@payez/next-mvp 4.10.0 → 4.11.0

package/src/api-handlers/auth/refresh.ts

@@ -1,47 +1,31 @@
 /**
- * CRITICAL REFRESH TOKEN API HANDLER
+ * REFRESH TOKEN API HANDLER - a thin HTTP wrapper over `ensureFreshAccessToken` (R-over-E, BAPert 76449; design: docs/refresh-r-over-e-delta.md)
  *
- * ASK BEFORE EDITING - TESTED AND WORKING SYSTEM
+ * ASK BEFORE EDITING - this is the route every browser, middleware and `internalRefresh` caller reaches.
  *
- * This handler manages the server-side refresh token cycle with:
- * - Better Auth session extraction (the ONLY way a session is established here)
- * - PayEz IDP refresh token exchange
- * - Session state updates with new tokens
- * - Proper error handling and logging
- * - Single-use semantics enforcement
+ * `lib/ensure-fresh-access-token` is the ONE implementation that talks to the IdP, holds the refresh lock and writes the tokens (post-lock
+ * token, in-doubt marker, fetch timeout, envelope rule, dropped-persist and canonical-row handling all live there). This file keeps what only
+ * an HTTP request has:
+ *  - resolving the session from the request's own Better Auth cookie,
+ *  - the `x-session-token` ownership rejection (below),
+ *  - the `x-request-id` trace id (log correlation only; it is never the lock identity),
+ *  - mapping E's typed result onto this route's existing JSON bodies and status codes.
+ * The bodies did not change except where E's rules did (see CHANGELOG): the browser, `middleware/create-middleware`, `lib/token-lifecycle`
+ * (which reads `reason === 'already_fresh'`) and `lib/idp-fetch` / `lib/api-handler` (via `internalRefresh`) depend on them.
  *
  * ── 246007: THE `x-session-token` FALLBACK IS GONE. IT NOW HARD-DENIES. ────
- * This list previously advertised an x-session-token fallback for internal
- * callers as a current capability. That behaviour has been REMOVED: a request presenting `x-session-token` with
- * no cookie-resolved session of its own is rejected 401 UNAUTHORIZED, because
- * there is no session to establish ownership of the token it names. Accepting
- * it let a caller refresh a session they did not own.
+ * A request presenting `x-session-token` with no cookie-resolved session of its own is rejected 401 UNAUTHORIZED, because there is no
+ * session to establish ownership of the token it names. Accepting it let a caller refresh a session they did not own. This docstring
+ * ships (it is compiled into dist and the .d.ts), so it describes what the code does.
  *
- * The line is corrected here rather than merely deleted, and it is called out
- * rather than quietly dropped, because THIS DOCSTRING SHIPS. It is compiled
- * into dist and into the .d.ts, so it reaches every consumer's editor as hover
- * text. QAPert-NightHawk caught that the fixed build was still describing the
- * removed capability as a current feature (34973) — her verifier tests code
- * properties and reads no comments, so a correct build could have published
- * documentation asserting the opposite of what the code does.
- *
- * That matters twice over: an internal caller relying on the fallback gets a
- * silent behavioural break while the docs promise it still works, and a
- * published package that misdescribes its own auth behaviour is the same
- * amplifier that put other defects onto three surfaces — shipped code carrying
- * instructions for using it wrongly.
- *
- * @version 2.1
+ * @version 3.0
  */
 
 import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from 'next/server';
-import { randomUUID } from 'crypto';
 import { getSession as getBetterAuthSession } from '../../server/auth';
-import { getSession, updateSession, acquireRefreshLock, releaseRefreshLock, checkRefreshLock } from '../../lib/session-store';
-import { computeTokenExpiries } from '../../lib/token-expiry';
-import { extractKidFromToken } from '../../auth/utils/token-utils';
-import { tokenLogId } from '../../lib/token-log-id';
-import { rotatedRowIsUsable } from '../../lib/refresh-rotation';
+import { ensureFreshAccessToken, type EnsureFreshResult } from '../../lib/ensure-fresh-access-token';
+import { UPSTREAM_TIMEOUT_CODE } from '../../lib/refresh-in-doubt';
+import { sanitizeTraceId } from '../../lib/safe-trace-id';
 
 interface RefreshConfig {
   idpBaseUrl: string;
@@ -49,6 +33,36 @@ interface RefreshConfig {
   refreshEndpoint?: string;
 }
 
+/** E's failure -> this route's body and status. Bodies for the cases the route always had are exactly as they were. */
+function failureResponse(r: Extract<EnsureFreshResult, { ok: false }>): NextResponse {
+  switch (r.code) {
+    case 'NO_SESSION':
+      return NextResponse.json({ error: 'No session available for refresh', code: 'UNAUTHORIZED' }, { status: 401 });
+    case 'NO_REFRESH_TOKEN':
+      return NextResponse.json({
+        error: 'No refresh token available',
+        code: 'NO_REFRESH_TOKEN', // Terminal state - session cannot be refreshed
+        terminal: true,          // Signal to frontend: don't retry, redirect to login
+        resolution: r.resolution ?? 'User must re-authenticate',
+      }, { status: 401 });
+    case 'CONFLICT':
+      return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Refresh already in progress', code: 'CONFLICT', retryable: true }, { status: 409 });
+    default: {
+      const body: Record<string, unknown> = {
+        error: r.message,
+        code: r.code,
+        retryable: r.retryable ?? false,
+        discardToken: r.discardToken ?? false,
+      };
+      if (r.terminal !== undefined) body.terminal = r.terminal;
+      if (r.resolution !== undefined) body.resolution = r.resolution;
+      // A timed-out refresh is outcome-UNKNOWN (BAPert 76403): say so, so a client does not treat it as a plain upstream failure.
+      if (r.code === UPSTREAM_TIMEOUT_CODE) body.outcomeUnknown = true;
+      return NextResponse.json(body, { status: r.status });
+    }
+  }
+}
+
 /**
  * Creates a refresh token handler for Next.js API routes
  *
@@ -72,48 +86,20 @@ export function createRefreshHandler(config: RefreshConfig) {
 
   return async function POST(req: NextRequest) {
     try {
-      // Extract session from Better Auth
+      // Extract session from Better Auth (the ONLY way a session is established here)
       const betterAuthSession = await getBetterAuthSession(req);
 
-      let sessionToken = (betterAuthSession?.session?.token) as string | undefined;
-      let userId = betterAuthSession?.user?.id;
+      const sessionToken = (betterAuthSession?.session?.token) as string | undefined;
+      const userId = betterAuthSession?.user?.id;
 
       if (!sessionToken) {
-        // OWNERSHIP CHECK on the x-session-token fallback (246007). BAPert ruled
-        // 34708: ship it, accept the one-time re-login cost, do not gate on 240654.
-        //
-        // WHAT THIS CLOSED: the fallback took a session token from a CALLER-SUPPLIED
-        // header and acted on that session with no check that it belonged to the
-        // caller. /api/auth/* is in publicRoutes on the consuming surfaces, so an
-        // UNAUTHENTICATED caller who knew any session token could cause that session
-        // to be refreshed -- an identity assumption, and the precondition for the
-        // forced-logout chain via IDP reuse detection.
-        //
-        // WHY THE CHECK IS A HARD DENY RATHER THAN A COMPARISON, which is the part
-        // worth understanding before anyone "improves" it: this branch is reached
-        // ONLY when getBetterAuthSession() failed to resolve a session from the
-        // request's own cookie. The natural ownership check -- "the header may only
-        // name the session the caller's cookie already resolves to" -- therefore has
-        // nothing to compare against by construction. Any correct ownership test at
-        // this point evaluates to reject. So the check and outright removal coincide
-        // here; a more permissive version is not possible without moving the check
-        // somewhere it can actually see an authenticated identity.
-        //
-        // WHO THIS AFFECTS, and it is a deliberate accepted cost, not an oversight:
-        // internal callers (lib/internal-api internalRefresh, from api-handler and
-        // idp-fetch) forward the end user's cookie. Where that cookie resolves they
-        // never enter this branch and are unaffected. Where it does not -- sessions
-        // minted before the graft dual-write (8a5ac21) whose cookie carries only the
-        // __Secure- name, which the pre-240654 resolver could not read -- the refresh
-        // now fails and the user re-authenticates ONCE. Their next login writes both
-        // cookie names and they are permanently fine. That population cannot grow, does
-        // not age out (session TTL slides on every write), and does not self-heal on
-        // use (this handler sets no cookie) -- so the only ways out were to accept the
-        // re-login or leave the defect live. BAPert chose to accept it.
-        //
-        // If server-to-server refresh must work WITHOUT an end-user cookie, that needs
-        // real service authentication -- a shared secret, mTLS, or a network policy --
-        // never a header any client can set.
+        // OWNERSHIP CHECK on the x-session-token fallback (246007; BAPert ruled 34708: ship it, accept the one-time re-login cost).
+        // This branch is reached ONLY when getBetterAuthSession() failed to resolve a session from the request's own cookie, so the natural
+        // check ("the header may only name the session the caller's cookie already resolves to") has nothing to compare against by
+        // construction: any correct ownership test here evaluates to reject. So the check and outright removal coincide. Internal callers
+        // (lib/internal-api internalRefresh) forward the end user's cookie and never enter this branch where that cookie resolves. If
+        // server-to-server refresh must work WITHOUT an end-user cookie it needs real service authentication (a shared secret, mTLS, a network
+        // policy), never a header any client can set.
         const headerSessionToken = req.headers.get('x-session-token');
         if (headerSessionToken) {
           console.warn(
@@ -139,750 +125,24 @@ export function createRefreshHandler(config: RefreshConfig) {
         }, { status: 401 });
       }
 
-      // Get current session
-      const currentSession = await getSession(sessionToken);
-      // NOTE: Field is idpRefreshToken (not refreshToken) per normalized naming convention
-      if (!currentSession?.idpRefreshToken) {
-        console.warn('[AUTH_REFRESH] No refresh token available', { userId });
-        return NextResponse.json({
-          error: 'No refresh token available',
-          code: 'NO_REFRESH_TOKEN',  // Terminal state - session cannot be refreshed
-          terminal: true,            // Signal to frontend: don't retry, redirect to login
-          resolution: 'User must re-authenticate'
-        }, { status: 401 });
-      }
-
-      // ============================================================================
-      // HIGH VISIBILITY: PRE-FLIGHT REFRESH DIAGNOSTICS
-      // ============================================================================
-      const now = Date.now();
-      const refreshTokenAge = currentSession.idpRefreshTokenIssuedAt
-        ? Math.round((now - currentSession.idpRefreshTokenIssuedAt) / 1000)
-        : 'unknown';
-      const refreshTokenExpiresIn = currentSession.idpRefreshTokenExpires
-        ? Math.round((currentSession.idpRefreshTokenExpires - now) / 1000)
-        : 'unknown';
-      const accessTokenExpiresIn = currentSession.idpAccessTokenExpires
-        ? Math.round((currentSession.idpAccessTokenExpires - now) / 1000)
-        : 'unknown';
-
-      console.log('╔══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗');
-      console.log('║                    REFRESH TOKEN ATTEMPT - PRE-FLIGHT                        ║');
-      console.log('╠══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╣');
-      console.log(`║ User: ${(userId || 'unknown').substring(0, 50).padEnd(50)}                   ║`);
-      console.log(`║ Session: ${tokenLogId(sessionToken)}                                                        ║`);
-      console.log('╠──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────╣');
-      console.log(`║ Access Token Expires In:  ${String(accessTokenExpiresIn).padEnd(10)} seconds                            ║`);
-      console.log(`║ Refresh Token Age:        ${String(refreshTokenAge).padEnd(10)} seconds                            ║`);
-      console.log(`║ Refresh Token Expires In: ${String(refreshTokenExpiresIn).padEnd(10)} seconds                            ║`);
-      console.log(`║ Refresh Token Length:     ${String(currentSession.idpRefreshToken?.length || 0).padEnd(10)} chars                              ║`);
-      console.log(`║ 2FA Complete:             ${String(!!currentSession.mfaVerified).padEnd(10)}                                   ║`);
-      console.log(`║ Auth Level (ACR):         ${String(currentSession.authenticationLevel || '1').padEnd(10)}                                   ║`);
-      console.log('╚══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝');
-
-      // LOCK IDENTITY IS MINTED SERVER-SIDE. It must never come from a header.
-      //
-      // This was `req.headers.get('x-request-id') ?? \`refresh_${Date.now()}\``, and the
-      // value was used as the lock's `acquiredBy`. Below it, a branch let a caller
-      // PROCEED WITHOUT THE LOCK when the existing lock's acquiredBy equalled the id
-      // they had supplied. Since the caller chose that id, the branch was a lock
-      // bypass requiring no guesswork: send N concurrent requests all carrying the
-      // same x-request-id, and every one after the first skips the wait.
-      //
-      // That completed an attacker-controlled forced logout, because the serialisation
-      // is what prevents refresh-token REUSE, and the IDP treats reuse as compromise:
-      // IdentityRefreshTokenService:166 -> RevokeDescendantTokens ->
-      // IdentityRefreshTokenRepository:142 revokes every ACTIVE token for that USER
-      // issued after the reused one -- across all devices and all client apps. So a
-      // caller who knew one session token could log a user out everywhere by sending
-      // a few requests with a header value of their own choosing.
-      //
-      // Minting server-side removes the bypass by construction: no caller can produce
-      // a value that matches an in-flight lock, so the equality branch can never be
-      // true and is deleted rather than left inert -- an unreachable branch that
-      // trusts a header is a trap for whoever edits this next.
-      //
-      // The anti-deadlock intent that branch served is preserved by the wait path
-      // below, which is the correct handling anyway: a genuine duplicate waits for the
-      // in-flight refresh and returns its result instead of starting a second one.
-      // The header is still read, for TRACING ONLY, and never influences control flow.
-      const traceId = req.headers.get('x-request-id') ?? undefined;
-      const requestId = `refresh_${randomUUID()}`;
-      const lockAcquired = await acquireRefreshLock(sessionToken, requestId, 5000);
-
-      let weAcquiredLock = false;
-      let releaseLockVersion: number | undefined;
-
-      if (!lockAcquired.acquired) {
-        {
-          // Wait for the lock to release, then check if token is now fresh
-          console.info('[AUTH_REFRESH] Refresh in progress by another request, waiting for completion...', { requestId, traceId });
-
-          const maxWaitMs = 5000;
-          const checkIntervalMs = 200;
-          const startWait = Date.now();
-
-          while (Date.now() - startWait < maxWaitMs) {
-            await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, checkIntervalMs));
-
-            // Check if lock was released
-            const lockCheck = await checkRefreshLock(sessionToken);
-            if (!lockCheck) {
-              // Lock released - check if token is now fresh
-              const refreshedSession = await getSession(sessionToken);
-              if (refreshedSession?.idpAccessToken && refreshedSession?.idpAccessTokenExpires) {
-                const timeUntilExpiry = refreshedSession.idpAccessTokenExpires - Date.now();
-                const fiveMinutes = 5 * 60 * 1000;
-
-                if (timeUntilExpiry > fiveMinutes) {
-                  console.info('[AUTH_REFRESH] Lock released, token is fresh - returning success', {
-                    requestId,
-                    accessTokenExpires: new Date(refreshedSession.idpAccessTokenExpires).toISOString(),
-                    waitedMs: Date.now() - startWait,
-                  });
-                  return NextResponse.json({
-                    refreshed: true,
-                    reason: 'completed_by_concurrent_request',
-                    accessTokenExpires: refreshedSession.idpAccessTokenExpires,
-                    hasRefreshToken: !!refreshedSession.idpRefreshToken,
-                  });
-                }
-              }
-              // Lock released but token not fresh - try to acquire lock ourselves
-              break;
-            }
-          }
-
-          // Still locked after waiting - return 409
-          console.warn('[AUTH_REFRESH] Refresh still in progress after waiting', { requestId, waitedMs: Date.now() - startWait });
-          return NextResponse.json({
-            error: 'Refresh already in progress',
-            code: 'CONFLICT'
-          }, { status: 409 });
-        }
-      } else {
-        weAcquiredLock = true;
-        releaseLockVersion = lockAcquired.lockInfo?.lockVersion;
-      }
-
-      // Before performing network refresh, re-check if tokens are already fresh
-      const latestAfterLock = await getSession(sessionToken);
-      const fiveMinutes = 5 * 60 * 1000;
-      const timeUntilExpiry = latestAfterLock?.idpAccessTokenExpires
-        ? latestAfterLock.idpAccessTokenExpires - Date.now()
-        : -1;
-
-      // CRITICAL: Also check the actual JWT's exp claim - Redis might have stale data
-      let actualJwtExpMs = -1;
-      let tokenMismatch = false;
-      if (latestAfterLock?.idpAccessToken) {
-        try {
-          const tokenParts = latestAfterLock.idpAccessToken.split('.');
-          if (tokenParts.length === 3) {
-            const payload = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(tokenParts[1], 'base64url').toString());
-            actualJwtExpMs = (payload.exp || 0) * 1000;
-            const now = Date.now();
-            // If the actual JWT is expired, we MUST refresh regardless of what Redis says
-            if (actualJwtExpMs < now) {
-              tokenMismatch = true;
-            }
-          }
-        } catch (e) {
-          // If we can't decode, proceed with normal logic
-        }
-      }
-
-      console.log('[AUTH_REFRESH] Pre-refresh check:', {
-        userId,
-        hasAccessToken: !!latestAfterLock?.idpAccessToken,
-        accessTokenExpires: latestAfterLock?.idpAccessTokenExpires
-          ? new Date(latestAfterLock.idpAccessTokenExpires).toISOString()
-          : 'undefined',
-        actualJwtExp: actualJwtExpMs > 0 ? new Date(actualJwtExpMs).toISOString() : 'unknown',
-        now: new Date().toISOString(),
-        timeUntilExpiryMs: timeUntilExpiry,
-        tokenMismatch,
-        willRefresh: timeUntilExpiry <= fiveMinutes || tokenMismatch
-      });
-
-      // Only skip refresh if BOTH Redis says fresh AND the actual JWT is not expired
-      if (latestAfterLock?.idpAccessToken && latestAfterLock?.idpAccessTokenExpires &&
-          timeUntilExpiry > fiveMinutes && !tokenMismatch) {
-        console.info('[AUTH_REFRESH] Skipping refresh: tokens already fresh', { userId, timeUntilExpiryMs: timeUntilExpiry });
-        if (weAcquiredLock) {
-          await releaseRefreshLock(sessionToken, requestId, releaseLockVersion);
-          weAcquiredLock = false;
-        }
-        return NextResponse.json({
-          refreshed: false,
-          reason: 'already_fresh',
-          accessTokenExpires: latestAfterLock.idpAccessTokenExpires,
-          hasRefreshToken: !!latestAfterLock.idpRefreshToken,
-        });
-      }
-
-      // If we detected a token mismatch, log it prominently
-      if (tokenMismatch) {
-        console.warn('[AUTH_REFRESH] Token mismatch detected - forcing refresh despite Redis claiming fresh', {
-          userId,
-          redisExpires: latestAfterLock?.idpAccessTokenExpires ? new Date(latestAfterLock.idpAccessTokenExpires).toISOString() : 'N/A',
-          actualJwtExp: new Date(actualJwtExpMs).toISOString()
-        });
-      }
-
-      // Copy refresh token for use in IDP call
-      // Note: Token is NOT cleared preemptively - it will be replaced on success.
-      // The lock mechanism prevents concurrent refresh attempts within the same session.
-      // If IDP call fails, user can retry with the same token.
-      // 4.9.0 (BAPert 76298 (b2), 76330): the token we SEND is the one read AFTER the lock was taken (`latestAfterLock`), and it is the ONLY
-      // source: there is NO fallback to `currentSession`, which was read BEFORE the lock. Between those reads another request can rotate the
-      // refresh token (sending the pre-lock value would send a SPENT token) or DISCARD it (the IdP answered 401 for it; re-sending it is a
-      // reuse). The IdP treats reuse as compromise and revokes descendants across devices. So:
-      //   - the post-lock read has NO ROW: the session vanished while we waited; it is not ours to refresh -> the 'No session' 401, no IdP call
-      //   - the row has NO refresh token: -> the same terminal NO_REFRESH_TOKEN as the pre-lock guard, no IdP call; the row is left exactly as
-      //     it is (a discard marker stays on it)
-      // (A row whose access token is still fresh was answered `already_fresh` above and never reaches here.)
-      if (!latestAfterLock) {
-        console.warn('[AUTH_REFRESH] Session vanished while waiting for the refresh lock; not refreshing', { userId });
-        if (weAcquiredLock) {
-          await releaseRefreshLock(sessionToken, requestId, releaseLockVersion);
-          weAcquiredLock = false;
-        }
-        return NextResponse.json({
-          error: 'No session available for refresh',
-          code: 'UNAUTHORIZED'
-        }, { status: 401 });
-      }
-      if (!latestAfterLock.idpRefreshToken) {
-        console.warn('[AUTH_REFRESH] No refresh token after the lock was taken; not calling the IdP', { userId });
-        if (weAcquiredLock) {
-          await releaseRefreshLock(sessionToken, requestId, releaseLockVersion);
-          weAcquiredLock = false;
-        }
-        return NextResponse.json({
-          error: 'No refresh token available',
-          code: 'NO_REFRESH_TOKEN',
-          terminal: true,
-          resolution: 'User must re-authenticate'
-        }, { status: 401 });
-      }
-      const originalRefreshToken = latestAfterLock.idpRefreshToken as string;
-      // The base of everything WRITTEN BACK after a successful exchange is the same post-lock read (BAPert 76318 item 4): writing
-      // `...currentSession` over a rotated row would put a SPENT token back. With no new refresh token from the IdP the stored token is the
-      // one that was SENT (`originalRefreshToken`).
-      const baseSession = latestAfterLock;
-
-      try {
-        // Extract 2FA claims from current session
-        let authMethods: string[] = [];
-        if (currentSession.authenticationMethods) {
-          if (typeof currentSession.authenticationMethods === 'string') {
-            try {
-              authMethods = JSON.parse(currentSession.authenticationMethods);
-            } catch (e) {
-              console.warn('[AUTH_REFRESH] Failed to parse authenticationMethods', { authenticationMethods: currentSession.authenticationMethods });
-            }
-          } else if (Array.isArray(currentSession.authenticationMethods)) {
-            authMethods = currentSession.authenticationMethods;
-          }
-        }
-
-        // For OAuth sessions with empty AMR claims, provide defaults
-        // OAuth IS a form of multi-factor auth (you authenticated with another provider)
-        let isOAuthSession = !!currentSession.oauthProvider;
-        if (authMethods.length === 0 && isOAuthSession) {
-          // OAuth sessions get default AMR claims
-          authMethods = ['pwd', 'mfa'];
-          console.log('[AUTH_REFRESH] OAuth session with empty AMR - using defaults:', {
-            oauthProvider: currentSession.oauthProvider,
-            defaultAmr: authMethods
-          });
-        }
-
-        // Check authMethods first, then fallback to twoFactorMethod field (set by transitionTo2FASession)
-        // For OAuth sessions, use 'oauth' as the 2FA method since OAuth itself is the authentication
-        const twoFactorMethod = authMethods.find(m => ['sms', 'totp', 'email'].includes(m))
-          || currentSession.mfaMethod
-          || (isOAuthSession ? 'oauth' : null);
-
-        // DEBUG: Log what we have for 2FA
-        console.log('[AUTH_REFRESH] 2FA Debug:', {
-          authMethods,
-          authMethodsRaw: currentSession.authenticationMethods,
-          twoFactorMethodFromSession: currentSession.mfaMethod,
-          twoFactorMethodResolved: twoFactorMethod,
-          twoFactorComplete: currentSession.mfaVerified,
-          sessionKeys: Object.keys(currentSession)
-        });
-
-        // Build refresh request body per PayEz wire standard (snake_case)
-        // See: 2FA-TOKEN-REFRESH-CONTEXT.md - "The Ninja Shit"
-        // For OAuth sessions with 2FA complete, use ACR level 2
-        let acrValue = String(currentSession.authenticationLevel ?? '1');
-        if (currentSession.oauthProvider && currentSession.mfaVerified && acrValue === '1') {
-          acrValue = '2'; // OAuth with 2FA complete = full authentication
-        }
-        const refreshRequestBody: any = {
-          refresh_token: originalRefreshToken,
-          amr: authMethods,
-          acr: acrValue
-        };
-
-        // DEBUG: Log exact request body
-        console.log('[AUTH_REFRESH] Request body:', JSON.stringify({
-          refresh_token: '***REDACTED***',
-          amr: authMethods,
-          acr: acrValue,
-          acrType: typeof acrValue
-        }));
-
-        const twoFactorVerified = !!currentSession.mfaVerified;
-        if (twoFactorVerified) {
-          refreshRequestBody.two_factor_verified = true;
-        }
-        if (twoFactorMethod) {
-          refreshRequestBody.two_factor_method = twoFactorMethod;
-        }
-        if (currentSession.mfaCompletedAt) {
-          refreshRequestBody.two_factor_completed_at = new Date(currentSession.mfaCompletedAt).toISOString();
-        }
-
-        // Log the full request details for debugging
-        console.log('[AUTH_REFRESH] Sending refresh request:', {
-          url: `${idpBaseUrl}${refreshEndpoint}`,
-          clientId,
-          hasRefreshToken: !!refreshRequestBody.refresh_token,
-          refreshTokenLength: refreshRequestBody.refresh_token?.length,
-          amr: refreshRequestBody.amr,
-          acr: refreshRequestBody.acr
-        });
-
-        let refreshResponse: Response;
-        try {
-          refreshResponse = await fetch(`${idpBaseUrl}${refreshEndpoint}`, {
-            method: 'POST',
-            headers: {
-              'Content-Type': 'application/json',
-              'X-Client-Id': clientId,
-            },
-            body: JSON.stringify(refreshRequestBody),
-          });
-        } catch (fetchError) {
-          // Network error - IDP unreachable
-          // Note: Lock will be released by finally block
-          console.error('[AUTH_REFRESH] IDP unreachable:', {
-            error: fetchError instanceof Error ? fetchError.message : String(fetchError),
-            idpUrl: idpBaseUrl,
-            userId
-          });
-          return NextResponse.json({
-            error: 'IDP service unavailable',
-            code: 'UPSTREAM_SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE',
-            retryable: true,
-            discardToken: false
-          }, { status: 503 });
-        }
-
-        // Parse response body - handle empty or invalid JSON
-        let responseData: any;
-        try {
-          const responseText = await refreshResponse.text();
-          if (!responseText || responseText.trim() === '') {
-            // Note: Lock will be released by finally block
-            console.error('[AUTH_REFRESH] Empty response from IDP:', {
-              status: refreshResponse.status,
-              statusText: refreshResponse.statusText,
-              userId
-            });
-            return NextResponse.json({
-              error: 'Empty response from IDP',
-              code: 'UPSTREAM_SERVICE_ERROR',
-              retryable: true,
-              discardToken: false
-            }, { status: 502 });
-          }
-          responseData = JSON.parse(responseText);
-        } catch (parseError) {
-          // Note: Lock will be released by finally block
-          console.error('[AUTH_REFRESH] Failed to parse IDP response:', {
-            error: parseError instanceof Error ? parseError.message : String(parseError),
-            status: refreshResponse.status,
-            userId
-          });
-          return NextResponse.json({
-            error: 'Invalid response from IDP',
-            code: 'UPSTREAM_SERVICE_ERROR',
-            retryable: true,
-            discardToken: false
-          }, { status: 502 });
-        }
-
-        // Handle non-OK responses with structured error format
-        if (!refreshResponse.ok) {
-          // Parse structured error from IDP
-          const idpError = responseData?.error || {};
-          const errorCode = idpError.code || 'UNKNOWN_ERROR';
-          const errorMessage = idpError.message || 'Token refresh failed';
-          // CRITICAL: 401 means token is definitively invalid - always discard
-          // This prevents redirect loops where viability check keeps returning canRefresh:true
-          let discardToken = refreshResponse.status === 401 || idpError.discard_token === true;
-          const retryable = refreshResponse.status !== 401 && idpError.retryable === true;
-          const resolution = idpError.resolution || null;
+      // The caller's x-request-id is TRACE ONLY (E keeps it as `traceId` for logs); the lock identity is minted inside E.
+      const traceId = sanitizeTraceId(req.headers.get('x-request-id'));
 
-          // ============================================================================
-          // HIGH VISIBILITY: REFRESH TOKEN FAILURE DIAGNOSTICS
-          // ============================================================================
-          // Translate error codes to human-readable explanations
-          const failureReasons: Record<string, string> = {
-            'UNAUTHORIZED': 'Token was already used (rotation) OR token is expired OR token was revoked',
-            'INVALID_REFRESH_TOKEN': 'Token format invalid OR token not found in IDP database',
-            'TOKEN_EXPIRED': 'Refresh token exceeded its max lifetime',
-            'TOKEN_REVOKED': 'Token was explicitly revoked (logout, password change, admin action)',
-            'TOKEN_REUSE_DETECTED': 'Same refresh token used twice - possible token theft, all tokens revoked',
-            'UPSTREAM_SERVICE_ERROR': 'IDP internal error - token may have been rotated before failure',
-            'INTERNAL_ERROR': 'IDP internal error - check IDP logs for details',
-            'RATE_LIMITED': 'Too many refresh attempts - try again later',
-          };
+      const result = await ensureFreshAccessToken(
+        sessionToken,
+        { idpBaseUrl, clientId, refreshEndpoint },
+        { requestId: traceId, requireRefreshToken: true },
+      );
 
-          const whyItFailed = failureReasons[errorCode] || 'Unknown error - check IDP logs';
-
-          console.error('╔══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╗');
-          console.error('║              ❌ REFRESH TOKEN FAILURE - DIAGNOSTIC REPORT                    ║');
-          console.error('╠══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╣');
-          console.error(`║ HTTP Status:    ${String(refreshResponse.status).padEnd(60)}║`);
-          console.error(`║ Error Code:     ${errorCode.padEnd(60)}║`);
-          console.error(`║ Discard Token:  ${String(discardToken).padEnd(60)}║`);
-          console.error(`║ Retryable:      ${String(retryable).padEnd(60)}║`);
-          console.error('╠──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────╣');
-          console.error(`║ WHY IT FAILED:                                                               ║`);
-          console.error(`║ ${whyItFailed.substring(0, 76).padEnd(76)} ║`);
-          console.error('╠──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────╣');
-          console.error(`║ User:           ${(userId || 'unknown').substring(0, 60).padEnd(60)}║`);
-          console.error(`║ Session:        ${tokenLogId(sessionToken)}                                                     ║`);
-          console.error(`║ Resolution:     ${(resolution || 'Check IDP logs').substring(0, 60).padEnd(60)}║`);
-          console.error('╚══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════╝');
-
-          // NEVER the raw envelope (DotNetPert-Scout, PR 139 review / mail 58691): this used to print
-          // a stringified dump of responseData (first 1000 chars) - the same whole IDP body the :618
-          // "unsuccessful" branch stopped logging. The box above already carries status, code and
-          // flags; add envelope SHAPE only (key names), never values.
-          console.error('[AUTH_REFRESH] IDP error response shape', {
-            bodyKeys: responseData && typeof responseData === 'object' ? Object.keys(responseData) : undefined,
-            errorKeys: idpError && typeof idpError === 'object' ? Object.keys(idpError) : undefined,
-            errorHasMessage: !!idpError.message,
-          });
-
-          // If IDP signals to discard token, clear it from Redis
-          if (discardToken) {
-            // Race-safe discard (CAS): only clear if the refresh token we sent is STILL
-            // the current one. A concurrent refresh may have already rotated it — our 401
-            // is then stale, and wiping here would silently log out a healthy session
-            // (the rotation-race wipe, QA 6873 site 2). Skip the wipe + drop terminal if changed.
-            const postRefresh = await getSession(sessionToken);
-            const tokenUnchanged =
-              !!originalRefreshToken && postRefresh?.idpRefreshToken === originalRefreshToken;
-            if (tokenUnchanged) {
-              console.error('[AUTH_REFRESH] ⚠️ REFRESH_TOKEN_REMOVAL: IDP signaled discard_token', {
-                reason: 'IDP_DISCARD_TOKEN',
-                errorCode,
-                userId,
-                sessionToken: tokenLogId(sessionToken),
-                hadRefreshToken: !!currentSession.idpRefreshToken,
-                stack: new Error().stack
-              });
-              await updateSession(sessionToken, {
-                idpRefreshToken: '',
-                idpRefreshTokenExpires: undefined,
-                refreshTokenClearedAt: Date.now(),
-                refreshTokenClearedReason: `IDP_DISCARD_TOKEN:${errorCode}`
-              });
-            } else {
-              // Concurrent refresh already rotated the token — our 401 is stale. Return the
-              // freshly-rotated token directly so the loser succeeds without a retry
-              // (race-fix follow-up #1).
-              discardToken = false;
-              console.warn('[AUTH_REFRESH] Discard suppressed: refresh token already rotated by a concurrent refresh — returning the fresh token (race-safe).');
-              if (rotatedRowIsUsable(postRefresh)) {
-                return NextResponse.json({
-                  refreshed: true,
-                  reason: 'completed_by_concurrent_request',
-                  accessTokenExpires: postRefresh.idpAccessTokenExpires,
-                  hasRefreshToken: !!postRefresh.idpRefreshToken,
-                });
-              }
-              // Rotated by a concurrent refresh but the row it left is NOT usable (BAPert 76359): the retryable 502, the rotated token kept,
-              // no marker. Same meaning in every branch (lib/refresh-rotation).
-              return NextResponse.json({
-                error: errorMessage,
-                code: errorCode,
-                discardToken: false,
-                retryable: true,
-                resolution,
-                status: 502
-              }, { status: 502 });
-            }
-          }
-
-          return NextResponse.json({
-            error: errorMessage,
-            code: errorCode,
-            discardToken,
-            retryable,
-            resolution,
-            status: refreshResponse.status
-          }, { status: refreshResponse.status });
-        }
-
-        // Validate PayEz canonical envelope for success responses
-        const isCompliant = responseData && typeof responseData === 'object' &&
-                            Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(responseData, 'success') &&
-                            (responseData.success === true ? Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(responseData, 'data') : Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(responseData, 'error')) &&
-                            Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(responseData, 'meta');
-
-        if (!isCompliant) {
-          // NEVER the raw body (DotNetPert-Scout, mail 58678): a non-compliant response has an
-          // UNKNOWN shape by definition, so there is no basis to assume it is free of tokens or
-          // other IDP-side secrets. Log shape metadata only - same "kind, never value" reasoning
-          // as the session-store.ts / refresh.ts REFRESH_TOKEN_REMOVAL fixes in PR 138.
-          console.error('[AUTH_REFRESH] Upstream non-compliant IDP response', {
-            bodyType: typeof responseData,
-            bodyKeys: responseData && typeof responseData === 'object' ? Object.keys(responseData) : undefined,
-            hasSuccessKey: !!(responseData && typeof responseData === 'object' && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(responseData, 'success')),
-            hasMetaKey: !!(responseData && typeof responseData === 'object' && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(responseData, 'meta')),
-          });
-          return NextResponse.json({
-            error: 'Upstream non-compliance',
-            code: 'UPSTREAM_SERVICE_ERROR',
-            retryable: true,
-            discardToken: false
-          }, { status: 502 });
-        }
-
-        if (responseData.success !== true || !responseData.data) {
-          // Handle success:false with structured error
-          const idpError = responseData?.error || {};
-          const errorCode = idpError.code || 'UPSTREAM_VALIDATION_ERROR';
-          const discardToken = idpError.discard_token === true;
-          const retryable = idpError.retryable === true;
-
-          // NEVER the raw envelope (DotNetPert-Scout, mail 58678): `responseData` here is the
-          // WHOLE IDP response body, and its `error` sub-object's contents are not something this
-          // handler controls or has audited - printing it wholesale would ship whatever the IDP
-          // decided to put there straight to the log sink. Log the fields THIS handler already
-          // extracts and acts on (retryable, plus envelope-shape flags for diagnosis) instead.
-          console.warn('[AUTH_REFRESH] IDP refresh unsuccessful', {
-            code: errorCode,
-            discardToken,
-            retryable,
-            errorHasMessage: !!idpError.message,
-            errorKeys: Object.keys(idpError),
-          });
-
-          // 4.9.0 (BAPert 76298 (c)): ONE IdP answer, ONE meaning, in both refresh implementations. This branch used to answer the upstream
-          // status, i.e. HTTP 200, with an error body, so `internalRefresh` reported `ok` and idpFetchJSON's 401-retry trusted a refresh that
-          // had failed; and it wrote a DIFFERENT marker (IDP_SUCCESS_FALSE_DISCARD) than the IdP-401 branch, which the logout dead-grant check
-          // does not recognise. Now:
-          //   success:false + discard_token  -> the stored token is discarded (same CAS as the 401 branch) with the IDP_DISCARD_TOKEN marker, and the
-          //                                     answer is 401 (never 200 with an error body)
-          //   success:false, no discard_token -> 502 retryable, the token is KEPT
-          if (discardToken) {
-            const postRefresh = await getSession(sessionToken);
-            const tokenUnchanged = !!originalRefreshToken && postRefresh?.idpRefreshToken === originalRefreshToken;
-            if (tokenUnchanged) {
-              console.error('[AUTH_REFRESH] ⚠️ REFRESH_TOKEN_REMOVAL: IDP success:false with discard_token', {
-                reason: 'IDP_DISCARD_TOKEN',
-                errorCode,
-                userId,
-                sessionToken: tokenLogId(sessionToken),
-                hadRefreshToken: !!currentSession.idpRefreshToken,
-                stack: new Error().stack
-              });
-              await updateSession(sessionToken, {
-                idpRefreshToken: '',
-                idpRefreshTokenExpires: undefined,
-                refreshTokenClearedAt: Date.now(),
-                refreshTokenClearedReason: `IDP_DISCARD_TOKEN:${errorCode}`
-              });
-              return NextResponse.json({
-                error: idpError.message || 'Token refresh failed',
-                code: errorCode,
-                discardToken: true,
-                retryable: false,
-                resolution: idpError.resolution || null,
-                status: 401
-              }, { status: 401 });
-            }
-            // A concurrent refresh already rotated the token: ours is stale. Return the fresh tokens if there are any (as the 401 branch does).
-            if (rotatedRowIsUsable(postRefresh)) {
-              return NextResponse.json({
-                refreshed: true,
-                reason: 'completed_by_concurrent_request',
-                accessTokenExpires: postRefresh.idpAccessTokenExpires,
-                hasRefreshToken: !!postRefresh.idpRefreshToken,
-              });
-            }
-          }
-
-          return NextResponse.json({
-            error: idpError.message || 'Token refresh failed',
-            code: errorCode,
-            discardToken: false,
-            retryable: true,
-            resolution: idpError.resolution || null,
-            status: 502
-          }, { status: 502 });
-        }
-
-        // Extract tokens from response
-        const payload = responseData.data as any;
-        const accessToken = payload?.access_token;
-        const refreshToken = payload?.refresh_token;
-
-        if (!accessToken) {
-          console.error('[AUTH_REFRESH] Missing access token in IDP response');
-          return NextResponse.json({
-            error: 'Invalid token response from IDP',
-            code: 'INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR'
-          }, { status: 500 });
-        }
-
-        // Decode and compute token expiries
-        let decodedAccessToken: any;
-        let accessTokenExpires: number;
-        let computedRefreshTokenExpires: number | undefined;
-        try {
-          const result = computeTokenExpiries({ accessToken, refreshToken, preferJwt: true });
-          decodedAccessToken = result.decodedAccessToken;
-          accessTokenExpires = result.accessTokenExpires;
-          computedRefreshTokenExpires = result.refreshTokenExpires;
-
-          console.info('[AUTH_REFRESH] Successfully decoded new token pair', {
-            accessTokenExpires: new Date(accessTokenExpires).toISOString(),
-            refreshTokenExpires: computedRefreshTokenExpires ? new Date(computedRefreshTokenExpires).toISOString() : null
-          });
-        } catch (decodeError) {
-          console.error('[AUTH_REFRESH] Failed to compute token expiries', { error: decodeError });
-          return NextResponse.json({
-            error: 'Failed to decode JWT tokens',
-            code: 'INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR'
-          }, { status: 500 });
-        }
-
-        // Extract 2FA claims from the new access token
-        let amrClaims: string[] = [];
-        if (decodedAccessToken.amr) {
-          try {
-            amrClaims = typeof decodedAccessToken.amr === 'string'
-              ? JSON.parse(decodedAccessToken.amr)
-              : decodedAccessToken.amr;
-          } catch (e) {
-            console.warn('[AUTH_REFRESH] Failed to parse AMR claims', { amr: decodedAccessToken.amr });
-            amrClaims = baseSession.authenticationMethods || [];
-          }
-        } else {
-          amrClaims = baseSession.authenticationMethods || [];
-        }
-        const acrLevel = String(decodedAccessToken.acr || baseSession.authenticationLevel || '1');
-
-        // Extract MFA timing claims
-        const mfaTime = decodedAccessToken.mfa_time ? parseInt(decodedAccessToken.mfa_time) * 1000 : baseSession.mfaCompletedAt;
-        const mfaExpires = decodedAccessToken.mfa_expires ? parseInt(decodedAccessToken.mfa_expires) * 1000 : baseSession.mfaExpiresAt;
-        const mfaValidityHours = decodedAccessToken.mfa_validity_hours ? parseInt(decodedAccessToken.mfa_validity_hours) : baseSession.mfaValidityHours;
-
-        // Update session with new tokens
-        const hasNewRefresh = typeof refreshToken === 'string' && refreshToken.length > 0;
-        const newRefreshTokenExpires = hasNewRefresh ? computedRefreshTokenExpires : undefined;
-
-        // CRITICAL: Log if we're about to clear the refresh token due to missing new token
-        if (!hasNewRefresh && baseSession.idpRefreshToken) {
-          console.error('[AUTH_REFRESH] ⚠️ REFRESH_TOKEN_REMOVAL: No new refresh token in IDP response', {
-            reason: 'NO_NEW_REFRESH_TOKEN_IN_RESPONSE',
-            userId,
-            sessionToken: tokenLogId(sessionToken),
-            hadRefreshToken: true,
-            // Kind only, never the value (credential). This branch runs when refreshToken is not a
-            // non-empty string, so the old raw value was almost always empty - but a token-shaped
-            // non-string would have been printed. refreshTokenType below already carries the kind.
-            refreshTokenFromResponsePresent: refreshToken !== undefined && refreshToken !== null && refreshToken !== '',
-            refreshTokenType: typeof refreshToken,
-            payloadKeys: Object.keys(payload || {}),
-            stack: new Error().stack
-          });
-        }
-
-        // Keep existing refresh token if IDP doesn't provide a new one
-        // Only clear if IDP explicitly signals discard_token=true (handled in error paths)
-        // NOTE: Use normalized field names (idp* prefix) per SessionData interface
-
-        // CRITICAL: Extract kid from JWT header - IDP may rotate keys during refresh
-        const newBearerKeyId = extractKidFromToken(accessToken);
-        if (newBearerKeyId) {
-          console.log('[AUTH_REFRESH] Extracted bearerKeyId (kid) from new JWT header:', newBearerKeyId);
-        } else {
-          console.warn('[AUTH_REFRESH] No kid found in new JWT header');
-        }
-
-        const sessionUpdate: any = {
-          ...baseSession,
-          idpAccessToken: accessToken,
-          idpAccessTokenExpires: accessTokenExpires,
-          idpRefreshToken: hasNewRefresh ? (refreshToken as string) : originalRefreshToken,
-          idpRefreshTokenExpires: hasNewRefresh ? newRefreshTokenExpires : baseSession.idpRefreshTokenExpires,
-          decodedAccessToken: decodedAccessToken,
-          // Bearer key ID from JWT header (may change on key rotation)
-          bearerKeyId: newBearerKeyId || baseSession.bearerKeyId,
-          authenticationMethods: amrClaims,
-          authenticationLevel: acrLevel,
-          // 170007 rule 2 (BAPert ruling on 121350): '||' is the wrong operator
-          // for a fact with an expiry. mfaVerified is derived from amrClaims,
-          // which is FRESH every exchange (decoded from the token just
-          // returned, falling back to the prior session's amr only on a
-          // genuine decode failure a few lines up — not on "this token
-          // doesn't currently carry mfa"). ORing in currentSession.mfaVerified
-          // made the flag MONOTONIC against a claim that DECAYS (mfa_time,
-          // 10 minutes): once true, it stayed true forever regardless of
-          // what the current token actually says, silently re-opening the
-          // 2FA bypass with no bug in the bridge. Re-derive only.
-          mfaVerified: amrClaims.includes('mfa'),
-          mfaCompletedAt: mfaTime,
-          mfaExpiresAt: mfaExpires,
-          mfaValidityHours: mfaValidityHours
-        };
-
-        await updateSession(sessionToken, sessionUpdate);
-
-        console.info('[AUTH_REFRESH] Token refreshed successfully', {
-          expiresAt: new Date(accessTokenExpires).toISOString(),
-          userId,
-          hasNewRefreshToken: hasNewRefresh,
-          hasAccessToken: !!accessToken // PAY-1427: was tokenPreview (first 20 chars of the new access token)
-        });
-
-      } catch (error) {
-        console.error('[AUTH_REFRESH] Error during token refresh', { error });
-        return NextResponse.json({
-          error: 'Token refresh error',
-          code: 'INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR'
-        }, { status: 500 });
-      } finally {
-        if (weAcquiredLock) {
-          await releaseRefreshLock(sessionToken, requestId, releaseLockVersion);
-        }
-      }
-
-      // Load the latest session to return basic status
-      const latest = await getSession(sessionToken);
-      if (!latest?.idpAccessToken) {
-        return NextResponse.json({
-          error: 'No access token after refresh',
-          code: 'INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR'
-        }, { status: 500 });
-      }
+      if (!result.ok) return failureResponse(result);
 
+      // The access token is deliberately NOT in this body (E's result carries it; this route never returns it).
       return NextResponse.json({
-        refreshed: true,
-        accessTokenExpires: latest.idpAccessTokenExpires,
-        hasRefreshToken: !!latest.idpRefreshToken,
+        refreshed: result.refreshed,
+        // The route's bodies carried a `reason` for two cases only; a plain refresh had none.
+        ...(result.reason === 'refreshed' ? {} : { reason: result.reason }),
+        accessTokenExpires: result.accessTokenExpires,
+        hasRefreshToken: result.hasRefreshToken,
       });
     } catch (err: any) {
       console.error('[AUTH_REFRESH] Unexpected error', { error: err?.message || String(err) });