@payez/next-mvp 4.4.1 → 4.4.3

package/src/auth/safe-callback.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+/**
+ * ONE definition of "is this callback target safe to navigate to", for the
+ * whole package (375656).
+ *
+ * *** THIS DELEGATES PARSING TO THE URL PARSER. DO NOT REPLACE IT WITH
+ * *** startsWith() CHECKS. THAT APPROACH FAILED FOUR TIMES.
+ *
+ * WHY THIS FILE EXISTS: `@payez/next-mvp` shipped THREE bodies named
+ * `makeAuthDecision`, each carrying its own `callbackUrl.startsWith('/account-auth/')`
+ * test. That test is a REDIRECT-LOOP guard sitting in the seat where an ORIGIN
+ * check belongs - its own comment says "prevents infinite loop" - so
+ * `https://evil.example.com` does not start with `/account-auth/`, passes
+ * through untouched, and becomes the redirect target. The exported copy
+ * (`auth/auth-decision.ts`, re-exported from `index.ts` and `edge/middleware.ts`)
+ * is public API, so that is a published open redirect independent of who calls it.
+ *
+ * HISTORY, because it is the whole argument for the current shape (267097 /
+ * 267174 / 267448), carried over verbatim from the portal's `src/lib/safe-callback.ts`
+ * where this guard was proven (0 leaks / 21 hostile inputs):
+ *
+ *   v1  `startsWith('/') && !startsWith('//')`            -> bypassed by  /BACKSLASH host
+ *   v2  + `!startsWith('/' + BACKSLASH)`                  -> bypassed by  /TAB/host
+ *   ...                                                      and /LF/host, /CR/host
+ *   v3  resolve once + compare ORIGIN                     -> bypassed by  /..//host
+ *                                                            and /.//host, /%2e%2e//host
+ *   v4  + require the RESULT to be a FIXED POINT          <- current
+ *
+ * *** DRIFT, 2026-09-11 (325543). THIS FILE WAS v3 WHILE THE PORTAL'S COPY WAS
+ * *** v4, AND THE PACKAGE COPY IS THE ONE THAT SHIPPED. The portal fixed its own
+ * *** src/lib/safe-callback.ts (e1f08fea) and deployed; the served bundle STILL
+ * *** escaped 5/5 in a real browser, because `src/contexts/ThemeContext.tsx`
+ * *** imports the BARE BARREL `@payez/next-mvp`, which pulls dist/index.js ->
+ * *** auth/auth-decision -> THIS FILE into the client graph, and because the
+ * *** portal's `src/middleware.ts` imports `@payez/next-mvp/edge`, which requires
+ * *** THIS FILE server-side on every request. It was read as a stale build
+ * *** artifact of the portal's file for most of a day. It was not. It was a
+ * *** SECOND DEFINITION, and no rebuild of the portal could have removed it.
+ * *** The header below says "ONE definition ... for the whole package" and that
+ * *** was true INSIDE this package boundary the entire time. The defect lived in
+ * *** the gap BETWEEN two boundaries that each enforced one-definition correctly.
+ * *** A guard that exists in N copies is only as strong as its weakest copy, and
+ * *** a per-repo grep gate cannot see N. IF YOU CHANGE THE PREDICATE HERE, CHANGE
+ * *** IT IN THE PORTAL'S src/lib/safe-callback.ts IN THE SAME HOUR, OR DELETE ONE
+ * *** OF THEM.
+ *
+ * Both bypasses work the same way: the browser NORMALISES the string AFTER the
+ * guard has finished looking at it. The WHATWG URL parser converts backslashes
+ * to forward slashes and STRIPS all ASCII tab, LF and CR before resolving. So a
+ * prefix check can always be defeated by a character that is not there yet when
+ * it runs. Each fix bought one character. The list was never provably complete.
+ *
+ * SO: stop re-implementing the parser and ask it instead. Resolve the input
+ * against a synthetic base and compare ORIGINS. Anything that escapes the
+ * origin - however it is spelled, including spellings nobody has found yet -
+ * fails one comparison. The returned value is the parser's own NORMALISED
+ * output, so an accepted path cannot smuggle a control character onward either.
+ *
+ * A synthetic base is used deliberately so this works identically in a server
+ * component (no window), on the client, and in the edge runtime.
+ */
+
+/** Where we send anyone whose requested target we will not honour. */
+export const DEFAULT_CALLBACK = '/';
+
+/** The auth surface. A callback pointing back into it causes a redirect cycle. */
+const AUTH_PREFIX = '/account-auth/';
+
+/**
+ * Synthetic, unreachable base. Only ever used as the resolution origin for the
+ * comparison below - never emitted, never navigated to. `.invalid` is reserved
+ * by RFC 2606 and can never resolve.
+ */
+const BASE = 'http://safe-callback.invalid';
+
+/**
+ * The value to navigate to: a same-origin relative path, NORMALISED by the URL
+ * parser, or `fallback` for anything that escapes the origin or loops back into
+ * the auth surface. Never throws.
+ */
+export function safeCallbackPath(raw: unknown, fallback: string = DEFAULT_CALLBACK): string {
+  if (typeof raw !== 'string' || raw.length === 0) return fallback;
+
+  let url: URL;
+  try {
+    url = new URL(raw, BASE);
+  } catch {
+    return fallback;
+  }
+
+  // Anything that resolved to a different origin escaped, however it was spelled:
+  // absolute, protocol-relative //host, backslash /\host, tab/LF/CR variants, or
+  // a scheme like javascript: (whose origin is opaque and never equals BASE).
+  if (url.origin !== BASE) return fallback;
+
+  // Loopbacks into the auth surface cause redirect cycles.
+  if (url.pathname.startsWith(AUTH_PREFIX)) return fallback;
+
+  // The parser's normalised output - control characters already stripped.
+  const candidate = url.pathname + url.search + url.hash;
+
+  // *** SECOND RESOLUTION. DO NOT DELETE THIS AS REDUNDANT - IT IS NOT. ***
+  //
+  // v3 (the origin comparison above) was bypassed too, and differently from v1/v2.
+  // The origin check constrains where `raw` RESOLVED TO. It does not constrain how
+  // the RESULT IS SPELLED - and the result is resolved a SECOND time, by whoever
+  // navigates to it. A returned path that begins with `//` is a PROTOCOL-RELATIVE
+  // URL at that second resolution, so it lands off-origin having passed every
+  // check here:
+  //
+  //     '/..//evil.example.com'     -> pathname '//evil.example.com'  -> evil.example.com
+  //     '/.//evil.example.com'      -> pathname '//evil.example.com'  -> evil.example.com
+  //     '/%2e%2e//evil.example.com' -> pathname '//evil.example.com'  -> evil.example.com
+  //
+  // The parser resolves `..` against the synthetic base and, at the root, leaves
+  // behind the EMPTY SEGMENT rather than collapsing it. Origin stayed BASE the
+  // whole time, so nothing upstream fired.
+  //
+  // MEASURED, not reasoned: in a real headless Chromium on the live origin
+  // https://portal.keelauth.com, 5 spellings resolved to https://evil.example.com
+  // (QAPert-NightHawk, 2026-09-11, card 325543), and on 2026-09-11 the SERVED
+  // BUNDLE was measured escaping 5/5 through THIS PACKAGE'S copy while the
+  // portal's own src/lib/safe-callback.ts was already fixed - the two copies had
+  // drifted. See the DRIFT note in this file's header.
+  //
+  // THE FIX FOLLOWS THIS FILE'S OWN DOCTRINE: do not pattern-match the spellings
+  // (that is the startsWith() trap that failed four times, and this would be the
+  // fifth). Ask the parser AGAIN about the exact value we are about to hand out,
+  // and require it to be a FIXED POINT. Anything whose meaning changes when it is
+  // resolved a second time is by definition not a stable same-origin path, however
+  // it is spelled - including spellings nobody has found yet.
+  let echo: URL;
+  try {
+    echo = new URL(candidate, BASE);
+  } catch {
+    return fallback;
+  }
+  if (echo.origin !== BASE) return fallback;
+  if (echo.pathname.startsWith(AUTH_PREFIX)) return fallback;
+  if (echo.pathname + echo.search + echo.hash !== candidate) return fallback;
+
+  return candidate;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Sentinel that `safeCallbackPath` can never legitimately return: it is not a
+ * fixed point of the URL parser (the parser would percent-encode the space), so
+ * it cannot collide with a genuine accepted value.
+ */
+const REJECTED = '\u0000rejected';
+
+/**
+ * True when `raw` is a callback target we are willing to honour.
+ *
+ * DEFINED IN TERMS OF `safeCallbackPath` ON PURPOSE - it used to carry its own
+ * copy of the predicate, and that copy was missing the second resolution above
+ * while the two were maintained separately. This file's whole history is
+ * duplicated predicates drifting apart (see the header). One definition, one
+ * place to fix.
+ */
+export function isSafeCallbackPath(raw: unknown): raw is string {
+  return typeof raw === 'string' && raw.length > 0 && safeCallbackPath(raw, REJECTED) !== REJECTED;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Pick the post-login destination: an explicit `?callbackUrl=` when it is one we
+ * will honour, otherwise the current path, otherwise `/`.
+ *
+ * This replaces the package's three hand-rolled `getSafeCallbackUrl` /
+ * `getCallbackUrl` bodies. Note the ARGUMENT ORDER DEPENDENCY those had: they
+ * tested `pathname` FIRST and returned early, so a caller on the login page
+ * never reached the attacker-controlled parameter at all - safe, but only
+ * because that caller happened to pass a value that tripped the function's own
+ * first guard. Nothing in the code named that dependency, and an argument
+ * reorder would have opened it. Here BOTH inputs are validated, so the
+ * protection no longer depends on which one is passed.
+ */
+export function resolveCallbackDestination(
+  pathname: string,
+  searchParams?: URLSearchParams | null,
+  fallback: string = DEFAULT_CALLBACK
+): string {
+  const requested = searchParams?.get('callbackUrl');
+  if (isSafeCallbackPath(requested)) return safeCallbackPath(requested, fallback);
+  return safeCallbackPath(pathname, fallback);
+}

package/src/hooks/useProfile.ts

@@ -49,7 +49,14 @@ export type ProfileResponse = {
   phone_confirmed?: boolean;
   two_factor_enabled?: boolean;
   roles?: string[];
-  contact_information?: Record<string, any>;
+  // REMOVED: `contact_information?: Record<string, any>` - the ADMIN DTO's field
+  // name (AdminUserProfileResponse), never emitted by /api/account/profile. This
+  // permissive declaration is WHY the wrong mapper type-checked for so long: the
+  // correct `contact_info` and `address` shapes were already declared right here,
+  // and this `Record<string, any>` sat beside them as an off switch, accepting
+  // `contact_information.addressLine1` on a path that could never carry data.
+  // Found by BAPert (41365) as the residual of my own half-sweep - I deleted the
+  // twin of this line from EnhancedProfilePage and left this one standing.
   [key: string]: any;
 };
 

package/src/lib/acr.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+/**
+ * CARD 375639 - the one place this package decides what an ABSENT assurance
+ * signal means.
+ *
+ * Card 375276 fixed this question inside `payez_idp_admin_web/src` (commit
+ * d9c6ac0, BAPert R980 remedy (a)) and fenced its own scope explicitly:
+ *
+ *     "fallbacks on the stored `session.authenticationLevel` (refresh lane)
+ *      are deliberately NOT covered ... That gap is 375276's remaining half."
+ *
+ * `src/api/auth-handler.ts` IS that remaining half, and it is in the shared
+ * package rather than in one app, so every consumer of the published
+ * `@payez/next-mvp/api/auth-handler` export inherits it.
+ *
+ * WHY BOTH SIGNALS LIVE IN ONE MODULE
+ * -----------------------------------
+ * `acr` (how strong the authentication was) and `amr` (which methods were
+ * used) are sent to the IDP together in a single refresh body. Defaulting one
+ * without the other produces an INCOHERENT assertion - "no second factor
+ * happened, and the method used was mfa" - so they are resolved side by side
+ * and a change to one is forced to confront the other.
+ *
+ * MEASURED CONVENTION IN THIS PACKAGE (census, 2026-09-11)
+ * -------------------------------------------------------
+ * acr absent-defaults:  '0' x1, '1' x3, '2' x1   <- the '2' was auth-handler
+ * amr absent-defaults:  []  x5, ['pwd','mfa'] x1 <- the list was auth-handler
+ *
+ * Both fail-open values were outliers at a single site, not the convention.
+ * These constants adopt the majority, fail-closed convention.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * The assurance level used when the session and token say NOTHING about it.
+ *
+ * '1' = a single factor. It does not assert that a second factor happened.
+ * It must never be '2' (or higher): that is the value the IDP reads as
+ * "a second factor was completed", and an absent claim is not evidence of one.
+ */
+export const ACR_WHEN_ABSENT = '1';
+
+/**
+ * The authentication-methods list used when nothing is known.
+ *
+ * Empty asserts nothing. It must never contain 'mfa' (or any second-factor
+ * method): claiming a method that was never exercised is the same fabrication
+ * as ACR '2', and because the two corroborate each other a downstream check
+ * that cross-validates amr against acr would accept the fabricated pair.
+ */
+export const AMR_WHEN_ABSENT: readonly string[] = [];
+
+/**
+ * True when an assurance signal carries no information.
+ *
+ * Deliberately NOT `!value`. The `||` idiom this replaces cannot tell
+ * "the token said nothing" from "the token said 0", and numeric 0 is a
+ * meaningful assurance level (unauthenticated) that must survive as '0'
+ * rather than being promoted to the fallback.
+ */
+function isAbsent(value: unknown): boolean {
+  return value === undefined || value === null || value === '';
+}
+
+/**
+ * Resolve an assurance level from any number of candidate sources, in
+ * priority order, falling back to the level that asserts no second factor.
+ *
+ * Accepts the candidates the refresh lane actually has: the stored
+ * `session.authenticationLevel` first, then the `acr` claim on the token.
+ */
+export function resolveAcrLevel(...candidates: unknown[]): string {
+  for (const candidate of candidates) {
+    if (!isAbsent(candidate)) {
+      return String(candidate);
+    }
+  }
+  return ACR_WHEN_ABSENT;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Resolve the authentication-methods list.
+ *
+ * `raw` may arrive as a JSON string (the shape stored on the token) or as an
+ * array (the shape held on the session). Anything unparseable resolves to the
+ * empty list rather than to an assumed set of methods - a malformed claim is
+ * not evidence that mfa happened.
+ */
+export function resolveAuthMethods(...candidates: unknown[]): string[] {
+  for (const candidate of candidates) {
+    if (isAbsent(candidate)) continue;
+
+    if (Array.isArray(candidate)) {
+      return candidate.map(String);
+    }
+
+    if (typeof candidate === 'string') {
+      try {
+        const parsed = JSON.parse(candidate);
+        if (Array.isArray(parsed)) {
+          return parsed.map(String);
+        }
+      } catch {
+        // A malformed amr claim asserts nothing. Fall through to the next
+        // candidate rather than inventing methods.
+        continue;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  return [...AMR_WHEN_ABSENT];
+}

package/src/lib/session-store.ts

@@ -434,6 +434,28 @@ export async function transitionTo2FASession(
     }
   }
 
+  // 339563: derive the expiry ONCE - it is both a field to write and the
+  // evidence test below. Re-deriving it twice invites the two reads to drift.
+  const mfaLifetime = mfaLifetimeFromAccessToken(newAccessToken);
+
+  // *** R908(e). ABSENCE OF THE EXPIRY IS NOT A COMPLETED CEREMONY. ***
+  //
+  // `mfaExpiresAt` is the only evidence we hold that a real MFA ceremony took
+  // place and when it lapses. When the stepped-up token carries no `mfa_expires`
+  // claim we do NOT know that this session is MFA-verified, and R908(e) binds
+  // the consumer to the third arm:
+  //
+  //   producers degrade  ->  consumers RE-CHALLENGE  ->  nobody infers a
+  //   negative from a silence.
+  //
+  // So: never mint `mfaVerified: true` off a token that carries no expiry (that
+  // is forging evidence of a ceremony we did not observe - 12188/12390), and
+  // never hard-refuse the user either (R486: null is "cannot determine", not
+  // "not 2FA-backed"). Leave the session un-verified and set `nextStep:
+  // 'mfa_verify'`, which is the field the gate already reads to mean "a usable
+  // method exists; challenge them" (SessionModel.ts:136).
+  const mfaEvidencePresent = mfaLifetime.mfaExpiresAt !== undefined;
+
   // Support both old and new field names in input
   // CRITICAL: Set BOTH mfaVerified (new) AND twoFactorComplete (legacy) for compatibility
   // auth.ts session callback reads twoFactorComplete, so we must set it here
@@ -441,16 +463,33 @@ export async function transitionTo2FASession(
     idpAccessToken: newAccessToken,
     idpRefreshToken: tokens.idpRefreshToken || tokens.refreshToken,
     idpAccessTokenExpires: tokens.idpAccessTokenExpires || tokens.accessTokenExpires,
-    mfaVerified: true,
-    twoFactorComplete: true, // Legacy field - required by auth.ts session callback
+    mfaVerified: mfaEvidencePresent,
+    twoFactorComplete: mfaEvidencePresent, // Legacy field - required by auth.ts session callback
     mfaMethod: mfaMethod,
     // Update bearerKeyId if extracted from new token
     ...(bearerKeyId && { bearerKeyId }),
     // 339563: write the expiry in the SAME update that sets the flag. We already
     // hold the stepped-up token here and already decode its header above.
-    ...mfaLifetimeFromAccessToken(newAccessToken),
+    ...mfaLifetime,
+    // R908(e): no evidence -> route to the challenge, do not grant and do not eject.
+    ...(mfaEvidencePresent ? {} : { nextStep: 'mfa_verify' as const }),
   };
 
+  if (!mfaEvidencePresent) {
+    console.warn(
+      '[transitionTo2FASession] R908(e): the stepped-up token carries NO mfa_expires ' +
+        'claim, so there is no evidence of an MFA ceremony to record. NOT setting ' +
+        'mfaVerified; setting nextStep=mfa_verify so the consumer re-challenges. ' +
+        'If this fires for a lane that DID complete a real ceremony, the defect is ' +
+        'on the emit side (R908(b)) - do not "fix" it by minting the flag here.',
+      {
+        sessionToken: sessionToken?.substring(0, 8) + '...',
+        mfaMethod,
+        hasAccessToken: !!newAccessToken,
+      }
+    );
+  }
+
   const refreshExpires = tokens.idpRefreshTokenExpires || tokens.refreshTokenExpires;
   if (refreshExpires !== undefined) {
     updates.idpRefreshTokenExpires = refreshExpires;
@@ -462,11 +501,13 @@ export async function transitionTo2FASession(
     mfaMethod: updates.mfaMethod,
     hasIdpAccessToken: !!updates.idpAccessToken,
     // 339563: surface the expiry we derived. `mfaExpiresAt: undefined` here is
-    // the passwordless/primary-credential lane (token carried no mfa_expires),
-    // NOT a bug - but it IS the case the consumers currently fail OPEN on, so
-    // it needs to be visible in the log rather than inferred from its absence.
+    // the passwordless/primary-credential lane (token carried no mfa_expires).
+    // Since R908(e) that absence no longer fails OPEN: it withholds mfaVerified
+    // and sets nextStep=mfa_verify instead, so log both together - the pair is
+    // the whole decision.
     mfaExpiresAt: updates.mfaExpiresAt,
     mfaExpiresAtISO: updates.mfaExpiresAt ? new Date(updates.mfaExpiresAt).toISOString() : undefined,
+    nextStep: (updates as any).nextStep,
   });
 
   const result = await updateSession(sessionToken, updates);
@@ -543,9 +584,27 @@ export async function mark2FAComplete(
     );
   }
 
+  // R908(e): identical rule to transitionTo2FASession above - no expiry derived
+  // means no observed ceremony, so we re-challenge rather than mint the flag.
+  // This path matters more than its sibling: `mark2FAComplete(sessionToken)`
+  // with the accessToken omitted used to write a bare `mfaVerified: true` that
+  // NO consumer could ever expire, and it is reachable from route handlers that
+  // take their tokens from the request body.
+  const mfaEvidencePresent = mfaLifetime.mfaExpiresAt !== undefined;
+
+  if (!mfaEvidencePresent) {
+    console.warn(
+      '[mark2FAComplete] R908(e): no mfa_expires could be derived, so mfaVerified ' +
+      'is NOT being set. Writing nextStep=mfa_verify instead so the consumer ' +
+      're-challenges. A caller that needs the grant must pass the stepped-up ' +
+      'access token that carries the claim.'
+    );
+  }
+
   return updateSession(sessionToken, {
-    mfaVerified: true,
+    mfaVerified: mfaEvidencePresent,
     ...mfaLifetime,
+    ...(mfaEvidencePresent ? {} : { nextStep: 'mfa_verify' as const }),
   });
 }
 

package/src/middleware/create-middleware.ts

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 
 import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server';
 import { isUnauthenticatedRoute, should2FABypass } from '../auth/route-config';
+import { resolveCallbackDestination } from '../auth/safe-callback';
 import { getInternalApiUrl } from '../edge/internal-api-url';
 import { getSessionCookieName, getSecureSessionCookieName } from '../lib/app-slug';
 import { checkPagePermission, isRBACEnabled } from './rbac-check';
@@ -151,16 +152,23 @@ function isLoginPage(pathname: string): boolean {
   return pathname === LOGIN_PAGE;
 }
 
-/** Ensures callback URLs never point to auth pages (prevents redirect loops) */
+/**
+ * Ensures callback URLs never point to auth pages (prevents redirect loops) AND
+ * never point off-origin (prevents open redirect).
+ *
+ * 375656: the previous body tested `pathname` FIRST and returned '/' early, so
+ * the two call sites that pass an attacker-controlled `searchParams` are both
+ * inside `if (onLoginPage)` branches - and `isLoginPage` is exact equality against
+ * `LOGIN_PAGE`, which starts with `/account-auth/`. The early return therefore
+ * fired before the parameter was ever read. That made this function SAFE, but
+ * safe because of which argument the caller happened to pass, not because the
+ * attacker-controlled value was ever checked: `existing` was returned raw on the
+ * strength of a `startsWith` test that `https://evil.example.com` passes.
+ * Nothing named that dependency, and reordering the arguments would have opened
+ * it silently. Both inputs are now validated by the same parser-based guard.
+ */
 function getSafeCallbackUrl(pathname: string, searchParams?: URLSearchParams): string {
-  if (pathname.startsWith('/account-auth/')) {
-    return '/';
-  }
-  const existing = searchParams?.get('callbackUrl');
-  if (existing && !existing.startsWith('/account-auth/')) {
-    return existing;
-  }
-  return pathname;
+  return resolveCallbackDestination(pathname, searchParams);
 }
 
 /** Clear all session cookies on a response */
@@ -388,14 +396,38 @@ export function createMvpMiddleware(options: MvpMiddlewareOptions = {}) {
     // --- Fetch session viability from internal API ---
     const { sessionStatus, sessionPointer } = await checkViability(request, viabilityEndpoint, log);
 
-    // --- Handle stale session early (cookie exists but session doesn't) ---
+    // --- Stale session (cookie exists but session doesn't): OBSERVE ONLY, DO NOT DECIDE ---
+    //
+    // *** CARD 349607. THIS BLOCK USED TO `return` HERE, AND THAT RETURN WAS A BYPASS. ***
+    //
+    // makeAuthDecision() below already handles this exact condition at its
+    // `if (!sessionStatus.exists)` branch, and it handles it with TWO guard
+    // clauses that this early return did not have:
+    //
+    //     if (onLoginPage)                 return { type: 'allow' };   // no redirect loop
+    //     if (pathname.startsWith('/api/'))return { type: 'allow' };   // no HTML 307 at fetch()
+    //
+    // Returning here skipped BOTH. The `/api/` case is the reported harm: a
+    // stale-session XHR was answered with a 307 to an HTML login page, so the
+    // failure is invisible to `fetch()` - the caller sees an opaque redirect
+    // instead of an auth error, which is the same "correct logic preempted by
+    // an earlier return" shape recorded on 307290.
+    //
+    // This was NOT a missing feature one level down - the decision engine's
+    // branch is a strict superset of the behaviour this block implemented.
+    // The early return was a DUPLICATE that had drifted from the original.
+    // Adding a single `/api/` exemption here would have re-created the
+    // duplication (and left the onLoginPage divergence in place), so the
+    // duplicate is removed instead and the engine is left as the ONE decider.
+    //
+    // The warning is deliberately KEPT: it is the only operational signal that
+    // stale sessions are occurring, and it costs nothing to log before
+    // delegating. Do not re-introduce a `return` in this block.
     if (!isPublic && sessionStatus.exists === false && sessionPointer.sessionToken) {
-      const safeCallback = getSafeCallbackUrl(pathname);
-      log.warn('Stale session detected', {
+      log.warn('Stale session detected (delegating to decision engine)', {
         sessionToken: sessionPointer.sessionToken?.substring(0, 8) + '...',
         pathname
       });
-      return redirectTo(request, `${LOGIN_PAGE}?callbackUrl=${encodeURIComponent(safeCallback)}`, true);
     }
 
     // --- Run decision engine ---

package/src/pages/profile/EnhancedProfilePage.tsx

@@ -69,7 +69,17 @@ interface ProfileData {
   full_name?: string;
   two_factor_enabled?: boolean;
   roles?: string[];
-  contact_information?: any;
+  // `contact_information` was declared here and read by the mapper below. The MEMBER
+  // endpoint never emits it - it belongs to AdminUserProfileResponse. The CORRECT
+  // shapes were already declared above (contact_info :44, address :51); only the
+  // mapper was pointed at the wrong field. Removed so nothing can read it again.
+}
+
+// An all-null object is not data. The member profile DTOs are always instantiated
+// server-side (UserService.GetUserProfileAsync), so `obj ? ... : undefined` cannot
+// tell "has an address" from "has an empty address shell".
+function hasAnyValue(obj: Record<string, unknown> | undefined | null): boolean {
+  return !!obj && Object.values(obj).some(v => v !== null && v !== undefined && v !== '');
 }
 
 interface EditableSectionProps {
@@ -233,20 +243,39 @@ export default function EnhancedProfilePage() {
         title: undefined,
         bio: undefined,
       },
-      contact_info: rawProfile.contact_information ? {
-        secondary_email: rawProfile.contact_information.secondary_email,
-        secondary_phone: rawProfile.contact_information.secondary_phone,
-        website: rawProfile.contact_information.website,
+      // Both blocks used to be read off `rawProfile.contact_information`, which the
+      // MEMBER endpoint NEVER emits - that name belongs to AdminUserProfileResponse
+      // (its only 2 occurrences in PayEz-Core are in that admin DTO).
+      // /api/account/profile returns UserProfileResponse: `contact_info` plus a
+      // SEPARATE TOP-LEVEL `address`. Both guards therefore always took the false
+      // branch and both blocks rendered permanently empty for every member.
+      //
+      // NOT a rename: `address` is a SIBLING of contact_info, not nested inside it,
+      // so contact_information -> contact_info alone fixes Contact and leaves ADDRESS
+      // DEAD. Inner names are snake_case on both DTOs; the old camelCase reads were
+      // shaped for the ADMIN payload, which is where those keys really are camelCase.
+      // GUARD ON CONTENT, NOT PRESENCE. UserService.GetUserProfileAsync ALWAYS
+      // instantiates both DTOs (ContactInfo = new ProfileContactInfoDto {...},
+      // Address = new AddressDto {...}), so both arrive NON-NULL with all-null
+      // members when the member has nothing on file. A truthiness guard always
+      // passes and would render a card full of blank fields - the hazard QAPert
+      // named in 41360 for the naive rename, which applies just as much to
+      // reading the CORRECT fields.
+      contact_info: hasAnyValue(rawProfile.contact_info) ? {
+        secondary_email: rawProfile.contact_info?.secondary_email,
+        secondary_phone: rawProfile.contact_info?.secondary_phone,
+        website: rawProfile.contact_info?.website,
+        preferred_contact_method: rawProfile.contact_info?.preferred_contact_method,
       } : undefined,
-      address: rawProfile.contact_information ? {
-        address_line_1: rawProfile.contact_information.addressLine1,
-        address_line_2: rawProfile.contact_information.addressLine2,
-        city: rawProfile.contact_information.city,
-        state_id: rawProfile.contact_information.stateId,
-        state_name: rawProfile.contact_information.stateName,
-        postal_code: rawProfile.contact_information.postalCode,
-        country_code: rawProfile.contact_information.countryCode,
-        country_name: rawProfile.contact_information.countryName,
+      address: hasAnyValue(rawProfile.address) ? {
+        address_line_1: rawProfile.address?.address_line_1,
+        address_line_2: rawProfile.address?.address_line_2,
+        city: rawProfile.address?.city,
+        state_id: rawProfile.address?.state_id,
+        state_name: rawProfile.address?.state_name,
+        postal_code: rawProfile.address?.postal_code,
+        country_code: rawProfile.address?.country_code,
+        country_name: rawProfile.address?.country_name,
       } : undefined,
       two_factor_enabled: rawProfile.two_factor_enabled,
       roles: rawProfile.roles,

package/src/pages/verify-code/page.tsx

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ import { useRouter, useSearchParams } from 'next/navigation';
 import { authClient } from '../../client/better-auth-client';
 import { Suspense } from 'react';
 import { useColors } from '../../theme/useTheme';
+import { safeCallbackPath } from '../../auth/safe-callback';
 
 /**
  * Session storage key to track that user intentionally navigated to verify-code.
@@ -52,7 +53,31 @@ interface MaskedInfo {
 function VerifyCodeForm({ enrollHref }: { enrollHref: string }) {
   const router = useRouter();
   const searchParams = useSearchParams();
-  const callbackUrl = searchParams?.get('callbackUrl') || '/dashboard';
+  /**
+   * 375936 - ORIGIN-GUARDED AT THE READ, NOT AT THE SINK.
+   *
+   * This value ends up in `window.location.href` after a SUCCESSFUL 2FA
+   * ceremony (see the setTimeout further down). That is a full navigation, so
+   * an absolute URL here is a cross-origin redirect - the user completes a
+   * genuine login and is then dropped on an attacker-controlled page at the
+   * exact moment they are most primed to trust what they see.
+   *
+   * This used to be a raw `searchParams?.get('callbackUrl') || '/dashboard'`.
+   * The middleware does NOT protect this page: create-middleware's
+   * `needsTwoFactorRedirect` returns false for VERIFY_CODE_PAGE, so a direct
+   * request arrives here with its query string untouched.
+   *
+   * Do NOT "simplify" this back to a `startsWith('/account-auth/')` test. The
+   * three such tests below are LOOP prevention, not ORIGIN prevention -
+   * `https://evil.example` passes every one of them. safeCallbackPath asks the
+   * URL parser instead, so protocol-relative (`//host`), backslash (`/\host`)
+   * and TAB/LF/CR spellings all fail one origin comparison rather than needing
+   * their own blacklist entry.
+   *
+   * Guarding at the READ rather than at the sink means every later use of
+   * `callbackUrl` on this page inherits the guarantee.
+   */
+  const callbackUrl = safeCallbackPath(searchParams?.get('callbackUrl'), '/dashboard');
 
   const { data: sessionData, isPending } = authClient.useSession();
   const session = sessionData;

package/src/routes/auth/viability.ts

@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ export async function GET(req: NextRequest) {
       const mfaExpiresAt = session?.mfaExpiresAt || 0;
       const mfaExpired = mfaExpiresAt > 0 && mfaExpiresAt < Date.now();
       // Check mfaVerified (normalized name) with fallback to twoFactorComplete for compatibility
-      const mfaVerifiedInSession = session?.mfaVerified ?? (session as any)?.twoFactorComplete ?? false;
+      const mfaVerifiedInSession = session?.mfaVerified ?? false;
 
       // User has completed 2FA requirements if: they verified AND it hasn't expired
       const userHasCompletedTenantTwoFactorRequirements = mfaVerifiedInSession && !mfaExpired;
@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ export async function GET(req: NextRequest) {
     const mfaExpiresAt = session?.mfaExpiresAt || 0;
     const mfaExpired = mfaExpiresAt > 0 && mfaExpiresAt < Date.now();
     // Check mfaVerified (normalized name) with fallback to twoFactorComplete for compatibility
-    const mfaVerifiedInSession = session?.mfaVerified ?? (session as any)?.twoFactorComplete ?? false;
+    const mfaVerifiedInSession = session?.mfaVerified ?? false;
 
     // DEBUG: Log what we're reading from the session
     console.log('[VIABILITY] Session 2FA state:', {