@peac/protocol 0.15.3 → 0.16.1

package/dist/replay-guard.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/**
+ * Optional, composable replay defense for online consumers of PEAC records.
+ *
+ * createReplayGuard() returns a stateful guard that classifies an already-verified
+ * record as 'fresh', 'replayed', or 'outside-window'. The store is bounded by both
+ * count (maxEntries) and time (a TTL purge plus an iat acceptance window), so
+ * it is finite and bounded against unbounded state growth. The dedup key is
+ * (iss, jti); iat gates the window. All timestamp/window values are safe integers
+ * (epoch seconds); unsafe-integer input fails closed.
+ *
+ * This is an online acceptance policy, not a record property: PEAC adds no exp to
+ * records, changes no wire bytes, and enforces nothing. The same record stays valid
+ * and offline-verifiable indefinitely outside any window. The guard returns a
+ * verdict; the deployer chooses the response. It is intentionally not wired into the
+ * stateless verifyLocal path.
+ *
+ * The clock (now) returns epoch seconds; backward movement (e.g. an NTP or manual
+ * wall-clock regression) is clamped internally to the last observed second, so the
+ * guard stays correct even if the clock goes backward. TTL entries expire at
+ * insertion-time + windowSeconds + maxClockSkewSeconds; with the clamped (monotonic)
+ * clock, expiry order equals insertion order and purge is O(number expired).
+ */
+export interface ReplayGuardOptions {
+    /**
+     * Accept only records whose iat is within [now - windowSeconds, now + maxClockSkewSeconds].
+     * Positive integer (seconds).
+     */
+    windowSeconds: number;
+    /** Allowed future skew for iat (seconds). Default 300. Non-negative integer. */
+    maxClockSkewSeconds?: number;
+    /** Upper bound on retained entries. Default 100_000. Positive integer. */
+    maxEntries?: number;
+    /**
+     * Injectable clock returning epoch seconds (tests/determinism). Backward movement
+     * is clamped internally to the last observed second. Default Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000).
+     */
+    now?: () => number;
+}
+export type ReplayGuardVerdict = 'fresh' | 'replayed' | 'outside-window';
+export interface ReplayGuard {
+    /** Classify a record that has already been verified (e.g. by verifyLocal). No I/O. */
+    check(record: {
+        iss: string;
+        jti: string;
+        iat: number;
+    }): ReplayGuardVerdict;
+}
+/**
+ * Create a bounded replay guard for already-verified records.
+ *
+ * @param options - window, optional max clock skew, optional entry cap, optional clock.
+ * @returns a guard whose `check(record)` returns 'fresh' | 'replayed' | 'outside-window'.
+ */
+export declare function createReplayGuard(options: ReplayGuardOptions): ReplayGuard;
+//# sourceMappingURL=replay-guard.d.ts.map

package/dist/replay-guard.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"replay-guard.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/replay-guard.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAqBG;AAOH,MAAM,WAAW,kBAAkB;IACjC;;;OAGG;IACH,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACtB,gFAAgF;IAChF,mBAAmB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC7B,0EAA0E;IAC1E,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACpB;;;OAGG;IACH,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC;CACpB;AAED,MAAM,MAAM,kBAAkB,GAAG,OAAO,GAAG,UAAU,GAAG,gBAAgB,CAAC;AAEzE,MAAM,WAAW,WAAW;IAC1B,sFAAsF;IACtF,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE;QAAE,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QAAC,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;QAAC,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,CAAA;KAAE,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC;CAC9E;AAwCD;;;;;GAKG;AACH,wBAAgB,iBAAiB,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,GAAG,WAAW,CAiF1E"}

package/dist/verify-local-wire01.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"verify-local-wire01.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/verify-local-wire01.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;GAQG;AAIH,OAAO,KAAK,EAA0B,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,CAAC;AAChF,OAAO,EAGL,KAAK,iBAAiB,EACtB,KAAK,wBAAwB,EAC9B,MAAM,cAAc,CAAC;AACtB,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,kBAAkB,CAAC;AAC5D,OAAO,KAAK,EAAwB,kBAAkB,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,gBAAgB,CAAC;AAEnG;;GAEG;AACH,MAAM,MAAM,wBAAwB,GAChC;IACE,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;IACZ,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC;IACpB,MAAM,EAAE,iBAAiB,CAAC;IAC1B,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACZ,WAAW,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC;IACnB,QAAQ,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,CAAC;IAChC,cAAc,EAAE,mBAAmB,CAAC;CACrC,GACD;IACE,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;IACZ,OAAO,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC;IACvB,MAAM,EAAE,wBAAwB,CAAC;IACjC,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACZ,WAAW,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC;IACnB,QAAQ,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,CAAC;IAChC,cAAc,EAAE,mBAAmB,CAAC;CACrC,CAAC;AAEN;;GAEG;AACH,MAAM,MAAM,uBAAuB,GAAG,wBAAwB,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC;AAoDpF;;;;;GAKG;AACH,wBAAsB,iBAAiB,CACrC,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,EACX,SAAS,EAAE,UAAU,EACrB,OAAO,GAAE,kBAAuB,GAC/B,OAAO,CAAC,uBAAuB,CAAC,CAmOlC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"verify-local-wire01.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/verify-local-wire01.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;GAQG;AAIH,OAAO,KAAK,EAA0B,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,cAAc,CAAC;AAChF,OAAO,EAGL,KAAK,iBAAiB,EACtB,KAAK,wBAAwB,EAC9B,MAAM,cAAc,CAAC;AACtB,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,kBAAkB,CAAC;AAC5D,OAAO,KAAK,EAAwB,kBAAkB,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,gBAAgB,CAAC;AAEnG;;GAEG;AACH,MAAM,MAAM,wBAAwB,GAChC;IACE,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;IACZ,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC;IACpB,MAAM,EAAE,iBAAiB,CAAC;IAC1B,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACZ,WAAW,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC;IACnB,QAAQ,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,CAAC;IAChC,cAAc,EAAE,mBAAmB,CAAC;CACrC,GACD;IACE,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;IACZ,OAAO,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC;IACvB,MAAM,EAAE,wBAAwB,CAAC;IACjC,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACZ,WAAW,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC;IACnB,QAAQ,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,CAAC;IAChC,cAAc,EAAE,mBAAmB,CAAC;CACrC,CAAC;AAEN;;GAEG;AACH,MAAM,MAAM,uBAAuB,GAAG,wBAAwB,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC;AAoDpF;;;;;GAKG;AACH,wBAAsB,iBAAiB,CACrC,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,EACX,SAAS,EAAE,UAAU,EACrB,OAAO,GAAE,kBAAuB,GAC/B,OAAO,CAAC,uBAAuB,CAAC,CA8OlC"}

package/dist/verify-local.cjs

@@ -918,7 +918,14 @@ var JOSE_CODE_MAP = {
   CRYPTO_JWS_CRIT_REJECTED: "E_JWS_CRIT_REJECTED",
   CRYPTO_JWS_MISSING_KID: "E_JWS_MISSING_KID",
   CRYPTO_JWS_B64_REJECTED: "E_JWS_B64_REJECTED",
-  CRYPTO_JWS_ZIP_REJECTED: "E_JWS_ZIP_REJECTED"
+  CRYPTO_JWS_ZIP_REJECTED: "E_JWS_ZIP_REJECTED",
+  // Raw-input I-JSON gate (RFC 7493): specific E_IJSON_* codes so callers can
+  // distinguish duplicate member names, out-of-range numbers, and invalid
+  // strings from ordinary format errors. (Generic JSON syntax errors from the
+  // gate use CRYPTO_INVALID_JWS_FORMAT -> E_INVALID_FORMAT via FORMAT_ERROR_CODES.)
+  CRYPTO_IJSON_DUPLICATE_MEMBER_NAME: "E_IJSON_DUPLICATE_MEMBER_NAME",
+  CRYPTO_IJSON_NUMBER_OUT_OF_RANGE: "E_IJSON_NUMBER_OUT_OF_RANGE",
+  CRYPTO_IJSON_INVALID_STRING: "E_IJSON_INVALID_STRING"
 };
 var MAX_PARSE_ISSUES = 25;
 function sanitizeParseIssues(issues) {
@@ -942,10 +949,12 @@ async function verifyLocal(jws, publicKey, options = {}) {
   try {
     const result = await defaultCodec.decode(jws, publicKey);
     if (!result.valid) {
+      const signatureBytes = ed25519SignatureByteLength(jws);
+      const invalidLength = signatureBytes !== null && signatureBytes !== ED25519_SIGNATURE_BYTES;
       return {
         valid: false,
         code: "E_INVALID_SIGNATURE",
-        message: "Ed25519 signature verification failed"
+        message: invalidLength ? "Ed25519 signature has invalid length" : "Ed25519 signature verification failed"
       };
     }
     const accumulatedWarnings = [];