@paydock/client-sdk 1.145.0-beta → 1.148.0-beta

package/bundles/widget.umd.js

@@ -1869,7 +1869,7 @@
     version: 'x-sdk-version',
     type: 'x-sdk-type'
   });
-  SDK._version = 'v1.145.0-beta';
+  SDK._version = 'v1.148.0-beta';
 
   var ACCESS_HEADER_NAME = {
     accessToken: 'x-access-token',
@@ -4725,6 +4725,15 @@
         this.env.setEnv(env, alias);
         return this;
       }
+      /**
+       * Origin (`scheme://host[:port]`) of the API this client talks to, for the current env/alias.
+       * Used to validate the `origin` of postMessages the API itself sends to the page.
+       */
+    }, {
+      key: "getApiOrigin",
+      value: function getApiOrigin() {
+        return ApiBase.toOrigin(this.env.getConf().url);
+      }
     }, {
       key: "requestObservable",
       value: function requestObservable(method, url, requestBody) {
@@ -4937,6 +4946,18 @@
           environment: this.env.getEnv()
         };
       }
+    }], [{
+      key: "toOrigin",
+      value: function toOrigin(url) {
+        try {
+          return new URL(url).origin;
+        } catch (_a) {
+          // Not a parsable URL: the returned string is not an origin and will never match a
+          // MessageEvent.origin — surface the misconfiguration instead of failing silently.
+          console.warn("[paydock/client-sdk] cannot derive an origin from configured URL \"".concat(url, "\""));
+          return url.replace(/\/+$/, '');
+        }
+      }
     }]);
   }();
 
@@ -5014,6 +5035,7 @@
       value: function walletCallback(payload) {
         return this.api.getClientPromise('POST', WALLET_CALLBACK_LINK).send(payload);
       }
+      /** Two-step mode: runs the deferred Standalone 3DS authentication (AReq). Charge-token auth, like `standalone3dsHandle`. */
     }, {
       key: "standalone3dsProcess",
       value: function standalone3dsProcess(payload) {
@@ -5157,6 +5179,10 @@
       _classCallCheck(this, IFrame);
       this.container = container;
     }
+    /**
+     * @param options.onLoad Called on every `load` of the iframe (initial document and each
+     *        subsequent navigation). Attached before `src` is set so a fast load is never missed.
+     */
     return _createClass(IFrame, [{
       key: "load",
       value: function load(link) {
@@ -5165,6 +5191,9 @@
         if (!this.container.isExist() || this.isExist()) return;
         var iFrame = document.createElement('iframe');
         if (options.title) iFrame.title = options.title;
+        if (options.onLoad) {
+          iFrame.addEventListener('load', options.onLoad);
+        }
         if (iframeClass) iFrame.classList.add(iframeClass);
         // Set additional attributes before src and DOM insertion so that
         // Permissions-Policy (e.g. allow="payment") is in place when the
@@ -5305,14 +5334,14 @@
           data = JSON.parse(event.data);
         } catch (error) {}
         if (!data) return;
-        _this.emit(data);
+        _this.emit(data, event.origin);
       });
     }
     return _createClass(IFrameEvent, [{
       key: "emit",
-      value: function emit(data) {
+      value: function emit(data, origin) {
         for (var key in this.listeners) {
-          if (this.listeners[key].event === data.event && data.widget_id === this.listeners[key].widget_id) this.listeners[key].listener.apply(this, [data]);
+          if (this.listeners[key].event === data.event && data.widget_id === this.listeners[key].widget_id) this.listeners[key].listener.apply(this, [data, origin]);
         }
       }
     }, {
@@ -5372,6 +5401,51 @@
     IFRAME_STATUS["TIMEOUT"] = "AuthTimedOut";
     IFRAME_STATUS["INVALID"] = "invalid_event";
   })(IFRAME_STATUS || (IFRAME_STATUS = {}));
+  /**
+   * Maps a `/process` rejection onto the error object the one-step callback delivers for the same outcome
+   * (`{ error_code, error_description, gateway_specific_description, process_error_code }`), so `error`
+   * carries the same payload in both flows. Absent fields are left out.
+   */
+  function toOutcomeError(err) {
+    var _a, _b;
+    if (err instanceof Error) {
+      // no API envelope to map (the body was not the API's JSON): report it as unreachable, so the
+      // merchant can tell this retryable case apart from a final API answer by `error_code` alone
+      return {
+        error_code: ERROR_CAUSE.SERVICE_UNREACHABLE,
+        error_description: 'Network request failed: the service did not answer with a valid response.'
+      };
+    }
+    var apiError = err !== null && err !== void 0 ? err : {};
+    var gateway = (_b = (_a = apiError.details) === null || _a === void 0 ? void 0 : _a.messages) === null || _b === void 0 ? void 0 : _b[0];
+    var fields = {
+      error_code: apiError.code,
+      error_description: apiError.message,
+      gateway_specific_description: gateway === null || gateway === void 0 ? void 0 : gateway.gateway_specific_description,
+      process_error_code: gateway === null || gateway === void 0 ? void 0 : gateway.gateway_specific_code
+    };
+    var outcomeError = {};
+    for (var _i = 0, _Object$keys = Object.keys(fields); _i < _Object$keys.length; _i++) {
+      var key = _Object$keys[_i];
+      if (fields[key]) {
+        outcomeError[key] = fields[key];
+      }
+    }
+    return outcomeError;
+  }
+  /**
+   * `true` when `/process` produced no API answer: the request never got a response (network, timeout, abort)
+   * or the response body was not the API's JSON (e.g. an HTML page from a proxy in between).
+   */
+  function isTransportFailure(err) {
+    if (err instanceof Error) {
+      return true;
+    }
+    var code = err === null || err === void 0 ? void 0 : err.code;
+    return code === ERROR_CAUSE.SERVICE_UNREACHABLE || code === ERROR_CAUSE.ABORTED;
+  }
+  /** Callback `process_status` of a two-step charge: fingerprint done, authentication not started. */
+  var PROCESS_STATUS_DEFERRED = 'deferred';
   /**
    * Event name constants emitted during the Standalone 3DS (GPayments) flow.
    * Used internally by `GPaymentsService` and re-exported publicly as `CANVAS_3DS_EVENT`.
@@ -5385,6 +5459,25 @@
     DECOUPLED: 'chargeAuthDecoupled',
     /** Challenge required — issuer demands user interaction. Payload: `Canvas3dsAuthPayload`. */
     CHALLENGE: 'chargeAuthChallenge',
+    /**
+     * Two-step mode only: fingerprint done, SDK waiting for `Canvas3ds.authenticate()`. Emitted once, before any
+     * outcome event (`INFO` may precede it); never for a one-step charge. Payload: `Canvas3dsReadyPayload`.
+     */
+    READY: 'chargeAuthReady',
+    /**
+     * The challenge iframe fired its FIRST `load` after `chargeAuthChallenge` (the ACS page has painted),
+     * or the `CHALLENGE_LOADED_FALLBACK_MS` safety fallback elapsed without one. Emitted exactly once per
+     * challenge; never emitted for a decoupled challenge (no challenge iframe). Payload: `Canvas3dsChallengeLoadedPayload`.
+     */
+    CHALLENGE_LOADED: 'chargeAuthChallengeLoaded',
+    /**
+     * The issuer delivered the final authentication result to the 3DS Server (the shopper finished the
+     * challenge, or approved a decoupled authentication) and the SDK is now obtaining the outcome. Emitted at
+     * most once per authentication, always before the terminal event. Detected through the `secondary_url`
+     * result monitor (`source: 'poll'`) or, when the callback message arrives first, right before the outcome
+     * it carries (`source: 'callback'`). Payload: `Canvas3dsChallengeCompletedPayload`.
+     */
+    CHALLENGE_COMPLETED: 'chargeAuthChallengeCompleted',
     /** Informational signal emitted by the GPayments flow. Internal — not part of the public typed surface. */
     INFO: 'chargeAuthInfo',
     /** Error during the flow (network, parsing, etc.). Payload: `Canvas3dsErrorPayload`. */
@@ -5396,13 +5489,64 @@
    * backwards-compatible internal usage.
    */
   var CANVAS_3DS_EVENT = GPAYMENTS_EVENT;
+  /**
+   * Upper bound on how long `chargeAuthChallengeLoaded` waits for the challenge iframe's first `load`.
+   * When it elapses the event is emitted with `reason: 'timeout'` so a merchant loader is never held
+   * forever; the real `load` arriving afterwards is the paint and is simply ignored.
+   */
+  var CHALLENGE_LOADED_FALLBACK_MS = 2500;
+  /**
+   * Interval of the `secondary_url` (GPayments `resultMonUrl`) poll while an ACS challenge is on screen.
+   * The monitor flips to `AuthResultReady` when the issuer's RReq reaches the 3DS Server — before the ACS has
+   * even returned its final page to the browser — so this poll is what makes `chargeAuthChallengeCompleted`
+   * land before the shopper sees any post-submit page. GPayments recommends 2 s and leaves the interval to the
+   * requestor; 1 s matches the cadence of GPayments' own monitoring frame.
+   */
+  var CHALLENGE_RESULT_POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 1000;
+  /**
+   * Interval of the `secondary_url` poll for a decoupled challenge (shopper approves out-of-band, possibly
+   * minutes later; nothing to cover on screen) — the GPayments-recommended 2 s.
+   */
+  var DECOUPLED_RESULT_POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 2000;
+  /** The result-monitor request failed at transport level (network, abort, timeout) — retried, not fatal. */
+  var ResultMonitorTransportError = /*#__PURE__*/function (_Error) {
+    function ResultMonitorTransportError() {
+      var _this;
+      _classCallCheck(this, ResultMonitorTransportError);
+      _this = _callSuper(this, ResultMonitorTransportError, ['Standalone 3DS result monitor request failed']);
+      _this.name = 'ResultMonitorTransportError';
+      return _this;
+    }
+    _inherits(ResultMonitorTransportError, _Error);
+    return _createClass(ResultMonitorTransportError);
+  }(/*#__PURE__*/_wrapNativeSuper(Error));
   var GPaymentsService = /*#__PURE__*/function () {
     function GPaymentsService(container, api, eventEmitter) {
+      var trustedOrigins = arguments.length > 3 && arguments[3] !== undefined ? arguments[3] : [];
       _classCallCheck(this, GPaymentsService);
       this.container = container;
       this.api = api;
       this.eventEmitter = eventEmitter;
+      this.trustedOrigins = trustedOrigins;
       this.resultRead = false;
+      /** `chargeAuthChallengeLoaded` already emitted for the current challenge (by `load` or by the fallback). */
+      this.challengeLoadedEmitted = false;
+      /** `chargeAuthChallengeCompleted` already emitted for the current authentication (poll or callback). */
+      this.challengeCompletedEmitted = false;
+      /** Set once a terminal event was emitted: no lifecycle event may follow (reset when a new challenge starts). */
+      this.challengeLifecycleClosed = false;
+      this.challengeLoadedTimer = null;
+      this.resultPollTimer = null;
+      /** One-shot guard for the `chargeAuth` leg — the callback message may be delivered more than once. */
+      this.authHandled = false;
+      /** Two-step mode: `charge_3ds_id` of the deferred callback message; `null` until it arrives (always for one-step). */
+      this.deferredCharge3dsId = null;
+      /** `authenticate()` latch; consumed when the deferred message arrives, reset only after a `/process` transport failure. */
+      this.authenticateRequested = false;
+      /** One `/process` call per widget instance (a transport failure allows one more `authenticate()`). */
+      this.authenticationStarted = false;
+      /** The single `/process` retry after a transport failure has been granted; the next failure is final. */
+      this.authenticationRetryUsed = false;
       this.iFrameEvent = new IFrameEvent(window);
     }
     return _createClass(GPaymentsService, [{
@@ -5422,6 +5566,7 @@
       key: "initializeIFrames",
       value: function initializeIFrames(initializationUrl, secondaryUrl, title) {
         var hideAuthorization = arguments.length > 3 && arguments[3] !== undefined ? arguments[3] : true;
+        var onLoad = arguments.length > 4 ? arguments[4] : undefined;
         var container = this.container.getElement();
         if (!container) {
           return;
@@ -5432,7 +5577,8 @@
         this.browserAndChallengeContainer = new Container('#paydock_authorization_iframe');
         this.iFrameAuthorization = new IFrame(this.browserAndChallengeContainer);
         this.iFrameAuthorization.load(initializationUrl, {
-          title: title
+          title: title,
+          onLoad: onLoad
         });
         if (secondaryUrl) {
           var divSecondaryURL = document.createElement('div');
@@ -5466,25 +5612,250 @@
     }, {
       key: "setupIFrameEvents",
       value: function setupIFrameEvents(widgetId) {
-        var _this = this;
-        this.iFrameEvent.on(EVENT$4.CHARGE_AUTH, widgetId, function (data) {
+        var _this2 = this;
+        this.iFrameEvent.on(EVENT$4.CHARGE_AUTH, widgetId, function (data, origin) {
           if (data.status === IFRAME_STATUS.SKIPPED || data.status === IFRAME_STATUS.FINISHED) {
+            // this channel is spoofable — any frame that knows the charge_3ds_id can post to it.
+            // A message from an unknown sender must never terminate a live authentication: ignore it.
+            if (!_this2.isTrustedOrigin(origin)) {
+              return;
+            }
+            // one-shot: the callback message can be delivered more than once (it is posted to both
+            // `parent` and `top`) — a duplicate must not re-emit events or duplicate challenge iframes
+            if (_this2.authHandled) {
+              return;
+            }
+            _this2.authHandled = true;
             if (data.info) {
-              _this.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.INFO, {
+              _this2.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.INFO, {
                 info: data.info
               });
             }
-            _this.performAuthentication(data);
+            _this2.removeIframes();
+            if (data.process_status === PROCESS_STATUS_DEFERRED) {
+              // two-step: announce readiness; authenticate now only if `authenticate()` was already called
+              _this2.deferredCharge3dsId = data.charge_3ds_id;
+              _this2.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.READY, {
+                charge_3ds_id: data.charge_3ds_id
+              });
+              if (_this2.authenticateRequested) {
+                _this2.performAuthentication(data.charge_3ds_id);
+              }
+            } else if (typeof data.process_status === 'string') {
+              // the API already ran the authentication inside the callback: no /process call needed
+              _this2.handleAuthenticationOutcome({
+                status: data.process_status,
+                result: data.result,
+                error: data.error
+              }, data.charge_3ds_id);
+            } else {
+              // The API always runs the authentication inside the callback (PAYRAC-2480). A trusted
+              // message without the outcome means an outdated API — fail, never verify via /process.
+              _this2.finishChallengeLifecycle();
+              _this2.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.ERROR, _this2.parseError({
+                message: 'Standalone 3DS authentication outcome missing from the callback message'
+              }, data.charge_3ds_id));
+            }
           } else if (data.status === IFRAME_STATUS.TIMEOUT || data.status === IFRAME_STATUS.INVALID) {
-            _this.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.AUTH_ERROR, _this.parseHandleResponse({
+            _this2.finishChallengeLifecycle();
+            _this2.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.AUTH_ERROR, _this2.parseHandleResponse({
               status: data.status
             }, data.charge_3ds_id));
           }
         });
-        this.iFrameEvent.on(EVENT$4.CHARGE_AUTH_SUCCESS, widgetId, function (data) {
-          _this.processResult(data.charge_3ds_id);
+        this.iFrameEvent.on(EVENT$4.CHARGE_AUTH_SUCCESS, widgetId, function (data, origin) {
+          // the callback iframe reached Paydock with `AuthResultReady`: the issuer has answered. Announce it
+          // before the outcome so merchants always see completed → terminal, whichever transport won.
+          _this2.emitChallengeCompleted(data.charge_3ds_id, 'callback');
+          if (_this2.hasChainedOutcome(data, origin)) {
+            // the API already fetched the challenge result inside the callback: no GET /handle needed
+            _this2.handleResultOutcome({
+              status: data.process_status,
+              result: data.result,
+              error: data.error
+            }, data.charge_3ds_id);
+          } else {
+            _this2.processResult(data.charge_3ds_id);
+          }
         });
       }
+      /**
+       * Two-step mode: run the deferred authentication (`POST /standalone-3ds/process`). Never throws: runs now if
+       * the deferred message already arrived, otherwise as soon as it does; a no-op on one-step charges, repeated
+       * calls or after a terminal outcome. The outcome flows through the usual events.
+       */
+    }, {
+      key: "authenticate",
+      value: function authenticate() {
+        if (this.authenticateRequested) {
+          return;
+        }
+        this.authenticateRequested = true;
+        if (this.deferredCharge3dsId !== null) {
+          this.performAuthentication(this.deferredCharge3dsId);
+        }
+      }
+      /**
+       * Calls `/process` once per instance (reachable from both the deferred message and `authenticate()`). The
+       * response has the callback-outcome shape, so the challenge / decoupled / result legs are shared with
+       * one-step. A rejection surfaces as `error`, with the same error object shape as the one-step callback
+       * (`toOutcomeError`). An API answer (stale session, rejected authentication…) is terminal. The first transport
+       * failure is not: the AReq may have run with its response lost, so the latches are reset and the merchant may
+       * call `authenticate()` once more — `/process` is idempotent and replays the stored outcome. A failure of that
+       * retry, of any kind, is final.
+       */
+    }, {
+      key: "performAuthentication",
+      value: function performAuthentication(charge3dsId) {
+        var _this3 = this;
+        if (this.authenticationStarted) {
+          return;
+        }
+        this.authenticationStarted = true;
+        this.api.charge().standalone3dsProcess({
+          charge_3ds_id: charge3dsId
+        }).then(function (authenticationResult) {
+          return _this3.handleAuthenticationOutcome(authenticationResult, charge3dsId);
+        }, function (err) {
+          if (isTransportFailure(err) && !_this3.authenticationRetryUsed) {
+            _this3.authenticationRetryUsed = true;
+            _this3.authenticateRequested = false;
+            _this3.authenticationStarted = false;
+          } else {
+            _this3.resultRead = true;
+            _this3.finishChallengeLifecycle();
+          }
+          _this3.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.ERROR, _this3.parseError(toOutcomeError(err), charge3dsId));
+        });
+      }
+      /**
+       * A message carries a processed outcome only when it has `process_status` AND comes from a trusted
+       * origin. Used by the result leg: an untrusted `process_status` is never acted upon — the SDK falls
+       * back to `GET /handle` (still needed for decoupled challenges / polling). The authentication leg
+       * ignores untrusted senders outright, before this check.
+       */
+    }, {
+      key: "hasChainedOutcome",
+      value: function hasChainedOutcome(data, origin) {
+        return typeof data.process_status === 'string' && this.isTrustedOrigin(origin);
+      }
+    }, {
+      key: "isTrustedOrigin",
+      value: function isTrustedOrigin(origin) {
+        // 'null' is the serialized opaque origin (e.g. a sandboxed iframe) — never trust it, even if a
+        // misconfigured env URL were ever to put the literal string 'null' into the trusted list
+        return typeof origin === 'string' && origin !== 'null' && this.trustedOrigins.includes(origin);
+      }
+    }, {
+      key: "removeIframes",
+      value: function removeIframes() {
+        var _a, _b;
+        this.clearChallengeLoadedTimer();
+        (_a = this.iFrameAuthorization) === null || _a === void 0 ? void 0 : _a.remove();
+        (_b = this.iFrameSecondaryUrl) === null || _b === void 0 ? void 0 : _b.remove();
+      }
+    }, {
+      key: "clearChallengeLoadedTimer",
+      value: function clearChallengeLoadedTimer() {
+        if (this.challengeLoadedTimer !== null) {
+          clearTimeout(this.challengeLoadedTimer);
+          this.challengeLoadedTimer = null;
+        }
+      }
+      /**
+       * Challenge iframe lifecycle (`chargeAuthChallengeLoaded`).
+       *
+       * The challenge iframe is cross-origin, but its `load` event still fires when the ACS page finishes loading:
+       * the first one means the page painted (merchants can drop their loader). A fallback timer
+       * (`armChallengeLoadedFallback`) guarantees `chargeAuthChallengeLoaded` within `CHALLENGE_LOADED_FALLBACK_MS`
+       * even if no `load` ever fires; a late paint after that is simply ignored. Later `load`s are NOT a usable
+       * signal for "the shopper submitted": the post-submit hops are HTTP redirects and self-submitting pages whose
+       * loads abort, and the final callback page posts its message before its own `load` — so the post-submit
+       * moment is `chargeAuthChallengeCompleted`, driven by the `secondary_url` result monitor instead.
+       *
+       * Nothing is emitted once the flow reached a terminal outcome (`finishChallengeLifecycle`), and a
+       * decoupled challenge (no challenge iframe) never emits `chargeAuthChallengeLoaded`.
+       *
+       * Resets the per-challenge state and returns the `load` handler to attach to the challenge iframe.
+       */
+    }, {
+      key: "startChallengeLifecycle",
+      value: function startChallengeLifecycle(charge3dsId) {
+        var _this4 = this;
+        this.clearChallengeLoadedTimer();
+        this.challengeLoadedEmitted = false;
+        this.challengeCompletedEmitted = false;
+        this.challengeLifecycleClosed = false;
+        return function () {
+          var _a;
+          if (_this4.challengeLifecycleClosed || _this4.challengeLoadedEmitted || !((_a = _this4.iFrameAuthorization) === null || _a === void 0 ? void 0 : _a.isExist())) {
+            return;
+          }
+          _this4.clearChallengeLoadedTimer();
+          _this4.emitChallengeLoaded(charge3dsId, 'load');
+        };
+      }
+      /**
+       * Arms the `chargeAuthChallengeLoaded` fallback — only when a challenge iframe actually exists (the
+       * container may be gone, or `IFrame.load` may have no-op'd on an already-present iframe).
+       */
+    }, {
+      key: "armChallengeLoadedFallback",
+      value: function armChallengeLoadedFallback(charge3dsId) {
+        var _this5 = this;
+        var _a;
+        if (!((_a = this.iFrameAuthorization) === null || _a === void 0 ? void 0 : _a.isExist())) {
+          return;
+        }
+        this.challengeLoadedTimer = setTimeout(function () {
+          _this5.challengeLoadedTimer = null;
+          if (_this5.challengeLifecycleClosed || _this5.challengeLoadedEmitted) {
+            return;
+          }
+          _this5.emitChallengeLoaded(charge3dsId, 'timeout');
+        }, CHALLENGE_LOADED_FALLBACK_MS);
+      }
+    }, {
+      key: "emitChallengeLoaded",
+      value: function emitChallengeLoaded(charge3dsId, reason) {
+        this.challengeLoadedEmitted = true;
+        this.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.CHALLENGE_LOADED, {
+          charge_3ds_id: charge3dsId,
+          reason: reason
+        });
+      }
+      /**
+       * `chargeAuthChallengeCompleted` — once per authentication, never after a terminal event. Idempotent so the
+       * poll and the callback message can both call it: the first transport to notice the issuer's result wins.
+       */
+    }, {
+      key: "emitChallengeCompleted",
+      value: function emitChallengeCompleted(charge3dsId, source) {
+        if (this.challengeLifecycleClosed || this.challengeCompletedEmitted) {
+          return;
+        }
+        this.challengeCompletedEmitted = true;
+        this.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.CHALLENGE_COMPLETED, {
+          charge_3ds_id: charge3dsId,
+          source: source
+        });
+      }
+      /** Call before emitting any terminal event: no lifecycle event may follow it, and the result poll stops. */
+    }, {
+      key: "finishChallengeLifecycle",
+      value: function finishChallengeLifecycle() {
+        this.clearChallengeLoadedTimer();
+        this.stopResultPolling();
+        this.challengeLifecycleClosed = true;
+      }
+    }, {
+      key: "stopResultPolling",
+      value: function stopResultPolling() {
+        if (this.resultPollTimer !== null) {
+          clearTimeout(this.resultPollTimer);
+          this.resultPollTimer = null;
+        }
+      }
     }, {
       key: "parseResultData",
       value: function parseResultData(_ref2, charge3dsId) {
@@ -5518,24 +5889,49 @@
     }, {
       key: "processResult",
       value: function processResult(charge3dsId) {
-        var _this2 = this;
+        var _this6 = this;
         if (this.resultRead) {
           return;
         }
         this.resultRead = true;
+        this.finishChallengeLifecycle();
         this.api.charge().standalone3dsHandle().then(function (result) {
           var _a;
-          _this2.iFrameAuthorization.remove();
-          (_a = _this2.iFrameSecondaryUrl) === null || _a === void 0 ? void 0 : _a.remove();
+          _this6.iFrameAuthorization.remove();
+          (_a = _this6.iFrameSecondaryUrl) === null || _a === void 0 ? void 0 : _a.remove();
           if (result.status === PROCESS_STANDALONE_3DS_STATUS.SUCCESS) {
-            _this2.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.AUTH_SUCCESS, _this2.parseResultData(result, charge3dsId));
+            _this6.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.AUTH_SUCCESS, _this6.parseResultData(result, charge3dsId));
           } else {
-            _this2.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.AUTH_ERROR, _this2.parseResultData(result, charge3dsId));
+            _this6.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.AUTH_ERROR, _this6.parseResultData(result, charge3dsId));
           }
         }, function (err) {
-          _this2.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.ERROR, _this2.parseError(err, charge3dsId));
+          _this6.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.ERROR, _this6.parseError(err, charge3dsId));
         });
       }
+      /** Final (post-challenge) outcome delivered by the API through the callback message. */
+    }, {
+      key: "handleResultOutcome",
+      value: function handleResultOutcome(_ref4, charge3dsId) {
+        var status = _ref4.status,
+          error = _ref4.error;
+        if (this.resultRead) {
+          return;
+        }
+        this.resultRead = true;
+        this.finishChallengeLifecycle();
+        this.removeIframes();
+        if (status === PROCESS_STANDALONE_3DS_STATUS.SUCCESS) {
+          this.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.AUTH_SUCCESS, this.parseResultData({
+            status: status
+          }, charge3dsId));
+        } else if (status === PROCESS_STANDALONE_3DS_STATUS.ERROR) {
+          this.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.ERROR, this.parseError(error, charge3dsId));
+        } else {
+          this.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.AUTH_ERROR, this.parseResultData({
+            status: status
+          }, charge3dsId));
+        }
+      }
     }, {
       key: "externalAPI",
       value: function externalAPI(method, url) {
@@ -5549,60 +5945,106 @@
               reject(error);
             }
           };
+          // without these a failed request left the promise pending forever and the poll silently dead
+          var fail = function fail() {
+            return reject(new ResultMonitorTransportError());
+          };
+          request.onerror = fail;
+          request.onabort = fail;
+          request.ontimeout = fail;
           request.send();
         });
       }
+      /**
+       * Polls the GPayments result monitor (`secondary_url`) until `AuthResultReady`. It is the primary source of
+       * `chargeAuthChallengeCompleted` (the monitor flips as soon as the issuer's RReq reaches the 3DS Server) and
+       * the fallback transport for the outcome itself (`GET /handle`) when the callback message never arrives —
+       * the only transport for decoupled challenges. Stops once an outcome was obtained or the lifecycle closed.
+       * Transport failures are retried on the same cadence; an unparsable body or an unknown event is fatal.
+       */
     }, {
       key: "doPolling",
-      value: function doPolling(url, charge3dsId) {
-        var _this3 = this;
+      value: function doPolling(url, charge3dsId, intervalMs) {
+        var _this7 = this;
+        this.stopResultPolling();
+        if (this.resultRead || this.challengeLifecycleClosed) {
+          return;
+        }
+        var schedule = function schedule() {
+          _this7.resultPollTimer = setTimeout(function () {
+            _this7.resultPollTimer = null;
+            _this7.doPolling(url, charge3dsId, intervalMs);
+          }, intervalMs);
+        };
         this.externalAPI('GET', url).then(function (data) {
+          if (_this7.resultRead || _this7.challengeLifecycleClosed) {
+            return;
+          }
           if (!data.event || data.event === 'AuthResultNotReady') {
-            setTimeout(function () {
-              _this3.doPolling(url, charge3dsId);
-            }, 2000);
+            schedule();
           } else if (data.event === 'AuthResultReady') {
-            _this3.processResult(charge3dsId);
+            _this7.emitChallengeCompleted(charge3dsId, 'poll');
+            _this7.processResult(charge3dsId);
           } else {
             throw new Error('Event not supported');
           }
         })["catch"](function (err) {
-          return _this3.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.ERROR, _this3.parseError(err, charge3dsId));
+          if (err instanceof ResultMonitorTransportError) {
+            if (!_this7.resultRead && !_this7.challengeLifecycleClosed) {
+              schedule();
+            }
+            return;
+          }
+          _this7.finishChallengeLifecycle();
+          _this7.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.ERROR, _this7.parseError(err, charge3dsId));
         });
       }
+      /**
+       * Branches on the authentication outcome — delivered by the API through the callback message
+       * (`process_status` → `status`) or, in two-step mode, returned by `/process` (same shape).
+       */
     }, {
-      key: "performAuthentication",
-      value: function performAuthentication(_ref4) {
-        var _this4 = this;
-        var charge_3ds_id = _ref4.charge_3ds_id;
-        var _a;
-        this.iFrameAuthorization.remove();
-        (_a = this.iFrameSecondaryUrl) === null || _a === void 0 ? void 0 : _a.remove();
-        this.api.charge().standalone3dsProcess({
-          charge_3ds_id: charge_3ds_id
-        }).then(function (authenticationResult) {
-          var _a, _b;
-          if (authenticationResult.status === AUTHENTICATION_STATUS.SUCCESS) {
-            _this4.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.AUTH_SUCCESS, _this4.parseHandleResponse(authenticationResult, charge_3ds_id));
-          } else if (authenticationResult.status === AUTHENTICATION_STATUS.PENDING) {
-            if ((_a = authenticationResult === null || authenticationResult === void 0 ? void 0 : authenticationResult.result) === null || _a === void 0 ? void 0 : _a.challenge) {
-              _this4.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.CHALLENGE, _this4.parseHandleResponse(authenticationResult, charge_3ds_id));
-              _this4.initializeIFrames(authenticationResult.result.challenge_url, undefined, 'Authentication Challenge', false);
-              if (authenticationResult.result.secondary_url) {
-                _this4.doPolling(authenticationResult.result.secondary_url, charge_3ds_id);
-              }
-            } else if ((_b = authenticationResult === null || authenticationResult === void 0 ? void 0 : authenticationResult.result) === null || _b === void 0 ? void 0 : _b.decoupled_challenge) {
-              _this4.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.DECOUPLED, _this4.parseHandleResponse(authenticationResult, charge_3ds_id));
-              if (authenticationResult.result.secondary_url) {
-                _this4.doPolling(authenticationResult.result.secondary_url, charge_3ds_id);
-              }
+      key: "handleAuthenticationOutcome",
+      value: function handleAuthenticationOutcome(authenticationResult, charge_3ds_id) {
+        var _a, _b, _c;
+        if (authenticationResult.status !== AUTHENTICATION_STATUS.PENDING) {
+          // terminal outcome — a later `chargeAuthSuccess` message or poll must not emit a second result
+          this.resultRead = true;
+        }
+        if (authenticationResult.status === AUTHENTICATION_STATUS.SUCCESS) {
+          this.finishChallengeLifecycle();
+          this.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.AUTH_SUCCESS, this.parseHandleResponse(authenticationResult, charge_3ds_id));
+        } else if (authenticationResult.status === AUTHENTICATION_STATUS.PENDING) {
+          if ((_a = authenticationResult === null || authenticationResult === void 0 ? void 0 : authenticationResult.result) === null || _a === void 0 ? void 0 : _a.challenge) {
+            this.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.CHALLENGE, this.parseHandleResponse(authenticationResult, charge_3ds_id));
+            var onChallengeLoad = this.startChallengeLifecycle(charge_3ds_id);
+            this.initializeIFrames(authenticationResult.result.challenge_url, undefined, 'Authentication Challenge', false, onChallengeLoad);
+            this.armChallengeLoadedFallback(charge_3ds_id);
+            if (authenticationResult.result.secondary_url) {
+              this.doPolling(authenticationResult.result.secondary_url, charge_3ds_id, CHALLENGE_RESULT_POLL_INTERVAL_MS);
+            }
+          } else if ((_b = authenticationResult === null || authenticationResult === void 0 ? void 0 : authenticationResult.result) === null || _b === void 0 ? void 0 : _b.decoupled_challenge) {
+            this.challengeCompletedEmitted = false;
+            this.challengeLifecycleClosed = false;
+            this.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.DECOUPLED, this.parseHandleResponse(authenticationResult, charge_3ds_id));
+            if (authenticationResult.result.secondary_url) {
+              this.doPolling(authenticationResult.result.secondary_url, charge_3ds_id, DECOUPLED_RESULT_POLL_INTERVAL_MS);
             }
           } else {
-            return _this4.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.AUTH_ERROR, _this4.parseHandleResponse(authenticationResult, charge_3ds_id));
-          }
-        }, function (err) {
-          _this4.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.ERROR, _this4.parseError(err, charge_3ds_id));
-        });
+            // pending but nothing to run (no challenge delivered) — fail rather than hang silently
+            // with the iframes already removed and no further message ever coming
+            this.resultRead = true;
+            this.finishChallengeLifecycle();
+            this.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.AUTH_ERROR, this.parseHandleResponse(authenticationResult, charge_3ds_id));
+          }
+        } else if (authenticationResult.status === AUTHENTICATION_STATUS.ERROR) {
+          // the API rejected the authentication, or could not run it inside the callback
+          this.finishChallengeLifecycle();
+          this.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.ERROR, this.parseError((_c = authenticationResult.error) !== null && _c !== void 0 ? _c : authenticationResult, charge_3ds_id));
+        } else {
+          this.finishChallengeLifecycle();
+          this.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.AUTH_ERROR, this.parseHandleResponse(authenticationResult, charge_3ds_id));
+        }
       }
     }]);
   }();
@@ -5629,16 +6071,61 @@
         api.setEnv(this.env, this.alias);
         switch (tokenData.service_type) {
           case STANDALONE_3DS_GATEWAYS.GPAYMENTS:
-            new GPaymentsService(this.container, api, this.eventEmitter).load(tokenData, options.title);
+            this.gpaymentsService = new GPaymentsService(this.container, api, this.eventEmitter, this.getTrustedMessageOrigins(api));
+            this.gpaymentsService.load(tokenData, options.title);
             break;
         }
       }
+      /**
+       * Two-step mode: forwards `Canvas3ds.authenticate()` to the provider flow. Calling it before `load()` is an
+       * integration bug (nothing to authenticate yet): it emits `error` and is not remembered.
+       */
+    }, {
+      key: "authenticate",
+      value: function authenticate(token) {
+        if (!this.gpaymentsService) {
+          this.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.ERROR, {
+            charge_3ds_id: Standalone3dsService.readCharge3dsId(token),
+            error: {
+              message: 'Canvas3ds.authenticate() called before load()'
+            }
+          });
+          return;
+        }
+        this.gpaymentsService.authenticate();
+      }
+      /** `charge_3ds_id` from the standalone 3DS charge token, `undefined` when it cannot be decoded. */
+    }, {
+      key: "getTrustedMessageOrigins",
+      value:
+      /**
+       * Origins allowed to deliver a processed 3DS outcome to the page via postMessage: the Paydock API
+       * (inline callback page) and the Paydock widget (remote-app landing page), for the current env/alias.
+       */
+      function getTrustedMessageOrigins(api) {
+        var origins = [api.getApiOrigin()];
+        try {
+          var widgetEnv = new Env(WIDGET_URL, this.env);
+          widgetEnv.setEnv(this.env, this.alias);
+          origins.push(ApiBase.toOrigin(widgetEnv.getConf().url));
+        } catch (_a) {
+          // widget origin unknown for this env — the API origin is enough
+        }
+        return origins;
+      }
     }, {
       key: "setEnv",
       value: function setEnv(env, alias) {
         this.env = env;
         this.alias = alias;
       }
+    }], [{
+      key: "readCharge3dsId",
+      value: function readCharge3dsId(token) {
+        var _a;
+        var parsedToken = AccessToken.validateJWT(token);
+        return parsedToken ? (_a = AccessToken.extractData(parsedToken.body)) === null || _a === void 0 ? void 0 : _a.charge_3ds_id : undefined;
+      }
     }]);
   }();
 
@@ -5801,11 +6288,14 @@
    * @const STANDALONE_3DS_EVENT
    *
    * @type {object}
-   * @param {string} CHARGE_AUTH_SUCCESS=chargeAuthSuccess
-   * @param {string} CHARGE_AUTH_REJECT=chargeAuthReject
-   * @param {string} CHARGE_AUTH_DECOUPLED=chargeAuthDecoupled
-   * @param {string} CHARGE_AUTH_CHALLENGE=chargeAuthChallenge
-   * @param {string} CHARGE_AUTH_INFO=chargeAuthInfo
+   * @param {string} AUTH_SUCCESS=chargeAuthSuccess
+   * @param {string} AUTH_ERROR=chargeAuthReject
+   * @param {string} DECOUPLED=chargeAuthDecoupled
+   * @param {string} CHALLENGE=chargeAuthChallenge
+   * @param {string} READY=chargeAuthReady - two-step mode only: fingerprint done, waiting for `authenticate()`
+   * @param {string} CHALLENGE_LOADED=chargeAuthChallengeLoaded - challenge iframe painted (first `load`, or 2.5 s fallback); reveal your challenge UI here
+   * @param {string} CHALLENGE_COMPLETED=chargeAuthChallengeCompleted - the shopper finished the challenge (issuer result delivered to the 3DS Server); cover the challenge iframe with your own loader until the terminal event
+   * @param {string} INFO=chargeAuthInfo
    * @param {string} ERROR=error
    */
   /**
@@ -5932,6 +6422,39 @@
           });
         }
       }
+      /**
+       * Two-step mode only (`_3ds.authentication_flow: 'two_step'`): runs the authentication the API deferred after the
+       * fingerprint. Call it when the shopper confirms (e.g. presses "Pay"); the outcome arrives through the
+       * usual events (`chargeAuthChallenge`, `chargeAuthSuccess`, `chargeAuthReject`, `error`).
+       *
+       * Never throws. After `chargeAuthReady` the authentication starts at once; before it, the call is
+       * remembered and runs as soon as the fingerprint completes. One-step charges, repeated calls and calls after
+       * a terminal outcome are no-ops. For inbuilt 3DS (`html` / `url`) tokens it is a silent no-op: no event is
+       * emitted at all, so do not wait for `error` there. Calling it before `load()` is an integration error: it emits `error` and
+       * is not remembered. If `/process` could not be reached (`error` with `error_code` `service_unreachable` /
+       * `aborted`), `authenticate()` may be called once more; any other `error`, and any failure of that retry,
+       * is final.
+       * No client-side deadline: a stale 3DS Server session surfaces as `error` / `chargeAuthReject`.
+       *
+       * @example
+       * const widget = new Canvas3ds('#widget', token); // charge created with _3ds.authentication_flow: 'two_step'
+       * widget.on('chargeAuthReady', () => payButton.disabled = false);
+       * widget.on('chargeAuthChallenge', () => showChallengeModal());
+       * widget.on('chargeAuthSuccess', (data) => completePayment(data.charge_3ds_id));
+       * widget.on('chargeAuthReject', () => showDeclined());
+       * widget.on('error', () => showError());
+       * widget.load(); // fingerprint runs while the shopper reviews the order
+       *
+       * payButton.addEventListener('click', () => widget.authenticate());
+       */
+    }, {
+      key: "authenticate",
+      value: function authenticate() {
+        if (this.token.format !== TOKEN_FORMAT$2.STANDALONE_3DS) {
+          return;
+        }
+        this.standalone3dsService.authenticate(this.token.content);
+      }
       /**
        * Using this method you can hide widget after load
        * @param {boolean} [saveSize=false] - using this param you can save iframe's size
@@ -6187,6 +6710,24 @@
     EFTPOS_WHITE: 'eftpos_white',
     UNIONPAY: 'unionpay'
   };
+  /**
+   * Card schemes the widget is able to resolve from a card number, and therefore the only values
+   * `setAllowedCardSchemes` accepts. This is a separate vocabulary from SUPPORTED_CARD_TYPES, which drives the
+   * card icons: it omits the icon-only variants `visa_white` / `eftpos_white`, and the `laser` / `maestro`
+   * identifiers the widget can never resolve — allowing those would be configuration that can never match.
+   */
+  var CARD_SCHEME = {
+    AMEX: 'amex',
+    AUSBC: 'ausbc',
+    DINERS: 'diners',
+    DISCOVER: 'discover',
+    EFTPOS: 'eftpos',
+    JAPCB: 'japcb',
+    MASTERCARD: 'mastercard',
+    SOLO: 'solo',
+    UNIONPAY: 'unionpay',
+    VISA: 'visa'
+  };
   var SUPPORTED_CHECKOUT_META_COLLECTION = [].concat([
   // Paypal
   'brand_name', 'cart_border_color', 'reference', 'email', 'hdr_img', 'logo_img', 'pay_flow_color', 'first_name', 'last_name', 'address_line', 'address_line2', 'address_city', 'address_state', 'address_postcode', 'address_country', 'phone', 'hide_shipping_address'], [
@@ -8371,7 +8912,7 @@
     }]);
   }(WalletService);
 
-  /*! @license DOMPurify 3.4.11 | (c) Cure53 and other contributors | Released under the Apache license 2.0 and Mozilla Public License 2.0 | github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/blob/3.4.11/LICENSE */
+  /*! @license DOMPurify 3.4.13 | (c) Cure53 and other contributors | Released under the Apache license 2.0 and Mozilla Public License 2.0 | github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/blob/3.4.13/LICENSE */
 
   var purify_cjs;
   var hasRequiredPurify_cjs;
@@ -8691,7 +9232,7 @@
   	const text = freeze(['#text']);
 
   	const html = freeze(['accept', 'action', 'align', 'alt', 'autocapitalize', 'autocomplete', 'autopictureinpicture', 'autoplay', 'background', 'bgcolor', 'border', 'capture', 'cellpadding', 'cellspacing', 'checked', 'cite', 'class', 'clear', 'color', 'cols', 'colspan', 'command', 'commandfor', 'controls', 'controlslist', 'coords', 'crossorigin', 'datetime', 'decoding', 'default', 'dir', 'disabled', 'disablepictureinpicture', 'disableremoteplayback', 'download', 'draggable', 'enctype', 'enterkeyhint', 'exportparts', 'face', 'for', 'headers', 'height', 'hidden', 'high', 'href', 'hreflang', 'id', 'inert', 'inputmode', 'integrity', 'ismap', 'kind', 'label', 'lang', 'list', 'loading', 'loop', 'low', 'max', 'maxlength', 'media', 'method', 'min', 'minlength', 'multiple', 'muted', 'name', 'nonce', 'noshade', 'novalidate', 'nowrap', 'open', 'optimum', 'part', 'pattern', 'placeholder', 'playsinline', 'popover', 'popovertarget', 'popovertargetaction', 'poster', 'preload', 'pubdate', 'radiogroup', 'readonly', 'rel', 'required', 'rev', 'reversed', 'role', 'rows', 'rowspan', 'spellcheck', 'scope', 'selected', 'shape', 'size', 'sizes', 'slot', 'span', 'srclang', 'start', 'src', 'srcset', 'step', 'style', 'summary', 'tabindex', 'title', 'translate', 'type', 'usemap', 'valign', 'value', 'width', 'wrap', 'xmlns']);
-  	const svg = freeze(['accent-height', 'accumulate', 'additive', 'alignment-baseline', 'amplitude', 'ascent', 'attributename', 'attributetype', 'azimuth', 'basefrequency', 'baseline-shift', 'begin', 'bias', 'by', 'class', 'clip', 'clippathunits', 'clip-path', 'clip-rule', 'color', 'color-interpolation', 'color-interpolation-filters', 'color-profile', 'color-rendering', 'cx', 'cy', 'd', 'dx', 'dy', 'diffuseconstant', 'direction', 'display', 'divisor', 'dur', 'edgemode', 'elevation', 'end', 'exponent', 'fill', 'fill-opacity', 'fill-rule', 'filter', 'filterunits', 'flood-color', 'flood-opacity', 'font-family', 'font-size', 'font-size-adjust', 'font-stretch', 'font-style', 'font-variant', 'font-weight', 'fx', 'fy', 'g1', 'g2', 'glyph-name', 'glyphref', 'gradientunits', 'gradienttransform', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'image-rendering', 'in', 'in2', 'intercept', 'k', 'k1', 'k2', 'k3', 'k4', 'kerning', 'keypoints', 'keysplines', 'keytimes', 'lang', 'lengthadjust', 'letter-spacing', 'kernelmatrix', 'kernelunitlength', 'lighting-color', 'local', 'marker-end', 'marker-mid', 'marker-start', 'markerheight', 'markerunits', 'markerwidth', 'maskcontentunits', 'maskunits', 'max', 'mask', 'mask-type', 'media', 'method', 'mode', 'min', 'name', 'numoctaves', 'offset', 'operator', 'opacity', 'order', 'orient', 'orientation', 'origin', 'overflow', 'paint-order', 'path', 'pathlength', 'patterncontentunits', 'patterntransform', 'patternunits', 'points', 'preservealpha', 'preserveaspectratio', 'primitiveunits', 'r', 'rx', 'ry', 'radius', 'refx', 'refy', 'repeatcount', 'repeatdur', 'restart', 'result', 'rotate', 'scale', 'seed', 'shape-rendering', 'slope', 'specularconstant', 'specularexponent', 'spreadmethod', 'startoffset', 'stddeviation', 'stitchtiles', 'stop-color', 'stop-opacity', 'stroke-dasharray', 'stroke-dashoffset', 'stroke-linecap', 'stroke-linejoin', 'stroke-miterlimit', 'stroke-opacity', 'stroke', 'stroke-width', 'style', 'surfacescale', 'systemlanguage', 'tabindex', 'tablevalues', 'targetx', 'targety', 'transform', 'transform-origin', 'text-anchor', 'text-decoration', 'text-rendering', 'textlength', 'type', 'u1', 'u2', 'unicode', 'values', 'viewbox', 'visibility', 'version', 'vert-adv-y', 'vert-origin-x', 'vert-origin-y', 'width', 'word-spacing', 'wrap', 'writing-mode', 'xchannelselector', 'ychannelselector', 'x', 'x1', 'x2', 'xmlns', 'y', 'y1', 'y2', 'z', 'zoomandpan']);
+  	const svg = freeze(['accent-height', 'accumulate', 'additive', 'alignment-baseline', 'amplitude', 'ascent', 'attributename', 'attributetype', 'azimuth', 'basefrequency', 'baseline-shift', 'begin', 'bias', 'by', 'class', 'clip', 'clippathunits', 'clip-path', 'clip-rule', 'color', 'color-interpolation', 'color-interpolation-filters', 'color-profile', 'color-rendering', 'cx', 'cy', 'd', 'dx', 'dy', 'diffuseconstant', 'direction', 'display', 'divisor', 'dominant-baseline', 'dur', 'edgemode', 'elevation', 'end', 'exponent', 'fill', 'fill-opacity', 'fill-rule', 'filter', 'filterunits', 'flood-color', 'flood-opacity', 'font-family', 'font-size', 'font-size-adjust', 'font-stretch', 'font-style', 'font-variant', 'font-weight', 'fx', 'fy', 'g1', 'g2', 'glyph-name', 'glyphref', 'gradientunits', 'gradienttransform', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'image-rendering', 'in', 'in2', 'intercept', 'k', 'k1', 'k2', 'k3', 'k4', 'kerning', 'keypoints', 'keysplines', 'keytimes', 'lang', 'lengthadjust', 'letter-spacing', 'kernelmatrix', 'kernelunitlength', 'lighting-color', 'local', 'marker-end', 'marker-mid', 'marker-start', 'markerheight', 'markerunits', 'markerwidth', 'maskcontentunits', 'maskunits', 'max', 'mask', 'mask-type', 'media', 'method', 'mode', 'min', 'name', 'numoctaves', 'offset', 'operator', 'opacity', 'order', 'orient', 'orientation', 'origin', 'overflow', 'paint-order', 'path', 'pathlength', 'patterncontentunits', 'patterntransform', 'patternunits', 'points', 'preservealpha', 'preserveaspectratio', 'primitiveunits', 'r', 'rx', 'ry', 'radius', 'refx', 'refy', 'repeatcount', 'repeatdur', 'restart', 'result', 'rotate', 'scale', 'seed', 'shape-rendering', 'slope', 'specularconstant', 'specularexponent', 'spreadmethod', 'startoffset', 'stddeviation', 'stitchtiles', 'stop-color', 'stop-opacity', 'stroke-dasharray', 'stroke-dashoffset', 'stroke-linecap', 'stroke-linejoin', 'stroke-miterlimit', 'stroke-opacity', 'stroke', 'stroke-width', 'style', 'surfacescale', 'systemlanguage', 'tabindex', 'tablevalues', 'targetx', 'targety', 'transform', 'transform-origin', 'text-anchor', 'text-decoration', 'text-orientation', 'text-rendering', 'textlength', 'type', 'u1', 'u2', 'unicode', 'values', 'viewbox', 'visibility', 'version', 'vert-adv-y', 'vert-origin-x', 'vert-origin-y', 'width', 'word-spacing', 'wrap', 'writing-mode', 'xchannelselector', 'ychannelselector', 'x', 'x1', 'x2', 'xmlns', 'y', 'y1', 'y2', 'z', 'zoomandpan']);
   	const mathMl = freeze(['accent', 'accentunder', 'align', 'bevelled', 'close', 'columnalign', 'columnlines', 'columnspacing', 'columnspan', 'denomalign', 'depth', 'dir', 'display', 'displaystyle', 'encoding', 'fence', 'frame', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'largeop', 'length', 'linethickness', 'lquote', 'lspace', 'mathbackground', 'mathcolor', 'mathsize', 'mathvariant', 'maxsize', 'minsize', 'movablelimits', 'notation', 'numalign', 'open', 'rowalign', 'rowlines', 'rowspacing', 'rowspan', 'rspace', 'rquote', 'scriptlevel', 'scriptminsize', 'scriptsizemultiplier', 'selection', 'separator', 'separators', 'stretchy', 'subscriptshift', 'supscriptshift', 'symmetric', 'voffset', 'width', 'xmlns']);
   	const xml = freeze(['xlink:href', 'xml:id', 'xlink:title', 'xml:space', 'xmlns:xlink']);
 
@@ -8804,7 +9345,7 @@
   	function createDOMPurify() {
   	  let window = arguments.length > 0 && arguments[0] !== undefined ? arguments[0] : getGlobal();
   	  const DOMPurify = root => createDOMPurify(root);
-  	  DOMPurify.version = '3.4.11';
+  	  DOMPurify.version = '3.4.13';
   	  DOMPurify.removed = [];
   	  if (!window || !window.document || window.document.nodeType !== NODE_TYPE.document || !window.Element) {
   	    // Not running in a browser, provide a factory function
@@ -8835,6 +9376,7 @@
   	  const getAttributes = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'attributes');
   	  const getNodeType = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'nodeType') : null;
   	  const getNodeName = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'nodeName') : null;
+  	  const getOwnerDocument = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'ownerDocument') : null;
   	  // As per issue #47, the web-components registry is inherited by a
   	  // new document created via createHTMLDocument. As per the spec
   	  // (http://w3c.github.io/webcomponents/spec/custom/#creating-and-passing-registries)
@@ -9486,6 +10028,13 @@
   	   * @param root the in-place root to empty
   	   */
   	  const _neutralizeRoot = function _neutralizeRoot(root) {
+  	    /* Strip every disallowed attribute (on* handlers included) off the whole
+  	       subtree BEFORE detaching anything. Detaching first would hand back
+  	       handler-bearing originals (e.g. an already-loading `<img onerror>`)
+  	       whose queued resource event still fires in page scope after we throw.
+  	       Clobber-safe reads; a doomed clobbered node's own attributes are
+  	       irrelevant while its non-clobbered descendants are reached and scrubbed. */
+  	    _neutralizeSubtree(root);
   	    const childNodes = getChildNodes(root);
   	    if (childNodes) {
   	      const snapshot = [];
@@ -9613,6 +10162,82 @@
   	      }
   	    }
   	  };
+  	  /**
+  	   * _neutralizePatchLinkage
+  	   *
+  	   * IN_PLACE entry pre-pass (declarative-partial-updates / streaming
+  	   * hardening, https://github.com/WICG/declarative-partial-updates).
+  	   *
+  	   * The main walk strips patch linkage (`for`/`patchsrc`) and removes range
+  	   * markers (PIs / markup comments) node-by-node, in document order, AS it
+  	   * reaches each node. On a live in-place root that leaves a window: from the
+  	   * moment the root is connected until the walk arrives at a given node, that
+  	   * node's linkage is live. A patch applied on connection/stream can fire as
+  	   * a microtask during the walk and inject or teleport an unsanitized DOM
+  	   * range into a region the iterator has already passed and will not revisit,
+  	   * so the post-return "tree is sanitized" contract is violated. Sweep the
+  	   * whole tree once up front and sever every linkage before the walk begins,
+  	   * closing that window.
+  	   *
+  	   * This CANNOT undo a patch that already fired before sanitize ran — that is
+  	   * the irreducible "do not IN_PLACE a live-connected attacker tree" caveat —
+  	   * but it closes everything from sanitize-start onward. Gated on SAFE_FOR_XML
+  	   * to group with the rest of the declarative-partial-updates handling and
+  	   * stay overridable, consistent with the codebase.
+  	   *
+  	   * Clobber-safe traversal (cached childNodes getter); per-node try/catch so a
+  	   * clobbered root cannot defeat the sweep of its non-clobbered descendants.
+  	   *
+  	   * NOTE (pending real-Chrome confirmation, see test/declarative-patch-probe
+  	   * .html Q1): this mirrors the existing policy of keeping `for` on
+  	   * <label>/<output>. If the shipping feature can drive a patch through a
+  	   * surviving `for`-on-label/output + `id` pair, this pre-pass and the
+  	   * attribute check at _isBasicCustomElement's caller must additionally drop
+  	   * that pair on the IN_PLACE path. Left as-is until the taxonomy is verified.
+  	   *
+  	   * @param root the in-place root to sweep
+  	   */
+  	  const _neutralizePatchLinkage = function _neutralizePatchLinkage(root) {
+  	    if (!SAFE_FOR_XML) {
+  	      return;
+  	    }
+  	    const stack = [root];
+  	    while (stack.length > 0) {
+  	      const node = stack.pop();
+  	      const nodeType = getNodeType ? getNodeType(node) : node.nodeType;
+  	      /* Remove range markers (the target side of a patch linkage): every
+  	         processing instruction, and any markup-bearing comment. */
+  	      if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.processingInstruction || nodeType === NODE_TYPE.comment && regExpTest(COMMENT_MARKUP_PROBE, node.data)) {
+  	        try {
+  	          remove(node);
+  	        } catch (_) {
+  	          /* Best-effort */
+  	        }
+  	        continue;
+  	      }
+  	      /* Strip patch-source attributes (the source side) off elements. */
+  	      if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
+  	        const element = node;
+  	        const lcTag = transformCaseFunc(getNodeName ? getNodeName(node) : node.nodeName);
+  	        try {
+  	          if (element.hasAttribute && element.hasAttribute('patchsrc')) {
+  	            element.removeAttribute('patchsrc');
+  	          }
+  	          if (element.hasAttribute && element.hasAttribute('for') && lcTag !== 'label' && lcTag !== 'output') {
+  	            element.removeAttribute('for');
+  	          }
+  	        } catch (_) {
+  	          /* Clobbered removeAttribute/hasAttribute on a doomed node — ignore */
+  	        }
+  	      }
+  	      const childNodes = getChildNodes(node);
+  	      if (childNodes) {
+  	        for (let i = childNodes.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
+  	          stack.push(childNodes[i]);
+  	        }
+  	      }
+  	    }
+  	  };
   	  /**
   	   * _initDocument
   	   *
@@ -9670,7 +10295,17 @@
   	   * @return The created NodeIterator
   	   */
   	  const _createNodeIterator = function _createNodeIterator(root) {
-  	    return createNodeIterator.call(root.ownerDocument || root, root,
+  	    /* Read ownerDocument through the cached Node.prototype getter, never the
+  	       direct property. HTMLFormElement has [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns], so a
+  	       clobbering child (<input name="ownerDocument"> or a form-associated
+  	       external input) shadows the prototype getter and makes a direct read
+  	       return that <input>. createNodeIterator.call(<input>, ...) then throws
+  	       "Illegal invocation", and on the IN_PLACE path that throw lands before
+  	       the walk's fail-closed barrier - leaving the caller's live tree, with
+  	       any already-armed handler in it, un-neutralized. The cached getter
+  	       returns the real Document regardless of the clobber. */
+  	    const doc = getOwnerDocument ? getOwnerDocument(root) : root.ownerDocument;
+  	    return createNodeIterator.call(doc || root, root,
   	    // eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise
   	    NodeFilter.SHOW_ELEMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_COMMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT | NodeFilter.SHOW_PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION | NodeFilter.SHOW_CDATA_SECTION, null);
   	  };
@@ -9710,7 +10345,11 @@
   	  const _scrubTemplateExpressions2 = function _scrubTemplateExpressions(node) {
   	    var _node$querySelectorAl;
   	    node.normalize();
-  	    const walker = createNodeIterator.call(node.ownerDocument || node, node,
+  	    /* Clobber-safe ownerDocument read, same reasoning as _createNodeIterator:
+  	       under SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES this runs on the live IN_PLACE root, which may
+  	       carry a form-named-getter override of ownerDocument. */
+  	    const doc = getOwnerDocument ? getOwnerDocument(node) : node.ownerDocument;
+  	    const walker = createNodeIterator.call(doc || node, node,
   	    // eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise
   	    NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT | NodeFilter.SHOW_COMMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_CDATA_SECTION | NodeFilter.SHOW_PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION, null);
   	    let currentNode = walker.nextNode();
@@ -9863,15 +10502,21 @@
   	  /**
   	   * Handle a node whose tag is forbidden or not allowlisted: keep
   	   * allowed custom elements (false return exits _sanitizeElements
-  	   * early - namespace/fallback checks and the afterSanitizeElements
-  	   * hook are intentionally skipped for kept custom elements), else
-  	   * hoist content per KEEP_CONTENT and remove.
+  	   * early - the namespace and fallback-tag removal checks are
+  	   * intentionally skipped for kept custom elements), else hoist
+  	   * content per KEEP_CONTENT and remove.
+  	   *
+  	   * A kept custom element is the ONLY case in which this function
+  	   * returns false, so the caller uses that return value to run the
+  	   * afterSanitizeElements hook on the kept element and keep the
+  	   * element-hook lifecycle consistent with normal allowlisted
+  	   * elements (GHSA-c2j3-45gr-mqc4).
   	   *
   	   * @param currentNode the disallowed node
   	   * @param tagName the node's transformCaseFunc'd tag name
   	   * @return true if the node was removed, false if kept
   	   */
-  	  const _sanitizeDisallowedNode = function _sanitizeDisallowedNode(currentNode, tagName) {
+  	  const _sanitizeDisallowedNode = function _sanitizeDisallowedNode(currentNode, tagName, root) {
   	    /* Check if we have a custom element to handle */
   	    if (!FORBID_TAGS[tagName] && _isBasicCustomElement(tagName)) {
   	      if (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof RegExp && regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, tagName)) {
@@ -9894,27 +10539,26 @@
   	      const childNodes = getChildNodes(currentNode);
   	      if (childNodes && parentNode) {
   	        const childCount = childNodes.length;
-  	        /* In-place: hoist the *original* children so the iterator visits
-  	             and sanitises them through the same allowlist pass as every other
-  	             node. The caller built the tree in the live document, so the
-  	             originals carry already-queued resource events (`<img onerror>`,
-  	             `<video>`/`<audio>` error, lazy/`onload`, …); cloning would leave
-  	             those originals detached but still armed, firing in page scope
-  	             while the returned tree looked clean. Moving is safe in-place: the
-  	             root is pre-validated as an allowed tag and so is never the node
-  	             being removed, which keeps `parentNode` inside the iterator root
-  	             and the relocated child inside the serialised tree.
-  	                      Otherwise (string / DOM-copy paths): clone. The iterator is rooted
-  	             at — and the result serialised from — `body`, so a restrictive
-  	             ALLOWED_TAGS that removes `body` itself must leave its content in
-  	             place, which only cloning does; and those paths parse into an
-  	             inert document, so their discarded originals never had a queued
-  	             event to neutralise.
+  	        /* Hoist by moving each child up one level rather than deep-cloning
+  	             it. Moving transfers every descendant exactly once, so a chain of
+  	             nested disallowed elements costs O(n) instead of the O(n^2) that
+  	             re-cloning the shrinking subtree at each level produced; it also
+  	             empties the removed original, so `DOMPurify.removed` no longer
+  	             pins whole subtrees. Moving preserves the in-place guarantee too:
+  	             an original carrying already-queued resource events (`<img
+  	             onerror>`, `<video>`/`<audio>` error, lazy/`onload`, …) is
+  	             relocated and sanitised rather than left detached but still armed.
+  	                      The sole case that must clone is removing the walk root itself.
+  	             The result is serialised from the root's subtree, so a restrictive
+  	             ALLOWED_TAGS that strips the root (`body` on the string path) must
+  	             leave the content inside it, which only cloning does. In IN_PLACE
+  	             the root is pre-validated as an allowed tag and so is never removed
+  	             here, so that path always takes the move branch.
   	                      `childNodes` is live; a tail-to-head walk keeps `childNodes[i]`
   	             valid whether we move (drops the trailing entry) or clone (leaves
   	             the list intact). */
   	        for (let i = childCount - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
-  	          const hoisted = IN_PLACE ? childNodes[i] : cloneNode(childNodes[i], true);
+  	          const hoisted = currentNode === root ? cloneNode(childNodes[i], true) : childNodes[i];
   	          parentNode.insertBefore(hoisted, getNextSibling(currentNode));
   	        }
   	      }
@@ -9922,6 +10566,26 @@
   	    _forceRemove(currentNode);
   	    return true;
   	  };
+  	  /**
+  	   * Fork a hook-mutable allowlist off its shared binding the first time a
+  	   * (possibly lazily-installed) uponSanitize* hook is about to see it, so the
+  	   * hook cannot widen the per-instance default or the setConfig binding by
+  	   * reference and leak past the call. Returns the set unchanged once it is
+  	   * already call-local, so repeated calls across elements are idempotent.
+  	   *
+  	   * @param hookList the uponSanitize* hook array for this event
+  	   * @param set the current ALLOWED_TAGS / ALLOWED_ATTR binding
+  	   * @param defaultSet the per-instance DEFAULT_ALLOWED_* constant
+  	   * @param setConfigSet the captured setConfig() binding, or null
+  	   * @return a call-local clone if a hook is present and set is still shared,
+  	   *   else set unchanged
+  	   */
+  	  const _forkSharedAllowlist = function _forkSharedAllowlist(hookList, set, defaultSet, setConfigSet) {
+  	    if (hookList.length === 0) {
+  	      return set;
+  	    }
+  	    return set === defaultSet || set === setConfigSet ? clone(set) : set;
+  	  };
   	  /**
   	   * _sanitizeElements
   	   *
@@ -9931,9 +10595,20 @@
   	   * @param currentNode to check for permission to exist
   	   * @return true if node was killed, false if left alive
   	   */
-  	  const _sanitizeElements = function _sanitizeElements(currentNode) {
+  	  // eslint-disable-next-line complexity
+  	  const _sanitizeElements = function _sanitizeElements(currentNode, root) {
   	    /* Execute a hook if present */
   	    _executeHooks(hooks.beforeSanitizeElements, currentNode, null);
+  	    /* A hook may have detached the node - treat it as removed (see the
+  	       detached-node comment after the uponSanitizeElement hook below). On
+  	       the IN_PLACE path, neutralize the detached subtree first so a queued
+  	       resource handler on it cannot fire in page scope after we return. */
+  	    if (currentNode !== root && getParentNode(currentNode) === null) {
+  	      if (IN_PLACE) {
+  	        _neutralizeSubtree(currentNode);
+  	      }
+  	      return true;
+  	    }
   	    /* Check if element is clobbered or can clobber */
   	    if (_isClobbered(currentNode)) {
   	      _forceRemove(currentNode);
@@ -9941,11 +10616,47 @@
   	    }
   	    /* Now let's check the element's type and name */
   	    const tagName = transformCaseFunc(getNodeName ? getNodeName(currentNode) : currentNode.nodeName);
+  	    /* Close the pre-walk clone-guard's timing gap: an uponSanitizeElement
+  	       hook may have been installed after that guard sampled the hook arrays
+  	       (e.g. lazily from beforeSanitizeElements), leaving ALLOWED_TAGS still
+  	       aliasing a shared binding that a widening hook would mutate by
+  	       reference. Fork it before exposing it to the hook. */
+  	    ALLOWED_TAGS = _forkSharedAllowlist(hooks.uponSanitizeElement, ALLOWED_TAGS, DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS, SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_TAGS);
   	    /* Execute a hook if present */
   	    _executeHooks(hooks.uponSanitizeElement, currentNode, {
   	      tagName,
   	      allowedTags: ALLOWED_TAGS
   	    });
+  	    /* A hook may have detached the node from the tree — a long-standing
+  	       user pattern (issue #469; draw.io-style foreignObject filtering).
+  	       Per the cached, unclobberable parentNode getter the node is
+  	       genuinely out of the tree, so it can reach neither the serialized
+  	       output nor an IN_PLACE live tree; treat it as removed and stop
+  	       processing it. Without this guard, the unsafe-node / namespace
+  	       checks below would call _forceRemove on a parentless node and hit
+  	       the REPORT-3 fail-closed throw — which exists for nodes DOMPurify
+  	       wants gone but *cannot* detach (clobbered / parentless roots), the
+  	       opposite of a node that is already safely gone. The walk root is
+  	       exempt: a detached IN_PLACE root is legitimate input and must still
+  	       be fully sanitized, and a kill-decision on it must keep hitting the
+  	       REPORT-3 throw. Nodes detached by hooks stay the hook's
+  	       responsibility for placement: they are not recorded in
+  	       DOMPurify.removed, so the post-walk IN_PLACE pass (which iterates
+  	       DOMPurify.removed) does not reach them. But a hook-detached subtree
+  	       can still hold a queued resource-event handler - e.g. an <img onload>
+  	       that began loading when the caller built the live tree - which fires
+  	       in page scope after sanitize returns even though the handler never
+  	       reached the returned tree. That is the audit-5 F1 hazard, and the
+  	       documented node.remove() hook pattern walks straight into it. So on
+  	       the IN_PLACE path we neutralize the detached subtree inline here,
+  	       stripping its non-allow-listed attributes before returning, exactly
+  	       as the post-walk pass does for _forceRemove'd subtrees. */
+  	    if (currentNode !== root && getParentNode(currentNode) === null) {
+  	      if (IN_PLACE) {
+  	        _neutralizeSubtree(currentNode);
+  	      }
+  	      return true;
+  	    }
   	    /* Remove mXSS vectors, processing instructions and risky comments */
   	    if (_isUnsafeNode(currentNode, tagName)) {
   	      _forceRemove(currentNode);
@@ -9953,7 +10664,22 @@
   	    }
   	    /* Remove element if anything forbids its presence */
   	    if (FORBID_TAGS[tagName] || !(EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck instanceof Function && EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck(tagName)) && !ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName]) {
-  	      return _sanitizeDisallowedNode(currentNode, tagName);
+  	      const removed = _sanitizeDisallowedNode(currentNode, tagName, root);
+  	      /* A false return means the node is a custom element kept via
+  	         CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING - the only keep path through
+  	         _sanitizeDisallowedNode. Run afterSanitizeElements on it so the
+  	         element-hook lifecycle matches normal allowlisted elements: a
+  	         security policy applied in this hook (e.g. stripping an attribute
+  	         from every surviving element) must not silently skip kept custom
+  	         elements (GHSA-c2j3-45gr-mqc4). This mirrors the normal-element
+  	         tail below - the hook runs, then the walker's subsequent
+  	         _sanitizeAttributes pass sanitizes the element's attributes. The
+  	         deliberately skipped namespace and fallback-tag removal checks stay
+  	         skipped; they are removal decisions, not the hook contract. */
+  	      if (removed === false) {
+  	        _executeHooks(hooks.afterSanitizeElements, currentNode, null);
+  	      }
+  	      return removed;
   	    }
   	    /* Check whether element has a valid namespace.
   	       Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): use the cached Node.prototype
@@ -10000,6 +10726,33 @@
   	    if (FORBID_ATTR[lcName]) {
   	      return false;
   	    }
+  	    /* Reject declarative-partial-updates patch-linkage attributes
+  	       (https://github.com/WICG/declarative-partial-updates).
+  	            Empirical note (Chrome 150, verified — see
+  	       test/declarative-patch-probe-v3.html): expansion is NOT applied after
+  	       sanitization. For the string path it fires during sanitize()'s own
+  	       parse, so the walk sees and sanitizes the fully materialized expanded
+  	       tree — teleports into MathML/SVG integration points included; a
+  	       weaponized `<template for>`->`<img onerror>` comes back with the handler
+  	       stripped. For the IN_PLACE path it fires on connection, before the walk.
+  	       Either way DOMPurify is NOT blind to the patch.
+  	            This removal is therefore defense-in-depth rather than the sole barrier:
+  	       it prevents live linkage from surviving into the OUTPUT and re-expanding
+  	       in the caller's context, and keeps behaviour deterministic if a future
+  	       engine defers expansion. `for` is legitimate only on <label>/<output>;
+  	       anywhere else (notably <template for>) it links the element to a patch
+  	       target and teleports or removes an arbitrary DOM range by id/marker name.
+  	       `patchsrc` fetches remote markup and is treated as a script-loading
+  	       mechanism (CSP). Gated on SAFE_FOR_XML so the removal groups with the
+  	       other structural-threat checks and stays overridable, consistent with
+  	       the rest of the codebase. PI range markers are already removed by
+  	       _isUnsafeNode. */
+  	    if (SAFE_FOR_XML && lcName === 'patchsrc') {
+  	      return false;
+  	    }
+  	    if (SAFE_FOR_XML && lcName === 'for' && lcTag !== 'label' && lcTag !== 'output') {
+  	      return false;
+  	    }
   	    /* Make sure attribute cannot clobber */
   	    if (SANITIZE_DOM && (lcName === 'id' || lcName === 'name') && (value in document || value in formElement)) {
   	      return false;
@@ -10116,6 +10869,9 @@
   	    if (!attributes || _isClobbered(currentNode)) {
   	      return;
   	    }
+  	    /* Same lazy-install guard as uponSanitizeElement (see there): fork the
+  	       attribute allowlist off its shared binding before a hook can see it. */
+  	    ALLOWED_ATTR = _forkSharedAllowlist(hooks.uponSanitizeAttribute, ALLOWED_ATTR, DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR, SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_ATTR);
   	    const hookEvent = {
   	      attrName: '',
   	      attrValue: '',
@@ -10209,7 +10965,7 @@
   	      /* Execute a hook if present */
   	      _executeHooks(hooks.uponSanitizeShadowNode, shadowNode, null);
   	      /* Sanitize tags and elements */
-  	      _sanitizeElements(shadowNode);
+  	      _sanitizeElements(shadowNode, fragment);
   	      /* Check attributes next */
   	      _sanitizeAttributes(shadowNode);
   	      /* Deep shadow DOM detected.
@@ -10400,6 +11156,11 @@
   	       keep using and whose return value they ignore — unsanitized. REPORT-2. */
   	    const inPlace = IN_PLACE && typeof dirty !== 'string' && _isNode(dirty);
   	    if (inPlace) {
+  	      /* Declarative-partial-updates / streaming pre-pass: sever every patch
+  	         linkage across the live tree BEFORE the walk, so no patch can fire
+  	         mid-walk and inject into an already-processed region. Runs first, so
+  	         it also covers the forbidden/clobbered roots that throw below. */
+  	      _neutralizePatchLinkage(dirty);
   	      /* Do some early pre-sanitization to avoid unsafe root nodes.
   	         Read nodeName through the cached prototype getter — a clobbering
   	         child named "nodeName" on the form root would otherwise shadow
@@ -10409,6 +11170,9 @@
   	      if (typeof nn === 'string') {
   	        const tagName = transformCaseFunc(nn);
   	        if (!ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName] || FORBID_TAGS[tagName]) {
+  	          /* Fail closed on a live root: neutralize handlers/children before
+  	             throwing, exactly as the mid-walk abort path does. */
+  	          _neutralizeRoot(dirty);
   	          throw typeErrorCreate('root node is forbidden and cannot be sanitized in-place');
   	        }
   	      }
@@ -10423,6 +11187,10 @@
   	         the application unsanitized. Refuse to sanitize such a root
   	         the same way we refuse a forbidden tag. GHSA-r47g-fvhr-h676. */
   	      if (_isClobbered(dirty)) {
+  	        /* Fail closed on a live clobbered root before throwing.
+  	           _neutralizeRoot's reads are clobber-safe (cached getters); the
+  	           form's non-clobbered descendants, e.g. an armed <img>, are scrubbed. */
+  	        _neutralizeRoot(dirty);
   	        throw typeErrorCreate('root node is clobbered and cannot be sanitized in-place');
   	      }
   	      /* Sanitize attached shadow roots before the main iterator runs.
@@ -10475,20 +11243,24 @@
   	      _forceRemove(body.firstChild);
   	    }
   	    /* Get node iterator */
-  	    const nodeIterator = _createNodeIterator(inPlace ? dirty : body);
+  	    const walkRoot = inPlace ? dirty : body;
   	    /* Now start iterating over the created document.
   	       The walk runs inside an exception barrier (campaign-3 F2): a re-entrant
   	       engine/custom-element mutation can detach a node mid-walk so
   	       `_forceRemove`'s parentless guard throws, aborting the loop. Without the
   	       barrier the caller's in-place tree would be left half-sanitized with the
-  	       unvisited tail still armed. On any throw we fail closed — strip the
-  	       in-place root bare — then rethrow so the existing throw contract is
-  	       preserved. (String/DOM-copy paths never return the partial body, so the
-  	       propagating throw is already fail-closed there.) */
+  	       unvisited tail still armed. _createNodeIterator itself is inside the
+  	       barrier too: constructing the iterator dereferences the root's document,
+  	       and any failure there (e.g. an exotic/clobbered root) must still fail
+  	       closed rather than skip the neutralize. On any throw we fail closed -
+  	       strip the in-place root bare - then rethrow so the existing throw
+  	       contract is preserved. (String/DOM-copy paths never return the partial
+  	       body, so the propagating throw is already fail-closed there.) */
   	    try {
+  	      const nodeIterator = _createNodeIterator(walkRoot);
   	      while (currentNode = nodeIterator.nextNode()) {
   	        /* Sanitize tags and elements */
-  	        _sanitizeElements(currentNode);
+  	        _sanitizeElements(currentNode, walkRoot);
   	        /* Check attributes next */
   	        _sanitizeAttributes(currentNode);
   	        /* Shadow DOM detected, sanitize it.
@@ -10502,6 +11274,14 @@
   	    } catch (error) {
   	      if (inPlace) {
   	        _neutralizeRoot(dirty);
+  	        /* Nodes _forceRemove'd earlier in the aborted walk are already
+  	           detached from the root, so _neutralizeRoot's subtree pass does not
+  	           reach them. Defuse them too, mirroring the success-path loop below. */
+  	        arrayForEach(DOMPurify.removed, entry => {
+  	          if (entry.element) {
+  	            _neutralizeSubtree(entry.element);
+  	          }
+  	        });
   	      }
   	      throw error;
   	    }
@@ -14928,6 +15708,54 @@
           validate_card_types: validateCardNumberInput
         });
       }
+      /**
+       * Current method restricts which card schemes the card number input accepts, without changing which card
+       * icons the widget displays. Scheme identifiers are matched case-insensitively and ignoring surrounding
+       * whitespace; unsupported identifiers are ignored with a warning, so a list in which every identifier is
+       * unsupported applies no restriction at all.
+       *
+       * Takes precedence over setSupportedCardIcons: when a non-empty list is supplied here, it is the only list
+       * used for validation and the validateCardNumberInput flag of setSupportedCardIcons no longer affects it.
+       * Calling this method more than once replaces the previous list rather than merging with it.
+       *
+       * Must be called before load().
+       *
+       * @example
+       *
+       * widget.setAllowedCardSchemes(['visa', 'mastercard']);
+       *
+       * @param {string[]} schemes - [CARD_SCHEME]{@link CARD_SCHEME}
+       */
+    }, {
+      key: "setAllowedCardSchemes",
+      value: function setAllowedCardSchemes(schemes) {
+        var vocabulary = ObjectHelper.values(CARD_SCHEME);
+        var allowedSchemes = [];
+        var _iterator = _createForOfIteratorHelper(Array.isArray(schemes) ? schemes : []),
+          _step;
+        try {
+          for (_iterator.s(); !(_step = _iterator.n()).done;) {
+            var entry = _step.value;
+            var scheme = typeof entry === 'string' ? entry.trim().toLowerCase() : '';
+            if (vocabulary.indexOf(scheme) === -1) {
+              console.warn("Widget::setAllowedCardSchemes: unsupported card scheme ".concat(entry));
+              continue;
+            }
+            if (allowedSchemes.indexOf(scheme) === -1) {
+              allowedSchemes.push(scheme);
+            }
+          }
+        } catch (err) {
+          _iterator.e(err);
+        } finally {
+          _iterator.f();
+        }
+        if (allowedSchemes.length) {
+          this.link.setParams({
+            allowed_card_schemes: allowedSchemes.join(',')
+          });
+        }
+      }
       /**
        * Current method can hide prevent the widget from showing the error messages
        *
@@ -45288,14 +46116,17 @@
   var slzh = function (d, b) { return b + 30 + b2(d, b + 26) + b2(d, b + 28); };
   // read zip header
   var zh = function (d, b, z) {
-      var fnl = b2(d, b + 28), fn = strFromU8(d.subarray(b + 46, b + 46 + fnl), !(b2(d, b + 8) & 2048)), es = b + 46 + fnl, bs = b4(d, b + 20);
-      var _a = z && bs == 4294967295 ? z64e(d, es) : [bs, b4(d, b + 24), b4(d, b + 42)], sc = _a[0], su = _a[1], off = _a[2];
-      return [b2(d, b + 10), sc, su, fn, es + b2(d, b + 30) + b2(d, b + 32), off];
+      var fnl = b2(d, b + 28), efl = b2(d, b + 30), fn = strFromU8(d.subarray(b + 46, b + 46 + fnl), !(b2(d, b + 8) & 2048)), es = b + 46 + fnl, bs = b4(d, b + 20);
+      var _a = z && bs == 4294967295 ? z64e(d, es, efl) : [bs, b4(d, b + 24), b4(d, b + 42)], sc = _a[0], su = _a[1], off = _a[2];
+      return [b2(d, b + 10), sc, su, fn, es + efl + b2(d, b + 32), off];
   };
   // read zip64 extra field
-  var z64e = function (d, b) {
-      for (; b2(d, b) != 1; b += 4 + b2(d, b + 2))
-          ;
+  var z64e = function (d, b, l) {
+      var e = b + l;
+      for (; b2(d, b) != 1; b += 4 + b2(d, b + 2)) {
+          if (b + 4 > e)
+              err(13);
+      }
       return [b8(d, b + 12), b8(d, b + 4), b8(d, b + 20)];
   };
   // extra field length
@@ -45898,7 +46729,7 @@
                           var sc_1 = b4(buf, i + 18), su_1 = b4(buf, i + 22);
                           var fn_1 = strFromU8(buf.subarray(i + 30, i += 30 + fnl), !u);
                           if (sc_1 == 4294967295) {
-                              _a = dd ? [-2] : z64e(buf, i), sc_1 = _a[0], su_1 = _a[1];
+                              _a = dd ? [-2] : z64e(buf, i, es), sc_1 = _a[0], su_1 = _a[1];
                           }
                           else if (dd)
                               sc_1 = -1;
@@ -46179,6 +47010,7 @@
   exports.ApplePayOpenWalletButton = ApplePayOpenWalletButton;
   exports.ApplePayWalletButtonExpress = ApplePayWalletButtonExpress;
   exports.CANVAS_3DS_EVENT = CANVAS_3DS_EVENT;
+  exports.CARD_SCHEME = CARD_SCHEME;
   exports.CHECKOUT_BUTTON_EVENT = CHECKOUT_BUTTON_EVENT;
   exports.CHECKOUT_EVENT = EVENT$2;
   exports.Canvas3ds = Canvas3ds;