@pithy-sh/auth 0.11.0 → 0.12.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +30 -2
- package/dist/audit/actions.d.ts +39 -0
- package/dist/audit/actions.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/audit/actions.js +40 -1
- package/dist/audit/emit.d.ts +34 -0
- package/dist/audit/emit.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/audit/emit.js +47 -1
- package/dist/audit/evidence.d.ts +8 -2
- package/dist/audit/evidence.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/capability.d.ts +31 -11
- package/dist/capability.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/capability.js +38 -5
- package/dist/client/api.d.ts +55 -12
- package/dist/client/api.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/api.js +57 -18
- package/dist/client/bearer.d.ts +110 -0
- package/dist/client/bearer.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/bearer.js +265 -0
- package/dist/client/handoff.d.ts +77 -0
- package/dist/client/handoff.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/handoff.js +119 -0
- package/dist/client/mcp.d.ts +70 -0
- package/dist/client/mcp.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/mcp.js +65 -0
- package/dist/data/betterAuth.d.ts +3 -2
- package/dist/data/betterAuth.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/data/betterAuth.js +5 -3
- package/dist/data/kitFields.d.ts +5 -0
- package/dist/data/kitFields.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/data/kitFields.js +5 -0
- package/dist/data/tables.d.ts +25 -4
- package/dist/data/tables.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/data/tables.js +5 -3
- package/dist/data/userLifecycle.d.ts +9 -0
- package/dist/data/userLifecycle.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/data/userLifecycle.js +6 -2
- package/dist/data/verificationOutcome.d.ts +53 -0
- package/dist/data/verificationOutcome.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/data/verificationOutcome.js +50 -0
- package/dist/email/send.js +6 -2
- package/dist/http/adminRoutes.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/http/adminRoutes.js +56 -10
- package/dist/http/csrf.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/http/csrf.js +2 -1
- package/dist/http/guards.d.ts +15 -11
- package/dist/http/guards.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/http/guards.js +46 -11
- package/dist/http/handoff.d.ts +76 -0
- package/dist/http/handoff.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/http/handoff.js +316 -0
- package/dist/http/middleware.d.ts +12 -0
- package/dist/http/middleware.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/http/middleware.js +25 -4
- package/dist/http/resolve.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/http/resolve.js +9 -3
- package/dist/http/responses.d.ts +142 -0
- package/dist/http/responses.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/http/responses.js +66 -10
- package/dist/http/routes.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/http/routes.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/http/routes.js +35 -4
- package/dist/http/schemas.d.ts +57 -0
- package/dist/http/schemas.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/http/schemas.js +44 -1
- package/dist/http/views.d.ts +22 -2
- package/dist/http/views.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/http/views.js +40 -4
- package/dist/index.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.js +4 -2
- package/dist/instance/auth.d.ts +148 -10
- package/dist/instance/auth.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/instance/auth.js +86 -41
- package/dist/instance/plugins.d.ts +6 -0
- package/dist/instance/plugins.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/instance/plugins.js +14 -1
- package/dist/ledger/read.d.ts +53 -0
- package/dist/ledger/read.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/ledger/read.js +85 -0
- package/dist/ledger/record.d.ts +35 -0
- package/dist/ledger/record.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/ledger/record.js +98 -0
- package/dist/lifecycle/erasure.d.ts +9 -0
- package/dist/lifecycle/erasure.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/lifecycle/erasure.js +96 -0
- package/dist/lifecycle/inactivity.d.ts +19 -0
- package/dist/lifecycle/inactivity.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/lifecycle/inactivity.js +28 -0
- package/dist/lifecycle/transitions.d.ts +22 -1
- package/dist/lifecycle/transitions.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/lifecycle/transitions.js +51 -4
- package/dist/mcp/argumentClass.d.ts +51 -0
- package/dist/mcp/argumentClass.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/mcp/argumentClass.js +69 -0
- package/dist/mcp/capability.d.ts +50 -0
- package/dist/mcp/capability.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/mcp/capability.js +140 -0
- package/dist/mcp/clientMetadata.d.ts +40 -0
- package/dist/mcp/clientMetadata.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/mcp/clientMetadata.js +68 -0
- package/dist/mcp/consent.d.ts +49 -0
- package/dist/mcp/consent.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/mcp/consent.js +69 -0
- package/dist/mcp/dispatch.d.ts +35 -0
- package/dist/mcp/dispatch.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/mcp/dispatch.js +135 -0
- package/dist/mcp/floor.d.ts +37 -0
- package/dist/mcp/floor.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/mcp/floor.js +41 -0
- package/dist/mcp/host.d.ts +34 -0
- package/dist/mcp/host.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/mcp/host.js +2 -0
- package/dist/mcp/http/redirectList.d.ts +9 -0
- package/dist/mcp/http/redirectList.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/mcp/http/redirectList.js +24 -0
- package/dist/mcp/http/responses.d.ts +143 -0
- package/dist/mcp/http/responses.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/mcp/http/responses.js +83 -0
- package/dist/mcp/http/routes.d.ts +28 -0
- package/dist/mcp/http/routes.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/mcp/http/routes.js +517 -0
- package/dist/mcp/http/schemas.d.ts +24 -0
- package/dist/mcp/http/schemas.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/mcp/http/schemas.js +18 -0
- package/dist/mcp/marker.d.ts +15 -0
- package/dist/mcp/marker.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/mcp/marker.js +15 -0
- package/dist/mcp/provider.d.ts +78 -0
- package/dist/mcp/provider.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/mcp/provider.js +108 -0
- package/dist/mcp/purge.d.ts +15 -0
- package/dist/mcp/purge.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/mcp/purge.js +31 -0
- package/dist/mcp/rpc.d.ts +79 -0
- package/dist/mcp/rpc.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/mcp/rpc.js +103 -0
- package/dist/mcp/toolAudit.d.ts +76 -0
- package/dist/mcp/toolAudit.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/mcp/toolAudit.js +86 -0
- package/dist/migrations/0006_verification_outcomes.d.ts +15 -0
- package/dist/migrations/0006_verification_outcomes.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/migrations/0006_verification_outcomes.js +35 -0
- package/dist/migrations/0007_erasure_record.d.ts +17 -0
- package/dist/migrations/0007_erasure_record.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/migrations/0007_erasure_record.js +36 -0
- package/dist/migrations/0008_last_active.d.ts +15 -0
- package/dist/migrations/0008_last_active.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/migrations/0008_last_active.js +29 -0
- package/dist/migrations/set.d.ts +4 -1
- package/dist/migrations/set.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/migrations/set.js +8 -2
- package/dist/peer.d.ts +3 -2
- package/dist/peer.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/processing/activities.d.ts +6 -0
- package/dist/processing/activities.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/processing/activities.js +12 -0
- package/dist/purge/contribution.d.ts +20 -5
- package/dist/purge/contribution.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/purge/contribution.js +20 -6
- package/dist/purge/run.d.ts +75 -5
- package/dist/purge/run.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/purge/run.js +117 -14
- package/dist/purge/workflow.d.ts +15 -2
- package/dist/purge/workflow.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/purge/workflow.js +51 -7
- package/dist/test-utils/accountFootprint.d.ts +5 -2
- package/dist/test-utils/accountFootprint.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/test-utils/accountFootprint.js +7 -2
- package/dist/test-utils/liveApp.d.ts +6 -0
- package/dist/test-utils/liveApp.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/test-utils/liveApp.js +7 -2
- package/dist/token/handoff.d.ts +80 -0
- package/dist/token/handoff.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/token/handoff.js +136 -0
- package/dist/version.generated.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/version.generated.js +1 -1
- package/docs/account-lifecycle.md +59 -7
- package/docs/apple-signin.md +32 -4
- package/docs/facebook-oauth.md +2 -2
- package/docs/github-oauth.md +2 -2
- package/docs/google-oauth.md +9 -7
- package/docs/microsoft-oauth.md +2 -2
- package/package.json +11 -5
- package/pithy.manifest.json +2 -2
- package/pithy.mcp.manifest.json +36 -0
- package/src/audit/actions.ts +39 -0
- package/src/audit/emit.ts +63 -0
- package/src/audit/evidence.ts +8 -4
- package/src/capability.ts +80 -23
- package/src/client/api.ts +69 -19
- package/src/client/bearer.ts +388 -0
- package/src/client/handoff.ts +172 -0
- package/src/client/mcp.ts +140 -0
- package/src/data/betterAuth.ts +8 -4
- package/src/data/kitFields.ts +2 -0
- package/src/data/tables.ts +4 -2
- package/src/data/userLifecycle.ts +15 -3
- package/src/data/verificationOutcome.ts +86 -0
- package/src/email/send.ts +2 -2
- package/src/http/adminRoutes.ts +68 -3
- package/src/http/csrf.ts +4 -1
- package/src/http/guards.ts +48 -11
- package/src/http/handoff.ts +350 -0
- package/src/http/middleware.ts +29 -3
- package/src/http/resolve.ts +25 -25
- package/src/http/responses.ts +134 -8
- package/src/http/routes.ts +63 -4
- package/src/http/schemas.ts +85 -0
- package/src/http/views.ts +46 -2
- package/src/index.ts +2 -0
- package/src/instance/auth.ts +51 -1
- package/src/instance/plugins.ts +20 -2
- package/src/ledger/read.ts +133 -0
- package/src/ledger/record.ts +198 -0
- package/src/lifecycle/erasure.ts +118 -0
- package/src/lifecycle/inactivity.ts +56 -0
- package/src/lifecycle/transitions.ts +75 -5
- package/src/mcp/argumentClass.ts +112 -0
- package/src/mcp/capability.ts +194 -0
- package/src/mcp/clientMetadata.ts +81 -0
- package/src/mcp/consent.ts +95 -0
- package/src/mcp/dispatch.ts +154 -0
- package/src/mcp/floor.ts +62 -0
- package/src/mcp/host.ts +36 -0
- package/src/mcp/http/redirectList.ts +26 -0
- package/src/mcp/http/responses.ts +157 -0
- package/src/mcp/http/routes.ts +635 -0
- package/src/mcp/http/schemas.ts +37 -0
- package/src/mcp/marker.ts +18 -0
- package/src/mcp/provider.ts +151 -0
- package/src/mcp/purge.ts +39 -0
- package/src/mcp/rpc.ts +135 -0
- package/src/mcp/toolAudit.ts +132 -0
- package/src/migrations/0006_verification_outcomes.ts +51 -0
- package/src/migrations/0007_erasure_record.ts +43 -0
- package/src/migrations/0008_last_active.ts +30 -0
- package/src/migrations/set.ts +7 -1
- package/src/processing/activities.ts +14 -0
- package/src/purge/contribution.ts +37 -10
- package/src/purge/run.ts +179 -16
- package/src/purge/workflow.ts +65 -7
- package/src/seeds/example.ts +2 -2
- package/src/test-utils/accountFootprint.ts +10 -1
- package/src/test-utils/liveApp.ts +10 -1
- package/src/token/handoff.ts +180 -0
- package/src/version.generated.ts +1 -1
package/src/http/guards.ts
CHANGED
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// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Pithy
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
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import type {
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import type { AdminRouteDeclaration } from "@pithy-sh/core/src/controlPlane/discovery/adminRoute";
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import type { ControlPlaneScope } from "@pithy-sh/core/src/controlPlane/scope/scope";
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/**
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@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ import type { ControlPlaneScope } from "@pithy-sh/core/src/controlPlane/scope/sc
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* every legitimate management call, permanently, and **no credential could fix it** — there is no user
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* to sign in as. `controlPlaneIsolation.workers.test.ts` pins both directions of that separation.
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*
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* ##
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* ## Nine scopes, because these are nine different blast radii
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*
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* The temptation is one `auth:admin` flag, and on this capability it is the most dangerous version of
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* that mistake. **Reading a user is a privacy operation; revoking their sessions is an availability
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export const AUTH_DEVICES_REVOKE_SCOPE: ControlPlaneScope = "auth:devices:revoke";
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/**
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* Suspend an account and reinstate it
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* Suspend an account and reinstate it: `POST {base}/admin/users/:userId/suspend` and `/reinstate`. Ending somebody's access is an availability
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* operation on one person, and reversible — which is what separates it from deleting them, and why it is
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* granted apart from both reading them and erasing them.
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*/
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export const AUTH_USERS_SUSPEND_SCOPE: ControlPlaneScope = "auth:users:suspend";
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/**
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* Delete an account, restore one inside its purge window, and start a purge
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* `DELETE {base}/admin/users/:userId` and `POST …/restore
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* Delete an account, restore one inside its purge window, and start a purge:
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* `DELETE {base}/admin/users/:userId` and `POST …/restore`. The
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* one scope on this surface whose worst case cannot be undone: once the window closes, the person's rows are
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* gone from every capability that held them.
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export const AUTH_USERS_DELETE_SCOPE: ControlPlaneScope = "auth:users:delete";
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/**
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* Export everything the kit holds about one account — the answer to an access request
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* `GET {base}/admin/users/:userId/export
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* Export everything the kit holds about one account — the answer to an access request:
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* `GET {base}/admin/users/:userId/export`. A disclosure, and a far larger one than reading the user: it carries every capability's rows about
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* them, so it is granted on its own and audited as one.
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export const AUTH_USERS_EXPORT_SCOPE: ControlPlaneScope = "auth:users:export";
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/**
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* Read the verification ledger: every sign-in link and code issued over a window, whether it was used,
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* expired or is still waiting, and the mail that carried it. A read, and apart from `auth:users:read` because the question is the fleet's deliverability rather than
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* who one person is — the rows name accounts by id and never by address.
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*/
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export const AUTH_VERIFICATIONS_READ_SCOPE: ControlPlaneScope = "auth:verifications:read";
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/**
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* Every control-plane scope auth defines — what `pithy dashboard connect` offers for this capability,
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* and the list a manifest or a doc quotes rather than re-typing.
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*
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*
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* landed in #621, delete, restore and export in #622. Declaring the vocabulary here, once, is what let those
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* issues build on one name each rather than each choosing its own.
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* Declaring the vocabulary here, once, gives every route that requires one of these the same name.
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*/
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export const AUTH_CONTROL_PLANE_SCOPES: readonly ControlPlaneScope[] = [
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AUTH_USERS_DELETE_SCOPE,
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AUTH_VERIFICATIONS_READ_SCOPE,
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];
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* The summaries say what the operation is *for*. A client renders these next to a button somebody is
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* about to press on a real person's account.
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*/
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export function authAdminRoutes(basePath: string):
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export function authAdminRoutes(basePath: string): AdminRouteDeclaration[] {
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return [
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{
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method: "GET",
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operation: "users.list",
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path: `${basePath}/admin/users`,
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scope: AUTH_USERS_READ_SCOPE,
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kind: "reads",
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summary: "Find a user. Lists everyone newest first, or searches email and display name.",
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},
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{
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method: "GET",
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operation: "users.read",
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path: `${basePath}/admin/users/:userId`,
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scope: AUTH_USERS_READ_SCOPE,
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kind: "reads",
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summary: "One user, with where they are signed in and what they sign in with.",
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},
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{
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method: "GET",
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operation: "devices.list",
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path: `${basePath}/admin/devices`,
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scope: AUTH_DEVICES_READ_SCOPE,
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kind: "reads",
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summary: "The device registry across users, most-recently-seen first.",
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},
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{
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method: "POST",
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operation: "sessions.revoke",
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path: `${basePath}/admin/sessions/revoke`,
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scope: AUTH_SESSIONS_REVOKE_SCOPE,
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kind: "credentials",
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summary: "Kill one session. The rest of that person's sign-ins keep working.",
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},
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{
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method: "POST",
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operation: "users.sessions.revoke",
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path: `${basePath}/admin/users/:userId/sessions/revoke`,
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scope: AUTH_USERS_LOGOUT_SCOPE,
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kind: "credentials",
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summary: "Sign a user out everywhere, on every device, immediately.",
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},
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kind: "deletes",
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operation: "verifications.list",
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path: `${basePath}/admin/verifications`,
|
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|
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scope: AUTH_VERIFICATIONS_READ_SCOPE,
|
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|
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kind: "reads",
|
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summary:
|
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|
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"Every sign-in link and code sent over a window: used, expired or still waiting, and the mail that carried it.",
|
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|
+
},
|
|
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|
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{
|
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|
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method: "GET",
|
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|
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operation: "users.export",
|
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|
path: `${basePath}/admin/users/:userId/export`,
|
|
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|
scope: AUTH_USERS_EXPORT_SCOPE,
|
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|
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kind: "reads",
|
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|
summary: "Everything the kit holds about one user, from every capability — the answer to an access request.",
|
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|
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|
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|
];
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,350 @@
|
|
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1
|
+
// SPDX-FileCopyrightText: 2026 Pithy
|
|
2
|
+
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
|
|
3
|
+
|
|
4
|
+
import type { PithyHonoEnv } from "@pithy-sh/core/src/capability/capability";
|
|
5
|
+
import {
|
|
6
|
+
ForbiddenError,
|
|
7
|
+
InternalError,
|
|
8
|
+
NotFoundError,
|
|
9
|
+
PithyError,
|
|
10
|
+
ValidationError,
|
|
11
|
+
} from "@pithy-sh/core/src/error/pithyError";
|
|
12
|
+
import type { Context } from "hono";
|
|
13
|
+
import { correlation, emitHandoffExchanged, emitHandoffIssued } from "../audit/emit";
|
|
14
|
+
import type { AuthWiring } from "../capability";
|
|
15
|
+
import { Session } from "../data/betterAuth";
|
|
16
|
+
import { authDatabase } from "../data/tables";
|
|
17
|
+
import { parseDeviceMeta, registerDevice } from "../device/registry";
|
|
18
|
+
import type { AuthInstance } from "../instance/auth";
|
|
19
|
+
import { isHandoffChallenge, issueHandoff, redeemHandoff } from "../token/handoff";
|
|
20
|
+
import { guardErrorCallbackURL } from "./errorCallbackUrl";
|
|
21
|
+
import { apiErrorToPithy } from "./errors";
|
|
22
|
+
import { getAuthInstance, resolveDb } from "./resolve";
|
|
23
|
+
import type { HandoffExchangeResponse } from "./responses";
|
|
24
|
+
import type { HandoffExchangeBody, SocialSignInStartQuery } from "./schemas";
|
|
25
|
+
|
|
26
|
+
/**
|
|
27
|
+
* The redirect half of a native sign-in, and the trade that ends it.
|
|
28
|
+
*
|
|
29
|
+
* A native app starts a social sign-in with its own deep link as `callbackURL` (a scheme in `trustedOrigins`,
|
|
30
|
+
* such as `myapp://auth/callback`). Better Auth checks that URL when the sign-in starts and, at the provider's
|
|
31
|
+
* callback, answers with a redirect to it carrying the session as a cookie. A cookie set on a redirect to an app
|
|
32
|
+
* scheme lands in the system browser, which the app never reads. {@link handOffToApp} replaces that answer: the
|
|
33
|
+
* session cookies are dropped and the deep link carries a one-time code instead (`../token/handoff.ts`). The app
|
|
34
|
+
* posts the code to `POST {base}/handoff`, {@link exchangeHandoff}, and gets the raw session token back.
|
|
35
|
+
*
|
|
36
|
+
* The code is bound to the app that asked for it. The app puts the S256 challenge of a verifier only it holds on
|
|
37
|
+
* its `callbackURL` as `handoff_challenge`, Better Auth keeps that URL with the sign-in's state, and the challenge
|
|
38
|
+
* comes back here on the redirect. It is moved off the link and stored with the code, and the trade must present
|
|
39
|
+
* the verifier. A deep link with no challenge gets no code at all.
|
|
40
|
+
*
|
|
41
|
+
* Which redirects are handed off: any whose link carries `handoff_challenge`, whatever its scheme, and any to a
|
|
42
|
+
* non-http(s) scheme. So an app's https universal link (iOS) or app link (Android), which the operating system
|
|
43
|
+
* routes only to the app that proves it owns the domain, gets a code when the app asks for one with a challenge.
|
|
44
|
+
* An http(s) callback with no challenge is a web page, and a web page gets its cookie.
|
|
45
|
+
*
|
|
46
|
+
* A magic link is handed off only to an https link. Whoever asks for the link chooses the challenge, and the
|
|
47
|
+
* person who opens it is somebody else, so the code must reach only the app that owns the link's domain. Any app
|
|
48
|
+
* can claim a custom scheme; a magic link to one is refused, and a native app without a universal link signs in
|
|
49
|
+
* by email with a one-time code instead.
|
|
50
|
+
*
|
|
51
|
+
* A native app starts a redirect sign-in with {@link startNativeSignIn}, a GET the system browser's sign-in sheet
|
|
52
|
+
* opens, rather than by posting `/sign-in/social` itself. Better Auth binds the sign-in to a signed `state`
|
|
53
|
+
* cookie and checks it at the provider's callback; set on the app's own request, that cookie would never reach
|
|
54
|
+
* the sheet that completes the callback.
|
|
55
|
+
*/
|
|
56
|
+
|
|
57
|
+
/** The deep-link query parameter the one-time code travels in. */
|
|
58
|
+
export const HANDOFF_CODE_PARAM = "code";
|
|
59
|
+
|
|
60
|
+
/** The `callbackURL` query parameter the app's S256 challenge travels in. */
|
|
61
|
+
export const HANDOFF_CHALLENGE_PARAM = "handoff_challenge";
|
|
62
|
+
|
|
63
|
+
/** The `error` a deep link gets back when it carried no challenge to bind a code to. */
|
|
64
|
+
export const HANDOFF_UNBOUND_ERROR = "handoff_challenge_required";
|
|
65
|
+
|
|
66
|
+
/** The `error` a magic link to a custom scheme gets back: only an https universal link or app link is handed one. */
|
|
67
|
+
export const HANDOFF_SCHEME_REFUSED_ERROR = "handoff_scheme_refused";
|
|
68
|
+
|
|
69
|
+
/** Better Auth's magic-link verification, under `basePath`: the one redirect that ends an emailed sign-in. */
|
|
70
|
+
const MAGIC_LINK_VERIFY_PATH = "/magic-link/verify";
|
|
71
|
+
|
|
72
|
+
type Ctx = Context<PithyHonoEnv>;
|
|
73
|
+
|
|
74
|
+
/** The cookie lines a response sets, as name and value. */
|
|
75
|
+
function setCookies(response: Response): { line: string; name: string; value: string }[] {
|
|
76
|
+
return response.headers.getSetCookie().map((line) => {
|
|
77
|
+
const pair = line.slice(0, line.indexOf(";") === -1 ? line.length : line.indexOf(";"));
|
|
78
|
+
const equals = pair.indexOf("=");
|
|
79
|
+
return { line, name: pair.slice(0, equals).trim(), value: pair.slice(equals + 1).trim() };
|
|
80
|
+
});
|
|
81
|
+
}
|
|
82
|
+
|
|
83
|
+
/** The raw session token inside a signed session cookie: everything before the signature. */
|
|
84
|
+
function rawToken(cookieValue: string): string | null {
|
|
85
|
+
let decoded: string;
|
|
86
|
+
try {
|
|
87
|
+
decoded = decodeURIComponent(cookieValue);
|
|
88
|
+
} catch {
|
|
89
|
+
return null;
|
|
90
|
+
}
|
|
91
|
+
const token = decoded.split(".")[0];
|
|
92
|
+
return token ? token : null;
|
|
93
|
+
}
|
|
94
|
+
|
|
95
|
+
/**
|
|
96
|
+
* The app link a redirect points at, or null when it points anywhere a browser should go: a custom-scheme deep link,
|
|
97
|
+
* or an http(s) link that asked for a handoff by carrying a challenge.
|
|
98
|
+
*/
|
|
99
|
+
function appLink(response: Response): URL | null {
|
|
100
|
+
if (response.status < 300 || response.status >= 400) return null;
|
|
101
|
+
const location = response.headers.get("location");
|
|
102
|
+
if (!location) return null;
|
|
103
|
+
let target: URL;
|
|
104
|
+
try {
|
|
105
|
+
target = new URL(location);
|
|
106
|
+
} catch {
|
|
107
|
+
return null;
|
|
108
|
+
}
|
|
109
|
+
const web = target.protocol === "http:" || target.protocol === "https:";
|
|
110
|
+
return web && !target.searchParams.has(HANDOFF_CHALLENGE_PARAM) ? null : target;
|
|
111
|
+
}
|
|
112
|
+
|
|
113
|
+
/** The `trustedOrigins` entry that would admit a link: its origin for http(s), its scheme otherwise. */
|
|
114
|
+
function trustedEntry(target: URL): string {
|
|
115
|
+
return target.protocol === "http:" || target.protocol === "https:" ? target.origin : `${target.protocol}//`;
|
|
116
|
+
}
|
|
117
|
+
|
|
118
|
+
/**
|
|
119
|
+
* Rewrite a sign-in that ends on an app link into a handoff, or answer null and leave the response as Better Auth
|
|
120
|
+
* wrote it: any answer that is not a redirect to an app link, and a redirect that sets no session (a refused
|
|
121
|
+
* sign-in returning its error to the app).
|
|
122
|
+
*
|
|
123
|
+
* An app link outside `trustedOrigins` is refused rather than followed. Better Auth checked the callback when the
|
|
124
|
+
* sign-in started, so reaching that branch means something else wrote the redirect, and a session must never be
|
|
125
|
+
* handed to a scheme this Worker does not trust.
|
|
126
|
+
*/
|
|
127
|
+
export async function handOffToApp(
|
|
128
|
+
c: Ctx,
|
|
129
|
+
wiring: AuthWiring,
|
|
130
|
+
instance: AuthInstance,
|
|
131
|
+
response: Response,
|
|
132
|
+
): Promise<Response | null> {
|
|
133
|
+
const target = appLink(response);
|
|
134
|
+
if (!target) return null;
|
|
135
|
+
const context = await instance.$context;
|
|
136
|
+
// Every cookie that carries the session or what was read alongside it. Better Auth splits a cookie cache too
|
|
137
|
+
// large for one cookie into `<name>.0`, `<name>.1`, …, so each chunk goes with its name.
|
|
138
|
+
const sessionCookieNames = [
|
|
139
|
+
context.authCookies.sessionToken.name,
|
|
140
|
+
context.authCookies.sessionData.name,
|
|
141
|
+
context.authCookies.dontRememberToken.name,
|
|
142
|
+
context.authCookies.accountData.name,
|
|
143
|
+
];
|
|
144
|
+
const isSessionCookie = (name: string) =>
|
|
145
|
+
sessionCookieNames.some((cookie) => name === cookie || name.startsWith(`${cookie}.`));
|
|
146
|
+
const cookies = setCookies(response);
|
|
147
|
+
const session = cookies.find((cookie) => cookie.name === context.authCookies.sessionToken.name && cookie.value);
|
|
148
|
+
if (!session) return null;
|
|
149
|
+
if (!context.isTrustedOrigin(target.href, { allowRelativePaths: false })) {
|
|
150
|
+
// The session the redirect made is reachable by nothing once its cookie is dropped, so it goes too.
|
|
151
|
+
const token = rawToken(session.value);
|
|
152
|
+
if (token) {
|
|
153
|
+
await authDatabase(resolveDb(c.env, wiring.config.database))
|
|
154
|
+
.deleteFrom("pithyAuthSessions")
|
|
155
|
+
.where("token", "=", token)
|
|
156
|
+
.execute();
|
|
157
|
+
}
|
|
158
|
+
throw new ForbiddenError({
|
|
159
|
+
message: "That app link is not one this service trusts.",
|
|
160
|
+
action: `Add the app's link to auth's \`trustedOrigins\`, for example "${trustedEntry(target)}".`,
|
|
161
|
+
detail: `sign-in redirect to untrusted app link ${trustedEntry(target)}`,
|
|
162
|
+
});
|
|
163
|
+
}
|
|
164
|
+
const token = rawToken(session.value);
|
|
165
|
+
if (!token) return null;
|
|
166
|
+
const db = authDatabase(resolveDb(c.env, wiring.config.database));
|
|
167
|
+
const row = await db
|
|
168
|
+
.selectFrom("pithyAuthSessions")
|
|
169
|
+
.select(["id", "userId"])
|
|
170
|
+
.where("token", "=", token)
|
|
171
|
+
.executeTakeFirst();
|
|
172
|
+
if (!row) return null;
|
|
173
|
+
|
|
174
|
+
const challenge = target.searchParams.get(HANDOFF_CHALLENGE_PARAM);
|
|
175
|
+
target.searchParams.delete(HANDOFF_CHALLENGE_PARAM);
|
|
176
|
+
const emailed = new URL(c.req.raw.url).pathname === `${wiring.config.basePath}${MAGIC_LINK_VERIFY_PATH}`;
|
|
177
|
+
const refusal =
|
|
178
|
+
emailed && target.protocol !== "https:"
|
|
179
|
+
? HANDOFF_SCHEME_REFUSED_ERROR
|
|
180
|
+
: challenge !== null && isHandoffChallenge(challenge)
|
|
181
|
+
? null
|
|
182
|
+
: HANDOFF_UNBOUND_ERROR;
|
|
183
|
+
if (refusal === null && challenge !== null) {
|
|
184
|
+
const { code } = await issueHandoff(db, { sessionId: row.id, challenge, now: new Date() });
|
|
185
|
+
target.searchParams.set(HANDOFF_CODE_PARAM, code);
|
|
186
|
+
} else {
|
|
187
|
+
// No code. The session the callback made is reachable by nothing once its cookie is dropped, so it goes too,
|
|
188
|
+
// and the app hears why on its own link.
|
|
189
|
+
await db.deleteFrom("pithyAuthSessions").where("id", "=", row.id).execute();
|
|
190
|
+
target.searchParams.set("error", refusal ?? HANDOFF_UNBOUND_ERROR);
|
|
191
|
+
}
|
|
192
|
+
|
|
193
|
+
const headers = new Headers(response.headers);
|
|
194
|
+
headers.delete("set-cookie");
|
|
195
|
+
headers.delete("set-auth-token");
|
|
196
|
+
headers.set("location", target.href);
|
|
197
|
+
headers.set("cache-control", "no-store");
|
|
198
|
+
headers.set("referrer-policy", "no-referrer");
|
|
199
|
+
for (const cookie of cookies) {
|
|
200
|
+
if (!isSessionCookie(cookie.name)) headers.append("set-cookie", cookie.line);
|
|
201
|
+
}
|
|
202
|
+
await emitHandoffIssued(c.var.emit, {
|
|
203
|
+
...(refusal === null
|
|
204
|
+
? { outcome: "success" as const }
|
|
205
|
+
: { outcome: "denied" as const, reason: refusal === HANDOFF_SCHEME_REFUSED_ERROR ? "scheme" : "unbound" }),
|
|
206
|
+
userId: row.userId,
|
|
207
|
+
sessionId: row.id,
|
|
208
|
+
...correlation(c.req.raw.headers),
|
|
209
|
+
});
|
|
210
|
+
return new Response(null, { status: response.status, headers });
|
|
211
|
+
}
|
|
212
|
+
|
|
213
|
+
/**
|
|
214
|
+
* Start a native redirect sign-in inside the system browser's sign-in sheet: run the social sign-in here and
|
|
215
|
+
* answer a redirect to the provider that carries Better Auth's `Set-Cookie`, so the signed `state` cookie lands in
|
|
216
|
+
* the jar of the browser that will come back through the provider's callback.
|
|
217
|
+
*
|
|
218
|
+
* Only for the handoff: the callback must be a link `trustedOrigins` admits, carrying a well-formed
|
|
219
|
+
* `handoff_challenge`, and a navigation another page started (`Sec-Fetch-Site` other than `none`) is refused. A web page starts its sign-in with the JSON `POST /sign-in/social`, as it always has.
|
|
220
|
+
* The sign-in runs on a request of its own with the sheet's cookies, origin and fetch metadata left behind:
|
|
221
|
+
* nothing the sheet already holds takes part in it.
|
|
222
|
+
*/
|
|
223
|
+
export async function startNativeSignIn(c: Ctx, wiring: AuthWiring, query: SocialSignInStartQuery): Promise<Response> {
|
|
224
|
+
// The sheet opens this address itself, so its navigation is `none`. A page that sent the browser here chose the
|
|
225
|
+
// challenge, and the code would go to whichever app claims the link.
|
|
226
|
+
const site = c.req.raw.headers.get("sec-fetch-site");
|
|
227
|
+
if (site !== null && site !== "none") {
|
|
228
|
+
throw new ForbiddenError({
|
|
229
|
+
message: "Start a sign-in from the app.",
|
|
230
|
+
action: "Open the start address in the system browser's sign-in sheet, not from a link on a page.",
|
|
231
|
+
detail: `native sign-in start reached from ${site}`,
|
|
232
|
+
});
|
|
233
|
+
}
|
|
234
|
+
if (!wiring.config[query.provider].enabled) {
|
|
235
|
+
throw new NotFoundError({
|
|
236
|
+
message: "That sign-in provider is not available here.",
|
|
237
|
+
action: `Enable \`${query.provider}\` in auth's config, or stop offering it.`,
|
|
238
|
+
detail: `native sign-in start for disabled provider ${query.provider}`,
|
|
239
|
+
});
|
|
240
|
+
}
|
|
241
|
+
const instance = await getAuthInstance(c, wiring);
|
|
242
|
+
const context = await instance.$context;
|
|
243
|
+
for (const [field, value] of [
|
|
244
|
+
["callbackURL", query.callbackURL],
|
|
245
|
+
["errorCallbackURL", query.errorCallbackURL],
|
|
246
|
+
] as const) {
|
|
247
|
+
if (value !== undefined && !context.isTrustedOrigin(value, { allowRelativePaths: false })) {
|
|
248
|
+
throw new ForbiddenError({
|
|
249
|
+
message: "That app link is not one this service trusts.",
|
|
250
|
+
action: "Add the app's link to auth's `trustedOrigins`.",
|
|
251
|
+
detail: `native sign-in start with untrusted ${field}`,
|
|
252
|
+
});
|
|
253
|
+
}
|
|
254
|
+
}
|
|
255
|
+
let challenge: string | null;
|
|
256
|
+
try {
|
|
257
|
+
challenge = new URL(query.callbackURL).searchParams.get(HANDOFF_CHALLENGE_PARAM);
|
|
258
|
+
} catch {
|
|
259
|
+
challenge = null;
|
|
260
|
+
}
|
|
261
|
+
if (challenge === null || !isHandoffChallenge(challenge)) {
|
|
262
|
+
throw new ValidationError({
|
|
263
|
+
message: "That sign-in link has no handoff challenge.",
|
|
264
|
+
action: "Start a native sign-in with `handoffCallbackURL` from `@pithy-sh/auth/src/client/handoff`.",
|
|
265
|
+
detail: "native sign-in start without a well-formed handoff challenge",
|
|
266
|
+
issues: [{ path: ["callbackURL"], message: `carries no well-formed ${HANDOFF_CHALLENGE_PARAM}`, code: "custom" }],
|
|
267
|
+
});
|
|
268
|
+
}
|
|
269
|
+
|
|
270
|
+
const headers = new Headers(c.req.raw.headers);
|
|
271
|
+
for (const name of [...headers.keys()]) {
|
|
272
|
+
if (name === "cookie" || name === "origin" || name === "referer" || name.startsWith("sec-fetch-")) {
|
|
273
|
+
headers.delete(name);
|
|
274
|
+
}
|
|
275
|
+
}
|
|
276
|
+
headers.delete("content-length");
|
|
277
|
+
headers.set("content-type", "application/json");
|
|
278
|
+
const signIn = new Request(new URL(`${wiring.config.basePath}/sign-in/social`, c.req.raw.url), {
|
|
279
|
+
method: "POST",
|
|
280
|
+
headers,
|
|
281
|
+
body: JSON.stringify({
|
|
282
|
+
provider: query.provider,
|
|
283
|
+
callbackURL: query.callbackURL,
|
|
284
|
+
...(query.errorCallbackURL === undefined ? {} : { errorCallbackURL: query.errorCallbackURL }),
|
|
285
|
+
}),
|
|
286
|
+
});
|
|
287
|
+
let answer: Response;
|
|
288
|
+
try {
|
|
289
|
+
answer = await instance.handler(await guardErrorCallbackURL(signIn, signIn.url));
|
|
290
|
+
} catch (error) {
|
|
291
|
+
throw apiErrorToPithy(error);
|
|
292
|
+
}
|
|
293
|
+
// Better Auth's own refusal is its own answer, as it is on the catch-all.
|
|
294
|
+
if (!answer.ok) return answer;
|
|
295
|
+
const body: unknown = await answer.json();
|
|
296
|
+
const url = typeof body === "object" && body !== null ? (body as { url?: unknown }).url : undefined;
|
|
297
|
+
if (typeof url !== "string") {
|
|
298
|
+
throw new InternalError({ detail: "the social sign-in answered without an authorization URL" });
|
|
299
|
+
}
|
|
300
|
+
const redirect = new Headers({ location: url, "cache-control": "no-store", "referrer-policy": "no-referrer" });
|
|
301
|
+
for (const line of answer.headers.getSetCookie()) redirect.append("set-cookie", line);
|
|
302
|
+
return new Response(null, { status: 302, headers: redirect });
|
|
303
|
+
}
|
|
304
|
+
|
|
305
|
+
/** The refusal every failed trade gets. One answer for spent, expired, unknown and a wrong verifier. */
|
|
306
|
+
function handoffInvalid(reason: string): PithyError {
|
|
307
|
+
return new PithyError({
|
|
308
|
+
code: "auth/handoff_invalid",
|
|
309
|
+
status: 400,
|
|
310
|
+
message: "That sign-in link has expired or was already used. Sign in again.",
|
|
311
|
+
detail: `handoff refused: ${reason}`,
|
|
312
|
+
});
|
|
313
|
+
}
|
|
314
|
+
|
|
315
|
+
/**
|
|
316
|
+
* Trade a one-time code and its verifier for the session the code stands for. The code is spent by the attempt
|
|
317
|
+
* whatever the answer, so a wrong verifier gets one guess.
|
|
318
|
+
* Device headers sent with the trade register the device and bind it to the session, as they would on any other
|
|
319
|
+
* native sign-in; the browser that completed the redirect had none to send.
|
|
320
|
+
*/
|
|
321
|
+
export async function exchangeHandoff(c: Ctx, wiring: AuthWiring, body: HandoffExchangeBody): Promise<Response> {
|
|
322
|
+
const db = authDatabase(resolveDb(c.env, wiring.config.database));
|
|
323
|
+
const corr = correlation(c.req.raw.headers);
|
|
324
|
+
const now = new Date();
|
|
325
|
+
const redemption = await redeemHandoff(db, { code: body.code, verifier: body.verifier }, now);
|
|
326
|
+
if (!redemption.ok) {
|
|
327
|
+
await emitHandoffExchanged(c.var.emit, { outcome: "denied", reason: redemption.reason, ...corr });
|
|
328
|
+
throw handoffInvalid(redemption.reason);
|
|
329
|
+
}
|
|
330
|
+
const row = await db
|
|
331
|
+
.selectFrom("pithyAuthSessions")
|
|
332
|
+
.select(["id", "token", "userId", "expiresAt", "deviceId"])
|
|
333
|
+
.where("id", "=", redemption.sessionId)
|
|
334
|
+
.executeTakeFirst();
|
|
335
|
+
const expiresAt = row ? Session.shape.expiresAt.parse(row.expiresAt) : null;
|
|
336
|
+
if (!row || !expiresAt || expiresAt.getTime() <= now.getTime()) {
|
|
337
|
+
await emitHandoffExchanged(c.var.emit, { outcome: "denied", reason: "unknown", ...corr });
|
|
338
|
+
throw handoffInvalid("the session the code stood for has ended");
|
|
339
|
+
}
|
|
340
|
+
|
|
341
|
+
const device = parseDeviceMeta(c.req.raw.headers);
|
|
342
|
+
if (device && !row.deviceId) {
|
|
343
|
+
await registerDevice(db, device, { userId: row.userId, lastIp: corr.ip ?? null, now });
|
|
344
|
+
await db.updateTable("pithyAuthSessions").set({ deviceId: device.id }).where("id", "=", row.id).execute();
|
|
345
|
+
}
|
|
346
|
+
|
|
347
|
+
await emitHandoffExchanged(c.var.emit, { outcome: "success", userId: row.userId, sessionId: row.id, ...corr });
|
|
348
|
+
c.header("cache-control", "no-store");
|
|
349
|
+
return c.json({ token: row.token, expiresAt: expiresAt.toISOString() } satisfies HandoffExchangeResponse);
|
|
350
|
+
}
|
package/src/http/middleware.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -11,14 +11,16 @@ import { authDatabase } from "../data/tables";
|
|
|
11
11
|
import type { AuthInstance } from "../instance/auth";
|
|
12
12
|
import { lifecycleRefusalFor, noteRefusal, noticedRefusal, suspendedHolder } from "../lifecycle/enforce";
|
|
13
13
|
import { LifecycleColumns } from "../lifecycle/state";
|
|
14
|
+
import { dispatchedAuth } from "../mcp/dispatch";
|
|
14
15
|
import { withResignedCredentials } from "./credentialResign";
|
|
15
16
|
import { getAuthInstance, resolveDb } from "./resolve";
|
|
16
17
|
|
|
17
18
|
/**
|
|
18
19
|
* The session-resolution middleware: it fills core's `AuthContext` seam (`c.var.auth`) for every
|
|
19
|
-
* request that carries a credential — a bearer token
|
|
20
|
+
* request that carries a credential — a bearer token, a session cookie, or an API key in `x-api-key` when
|
|
21
|
+
* the adopter composes `apiKey({ enableSessionForAPIKeys: true })`. Better Auth resolves all three
|
|
20
22
|
* transparently (the bearer plugin rewrites the header into the session cookie), so one `getSession`
|
|
21
|
-
* call covers mobile and
|
|
23
|
+
* call covers mobile, web and a machine. A credential-less request stays anonymous (no instance build, no D1 hit).
|
|
22
24
|
* Resolution never throws — an invalid credential simply leaves `auth` null for `requireAuth` to reject.
|
|
23
25
|
*/
|
|
24
26
|
/** The session's authentication instant when it is a real `Date`, else `null`. Never anything else. */
|
|
@@ -67,10 +69,34 @@ async function resolvedScopes(
|
|
|
67
69
|
return parsed.data;
|
|
68
70
|
}
|
|
69
71
|
|
|
72
|
+
/**
|
|
73
|
+
* The header Better Auth's `apiKey()` plugin reads a key from by default. With `enableSessionForAPIKeys` on, the plugin
|
|
74
|
+
* answers `getSession` for a request carrying one, so a key stands for its owner's session. It is the default
|
|
75
|
+
* rather than whatever an adopter configured, because the plugin does not expose its options: an adopter who renames
|
|
76
|
+
* the header keeps `x-api-key` for keys meant to reach this middleware.
|
|
77
|
+
*/
|
|
78
|
+
export const API_KEY_HEADER = "x-api-key";
|
|
79
|
+
|
|
80
|
+
/**
|
|
81
|
+
* Whether a request carries anything `getSession` could resolve: a bearer token, a session cookie, or an API key. A
|
|
82
|
+
* request with none stays anonymous without building the instance or reading D1.
|
|
83
|
+
*/
|
|
84
|
+
export function carriesCredential(headers: Headers): boolean {
|
|
85
|
+
return headers.has("authorization") || headers.has("cookie") || headers.has(API_KEY_HEADER);
|
|
86
|
+
}
|
|
87
|
+
|
|
70
88
|
export function createSessionMiddleware(wiring: AuthWiring): PithyMiddleware {
|
|
71
89
|
return (app) => {
|
|
72
90
|
app.use("*", async (c, next) => {
|
|
73
|
-
|
|
91
|
+
// A tool call the MCP endpoint dispatched to a route. Its caller was verified there, against the
|
|
92
|
+
// token, the consent, the session and the account's standing, and it arrives with no credential of its own:
|
|
93
|
+
// the identity rides beside the request in process, where nothing on the network can put one.
|
|
94
|
+
const dispatched = dispatchedAuth(c.req.raw);
|
|
95
|
+
if (dispatched !== undefined) {
|
|
96
|
+
c.set("auth", dispatched);
|
|
97
|
+
return await next();
|
|
98
|
+
}
|
|
99
|
+
if (!carriesCredential(c.req.raw.headers)) return await next();
|
|
74
100
|
// A credential signed under a session secret this deployment has since rotated is re-signed under the
|
|
75
101
|
// current one before anything reads it (#602), and the re-signed one rides back on the response. A
|
|
76
102
|
// failure building the instance is not this middleware's to raise, so it is left to the routes.
|