@payez/next-mvp 4.8.0 → 4.8.2

package/src/api-handlers/mfa/backup-code-verify.ts

@@ -1,170 +1,170 @@
-/**
- * Verify Backup Code 2FA Challenge Handler
- *
- * Verifies a single-use recovery code AT LOGIN and completes the 2FA flow,
- * transitioning the session to MFA-verified.
- *
- * WHY THIS EXISTS (2026-08-02)
- * The package shipped backup-code GENERATION (backup-codes.ts, POST
- * /api/Account/mfa/backup-codes) and no way to SPEND one. Codes could be
- * generated, displayed once, written down — and then never used to satisfy a
- * login challenge. Exactly the gap TOTP had before totp-verify: the enrolment
- * half without the challenge half.
- *
- * THIS IS THE FACTOR OF LAST RESORT. A user reaches for a backup code when they
- * have lost the authenticator, so it is the one path that must work when
- * everything else has already failed. A recovery mechanism that cannot be
- * redeemed is worse than none: it invites people to rely on it.
- *
- * FIELD NAME: the IDP expects { "code": ... }
- * (MfaBackupCodeVerifyRequest, [JsonPropertyName("code")]). The dash in
- * 'xxxx-xxxx' is optional per the IDP contract, so the code is forwarded as
- * typed and normalisation is left to the IDP rather than guessed here.
- *
- * SINGLE USE, CONSUMED ATOMICALLY. The IDP hash-compares against unused codes
- * and stamps used_at + used_by_ip in the same operation (MfaController 5g).
- * NEVER retry this call on a network error or an ambiguous response — a retry
- * can burn a second code, and the user has ten.
- *
- * DO NOT MAKE GENERATION TRANSITION THE SESSION, the same trap totp-confirm
- * carries: generating recovery codes is not proof of possessing one.
- *
- * THE STORED 2FA METHOD IS 'totp', NOT 'backup_code'. READ THIS BEFORE
- * "CORRECTING" IT — it looks wrong and is not.
- *
- *   1. IT MATCHES THE IDP. MfaController 5g sets
- *      `TwoFactorMethod = TwoFactorMethodType.Totp` for this exact path,
- *      commented "Backup code = recovery proof of the TOTP factor", and the
- *      reissued token's amr carries mfa+totp. A backup code is not a separate
- *      factor; it is recovery proof of the authenticator factor.
- *
- *   2. INVENTING A NEW VALUE SILENTLY BREAKS TOKEN REFRESH. refresh.ts:279
- *      resolves the method with ['sms','totp','email'].includes(m). Anything
- *      outside that set is dropped, so `two_factor_method` never reaches the
- *      IDP on refresh, and a session established with a recovery code refreshes
- *      differently from one established with the authenticator — for the same
- *      underlying factor. It fails quietly, days later, as "sessions
- *      occasionally drop", with nothing pointing back to this string.
- *
- * The type union (email|sms|totp) is not the reason for the choice, it is a
- * coincidence that caught it. Widening the union would have compiled and
- * shipped the refresh bug.
- *
- * @package @payez/next-mvp
- */
-
-import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server';
-import { idpFetchJSON } from '../../lib/idp-fetch';
-import { ENV_CONFIG } from '../../config/env';
-import { getTokenTestAware } from '../../lib/test-aware-get-token';
-import { transitionTo2FASession } from '../../lib/session-store';
-import { jwtDecode } from '../../lib/jwt-decode';
-import { twoFactorVerifyFailure } from '../../lib/two-factor-verify-failure';
-
-export async function POST(req: NextRequest) {
-  try {
-    const body = await req.json();
-    const code = body.code || body.backupCode || body.verificationCode || body.verification_code;
-
-    if (!code) {
-      return NextResponse.json(
-        {
-          success: false,
-          error: 'Backup code is required',
-          code: 'INVALID_REQUEST',
-        },
-        { status: 400 }
-      );
-    }
-
-    const result = await idpFetchJSON(
-      req,
-      `${ENV_CONFIG.IDP_URL}/api/ExternalAuth/twofa/backup-code/verify`,
-      {
-        method: 'POST',
-        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
-        body: JSON.stringify({ code }),
-      }
-    );
-
-    if (!result.ok) {
-      // PAY-1443: never relay the IDP's error text - it arrives as a C# anonymous-object
-      // ToString ("{ message = ... }") on the deployed IDP. Classify it, answer a fixed sentence.
-      return twoFactorVerifyFailure(result, 'backup_code');
-    }
-
-    const unwrappedData = result.json?.data || result.json;
-
-    // Only a challenge that returns fresh tokens may transition the session.
-    let sessionTransitioned = false;
-
-    if (unwrappedData.access_token && unwrappedData.refresh_token) {
-      const token = await getTokenTestAware(req);
-      const sessionToken = (token?.sessionToken || token?.redisSessionId) as string | undefined;
-
-      if (sessionToken) {
-        let accessTokenExpires = Date.now() + 15 * 60 * 1000;
-        try {
-          const decoded = jwtDecode<{ exp?: number }>(unwrappedData.access_token);
-          if (decoded?.exp) accessTokenExpires = decoded.exp * 1000;
-        } catch {
-          console.warn('[VERIFY_BACKUP_CODE] Could not decode access token, using default expiration');
-        }
-
-        let refreshTokenExpires = Date.now() + 3 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
-        try {
-          const decoded = jwtDecode<{ exp?: number }>(unwrappedData.refresh_token);
-          if (decoded?.exp) refreshTokenExpires = decoded.exp * 1000;
-        } catch {
-          // Refresh token may carry no exp claim; default stands.
-        }
-
-        await transitionTo2FASession(
-          sessionToken,
-          {
-            accessToken: unwrappedData.access_token,
-            refreshToken: unwrappedData.refresh_token,
-            accessTokenExpires,
-            refreshTokenExpires,
-          },
-          // 'totp' is deliberate and load-bearing. See "THE STORED 2FA METHOD"
-          // in the file header before changing it.
-          'totp'
-        );
-
-        sessionTransitioned = true;
-        console.log('[VERIFY_BACKUP_CODE] Session transitioned to 2FA-verified');
-      } else {
-        console.warn('[VERIFY_BACKUP_CODE] IDP accepted the code but no session token was resolvable — session NOT transitioned. THE CODE IS ALREADY SPENT.');
-      }
-    } else {
-      console.warn('[VERIFY_BACKUP_CODE] IDP returned 2xx without tokens — session NOT transitioned. THE CODE IS ALREADY SPENT.');
-    }
-
-    // twoFactorSessionVerified reports WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED, never a copy of
-    // `success`. It matters more here than anywhere else: the code is consumed
-    // the moment the IDP accepts it, so a client that trusted a hardcoded true
-    // would show the user as verified, leave the session unverified, and have
-    // burned one of their ten recovery codes to do it.
-    return NextResponse.json(
-      {
-        success: true,
-        verificationSuccessful: true,
-        twoFactorSessionVerified: sessionTransitioned,
-        codeConsumed: true,
-        message: unwrappedData.message || 'Backup code verified successfully',
-      },
-      { status: 200 }
-    );
-  } catch (error) {
-    console.error('[VERIFY_BACKUP_CODE] Error:', error);
-    return NextResponse.json(
-      {
-        success: false,
-        error: 'Failed to verify backup code',
-        code: 'INTERNAL_ERROR',
-      },
-      { status: 500 }
-    );
-  }
-}
+/**
+ * Verify Backup Code 2FA Challenge Handler
+ *
+ * Verifies a single-use recovery code AT LOGIN and completes the 2FA flow,
+ * transitioning the session to MFA-verified.
+ *
+ * WHY THIS EXISTS (2026-08-02)
+ * The package shipped backup-code GENERATION (backup-codes.ts, POST
+ * /api/Account/mfa/backup-codes) and no way to SPEND one. Codes could be
+ * generated, displayed once, written down — and then never used to satisfy a
+ * login challenge. Exactly the gap TOTP had before totp-verify: the enrolment
+ * half without the challenge half.
+ *
+ * THIS IS THE FACTOR OF LAST RESORT. A user reaches for a backup code when they
+ * have lost the authenticator, so it is the one path that must work when
+ * everything else has already failed. A recovery mechanism that cannot be
+ * redeemed is worse than none: it invites people to rely on it.
+ *
+ * FIELD NAME: the IDP expects { "code": ... }
+ * (MfaBackupCodeVerifyRequest, [JsonPropertyName("code")]). The dash in
+ * 'xxxx-xxxx' is optional per the IDP contract, so the code is forwarded as
+ * typed and normalisation is left to the IDP rather than guessed here.
+ *
+ * SINGLE USE, CONSUMED ATOMICALLY. The IDP hash-compares against unused codes
+ * and stamps used_at + used_by_ip in the same operation (MfaController 5g).
+ * NEVER retry this call on a network error or an ambiguous response — a retry
+ * can burn a second code, and the user has ten.
+ *
+ * DO NOT MAKE GENERATION TRANSITION THE SESSION, the same trap totp-confirm
+ * carries: generating recovery codes is not proof of possessing one.
+ *
+ * THE STORED 2FA METHOD IS 'totp', NOT 'backup_code'. READ THIS BEFORE
+ * "CORRECTING" IT — it looks wrong and is not.
+ *
+ *   1. IT MATCHES THE IDP. MfaController 5g sets
+ *      `TwoFactorMethod = TwoFactorMethodType.Totp` for this exact path,
+ *      commented "Backup code = recovery proof of the TOTP factor", and the
+ *      reissued token's amr carries mfa+totp. A backup code is not a separate
+ *      factor; it is recovery proof of the authenticator factor.
+ *
+ *   2. INVENTING A NEW VALUE SILENTLY BREAKS TOKEN REFRESH. refresh.ts:279
+ *      resolves the method with ['sms','totp','email'].includes(m). Anything
+ *      outside that set is dropped, so `two_factor_method` never reaches the
+ *      IDP on refresh, and a session established with a recovery code refreshes
+ *      differently from one established with the authenticator — for the same
+ *      underlying factor. It fails quietly, days later, as "sessions
+ *      occasionally drop", with nothing pointing back to this string.
+ *
+ * The type union (email|sms|totp) is not the reason for the choice, it is a
+ * coincidence that caught it. Widening the union would have compiled and
+ * shipped the refresh bug.
+ *
+ * @package @payez/next-mvp
+ */
+
+import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server';
+import { idpFetchJSON } from '../../lib/idp-fetch';
+import { ENV_CONFIG } from '../../config/env';
+import { getTokenTestAware } from '../../lib/test-aware-get-token';
+import { transitionTo2FASession } from '../../lib/session-store';
+import { jwtDecode } from '../../lib/jwt-decode';
+import { twoFactorVerifyFailure } from '../../lib/two-factor-verify-failure';
+
+export async function POST(req: NextRequest) {
+  try {
+    const body = await req.json();
+    const code = body.code || body.backupCode || body.verificationCode || body.verification_code;
+
+    if (!code) {
+      return NextResponse.json(
+        {
+          success: false,
+          error: 'Backup code is required',
+          code: 'INVALID_REQUEST',
+        },
+        { status: 400 }
+      );
+    }
+
+    const result = await idpFetchJSON(
+      req,
+      `${ENV_CONFIG.IDP_URL}/api/ExternalAuth/twofa/backup-code/verify`,
+      {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+        body: JSON.stringify({ code }),
+      }
+    );
+
+    if (!result.ok) {
+      // PAY-1443: never relay the IDP's error text - it arrives as a C# anonymous-object
+      // ToString ("{ message = ... }") on the deployed IDP. Classify it, answer a fixed sentence.
+      return twoFactorVerifyFailure(result, 'backup_code');
+    }
+
+    const unwrappedData = result.json?.data || result.json;
+
+    // Only a challenge that returns fresh tokens may transition the session.
+    let sessionTransitioned = false;
+
+    if (unwrappedData.access_token && unwrappedData.refresh_token) {
+      const token = await getTokenTestAware(req);
+      const sessionToken = (token?.sessionToken || token?.redisSessionId) as string | undefined;
+
+      if (sessionToken) {
+        let accessTokenExpires = Date.now() + 15 * 60 * 1000;
+        try {
+          const decoded = jwtDecode<{ exp?: number }>(unwrappedData.access_token);
+          if (decoded?.exp) accessTokenExpires = decoded.exp * 1000;
+        } catch {
+          console.warn('[VERIFY_BACKUP_CODE] Could not decode access token, using default expiration');
+        }
+
+        let refreshTokenExpires = Date.now() + 3 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
+        try {
+          const decoded = jwtDecode<{ exp?: number }>(unwrappedData.refresh_token);
+          if (decoded?.exp) refreshTokenExpires = decoded.exp * 1000;
+        } catch {
+          // Refresh token may carry no exp claim; default stands.
+        }
+
+        await transitionTo2FASession(
+          sessionToken,
+          {
+            accessToken: unwrappedData.access_token,
+            refreshToken: unwrappedData.refresh_token,
+            accessTokenExpires,
+            refreshTokenExpires,
+          },
+          // 'totp' is deliberate and load-bearing. See "THE STORED 2FA METHOD"
+          // in the file header before changing it.
+          'totp'
+        );
+
+        sessionTransitioned = true;
+        console.log('[VERIFY_BACKUP_CODE] Session transitioned to 2FA-verified');
+      } else {
+        console.warn('[VERIFY_BACKUP_CODE] IDP accepted the code but no session token was resolvable — session NOT transitioned. THE CODE IS ALREADY SPENT.');
+      }
+    } else {
+      console.warn('[VERIFY_BACKUP_CODE] IDP returned 2xx without tokens — session NOT transitioned. THE CODE IS ALREADY SPENT.');
+    }
+
+    // twoFactorSessionVerified reports WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED, never a copy of
+    // `success`. It matters more here than anywhere else: the code is consumed
+    // the moment the IDP accepts it, so a client that trusted a hardcoded true
+    // would show the user as verified, leave the session unverified, and have
+    // burned one of their ten recovery codes to do it.
+    return NextResponse.json(
+      {
+        success: true,
+        verificationSuccessful: true,
+        twoFactorSessionVerified: sessionTransitioned,
+        codeConsumed: true,
+        message: unwrappedData.message || 'Backup code verified successfully',
+      },
+      { status: 200 }
+    );
+  } catch (error) {
+    console.error('[VERIFY_BACKUP_CODE] Error:', error);
+    return NextResponse.json(
+      {
+        success: false,
+        error: 'Failed to verify backup code',
+        code: 'INTERNAL_ERROR',
+      },
+      { status: 500 }
+    );
+  }
+}

package/src/api-handlers/mfa/backup-codes.ts

@@ -1,42 +1,42 @@
-import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server';
-import { idpFetchJSON } from '../../lib/idp-fetch';
-import { ENV_CONFIG } from '../../config/env';
-import { projectIdpError } from '../../lib/safe-error-response';
-
-/**
- * Generate MFA backup codes (POST /api/Account/mfa/backup-codes, user JWT).
- * Regeneration REPLACES the prior set — the response carries the new codes
- * once; they are shown once and never retrievable again.
- */
-export async function POST(req: NextRequest) {
-  let body = '{}';
-  try {
-    const raw = await req.text();
-    if (raw && raw.trim().length > 0) body = raw;
-  } catch {}
-
-  const result = await idpFetchJSON(req, `${ENV_CONFIG.IDP_URL}/api/Account/mfa/backup-codes`, {
-    method: 'POST',
-    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
-    body,
-  });
-
-  if (!result.ok) {
-    return NextResponse.json(
-      {
-        success: false,
-        message: 'Upstream error',
-        error: { code: 'UPSTREAM_SERVICE_ERROR', status: result.status, details: projectIdpError(result.json) },
-        meta: { attemptedRefresh: result.attemptedRefresh },
-      },
-      { status: result.status },
-    );
-  }
-
-  const bodyJson: any = result.json;
-  if (bodyJson && typeof bodyJson === 'object' && 'success' in bodyJson && 'data' in bodyJson) {
-    if (bodyJson.success === true) return NextResponse.json(bodyJson.data, { status: 200 });
-    return NextResponse.json(bodyJson, { status: 200 });
-  }
-  return NextResponse.json(bodyJson ?? {}, { status: 200 });
-}
+import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server';
+import { idpFetchJSON } from '../../lib/idp-fetch';
+import { ENV_CONFIG } from '../../config/env';
+import { projectIdpError } from '../../lib/safe-error-response';
+
+/**
+ * Generate MFA backup codes (POST /api/Account/mfa/backup-codes, user JWT).
+ * Regeneration REPLACES the prior set — the response carries the new codes
+ * once; they are shown once and never retrievable again.
+ */
+export async function POST(req: NextRequest) {
+  let body = '{}';
+  try {
+    const raw = await req.text();
+    if (raw && raw.trim().length > 0) body = raw;
+  } catch {}
+
+  const result = await idpFetchJSON(req, `${ENV_CONFIG.IDP_URL}/api/Account/mfa/backup-codes`, {
+    method: 'POST',
+    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+    body,
+  });
+
+  if (!result.ok) {
+    return NextResponse.json(
+      {
+        success: false,
+        message: 'Upstream error',
+        error: { code: 'UPSTREAM_SERVICE_ERROR', status: result.status, details: projectIdpError(result.json) },
+        meta: { attemptedRefresh: result.attemptedRefresh },
+      },
+      { status: result.status },
+    );
+  }
+
+  const bodyJson: any = result.json;
+  if (bodyJson && typeof bodyJson === 'object' && 'success' in bodyJson && 'data' in bodyJson) {
+    if (bodyJson.success === true) return NextResponse.json(bodyJson.data, { status: 200 });
+    return NextResponse.json(bodyJson, { status: 200 });
+  }
+  return NextResponse.json(bodyJson ?? {}, { status: 200 });
+}

package/src/api-handlers/mfa/methods.ts

@@ -1,47 +1,47 @@
-import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server';
-import { idpFetchJSON } from '../../lib/idp-fetch';
-import { ENV_CONFIG } from '../../config/env';
-import { projectIdpError } from '../../lib/safe-error-response';
-
-/**
- * MFA methods (GET list / DELETE one, /api/Account/mfa/methods[/{id}],
- * user JWT). Drives the method picker: an EMPTY list must route the user to
- * ENROLMENT, never to a verify screen for a factor they do not hold.
- */
-
-function upstreamError(result: { status: number; json: unknown; attemptedRefresh: boolean }) {
-  return NextResponse.json(
-    {
-      success: false,
-      message: 'Upstream error',
-      error: { code: 'UPSTREAM_SERVICE_ERROR', status: result.status, details: projectIdpError(result.json) },
-      meta: { attemptedRefresh: result.attemptedRefresh },
-    },
-    { status: result.status },
-  );
-}
-
-function passthrough(json: unknown) {
-  const bodyJson: any = json;
-  if (bodyJson && typeof bodyJson === 'object' && 'success' in bodyJson && 'data' in bodyJson) {
-    if (bodyJson.success === true) return NextResponse.json(bodyJson.data ?? { success: true }, { status: 200 });
-    return NextResponse.json(bodyJson, { status: 200 });
-  }
-  return NextResponse.json(bodyJson ?? { success: true }, { status: 200 });
-}
-
-export async function GET(req: NextRequest) {
-  const result = await idpFetchJSON(req, `${ENV_CONFIG.IDP_URL}/api/Account/mfa/methods`, { method: 'GET' });
-  if (!result.ok) return upstreamError(result);
-  return passthrough(result.json);
-}
-
-export async function DELETE(req: NextRequest, id: string) {
-  const result = await idpFetchJSON(
-    req,
-    `${ENV_CONFIG.IDP_URL}/api/Account/mfa/methods/${encodeURIComponent(id)}`,
-    { method: 'DELETE' },
-  );
-  if (!result.ok) return upstreamError(result);
-  return passthrough(result.json);
-}
+import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server';
+import { idpFetchJSON } from '../../lib/idp-fetch';
+import { ENV_CONFIG } from '../../config/env';
+import { projectIdpError } from '../../lib/safe-error-response';
+
+/**
+ * MFA methods (GET list / DELETE one, /api/Account/mfa/methods[/{id}],
+ * user JWT). Drives the method picker: an EMPTY list must route the user to
+ * ENROLMENT, never to a verify screen for a factor they do not hold.
+ */
+
+function upstreamError(result: { status: number; json: unknown; attemptedRefresh: boolean }) {
+  return NextResponse.json(
+    {
+      success: false,
+      message: 'Upstream error',
+      error: { code: 'UPSTREAM_SERVICE_ERROR', status: result.status, details: projectIdpError(result.json) },
+      meta: { attemptedRefresh: result.attemptedRefresh },
+    },
+    { status: result.status },
+  );
+}
+
+function passthrough(json: unknown) {
+  const bodyJson: any = json;
+  if (bodyJson && typeof bodyJson === 'object' && 'success' in bodyJson && 'data' in bodyJson) {
+    if (bodyJson.success === true) return NextResponse.json(bodyJson.data ?? { success: true }, { status: 200 });
+    return NextResponse.json(bodyJson, { status: 200 });
+  }
+  return NextResponse.json(bodyJson ?? { success: true }, { status: 200 });
+}
+
+export async function GET(req: NextRequest) {
+  const result = await idpFetchJSON(req, `${ENV_CONFIG.IDP_URL}/api/Account/mfa/methods`, { method: 'GET' });
+  if (!result.ok) return upstreamError(result);
+  return passthrough(result.json);
+}
+
+export async function DELETE(req: NextRequest, id: string) {
+  const result = await idpFetchJSON(
+    req,
+    `${ENV_CONFIG.IDP_URL}/api/Account/mfa/methods/${encodeURIComponent(id)}`,
+    { method: 'DELETE' },
+  );
+  if (!result.ok) return upstreamError(result);
+  return passthrough(result.json);
+}

package/src/api-handlers/mfa/totp-confirm.ts

@@ -1,43 +1,43 @@
-import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server';
-import { idpFetchJSON } from '../../lib/idp-fetch';
-import { ENV_CONFIG } from '../../config/env';
-import { projectIdpError } from '../../lib/safe-error-response';
-
-/**
- * Confirm TOTP enrolment with the first authenticator code
- * (POST /api/Account/mfa/totp/confirm, user JWT). Body forwarded verbatim —
- * it carries the enrolment handle plus the code. Only after this succeeds is
- * the method ACTIVE.
- */
-export async function POST(req: NextRequest) {
-  let body = '{}';
-  try {
-    const raw = await req.text();
-    if (raw && raw.trim().length > 0) body = raw;
-  } catch {}
-
-  const result = await idpFetchJSON(req, `${ENV_CONFIG.IDP_URL}/api/Account/mfa/totp/confirm`, {
-    method: 'POST',
-    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
-    body,
-  });
-
-  if (!result.ok) {
-    return NextResponse.json(
-      {
-        success: false,
-        message: 'Upstream error',
-        error: { code: 'UPSTREAM_SERVICE_ERROR', status: result.status, details: projectIdpError(result.json) },
-        meta: { attemptedRefresh: result.attemptedRefresh },
-      },
-      { status: result.status },
-    );
-  }
-
-  const bodyJson: any = result.json;
-  if (bodyJson && typeof bodyJson === 'object' && 'success' in bodyJson && 'data' in bodyJson) {
-    if (bodyJson.success === true) return NextResponse.json(bodyJson.data, { status: 200 });
-    return NextResponse.json(bodyJson, { status: 200 });
-  }
-  return NextResponse.json(bodyJson ?? {}, { status: 200 });
-}
+import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server';
+import { idpFetchJSON } from '../../lib/idp-fetch';
+import { ENV_CONFIG } from '../../config/env';
+import { projectIdpError } from '../../lib/safe-error-response';
+
+/**
+ * Confirm TOTP enrolment with the first authenticator code
+ * (POST /api/Account/mfa/totp/confirm, user JWT). Body forwarded verbatim —
+ * it carries the enrolment handle plus the code. Only after this succeeds is
+ * the method ACTIVE.
+ */
+export async function POST(req: NextRequest) {
+  let body = '{}';
+  try {
+    const raw = await req.text();
+    if (raw && raw.trim().length > 0) body = raw;
+  } catch {}
+
+  const result = await idpFetchJSON(req, `${ENV_CONFIG.IDP_URL}/api/Account/mfa/totp/confirm`, {
+    method: 'POST',
+    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+    body,
+  });
+
+  if (!result.ok) {
+    return NextResponse.json(
+      {
+        success: false,
+        message: 'Upstream error',
+        error: { code: 'UPSTREAM_SERVICE_ERROR', status: result.status, details: projectIdpError(result.json) },
+        meta: { attemptedRefresh: result.attemptedRefresh },
+      },
+      { status: result.status },
+    );
+  }
+
+  const bodyJson: any = result.json;
+  if (bodyJson && typeof bodyJson === 'object' && 'success' in bodyJson && 'data' in bodyJson) {
+    if (bodyJson.success === true) return NextResponse.json(bodyJson.data, { status: 200 });
+    return NextResponse.json(bodyJson, { status: 200 });
+  }
+  return NextResponse.json(bodyJson ?? {}, { status: 200 });
+}