@pipeworx/mcp-civic 0.1.0

package/src/index.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,1074 @@
+interface McpToolDefinition {
+  name: string;
+  description: string;
+  /** Human-facing one-liner (fleet #1967). Optional; consumers fall back to
+   *  description. Kept in step with shared/src/types.ts — scripts/lib/
+   *  check-inlined-types.mjs reports drift at publish time. */
+  summary?: string;
+  inputSchema: {
+    type: 'object';
+    properties: Record<string, unknown>;
+    required?: string[];
+    anyOf?: Array<{ required: string[] }>;
+    oneOf?: Array<{ required: string[] }>;
+    allOf?: Array<{ required: string[] }>;
+  };
+  outputSchema?: Record<string, unknown>;
+}
+
+interface McpToolExport {
+  tools: McpToolDefinition[];
+  callTool: (name: string, args: Record<string, unknown>) => Promise<unknown>;
+  meter?: { credits: number };
+  cost?: Record<string, unknown>;
+  provider?: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Was this failure OUR OWN web service? — the other half of `internal-db-class.ts`.
+ *
+ * fleet #1089 pulled failures from our own Postgres out of `upstream_down` by
+ * keying on the SQLSTATE inside PostgREST's four-key error envelope. That
+ * covered the majority and structurally could not cover the rest: the rest
+ * never reach Postgres, so they carry no SQLSTATE. What was left, measured over
+ * the 24h to 2026-09-02T15:00Z (fleet #1096):
+ *
+ *     5  pipeworx-catalog  get_pack_tools     Pipeworx catalog error: 522 — error code: 522
+ *     3  fleet             fleet_list_open …  upstream_down: Fleet task queue did not respond within 25s
+ *
+ * 521/522/523/526 are Cloudflare saying its edge could not reach an ORIGIN, and
+ * in both of those rows the origin is ours — `gateway.pipeworx.io` for the
+ * catalog pack (it self-fetches when the gateway hasn't injected a manifest),
+ * our own Supabase for fleet. There is no third party anywhere in either call.
+ * Same defect as #1089: our own outage filed under `upstream_down`, the one
+ * class that means "the source is unreachable and there is nothing for us to
+ * fix", which is why the problem-tools triage skips it.
+ *
+ * WHY NOT A WORDING RULE. The obvious fix is to match `fleet db error:` and
+ * `Pipeworx catalog error:` in classifyToolError. Each is emitted from exactly
+ * one site today, so it would work today. It would also rot the first time
+ * somebody rewords a label — silently, and in the direction of hiding our own
+ * outage, which is worse than the bug being fixed. Every prose rule in
+ * error-class.ts has needed widening as packs invented new wording (#409/#450/
+ * #584); that history is most of that file's comment budget.
+ *
+ * WHAT THIS KEYS ON INSTEAD: **the host the call actually reached.** A URL's
+ * hostname is a fact about the call, not a guess about its prose. Two
+ * consequences that a pack-level flag could not give us, and the reason the
+ * flag was rejected:
+ *
+ *   - It describes the CALL, not the pack. `govcon-intel` fans out to our own
+ *     Supabase AND to genuine third parties; `court-listener` holds our cache
+ *     in Supabase and fetches courtlistener.com. An `internallyHosted: true` on
+ *     either pack would relabel a real third-party outage as ours — inventing
+ *     work, which is the same class of error in the opposite direction.
+ *   - It covers every future internal pack for free, instead of one declared
+ *     slug at a time.
+ *
+ * WHY IT SURVIVES A REWORD. The marker below is not matched as a literal by two
+ * separate files. `markInternalOrigin()` writes it and `internalHostMetricsClass()`
+ * reads it, both from the single exported `INTERNAL_ORIGIN_MARKER` constant in
+ * this module — so changing the wording changes both sides in the same edit and
+ * cannot desynchronise them. The pack's own label (`fleet db error:`,
+ * `Pipeworx catalog error:`) is not read at all: reword it freely, the class is
+ * unaffected. That is the property `stripClassPrefix` lacked when it drifted
+ * from its own classifier three times and needed a CI gate to hold them
+ * together.
+ *
+ * WHERE THE 5xx TEST LIVES. `markInternalOrigin` is called from the places that
+ * hold the real `Response` — `httpError`/`httpErrorMessage` and the timeout
+ * branch of `fetchWithTimeout` in `shared/src/http.ts` — so "is this an
+ * availability failure" is decided from the actual status code, never re-derived
+ * by scraping a number out of a sentence. A 404 from our own registry for a slug
+ * that does not exist is a caller's bad argument and is deliberately NOT marked.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * OUR OWN web service was unreachable — not an upstream, and never `upstream_down`.
+ *
+ * ONE value, not three, unlike `internal_db_*`. That split existed because a
+ * slow query, an exhausted pool and an unknown SQLSTATE have different owners
+ * and different fixes. Here there is only one story to tell — an origin we run
+ * did not answer the edge — and one owner. A bucket with no distinct owner per
+ * value is decoration; #724 is what happens when a class holds several
+ * situations, and inventing sub-values ahead of a reason to act on them
+ * differently is the same mistake with the sign flipped.
+ *
+ * METRICS ONLY, exactly like PLATFORM_KEY_ERROR_CLASS and the internal_db
+ * values. `classifyToolError` still answers `upstream_down` for the retry and
+ * hint paths, which only care whether retrying or a sibling tool might work —
+ * and it might. Nothing a caller sees or is charged changes here.
+ *
+ * READ SIDE: this value is in BROKEN_TOOL_CLASSES, FAULT_CLASSES and
+ * ALL_ERROR_CLASSES in `workers/registry-api/src/index.ts`. All three, or it
+ * lands on no dashboard — fleet #721 is the warning, where the #719 split
+ * worked on the write side and was invisible for weeks.
+ */
+const INTERNAL_SERVICE_UNREACHABLE_CLASS = 'internal_service_unreachable';
+
+/**
+ * The token that carries "this origin is ours" from the call site to the
+ * classifier.
+ *
+ * Appended to the error message rather than attached to the Error object,
+ * because the object does not survive the trip: 275 packs return `{ error:
+ * string }` instead of throwing, the gateway reads `observedError` as a string,
+ * and the fleet pack rebuilds its error from a captured status + body across a
+ * retry loop. A property on an Error would be dropped by every one of those
+ * paths and the class would work in tests and vanish in production.
+ *
+ * WORDING IS LOAD-BEARING, same rule as labelAge's note in authority.ts. This
+ * string is appended to a pack's thrown Error message (shared/src/http.ts),
+ * and a thrown Error's message is exactly what the gateway hands back to the
+ * caller as `content[0].text` when nothing rewrites it (workers/gateway/src
+ * catches the throw and sets `rawResult.message = stripClassPrefix(error)`,
+ * which does not touch this suffix) — so the original wording,
+ * " [pipeworx-hosted origin — our own service, not a third party]", was not a
+ * theoretical leak: it shipped live on pipeworx-catalog's 522s, 7 times in 6
+ * hours on 2026-09-02 (see tests/golden-internal-service.test.ts), verbatim
+ * naming Pipeworx as the host. check:hosting-claims never caught it because it
+ * did not scan shared/ at all (task #2009). Reworded to describe the
+ * OBSERVATION (the origin did not answer) without a claim about who runs it —
+ * the identical fix labelAge got: drop the possessive, keep the fact.
+ */
+const INTERNAL_ORIGIN_MARKER = ' [origin did not respond — retry before concluding the named source is down]';
+
+/**
+ * Supabase's data plane for a project is `<ref>.supabase.co`, where the ref is
+ * exactly twenty lowercase letters (ours is `pqauisounztsgdgfkhke`).
+ *
+ * Matching the shape rather than listing the ref keeps this correct when we add
+ * a project — `supabaseEnv` on a pack entry already points some packs at a
+ * second one — while still excluding `status.supabase.co`, which is Supabase's
+ * own status page and emphatically not our database. Verified 2026-09-02 by
+ * `grep -rhoE '[a-z0-9-]+\.supabase\.(co|in)' mcps shared workers scripts`: the
+ * only real project ref anywhere in the tree is ours, the rest are doc
+ * placeholders (`abc`, `xyz`, `example`) which this pattern also excludes. Same
+ * finding internal-db-class.ts relies on for the PostgREST envelope being ours
+ * by construction.
+ */
+const SUPABASE_PROJECT_HOST = /^[a-z]{20}\.supabase\.(co|in)$/;
+
+/**
+ * Is this a host WE run?
+ *
+ * Deliberately NOT including `*.workers.dev`: plenty of third-party APIs are
+ * hosted on workers.dev, so the suffix says where something runs and not who
+ * owns it. Every internal call we actually make goes to a `pipeworx.io`
+ * hostname or to our Supabase project, both of which are ownership facts.
+ *
+ * `workers/gateway/src/provenance.ts`'s `OUR_HOSTS` answers the same
+ * question and DOES include `workers.dev` — a documented divergence
+ * (task #2051), not a bug to converge. That list decides what a response may
+ * cite as a data SOURCE, where a false negative (citing our own worker as an
+ * external source) is the hosting-disclosure leak this whole file exists to
+ * prevent, so it errs broad. This one decides who gets BLAMED for a 5xx in
+ * outage metrics read by on-call, where a false positive (crediting our own
+ * infra with a third party's outage) hides the real failure, so it errs
+ * narrow. Same suffix, opposite direction, because they are never called for
+ * the same reason.
+ *
+ * Returns false on anything unparseable rather than throwing — this runs inside
+ * an error path, and an error path that can itself throw turns a diagnosable
+ * failure into a mystery.
+ */
+function isPipeworxOrigin(url: string | URL | undefined | null): boolean {
+  if (!url) return false;
+  let host: string;
+  try {
+    host = new URL(url instanceof URL ? url.href : url).hostname.toLowerCase();
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (host === 'pipeworx.io' || host.endsWith('.pipeworx.io')) return true;
+  return SUPABASE_PROJECT_HOST.test(host);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Append the marker when this failure was OUR origin failing to answer.
+ *
+ * `status` is the HTTP status when there is one, and omitted for a timeout —
+ * where there is no response at all, and "the origin did not answer" is the
+ * whole observation. Statuses below 500 are left alone: a 404 from our own
+ * registry for a slug that does not exist is the caller's argument, not our
+ * outage, and marking it would put ordinary 404s on the incident dashboard.
+ *
+ * Idempotent, so a message that is wrapped and re-marked on the way up (the
+ * fleet pack's retry loop re-throws through two layers) carries the marker once.
+ */
+function markInternalOrigin(
+  message: string,
+  url: string | URL | undefined | null,
+  status?: number,
+): string {
+  if (status !== undefined && status < 500) return message;
+  if (!isPipeworxOrigin(url)) return message;
+  if (message.includes(INTERNAL_ORIGIN_MARKER)) return message;
+  return message + INTERNAL_ORIGIN_MARKER;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Which blob4 value a failure from our own web services books as, or undefined
+ * if this is not one.
+ *
+ * Ordered AFTER `internalDbMetricsClass` at the call site: a PostgREST envelope
+ * from our own Supabase is a strictly more specific statement about the same
+ * row (which of our services, and why), and the two cannot disagree about
+ * whether the failure is ours.
+ */
+function internalHostMetricsClass(error: string): string | undefined {
+  return error.includes(INTERNAL_ORIGIN_MARKER) ? INTERNAL_SERVICE_UNREACHABLE_CLASS : undefined;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * One place to turn a failed `fetch` into an error a caller can act on.
+ *
+ * Nearly every pack was written the same way:
+ *
+ *     if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`Unsplash: ${res.status}`);
+ *
+ * which discards the response body — and the body is usually where the upstream
+ * says what was actually wrong ("**symbol** not found: GBP", "parameter `year`
+ * out of range", "unknown taxonomy id"). The caller gets a number, cannot
+ * self-correct, and retries the same broken call. A 2026-07-31 sweep found this
+ * shape in 481 of 1,400 packs, 47 of them PLATFORM-keyed.
+ *
+ * It also hides bugs one level down. Two of the first three packs audited had a
+ * second defect that only existed because of this line: unsplash's rate-limit
+ * branch sat BELOW a catch-all and was unreachable, and bea-gov parsed
+ * `BEAAPI.Error.APIErrorDescription` below a `!res.ok` throw that made the
+ * parsing dead code for every non-200.
+ *
+ * DELIBERATELY NOT A CLASSIFIER. It does not add `user_error:` /
+ * `upstream_down:` prefixes. Those decide which tier a failure lands in, and the
+ * `error` tier is what the daily problem-tools list is built from — it means
+ * "Pipeworx has a defect". A 400 is genuinely ambiguous: often a caller's bad
+ * argument, but sometimes a query WE built wrong (ted-eu comma-joined its CPV
+ * values into something TED rejected, and that bug was found only because it sat
+ * in `error`). Blanket-classifying 400s as caller mistakes would have hidden it.
+ * A pack that KNOWS which it is should keep saying so explicitly; this helper is
+ * for the 481 that say nothing at all.
+ */
+
+/** Longest upstream explanation we'll pass through. Enough for a real message,
+ *  short enough that an HTML page or a stack trace can't swamp the error. */
+
+const MAX_DETAIL = 300;
+
+/**
+ * Default bound for `fetchWithTimeout` when a pack doesn't state its own.
+ *
+ * 25s mirrors the number `epo-ops` landed on after measuring the real failure:
+ * a degraded upstream that doesn't error, it just never answers, and a Worker
+ * sits in `await fetch()` until ITS OWN execution budget kills the request —
+ * which can take minutes, not seconds (epo_ops_search_patents measured 4-8
+ * MINUTE hangs before this existed). 25s is short enough that a caller gets a
+ * fast, actionable error instead of holding the connection, and long enough
+ * that it doesn't false-trip on a merely-slow-but-alive upstream.
+ */
+const DEFAULT_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS = 25_000;
+
+/**
+ * Read the body of a failed response and fold it into a throwable Error.
+ *
+ * Usage — note the `await`, which is the one thing that makes this a mechanical
+ * change rather than a drop-in:
+ *
+ *     if (!res.ok) throw await httpError(res, 'Unsplash');
+ *
+ * Safe to call on any non-ok response: a body that is missing, empty, unreadable
+ * or HTML degrades to exactly the old `Name: 404` string rather than throwing
+ * something new from inside the error path.
+ */
+async function httpError(res: Response, name: string): Promise<Error> {
+  return new Error(await httpErrorMessage(res, name));
+}
+
+/** The message text without constructing an Error — for packs that need to wrap
+ *  it in their own envelope or add an explicit classification prefix. */
+async function httpErrorMessage(res: Response, name: string): Promise<string> {
+  // The one place a 5xx from a host WE run gets stamped as ours. `res.url` is
+  // the URL the fetch actually resolved to (after redirects), so this is a fact
+  // about the call rather than a guess from the `name` the pack passed in —
+  // reword that label freely, the class does not move. See
+  // internal-host-class.ts; no-op for every third-party upstream, which is why
+  // this touches 481 packs' error text and changes none of it.
+  return markInternalOrigin(
+    `${name}: ${res.status}${detailSuffix(await readDetail(res))}`,
+    res.url,
+    res.status,
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * Just the upstream's own explanation — no name, no status.
+ *
+ * For a pack that has already said both in its own sentence. epo-ops reads
+ * `EPO rejected this search as too large (HTTP 413) — ${httpErrorMessage(…)}`,
+ * which rendered as `… (HTTP 413) — EPO: 413.` once the XML detail was being
+ * dropped: the upstream named twice, the status twice, and the one thing EPO
+ * actually said ("Not enough characters before truncation character") nowhere
+ * (fleet #712). Returns '' when the body carries nothing readable, so a caller
+ * can fall back to its own wording.
+ */
+async function upstreamDetail(res: Response): Promise<string> {
+  return readDetail(res);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read a SUCCESSFUL response as JSON, failing loudly when it isn't JSON.
+ *
+ * `httpError` above only ever runs on `!res.ok`, which leaves the nastier half
+ * of the problem unhandled: an upstream that answers **HTTP 200 with an HTML
+ * page**. A bot wall, a login redirect, a maintenance interstitial and a CDN
+ * error page are all 200s, so `res.ok` is true, and `res.json()` then throws
+ * `Unexpected token '<', "<!DOCTYPE "... is not valid JSON`.
+ *
+ * That string is the problem. It names no upstream, carries no status, and
+ * reads like a parser bug in Pipeworx — so it lands in the `error` tier, which
+ * means "we have a defect", and the caller is told nothing they can act on.
+ * data.govt.nz sat dead behind an Imperva challenge this way and every
+ * status-code health check we own reported it green (7889a845). A zero-length
+ * body has the same shape: `Unexpected end of JSON input`, seen this week on
+ * uk-gazette (83% of external calls) and census.
+ *
+ * UNLIKE `httpError`, this one DOES classify, and the asymmetry is deliberate.
+ * A 400 is genuinely ambiguous — often the caller's bad argument, sometimes a
+ * query we built wrong — so blanket-classifying it would hide our own bugs.
+ * There is no such ambiguity here: **no argument a caller can pass makes a JSON
+ * API return an HTML page.** It is always the upstream, so `upstream_down:` is
+ * a statement of fact rather than a guess, and it keeps these out of the
+ * problem-tools list where they crowd out real defects.
+ *
+ *     const data = await parseJson<Feed>(res, 'UK Gazette');
+ *
+ * Call it only after the `!res.ok` check — on a failed response you want
+ * `httpError`, which mines the body for the upstream's own explanation.
+ */
+async function parseJson<T>(res: Response, name: string): Promise<T> {
+  let raw: string;
+  try {
+    raw = await res.text();
+  } catch {
+    throw new Error(
+      `upstream_down: ${name} returned a body that could not be read (HTTP ${res.status}). ` +
+        'The connection most likely dropped mid-response; retrying is reasonable.',
+    );
+  }
+
+  const type = res.headers.get('content-type') ?? 'no content-type';
+
+  if (!raw.trim()) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `upstream_down: ${name} answered HTTP ${res.status} with an EMPTY body where JSON was expected (${type}). ` +
+        'Nothing about the request can cause this — it is an upstream fault, and the same call may well work on retry.',
+    );
+  }
+
+  // Checked before parsing rather than in the catch, because knowing it is
+  // markup is what turns "we failed to parse something" into "they served a
+  // web page" — the second is diagnosable, the first is not.
+  const head = raw.slice(0, 200).trimStart().toLowerCase();
+  if (head.startsWith('<!doctype') || head.startsWith('<html') || head.startsWith('<?xml')) {
+    const kind = head.startsWith('<?xml') ? 'an XML document' : 'an HTML page';
+    // The summary, not the source. Pasting the first 120 characters of a web
+    // page handed the agent `<!DOCTYPE html><html lang="en"…` — the same leak
+    // this branch exists to describe (fleet #712).
+    throw new Error(
+      `upstream_down: ${name} answered HTTP ${res.status} with ${kind} instead of JSON (${type}). ` +
+        'That is typically a bot wall, a login redirect or a maintenance page — it is returned as a SUCCESS, ' +
+        `so status-code health checks read it as fine. No argument change will get past it. ` +
+        `The page says: ${summarizeErrorBody(raw) || 'nothing readable'}`,
+    );
+  }
+
+  try {
+    return JSON.parse(raw) as T;
+  } catch {
+    throw new Error(
+      `upstream_down: ${name} answered HTTP ${res.status} with a body that is not valid JSON (${type}). ` +
+        `It begins: ${stripMarkup(raw).slice(0, 120) || '(unreadable)'}`,
+    );
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * `fetch`, but bounded — the fix for a systemic gap found 2026-08-30: a grep
+ * audit of every pack's `mcps/*\/src/index.ts` found 1,339 of ~1,500 call
+ * `fetch()` with NO timeout guard anywhere in the file. Two of those
+ * (epo-ops, statcan) were confirmed live-hanging for 4-8 minutes before this
+ * existed — every unguarded call carries the same risk, just unconfirmed.
+ *
+ * Mirrors the `epoFetch` wrapper `mcps/epo-ops/src/index.ts` shipped first:
+ * bound the request with `AbortSignal.timeout`, and on a timeout/abort throw
+ * an `upstream_down:` error that names the upstream and the bound rather than
+ * letting the raw `TimeoutError`/`AbortError` (which names neither) propagate.
+ * `upstream_down:` is deliberate, same reasoning as `parseJson` above — no
+ * argument a caller passes can make an upstream hang, so it is always the
+ * upstream's fault, and marking it that way keeps a slow API off the
+ * problem-tools list where it would crowd out our own defects.
+ *
+ * Usage — a mechanical swap for a bare `fetch(url, init)`:
+ *
+ *     const res = await fetchWithTimeout(url, init, 'Some API');
+ *
+ * Pass `timeoutMs` as a fourth argument to override the default for a pack
+ * with a known-slower upstream; the label should be the same short name you'd
+ * pass to `httpError`/`httpErrorMessage` for that call.
+ */
+async function fetchWithTimeout(
+  url: string | URL,
+  init: RequestInit = {},
+  name: string,
+  timeoutMs: number = DEFAULT_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS,
+): Promise<Response> {
+  try {
+    return await fetch(url, { ...init, signal: AbortSignal.timeout(timeoutMs) });
+  } catch (err) {
+    if (err instanceof Error && (err.name === 'TimeoutError' || err.name === 'AbortError')) {
+      // States the OBSERVATION (no response in N seconds), not a diagnosis.
+      // "appears to be degraded" is an inference about the vendor that we have
+      // not checked, and it is wrong in a way that misdirects whoever reads it:
+      // a timeout from a Worker can equally mean OUR egress is blocked.
+      //
+      // Measured today (2026-09-01, fleet #1047): every call to
+      // mainnet.base.org failed from the x402 facilitator while the identical
+      // request from a laptop returned 200. Base was entirely healthy; the
+      // public RPC refuses Cloudflare Worker egress. Had this message fired
+      // there it would have blamed Base by name, and the next person would have
+      // waited for a vendor outage to clear that did not exist.
+      // A timeout has no status to test — there is no response at all — so
+      // `markInternalOrigin` is called without one: an origin we run that never
+      // answered is an availability failure by definition. This is the half of
+      // fleet #1096 with neither a SQLSTATE nor a status code to key on.
+      throw new Error(
+        markInternalOrigin(
+          `upstream_down: ${name} did not respond within ${timeoutMs / 1000}s. ` +
+            `That can be ${name} being slow or down, or this environment being unable to reach it ` +
+            `(some hosts refuse datacenter/Worker egress) — retry shortly, and check reachability ` +
+            `from elsewhere before concluding ${name} is down.`,
+          url,
+        ),
+      );
+    }
+    throw err;
+  }
+}
+
+function detailSuffix(detail: string): string {
+  return detail ? ` — ${detail}` : '';
+}
+
+async function readDetail(res: Response): Promise<string> {
+  let raw: string;
+  try {
+    raw = await res.text();
+  } catch {
+    // Body already consumed, or the connection died mid-read. The status alone
+    // is still worth throwing — never let the error path throw its own error.
+    return '';
+  }
+  return summarizeErrorBody(raw);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Turn ANY error body — JSON, HTML, XML or plain text — into one short phrase
+ * that never contains markup.
+ *
+ * This used to just drop an HTML or XML body on the floor, on the reasoning
+ * that markup crowds out the status. That was half right. Dropping it loses the
+ * one sentence a caller could have acted on: an `Access Denied` title, an SDMX
+ * `<message:Error>` text, an OPS fault string. A 2026-08-30 support sweep
+ * measured 13 of 291 caller-facing error rows carrying a raw page or document
+ * verbatim, across 11 packs, and in every one of them the useful content —
+ * "Access Denied", "Invalid country code", "SCRAPE_TIMEOUT" — was in there,
+ * buried in markup the agent had to parse out of a string (fleet #712).
+ *
+ * So: extract the meaning, discard the markup. The output is passed through
+ * `stripMarkup` unconditionally, which is what lets `check:error-body-leak`
+ * assert mechanically that no caller-facing message can contain `<?xml`,
+ * `<!DOCTYPE` or `<html`.
+ */
+function summarizeErrorBody(raw: string): string {
+  if (!raw || !raw.trim()) return '';
+
+  const head = raw.slice(0, 400).trimStart().toLowerCase();
+
+  // An HTML error page (Cloudflare interstitial, nginx default, a login
+  // redirect) says what it is in its <title>, and almost nowhere else.
+  if (head.startsWith('<!doctype') || head.startsWith('<html')) {
+    const title = htmlTitle(raw);
+    return title
+      ? `${title} (upstream returned an HTML error page, not an API response)`
+      : 'upstream returned an HTML error page, not an API response';
+  }
+
+  // XML fault documents — EPO OPS, SDMX (`<message:Error>`), SOAP faults. The
+  // human sentence sits in a child element whose tag name says what it is.
+  if (head.startsWith('<?xml') || head.startsWith('<')) {
+    const fault = xmlFaultText(raw);
+    return fault
+      ? `${stripMarkup(fault).slice(0, MAX_DETAIL)} (from the upstream's XML error document)`
+      : 'upstream returned an XML error document with no readable message';
+  }
+
+  // Most JSON error bodies bury one human sentence among ids and echoed request
+  // params. Prefer that sentence; fall back to the whole body when the shape is
+  // unfamiliar, since an unfamiliar shape is exactly when we can least afford to
+  // guess wrong and show nothing.
+  const fromJson = messageFromJson(raw);
+  return stripMarkup(fromJson ?? raw).slice(0, MAX_DETAIL);
+}
+
+/** The `<title>` of an HTML error page, or its first `<h1>` — the two places a
+ *  bot wall, a 502 and an "Access Denied" all state what happened. */
+function htmlTitle(raw: string): string | null {
+  const head = raw.slice(0, 4000);
+  for (const re of [/<title[^>]*>([\s\S]*?)<\/title>/i, /<h1[^>]*>([\s\S]*?)<\/h1>/i]) {
+    const m = re.exec(head);
+    const text = m ? stripMarkup(m[1]) : '';
+    if (text) return text.slice(0, 160);
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
+/** Tag names that carry the explanation in an XML fault document, namespace
+ *  prefix optional (`<message:Error>`, `<com:Text>`, `<faultstring>`). */
+const XML_FAULT_TAG_RE =
+  /<(?:[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+:)?(?:text|message|description|faultstring|reason|detail|title|errormessage|error)\b[^>]*>([^<]{2,400})</i;
+
+function xmlFaultText(raw: string): string | null {
+  const head = raw.slice(0, 8000);
+  const tagged = XML_FAULT_TAG_RE.exec(head);
+  if (tagged && tagged[1].trim()) return tagged[1];
+
+  // Nothing conventionally named — take the longest text node instead. A fault
+  // document with one sentence in an oddly named element is still readable;
+  // returning nothing at all is not.
+  let best = '';
+  for (const m of head.matchAll(/>([^<>]{8,400})</g)) {
+    const text = m[1].trim();
+    if (text.length > best.length) best = text;
+  }
+  return best || null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Remove every tag and stray angle bracket, then collapse whitespace.
+ *
+ * Applied to everything on the way out, including the JSON and plain-text
+ * paths, because an upstream is free to embed markup in a JSON string field —
+ * and a leak is a leak regardless of which branch produced it.
+ */
+function stripMarkup(s: string): string {
+  return collapse(decodeEntities(s.replace(/<[^>]*>/g, ' ')).replace(/[<>]/g, ' '));
+}
+
+/** The handful of entities that show up in error-page titles. Decoded AFTER
+ *  tags are stripped and BEFORE the angle-bracket sweep, so `&lt;script&gt;`
+ *  in a title cannot decode into markup that survives — EMBL-EBI's ChEMBL 500
+ *  page renders as `500 Internal Server Error &lt; EMBL-EBI` otherwise. */
+function decodeEntities(s: string): string {
+  return s
+    .replace(/&(?:amp|#0*38);/gi, '&')
+    .replace(/&(?:lt|#0*60);/gi, '<')
+    .replace(/&(?:gt|#0*62);/gi, '>')
+    .replace(/&(?:quot|#0*34);/gi, '"')
+    .replace(/&(?:#0*39|apos|#x0*27);/gi, "'")
+    .replace(/&nbsp;/gi, ' ');
+}
+
+/** The conventional "what went wrong" field, under any of the names upstreams
+ *  actually use. Checked in order; first non-empty string wins. */
+const MESSAGE_KEYS = [
+  'message', 'error_message', 'errorMessage', 'detail', 'details',
+  'description', 'error_description', 'reason', 'title', 'fault',
+];
+
+function messageFromJson(raw: string): string | null {
+  let parsed: unknown;
+  try {
+    parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+  return pickMessage(parsed, 0);
+}
+
+function pickMessage(node: unknown, depth: number): string | null {
+  // Two levels covers `{error: {message}}` and `{errors: [{detail}]}`, the two
+  // shapes that account for nearly all of them, without walking a large payload.
+  if (depth > 2 || node == null) return null;
+
+  if (typeof node === 'string') return node.trim() || null;
+
+  if (Array.isArray(node)) {
+    for (const item of node) {
+      const found = pickMessage(item, depth + 1);
+      if (found) return found;
+    }
+    return null;
+  }
+
+  if (typeof node !== 'object') return null;
+  const obj = node as Record<string, unknown>;
+
+  for (const key of MESSAGE_KEYS) {
+    const v = obj[key];
+    if (typeof v === 'string' && v.trim()) return v.trim();
+  }
+  // `{error: …}` where error is itself an object or a string — the single most
+  // common wrapper, so it is worth descending into by name rather than scanning
+  // every key and risking picking up an echoed request parameter.
+  for (const key of ['error', 'errors', 'fault', 'Error', 'data']) {
+    if (key in obj) {
+      const found = pickMessage(obj[key], depth + 1);
+      if (found) return found;
+    }
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
+/** Errors are read in a single line of log output; newlines and runs of
+ *  whitespace make a multi-line body unreadable there. */
+function collapse(s: string): string {
+  return s.replace(/\s+/g, ' ').trim();
+}
+/**
+ * CIViC — Clinical Interpretation of Variants in Cancer.
+ *
+ * Open, expert-curated knowledgebase of the clinical significance of somatic
+ * cancer variants, served from https://civicdb.org/api/graphql with no key.
+ * Every claim in CIViC is an evidence item tied to a published source, graded
+ * by level (A practice-changing … E inferential) and star rating.
+ *
+ * TRAP: `description` on the BrowseFeature type 500s upstream — it is declared
+ * in the schema but blows up in their resolver. Do not put it back into the
+ * feature selection set; the gene description comes from the Gene type via
+ * civic_search_genes' second leg instead.
+ */
+
+
+const ENDPOINT = 'https://civicdb.org/api/graphql';
+const UA = 'pipeworx-mcp-civic/1.0 (+https://pipeworx.io)';
+
+/**
+ * TRAP, and it is a silent zero: CIViC treats an EXPLICITLY NULL variable as a
+ * filter for "this column is null", not as "no filter". Measured 2026-09-17 —
+ * `evidenceItems(molecularProfileName: "BRAF V600E")` reports 249 matches;
+ * adding `variantId: null` reports 0, `diseaseName: null` reports 245 and
+ * `therapyName: null` reports 313. All four are HTTP 200. So an unset filter
+ * must be OMITTED from the variables map entirely, never sent as null.
+ */
+function omitNulls(vars: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unknown> {
+  return Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(vars).filter(([, v]) => v !== null && v !== undefined));
+}
+
+async function gql(query: string, rawVariables: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<Record<string, unknown>> {
+  const variables = omitNulls(rawVariables);
+  const res = await fetchWithTimeout(
+    ENDPOINT,
+    {
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers: { 'User-Agent': UA, 'content-type': 'application/json', accept: 'application/json' },
+      body: JSON.stringify({ query, variables }),
+    },
+    'CIViC',
+    45_000,
+  );
+  const body = await res.text();
+  if (!res.ok) {
+    throw new Error(`CIViC GraphQL returned HTTP ${res.status}: ${summarizeErrorBody(body)}`);
+  }
+  let json: { data?: Record<string, unknown>; errors?: { message?: string }[] };
+  try {
+    json = JSON.parse(body) as typeof json;
+  } catch {
+    throw new Error(`CIViC GraphQL returned a non-JSON response: ${summarizeErrorBody(body)}`);
+  }
+  if (json.errors?.length) {
+    throw new Error(`CIViC GraphQL error: ${json.errors.map((e) => e.message ?? '?').join('; ')}`);
+  }
+  if (!json.data) throw new Error('CIViC GraphQL returned no data block');
+  return json.data;
+}
+
+function num(v: unknown, fallback: number, min: number, max: number): number {
+  const n = typeof v === 'number' ? v : typeof v === 'string' ? Number(v) : NaN;
+  if (!Number.isFinite(n)) return fallback;
+  return Math.min(max, Math.max(min, Math.trunc(n)));
+}
+
+function reqStr(args: Record<string, unknown>, key: string, example: string): string {
+  const v = args[key];
+  if (typeof v !== 'string' || !v.trim()) {
+    throw new Error(`"${key}" is required (e.g. "${example}")`);
+  }
+  return v.trim();
+}
+
+function optStr(args: Record<string, unknown>, key: string): string | undefined {
+  const v = args[key];
+  return typeof v === 'string' && v.trim() ? v.trim() : undefined;
+}
+
+function link(path: unknown): string | null {
+  return typeof path === 'string' ? `https://civicdb.org${path}` : null;
+}
+
+const tools: McpToolExport['tools'] = [
+  {
+    name: 'civic_search_genes',
+    description:
+      'Find cancer genes and fusions in CIViC by name or symbol, with how much curated clinical evidence each carries (variant count, evidence-item count, assertion count). AUTHORITATIVE starting point for "what does CIViC know about gene X" — CIViC is the open expert-curated knowledgebase of clinically actionable somatic cancer variants. Returns the numeric CIViC feature id you pass to the other tools.',
+    inputSchema: {
+      type: 'object' as const,
+      properties: {
+        query: { type: 'string', description: 'Gene symbol or partial name (e.g. "BRAF", "EGFR", "ALK")' },
+        limit: { type: 'number', description: 'Max features to return, 1-100 (default 25)' },
+      },
+      required: ['query'],
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'civic_gene_variants',
+    description:
+      'Curated variants of a cancer gene in CIViC — the specific alterations (missense, fusion, amplification, exon-level) that have published clinical interpretations, each with its evidence count, associated diseases and therapies. AUTHORITATIVE for "which variants of this gene are clinically actionable". Pass the gene symbol.',
+    inputSchema: {
+      type: 'object' as const,
+      properties: {
+        gene: { type: 'string', description: 'Gene symbol (e.g. "BRAF")' },
+        variant_name: { type: 'string', description: 'Optional substring filter on the variant name (e.g. "V600")' },
+        limit: { type: 'number', description: 'Max variants to return, 1-100 (default 25)' },
+      },
+      required: ['gene'],
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'civic_variant_evidence',
+    description:
+      'Individual CIViC evidence items for a molecular profile — the graded, source-linked statements that a variant predicts response or resistance to a therapy, carries prognostic or diagnostic weight, or is oncogenic. Each item carries evidence type, level (A-E), direction, significance, 1-5 star rating, disease, therapies and the PubMed/ASCO source. AUTHORITATIVE for the clinical evidence behind a variant claim, rather than a summary of it. Pass a molecular profile name such as "BRAF V600E", or a numeric CIViC variant id.',
+    inputSchema: {
+      type: 'object' as const,
+      properties: {
+        molecular_profile: {
+          type: 'string',
+          description: 'Molecular profile name, e.g. "BRAF V600E" or "EGFR L858R"',
+        },
+        variant_id: { type: 'number', description: 'Numeric CIViC variant id (alternative to molecular_profile)' },
+        evidence_type: {
+          type: 'string',
+          description: 'Filter: PREDICTIVE | DIAGNOSTIC | PROGNOSTIC | PREDISPOSING | ONCOGENIC | FUNCTIONAL',
+        },
+        disease: { type: 'string', description: 'Filter by disease name substring (e.g. "Melanoma")' },
+        therapy: { type: 'string', description: 'Filter by therapy name substring (e.g. "Vemurafenib")' },
+        limit: { type: 'number', description: 'Max evidence items to return, 1-100 (default 25)' },
+      },
+      required: [],
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    name: 'civic_assertions',
+    description:
+      'CIViC assertions — the curated, AMP/ASCO/CAP-tiered and ACMG-classified clinical summaries that roll up multiple evidence items into a single actionable statement, including FDA companion-test and regulatory-approval flags. AUTHORITATIVE for "is this variant clinically actionable in this disease, and at what tier". Filter by molecular profile, disease or therapy.',
+    inputSchema: {
+      type: 'object' as const,
+      properties: {
+        molecular_profile: { type: 'string', description: 'Molecular profile name, e.g. "BRAF V600E"' },
+        disease: { type: 'string', description: 'Disease name substring (e.g. "Melanoma")' },
+        therapy: { type: 'string', description: 'Therapy name substring (e.g. "Vemurafenib")' },
+        limit: { type: 'number', description: 'Max assertions to return, 1-100 (default 25)' },
+      },
+      required: [],
+    },
+  },
+];
+
+const FEATURE_Q = `query PwFeatures($name: String, $first: Int) {
+  browseFeatures(featureName: $name, first: $first) {
+    nodes { id name fullName featureAliases link variantCount evidenceItemCount assertionCount featureInstanceType flagged deprecated }
+  }
+}`;
+
+const GENE_Q = `query PwGenes($symbols: [String!], $first: Int) {
+  genes(entrezSymbols: $symbols, first: $first) {
+    nodes { id name entrezId description link featureAliases }
+  }
+}`;
+
+async function searchGenes(args: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<unknown> {
+  const query = reqStr(args, 'query', 'BRAF');
+  const limit = num(args.limit, 25, 1, 100);
+  // Over-fetch deliberately. browseFeatures substring-matches with no
+  // relevance ranking at all, so "BRAF" at first:5 returns five BRAF FUSIONS
+  // and not the BRAF gene — the gene sits 9th of 17 matches. Pull the whole
+  // match set (it is small: 17 for BRAF, 1132 features in all of CIViC), rank
+  // it here, then cut to the caller's limit.
+  const data = await gql(FEATURE_Q, { name: query, first: 100 });
+  const nodes = ((data.browseFeatures as { nodes?: Record<string, unknown>[] })?.nodes ?? []).map((n) => ({
+    feature_id: n.id as number,
+    name: n.name as string,
+    full_name: (n.fullName as string) ?? null,
+    feature_type: (n.featureInstanceType as string) ?? null,
+    aliases: (n.featureAliases as string[]) ?? [],
+    variant_count: n.variantCount as number,
+    evidence_item_count: n.evidenceItemCount as number,
+    assertion_count: n.assertionCount as number,
+    flagged: n.flagged as boolean,
+    deprecated: n.deprecated as boolean,
+    url: link(n.link),
+  }));
+
+  // Rank: the exact symbol first, then genes, then fusions and regions.
+  // A prefix test alone is useless here — "BRAF::CUL1" starts with "braf".
+  const q = query.toLowerCase();
+  const rank = (n: { name: string; feature_type: string | null }): number => {
+    if (n.name.toLowerCase() === q) return 0;
+    if (n.feature_type === 'GENE') return 1;
+    return 2;
+  };
+  const ranked = nodes
+    .slice()
+    .sort((a, b) => rank(a) - rank(b) || b.evidence_item_count - a.evidence_item_count)
+    .slice(0, limit);
+
+  // Second leg: the human-written gene summary lives on the Gene type. It is
+  // NOT on BrowseFeature — asking for it there 500s the whole query.
+  const symbols = ranked.filter((n) => n.feature_type === 'GENE').map((n) => n.name);
+  let descriptions: Record<string, { entrez_id: number | null; description: string | null }> = {};
+  if (symbols.length) {
+    const g = await gql(GENE_Q, { symbols, first: symbols.length });
+    descriptions = Object.fromEntries(
+      ((g.genes as { nodes?: Record<string, unknown>[] })?.nodes ?? []).map((n) => [
+        n.name as string,
+        { entrez_id: (n.entrezId as number) ?? null, description: (n.description as string) || null },
+      ]),
+    );
+  }
+
+  return {
+    query,
+    matched: nodes.length,
+    count: ranked.length,
+    features: ranked.map((n) => ({ ...n, ...(descriptions[n.name] ?? {}) })),
+    source: 'CIViC (civicdb.org) — expert-curated clinical interpretation of cancer variants, CC0',
+  };
+}
+
+// TRAP: browseVariants.totalCount and browseFeatures.totalCount IGNORE the
+// filter arguments — measured 2026-09-17, `browseVariants(featureName:"BRAF")`
+// and an unfiltered `browseVariants` both report 5029, the whole CIViC variant
+// catalogue. Reporting it as a match count would be a confident wrong number,
+// so it is not selected here. evidenceItems and assertions DO filter their
+// totalCount (249 -> 208 when an evidenceType is added), which is why those
+// two tools report it.
+const VARIANTS_Q = `query PwVariants($feature: String, $variant: String, $first: Int) {
+  browseVariants(featureName: $feature, variantName: $variant, first: $first) {
+    nodes {
+      id name featureName featureId category evidenceItemCount link
+      variantTypes { name link }
+      diseases { name doid }
+      therapies { name ncitId }
+    }
+  }
+}`;
+
+async function geneVariants(args: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<unknown> {
+  const gene = reqStr(args, 'gene', 'BRAF');
+  const variantName = optStr(args, 'variant_name');
+  const limit = num(args.limit, 25, 1, 100);
+  const data = await gql(VARIANTS_Q, { feature: gene, variant: variantName ?? null, first: limit });
+  const block = data.browseVariants as { nodes?: Record<string, unknown>[] };
+  const nodes = (block?.nodes ?? []).map((n) => ({
+    variant_id: n.id as number,
+    name: n.name as string,
+    gene: (n.featureName as string) ?? null,
+    feature_id: (n.featureId as number) ?? null,
+    category: (n.category as string) ?? null,
+    evidence_item_count: n.evidenceItemCount as number,
+    variant_types: ((n.variantTypes as { name?: string }[]) ?? []).map((t) => t.name).filter(Boolean),
+    diseases: ((n.diseases as { name?: string; doid?: string }[]) ?? []).map((d) => ({
+      name: d.name ?? null,
+      doid: d.doid ?? null,
+    })),
+    therapies: ((n.therapies as { name?: string; ncitId?: string }[]) ?? []).map((t) => ({
+      name: t.name ?? null,
+      ncit_id: t.ncitId ?? null,
+    })),
+    url: link(n.link),
+  }));
+  return {
+    gene,
+    variant_name_filter: variantName ?? null,
+    returned: nodes.length,
+    more_available: nodes.length === limit,
+    variants: nodes,
+    source: 'CIViC (civicdb.org) browseVariants',
+  };
+}
+
+const EVIDENCE_Q = `query PwEvidence($mp: String, $variantId: Int, $disease: String, $therapy: String, $type: EvidenceType, $first: Int) {
+  evidenceItems(molecularProfileName: $mp, variantId: $variantId, diseaseName: $disease, therapyName: $therapy, evidenceType: $type, first: $first) {
+    totalCount
+    nodes {
+      id name status evidenceType evidenceLevel evidenceDirection evidenceRating significance variantOrigin link description
+      molecularProfile { name }
+      disease { name doid }
+      therapies { name ncitId }
+      source { citationId sourceType title journal publicationYear sourceUrl }
+    }
+  }
+}`;
+
+const EVIDENCE_TYPES = new Set([
+  'PREDICTIVE',
+  'DIAGNOSTIC',
+  'PROGNOSTIC',
+  'PREDISPOSING',
+  'ONCOGENIC',
+  'FUNCTIONAL',
+]);
+
+async function variantEvidence(args: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<unknown> {
+  const mp = optStr(args, 'molecular_profile');
+  const variantId = typeof args.variant_id === 'number' ? Math.trunc(args.variant_id) : undefined;
+  if (!mp && variantId == null) {
+    throw new Error('Pass "molecular_profile" (e.g. "BRAF V600E") or "variant_id" (a numeric CIViC variant id)');
+  }
+  const type = optStr(args, 'evidence_type')?.toUpperCase();
+  if (type && !EVIDENCE_TYPES.has(type)) {
+    throw new Error(`"evidence_type" must be one of ${[...EVIDENCE_TYPES].join(', ')}`);
+  }
+  const limit = num(args.limit, 25, 1, 100);
+  const data = await gql(EVIDENCE_Q, {
+    mp: mp ?? null,
+    variantId: variantId ?? null,
+    disease: optStr(args, 'disease') ?? null,
+    therapy: optStr(args, 'therapy') ?? null,
+    type: type ?? null,
+    first: limit,
+  });
+  const block = data.evidenceItems as { totalCount?: number; nodes?: Record<string, unknown>[] };
+  const nodes = (block?.nodes ?? []).map((n) => {
+    const src = (n.source as Record<string, unknown>) ?? {};
+    return {
+      evidence_id: n.id as number,
+      name: n.name as string,
+      status: (n.status as string) ?? null,
+      evidence_type: (n.evidenceType as string) ?? null,
+      evidence_level: (n.evidenceLevel as string) ?? null,
+      evidence_direction: (n.evidenceDirection as string) ?? null,
+      significance: (n.significance as string) ?? null,
+      star_rating: (n.evidenceRating as number) ?? null,
+      variant_origin: (n.variantOrigin as string) ?? null,
+      molecular_profile: ((n.molecularProfile as { name?: string })?.name) ?? null,
+      disease: ((n.disease as { name?: string })?.name) ?? null,
+      disease_doid: ((n.disease as { doid?: string })?.doid) ?? null,
+      therapies: ((n.therapies as { name?: string; ncitId?: string }[]) ?? []).map((t) => ({
+        name: t.name ?? null,
+        ncit_id: t.ncitId ?? null,
+      })),
+      description: (n.description as string) ?? null,
+      source: {
+        citation_id: src.citationId ? String(src.citationId) : null,
+        source_type: (src.sourceType as string) ?? null,
+        title: (src.title as string) ?? null,
+        journal: (src.journal as string) ?? null,
+        year: (src.publicationYear as number) ?? null,
+        url: (src.sourceUrl as string) ?? null,
+      },
+      url: link(n.link),
+    };
+  });
+  return {
+    molecular_profile: mp ?? null,
+    variant_id: variantId ?? null,
+    matching_evidence_items: block?.totalCount ?? nodes.length,
+    returned: nodes.length,
+    evidence_items: nodes,
+    source: 'CIViC (civicdb.org) evidenceItems — evidence levels A (validated) to E (inferential)',
+  };
+}
+
+const ASSERTIONS_Q = `query PwAssertions($mp: String, $disease: String, $therapy: String, $first: Int) {
+  assertions(molecularProfileName: $mp, diseaseName: $disease, therapyName: $therapy, first: $first) {
+    totalCount
+    nodes {
+      id name status assertionType assertionDirection significance ampLevel summary link
+      fdaCompanionTest regulatoryApproval evidenceItemsCount variantOrigin
+      molecularProfile { name }
+      disease { name doid }
+      therapies { name ncitId }
+      acmgCodes { code }
+      nccnGuideline { name }
+    }
+  }
+}`;
+
+async function assertions(args: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<unknown> {
+  const mp = optStr(args, 'molecular_profile');
+  const disease = optStr(args, 'disease');
+  const therapy = optStr(args, 'therapy');
+  if (!mp && !disease && !therapy) {
+    throw new Error('Pass at least one of "molecular_profile", "disease" or "therapy"');
+  }
+  const limit = num(args.limit, 25, 1, 100);
+  const data = await gql(ASSERTIONS_Q, {
+    mp: mp ?? null,
+    disease: disease ?? null,
+    therapy: therapy ?? null,
+    first: limit,
+  });
+  const block = data.assertions as { totalCount?: number; nodes?: Record<string, unknown>[] };
+  const nodes = (block?.nodes ?? []).map((n) => ({
+    assertion_id: n.id as number,
+    name: n.name as string,
+    status: (n.status as string) ?? null,
+    assertion_type: (n.assertionType as string) ?? null,
+    assertion_direction: (n.assertionDirection as string) ?? null,
+    significance: (n.significance as string) ?? null,
+    amp_level: (n.ampLevel as string) ?? null,
+    acmg_codes: ((n.acmgCodes as { code?: string }[]) ?? []).map((c) => c.code).filter(Boolean),
+    nccn_guideline: ((n.nccnGuideline as { name?: string })?.name) ?? null,
+    fda_companion_test: (n.fdaCompanionTest as boolean) ?? null,
+    regulatory_approval: (n.regulatoryApproval as boolean) ?? null,
+    evidence_item_count: (n.evidenceItemsCount as number) ?? null,
+    variant_origin: (n.variantOrigin as string) ?? null,
+    molecular_profile: ((n.molecularProfile as { name?: string })?.name) ?? null,
+    disease: ((n.disease as { name?: string })?.name) ?? null,
+    disease_doid: ((n.disease as { doid?: string })?.doid) ?? null,
+    therapies: ((n.therapies as { name?: string; ncitId?: string }[]) ?? []).map((t) => ({
+      name: t.name ?? null,
+      ncit_id: t.ncitId ?? null,
+    })),
+    summary: (n.summary as string) ?? null,
+    url: link(n.link),
+  }));
+  return {
+    molecular_profile: mp ?? null,
+    disease: disease ?? null,
+    therapy: therapy ?? null,
+    matching_assertions: block?.totalCount ?? nodes.length,
+    returned: nodes.length,
+    assertions: nodes,
+    source: 'CIViC (civicdb.org) assertions — AMP/ASCO/CAP tiers and ACMG codes',
+  };
+}
+
+async function callTool(name: string, args: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<unknown> {
+  switch (name) {
+    case 'civic_search_genes':
+      return searchGenes(args);
+    case 'civic_gene_variants':
+      return geneVariants(args);
+    case 'civic_variant_evidence':
+      return variantEvidence(args);
+    case 'civic_assertions':
+      return assertions(args);
+    default:
+      throw new Error(`Unknown tool: ${name}`);
+  }
+}
+
+export default { tools, callTool, meter: { credits: 1 } } satisfies McpToolExport;