability declares for its own rows.
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package/dist/audit/actions.d.ts
CHANGED
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@@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ export declare const AuthAuditActions: {
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* A sign-out / session revocation completed — and **completed** is the load-bearing word.
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*
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* `/sign-out` answers `200 {"success":true}` whether or not it found a session to delete: an expired
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* cookie, a bearer token (which it does not read) or a bare `curl` all get the same body
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*
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* cookie, a bearer token (which it does not read) or a bare `curl` all get the same body, so the path is
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* no evidence that anybody was signed out. The evidence is a session row
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* disappearing, which `../instance/auth.ts`'s `session.delete.after` observes and `../audit/evidence.ts`
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* carries to the emitter; with no session gone there is no event, because nothing happened.
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*/
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@@ -37,14 +37,13 @@ export declare const AuthAuditActions: {
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*/
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readonly magicLinkSent: "auth/magic_link_sent";
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/**
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* An email OTP was requested and enqueued for delivery. Same claim, same evidence
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* endpoint that made the point (#627).
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* An email OTP was requested and enqueued for delivery. Same claim, same evidence.
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*
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* It declines twice over and answers `200 {"success":true}` both times. Better Auth drops the
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* verification row and returns success rather than confirm that an address is registered, which is the
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* whole reason the response is shaped that way; and the kit's own `sendVerificationOTP` returns without
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* queuing for any `type` but `sign-in`, because an OTP is a sign-in credential here.
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*
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* queuing for any `type` but `sign-in`, because an OTP is a sign-in credential here. The status says
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* nothing about whether a message was made.
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*
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* **Two more declines sit under the send callback rather than over it, and they are not the same
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* thing as each other.** `@pithy-sh/email` withholds a message to a suppressed address — a hard bounce,
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/**
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* A social account row was created — from here on that provider can sign in as this user.
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*
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* **Emitted from the row, not from `/link-social
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*
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*
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*
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* happened, which makes "which providers can sign in as this account today" unanswerable from the
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* trail that exists to answer it.
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* **Emitted from the row, not from `/link-social`.** Minting the provider redirect is a request; the
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* account row is created later at `/callback/:id` and may never be created at all — the person abandons
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* the consent screen, the provider refuses, the linking gate rejects it. Only the row answers "which
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* providers can sign in as this account today".
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*
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* **A first social sign-up writes this too, deliberately.**
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*
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* *path*, which cannot tell a sign-up from a link. From the row it stops mattering: this event claims a
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* provider can now sign in as this user, and a first social sign-up is exactly when that becomes true.
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* **A first social sign-up writes this too, deliberately.** This event claims a provider can now sign in
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* as this user, and a first social sign-up is exactly when that becomes true.
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* Pinned by `emit.workers.test.ts`, so the decision is asserted rather than inferred from the absence
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* of a branch.
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*/
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/**
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* A social account row was removed — that provider can no longer sign in as this user.
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*
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* The other half of the same question
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* detached and the trail was silent. Emitted from the row for the same reason its twin is, which also
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* The other half of the same question. Emitted from the row for the same reason its twin is, which also
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* means it covers every way a link ends — `/unlink-account`, and the cascade when a user is deleted —
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* rather than the one endpoint somebody remembered to wire. Both are driven in `emit.workers.test.ts`:
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* a sentence claiming a class is covered is not the same as a test that reddens when it stops being.
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readonly deviceRevoked: "auth/device_revoked";
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/**
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* Somebody tried to sign in with a provider this deployment enables and cannot serve — its credential
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* would not resolve, so the instance was built without it
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* would not resolve, so the instance was built without it. Outcome `denied`, severity
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* `warning`.
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*
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* **This is the operator's channel, and it is why degrading is not the same as degrading silently.**
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* account-takeover step". One is a person who left a tab open; a run of them against one user id is the
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* incident, and without the row there is nothing to count.
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*
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* Mirrors the error code
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* Mirrors the error code.
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*/
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readonly sessionNotFresh: "auth/session_not_fresh";
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/**
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* Somebody signed in reached an app route gated by `requireRecentSignIn` without having signed in within
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* that route's window. Outcome `denied`, severity `warning`, with the route's `purpose` in
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* `metadata.purpose`.
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*
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* One action for every gated route, so one filter finds every refusal and the purpose says which route.
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* A run of them against one user id is a stolen credential being walked toward something the app
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* protects.
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*/
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readonly recentSignInRefused: "auth/recent_sign_in_refused";
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/**
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* The admin actions, emitted only from the control-plane surface (`http/adminRoutes.ts`) and always
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* with `actorType: "control-plane"` — a management client is not a user of the adopter's app, so its
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readonly adminUserRead: "auth/admin_user_read";
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/** The device registry was walked from the management surface. */
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readonly adminDevicesListed: "auth/admin_devices_listed";
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/** The verification ledger was read from the management surface
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/** The verification ledger was read from the management surface: counts and rows over a window. */
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readonly adminVerificationsListed: "auth/admin_verifications_listed";
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/** One named session was revoked from the management surface. */
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readonly adminSessionRevoked: "auth/admin_session_revoked";
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/** One of a user's devices was signed out and its registration dropped, from the management surface. */
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readonly adminDeviceRevoked: "auth/admin_device_revoked";
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/**
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* The account lifecycle
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* The account lifecycle. Each is written by the transition in `../lifecycle/transitions.ts`, beside
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* the `pithy_auth_user_lifecycle` row that records the same fact — the trail answers "who, from where", the
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* table answers "what happened to this account". The admin ones carry `actorType: "control-plane"`; the
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* self-service deletion carries the account's own holder, and the purge `system`.
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* The dashboard's own `customer/user_suspended` and `customer/user_restored` are the client side of the
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* same events, recorded where the operator pressed the button.
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*
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* **The suspend and reinstate routes record every call under the same action
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* **The suspend and reinstate routes record every call under the same action**, the ones the
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* transition did not write included: a refusal as `denied` with its code in `metadata.code`, and a
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* reinstatement that found nothing to lift as a `success` with `metadata.changed: false`. A restated
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* suspension is the transition's own event, with `metadata.updated: true`. So one filter on the action
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/** An account was deleted from the management surface, with its purge window starting now. */
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readonly adminUserSoftDeleted: "auth/admin_user_soft_deleted";
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/**
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* An account was deleted from the management surface with no window — its purge starts now
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* An account was deleted from the management surface with no window — its purge starts now. Also
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* written when a hard deletion brings an already-deleted account's purge forward, with
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* `metadata.broughtForward: true`. Never written by omission: the route reaches it only for `mode: "hard"`.
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*/
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/** A deleted account's data was erased. Recorded once, when the last purge step has run. */
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readonly adminUserPurged: "auth/admin_user_purged";
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/**
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* One purge step answered for a capability's rows: erased them, or kept them under a stated basis
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* One purge step answered for a capability's rows: erased them, or kept them under a stated basis.
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* `metadata.step` names the capability and `metadata.disposition` says which. The erasure attestation cites it
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* by event id and chain position
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* by event id and chain position.
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*/
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readonly adminUserPurgeStep: "auth/admin_user_purge_step";
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/**
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* A purge gave up at the step `metadata.step` names, until the next daily pass starts it again. The
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* erasure attestation cites it, and names every failed purge in a period.
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*/
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readonly adminUserPurgeFailed: "auth/admin_user_purge_failed";
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readonly userSelfDeleted: "auth/user_self_deleted";
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/**
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* Everything the kit holds about one account was exported from the management surface — an access request
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* answered
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* answered. A **disclosure**, and the largest one on this surface: it carries every composed
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* capability's rows about the person. Recorded with the caller, the reason they gave, and which capabilities
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* answered; never with any of the data.
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*/
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{"version":3,"file":"actions.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/audit/actions.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAGA;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,gBAAgB;IAC3B,+FAA+F;aAC/F,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa;IACrB;;;;;;;;OAQG;aACH,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc;IACvB;;;;OAIG;aACH,YAAY,EAAE,oBAAoB;IAClC,sHAAsH;aACtH,kBAAkB,EAAE,2BAA2B;IAC/C;;;;;OAKG;aACH,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;IACrC
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{"version":3,"file":"actions.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/audit/actions.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAGA;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,gBAAgB;IAC3B,+FAA+F;aAC/F,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa;IACrB;;;;;;;;OAQG;aACH,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc;IACvB;;;;OAIG;aACH,YAAY,EAAE,oBAAoB;IAClC,sHAAsH;aACtH,kBAAkB,EAAE,2BAA2B;IAC/C;;;;;OAKG;aACH,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;IACrC;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;OAqBG;aACH,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe;IACxB;;;;;;;;;;;;OAYG;aACH,WAAW,EAAE,mBAAmB;IAChC;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;OAeG;aACH,aAAa,EAAE,qBAAqB;IACpC;;;;;OAKG;aACH,aAAa,EAAE,qBAAqB;IACpC;;;;OAIG;aACH,gBAAgB,EAAE,wBAAwB;IAC1C,gEAAgE;aAChE,gBAAgB,EAAE,wBAAwB;IAC1C,wDAAwD;aACxD,aAAa,EAAE,qBAAqB;IACpC;;;;;;;;;;OAUG;aACH,mBAAmB,EAAE,2BAA2B;IAChD;;;;;;;;;;OAUG;aACH,eAAe,EAAE,wBAAwB;IACzC;;;;;;;;OAQG;aACH,mBAAmB,EAAE,6BAA6B;IAElD;;;;;;;;;;OAUG;IAEH,wGAAwG;aACxG,gBAAgB,EAAE,yBAAyB;IAC3C,sFAAsF;aACtF,aAAa,EAAE,sBAAsB;IACrC,kEAAkE;aAClE,kBAAkB,EAAE,2BAA2B;IAC/C,mGAAmG;aACnG,wBAAwB,EAAE,iCAAiC;IAC3D,iEAAiE;aACjE,mBAAmB,EAAE,4BAA4B;IACjD,iGAAiG;aACjG,wBAAwB,EAAE,kCAAkC;IAC5D,wGAAwG;aACxG,kBAAkB,EAAE,2BAA2B;IAE/C;;;;;;;;;;;;;;OAcG;IAEH,iGAAiG;aACjG,kBAAkB,EAAE,2BAA2B;IAC/C,sEAAsE;aACtE,mBAAmB,EAAE,4BAA4B;IACjD,8FAA8F;aAC9F,oBAAoB,EAAE,8BAA8B;IACpD;;;;OAIG;aACH,oBAAoB,EAAE,8BAA8B;IACpD,2FAA2F;aAC3F,iBAAiB,EAAE,0BAA0B;IAC7C,4FAA4F;aAC5F,eAAe,EAAE,wBAAwB;IACzC;;;;OAIG;aACH,kBAAkB,EAAE,4BAA4B;IAChD;;;OAGG;aACH,oBAAoB,EAAE,8BAA8B;IACpD,wGAAwG;aACxG,eAAe,EAAE,wBAAwB;IACzC;;;;;OAKG;aACH,iBAAiB,EAAE,0BAA0B;IAC7C;;;;OAIG;aACH,gBAAgB,EAAE,yBAAyB;IAC3C,0DAA0D;aAC1D,cAAc,EAAE,uBAAuB;IACvC;;;OAGG;aACH,eAAe,EAAE,wBAAwB;CACjC,CAAC;AAEX,0CAA0C;AAC1C,MAAM,MAAM,eAAe,GAAG,CAAC,OAAO,gBAAgB,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,OAAO,gBAAgB,CAAC,CAAC"}
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package/dist/audit/actions.js
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* A sign-out / session revocation completed — and **completed** is the load-bearing word.
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*
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|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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* `metadata.broughtForward: true`. Never written by omission: the route reaches it only for `mode: "hard"`.
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*/
|
|
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|
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/** A deleted account's data was erased. Recorded once, when the last purge step has run. */
|
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|
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|
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/**
|
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|
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+
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|
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|
* `metadata.step` names the capability and `metadata.disposition` says which. The erasure attestation cites it
|
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|
-
* by event id and chain position
|
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+
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|
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/**
|
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|
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* A purge gave up at the step `metadata.step` names, until the next daily pass starts it again
|
|
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|
+
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|
|
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|
* erasure attestation cites it, and names every failed purge in a period.
|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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/**
|
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|
* Everything the kit holds about one account was exported from the management surface — an access request
|
|
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|
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* answered
|
|
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|
+
* answered. A **disclosure**, and the largest one on this surface: it carries every composed
|
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|
* capability's rows about the person. Recorded with the caller, the reason they gave, and which capabilities
|
|
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* answered; never with any of the data.
|
|
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|
*/
|
package/dist/audit/emit.d.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -21,8 +21,7 @@ export declare function correlation(headers: Headers | undefined): {
|
|
|
21
21
|
/**
|
|
22
22
|
* What an endpoint must have *done* for its path event to be a success.
|
|
23
23
|
*
|
|
24
|
-
* **There is no "the response is its own evidence" member
|
|
25
|
-
* non-2xx is sufficient evidence of a refusal and is nowhere near necessary: `/sign-out` answers
|
|
24
|
+
* **There is no "the response is its own evidence" member.** A non-2xx is sufficient evidence of a refusal and is nowhere near necessary: `/sign-out` answers
|
|
26
25
|
* `200 {"success":true}` having deleted nothing, and `/email-otp/send-verification-otp` answers
|
|
27
26
|
* `200 {"success":true}` having declined to send — Better Auth drops the verification row and returns
|
|
28
27
|
* success rather than confirm that an address is registered (`plugins/email-otp/routes.mjs`), and the
|
|
@@ -67,21 +66,16 @@ export interface PathEvent {
|
|
|
67
66
|
* The endpoints whose *path* names an audit action, what "success" means for each, and what a completed
|
|
68
67
|
* response without it means instead.
|
|
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68
|
*
|
|
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|
-
* **A table rather than a chain of `if`s so the rule can be asserted over all of it.**
|
|
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|
-
*
|
|
72
|
-
*
|
|
73
|
-
*
|
|
74
|
-
* both looked, from here, exactly like a request that worked. Naming the two paths somebody happened to
|
|
75
|
-
* probe would have fixed those two; the exposure was every entry, including ones added later. So the
|
|
76
|
-
* rule is `emitAfterRequest` reading the outcome, and the gate walks this table.
|
|
69
|
+
* **A table rather than a chain of `if`s so the rule can be asserted over all of it.** Better Auth
|
|
70
|
+
* catches an endpoint's `APIError` into a result and runs the `after` hooks over it anyway
|
|
71
|
+
* (`better-auth/dist/api/dispatch.mjs`), so a refused `/token` reaches the hook looking like one that
|
|
72
|
+
* worked. `emitAfterRequest` reads the outcome for every entry, and the gate walks this table.
|
|
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73
|
*
|
|
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|
-
* **
|
|
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|
-
*
|
|
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|
-
*
|
|
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|
-
* it cannot evidence does not compile, and `emit.test.ts` walks the table asserting that an entry whose
|
|
82
|
-
* evidence is absent never writes `success`.
|
|
74
|
+
* **A refusal can also answer 200**, so every entry fills `evidence`, which has no "the response says so"
|
|
75
|
+
* member: an entry that claims an outcome it cannot evidence does not compile, and `emit.test.ts` walks
|
|
76
|
+
* the table asserting that an entry whose evidence is absent never writes `success`.
|
|
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77
|
*
|
|
84
|
-
* **No path maps to `oauth_linked
|
|
78
|
+
* **No path maps to `oauth_linked`.** `/link-social` mints
|
|
85
79
|
* a redirect, which is a request rather than an outcome; `/callback/:id` completes a sign-in *or* a link
|
|
86
80
|
* and cannot be told apart by its path. The event that means "this provider can sign in as this user" is
|
|
87
81
|
* the account row, so it is emitted from the row — see `emitProviderAccountChanged`.
|
|
@@ -232,7 +226,7 @@ export declare function emitControlPlaneAction(emit: AuditEmit, event: {
|
|
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232
226
|
userAgent?: string;
|
|
233
227
|
requestId?: string;
|
|
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228
|
metadata?: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
235
|
-
/** `success` unless the call was refused (`denied`) or broke (`failure`)
|
|
229
|
+
/** `success` unless the call was refused (`denied`) or broke (`failure`). */
|
|
236
230
|
outcome?: "success" | "denied" | "failure";
|
|
237
231
|
}): Promise<void>;
|
|
238
232
|
/**
|
|
@@ -241,8 +235,8 @@ export declare function emitControlPlaneAction(emit: AuditEmit, event: {
|
|
|
241
235
|
*
|
|
242
236
|
* `anonymous`, because the caller has no session yet by definition. `denied` rather than `failure`: the
|
|
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237
|
* request was refused deliberately by a rule this Worker holds, not lost to a fault. `warning` rather
|
|
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|
-
* than `critical` — the other sign-in methods are working,
|
|
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|
-
*
|
|
238
|
+
* than `critical` — the other sign-in methods are still working, so this is notable rather than
|
|
239
|
+
* alert-worthy.
|
|
246
240
|
*
|
|
247
241
|
* `metadata.provider` is the provider id and nothing else. The secret name is derivable from it and is
|
|
248
242
|
* still not written: an audit row is long-lived and queryable, and naming a store entry in one is a map
|
|
@@ -262,7 +256,7 @@ export type ProviderChange = "link" | "unlink";
|
|
|
262
256
|
* three. Parsing it into a named shape means the emitter below is holding a value that never contained
|
|
263
257
|
* a provider token, so no later edit spreading "the account" into `metadata` can leak one — the guard
|
|
264
258
|
* is structural instead of a rule somebody has to remember. The provider-asserted email is not here
|
|
265
|
-
* either, and is not stored on this row to begin with
|
|
259
|
+
* either, and is not stored on this row to begin with.
|
|
266
260
|
*/
|
|
267
261
|
export declare const ProviderAccount: z.ZodObject<{
|
|
268
262
|
id: z.ZodString;
|
|
@@ -275,9 +269,8 @@ export type ProviderAccount = z.output<typeof ProviderAccount>;
|
|
|
275
269
|
*
|
|
276
270
|
* **Called from the `account` database hooks, and the row is the point.** An operator's question is
|
|
277
271
|
* "which providers can sign in as this account today, and when did that change"; the account table is
|
|
278
|
-
* the answer to the first half, so the second half has to be recorded where that table changes.
|
|
279
|
-
*
|
|
280
|
-
* `/unlink-account` recorded nothing. From the row, an abandoned consent screen emits nothing because
|
|
272
|
+
* the answer to the first half, so the second half has to be recorded where that table changes. An
|
|
273
|
+
* endpoint records an intention, not an outcome. From the row, an abandoned consent screen emits nothing because
|
|
281
274
|
* nothing happened, and every path that ends a link — the unlink endpoint, and the cascade when a user
|
|
282
275
|
* is deleted — is covered without naming any of them.
|
|
283
276
|
*
|
|
@@ -286,11 +279,11 @@ export type ProviderAccount = z.output<typeof ProviderAccount>;
|
|
|
286
279
|
* filter on.
|
|
287
280
|
*
|
|
288
281
|
* **The actor is whoever caused the change, never the account it concerns.** The row's `userId` says
|
|
289
|
-
* *whose* link it was, which is not the same question and is carried in `metadata.userId` instead.
|
|
290
|
-
*
|
|
291
|
-
*
|
|
292
|
-
*
|
|
293
|
-
*
|
|
282
|
+
* *whose* link it was, which is not the same question and is carried in `metadata.userId` instead.
|
|
283
|
+
* `delete.after` fires on every removal, the user-deletion cascade included, so an operator deleting
|
|
284
|
+
* somebody's account must not write rows saying that person detached their own providers. A trail that
|
|
285
|
+
* misattributes an actor is worse than one that is silent, because it reads as evidence. Three cases,
|
|
286
|
+
* and only three:
|
|
294
287
|
*
|
|
295
288
|
* - An authenticated caller — `/unlink-account`, a link from a signed-in session, an operator's console
|
|
296
289
|
* endpoint — is `user`, named.
|
|
@@ -299,13 +292,12 @@ export type ProviderAccount = z.output<typeof ProviderAccount>;
|
|
|
299
292
|
* - No request at all is `system`, with no actor id and no ip: there is no caller to name and nothing to
|
|
300
293
|
* borrow one from.
|
|
301
294
|
*
|
|
302
|
-
* **A cascade is not a fourth case
|
|
303
|
-
*
|
|
304
|
-
*
|
|
305
|
-
*
|
|
306
|
-
*
|
|
307
|
-
*
|
|
308
|
-
* rule that does hold everywhere is the one above it: the account's owner is never the actor merely for
|
|
295
|
+
* **A cascade is not a fourth case.** `deleteWithHooks` resolves its context from
|
|
296
|
+
* `getCurrentAuthContext()`, which is async-scoped to the dispatch, so the cascade
|
|
297
|
+
* `internalAdapter.deleteUser` runs carries whatever context reached it: an operator deleting somebody
|
|
298
|
+
* through an endpoint is named as the actor of every row it writes, with their address, because they
|
|
299
|
+
* caused every one of them. `system` is what *no request* looks like — a queue consumer, a script, a
|
|
300
|
+
* migration — not what a cascade looks like. The rule that does hold everywhere is the one above it: the account's owner is never the actor merely for
|
|
309
301
|
* owning the row. Both shapes are driven in `emit.workers.test.ts` rather than asserted here.
|
|
310
302
|
*
|
|
311
303
|
* Unparseable input is dropped rather than thrown. The write it describes has already happened, and an
|
|
@@ -334,6 +326,20 @@ export declare function emitProviderChangeNotFresh(emit: AuditEmit, context: {
|
|
|
334
326
|
sessionId: string;
|
|
335
327
|
headers: Headers | undefined;
|
|
336
328
|
}): Promise<void>;
|
|
329
|
+
/**
|
|
330
|
+
* Emit a `recent_sign_in_refused` event — a signed-in caller reached an app route gated by
|
|
331
|
+
* `requireRecentSignIn` without a sign-in inside that route's window.
|
|
332
|
+
*
|
|
333
|
+
* `actorType: "user"`, for the same reason as {@link emitProviderChangeNotFresh}: the caller is
|
|
334
|
+
* authenticated and the user id is the whole value of the row. `metadata.purpose` is the app's own
|
|
335
|
+
* `domain/reason` for the route, which says what was being reached for.
|
|
336
|
+
*/
|
|
337
|
+
export declare function emitRecentSignInRefused(emit: AuditEmit, context: {
|
|
338
|
+
purpose: string;
|
|
339
|
+
userId: string;
|
|
340
|
+
sessionId: string;
|
|
341
|
+
headers: Headers | undefined;
|
|
342
|
+
}): Promise<void>;
|
|
337
343
|
/**
|
|
338
344
|
* Emit a `handoff_issued` event: a redirect sign-in's session left on a deep link as a one-time code, or, denied,
|
|
339
345
|
* a sign-in whose deep link carried no challenge, or a magic link to a custom scheme, so no code was issued.
|
package/dist/audit/emit.d.ts.map
CHANGED
|
@@ -1 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
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|
|
1
|
+
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|