@pikku/kysely 0.13.6 → 0.13.7

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,3 +1,328 @@
+## 0.13.7
+
+### Patch Changes
+
+- 6a307f0: Fix four latent correctness bugs in the function, RPC and error runtimes, and
+  remove dead code from the workflow service surface.
+
+  `WorkflowService.getNodesWithoutSteps` is gone. It was declared on the abstract
+  service and implemented by all five storage backends, and nothing ever called
+  it — hence the non-core packages in this changeset, which only lose that method.
+
+  **An RPC could execute twice.** `RPCService.invoke`, its addon path, and
+  `rpcWithWire` each wrapped the _execution_ of a resolved function in a `try`
+  whose `catch` treated `RPCNotFoundError` as "not found locally" and re-dispatched
+  the call through `deploymentService`. A nested `rpc.invoke` to a missing name,
+  raised from inside an already-running function, therefore re-ran that function on
+  a remote instance after its local side effects had already committed. Resolution
+  is now separated from execution on all three paths, so only a genuinely
+  unresolvable name reaches the fallback. What escapes to callers is unchanged.
+
+  **`addonNamespace` leaked between sibling calls.** The function runner's
+  middleware path restored `rpc`, `functionId`, `audit` and `addonNamespace` after
+  an invocation; the non-middleware path restored the first three but not the
+  fourth. A call into an addon function with no middleware left the addon's
+  namespace on the wire, so subsequent sibling calls resolved the wrong
+  per-instance singletons and `credentialOverrides`.
+
+  **Errors registered on a subclass never resolved.** `misc.errors` was typed
+  `Map<PikkuError, ErrorDetails>` — instances — while `addError` stores
+  constructors, a mismatch hidden by its `error: any` parameter. The instance
+  lookup in `getErrorResponse` was consequently dead, and lookup fell through to a
+  scan comparing `constructor.name`, so a subclass of a registered error got no
+  status mapping at all. The map is now typed `Map<PikkuErrorConstructor, …>` and
+  lookup walks the prototype chain first. Name matching is retained, deliberately,
+  as the fallback that keeps error mapping working when two copies of
+  `@pikku/core` are installed.
+
+  **`createWeakUID` collided across instances.** The prefix was
+  `Date.now().toString(36)` evaluated at module load, so any two instances loading
+  the module in the same millisecond emitted identical `channelId` and `requestId`
+  sequences — reproducibly, not just in principle. It is now seeded lazily from
+  `crypto.randomUUID()`.
+
+  Also: `pikkuState` keys its global map with `Symbol.for` rather than `Symbol`, so
+  two copies of the package share registrations instead of silently getting
+  disjoint state; and the local channel upgrade path no longer keys its middleware
+  cache on the raw request path, which grew the cache without bound while the
+  cached value never varied by path.
+
+- afef587: Close eleven security weaknesses found in a review of `@pikku/core`. Most are
+  breaking, and two invalidate data or credentials already in the wild — read the
+  migration notes before upgrading.
+
+  **Breaking: AI agent thread ownership now fails closed.** Reading, listing,
+  resuming or approving an existing thread or run requires a resolved session
+  principal (`userId`, or `orgId` for `sessionScope: 'org'`), regardless of the
+  agent's `auth` setting. Previously a request without a session had no ownership
+  model at all: the caller-supplied `resourceId` was accepted as the ownership
+  key, so any caller could read or resume another party's thread by naming its
+  `resourceId`. Worse, `threadOwnerConstraint` returned `undefined` for a
+  sessionless caller, and `undefined` means _no filter_ rather than _no rows_ —
+  so `getAgentThreads` returned every thread in the deployment. It now returns
+  `string[]`, empty for a sessionless caller, which every storage backend already
+  treats as matching nothing. Sessionless agents still run one-shot conversations,
+  each with a fresh unguessable owner; what they lose is cross-request continuity.
+  Wire a session to restore it.
+
+  **Breaking: stored secrets and credentials must be re-entered.** `deriveKey` ran
+  a single unsalted round of SHA-256 over the passphrase and used the digest
+  directly as the AES-GCM key — roughly one hash per brute-force guess, with one
+  rainbow table working against every deployment. It is now PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 at
+  600,000 iterations over a random salt. There is no compatibility path: every
+  value held by the kysely, mongodb and redis secret services and the kysely
+  credential service becomes undecryptable. They fail loud, naming the key and
+  `key_version`, so the app hard-fails on first secret read until each is re-set.
+
+  The KEK salt is scoped to the key version and stored alongside it, rather than
+  per secret, so a bulk read costs one derivation instead of N — `getSecrets` over
+  50 secrets went from ~2.3s to ~48ms, and rotation from ~4.6s to ~94ms. This adds
+  a salt table (kysely), hash field (redis) or collection (mongodb), created
+  automatically on first use.
+
+  **Breaking: `PIKKU_REMOTE_SECRET` must be at least 32 characters.** The
+  remote-RPC session envelope moved from PBKDF2 to HKDF, which expands
+  high-entropy key material rather than stretching a low-entropy passphrase. That
+  took a remote hop from ~269ms to ~0.4ms — PBKDF2 was running twice per request —
+  but HKDF supplies no brute-force resistance, so the secret must carry the
+  entropy itself. A shorter secret now throws `WeakKeyMaterialError` at both ends.
+  Generate one with `openssl rand -base64 32` and roll it out to every service in
+  the mesh together: existing bearer tokens are format-incompatible, so a partial
+  rollout produces 401s until every instance is updated. The Cloudflare, Lambda
+  and Azure deployment services each hand-rolled a copy of `buildRemoteHeaders`
+  and now call the shared one, which is what keeps the two sides in step.
+
+  **Breaking: previously signed content URLs stop verifying.** `LocalContent`
+  signed only `{signedAt, expiresAt, notBefore}`, so a signature proved when a URL
+  was issued but never what it was issued for — any valid token was a skeleton
+  key, and swapping the pathname from a public thumbnail to a private document
+  still verified. The signature now binds the request path. Separately, the
+  verifier returned "valid" when no JWT service was wired, which is how
+  `pikku serve` ran: a forged `?signedAt=0&expiresAt=99999999999999` was accepted.
+  It now rejects with 403, `LocalContent` requires a `JWTService`, and
+  `pikku serve`/`pikku dev` mint an ephemeral per-process signing key so local
+  development works without shipping a fail-open path. In-flight signed URLs must
+  be re-issued.
+
+  **Request body size limits now apply to every adapter.** The `maxBodySize` cap
+  existed only in `PikkuFetchHTTPRequest`. The real hole was uWebSockets, which
+  drove `res.onData` itself and concatenated every chunk with no bound and nothing
+  downstream able to intervene; it now drops chunks past the limit and replies 413
+  before routing. Fastify delegates to its native `bodyLimit` (set only when
+  `maxBodySize` is configured, so fastify's stricter 1 MB default is never
+  loosened), and `PikkuExpressServer` feeds the limit into its body parsers. Two
+  paths can only reject rather than prevent, and are documented as such:
+  `express-middleware` mounted on your own app receives an already-parsed body, so
+  that deployment must bound its own parser; Next server actions bottom out at
+  `experimental.serverActions.bodySizeLimit`.
+
+  **Breaking: the console addon's privileged functions are gated by default.**
+  `wireAddon` gains a `scopes` option that applies to every function in the
+  addon's namespace, and the console scaffold now generates
+  `wireAddon({ name: 'console', package: '@pikku/addon-console', scopes: ['admin'] })`.
+  Previously the console's entire privileged surface — around 54 functions
+  including `credentialGet`, which returns a resolved OAuth token for an arbitrary
+  `userId`, `updateFunctionBody`, and `installAddon`, which shells out to a
+  package install — was protected only by an optional host-registered
+  `addGlobalPermission`. `resolveGlobalPermissions` returns `[]` when none is
+  registered and permission checking then no-ops, so an app that never registered
+  one served those functions to anyone, and with the template's default
+  `scaffold.rpc: "no-auth"` that meant unauthenticated. All of them now return 403
+  `MissingScopeError` without an `admin`, `admin:*` or `*` scope. **Regenerating
+  is required** — an app holding an old `console.gen.ts` stays open.
+  `installAddon` and `installOpenapiAddon` additionally declare their own
+  `auth: true, scopes: ['admin']`, and `getAgentThreads` now scopes its listing to
+  the session's own threads unless the caller holds admin.
+
+  Addon scopes are enforced in `runPikkuFunc` rather than at the RPC boundary,
+  because a wiring can reference an addon function directly — the inspector
+  records the addon's `packageName` on HTTP, channel, schedule, queue, CLI,
+  trigger, gateway and MCP wirings — and those paths never call `resolveNamespace`.
+  Enforcing at the RPC seam would have covered only the `namespace:function` form
+  while reading as complete.
+
+  **Breaking: `wireAddon`'s `auth` and `tags` now apply on direct wirings too.**
+  Both were read only by `resolveAddonFunction`, so they had exactly the hole
+  scopes had: `wireAddon({ name: 'console', package: '@pikku/addon-console', auth:
+true, tags: ['admin'] })` gated `rpc('console:credentialGet')` and gated nothing
+  at all on an HTTP route wired straight to `credentialGet`. A consumer who
+  reached for the documented way to lock an addon down got a control that was
+  silently inert on every wiring except one. Both now resolve in `runPikkuFunc`.
+  `auth` merges as an OR — `auth: false` from an addon is ignored on a direct
+  wiring, because an addon may require a session the wiring did not but must never
+  waive one it did. Addon tags resolve to concrete middleware against the **root**
+  tag groups before the call rather than being folded into the function's
+  inherited middleware: `addTagMiddleware('admin', …)` is written by the consuming
+  app and registers under the root package, whereas `combineMiddleware` would look
+  the tag up under the addon's own `packageName`, where it does not exist.
+
+  One consequence worth naming: an addon that wires `auth: true` and also runs its
+  own sessionless internal work — a scheduled task or queue worker inside the
+  addon calling a sibling function — is now gated where it previously was not,
+  because a bare `rpc('fn')` from inside the addon reaches `runPikkuFunc` with the
+  addon's `packageName` like any other call. This reverses a decision that
+  deliberately scoped the gate to the namespaced boundary; that reasoning held
+  only while the boundary was real, and a direct wiring can enter an addon without
+  crossing it, so "already inside" is not something the runtime can infer. Such an
+  addon should carry authorization on the function via
+  `pikkuFunc({ permissions })`, which has always been enforced on every path. A
+  follow-up will add execution provenance so an intra-addon call can be
+  distinguished from an external one and skip the addon-level check; that needs a
+  marker no caller outside the process can set, which is its own design problem
+  and does not belong in a security fix.
+
+  **Codegen now warns when an exposed function has no gate (PKU574).** The
+  generated `POST /rpc/:rpcName` dispatcher forwards to `rpc.exposed`, which
+  refuses anything without `expose: true` — but nothing checked whether the
+  target was gated, because a dispatcher cannot know what it dispatches to. The
+  console shipped ~54 privileged functions through that gap and the toolchain was
+  silent. The inspector now reports every function that is exposed, sessionless,
+  and carries no `auth`, `scopes` or `permissions` of its own and none from a
+  governing `wireAddon`. It is a `warn`, not a critical: `expose: true` on an
+  ungated sessionless function is correct for a genuinely public endpoint, so it
+  blocks a build only under `--fail-on-warn`.
+
+  Two pieces of metadata were missing for this to be answerable statically, and
+  both are now recorded. A `pikkuSessionlessFunc`'s own `auth: true` was read at
+  runtime but never written to function meta, so a self-gated function was
+  indistinguishable from an ungated one — `sessionless` carries the baseline, and
+  `auth` now carries the tightening. And `wireAddon`'s `scopes`, `auth` and `tags`
+  were not parsed at all: the inspector recorded the addon's `rpcEndpoint` and its
+  secret, variable and credential overrides, and dropped every one of its gates.
+  An addon whose gates are not statically knowable is treated as gated, because a
+  false positive on a correctly-secured addon costs more than the one case it
+  would catch.
+
+  **Breaking: an application's global permissions now apply inside addons.**
+  `resolveGlobalPermissions` read only the bucket matching the function's own
+  package, but the generated `addGlobalPermission` wrapper takes no package
+  argument and always registers under the root. An app-wide rule like "every
+  request needs a signed-in user" therefore stopped at the addon boundary, and the
+  bucket an addon's functions did read was one no host could write to — which is
+  why the console addon's recommended `addGlobalPermission([isAdmin],
+'@pikku/addon-console')` was never a gate anybody could actually install. A
+  function now resolves the root bucket and its own package's, root first.
+  Unioning is safe in a way nothing else here would be: globals AND, so adding the
+  root ones can only tighten. Package buckets stay one-way — a package's globals
+  never reach root functions, or an installed addon could gate the whole
+  application. Apps with both a root global and addon-provided functions will see
+  those functions gated where they previously were not.
+
+  **Codegen now records whether each HTTP route requires a session, and warns
+  about inert addon tags (PKU575).** Four separate things can demand a session —
+  the function's `sessionless`, its own `auth`, the route's (or its group's)
+  `auth`, and the addon it belongs to — and answering "which routes are open?"
+  meant joining all four by hand and knowing which wins. Each route's meta now
+  carries the resolved `requiresSession` alongside the route's own `auth`. Scopes
+  count as requiring one, since they are matched against the session's and fail
+  closed. Anything not statically knowable resolves to `true`, matching PKU574:
+  a route that looks stricter than it is costs less than one that looks open and
+  isn't. Separately, `wireAddon({ tags: ['admin'] })` reads like a gate and is
+  applied like one right up until no `addTagMiddleware('admin', …)` exists, at
+  which point it resolves to an empty list and gates nothing; that now warns.
+  Only addon tags are reported — a tag on a function is as likely to be
+  organizational, and warning about those would bury the case that matters.
+
+  **Object-shorthand permissions were missing from meta.** The inspector visited
+  `ts.PropertyAssignment` but not `ts.ShorthandPropertyAssignment`, so
+  `permissions: { canAdminOrg }` — enforced identically to the longhand form at
+  runtime, since `verifyPermissions` has a non-array branch — was recorded as _no
+  permissions at all_. That is the most dangerous direction for meta to be wrong
+  in: an audit reading it sees an open door where one is shut. It cost this review
+  a false IDOR report across ~35 billing and org functions before the source
+  contradicted the metadata.
+
+  **Functions that authorize in their own body can say so.** A webhook receiver
+  verifying a signature, or a handler redeeming a signed invite, is genuinely
+  closed while carrying no session, scope or permission — indistinguishable in
+  meta from one nobody remembered to gate, and so warned about forever by PKU574.
+  `selfAuthenticated: true` on the function config records the claim and silences
+  the warning for that function. It is declarative only: nothing at runtime reads
+  it and it grants nothing. Detection was rejected deliberately — inferring it
+  from the body means a function that _looks_ like it checks something silences
+  the warning while checking nothing, and a warning that is usually wrong stops
+  being read.
+
+  **Breaking: `scaffold.<feature>` is now `boolean | { auth?, path? }`, and `true`
+  means authenticated.** The old `'auth' | 'no-auth' | false` read like a
+  starter-file preference while being a live authorization decision, set three
+  directories from the functions it governed — the shape the console incident
+  took. A surface now becomes public only by writing `{ auth: false }`, so
+  omitting a field can never open anything: the failure mode of a forgotten flag
+  is a locked door. `{ path }` additionally overrides where the file is
+  generated, which previously could only be set for all features at once via
+  `pikkuDir`.
+
+  The legacy strings are **refused, not coerced**. `resolveScaffoldFeature` throws
+  naming the key and its replacement (`"rpc": "no-auth"` → `"rpc": { "auth":
+false }`), and it does so at config load, not downstream. An earlier design used
+  a bare `string` for the output path, under which `"no-auth"` would have parsed
+  as a file named `no-auth` and every unmigrated config would have silently
+  produced nonsense; the object form makes any string invalid, so the failure is
+  loud.
+
+  The collapse is deliberately not uniform in effect. For `rpc` the flag was a
+  blanket "no anonymous RPC in this app" set on a dispatcher that cannot know what
+  it dispatches to; for `userAdmin` it was redundant, since the generated
+  functions are already `pikkuFunc` with `scopes: ['admin:users:list']`. But for
+  `agent`, `workflow`, `events` and `scenarios` it is the only gate — those
+  generate real endpoints the app never authors — so `true` keeps them
+  authenticated rather than opening them as a side effect of a config cleanup.
+  `webhook` and `remoteRpc` have no auth dimension at all (`serialize-remote-rpc.ts`
+  hardcodes `auth: false`), so an `{ auth }` on them is ignored. The three
+  configs in this repo are migrated preserving their current behaviour exactly.
+
+  **Queue job identities are signed.** A job carried the producer's `pikkuUserId`
+  as a plain string and the worker resolved a session from it with no
+  verification, so write access to the queue backend was act-as-any-user. The
+  identity is now `pq1.<claim>.<hmac>`, HMAC-SHA256 over the claim and the
+  canonicalized job payload, keyed by HKDF expansion of a new
+  `PIKKU_QUEUE_IDENTITY_SECRET`. Producers opt in by wrapping their queue service
+  with `SignedQueueService`. This fails safe rather than closed: with no secret
+  configured the identity is dropped and jobs still process, warning once per
+  process, so no existing deployment breaks on upgrade — it simply loses queue
+  identity until the secret is set. The payload rather than the job id is bound
+  because SQS, Cloudflare Queues, Azure and the in-memory service all mint ids
+  after `add` returns.
+
+  **Workflow inline state is read from the run record.** `isInline` consulted a
+  process-local `Map`, while `WorkflowRun.inline` is durable. Any instance that
+  did not start a run disagreed with the record, so one instance could dispatch a
+  queued job for a workflow another was already executing in-process. It is now
+  async and resolves through the durable identity, cached only when a context
+  already exists so a passive reader allocates nothing. The same `Map` also leaked:
+  `nextStepKey` fabricated replay state on every step, and `releaseContext`
+  refused to free anything carrying it, so runs whose steps executed outside a
+  `beginReplay` bracket — the step-worker queue path — stranded their context and
+  step state for the process lifetime. Contexts are now released by an explicit
+  execution counter. Step ordinals reset per execution rather than accumulating
+  across step-worker invocations in one process, which makes step naming
+  independent of how work was distributed.
+
+  **Secret reads fail loud in every store.** `MongoDBSecretService.getSecrets`
+  skipped rows that failed to decrypt, and the redis equivalent dropped every
+  rejection via `Promise.allSettled`, including the "No KEK available for
+  key_version N" configuration error. Both now throw, naming the key and its key
+  version, matching the kysely behaviour. This matters most alongside the KEK
+  change above: without it, an upgrade surfaces as a partial secrets map and an
+  opaque downstream failure instead of an error naming the secret to re-enter.
+
+  **A second middleware registration for a pattern no longer erases the first.**
+  `addHTTPMiddleware`, `addTagMiddleware` and `addChannelMiddleware` groups are
+  keyed by pattern or tag and held one source file each, so a second file's call
+  overwrote the first's. Codegen emits its imports from what is stored, so the
+  losing file was never imported and its middleware never registered — the
+  runtime composes repeated registrations for a pattern happily, and only codegen
+  dropped one. Adding an unrelated `addHTTPMiddleware('*', …)` to an app was
+  enough to silently unregister the generated better-auth session bridge, which
+  fails open and gives no sign until a request arrives without a session. A group
+  now carries every registration made for it, and all of them are imported.
+
+- Updated dependencies [6a307f0]
+- Updated dependencies [afef587]
+- Updated dependencies [8075f6a]
+  - @pikku/core@0.12.74
+
 ## 0.13.6
 
 ### Patch Changes

package/dist/src/kysely-credential-service.d.ts

@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ export interface KyselyCredentialServiceConfig {
 export declare class KyselyCredentialService implements CredentialService {
     private db;
     private initialized;
+    private kekSalts;
+    private keks;
     private key;
     private keyVersion;
     private previousKey?;
@@ -19,6 +21,7 @@ export declare class KyselyCredentialService implements CredentialService {
     constructor(db: Kysely<KyselyPikkuDB>, config: KyselyCredentialServiceConfig);
     init(): Promise<void>;
     private logAudit;
+    private getKEKSalt;
     private getKEK;
     private whereUserId;
     get<T = unknown>(name: string, userId?: string): Promise<T | null>;

package/dist/src/kysely-credential-service.js

@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
-import { envelopeEncrypt, envelopeDecrypt, envelopeRewrap, } from '@pikku/core/crypto-utils';
+import { deriveKEK, generateKEKSalt, envelopeEncrypt, envelopeDecrypt, envelopeRewrap, } from '@pikku/core/crypto-utils';
 import { ensurePikkuSchema } from './schema/index.js';
 import { credentialSchema } from './schema/credential.schema.js';
 export class KyselyCredentialService {
     db;
     initialized = false;
+    kekSalts = new Map();
+    keks = new Map();
     key;
     keyVersion;
     previousKey;
@@ -39,12 +41,47 @@ export class KyselyCredentialService {
         })
             .execute();
     }
-    getKEK(version) {
-        if (version === this.keyVersion)
-            return this.key;
-        if (this.previousKey)
-            return this.previousKey;
-        throw new Error(`No KEK available for key_version ${version}`);
+    async getKEKSalt(version) {
+        const cached = this.kekSalts.get(version);
+        if (cached)
+            return cached;
+        const existing = await this.db
+            .selectFrom('credentialKekSalts')
+            .select('salt')
+            .where('keyVersion', '=', version)
+            .executeTakeFirst();
+        let salt = existing?.salt;
+        if (!salt) {
+            await this.db
+                .insertInto('credentialKekSalts')
+                .values({
+                keyVersion: version,
+                salt: generateKEKSalt(),
+                createdAt: new Date().toISOString(),
+            })
+                .onConflict((oc) => oc.column('keyVersion').doNothing())
+                .execute();
+            const row = await this.db
+                .selectFrom('credentialKekSalts')
+                .select('salt')
+                .where('keyVersion', '=', version)
+                .executeTakeFirstOrThrow();
+            salt = row.salt;
+        }
+        this.kekSalts.set(version, salt);
+        return salt;
+    }
+    async getKEK(version) {
+        const cached = this.keks.get(version);
+        if (cached)
+            return cached;
+        const passphrase = version === this.keyVersion ? this.key : this.previousKey;
+        if (!passphrase) {
+            throw new Error(`No KEK available for key_version ${version}`);
+        }
+        const kek = await deriveKEK(passphrase, await this.getKEKSalt(version));
+        this.keks.set(version, kek);
+        return kek;
     }
     whereUserId(qb, userId) {
         return userId
@@ -60,7 +97,7 @@ export class KyselyCredentialService {
         const row = await qb.executeTakeFirst();
         if (!row)
             return null;
-        const kek = this.getKEK(row.keyVersion);
+        const kek = await this.getKEK(row.keyVersion);
         const plaintext = await envelopeDecrypt(kek, row.ciphertext, row.wrappedDek);
         await this.logAudit(name, userId, 'read');
         try {
@@ -72,7 +109,7 @@ export class KyselyCredentialService {
     }
     async set(name, value, userId) {
         const plaintext = JSON.stringify(value);
-        const { ciphertext, wrappedDEK } = await envelopeEncrypt(this.key, plaintext);
+        const { ciphertext, wrappedDEK } = await envelopeEncrypt(await this.getKEK(this.keyVersion), plaintext);
         const now = new Date().toISOString();
         const exists = await this.has(name, userId);
         if (exists) {
@@ -127,7 +164,7 @@ export class KyselyCredentialService {
             .execute();
         const result = {};
         for (const row of rows) {
-            const kek = this.getKEK(row.keyVersion);
+            const kek = await this.getKEK(row.keyVersion);
             const plaintext = await envelopeDecrypt(kek, row.ciphertext, row.wrappedDek);
             try {
                 result[row.name] = JSON.parse(plaintext);
@@ -166,8 +203,10 @@ export class KyselyCredentialService {
             .select(['name', 'userId', 'wrappedDek'])
             .where('keyVersion', '<', this.keyVersion)
             .execute();
+        const oldKEK = await this.getKEK(this.keyVersion - 1);
+        const newKEK = await this.getKEK(this.keyVersion);
         for (const row of rows) {
-            const newWrappedDEK = await envelopeRewrap(this.previousKey, this.key, row.wrappedDek);
+            const newWrappedDEK = await envelopeRewrap(oldKEK, newKEK, row.wrappedDek);
             let qb = this.db
                 .updateTable('credentials')
                 .set({

package/dist/src/kysely-scope-service.d.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 import type { Role, ScopeService } from '@pikku/core/services';
 import type { FlatScope } from '@pikku/core/scope';
+import type { SystemRole } from '@pikku/core/role';
 import type { Kysely } from 'kysely';
 import type { KyselyPikkuDB } from './kysely-tables.js';
 /**
@@ -33,9 +34,28 @@ export declare class KyselyScopeService implements ScopeService {
     listScopes(): Promise<Array<FlatScope & {
         declared: boolean;
     }>>;
+    /**
+     * Registers the roles declared with `defineSystemRole`.
+     *
+     * Additive on the same terms as `syncScopes` — a role whose declaration has
+     * gone is marked `declared = false` rather than deleted, so a rollback or a
+     * rolling deploy cannot strip everyone's grant. Its *scope set* is replaced
+     * outright, because that is the declaration's entire content: editing
+     * `defineSystemRole` is how you change what a role means, and the deploy is
+     * when it takes effect.
+     */
+    syncSystemRoles(roles: SystemRole[]): Promise<void>;
     createRole(role: Role): Promise<void>;
     deleteRole(name: string): Promise<void>;
     setRoleScopes(name: string, scopes: string[]): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Whether the store holds this name as a system role.
+     *
+     * Asked of the store rather than of the generated `SYSTEM_ROLES`, because the
+     * store is where a shadow would actually collide — and because a role whose
+     * declaration was deleted is still immutable until someone prunes it.
+     */
+    private isSystemRole;
     listRoles(): Promise<Role[]>;
     addUserToRole(userId: string, role: string, grantedBy?: string): Promise<void>;
     removeUserFromRole(userId: string, role: string): Promise<void>;
@@ -56,4 +76,22 @@ export declare class KyselyScopeService implements ScopeService {
      * them. This revokes access, so it is never run implicitly.
      */
     pruneScopes(): Promise<string[]>;
+    /**
+     * System roles the last sync found no declaration for, with how many people
+     * still hold each. Powers `pikku roles audit`.
+     *
+     * The count is the whole point: "this role is gone from the code" and "this
+     * role is gone from the code and 40 people are standing on it" call for
+     * different decisions, and the number is what makes pruning a choice rather
+     * than a formality.
+     */
+    findStaleSystemRoles(): Promise<Array<{
+        role: string;
+        users: number;
+    }>>;
+    /**
+     * Removes undeclared system roles, cascading them out of every user grant
+     * that holds them. This revokes access, so it is never run implicitly.
+     */
+    pruneSystemRoles(): Promise<string[]>;
 }