@payez/next-mvp 4.5.4 → 4.5.6

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@@ -4,12 +4,29 @@ import { checkRefreshViability } from '../../lib/refresh-token-validator';
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  import { getTokenTestAware } from '../../lib/test-aware-get-token';
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  import { logger } from '../../config/logger';
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  import { tokenLogId } from '../../lib/token-log-id';
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+ import { resolveSessionState } from '../../server/auth';
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8
 
8
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  export async function GET(req: NextRequest) {
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  try {
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  const sessionToken = req.nextUrl.searchParams.get('token');
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  let finalSessionToken = sessionToken;
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- if (!finalSessionToken) {
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+ if (!finalSessionToken && process.env.TEST_MODE !== 'true') {
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+ // PAY-2216: outside TEST_MODE getTokenTestAware is getSession(), which answered null for a store outage AND
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+ // for a deleted session, so this route said not_logged_in to both and its own session_not_found arm (below)
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+ // was unreachable from a cookie. Ask for the state instead. Same rules as routes/auth/viability.ts:
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+ // 'unknown' never reads as logged out or stale; 'missing' requires a verified cookie.
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+ const sessionState = await resolveSessionState(req);
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+ if (sessionState.state === 'unknown') {
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+ logger.warn('[REFRESH-VIABILITY] Session store unavailable - session state unknown');
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+ return NextResponse.json({ canRefresh: false, reason: 'store_unavailable', error: 'Session store unavailable', code: 'STORE_UNAVAILABLE' }, { status: 500 });
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+ }
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+ if (sessionState.state === 'missing') {
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+ return NextResponse.json({ canRefresh: false, reason: 'session_not_found', sessionTokenId: tokenLogId(sessionState.sessionToken) }, { status: 200 });
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+ }
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+ if (sessionState.state === 'live') {
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+ finalSessionToken = sessionState.session?.session?.token ?? null;
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+ }
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+ } else if (!finalSessionToken) {
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  const token = await getTokenTestAware(req);
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  // Support both field names: sessionToken (auth.ts JWT) and redisSessionId (legacy)
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  finalSessionToken = (token?.sessionToken || token?.redisSessionId) as string;
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
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6
 
7
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  import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server';
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  import { getSession as getRedisSession, getBetterAuthSession } from '../../lib/session-store';
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- import { getSession } from '../../server/auth';
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+ import { resolveSessionState } from '../../server/auth';
10
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  import { isInitializationFailed, ensureInitialized } from '../../lib/startup-init';
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  import { getIDPClientConfig } from '../../lib/idp-client-config';
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  import { tokenLogId } from '../../lib/token-log-id';
@@ -45,8 +45,25 @@ export async function GET(req: NextRequest) {
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  );
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  }
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- // Get session from Better Auth
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- const betterAuthSession = await getSession(req);
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+ // PAY-2216: the TWIN of routes/auth/viability.ts - same tri-state, same answers, or an app mounting this export
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+ // keeps the defect. 'unknown' (store did not answer) is a 5xx and never stale; 'missing' (verified cookie, store
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+ // answered "not here") is the stale shape with a token id; 'none' stays { authenticated: false }.
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+ const sessionState = await resolveSessionState(req);
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+ if (sessionState.state === 'unknown') {
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+ console.warn('[VIABILITY] Session store unavailable - session state unknown');
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+ return NextResponse.json(
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+ { authenticated: false, revocationStatus: 'unknown' as RevocationStatus, error: 'Session store unavailable', code: 'STORE_UNAVAILABLE' },
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+ { status: 500 }
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+ );
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+ }
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+ if (sessionState.state === 'missing') {
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+ console.warn('[VIABILITY] Stale cookie detected - verified cookie, session not in Redis');
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+ return NextResponse.json({
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+ authenticated: false,
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+ sessionTokenId: tokenLogId(sessionState.sessionToken) // PAY-1481: correlation id, never the token
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+ });
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+ }
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+ const betterAuthSession = sessionState.state === 'live' ? sessionState.session : null;
50
67
 
51
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  // Debug logging
52
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  if (!betterAuthSession) {
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import { decodeJwt } from 'jose'; // better-auth's own JWT dependency
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  import { betterAuth } from 'better-auth';
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  import { nextCookies } from 'better-auth/next-js';
18
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  import { toNextJsHandler } from 'better-auth/next-js';
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+ import { wrapBetterAuthHandler } from './session-response-sanitizer';
19
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  import { magicLink, type MagicLinkOptions } from 'better-auth/plugins/magic-link';
20
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  import { resolveClientKey } from '../lib/client-key';
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  import { genericOAuth } from 'better-auth/plugins/generic-oauth';
@@ -996,7 +997,10 @@ export async function getBetterAuthHandler(): Promise<{ GET: (req: Request) => P
996
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  if (!isBetterAuthEnabled()) return null;
997
998
 
998
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  const auth = await getBetterAuthInstance();
999
- return toNextJsHandler(auth);
1000
+ // PAY-2217: Better Auth's native endpoints (get-session, list-sessions, sign-in/*, sign-up/*) put the session
1001
+ // token in the body. Strip it at the HTTP boundary here, so every consumer that mounts this handler gets it;
1002
+ // auth.api (server-side) is untouched and still sees the token. See session-response-sanitizer.ts.
1003
+ return wrapBetterAuthHandler(auth as any, toNextJsHandler(auth));
1000
1004
  }
1001
1005
 
1002
1006
  /**
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
1
+ /**
2
+ * PAY-2217: no session token reaches browser JS from Better Auth's own HTTP endpoints.
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+ *
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+ * WHAT WAS WRONG. PAY-1481 removed token material from the package's own GET /api/auth/session. Better Auth's native
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+ * endpoints are a separate surface served by the catch-all mount, and their default bodies carry the session
6
+ * credential identifier:
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+ * GET /get-session -> { session: { id, token, userId, ... }, user }
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+ * GET /list-sessions -> [ { id, token, ... } ] (EVERY session of the user, not just this one)
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+ * POST /sign-in/* -> { token, user, ... }
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+ * POST /sign-up/* -> { token, user }
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+ * GET /magic-link/verify (no callbackURL) -> { token, user } (NightHawk G4 on PR 1190, measured on a real instance)
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+ * and any plugin endpoint (passkey verify, two-factor verify, genericOAuth) answers a session object the same way.
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+ * `token` is the Redis key of the session. The cookie is token.HMAC and Path B verifies the signature, so a bare
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+ * token is not a replayable cookie (gate rows B1-B4 measure that), but it is a credential identifier readable by any
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+ * script on the page, for this session and for every other session the user has. It breaks the PAY-1481 rule.
16
+ *
17
+ * EVERY 2xx JSON BODY IS STRIPPED, not a named list of paths. A list protects the endpoints someone remembered and
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+ * silently misses the next plugin; the strip is a function of the response, so a new endpoint is covered the day it is
19
+ * mounted. A 2xx JSON body that legitimately needs one of these names to reach the browser would have to be
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+ * allowlisted here on purpose (none is known: no client in this package reads one).
21
+ *
22
+ * WHERE THE FIX LIVES, AND WHY NOT customSession. Server-side code in this package reads session.session.token from
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+ * auth.api.getSession() (viability, refresh, status, the OAuth exchange). A customSession plugin or an after-hook
24
+ * runs for those calls too and would strip the token from them. So the strip is applied at the HTTP BOUNDARY only:
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+ * getBetterAuthHandler() returns handlers wrapped by wrapBetterAuthHandler(), and auth.api stays untouched.
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+ *
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+ * WHAT THE BROWSER GETS INSTEAD.
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+ * - list-sessions rows carry `isCurrent` (computed here against the caller's cookie-resolved session) and `id`.
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+ * - POST /revoke-session-by-id { id }: revokes ONE of the CALLER's sessions by its id. An id that is not one of the
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+ * caller's own sessions answers 404 (never 403: do not confirm that another user's session id exists).
31
+ * - Better Auth's native POST /revoke-session { token } still exists and still requires a cookie-resolved session
32
+ * that owns the token, but no browser ever holds a token to send it.
33
+ */
34
+
35
+ /** Credential-bearing key names, compared case- and separator-insensitively. */
36
+ const STRIP_KEYS = new Set(['token', 'sessiontoken', 'accesstoken', 'refreshtoken', 'idtoken']);
37
+
38
+ const norm = (k: string): string => k.toLowerCase().replace(/[_\-\s]/g, '');
39
+
40
+ /** Deep copy of `value` with every credential-named key removed, at any depth, in objects and arrays. */
41
+ export function stripSessionCredentials(value: unknown): unknown {
42
+ if (Array.isArray(value)) return value.map(stripSessionCredentials);
43
+ if (value !== null && typeof value === 'object') {
44
+ const out: Record<string, unknown> = {};
45
+ for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(value as Record<string, unknown>)) {
46
+ if (STRIP_KEYS.has(norm(k))) continue;
47
+ out[k] = stripSessionCredentials(v);
48
+ }
49
+ return out;
50
+ }
51
+ return value;
52
+ }
53
+
54
+ /** "/api/auth/get-session" -> "/get-session". Anything not under an /auth/ segment is returned as-is. */
55
+ export function authSubPath(pathname: string): string {
56
+ const i = pathname.indexOf('/api/auth/');
57
+ if (i >= 0) return pathname.slice(i + '/api/auth'.length).replace(/\/+$/, '') || '/';
58
+ return pathname.replace(/\/+$/, '') || '/';
59
+ }
60
+
61
+ function isJson(res: Response): boolean {
62
+ return (res.headers.get('content-type') || '').toLowerCase().includes('application/json');
63
+ }
64
+
65
+ /** A Response with a new JSON body and the original status and headers (content-length recomputed by the runtime). */
66
+ function withJsonBody(res: Response, body: unknown): Response {
67
+ const headers = new Headers(res.headers);
68
+ headers.delete('content-length');
69
+ return new Response(JSON.stringify(body), { status: res.status, statusText: res.statusText, headers });
70
+ }
71
+
72
+ interface AuthApi {
73
+ getSession: (opts: { headers: Headers }) => Promise<any>;
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+ listSessions: (opts: { headers: Headers }) => Promise<any>;
75
+ revokeSession: (opts: { headers: Headers; body: { token: string }; asResponse?: boolean }) => Promise<any>;
76
+ }
77
+
78
+ /** Sanitise one already-produced Better Auth response. Pure function of (request, response, current token). */
79
+ export async function sanitizeBetterAuthResponse(
80
+ req: Request,
81
+ res: Response,
82
+ currentToken: () => Promise<string | undefined>,
83
+ ): Promise<Response> {
84
+ const sub = authSubPath(new URL(req.url).pathname);
85
+ if (!res.ok || !isJson(res)) return res;
86
+
87
+ let body: unknown;
88
+ try {
89
+ body = await res.clone().json();
90
+ } catch {
91
+ return res; // unreadable body: nothing to strip, and do not turn it into a different failure
92
+ }
93
+
94
+ if (sub === '/list-sessions' && Array.isArray(body)) {
95
+ const cur = await currentToken().catch(() => undefined);
96
+ body = body.map((row: any) =>
97
+ row && typeof row === 'object' ? { ...row, isCurrent: !!cur && row.token === cur } : row,
98
+ );
99
+ }
100
+ return withJsonBody(res, stripSessionCredentials(body));
101
+ }
102
+
103
+ const json = (status: number, body: unknown): Response =>
104
+ new Response(JSON.stringify(body), { status, headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' } });
105
+
106
+ /** POST /revoke-session-by-id { id }: revoke one of the caller's own sessions by id. */
107
+ async function revokeById(req: Request, api: AuthApi): Promise<Response> {
108
+ let id: unknown;
109
+ try {
110
+ id = (await req.json())?.id;
111
+ } catch {
112
+ return json(400, { code: 'INVALID_REQUEST', message: 'Body must be JSON { id }' });
113
+ }
114
+ if (typeof id !== 'string' || id.length === 0) {
115
+ return json(400, { code: 'INVALID_REQUEST', message: 'id is required' });
116
+ }
117
+ const headers = new Headers(req.headers);
118
+ const rows = await api.listSessions({ headers }).catch(() => null);
119
+ if (rows === null) return json(401, { code: 'UNAUTHORIZED', message: 'No session' });
120
+ // listSessions returns ONLY the caller's own sessions, so a foreign id cannot match: 404, not 403.
121
+ const row = Array.isArray(rows) ? rows.find((r: any) => r && r.id === id && typeof r.token === 'string') : undefined;
122
+ if (!row) return json(404, { code: 'SESSION_NOT_FOUND', message: 'No such session' });
123
+ const res = await api.revokeSession({ headers, body: { token: row.token }, asResponse: true });
124
+ // Pass Better Auth's own answer (and its Set-Cookie when the current session was the one revoked) through.
125
+ return res instanceof Response ? res : json(200, { status: true });
126
+ }
127
+
128
+ type Handler = (req: Request) => Promise<Response>;
129
+
130
+ /**
131
+ * Wrap Better Auth's Next.js handlers so no response carries a session credential to the browser.
132
+ * `auth` is the Better Auth instance; its `api` is used server-side only (to find the caller's current session and to
133
+ * revoke by id) and is not modified.
134
+ */
135
+ export function wrapBetterAuthHandler(
136
+ auth: { api: AuthApi },
137
+ handlers: { GET: Handler; POST: Handler },
138
+ ): { GET: Handler; POST: Handler } {
139
+ const currentTokenFor = (req: Request) => async (): Promise<string | undefined> => {
140
+ const s = await auth.api.getSession({ headers: new Headers(req.headers) });
141
+ return s?.session?.token;
142
+ };
143
+ return {
144
+ GET: async (req) => sanitizeBetterAuthResponse(req, await handlers.GET(req), currentTokenFor(req)),
145
+ POST: async (req) => {
146
+ const sub = authSubPath(new URL(req.url).pathname);
147
+ if (sub === '/revoke-session-by-id') return revokeById(req, auth.api);
148
+ return sanitizeBetterAuthResponse(req, await handlers.POST(req), currentTokenFor(req));
149
+ },
150
+ };
151
+ }
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
15
15
  */
16
16
 
17
17
  import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server';
18
- import { getSession as getBetterAuthSession } from '../../server/auth';
18
+ import { resolveSessionState } from '../../server/auth';
19
19
  import {
20
20
  getSession as getRedisSession,
21
21
  getBetterAuthSession as getBetterAuthRedisSession,
@@ -142,9 +142,40 @@ function resolveClientId(sessionClientId: string | undefined): string | null {
142
142
  */
143
143
  export async function GET(req: NextRequest) {
144
144
  try {
145
- const baSession = await getBetterAuthSession(req);
145
+ // PAY-2216: ask for the session's STATE, not a session-or-null. A null used to cover a store outage, a deleted
146
+ // session and no cookie alike, so this route answered 'No session found' to all three and the middleware could
147
+ // never clear a dead cookie (it must not clear on an outage). See SessionState in server/auth.
148
+ const sessionState = await resolveSessionState(req);
146
149
 
147
- if (!baSession) {
150
+ if (sessionState.state === 'unknown') {
151
+ // The store did not answer. NOT a statement about the session: never stale, never 'No session found'.
152
+ // Same shape as this route's catch (PAY-1882 step 4): 'unknown' revocation -> the middleware's fail-closed
153
+ // path, a non-OK answer -> service_error, which never clears cookies.
154
+ console.warn('[VIABILITY] Session store unavailable - session state unknown');
155
+ return NextResponse.json({
156
+ viable: false,
157
+ needsRefresh: false,
158
+ authenticated: false,
159
+ revocationStatus: 'unknown' as RevocationStatus,
160
+ error: 'Session store unavailable',
161
+ code: 'STORE_UNAVAILABLE'
162
+ }, { status: 500 });
163
+ }
164
+
165
+ if (sessionState.state === 'missing') {
166
+ // A VERIFIED cookie and a store that answered "not here". The existing stale shape, so the middleware's
167
+ // stale_session arm (PAY-2216 / 4.5.4) clears it.
168
+ console.warn('[VIABILITY] Stale cookie detected - verified cookie, session not in Redis');
169
+ return NextResponse.json({
170
+ viable: false,
171
+ needsRefresh: false,
172
+ authenticated: false,
173
+ sessionTokenId: tokenLogId(sessionState.sessionToken), // PAY-1481: a correlation id, never the token
174
+ reason: 'Stale session - cookie exists but session not found in Redis'
175
+ });
176
+ }
177
+
178
+ if (sessionState.state === 'none') {
148
179
  return NextResponse.json({
149
180
  viable: false,
150
181
  needsRefresh: false,
@@ -153,6 +184,8 @@ export async function GET(req: NextRequest) {
153
184
  });
154
185
  }
155
186
 
187
+ const baSession = sessionState.session;
188
+
156
189
  const token = baSession as any;
157
190
  const sessionToken = baSession.session?.token;
158
191
 
@@ -221,17 +221,60 @@ function logNoSessionWithKeys(origin: 'b' | 'c', sessionToken: string): void {
221
221
  * getFreshIdpToken → NO_SESSION (Better Auth cache miss)
222
222
  *
223
223
  * Returns the session object or null if not authenticated per Redis.
224
+ *
225
+ * PAY-2216: this is now a thin wrapper over {@link resolveSessionState} and returns the session ONLY for `live`.
226
+ * Its signature and every answer it gives are unchanged; callers that must tell a dead session from an
227
+ * unreachable store call resolveSessionState directly.
224
228
  */
225
229
  export async function getSession(request?: Request): Promise<any> {
230
+ const state = await resolveSessionState(request);
231
+ return state.state === 'live' ? state.session : null;
232
+ }
233
+
234
+ /**
235
+ * PAY-2216: what the session store said about this request's cookie. `getSession()` collapses all three
236
+ * non-live answers to `null`, and that collapse is the defect this type exists to undo.
237
+ *
238
+ * MEASURED (PAY-2216, NextPert 2026-10-11, portal fe547fa4 / next-mvp 4.5.4 / ioredis 5.3.2, real server):
239
+ * a Redis OUTAGE and a really DELETED key both came out of getSession() as `null`, so viability answered the
240
+ * identical `200 No session found` for both. Clearing on that shape would log every live user out on an
241
+ * outage (the PAY-2147 class), so nothing cleared at all and a dead cookie lingered.
242
+ *
243
+ * live - the session resolved. `session` is exactly what getSession() returns.
244
+ * missing - a cookie whose signature VERIFIED (HMAC or JWS, resolveVerifiedSessionTokenFromRequest) and BOTH
245
+ * store reads (canonical `{slug}:sess:{t}` and Better Auth's `ba:{slug}:{t}`) COMPLETED and found
246
+ * nothing. The store answered; the session is gone. Clearing the cookie is correct. This includes
247
+ * a Redis that restarted EMPTY: those sessions really are gone (BAPert 72093, gate row 6).
248
+ * unknown - a store read THREW (connection refused, commandTimeout, max retries). The store did not answer,
249
+ * so nothing is known about the session. NEVER clear on this. Callers answer 5xx.
250
+ * none - no session cookie, or a cookie whose signature does not verify, with the store not failing.
251
+ * Nothing to clear on our authority: a forged cookie never yields `missing`.
252
+ *
253
+ * The rule the whole type exists for: `missing` REQUIRES a verified cookie AND reads that completed. Weaken
254
+ * either and an outage or a forged cookie becomes a clear.
255
+ */
256
+ export type SessionState =
257
+ | { state: 'live'; session: any }
258
+ | { state: 'missing'; sessionToken: string }
259
+ | { state: 'unknown' }
260
+ | { state: 'none' };
261
+
262
+ export async function resolveSessionState(request?: Request): Promise<SessionState> {
226
263
  const auth = await getAuthInstance();
227
- if (!request) return null;
264
+ if (!request) return { state: 'none' };
228
265
 
229
266
  // Path A — Better Auth primary path (cookie cache → secondary storage).
230
267
  // Fast happy-path when both Better Auth and Redis agree.
268
+ //
269
+ // PAY-2216: secondaryStorage.get RETHROWS a Redis failure on purpose (170033), so a throw here means "the store
270
+ // could not be asked". It is remembered: if Path B then has no verified token to read with, the honest answer is
271
+ // `unknown`, not `none`.
231
272
  let betterAuthSession: any = null;
273
+ let primaryThrew = false;
232
274
  try {
233
275
  betterAuthSession = await auth.api.getSession({ headers: request.headers });
234
276
  } catch (err) {
277
+ primaryThrew = true;
235
278
  logSessionReadSwallowed('primary', err); // fall through to canonical Redis path
236
279
  }
237
280
 
@@ -245,7 +288,7 @@ export async function getSession(request?: Request): Promise<any> {
245
288
  logSessionReadSwallowed('A', err); // Redis unavailable
246
289
  }
247
290
  if (!sessionData) sessionData = buildSessionDataFromAuthSession(betterAuthSession);
248
- return attachSessionData(betterAuthSession, sessionData, sessionToken);
291
+ return { state: 'live', session: attachSessionData(betterAuthSession, sessionData, sessionToken) };
249
292
  }
250
293
 
251
294
  // Path B — Better Auth said null/incomplete. Fall back to a VERIFIED cookie
@@ -260,16 +303,21 @@ export async function getSession(request?: Request): Promise<any> {
260
303
  // the signature position, and a forged JWS too. The token now comes only from
261
304
  // the shared verified resolver (HMAC or JWS signature checked first).
262
305
  const sessionToken = await resolveVerifiedSessionTokenFromRequest(request);
263
- if (!sessionToken) return null;
306
+ // No verified token. If Better Auth's read THREW, the store was failing, so we cannot say the cookie is
307
+ // unverifiable rather than unreadable: `unknown`. Otherwise there is nothing to act on: `none`.
308
+ if (!sessionToken) return primaryThrew ? { state: 'unknown' } : { state: 'none' };
264
309
 
310
+ // PAY-2216: both reads must COMPLETE for a miss to mean anything. Either one throwing is `unknown`, which
311
+ // nobody may clear on. These two functions do a bare redis.get and do not swallow (verified at 4.5.4).
265
312
  let sessionData: SessionData | null = null;
266
313
  try {
267
314
  sessionData = await getRedisSession(sessionToken);
268
315
  if (!sessionData) sessionData = await getBetterAuthRedisSession(sessionToken);
269
316
  } catch (err) {
270
317
  logSessionReadSwallowed('B', err); // Redis unavailable
318
+ return { state: 'unknown' };
271
319
  }
272
- if (!sessionData) return null;
320
+ if (!sessionData) return { state: 'missing', sessionToken };
273
321
 
274
322
  // Synthesize a minimal session shape compatible with downstream callers.
275
323
  // The `session.token` field is what `getFreshIdpToken` and other callers
@@ -283,7 +331,7 @@ export async function getSession(request?: Request): Promise<any> {
283
331
  roles: sessionData.roles,
284
332
  },
285
333
  };
286
- return attachSessionData(synthetic, sessionData, sessionToken);
334
+ return { state: 'live', session: attachSessionData(synthetic, sessionData, sessionToken) };
287
335
  }
288
336
 
289
337
  /**
@@ -637,23 +637,13 @@ export const useAuthStore = create<AuthStore>()(
637
637
  // COORDINATED REFRESH: The server now handles distributed locking
638
638
  // We just need to make the refresh call and let the server coordinate
639
639
 
640
- // Resolve session token for header
641
- const resolveSessionTokenForHeader = async (): Promise<string | undefined> => {
642
- let token = get().session?.sessionToken as string | undefined;
643
- if (token) return token;
644
- try {
645
- for (let attempt = 1; attempt <= 3 && !token; attempt++) {
646
- const { data: s } = await authClient.getSession();
647
- token = (s as any)?.sessionToken;
648
- if (!token) {
649
- await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 150));
650
- }
651
- }
652
- } catch {
653
- authLogger.warn('[AuthStore] Failed to resolve session token from Better Auth during refresh');
654
- }
655
- return token;
656
- };
640
+ // PAY-2217: the session token is NOT read from Better Auth's getSession() any more. The HTTP body no
641
+ // longer carries it (wrapBetterAuthHandler), and this read was already dead: getSession() returns
642
+ // { session: { token } }, never a top-level `sessionToken`, so the 3 x 150 ms retry loop that used to sit
643
+ // here always ran to exhaustion. The server resolves the session from the cookie and REJECTS an
644
+ // x-session-token header when it cannot (refresh.ts, 246007), so the header is advisory at best.
645
+ const resolveSessionTokenForHeader = async (): Promise<string | undefined> =>
646
+ get().session?.sessionToken as string | undefined;
657
647
 
658
648
  const sessionTokenHeader = await resolveSessionTokenForHeader();
659
649