@paydock/client-sdk 1.144.1-beta → 1.147.0

package/bundles/index.cjs

@@ -830,16 +830,28 @@ var Browser = /*#__PURE__*/function () {
     value: function getBrowserName() {
       var sUsrAg = navigator.userAgent;
       // "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:61.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/61.0"
-      if (sUsrAg.indexOf('Firefox') > -1) return 'Mozilla Firefox';
-      if (sUsrAg.indexOf('Opera') > -1) return 'Opera';
+      if (sUsrAg.indexOf('Firefox') > -1) {
+        return 'Mozilla Firefox';
+      }
+      if (sUsrAg.indexOf('Opera') > -1) {
+        return 'Opera';
+      }
       // "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; Trident/7.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E; Zoom 3.6.0; wbx 1.0.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko"
-      if (sUsrAg.indexOf('Trident') > -1) return 'Microsoft Internet Explorer';
+      if (sUsrAg.indexOf('Trident') > -1) {
+        return 'Microsoft Internet Explorer';
+      }
       // "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/58.0.3029.110 Safari/537.36 Edge/16.16299"
-      if (sUsrAg.indexOf('Edge') > -1) return 'Microsoft Edge';
+      if (sUsrAg.indexOf('Edge') > -1) {
+        return 'Microsoft Edge';
+      }
       // "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Ubuntu Chromium/66.0.3359.181 Chrome/66.0.3359.181 Safari/537.36"
-      if (sUsrAg.indexOf('Chrome') > -1) return 'Google Chrome or Chromium';
+      if (sUsrAg.indexOf('Chrome') > -1) {
+        return 'Google Chrome or Chromium';
+      }
       // "Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 11_4 like Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/11.0 Mobile/15E148 Safari/604.1 980x1306"
-      if (sUsrAg.indexOf('Safari') > -1) return 'Apple Safari';
+      if (sUsrAg.indexOf('Safari') > -1) {
+        return 'Apple Safari';
+      }
       return 'unknown';
     }
   }, {
@@ -870,11 +882,13 @@ var Browser = /*#__PURE__*/function () {
   }, {
     key: "getBrowserInfo",
     value: function getBrowserInfo() {
-      var ua = navigator.userAgent;
+      // Bound the user-agent length before running any regex to avoid
+      // pathological backtracking (ReDoS) on maliciously long inputs.
+      var ua = (navigator.userAgent || '').slice(0, 256);
       var M = ua.match(/(opera|chrome|safari|firefox|msie|trident(?=\/))\/?\s*(\d+)/i) || [];
-      var tem;
-      if (/trident/i.test(M[1])) {
-        tem = /\brv[ :](\d+)/.exec(ua) || [];
+      var tem = null;
+      if (/trident/i.test(M[1] || '')) {
+        tem = ua.match(/\brv[ :](\d+)/) || [];
         return {
           name: 'IE',
           version: tem[1] || ''
@@ -890,8 +904,8 @@ var Browser = /*#__PURE__*/function () {
         }
       }
       M = M[2] ? [M[1], M[2]] : [navigator.appName, navigator.appVersion, '-?'];
-      // tslint:disable-next-line:no-conditional-assignment
-      if ((tem = ua.match(/version\/(\d+)/i)) != null) {
+      tem = ua.match(/version\/(\d+)/i);
+      if (tem != null) {
         M.splice(1, 1, tem[1]);
       }
       return {
@@ -1851,7 +1865,7 @@ SDK.headerKeys = Object.freeze({
   version: 'x-sdk-version',
   type: 'x-sdk-type'
 });
-SDK._version = 'v1.144.1-beta';
+SDK._version = 'v1.147.0';
 
 var ACCESS_HEADER_NAME = {
   accessToken: 'x-access-token',
@@ -4707,6 +4721,15 @@ var ApiBase = /*#__PURE__*/function () {
       this.env.setEnv(env, alias);
       return this;
     }
+    /**
+     * Origin (`scheme://host[:port]`) of the API this client talks to, for the current env/alias.
+     * Used to validate the `origin` of postMessages the API itself sends to the page.
+     */
+  }, {
+    key: "getApiOrigin",
+    value: function getApiOrigin() {
+      return ApiBase.toOrigin(this.env.getConf().url);
+    }
   }, {
     key: "requestObservable",
     value: function requestObservable(method, url, requestBody) {
@@ -4919,6 +4942,18 @@ var ApiBase = /*#__PURE__*/function () {
         environment: this.env.getEnv()
       };
     }
+  }], [{
+    key: "toOrigin",
+    value: function toOrigin(url) {
+      try {
+        return new URL(url).origin;
+      } catch (_a) {
+        // Not a parsable URL: the returned string is not an origin and will never match a
+        // MessageEvent.origin — surface the misconfiguration instead of failing silently.
+        console.warn("[paydock/client-sdk] cannot derive an origin from configured URL \"".concat(url, "\""));
+        return url.replace(/\/+$/, '');
+      }
+    }
   }]);
 }();
 
@@ -4979,7 +5014,6 @@ var Api = /*#__PURE__*/function (_ApiBase) {
 
 var WALLET_CAPTURE_LINK = '/v1/charges/wallet/capture';
 var WALLET_CALLBACK_LINK = '/v1/charges/wallet/callback';
-var STANDALONE_3DS_PROCESS_LINK = '/v1/charges/standalone-3ds/process';
 var STANDALONE_3DS_HANDLE_LINK = '/v1/charges/standalone-3ds/handle';
 var ApiChargeInternal = /*#__PURE__*/function () {
   function ApiChargeInternal(api) {
@@ -4996,11 +5030,6 @@ var ApiChargeInternal = /*#__PURE__*/function () {
     value: function walletCallback(payload) {
       return this.api.getClientPromise('POST', WALLET_CALLBACK_LINK).send(payload);
     }
-  }, {
-    key: "standalone3dsProcess",
-    value: function standalone3dsProcess(payload) {
-      return this.api.getClientPromise('POST', STANDALONE_3DS_PROCESS_LINK).send(payload);
-    }
   }, {
     key: "standalone3dsHandle",
     value: function standalone3dsHandle() {
@@ -5139,6 +5168,10 @@ var IFrame = /*#__PURE__*/function () {
     _classCallCheck(this, IFrame);
     this.container = container;
   }
+  /**
+   * @param options.onLoad Called on every `load` of the iframe (initial document and each
+   *        subsequent navigation). Attached before `src` is set so a fast load is never missed.
+   */
   return _createClass(IFrame, [{
     key: "load",
     value: function load(link) {
@@ -5147,6 +5180,9 @@ var IFrame = /*#__PURE__*/function () {
       if (!this.container.isExist() || this.isExist()) return;
       var iFrame = document.createElement('iframe');
       if (options.title) iFrame.title = options.title;
+      if (options.onLoad) {
+        iFrame.addEventListener('load', options.onLoad);
+      }
       if (iframeClass) iFrame.classList.add(iframeClass);
       // Set additional attributes before src and DOM insertion so that
       // Permissions-Policy (e.g. allow="payment") is in place when the
@@ -5287,14 +5323,14 @@ var IFrameEvent = /*#__PURE__*/function () {
         data = JSON.parse(event.data);
       } catch (error) {}
       if (!data) return;
-      _this.emit(data);
+      _this.emit(data, event.origin);
     });
   }
   return _createClass(IFrameEvent, [{
     key: "emit",
-    value: function emit(data) {
+    value: function emit(data, origin) {
       for (var key in this.listeners) {
-        if (this.listeners[key].event === data.event && data.widget_id === this.listeners[key].widget_id) this.listeners[key].listener.apply(this, [data]);
+        if (this.listeners[key].event === data.event && data.widget_id === this.listeners[key].widget_id) this.listeners[key].listener.apply(this, [data, origin]);
       }
     }
   }, {
@@ -5367,6 +5403,20 @@ var GPAYMENTS_EVENT = {
   DECOUPLED: 'chargeAuthDecoupled',
   /** Challenge required — issuer demands user interaction. Payload: `Canvas3dsAuthPayload`. */
   CHALLENGE: 'chargeAuthChallenge',
+  /**
+   * The challenge iframe fired its FIRST `load` after `chargeAuthChallenge` (the ACS page has painted),
+   * or the `CHALLENGE_LOADED_FALLBACK_MS` safety fallback elapsed without one. Emitted exactly once per
+   * challenge; never emitted for a decoupled challenge (no challenge iframe). Payload: `Canvas3dsChallengeLoadedPayload`.
+   */
+  CHALLENGE_LOADED: 'chargeAuthChallengeLoaded',
+  /**
+   * The issuer delivered the final authentication result to the 3DS Server (the shopper finished the
+   * challenge, or approved a decoupled authentication) and the SDK is now obtaining the outcome. Emitted at
+   * most once per authentication, always before the terminal event. Detected through the `secondary_url`
+   * result monitor (`source: 'poll'`) or, when the callback message arrives first, right before the outcome
+   * it carries (`source: 'callback'`). Payload: `Canvas3dsChallengeCompletedPayload`.
+   */
+  CHALLENGE_COMPLETED: 'chargeAuthChallengeCompleted',
   /** Informational signal emitted by the GPayments flow. Internal — not part of the public typed surface. */
   INFO: 'chargeAuthInfo',
   /** Error during the flow (network, parsing, etc.). Payload: `Canvas3dsErrorPayload`. */
@@ -5378,13 +5428,56 @@ var GPAYMENTS_EVENT = {
  * backwards-compatible internal usage.
  */
 var CANVAS_3DS_EVENT = GPAYMENTS_EVENT;
+/**
+ * Upper bound on how long `chargeAuthChallengeLoaded` waits for the challenge iframe's first `load`.
+ * When it elapses the event is emitted with `reason: 'timeout'` so a merchant loader is never held
+ * forever; the real `load` arriving afterwards is the paint and is simply ignored.
+ */
+var CHALLENGE_LOADED_FALLBACK_MS = 2500;
+/**
+ * Interval of the `secondary_url` (GPayments `resultMonUrl`) poll while an ACS challenge is on screen.
+ * The monitor flips to `AuthResultReady` when the issuer's RReq reaches the 3DS Server — before the ACS has
+ * even returned its final page to the browser — so this poll is what makes `chargeAuthChallengeCompleted`
+ * land before the shopper sees any post-submit page. GPayments recommends 2 s and leaves the interval to the
+ * requestor; 1 s matches the cadence of GPayments' own monitoring frame.
+ */
+var CHALLENGE_RESULT_POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 1000;
+/**
+ * Interval of the `secondary_url` poll for a decoupled challenge (shopper approves out-of-band, possibly
+ * minutes later; nothing to cover on screen) — the GPayments-recommended 2 s.
+ */
+var DECOUPLED_RESULT_POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 2000;
+/** The result-monitor request failed at transport level (network, abort, timeout) — retried, not fatal. */
+var ResultMonitorTransportError = /*#__PURE__*/function (_Error) {
+  function ResultMonitorTransportError() {
+    var _this;
+    _classCallCheck(this, ResultMonitorTransportError);
+    _this = _callSuper(this, ResultMonitorTransportError, ['Standalone 3DS result monitor request failed']);
+    _this.name = 'ResultMonitorTransportError';
+    return _this;
+  }
+  _inherits(ResultMonitorTransportError, _Error);
+  return _createClass(ResultMonitorTransportError);
+}(/*#__PURE__*/_wrapNativeSuper(Error));
 var GPaymentsService = /*#__PURE__*/function () {
   function GPaymentsService(container, api, eventEmitter) {
+    var trustedOrigins = arguments.length > 3 && arguments[3] !== undefined ? arguments[3] : [];
     _classCallCheck(this, GPaymentsService);
     this.container = container;
     this.api = api;
     this.eventEmitter = eventEmitter;
+    this.trustedOrigins = trustedOrigins;
     this.resultRead = false;
+    /** `chargeAuthChallengeLoaded` already emitted for the current challenge (by `load` or by the fallback). */
+    this.challengeLoadedEmitted = false;
+    /** `chargeAuthChallengeCompleted` already emitted for the current authentication (poll or callback). */
+    this.challengeCompletedEmitted = false;
+    /** Set once a terminal event was emitted: no lifecycle event may follow (reset when a new challenge starts). */
+    this.challengeLifecycleClosed = false;
+    this.challengeLoadedTimer = null;
+    this.resultPollTimer = null;
+    /** One-shot guard for the `chargeAuth` leg — the callback message may be delivered more than once. */
+    this.authHandled = false;
     this.iFrameEvent = new IFrameEvent(window);
   }
   return _createClass(GPaymentsService, [{
@@ -5404,6 +5497,7 @@ var GPaymentsService = /*#__PURE__*/function () {
     key: "initializeIFrames",
     value: function initializeIFrames(initializationUrl, secondaryUrl, title) {
       var hideAuthorization = arguments.length > 3 && arguments[3] !== undefined ? arguments[3] : true;
+      var onLoad = arguments.length > 4 ? arguments[4] : undefined;
       var container = this.container.getElement();
       if (!container) {
         return;
@@ -5414,7 +5508,8 @@ var GPaymentsService = /*#__PURE__*/function () {
       this.browserAndChallengeContainer = new Container('#paydock_authorization_iframe');
       this.iFrameAuthorization = new IFrame(this.browserAndChallengeContainer);
       this.iFrameAuthorization.load(initializationUrl, {
-        title: title
+        title: title,
+        onLoad: onLoad
       });
       if (secondaryUrl) {
         var divSecondaryURL = document.createElement('div');
@@ -5448,25 +5543,192 @@ var GPaymentsService = /*#__PURE__*/function () {
   }, {
     key: "setupIFrameEvents",
     value: function setupIFrameEvents(widgetId) {
-      var _this = this;
-      this.iFrameEvent.on(EVENT$4.CHARGE_AUTH, widgetId, function (data) {
+      var _this2 = this;
+      this.iFrameEvent.on(EVENT$4.CHARGE_AUTH, widgetId, function (data, origin) {
         if (data.status === IFRAME_STATUS.SKIPPED || data.status === IFRAME_STATUS.FINISHED) {
+          // this channel is spoofable — any frame that knows the charge_3ds_id can post to it.
+          // A message from an unknown sender must never terminate a live authentication: ignore it.
+          if (!_this2.isTrustedOrigin(origin)) {
+            return;
+          }
+          // one-shot: the callback message can be delivered more than once (it is posted to both
+          // `parent` and `top`) — a duplicate must not re-emit events or duplicate challenge iframes
+          if (_this2.authHandled) {
+            return;
+          }
+          _this2.authHandled = true;
           if (data.info) {
-            _this.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.INFO, {
+            _this2.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.INFO, {
               info: data.info
             });
           }
-          _this.performAuthentication(data);
+          _this2.removeIframes();
+          if (typeof data.process_status === 'string') {
+            // the API already ran the authentication inside the callback: no /process call needed
+            _this2.handleAuthenticationOutcome({
+              status: data.process_status,
+              result: data.result,
+              error: data.error
+            }, data.charge_3ds_id);
+          } else {
+            // The API always runs the authentication inside the callback (PAYRAC-2480). A trusted
+            // message without the outcome means an outdated API — fail, never verify via /process.
+            _this2.finishChallengeLifecycle();
+            _this2.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.ERROR, _this2.parseError({
+              message: 'Standalone 3DS authentication outcome missing from the callback message'
+            }, data.charge_3ds_id));
+          }
         } else if (data.status === IFRAME_STATUS.TIMEOUT || data.status === IFRAME_STATUS.INVALID) {
-          _this.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.AUTH_ERROR, _this.parseHandleResponse({
+          _this2.finishChallengeLifecycle();
+          _this2.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.AUTH_ERROR, _this2.parseHandleResponse({
             status: data.status
           }, data.charge_3ds_id));
         }
       });
-      this.iFrameEvent.on(EVENT$4.CHARGE_AUTH_SUCCESS, widgetId, function (data) {
-        _this.processResult(data.charge_3ds_id);
+      this.iFrameEvent.on(EVENT$4.CHARGE_AUTH_SUCCESS, widgetId, function (data, origin) {
+        // the callback iframe reached Paydock with `AuthResultReady`: the issuer has answered. Announce it
+        // before the outcome so merchants always see completed → terminal, whichever transport won.
+        _this2.emitChallengeCompleted(data.charge_3ds_id, 'callback');
+        if (_this2.hasChainedOutcome(data, origin)) {
+          // the API already fetched the challenge result inside the callback: no GET /handle needed
+          _this2.handleResultOutcome({
+            status: data.process_status,
+            result: data.result,
+            error: data.error
+          }, data.charge_3ds_id);
+        } else {
+          _this2.processResult(data.charge_3ds_id);
+        }
+      });
+    }
+    /**
+     * A message carries a processed outcome only when it has `process_status` AND comes from a trusted
+     * origin. Used by the result leg: an untrusted `process_status` is never acted upon — the SDK falls
+     * back to `GET /handle` (still needed for decoupled challenges / polling). The authentication leg
+     * ignores untrusted senders outright, before this check.
+     */
+  }, {
+    key: "hasChainedOutcome",
+    value: function hasChainedOutcome(data, origin) {
+      return typeof data.process_status === 'string' && this.isTrustedOrigin(origin);
+    }
+  }, {
+    key: "isTrustedOrigin",
+    value: function isTrustedOrigin(origin) {
+      // 'null' is the serialized opaque origin (e.g. a sandboxed iframe) — never trust it, even if a
+      // misconfigured env URL were ever to put the literal string 'null' into the trusted list
+      return typeof origin === 'string' && origin !== 'null' && this.trustedOrigins.includes(origin);
+    }
+  }, {
+    key: "removeIframes",
+    value: function removeIframes() {
+      var _a, _b;
+      this.clearChallengeLoadedTimer();
+      (_a = this.iFrameAuthorization) === null || _a === void 0 ? void 0 : _a.remove();
+      (_b = this.iFrameSecondaryUrl) === null || _b === void 0 ? void 0 : _b.remove();
+    }
+  }, {
+    key: "clearChallengeLoadedTimer",
+    value: function clearChallengeLoadedTimer() {
+      if (this.challengeLoadedTimer !== null) {
+        clearTimeout(this.challengeLoadedTimer);
+        this.challengeLoadedTimer = null;
+      }
+    }
+    /**
+     * Challenge iframe lifecycle (`chargeAuthChallengeLoaded`).
+     *
+     * The challenge iframe is cross-origin, but its `load` event still fires when the ACS page finishes loading:
+     * the first one means the page painted (merchants can drop their loader). A fallback timer
+     * (`armChallengeLoadedFallback`) guarantees `chargeAuthChallengeLoaded` within `CHALLENGE_LOADED_FALLBACK_MS`
+     * even if no `load` ever fires; a late paint after that is simply ignored. Later `load`s are NOT a usable
+     * signal for "the shopper submitted": the post-submit hops are HTTP redirects and self-submitting pages whose
+     * loads abort, and the final callback page posts its message before its own `load` — so the post-submit
+     * moment is `chargeAuthChallengeCompleted`, driven by the `secondary_url` result monitor instead.
+     *
+     * Nothing is emitted once the flow reached a terminal outcome (`finishChallengeLifecycle`), and a
+     * decoupled challenge (no challenge iframe) never emits `chargeAuthChallengeLoaded`.
+     *
+     * Resets the per-challenge state and returns the `load` handler to attach to the challenge iframe.
+     */
+  }, {
+    key: "startChallengeLifecycle",
+    value: function startChallengeLifecycle(charge3dsId) {
+      var _this3 = this;
+      this.clearChallengeLoadedTimer();
+      this.challengeLoadedEmitted = false;
+      this.challengeCompletedEmitted = false;
+      this.challengeLifecycleClosed = false;
+      return function () {
+        var _a;
+        if (_this3.challengeLifecycleClosed || _this3.challengeLoadedEmitted || !((_a = _this3.iFrameAuthorization) === null || _a === void 0 ? void 0 : _a.isExist())) {
+          return;
+        }
+        _this3.clearChallengeLoadedTimer();
+        _this3.emitChallengeLoaded(charge3dsId, 'load');
+      };
+    }
+    /**
+     * Arms the `chargeAuthChallengeLoaded` fallback — only when a challenge iframe actually exists (the
+     * container may be gone, or `IFrame.load` may have no-op'd on an already-present iframe).
+     */
+  }, {
+    key: "armChallengeLoadedFallback",
+    value: function armChallengeLoadedFallback(charge3dsId) {
+      var _this4 = this;
+      var _a;
+      if (!((_a = this.iFrameAuthorization) === null || _a === void 0 ? void 0 : _a.isExist())) {
+        return;
+      }
+      this.challengeLoadedTimer = setTimeout(function () {
+        _this4.challengeLoadedTimer = null;
+        if (_this4.challengeLifecycleClosed || _this4.challengeLoadedEmitted) {
+          return;
+        }
+        _this4.emitChallengeLoaded(charge3dsId, 'timeout');
+      }, CHALLENGE_LOADED_FALLBACK_MS);
+    }
+  }, {
+    key: "emitChallengeLoaded",
+    value: function emitChallengeLoaded(charge3dsId, reason) {
+      this.challengeLoadedEmitted = true;
+      this.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.CHALLENGE_LOADED, {
+        charge_3ds_id: charge3dsId,
+        reason: reason
+      });
+    }
+    /**
+     * `chargeAuthChallengeCompleted` — once per authentication, never after a terminal event. Idempotent so the
+     * poll and the callback message can both call it: the first transport to notice the issuer's result wins.
+     */
+  }, {
+    key: "emitChallengeCompleted",
+    value: function emitChallengeCompleted(charge3dsId, source) {
+      if (this.challengeLifecycleClosed || this.challengeCompletedEmitted) {
+        return;
+      }
+      this.challengeCompletedEmitted = true;
+      this.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.CHALLENGE_COMPLETED, {
+        charge_3ds_id: charge3dsId,
+        source: source
       });
     }
+    /** Call before emitting any terminal event: no lifecycle event may follow it, and the result poll stops. */
+  }, {
+    key: "finishChallengeLifecycle",
+    value: function finishChallengeLifecycle() {
+      this.clearChallengeLoadedTimer();
+      this.stopResultPolling();
+      this.challengeLifecycleClosed = true;
+    }
+  }, {
+    key: "stopResultPolling",
+    value: function stopResultPolling() {
+      if (this.resultPollTimer !== null) {
+        clearTimeout(this.resultPollTimer);
+        this.resultPollTimer = null;
+      }
+    }
   }, {
     key: "parseResultData",
     value: function parseResultData(_ref2, charge3dsId) {
@@ -5500,24 +5762,49 @@ var GPaymentsService = /*#__PURE__*/function () {
   }, {
     key: "processResult",
     value: function processResult(charge3dsId) {
-      var _this2 = this;
+      var _this5 = this;
       if (this.resultRead) {
         return;
       }
       this.resultRead = true;
+      this.finishChallengeLifecycle();
       this.api.charge().standalone3dsHandle().then(function (result) {
         var _a;
-        _this2.iFrameAuthorization.remove();
-        (_a = _this2.iFrameSecondaryUrl) === null || _a === void 0 ? void 0 : _a.remove();
+        _this5.iFrameAuthorization.remove();
+        (_a = _this5.iFrameSecondaryUrl) === null || _a === void 0 ? void 0 : _a.remove();
         if (result.status === PROCESS_STANDALONE_3DS_STATUS.SUCCESS) {
-          _this2.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.AUTH_SUCCESS, _this2.parseResultData(result, charge3dsId));
+          _this5.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.AUTH_SUCCESS, _this5.parseResultData(result, charge3dsId));
         } else {
-          _this2.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.AUTH_ERROR, _this2.parseResultData(result, charge3dsId));
+          _this5.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.AUTH_ERROR, _this5.parseResultData(result, charge3dsId));
         }
       }, function (err) {
-        _this2.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.ERROR, _this2.parseError(err, charge3dsId));
+        _this5.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.ERROR, _this5.parseError(err, charge3dsId));
       });
     }
+    /** Final (post-challenge) outcome delivered by the API through the callback message. */
+  }, {
+    key: "handleResultOutcome",
+    value: function handleResultOutcome(_ref4, charge3dsId) {
+      var status = _ref4.status,
+        error = _ref4.error;
+      if (this.resultRead) {
+        return;
+      }
+      this.resultRead = true;
+      this.finishChallengeLifecycle();
+      this.removeIframes();
+      if (status === PROCESS_STANDALONE_3DS_STATUS.SUCCESS) {
+        this.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.AUTH_SUCCESS, this.parseResultData({
+          status: status
+        }, charge3dsId));
+      } else if (status === PROCESS_STANDALONE_3DS_STATUS.ERROR) {
+        this.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.ERROR, this.parseError(error, charge3dsId));
+      } else {
+        this.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.AUTH_ERROR, this.parseResultData({
+          status: status
+        }, charge3dsId));
+      }
+    }
   }, {
     key: "externalAPI",
     value: function externalAPI(method, url) {
@@ -5531,60 +5818,106 @@ var GPaymentsService = /*#__PURE__*/function () {
             reject(error);
           }
         };
+        // without these a failed request left the promise pending forever and the poll silently dead
+        var fail = function fail() {
+          return reject(new ResultMonitorTransportError());
+        };
+        request.onerror = fail;
+        request.onabort = fail;
+        request.ontimeout = fail;
         request.send();
       });
     }
+    /**
+     * Polls the GPayments result monitor (`secondary_url`) until `AuthResultReady`. It is the primary source of
+     * `chargeAuthChallengeCompleted` (the monitor flips as soon as the issuer's RReq reaches the 3DS Server) and
+     * the fallback transport for the outcome itself (`GET /handle`) when the callback message never arrives —
+     * the only transport for decoupled challenges. Stops once an outcome was obtained or the lifecycle closed.
+     * Transport failures are retried on the same cadence; an unparsable body or an unknown event is fatal.
+     */
   }, {
     key: "doPolling",
-    value: function doPolling(url, charge3dsId) {
-      var _this3 = this;
+    value: function doPolling(url, charge3dsId, intervalMs) {
+      var _this6 = this;
+      this.stopResultPolling();
+      if (this.resultRead || this.challengeLifecycleClosed) {
+        return;
+      }
+      var schedule = function schedule() {
+        _this6.resultPollTimer = setTimeout(function () {
+          _this6.resultPollTimer = null;
+          _this6.doPolling(url, charge3dsId, intervalMs);
+        }, intervalMs);
+      };
       this.externalAPI('GET', url).then(function (data) {
+        if (_this6.resultRead || _this6.challengeLifecycleClosed) {
+          return;
+        }
         if (!data.event || data.event === 'AuthResultNotReady') {
-          setTimeout(function () {
-            _this3.doPolling(url, charge3dsId);
-          }, 2000);
+          schedule();
         } else if (data.event === 'AuthResultReady') {
-          _this3.processResult(charge3dsId);
+          _this6.emitChallengeCompleted(charge3dsId, 'poll');
+          _this6.processResult(charge3dsId);
         } else {
           throw new Error('Event not supported');
         }
       })["catch"](function (err) {
-        return _this3.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.ERROR, _this3.parseError(err, charge3dsId));
+        if (err instanceof ResultMonitorTransportError) {
+          if (!_this6.resultRead && !_this6.challengeLifecycleClosed) {
+            schedule();
+          }
+          return;
+        }
+        _this6.finishChallengeLifecycle();
+        _this6.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.ERROR, _this6.parseError(err, charge3dsId));
       });
     }
+    /**
+     * Branches on the authentication outcome delivered by the API through the callback message
+     * (`process_status` → `status`; same shape as the `/process` response body).
+     */
   }, {
-    key: "performAuthentication",
-    value: function performAuthentication(_ref4) {
-      var _this4 = this;
-      var charge_3ds_id = _ref4.charge_3ds_id;
-      var _a;
-      this.iFrameAuthorization.remove();
-      (_a = this.iFrameSecondaryUrl) === null || _a === void 0 ? void 0 : _a.remove();
-      this.api.charge().standalone3dsProcess({
-        charge_3ds_id: charge_3ds_id
-      }).then(function (authenticationResult) {
-        var _a, _b;
-        if (authenticationResult.status === AUTHENTICATION_STATUS.SUCCESS) {
-          _this4.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.AUTH_SUCCESS, _this4.parseHandleResponse(authenticationResult, charge_3ds_id));
-        } else if (authenticationResult.status === AUTHENTICATION_STATUS.PENDING) {
-          if ((_a = authenticationResult === null || authenticationResult === void 0 ? void 0 : authenticationResult.result) === null || _a === void 0 ? void 0 : _a.challenge) {
-            _this4.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.CHALLENGE, _this4.parseHandleResponse(authenticationResult, charge_3ds_id));
-            _this4.initializeIFrames(authenticationResult.result.challenge_url, undefined, 'Authentication Challenge', false);
-            if (authenticationResult.result.secondary_url) {
-              _this4.doPolling(authenticationResult.result.secondary_url, charge_3ds_id);
-            }
-          } else if ((_b = authenticationResult === null || authenticationResult === void 0 ? void 0 : authenticationResult.result) === null || _b === void 0 ? void 0 : _b.decoupled_challenge) {
-            _this4.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.DECOUPLED, _this4.parseHandleResponse(authenticationResult, charge_3ds_id));
-            if (authenticationResult.result.secondary_url) {
-              _this4.doPolling(authenticationResult.result.secondary_url, charge_3ds_id);
-            }
+    key: "handleAuthenticationOutcome",
+    value: function handleAuthenticationOutcome(authenticationResult, charge_3ds_id) {
+      var _a, _b, _c;
+      if (authenticationResult.status !== AUTHENTICATION_STATUS.PENDING) {
+        // terminal outcome — a later `chargeAuthSuccess` message or poll must not emit a second result
+        this.resultRead = true;
+      }
+      if (authenticationResult.status === AUTHENTICATION_STATUS.SUCCESS) {
+        this.finishChallengeLifecycle();
+        this.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.AUTH_SUCCESS, this.parseHandleResponse(authenticationResult, charge_3ds_id));
+      } else if (authenticationResult.status === AUTHENTICATION_STATUS.PENDING) {
+        if ((_a = authenticationResult === null || authenticationResult === void 0 ? void 0 : authenticationResult.result) === null || _a === void 0 ? void 0 : _a.challenge) {
+          this.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.CHALLENGE, this.parseHandleResponse(authenticationResult, charge_3ds_id));
+          var onChallengeLoad = this.startChallengeLifecycle(charge_3ds_id);
+          this.initializeIFrames(authenticationResult.result.challenge_url, undefined, 'Authentication Challenge', false, onChallengeLoad);
+          this.armChallengeLoadedFallback(charge_3ds_id);
+          if (authenticationResult.result.secondary_url) {
+            this.doPolling(authenticationResult.result.secondary_url, charge_3ds_id, CHALLENGE_RESULT_POLL_INTERVAL_MS);
+          }
+        } else if ((_b = authenticationResult === null || authenticationResult === void 0 ? void 0 : authenticationResult.result) === null || _b === void 0 ? void 0 : _b.decoupled_challenge) {
+          this.challengeCompletedEmitted = false;
+          this.challengeLifecycleClosed = false;
+          this.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.DECOUPLED, this.parseHandleResponse(authenticationResult, charge_3ds_id));
+          if (authenticationResult.result.secondary_url) {
+            this.doPolling(authenticationResult.result.secondary_url, charge_3ds_id, DECOUPLED_RESULT_POLL_INTERVAL_MS);
           }
         } else {
-          return _this4.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.AUTH_ERROR, _this4.parseHandleResponse(authenticationResult, charge_3ds_id));
-        }
-      }, function (err) {
-        _this4.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.ERROR, _this4.parseError(err, charge_3ds_id));
-      });
+          // pending but nothing to run (no challenge delivered) — fail rather than hang silently
+          // with the iframes already removed and no further message ever coming
+          this.resultRead = true;
+          this.finishChallengeLifecycle();
+          this.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.AUTH_ERROR, this.parseHandleResponse(authenticationResult, charge_3ds_id));
+        }
+      } else if (authenticationResult.status === AUTHENTICATION_STATUS.ERROR) {
+        // the API rejected the authentication, or could not run it inside the callback
+        this.finishChallengeLifecycle();
+        this.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.ERROR, this.parseError((_c = authenticationResult.error) !== null && _c !== void 0 ? _c : authenticationResult, charge_3ds_id));
+      } else {
+        this.finishChallengeLifecycle();
+        this.eventEmitter.emit(GPAYMENTS_EVENT.AUTH_ERROR, this.parseHandleResponse(authenticationResult, charge_3ds_id));
+      }
     }
   }]);
 }();
@@ -5611,10 +5944,27 @@ var Standalone3dsService = /*#__PURE__*/function () {
       api.setEnv(this.env, this.alias);
       switch (tokenData.service_type) {
         case STANDALONE_3DS_GATEWAYS.GPAYMENTS:
-          new GPaymentsService(this.container, api, this.eventEmitter).load(tokenData, options.title);
+          new GPaymentsService(this.container, api, this.eventEmitter, this.getTrustedMessageOrigins(api)).load(tokenData, options.title);
           break;
       }
     }
+    /**
+     * Origins allowed to deliver a processed 3DS outcome to the page via postMessage: the Paydock API
+     * (inline callback page) and the Paydock widget (remote-app landing page), for the current env/alias.
+     */
+  }, {
+    key: "getTrustedMessageOrigins",
+    value: function getTrustedMessageOrigins(api) {
+      var origins = [api.getApiOrigin()];
+      try {
+        var widgetEnv = new Env(WIDGET_URL, this.env);
+        widgetEnv.setEnv(this.env, this.alias);
+        origins.push(ApiBase.toOrigin(widgetEnv.getConf().url));
+      } catch (_a) {
+        // widget origin unknown for this env — the API origin is enough
+      }
+      return origins;
+    }
   }, {
     key: "setEnv",
     value: function setEnv(env, alias) {
@@ -5650,12 +6000,12 @@ var Uuid = /*#__PURE__*/function () {
   return _createClass(Uuid, null, [{
     key: "generate",
     value: function generate() {
-      if (typeof window !== "undefined" && typeof window.crypto !== "undefined" && typeof window.crypto.getRandomValues !== "undefined") {
+      if (typeof window !== 'undefined' && typeof window.crypto !== 'undefined' && typeof window.crypto.getRandomValues !== 'undefined') {
         var buf = new Uint16Array(8);
         window.crypto.getRandomValues(buf);
-        return this.hash(buf[0]) + this.hash(buf[1]) + "-" + this.hash(buf[2]) + "-" + this.hash(buf[3]) + "-" + this.hash(buf[4]) + "-" + this.hash(buf[5]) + this.hash(buf[6]) + this.hash(buf[7]);
+        return Uuid.hash(buf[0]) + Uuid.hash(buf[1]) + '-' + Uuid.hash(buf[2]) + '-' + Uuid.hash(buf[3]) + '-' + Uuid.hash(buf[4]) + '-' + Uuid.hash(buf[5]) + Uuid.hash(buf[6]) + Uuid.hash(buf[7]);
       } else {
-        return this.random() + this.random() + "-" + this.random() + "-" + this.random() + "-" + this.random() + "-" + this.random() + this.random() + this.random();
+        return Uuid.random() + Uuid.random() + '-' + Uuid.random() + '-' + Uuid.random() + '-' + Uuid.random() + '-' + Uuid.random() + Uuid.random() + Uuid.random();
       }
     }
   }, {
@@ -5663,14 +6013,22 @@ var Uuid = /*#__PURE__*/function () {
     value: function hash(number) {
       var hash = number.toString(16);
       while (hash.length < 4) {
-        hash = "0" + hash;
+        hash = '0' + hash;
       }
       return hash;
     }
   }, {
     key: "random",
     value: function random() {
-      return Math.floor((1 + Math.random()) * 0x10000).toString(16).substring(1);
+      var value;
+      if (typeof crypto !== 'undefined' && typeof crypto.getRandomValues === 'function') {
+        var buf = new Uint16Array(1);
+        crypto.getRandomValues(buf);
+        value = buf[0] / 0x10000;
+      } else {
+        value = Math.random();
+      }
+      return Math.floor((1 + value) * 0x10000).toString(16).substring(1);
     }
   }]);
 }();
@@ -5775,11 +6133,13 @@ var TOKEN_FORMAT$2;
  * @const STANDALONE_3DS_EVENT
  *
  * @type {object}
- * @param {string} CHARGE_AUTH_SUCCESS=chargeAuthSuccess
- * @param {string} CHARGE_AUTH_REJECT=chargeAuthReject
- * @param {string} CHARGE_AUTH_DECOUPLED=chargeAuthDecoupled
- * @param {string} CHARGE_AUTH_CHALLENGE=chargeAuthChallenge
- * @param {string} CHARGE_AUTH_INFO=chargeAuthInfo
+ * @param {string} AUTH_SUCCESS=chargeAuthSuccess
+ * @param {string} AUTH_ERROR=chargeAuthReject
+ * @param {string} DECOUPLED=chargeAuthDecoupled
+ * @param {string} CHALLENGE=chargeAuthChallenge
+ * @param {string} CHALLENGE_LOADED=chargeAuthChallengeLoaded - challenge iframe painted (first `load`, or 2.5 s fallback); reveal your challenge UI here
+ * @param {string} CHALLENGE_COMPLETED=chargeAuthChallengeCompleted - the shopper finished the challenge (issuer result delivered to the 3DS Server); cover the challenge iframe with your own loader until the terminal event
+ * @param {string} INFO=chargeAuthInfo
  * @param {string} ERROR=error
  */
 /**
@@ -6161,6 +6521,24 @@ var SUPPORTED_CARD_TYPES = {
   EFTPOS_WHITE: 'eftpos_white',
   UNIONPAY: 'unionpay'
 };
+/**
+ * Card schemes the widget is able to resolve from a card number, and therefore the only values
+ * `setAllowedCardSchemes` accepts. This is a separate vocabulary from SUPPORTED_CARD_TYPES, which drives the
+ * card icons: it omits the icon-only variants `visa_white` / `eftpos_white`, and the `laser` / `maestro`
+ * identifiers the widget can never resolve — allowing those would be configuration that can never match.
+ */
+var CARD_SCHEME = {
+  AMEX: 'amex',
+  AUSBC: 'ausbc',
+  DINERS: 'diners',
+  DISCOVER: 'discover',
+  EFTPOS: 'eftpos',
+  JAPCB: 'japcb',
+  MASTERCARD: 'mastercard',
+  SOLO: 'solo',
+  UNIONPAY: 'unionpay',
+  VISA: 'visa'
+};
 var SUPPORTED_CHECKOUT_META_COLLECTION = [].concat([
 // Paypal
 'brand_name', 'cart_border_color', 'reference', 'email', 'hdr_img', 'logo_img', 'pay_flow_color', 'first_name', 'last_name', 'address_line', 'address_line2', 'address_city', 'address_state', 'address_postcode', 'address_country', 'phone', 'hide_shipping_address'], [
@@ -8345,7 +8723,7 @@ var AfterPayWalletService = /*#__PURE__*/function (_WalletService) {
   }]);
 }(WalletService);
 
-/*! @license DOMPurify 3.4.0 | (c) Cure53 and other contributors | Released under the Apache license 2.0 and Mozilla Public License 2.0 | github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/blob/3.4.0/LICENSE */
+/*! @license DOMPurify 3.4.13 | (c) Cure53 and other contributors | Released under the Apache license 2.0 and Mozilla Public License 2.0 | github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/blob/3.4.13/LICENSE */
 
 var purify_cjs;
 var hasRequiredPurify_cjs;
@@ -8354,22 +8732,63 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	if (hasRequiredPurify_cjs) return purify_cjs;
 	hasRequiredPurify_cjs = 1;
 
-	const {
-	  entries,
-	  setPrototypeOf,
-	  isFrozen,
-	  getPrototypeOf,
-	  getOwnPropertyDescriptor
-	} = Object;
-	let {
-	  freeze,
-	  seal,
-	  create
-	} = Object; // eslint-disable-line import/no-mutable-exports
-	let {
-	  apply,
-	  construct
-	} = typeof Reflect !== 'undefined' && Reflect;
+	function _arrayLikeToArray(r, a) {
+	  (null == a || a > r.length) && (a = r.length);
+	  for (var e = 0, n = Array(a); e < a; e++) n[e] = r[e];
+	  return n;
+	}
+	function _arrayWithHoles(r) {
+	  if (Array.isArray(r)) return r;
+	}
+	function _iterableToArrayLimit(r, l) {
+	  var t = null == r ? null : "undefined" != typeof Symbol && r[Symbol.iterator] || r["@@iterator"];
+	  if (null != t) {
+	    var e,
+	      n,
+	      i,
+	      u,
+	      a = [],
+	      f = true,
+	      o = false;
+	    try {
+	      if (i = (t = t.call(r)).next, 0 === l) ; else for (; !(f = (e = i.call(t)).done) && (a.push(e.value), a.length !== l); f = !0);
+	    } catch (r) {
+	      o = true, n = r;
+	    } finally {
+	      try {
+	        if (!f && null != t.return && (u = t.return(), Object(u) !== u)) return;
+	      } finally {
+	        if (o) throw n;
+	      }
+	    }
+	    return a;
+	  }
+	}
+	function _nonIterableRest() {
+	  throw new TypeError("Invalid attempt to destructure non-iterable instance.\nIn order to be iterable, non-array objects must have a [Symbol.iterator]() method.");
+	}
+	function _slicedToArray(r, e) {
+	  return _arrayWithHoles(r) || _iterableToArrayLimit(r, e) || _unsupportedIterableToArray(r, e) || _nonIterableRest();
+	}
+	function _unsupportedIterableToArray(r, a) {
+	  if (r) {
+	    if ("string" == typeof r) return _arrayLikeToArray(r, a);
+	    var t = {}.toString.call(r).slice(8, -1);
+	    return "Object" === t && r.constructor && (t = r.constructor.name), "Map" === t || "Set" === t ? Array.from(r) : "Arguments" === t || /^(?:Ui|I)nt(?:8|16|32)(?:Clamped)?Array$/.test(t) ? _arrayLikeToArray(r, a) : void 0;
+	  }
+	}
+
+	const entries = Object.entries,
+	  setPrototypeOf = Object.setPrototypeOf,
+	  isFrozen = Object.isFrozen,
+	  getPrototypeOf = Object.getPrototypeOf,
+	  getOwnPropertyDescriptor = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;
+	let freeze = Object.freeze,
+	  seal = Object.seal,
+	  create = Object.create; // eslint-disable-line import/no-mutable-exports
+	let _ref = typeof Reflect !== 'undefined' && Reflect,
+	  apply = _ref.apply,
+	  construct = _ref.construct;
 	if (!freeze) {
 	  freeze = function freeze(x) {
 	    return x;
@@ -8401,13 +8820,19 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	const arrayPop = unapply(Array.prototype.pop);
 	const arrayPush = unapply(Array.prototype.push);
 	const arraySplice = unapply(Array.prototype.splice);
+	const arrayIsArray = Array.isArray;
 	const stringToLowerCase = unapply(String.prototype.toLowerCase);
 	const stringToString = unapply(String.prototype.toString);
 	const stringMatch = unapply(String.prototype.match);
 	const stringReplace = unapply(String.prototype.replace);
 	const stringIndexOf = unapply(String.prototype.indexOf);
 	const stringTrim = unapply(String.prototype.trim);
+	const numberToString = unapply(Number.prototype.toString);
+	const booleanToString = unapply(Boolean.prototype.toString);
+	const bigintToString = typeof BigInt === 'undefined' ? null : unapply(BigInt.prototype.toString);
+	const symbolToString = typeof Symbol === 'undefined' ? null : unapply(Symbol.prototype.toString);
 	const objectHasOwnProperty = unapply(Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty);
+	const objectToString = unapply(Object.prototype.toString);
 	const regExpTest = unapply(RegExp.prototype.test);
 	const typeErrorCreate = unconstruct(TypeError);
 	/**
@@ -8457,6 +8882,9 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	    // Prevent prototype setters from intercepting set as a this value.
 	    setPrototypeOf(set, null);
 	  }
+	  if (!arrayIsArray(array)) {
+	    return set;
+	  }
 	  let l = array.length;
 	  while (l--) {
 	    let element = array[l];
@@ -8497,10 +8925,13 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	 */
 	function clone(object) {
 	  const newObject = create(null);
-	  for (const [property, value] of entries(object)) {
+	  for (const _ref2 of entries(object)) {
+	    var _ref3 = _slicedToArray(_ref2, 2);
+	    const property = _ref3[0];
+	    const value = _ref3[1];
 	    const isPropertyExist = objectHasOwnProperty(object, property);
 	    if (isPropertyExist) {
-	      if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+	      if (arrayIsArray(value)) {
 	        newObject[property] = cleanArray(value);
 	      } else if (value && typeof value === 'object' && value.constructor === Object) {
 	        newObject[property] = clone(value);
@@ -8511,6 +8942,58 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	  }
 	  return newObject;
 	}
+	/**
+	 * Convert non-node values into strings without depending on direct property access.
+	 *
+	 * @param value - The value to stringify.
+	 * @returns A string representation of the provided value.
+	 */
+	function stringifyValue(value) {
+	  switch (typeof value) {
+	    case 'string':
+	      {
+	        return value;
+	      }
+	    case 'number':
+	      {
+	        return numberToString(value);
+	      }
+	    case 'boolean':
+	      {
+	        return booleanToString(value);
+	      }
+	    case 'bigint':
+	      {
+	        return bigintToString ? bigintToString(value) : '0';
+	      }
+	    case 'symbol':
+	      {
+	        return symbolToString ? symbolToString(value) : 'Symbol()';
+	      }
+	    case 'undefined':
+	      {
+	        return objectToString(value);
+	      }
+	    case 'function':
+	    case 'object':
+	      {
+	        if (value === null) {
+	          return objectToString(value);
+	        }
+	        const valueAsRecord = value;
+	        const valueToString = lookupGetter(valueAsRecord, 'toString');
+	        if (typeof valueToString === 'function') {
+	          const stringified = valueToString(valueAsRecord);
+	          return typeof stringified === 'string' ? stringified : objectToString(stringified);
+	        }
+	        return objectToString(value);
+	      }
+	    default:
+	      {
+	        return objectToString(value);
+	      }
+	  }
+	}
 	/**
 	 * This method automatically checks if the prop is function or getter and behaves accordingly.
 	 *
@@ -8536,6 +9019,14 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	  }
 	  return fallbackValue;
 	}
+	function isRegex(value) {
+	  try {
+	    regExpTest(value, '');
+	    return true;
+	  } catch (_unused) {
+	    return false;
+	  }
+	}
 
 	const html$1 = freeze(['a', 'abbr', 'acronym', 'address', 'area', 'article', 'aside', 'audio', 'b', 'bdi', 'bdo', 'big', 'blink', 'blockquote', 'body', 'br', 'button', 'canvas', 'caption', 'center', 'cite', 'code', 'col', 'colgroup', 'content', 'data', 'datalist', 'dd', 'decorator', 'del', 'details', 'dfn', 'dialog', 'dir', 'div', 'dl', 'dt', 'element', 'em', 'fieldset', 'figcaption', 'figure', 'font', 'footer', 'form', 'h1', 'h2', 'h3', 'h4', 'h5', 'h6', 'head', 'header', 'hgroup', 'hr', 'html', 'i', 'img', 'input', 'ins', 'kbd', 'label', 'legend', 'li', 'main', 'map', 'mark', 'marquee', 'menu', 'menuitem', 'meter', 'nav', 'nobr', 'ol', 'optgroup', 'option', 'output', 'p', 'picture', 'pre', 'progress', 'q', 'rp', 'rt', 'ruby', 's', 'samp', 'search', 'section', 'select', 'shadow', 'slot', 'small', 'source', 'spacer', 'span', 'strike', 'strong', 'style', 'sub', 'summary', 'sup', 'table', 'tbody', 'td', 'template', 'textarea', 'tfoot', 'th', 'thead', 'time', 'tr', 'track', 'tt', 'u', 'ul', 'var', 'video', 'wbr']);
 	const svg$1 = freeze(['svg', 'a', 'altglyph', 'altglyphdef', 'altglyphitem', 'animatecolor', 'animatemotion', 'animatetransform', 'circle', 'clippath', 'defs', 'desc', 'ellipse', 'enterkeyhint', 'exportparts', 'filter', 'font', 'g', 'glyph', 'glyphref', 'hkern', 'image', 'inputmode', 'line', 'lineargradient', 'marker', 'mask', 'metadata', 'mpath', 'part', 'path', 'pattern', 'polygon', 'polyline', 'radialgradient', 'rect', 'stop', 'style', 'switch', 'symbol', 'text', 'textpath', 'title', 'tref', 'tspan', 'view', 'vkern']);
@@ -8551,15 +9042,14 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	const mathMlDisallowed = freeze(['maction', 'maligngroup', 'malignmark', 'mlongdiv', 'mscarries', 'mscarry', 'msgroup', 'mstack', 'msline', 'msrow', 'semantics', 'annotation', 'annotation-xml', 'mprescripts', 'none']);
 	const text = freeze(['#text']);
 
-	const html = freeze(['accept', 'action', 'align', 'alt', 'autocapitalize', 'autocomplete', 'autopictureinpicture', 'autoplay', 'background', 'bgcolor', 'border', 'capture', 'cellpadding', 'cellspacing', 'checked', 'cite', 'class', 'clear', 'color', 'cols', 'colspan', 'controls', 'controlslist', 'coords', 'crossorigin', 'datetime', 'decoding', 'default', 'dir', 'disabled', 'disablepictureinpicture', 'disableremoteplayback', 'download', 'draggable', 'enctype', 'enterkeyhint', 'exportparts', 'face', 'for', 'headers', 'height', 'hidden', 'high', 'href', 'hreflang', 'id', 'inert', 'inputmode', 'integrity', 'ismap', 'kind', 'label', 'lang', 'list', 'loading', 'loop', 'low', 'max', 'maxlength', 'media', 'method', 'min', 'minlength', 'multiple', 'muted', 'name', 'nonce', 'noshade', 'novalidate', 'nowrap', 'open', 'optimum', 'part', 'pattern', 'placeholder', 'playsinline', 'popover', 'popovertarget', 'popovertargetaction', 'poster', 'preload', 'pubdate', 'radiogroup', 'readonly', 'rel', 'required', 'rev', 'reversed', 'role', 'rows', 'rowspan', 'spellcheck', 'scope', 'selected', 'shape', 'size', 'sizes', 'slot', 'span', 'srclang', 'start', 'src', 'srcset', 'step', 'style', 'summary', 'tabindex', 'title', 'translate', 'type', 'usemap', 'valign', 'value', 'width', 'wrap', 'xmlns', 'slot']);
-	const svg = freeze(['accent-height', 'accumulate', 'additive', 'alignment-baseline', 'amplitude', 'ascent', 'attributename', 'attributetype', 'azimuth', 'basefrequency', 'baseline-shift', 'begin', 'bias', 'by', 'class', 'clip', 'clippathunits', 'clip-path', 'clip-rule', 'color', 'color-interpolation', 'color-interpolation-filters', 'color-profile', 'color-rendering', 'cx', 'cy', 'd', 'dx', 'dy', 'diffuseconstant', 'direction', 'display', 'divisor', 'dur', 'edgemode', 'elevation', 'end', 'exponent', 'fill', 'fill-opacity', 'fill-rule', 'filter', 'filterunits', 'flood-color', 'flood-opacity', 'font-family', 'font-size', 'font-size-adjust', 'font-stretch', 'font-style', 'font-variant', 'font-weight', 'fx', 'fy', 'g1', 'g2', 'glyph-name', 'glyphref', 'gradientunits', 'gradienttransform', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'image-rendering', 'in', 'in2', 'intercept', 'k', 'k1', 'k2', 'k3', 'k4', 'kerning', 'keypoints', 'keysplines', 'keytimes', 'lang', 'lengthadjust', 'letter-spacing', 'kernelmatrix', 'kernelunitlength', 'lighting-color', 'local', 'marker-end', 'marker-mid', 'marker-start', 'markerheight', 'markerunits', 'markerwidth', 'maskcontentunits', 'maskunits', 'max', 'mask', 'mask-type', 'media', 'method', 'mode', 'min', 'name', 'numoctaves', 'offset', 'operator', 'opacity', 'order', 'orient', 'orientation', 'origin', 'overflow', 'paint-order', 'path', 'pathlength', 'patterncontentunits', 'patterntransform', 'patternunits', 'points', 'preservealpha', 'preserveaspectratio', 'primitiveunits', 'r', 'rx', 'ry', 'radius', 'refx', 'refy', 'repeatcount', 'repeatdur', 'restart', 'result', 'rotate', 'scale', 'seed', 'shape-rendering', 'slope', 'specularconstant', 'specularexponent', 'spreadmethod', 'startoffset', 'stddeviation', 'stitchtiles', 'stop-color', 'stop-opacity', 'stroke-dasharray', 'stroke-dashoffset', 'stroke-linecap', 'stroke-linejoin', 'stroke-miterlimit', 'stroke-opacity', 'stroke', 'stroke-width', 'style', 'surfacescale', 'systemlanguage', 'tabindex', 'tablevalues', 'targetx', 'targety', 'transform', 'transform-origin', 'text-anchor', 'text-decoration', 'text-rendering', 'textlength', 'type', 'u1', 'u2', 'unicode', 'values', 'viewbox', 'visibility', 'version', 'vert-adv-y', 'vert-origin-x', 'vert-origin-y', 'width', 'word-spacing', 'wrap', 'writing-mode', 'xchannelselector', 'ychannelselector', 'x', 'x1', 'x2', 'xmlns', 'y', 'y1', 'y2', 'z', 'zoomandpan']);
+	const html = freeze(['accept', 'action', 'align', 'alt', 'autocapitalize', 'autocomplete', 'autopictureinpicture', 'autoplay', 'background', 'bgcolor', 'border', 'capture', 'cellpadding', 'cellspacing', 'checked', 'cite', 'class', 'clear', 'color', 'cols', 'colspan', 'command', 'commandfor', 'controls', 'controlslist', 'coords', 'crossorigin', 'datetime', 'decoding', 'default', 'dir', 'disabled', 'disablepictureinpicture', 'disableremoteplayback', 'download', 'draggable', 'enctype', 'enterkeyhint', 'exportparts', 'face', 'for', 'headers', 'height', 'hidden', 'high', 'href', 'hreflang', 'id', 'inert', 'inputmode', 'integrity', 'ismap', 'kind', 'label', 'lang', 'list', 'loading', 'loop', 'low', 'max', 'maxlength', 'media', 'method', 'min', 'minlength', 'multiple', 'muted', 'name', 'nonce', 'noshade', 'novalidate', 'nowrap', 'open', 'optimum', 'part', 'pattern', 'placeholder', 'playsinline', 'popover', 'popovertarget', 'popovertargetaction', 'poster', 'preload', 'pubdate', 'radiogroup', 'readonly', 'rel', 'required', 'rev', 'reversed', 'role', 'rows', 'rowspan', 'spellcheck', 'scope', 'selected', 'shape', 'size', 'sizes', 'slot', 'span', 'srclang', 'start', 'src', 'srcset', 'step', 'style', 'summary', 'tabindex', 'title', 'translate', 'type', 'usemap', 'valign', 'value', 'width', 'wrap', 'xmlns']);
+	const svg = freeze(['accent-height', 'accumulate', 'additive', 'alignment-baseline', 'amplitude', 'ascent', 'attributename', 'attributetype', 'azimuth', 'basefrequency', 'baseline-shift', 'begin', 'bias', 'by', 'class', 'clip', 'clippathunits', 'clip-path', 'clip-rule', 'color', 'color-interpolation', 'color-interpolation-filters', 'color-profile', 'color-rendering', 'cx', 'cy', 'd', 'dx', 'dy', 'diffuseconstant', 'direction', 'display', 'divisor', 'dominant-baseline', 'dur', 'edgemode', 'elevation', 'end', 'exponent', 'fill', 'fill-opacity', 'fill-rule', 'filter', 'filterunits', 'flood-color', 'flood-opacity', 'font-family', 'font-size', 'font-size-adjust', 'font-stretch', 'font-style', 'font-variant', 'font-weight', 'fx', 'fy', 'g1', 'g2', 'glyph-name', 'glyphref', 'gradientunits', 'gradienttransform', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'image-rendering', 'in', 'in2', 'intercept', 'k', 'k1', 'k2', 'k3', 'k4', 'kerning', 'keypoints', 'keysplines', 'keytimes', 'lang', 'lengthadjust', 'letter-spacing', 'kernelmatrix', 'kernelunitlength', 'lighting-color', 'local', 'marker-end', 'marker-mid', 'marker-start', 'markerheight', 'markerunits', 'markerwidth', 'maskcontentunits', 'maskunits', 'max', 'mask', 'mask-type', 'media', 'method', 'mode', 'min', 'name', 'numoctaves', 'offset', 'operator', 'opacity', 'order', 'orient', 'orientation', 'origin', 'overflow', 'paint-order', 'path', 'pathlength', 'patterncontentunits', 'patterntransform', 'patternunits', 'points', 'preservealpha', 'preserveaspectratio', 'primitiveunits', 'r', 'rx', 'ry', 'radius', 'refx', 'refy', 'repeatcount', 'repeatdur', 'restart', 'result', 'rotate', 'scale', 'seed', 'shape-rendering', 'slope', 'specularconstant', 'specularexponent', 'spreadmethod', 'startoffset', 'stddeviation', 'stitchtiles', 'stop-color', 'stop-opacity', 'stroke-dasharray', 'stroke-dashoffset', 'stroke-linecap', 'stroke-linejoin', 'stroke-miterlimit', 'stroke-opacity', 'stroke', 'stroke-width', 'style', 'surfacescale', 'systemlanguage', 'tabindex', 'tablevalues', 'targetx', 'targety', 'transform', 'transform-origin', 'text-anchor', 'text-decoration', 'text-orientation', 'text-rendering', 'textlength', 'type', 'u1', 'u2', 'unicode', 'values', 'viewbox', 'visibility', 'version', 'vert-adv-y', 'vert-origin-x', 'vert-origin-y', 'width', 'word-spacing', 'wrap', 'writing-mode', 'xchannelselector', 'ychannelselector', 'x', 'x1', 'x2', 'xmlns', 'y', 'y1', 'y2', 'z', 'zoomandpan']);
 	const mathMl = freeze(['accent', 'accentunder', 'align', 'bevelled', 'close', 'columnalign', 'columnlines', 'columnspacing', 'columnspan', 'denomalign', 'depth', 'dir', 'display', 'displaystyle', 'encoding', 'fence', 'frame', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'largeop', 'length', 'linethickness', 'lquote', 'lspace', 'mathbackground', 'mathcolor', 'mathsize', 'mathvariant', 'maxsize', 'minsize', 'movablelimits', 'notation', 'numalign', 'open', 'rowalign', 'rowlines', 'rowspacing', 'rowspan', 'rspace', 'rquote', 'scriptlevel', 'scriptminsize', 'scriptsizemultiplier', 'selection', 'separator', 'separators', 'stretchy', 'subscriptshift', 'supscriptshift', 'symmetric', 'voffset', 'width', 'xmlns']);
 	const xml = freeze(['xlink:href', 'xml:id', 'xlink:title', 'xml:space', 'xmlns:xlink']);
 
-	// eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/better-regex
-	const MUSTACHE_EXPR = seal(/\{\{[\w\W]*|[\w\W]*\}\}/gm); // Specify template detection regex for SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES mode
-	const ERB_EXPR = seal(/<%[\w\W]*|[\w\W]*%>/gm);
-	const TMPLIT_EXPR = seal(/\$\{[\w\W]*/gm); // eslint-disable-line unicorn/better-regex
+	const MUSTACHE_EXPR = seal(/{{[\w\W]*|^[\w\W]*}}/g);
+	const ERB_EXPR = seal(/<%[\w\W]*|^[\w\W]*%>/g);
+	const TMPLIT_EXPR = seal(/\${[\w\W]*/g);
 	const DATA_ATTR = seal(/^data-[\-\w.\u00B7-\uFFFF]+$/); // eslint-disable-line no-useless-escape
 	const ARIA_ATTR = seal(/^aria-[\-\w]+$/); // eslint-disable-line no-useless-escape
 	const IS_ALLOWED_URI = seal(/^(?:(?:(?:f|ht)tps?|mailto|tel|callto|sms|cid|xmpp|matrix):|[^a-z]|[a-z+.\-]+(?:[^a-z+.\-:]|$))/i // eslint-disable-line no-useless-escape
@@ -8569,30 +9059,31 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	);
 	const DOCTYPE_NAME = seal(/^html$/i);
 	const CUSTOM_ELEMENT = seal(/^[a-z][.\w]*(-[.\w]+)+$/i);
+	// Markup-significant character probes used by _sanitizeElements.
+	// Shared module-level instances are safe despite the sticky /g flags:
+	// unapply() resets lastIndex for RegExp receivers before every call.
+	const ELEMENT_MARKUP_PROBE = seal(/<[/\w!]/g);
+	const COMMENT_MARKUP_PROBE = seal(/<[/\w]/g);
+	const FALLBACK_TAG_CLOSE = seal(/<\/no(script|embed|frames)/i);
+	const SELF_CLOSING_TAG = seal(/\/>/i);
 
-	var EXPRESSIONS = /*#__PURE__*/Object.freeze({
-	  __proto__: null,
-	  ARIA_ATTR: ARIA_ATTR,
-	  ATTR_WHITESPACE: ATTR_WHITESPACE,
-	  CUSTOM_ELEMENT: CUSTOM_ELEMENT,
-	  DATA_ATTR: DATA_ATTR,
-	  DOCTYPE_NAME: DOCTYPE_NAME,
-	  ERB_EXPR: ERB_EXPR,
-	  IS_ALLOWED_URI: IS_ALLOWED_URI,
-	  IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA: IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA,
-	  MUSTACHE_EXPR: MUSTACHE_EXPR,
-	  TMPLIT_EXPR: TMPLIT_EXPR
-	});
-
-	/* eslint-disable @typescript-eslint/indent */
 	// https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Node/nodeType
 	const NODE_TYPE = {
 	  element: 1,
+	  attribute: 2,
 	  text: 3,
+	  cdataSection: 4,
+	  entityReference: 5,
 	  // Deprecated
-	  progressingInstruction: 7,
+	  entityNode: 6,
+	  // Deprecated
+	  processingInstruction: 7,
 	  comment: 8,
-	  document: 9};
+	  document: 9,
+	  documentType: 10,
+	  documentFragment: 11,
+	  notation: 12 // Deprecated
+	};
 	const getGlobal = function getGlobal() {
 	  return typeof window === 'undefined' ? null : window;
 	};
@@ -8647,10 +9138,25 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	    uponSanitizeShadowNode: []
 	  };
 	};
+	/**
+	 * Resolve a set-valued configuration option: a fresh set built from
+	 * cfg[key] when it is an own array property (seeded with a clone of
+	 * options.base when given, case-normalized via options.transform),
+	 * the fallback set otherwise.
+	 *
+	 * @param cfg the cloned, prototype-free configuration object
+	 * @param key the configuration property to read
+	 * @param fallback the set to use when the option is absent or not an array
+	 * @param options transform and optional base set to merge into
+	 * @returns the resolved set
+	 */
+	const _resolveSetOption = function _resolveSetOption(cfg, key, fallback, options) {
+	  return objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, key) && arrayIsArray(cfg[key]) ? addToSet(options.base ? clone(options.base) : {}, cfg[key], options.transform) : fallback;
+	};
 	function createDOMPurify() {
 	  let window = arguments.length > 0 && arguments[0] !== undefined ? arguments[0] : getGlobal();
 	  const DOMPurify = root => createDOMPurify(root);
-	  DOMPurify.version = '3.4.0';
+	  DOMPurify.version = '3.4.13';
 	  DOMPurify.removed = [];
 	  if (!window || !window.document || window.document.nodeType !== NODE_TYPE.document || !window.Element) {
 	    // Not running in a browser, provide a factory function
@@ -8658,28 +9164,30 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	    DOMPurify.isSupported = false;
 	    return DOMPurify;
 	  }
-	  let {
-	    document
-	  } = window;
+	  let document = window.document;
 	  const originalDocument = document;
 	  const currentScript = originalDocument.currentScript;
-	  const {
-	    DocumentFragment,
-	    HTMLTemplateElement,
-	    Node,
-	    Element,
-	    NodeFilter,
-	    NamedNodeMap = window.NamedNodeMap || window.MozNamedAttrMap,
-	    HTMLFormElement,
-	    DOMParser,
-	    trustedTypes
-	  } = window;
+	  window.DocumentFragment;
+	    const HTMLTemplateElement = window.HTMLTemplateElement,
+	    Node = window.Node,
+	    Element = window.Element,
+	    NodeFilter = window.NodeFilter,
+	    _window$NamedNodeMap = window.NamedNodeMap;
+	    _window$NamedNodeMap === void 0 ? window.NamedNodeMap || window.MozNamedAttrMap : _window$NamedNodeMap;
+	    window.HTMLFormElement;
+	    const DOMParser = window.DOMParser,
+	    trustedTypes = window.trustedTypes;
 	  const ElementPrototype = Element.prototype;
 	  const cloneNode = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'cloneNode');
 	  const remove = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'remove');
 	  const getNextSibling = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'nextSibling');
 	  const getChildNodes = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'childNodes');
 	  const getParentNode = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'parentNode');
+	  const getShadowRoot = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'shadowRoot');
+	  const getAttributes = lookupGetter(ElementPrototype, 'attributes');
+	  const getNodeType = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'nodeType') : null;
+	  const getNodeName = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'nodeName') : null;
+	  const getOwnerDocument = Node && Node.prototype ? lookupGetter(Node.prototype, 'ownerDocument') : null;
 	  // As per issue #47, the web-components registry is inherited by a
 	  // new document created via createHTMLDocument. As per the spec
 	  // (http://w3c.github.io/webcomponents/spec/custom/#creating-and-passing-registries)
@@ -8694,33 +9202,74 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	  }
 	  let trustedTypesPolicy;
 	  let emptyHTML = '';
-	  const {
-	    implementation,
-	    createNodeIterator,
-	    createDocumentFragment,
-	    getElementsByTagName
-	  } = document;
-	  const {
-	    importNode
-	  } = originalDocument;
+	  // The instance's own internal Trusted Types policy. Unlike a caller-supplied
+	  // `TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY`, this is created at most once — Trusted Types throws
+	  // on duplicate policy names — and is the only policy allowed to persist
+	  // across configurations and survive `clearConfig()`.
+	  let defaultTrustedTypesPolicy;
+	  let defaultTrustedTypesPolicyResolved = false;
+	  // Tracks whether we are already inside a call to the configured Trusted Types
+	  // policy (`createHTML` or `createScriptURL`). If a supplied policy callback
+	  // itself calls `DOMPurify.sanitize` (the cause of #1422), `sanitize` would
+	  // re-enter the policy and recurse until the stack overflows. We detect that
+	  // re-entry and throw a clear, actionable error instead. The guard is shared
+	  // across both callbacks, because either one re-entering `sanitize` triggers
+	  // the same unbounded recursion.
+	  let IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY = 0;
+	  const _assertNotInTrustedTypesPolicy = function _assertNotInTrustedTypesPolicy() {
+	    if (IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY > 0) {
+	      throw typeErrorCreate('A configured TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY callback (createHTML or ' + 'createScriptURL) must not call DOMPurify.sanitize, as that causes ' + 'infinite recursion. Do not pass a policy whose callbacks wrap ' + 'DOMPurify as TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY; see the "DOMPurify and Trusted ' + 'Types" section of the README.');
+	    }
+	  };
+	  const _createTrustedHTML = function _createTrustedHTML(html) {
+	    _assertNotInTrustedTypesPolicy();
+	    IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY++;
+	    try {
+	      return trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(html);
+	    } finally {
+	      IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY--;
+	    }
+	  };
+	  const _createTrustedScriptURL = function _createTrustedScriptURL(scriptUrl) {
+	    _assertNotInTrustedTypesPolicy();
+	    IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY++;
+	    try {
+	      return trustedTypesPolicy.createScriptURL(scriptUrl);
+	    } finally {
+	      IN_TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY--;
+	    }
+	  };
+	  // Lazily resolve (and cache) the instance's internal default policy.
+	  // Resolution is attempted at most once: a successful `createPolicy` cannot be
+	  // repeated (Trusted Types throws on duplicate names), and a failed or
+	  // unsupported attempt must not be retried on every parse.
+	  const _getDefaultTrustedTypesPolicy = function _getDefaultTrustedTypesPolicy() {
+	    if (!defaultTrustedTypesPolicyResolved) {
+	      defaultTrustedTypesPolicy = _createTrustedTypesPolicy(trustedTypes, currentScript);
+	      defaultTrustedTypesPolicyResolved = true;
+	    }
+	    return defaultTrustedTypesPolicy;
+	  };
+	  const _document = document,
+	    implementation = _document.implementation,
+	    createNodeIterator = _document.createNodeIterator,
+	    createDocumentFragment = _document.createDocumentFragment,
+	    getElementsByTagName = _document.getElementsByTagName;
+	  const importNode = originalDocument.importNode;
 	  let hooks = _createHooksMap();
 	  /**
 	   * Expose whether this browser supports running the full DOMPurify.
 	   */
 	  DOMPurify.isSupported = typeof entries === 'function' && typeof getParentNode === 'function' && implementation && implementation.createHTMLDocument !== undefined;
-	  const {
-	    MUSTACHE_EXPR,
-	    ERB_EXPR,
-	    TMPLIT_EXPR,
-	    DATA_ATTR,
-	    ARIA_ATTR,
-	    IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA,
-	    ATTR_WHITESPACE,
-	    CUSTOM_ELEMENT
-	  } = EXPRESSIONS;
-	  let {
-	    IS_ALLOWED_URI: IS_ALLOWED_URI$1
-	  } = EXPRESSIONS;
+	  const MUSTACHE_EXPR$1 = MUSTACHE_EXPR,
+	    ERB_EXPR$1 = ERB_EXPR,
+	    TMPLIT_EXPR$1 = TMPLIT_EXPR,
+	    DATA_ATTR$1 = DATA_ATTR,
+	    ARIA_ATTR$1 = ARIA_ATTR,
+	    IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA$1 = IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA,
+	    ATTR_WHITESPACE$1 = ATTR_WHITESPACE,
+	    CUSTOM_ELEMENT$1 = CUSTOM_ELEMENT;
+	  let IS_ALLOWED_URI$1 = IS_ALLOWED_URI;
 	  /**
 	   * We consider the elements and attributes below to be safe. Ideally
 	   * don't add any new ones but feel free to remove unwanted ones.
@@ -8797,6 +9346,13 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	  let WHOLE_DOCUMENT = false;
 	  /* Track whether config is already set on this instance of DOMPurify. */
 	  let SET_CONFIG = false;
+	  /* Pristine allowlist bindings captured at setConfig() time. On the
+	   * persistent-config path sanitize() restores the sets from these before
+	   * the per-walk hook clone-guard, so a hook's in-call widening cannot
+	   * carry across calls. Null until setConfig() is called; reset by
+	   * clearConfig(). */
+	  let SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_TAGS = null;
+	  let SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_ATTR = null;
 	  /* Decide if all elements (e.g. style, script) must be children of
 	   * document.body. By default, browsers might move them to document.head */
 	  let FORCE_BODY = false;
@@ -8839,7 +9395,17 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	  let USE_PROFILES = {};
 	  /* Tags to ignore content of when KEEP_CONTENT is true */
 	  let FORBID_CONTENTS = null;
-	  const DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS = addToSet({}, ['annotation-xml', 'audio', 'colgroup', 'desc', 'foreignobject', 'head', 'iframe', 'math', 'mi', 'mn', 'mo', 'ms', 'mtext', 'noembed', 'noframes', 'noscript', 'plaintext', 'script', 'style', 'svg', 'template', 'thead', 'title', 'video', 'xmp']);
+	  const DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS = addToSet({}, ['annotation-xml', 'audio', 'colgroup', 'desc', 'foreignobject', 'head', 'iframe', 'math', 'mi', 'mn', 'mo', 'ms', 'mtext', 'noembed', 'noframes', 'noscript', 'plaintext', 'script',
+	  // <selectedcontent> mirrors the selected <option>'s subtree, cloned by
+	  // the UA (customizable <select>) — including any on* handlers — and the
+	  // engine re-mirrors synchronously whenever a removal changes which
+	  // option/selectedcontent is current, even inside DOMPurify's inert
+	  // DOMParser document. Hoisting its children on removal re-inserts a fresh
+	  // mirror target ahead of the walk, which the engine refills, looping
+	  // forever (DoS) and amplifying output. Dropping its content on removal
+	  // (rather than hoisting) breaks that cascade; the content is a duplicate
+	  // of the option, which is sanitized on its own. See campaign-3 F1/F6.
+	  'selectedcontent', 'style', 'svg', 'template', 'thead', 'title', 'video', 'xmp']);
 	  /* Tags that are safe for data: URIs */
 	  let DATA_URI_TAGS = null;
 	  const DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS = addToSet({}, ['audio', 'video', 'img', 'source', 'image', 'track']);
@@ -8855,8 +9421,10 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	  /* Allowed XHTML+XML namespaces */
 	  let ALLOWED_NAMESPACES = null;
 	  const DEFAULT_ALLOWED_NAMESPACES = addToSet({}, [MATHML_NAMESPACE, SVG_NAMESPACE, HTML_NAMESPACE], stringToString);
-	  let MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS = addToSet({}, ['mi', 'mo', 'mn', 'ms', 'mtext']);
-	  let HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS = addToSet({}, ['annotation-xml']);
+	  const DEFAULT_MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS = freeze(['mi', 'mo', 'mn', 'ms', 'mtext']);
+	  let MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS = addToSet({}, DEFAULT_MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS);
+	  const DEFAULT_HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS = freeze(['annotation-xml']);
+	  let HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS = addToSet({}, DEFAULT_HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS);
 	  // Certain elements are allowed in both SVG and HTML
 	  // namespace. We need to specify them explicitly
 	  // so that they don't get erroneously deleted from
@@ -8898,15 +9466,33 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	    // HTML tags and attributes are not case-sensitive, converting to lowercase. Keeping XHTML as is.
 	    transformCaseFunc = PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE === 'application/xhtml+xml' ? stringToString : stringToLowerCase;
 	    /* Set configuration parameters */
-	    ALLOWED_TAGS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ALLOWED_TAGS') ? addToSet({}, cfg.ALLOWED_TAGS, transformCaseFunc) : DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS;
-	    ALLOWED_ATTR = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ALLOWED_ATTR') ? addToSet({}, cfg.ALLOWED_ATTR, transformCaseFunc) : DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR;
-	    ALLOWED_NAMESPACES = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ALLOWED_NAMESPACES') ? addToSet({}, cfg.ALLOWED_NAMESPACES, stringToString) : DEFAULT_ALLOWED_NAMESPACES;
-	    URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR') ? addToSet(clone(DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES), cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR, transformCaseFunc) : DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES;
-	    DATA_URI_TAGS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS') ? addToSet(clone(DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS), cfg.ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS, transformCaseFunc) : DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS;
-	    FORBID_CONTENTS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'FORBID_CONTENTS') ? addToSet({}, cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS, transformCaseFunc) : DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS;
-	    FORBID_TAGS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'FORBID_TAGS') ? addToSet({}, cfg.FORBID_TAGS, transformCaseFunc) : clone({});
-	    FORBID_ATTR = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'FORBID_ATTR') ? addToSet({}, cfg.FORBID_ATTR, transformCaseFunc) : clone({});
-	    USE_PROFILES = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'USE_PROFILES') ? cfg.USE_PROFILES : false;
+	    ALLOWED_TAGS = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'ALLOWED_TAGS', DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS, {
+	      transform: transformCaseFunc
+	    });
+	    ALLOWED_ATTR = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'ALLOWED_ATTR', DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR, {
+	      transform: transformCaseFunc
+	    });
+	    ALLOWED_NAMESPACES = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'ALLOWED_NAMESPACES', DEFAULT_ALLOWED_NAMESPACES, {
+	      transform: stringToString
+	    });
+	    URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR', DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES, {
+	      transform: transformCaseFunc,
+	      base: DEFAULT_URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES
+	    });
+	    DATA_URI_TAGS = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'ADD_DATA_URI_TAGS', DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS, {
+	      transform: transformCaseFunc,
+	      base: DEFAULT_DATA_URI_TAGS
+	    });
+	    FORBID_CONTENTS = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'FORBID_CONTENTS', DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS, {
+	      transform: transformCaseFunc
+	    });
+	    FORBID_TAGS = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'FORBID_TAGS', clone({}), {
+	      transform: transformCaseFunc
+	    });
+	    FORBID_ATTR = _resolveSetOption(cfg, 'FORBID_ATTR', clone({}), {
+	      transform: transformCaseFunc
+	    });
+	    USE_PROFILES = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'USE_PROFILES') ? cfg.USE_PROFILES && typeof cfg.USE_PROFILES === 'object' ? clone(cfg.USE_PROFILES) : cfg.USE_PROFILES : false;
 	    ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR = cfg.ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR !== false; // Default true
 	    ALLOW_DATA_ATTR = cfg.ALLOW_DATA_ATTR !== false; // Default true
 	    ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS = cfg.ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS || false; // Default false
@@ -8922,20 +9508,22 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	    SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS = cfg.SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS || false; // Default false
 	    KEEP_CONTENT = cfg.KEEP_CONTENT !== false; // Default true
 	    IN_PLACE = cfg.IN_PLACE || false; // Default false
-	    IS_ALLOWED_URI$1 = cfg.ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP || IS_ALLOWED_URI;
-	    NAMESPACE = cfg.NAMESPACE || HTML_NAMESPACE;
-	    MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS = cfg.MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS || MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS;
-	    HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS = cfg.HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS || HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS;
-	    CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING = cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING || create(null);
-	    if (cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING && isRegexOrFunction(cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck)) {
-	      CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck = cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck;
+	    IS_ALLOWED_URI$1 = isRegex(cfg.ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP) ? cfg.ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP : IS_ALLOWED_URI; // Default regexp
+	    NAMESPACE = typeof cfg.NAMESPACE === 'string' ? cfg.NAMESPACE : HTML_NAMESPACE; // Default HTML namespace
+	    MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS') && cfg.MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS && typeof cfg.MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS === 'object' ? clone(cfg.MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS) : addToSet({}, DEFAULT_MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS); // Default built-in map
+	    HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS') && cfg.HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS && typeof cfg.HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS === 'object' ? clone(cfg.HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS) : addToSet({}, DEFAULT_HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS); // Default built-in map
+	    const customElementHandling = objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING') && cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING && typeof cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING === 'object' ? clone(cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING) : create(null);
+	    CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING = create(null);
+	    if (objectHasOwnProperty(customElementHandling, 'tagNameCheck') && isRegexOrFunction(customElementHandling.tagNameCheck)) {
+	      CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck = customElementHandling.tagNameCheck; // Default undefined
 	    }
-	    if (cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING && isRegexOrFunction(cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck)) {
-	      CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck = cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck;
+	    if (objectHasOwnProperty(customElementHandling, 'attributeNameCheck') && isRegexOrFunction(customElementHandling.attributeNameCheck)) {
+	      CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeNameCheck = customElementHandling.attributeNameCheck; // Default undefined
 	    }
-	    if (cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING && typeof cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements === 'boolean') {
-	      CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements = cfg.CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements;
+	    if (objectHasOwnProperty(customElementHandling, 'allowCustomizedBuiltInElements') && typeof customElementHandling.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements === 'boolean') {
+	      CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements = customElementHandling.allowCustomizedBuiltInElements; // Default undefined
 	    }
+	    seal(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING);
 	    if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
 	      ALLOW_DATA_ATTR = false;
 	    }
@@ -8971,36 +9559,36 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	    EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck = null;
 	    EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck = null;
 	    /* Merge configuration parameters */
-	    if (cfg.ADD_TAGS) {
+	    if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_TAGS')) {
 	      if (typeof cfg.ADD_TAGS === 'function') {
 	        EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck = cfg.ADD_TAGS;
-	      } else {
+	      } else if (arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_TAGS)) {
 	        if (ALLOWED_TAGS === DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS) {
 	          ALLOWED_TAGS = clone(ALLOWED_TAGS);
 	        }
 	        addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, cfg.ADD_TAGS, transformCaseFunc);
 	      }
 	    }
-	    if (cfg.ADD_ATTR) {
+	    if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_ATTR')) {
 	      if (typeof cfg.ADD_ATTR === 'function') {
 	        EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck = cfg.ADD_ATTR;
-	      } else {
+	      } else if (arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_ATTR)) {
 	        if (ALLOWED_ATTR === DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR) {
 	          ALLOWED_ATTR = clone(ALLOWED_ATTR);
 	        }
 	        addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, cfg.ADD_ATTR, transformCaseFunc);
 	      }
 	    }
-	    if (cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR) {
+	    if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR') && arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR)) {
 	      addToSet(URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES, cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR, transformCaseFunc);
 	    }
-	    if (cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS) {
+	    if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'FORBID_CONTENTS') && arrayIsArray(cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS)) {
 	      if (FORBID_CONTENTS === DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS) {
 	        FORBID_CONTENTS = clone(FORBID_CONTENTS);
 	      }
 	      addToSet(FORBID_CONTENTS, cfg.FORBID_CONTENTS, transformCaseFunc);
 	    }
-	    if (cfg.ADD_FORBID_CONTENTS) {
+	    if (objectHasOwnProperty(cfg, 'ADD_FORBID_CONTENTS') && arrayIsArray(cfg.ADD_FORBID_CONTENTS)) {
 	      if (FORBID_CONTENTS === DEFAULT_FORBID_CONTENTS) {
 	        FORBID_CONTENTS = clone(FORBID_CONTENTS);
 	      }
@@ -9019,6 +9607,13 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	      addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, ['tbody']);
 	      delete FORBID_TAGS.tbody;
 	    }
+	    // Re-derive the active Trusted Types policy from this configuration on
+	    // every parse. The active policy must never be sticky closure state that
+	    // outlives the config that set it: a caller-supplied policy left in place
+	    // after `clearConfig()` — or after a later call that supplied none, or
+	    // `TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY: null` — could sign a subsequent "default"
+	    // `RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE` result with a foreign, possibly unsafe policy.
+	    // See GHSA-vxr8-fq34-vvx9.
 	    if (cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY) {
 	      if (typeof cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY.createHTML !== 'function') {
 	        throw typeErrorCreate('TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY configuration option must provide a "createHTML" hook.');
@@ -9026,18 +9621,45 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	      if (typeof cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY.createScriptURL !== 'function') {
 	        throw typeErrorCreate('TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY configuration option must provide a "createScriptURL" hook.');
 	      }
-	      // Overwrite existing TrustedTypes policy.
+	      // A caller-supplied policy applies to this configuration only.
+	      const previousTrustedTypesPolicy = trustedTypesPolicy;
 	      trustedTypesPolicy = cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY;
-	      // Sign local variables required by `sanitize`.
-	      emptyHTML = trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML('');
+	      // Sign local variables required by `sanitize`. If the supplied policy's
+	      // `createHTML` is circular (i.e. it calls `DOMPurify.sanitize`), this
+	      // throws via the re-entrancy guard. Restore the previous policy first so
+	      // the instance is not left in a poisoned state. See #1422.
+	      try {
+	        emptyHTML = _createTrustedHTML('');
+	      } catch (error) {
+	        trustedTypesPolicy = previousTrustedTypesPolicy;
+	        throw error;
+	      }
+	    } else if (cfg.TRUSTED_TYPES_POLICY === null) {
+	      // Explicit opt-out for this call: perform no Trusted Types signing and
+	      // create nothing (so a strict `trusted-types` CSP that disallows a
+	      // `dompurify` policy can still call `sanitize` from inside its own
+	      // policy — see #1422). Resetting to `undefined` rather than a sticky
+	      // `null` also drops any previously retained caller policy, so it cannot
+	      // resurface on a later call, while still allowing the next config-less
+	      // call to restore the internal default policy. See GHSA-vxr8-fq34-vvx9.
+	      trustedTypesPolicy = undefined;
+	      emptyHTML = '';
 	    } else {
-	      // Uninitialized policy, attempt to initialize the internal dompurify policy.
+	      // No policy supplied: keep the currently active policy if one is set — a
+	      // previously supplied policy is intentionally sticky across config-less
+	      // calls — otherwise fall back to the instance's own internal policy,
+	      // created at most once. (A policy supplied for a *single* call still
+	      // lingers by design; what must not linger is a policy whose configuration
+	      // has been torn down via `clearConfig()`, which restores the default.)
 	      if (trustedTypesPolicy === undefined) {
-	        trustedTypesPolicy = _createTrustedTypesPolicy(trustedTypes, currentScript);
+	        trustedTypesPolicy = _getDefaultTrustedTypesPolicy();
 	      }
-	      // If creating the internal policy succeeded sign internal variables.
-	      if (trustedTypesPolicy !== null && typeof emptyHTML === 'string') {
-	        emptyHTML = trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML('');
+	      // Sign internal variables only when a policy is active. A falsy policy
+	      // (Trusted Types unsupported, creation failed, or an explicit opt-out)
+	      // leaves `emptyHTML` as a plain string, so we never call `.createHTML` on
+	      // a non-policy and throw. See #1422.
+	      if (trustedTypesPolicy && typeof emptyHTML === 'string') {
+	        emptyHTML = _createTrustedHTML('');
 	      }
 	    }
 	    // Prevent further manipulation of configuration.
@@ -9052,6 +9674,77 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	   * correctly. */
 	  const ALL_SVG_TAGS = addToSet({}, [...svg$1, ...svgFilters, ...svgDisallowed]);
 	  const ALL_MATHML_TAGS = addToSet({}, [...mathMl$1, ...mathMlDisallowed]);
+	  /**
+	   * Namespace rules for an element in the SVG namespace.
+	   *
+	   * @param tagName the element's lowercase tag name
+	   * @param parent the (possibly simulated) parent node
+	   * @param parentTagName the parent's lowercase tag name
+	   * @returns true if a spec-compliant parser could produce this element
+	   */
+	  const _checkSvgNamespace = function _checkSvgNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName) {
+	    // The only way to switch from HTML namespace to SVG
+	    // is via <svg>. If it happens via any other tag, then
+	    // it should be killed.
+	    if (parent.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
+	      return tagName === 'svg';
+	    }
+	    // The only way to switch from MathML to SVG is via <svg>
+	    // if the parent is either <annotation-xml> or a MathML
+	    // text integration point.
+	    if (parent.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE) {
+	      return tagName === 'svg' && (parentTagName === 'annotation-xml' || MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]);
+	    }
+	    // We only allow elements that are defined in SVG
+	    // spec. All others are disallowed in SVG namespace.
+	    return Boolean(ALL_SVG_TAGS[tagName]);
+	  };
+	  /**
+	   * Namespace rules for an element in the MathML namespace.
+	   *
+	   * @param tagName the element's lowercase tag name
+	   * @param parent the (possibly simulated) parent node
+	   * @param parentTagName the parent's lowercase tag name
+	   * @returns true if a spec-compliant parser could produce this element
+	   */
+	  const _checkMathMlNamespace = function _checkMathMlNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName) {
+	    // The only way to switch from HTML namespace to MathML
+	    // is via <math>. If it happens via any other tag, then
+	    // it should be killed.
+	    if (parent.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
+	      return tagName === 'math';
+	    }
+	    // The only way to switch from SVG to MathML is via
+	    // <math> and HTML integration points
+	    if (parent.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE) {
+	      return tagName === 'math' && HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName];
+	    }
+	    // We only allow elements that are defined in MathML
+	    // spec. All others are disallowed in MathML namespace.
+	    return Boolean(ALL_MATHML_TAGS[tagName]);
+	  };
+	  /**
+	   * Namespace rules for an element in the HTML namespace.
+	   *
+	   * @param tagName the element's lowercase tag name
+	   * @param parent the (possibly simulated) parent node
+	   * @param parentTagName the parent's lowercase tag name
+	   * @returns true if a spec-compliant parser could produce this element
+	   */
+	  const _checkHtmlNamespace = function _checkHtmlNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName) {
+	    // The only way to switch from SVG to HTML is via
+	    // HTML integration points, and from MathML to HTML
+	    // is via MathML text integration points
+	    if (parent.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE && !HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]) {
+	      return false;
+	    }
+	    if (parent.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE && !MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]) {
+	      return false;
+	    }
+	    // We disallow tags that are specific for MathML
+	    // or SVG and should never appear in HTML namespace
+	    return !ALL_MATHML_TAGS[tagName] && (COMMON_SVG_AND_HTML_ELEMENTS[tagName] || !ALL_SVG_TAGS[tagName]);
+	  };
 	  /**
 	   * @param element a DOM element whose namespace is being checked
 	   * @returns Return false if the element has a
@@ -9074,51 +9767,13 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	      return false;
 	    }
 	    if (element.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE) {
-	      // The only way to switch from HTML namespace to SVG
-	      // is via <svg>. If it happens via any other tag, then
-	      // it should be killed.
-	      if (parent.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
-	        return tagName === 'svg';
-	      }
-	      // The only way to switch from MathML to SVG is via`
-	      // svg if parent is either <annotation-xml> or MathML
-	      // text integration points.
-	      if (parent.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE) {
-	        return tagName === 'svg' && (parentTagName === 'annotation-xml' || MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]);
-	      }
-	      // We only allow elements that are defined in SVG
-	      // spec. All others are disallowed in SVG namespace.
-	      return Boolean(ALL_SVG_TAGS[tagName]);
+	      return _checkSvgNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName);
 	    }
 	    if (element.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE) {
-	      // The only way to switch from HTML namespace to MathML
-	      // is via <math>. If it happens via any other tag, then
-	      // it should be killed.
-	      if (parent.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
-	        return tagName === 'math';
-	      }
-	      // The only way to switch from SVG to MathML is via
-	      // <math> and HTML integration points
-	      if (parent.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE) {
-	        return tagName === 'math' && HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName];
-	      }
-	      // We only allow elements that are defined in MathML
-	      // spec. All others are disallowed in MathML namespace.
-	      return Boolean(ALL_MATHML_TAGS[tagName]);
+	      return _checkMathMlNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName);
 	    }
 	    if (element.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE) {
-	      // The only way to switch from SVG to HTML is via
-	      // HTML integration points, and from MathML to HTML
-	      // is via MathML text integration points
-	      if (parent.namespaceURI === SVG_NAMESPACE && !HTML_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]) {
-	        return false;
-	      }
-	      if (parent.namespaceURI === MATHML_NAMESPACE && !MATHML_TEXT_INTEGRATION_POINTS[parentTagName]) {
-	        return false;
-	      }
-	      // We disallow tags that are specific for MathML
-	      // or SVG and should never appear in HTML namespace
-	      return !ALL_MATHML_TAGS[tagName] && (COMMON_SVG_AND_HTML_ELEMENTS[tagName] || !ALL_SVG_TAGS[tagName]);
+	      return _checkHtmlNamespace(tagName, parent, parentTagName);
 	    }
 	    // For XHTML and XML documents that support custom namespaces
 	    if (PARSER_MEDIA_TYPE === 'application/xhtml+xml' && ALLOWED_NAMESPACES[element.namespaceURI]) {
@@ -9143,7 +9798,81 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	      // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-dom-node-remove
 	      getParentNode(node).removeChild(node);
 	    } catch (_) {
+	      /* The normal detach failed — this is reached for a parentless node
+	         (getParentNode() is null, so .removeChild throws). Element.prototype
+	         .remove() is itself a spec no-op on a parentless node, so a recorded
+	         "removal" would otherwise hand the caller back an intact,
+	         payload-bearing node (e.g. a detached IN_PLACE root the mXSS canary or
+	         the style-with-element-child rule decided to kill). Fail closed by
+	         throwing — exactly as a clobbered root does at the IN_PLACE entry —
+	         rather than trying to "neutralize" the node via its own methods.
+	         Neutralizing would mean calling getAttributeNames()/removeAttribute()
+	         on the node, both of which a <form> root can clobber via a named child
+	         (and _isClobbered does not even probe getAttributeNames), so the
+	         neutralize step could itself be silently defeated, leaving the payload
+	         intact. A throw touches only the cached, clobber-safe remove() and
+	         getParentNode(). Generalizes GHSA-r47g-fvhr-h676 (clobbered-form root)
+	         to every root-kill reason. REPORT-3.
+	                This lives inside the catch, so it never fires for a normally-removed
+	         in-tree node: those have a parent, removeChild() succeeds, and the
+	         catch is not entered. Only a kept (parentless) root reaches here. */
 	      remove(node);
+	      if (!getParentNode(node)) {
+	        throw typeErrorCreate('a node selected for removal could not be detached from its tree ' + 'and cannot be safely returned; refusing to sanitize in place');
+	      }
+	    }
+	  };
+	  /**
+	   * _neutralizeRoot
+	   *
+	   * Fail-closed teardown of an in-place root after the sanitize walk aborts
+	   * (campaign-3 F2). An internal throw mid-walk — e.g. a page-registered
+	   * custom element's reaction detaches a node so `_forceRemove`'s deliberate
+	   * parentless guard throws, or any other re-entrant engine mutation — would
+	   * otherwise leave the caller's *live* tree half-sanitized, with everything
+	   * after the abort point still carrying its handlers. There is no safe way
+	   * to resume the walk (the tree mutated under us), so we strip the root bare:
+	   * remove every child and every attribute, then let the caller's catch see
+	   * the original error. Clobber-safe (cached `remove`/`childNodes`/`attributes`
+	   * getters; the root was already clobber-pre-flighted at the IN_PLACE entry).
+	   *
+	   * @param root the in-place root to empty
+	   */
+	  const _neutralizeRoot = function _neutralizeRoot(root) {
+	    /* Strip every disallowed attribute (on* handlers included) off the whole
+	       subtree BEFORE detaching anything. Detaching first would hand back
+	       handler-bearing originals (e.g. an already-loading `<img onerror>`)
+	       whose queued resource event still fires in page scope after we throw.
+	       Clobber-safe reads; a doomed clobbered node's own attributes are
+	       irrelevant while its non-clobbered descendants are reached and scrubbed. */
+	    _neutralizeSubtree(root);
+	    const childNodes = getChildNodes(root);
+	    if (childNodes) {
+	      const snapshot = [];
+	      arrayForEach(childNodes, child => {
+	        arrayPush(snapshot, child);
+	      });
+	      arrayForEach(snapshot, child => {
+	        try {
+	          remove(child);
+	        } catch (_) {
+	          /* Best-effort teardown; a still-attached child is handled below */
+	        }
+	      });
+	    }
+	    const attributes = getAttributes(root);
+	    if (attributes) {
+	      for (let i = attributes.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
+	        const attribute = attributes[i];
+	        const name = attribute && attribute.name;
+	        if (typeof name === 'string') {
+	          try {
+	            root.removeAttribute(name);
+	          } catch (_) {
+	            /* Clobbered removeAttribute — ignore (fail-closed best effort) */
+	          }
+	        }
+	      }
 	    }
 	  };
 	  /**
@@ -9178,6 +9907,148 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	      }
 	    }
 	  };
+	  /**
+	   * _stripDisallowedAttributes
+	   *
+	   * Removes every attribute the active configuration does not allow from a
+	   * single element, using the same allowlist as the main attribute pass (so
+	   * `on*` handlers go, but no `/^on/` blocklist is introduced). Used only to
+	   * neutralise nodes that are being discarded from an in-place tree.
+	   *
+	   * @param element the element to strip
+	   */
+	  const _stripDisallowedAttributes = function _stripDisallowedAttributes(element) {
+	    const attributes = getAttributes(element);
+	    if (!attributes) {
+	      return;
+	    }
+	    for (let i = attributes.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
+	      const attribute = attributes[i];
+	      const name = attribute && attribute.name;
+	      if (typeof name !== 'string' || ALLOWED_ATTR[transformCaseFunc(name)]) {
+	        continue;
+	      }
+	      try {
+	        element.removeAttribute(name);
+	      } catch (_) {
+	        /* Clobbered removeAttribute on a doomed node — ignore */
+	      }
+	    }
+	  };
+	  /**
+	   * _neutralizeSubtree
+	   *
+	   * Completes the audit-5 F1 fix across every removal path. The KEEP_CONTENT
+	   * move-hoist neutralises only disallowed-tag removals; clobber, mXSS-canary,
+	   * namespace, comment, processing-instruction and KEEP_CONTENT:false removals
+	   * all drop their subtree wholesale via `_forceRemove`. On the IN_PLACE path
+	   * those dropped nodes are detached from the caller's LIVE tree but a
+	   * handler-bearing original among them (an `<img onerror>`/`<video>` that was
+	   * loading) keeps its queued resource event, which fires in page scope after
+	   * sanitize returns. This walks a removed subtree and strips every attribute
+	   * the active configuration does not allow — so `on*` handlers are cancelled
+	   * through the SAME allowlist that governs kept nodes, not a separate `/^on/`
+	   * blocklist. Run synchronously before sanitize returns, i.e. before any
+	   * queued event can fire. Hook-free by design: these nodes leave the output,
+	   * so firing attribute hooks for them would be surprising. Clobber-safe reads;
+	   * a doomed clobbered node may shadow `removeAttribute` (its own attributes are
+	   * irrelevant — it is discarded — while its non-clobbered descendants, e.g.
+	   * the `<img>`, are reached and scrubbed).
+	   *
+	   * @param root the root of a removed subtree to neutralise
+	   */
+	  const _neutralizeSubtree = function _neutralizeSubtree(root) {
+	    const stack = [root];
+	    while (stack.length > 0) {
+	      const node = stack.pop();
+	      const nodeType = getNodeType ? getNodeType(node) : node.nodeType;
+	      if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
+	        _stripDisallowedAttributes(node);
+	      }
+	      const childNodes = getChildNodes(node);
+	      if (childNodes) {
+	        for (let i = childNodes.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
+	          stack.push(childNodes[i]);
+	        }
+	      }
+	    }
+	  };
+	  /**
+	   * _neutralizePatchLinkage
+	   *
+	   * IN_PLACE entry pre-pass (declarative-partial-updates / streaming
+	   * hardening, https://github.com/WICG/declarative-partial-updates).
+	   *
+	   * The main walk strips patch linkage (`for`/`patchsrc`) and removes range
+	   * markers (PIs / markup comments) node-by-node, in document order, AS it
+	   * reaches each node. On a live in-place root that leaves a window: from the
+	   * moment the root is connected until the walk arrives at a given node, that
+	   * node's linkage is live. A patch applied on connection/stream can fire as
+	   * a microtask during the walk and inject or teleport an unsanitized DOM
+	   * range into a region the iterator has already passed and will not revisit,
+	   * so the post-return "tree is sanitized" contract is violated. Sweep the
+	   * whole tree once up front and sever every linkage before the walk begins,
+	   * closing that window.
+	   *
+	   * This CANNOT undo a patch that already fired before sanitize ran — that is
+	   * the irreducible "do not IN_PLACE a live-connected attacker tree" caveat —
+	   * but it closes everything from sanitize-start onward. Gated on SAFE_FOR_XML
+	   * to group with the rest of the declarative-partial-updates handling and
+	   * stay overridable, consistent with the codebase.
+	   *
+	   * Clobber-safe traversal (cached childNodes getter); per-node try/catch so a
+	   * clobbered root cannot defeat the sweep of its non-clobbered descendants.
+	   *
+	   * NOTE (pending real-Chrome confirmation, see test/declarative-patch-probe
+	   * .html Q1): this mirrors the existing policy of keeping `for` on
+	   * <label>/<output>. If the shipping feature can drive a patch through a
+	   * surviving `for`-on-label/output + `id` pair, this pre-pass and the
+	   * attribute check at _isBasicCustomElement's caller must additionally drop
+	   * that pair on the IN_PLACE path. Left as-is until the taxonomy is verified.
+	   *
+	   * @param root the in-place root to sweep
+	   */
+	  const _neutralizePatchLinkage = function _neutralizePatchLinkage(root) {
+	    if (!SAFE_FOR_XML) {
+	      return;
+	    }
+	    const stack = [root];
+	    while (stack.length > 0) {
+	      const node = stack.pop();
+	      const nodeType = getNodeType ? getNodeType(node) : node.nodeType;
+	      /* Remove range markers (the target side of a patch linkage): every
+	         processing instruction, and any markup-bearing comment. */
+	      if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.processingInstruction || nodeType === NODE_TYPE.comment && regExpTest(COMMENT_MARKUP_PROBE, node.data)) {
+	        try {
+	          remove(node);
+	        } catch (_) {
+	          /* Best-effort */
+	        }
+	        continue;
+	      }
+	      /* Strip patch-source attributes (the source side) off elements. */
+	      if (nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
+	        const element = node;
+	        const lcTag = transformCaseFunc(getNodeName ? getNodeName(node) : node.nodeName);
+	        try {
+	          if (element.hasAttribute && element.hasAttribute('patchsrc')) {
+	            element.removeAttribute('patchsrc');
+	          }
+	          if (element.hasAttribute && element.hasAttribute('for') && lcTag !== 'label' && lcTag !== 'output') {
+	            element.removeAttribute('for');
+	          }
+	        } catch (_) {
+	          /* Clobbered removeAttribute/hasAttribute on a doomed node — ignore */
+	        }
+	      }
+	      const childNodes = getChildNodes(node);
+	      if (childNodes) {
+	        for (let i = childNodes.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
+	          stack.push(childNodes[i]);
+	        }
+	      }
+	    }
+	  };
 	  /**
 	   * _initDocument
 	   *
@@ -9199,7 +10070,7 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	      // Root of XHTML doc must contain xmlns declaration (see https://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/normative.html#strict)
 	      dirty = '<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head></head><body>' + dirty + '</body></html>';
 	    }
-	    const dirtyPayload = trustedTypesPolicy ? trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(dirty) : dirty;
+	    const dirtyPayload = trustedTypesPolicy ? _createTrustedHTML(dirty) : dirty;
 	    /*
 	     * Use the DOMParser API by default, fallback later if needs be
 	     * DOMParser not work for svg when has multiple root element.
@@ -9235,33 +10106,297 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	   * @return The created NodeIterator
 	   */
 	  const _createNodeIterator = function _createNodeIterator(root) {
-	    return createNodeIterator.call(root.ownerDocument || root, root,
+	    /* Read ownerDocument through the cached Node.prototype getter, never the
+	       direct property. HTMLFormElement has [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns], so a
+	       clobbering child (<input name="ownerDocument"> or a form-associated
+	       external input) shadows the prototype getter and makes a direct read
+	       return that <input>. createNodeIterator.call(<input>, ...) then throws
+	       "Illegal invocation", and on the IN_PLACE path that throw lands before
+	       the walk's fail-closed barrier - leaving the caller's live tree, with
+	       any already-armed handler in it, un-neutralized. The cached getter
+	       returns the real Document regardless of the clobber. */
+	    const doc = getOwnerDocument ? getOwnerDocument(root) : root.ownerDocument;
+	    return createNodeIterator.call(doc || root, root,
 	    // eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise
 	    NodeFilter.SHOW_ELEMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_COMMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT | NodeFilter.SHOW_PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION | NodeFilter.SHOW_CDATA_SECTION, null);
 	  };
+	  /**
+	   * Replace template expression syntax (mustache, ERB, template
+	   * literal) with a space; shared by all SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES scrub
+	   * sites. Order matters: mustache, then ERB, then template literal.
+	   *
+	   * @param value the string to scrub
+	   * @returns the scrubbed string
+	   */
+	  const _stripTemplateExpressions = function _stripTemplateExpressions(value) {
+	    value = stringReplace(value, MUSTACHE_EXPR$1, ' ');
+	    value = stringReplace(value, ERB_EXPR$1, ' ');
+	    value = stringReplace(value, TMPLIT_EXPR$1, ' ');
+	    return value;
+	  };
+	  /**
+	   * Strip template-engine expressions ({{...}}, ${...}, <%...%>) from the
+	   * character data of an element subtree. Used as the final safety net for
+	   * SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES on every DOM-returning code path so that expressions
+	   * which only form after text-node normalization (e.g. fragments split across
+	   * stripped elements) cannot survive into a template-evaluating framework.
+	   *
+	   * Walks text/comment/CDATA/processing-instruction nodes and mutates `.data`
+	   * in place rather than round-tripping through innerHTML. This preserves
+	   * descendant node references (important for IN_PLACE callers), avoids a
+	   * serialize/reparse cycle, and reads literal character data — which means
+	   * `<%...%>` in text content matches the ERB regex against its real bytes
+	   * instead of the HTML-entity-escaped form innerHTML would produce.
+	   *
+	   * Attribute values are not visited here; SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES handling for
+	   * attributes is performed during the per-node `_sanitizeAttributes` pass.
+	   *
+	   * @param node The root element whose character data should be scrubbed.
+	   */
+	  const _scrubTemplateExpressions2 = function _scrubTemplateExpressions(node) {
+	    var _node$querySelectorAl;
+	    node.normalize();
+	    /* Clobber-safe ownerDocument read, same reasoning as _createNodeIterator:
+	       under SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES this runs on the live IN_PLACE root, which may
+	       carry a form-named-getter override of ownerDocument. */
+	    const doc = getOwnerDocument ? getOwnerDocument(node) : node.ownerDocument;
+	    const walker = createNodeIterator.call(doc || node, node,
+	    // eslint-disable-next-line no-bitwise
+	    NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT | NodeFilter.SHOW_COMMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_CDATA_SECTION | NodeFilter.SHOW_PROCESSING_INSTRUCTION, null);
+	    let currentNode = walker.nextNode();
+	    while (currentNode) {
+	      currentNode.data = _stripTemplateExpressions(currentNode.data);
+	      currentNode = walker.nextNode();
+	    }
+	    // NodeIterator does not descend into <template>.content per the DOM spec,
+	    // so we must explicitly recurse into each template's content fragment,
+	    // mirroring the approach used by _sanitizeShadowDOM.
+	    const templates = (_node$querySelectorAl = node.querySelectorAll) === null || _node$querySelectorAl === void 0 ? void 0 : _node$querySelectorAl.call(node, 'template');
+	    if (templates) {
+	      arrayForEach(templates, tmpl => {
+	        if (_isDocumentFragment(tmpl.content)) {
+	          _scrubTemplateExpressions2(tmpl.content);
+	        }
+	      });
+	    }
+	  };
 	  /**
 	   * _isClobbered
 	   *
+	   * Detect DOM-clobbering on HTMLFormElement nodes. Form is the only HTML
+	   * interface with [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns]; a descendant element with a
+	   * `name` attribute matching a prototype property shadows that property
+	   * on direct reads. We use this check at the IN_PLACE entry-point and
+	   * during attribute sanitization to refuse clobbered forms.
+	   *
 	   * @param element element to check for clobbering attacks
 	   * @return true if clobbered, false if safe
 	   */
 	  const _isClobbered = function _isClobbered(element) {
-	    return element instanceof HTMLFormElement && (typeof element.nodeName !== 'string' || typeof element.textContent !== 'string' || typeof element.removeChild !== 'function' || !(element.attributes instanceof NamedNodeMap) || typeof element.removeAttribute !== 'function' || typeof element.setAttribute !== 'function' || typeof element.namespaceURI !== 'string' || typeof element.insertBefore !== 'function' || typeof element.hasChildNodes !== 'function');
+	    // Realm-independent tag-name probe. If we can't determine the tag
+	    // name at all, we can't reason about clobbering — return false
+	    // (the caller's other defences still apply).
+	    const realTagName = getNodeName ? getNodeName(element) : null;
+	    if (typeof realTagName !== 'string') {
+	      return false;
+	    }
+	    if (transformCaseFunc(realTagName) !== 'form') {
+	      return false;
+	    }
+	    return typeof element.nodeName !== 'string' || typeof element.textContent !== 'string' || typeof element.removeChild !== 'function' ||
+	    // Realm-safe NamedNodeMap detection: equality against the cached
+	    // prototype getter. Clobbered .attributes (e.g. <input name="attributes">)
+	    // makes the direct read diverge from the cached read; a clean form
+	    // (same-realm OR foreign-realm) has both reads pointing at the same
+	    // canonical NamedNodeMap.
+	    element.attributes !== getAttributes(element) || typeof element.removeAttribute !== 'function' || typeof element.setAttribute !== 'function' || typeof element.namespaceURI !== 'string' || typeof element.insertBefore !== 'function' || typeof element.hasChildNodes !== 'function' ||
+	    // NodeType clobbering probe. Cached Node.prototype.nodeType getter
+	    // returns the integer 1 for any Element regardless of realm; direct
+	    // read on a clobbered form (e.g. <input name="nodeType">) returns
+	    // the named child element. Cheap addition — nodeType is read from
+	    // an internal slot, no serialization cost — and removes a residual
+	    // clobbering surface used by several mXSS / PI / comment branches
+	    // in _sanitizeElements that compare currentNode.nodeType directly.
+	    element.nodeType !== getNodeType(element) ||
+	    // HTMLFormElement has [LegacyOverrideBuiltIns]: a descendant named
+	    // "childNodes" shadows the prototype getter. Direct reads of
+	    // form.childNodes from a clobbered form return the named child
+	    // instead of the real NodeList, so any walk that reads it directly
+	    // skips the form's real children. Compare the direct read to the
+	    // cached Node.prototype getter — when the form's named-property
+	    // getter intercepts the read, the two values differ and we flag
+	    // the form. This catches every clobbering child type (input,
+	    // select, etc.) regardless of whether the named child happens to
+	    // carry a numeric .length, which a typeof-based probe would miss
+	    // (e.g. HTMLSelectElement.length is a defined unsigned-long).
+	    element.childNodes !== getChildNodes(element);
 	  };
 	  /**
-	   * Checks whether the given object is a DOM node.
+	   * Checks whether the given value is a DocumentFragment from any realm.
+	   *
+	   * The realm-independent replacement reads `nodeType` through the cached
+	   * Node.prototype getter and compares to the DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT_NODE
+	   * constant (11). nodeType is a numeric value resolved from the node's
+	   * internal slot, identical across realms for the same kind of node.
+	   *
+	   * @param value object to check
+	   * @return true if value is a DocumentFragment-shaped node from any realm
+	   */
+	  const _isDocumentFragment = function _isDocumentFragment(value) {
+	    if (!getNodeType || typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) {
+	      return false;
+	    }
+	    try {
+	      return getNodeType(value) === NODE_TYPE.documentFragment;
+	    } catch (_) {
+	      return false;
+	    }
+	  };
+	  /**
+	   * Checks whether the given object is a DOM node, including nodes that
+	   * originate from a different window/realm (e.g. an iframe's
+	   * contentDocument). The previous `value instanceof Node` check was
+	   * realm-bound: nodes from a different window failed it, causing
+	   * sanitize() to silently stringify them and reset IN_PLACE to false,
+	   * returning the original node unsanitized. See GHSA-4w3q-35jp-p934.
 	   *
 	   * @param value object to check whether it's a DOM node
-	   * @return true is object is a DOM node
+	   * @return true if value is a DOM node from any realm
 	   */
 	  const _isNode = function _isNode(value) {
-	    return typeof Node === 'function' && value instanceof Node;
+	    if (!getNodeType || typeof value !== 'object' || value === null) {
+	      return false;
+	    }
+	    try {
+	      return typeof getNodeType(value) === 'number';
+	    } catch (_) {
+	      return false;
+	    }
 	  };
 	  function _executeHooks(hooks, currentNode, data) {
+	    if (hooks.length === 0) {
+	      return;
+	    }
 	    arrayForEach(hooks, hook => {
 	      hook.call(DOMPurify, currentNode, data, CONFIG);
 	    });
 	  }
+	  /**
+	   * Structural-threat checks that condemn a node regardless of the
+	   * allowlists: mXSS via namespace confusion, risky CSS construction,
+	   * processing instructions, markup-bearing comments. Pure predicate;
+	   * the caller removes. Check order is load-bearing.
+	   *
+	   * @param currentNode the node to inspect
+	   * @param tagName the node's transformCaseFunc'd tag name
+	   * @return true if the node must be removed
+	   */
+	  const _isUnsafeNode = function _isUnsafeNode(currentNode, tagName) {
+	    /* Detect mXSS attempts abusing namespace confusion */
+	    if (SAFE_FOR_XML && currentNode.hasChildNodes() && !_isNode(currentNode.firstElementChild) && regExpTest(ELEMENT_MARKUP_PROBE, currentNode.textContent) && regExpTest(ELEMENT_MARKUP_PROBE, currentNode.innerHTML)) {
+	      return true;
+	    }
+	    /* Remove risky CSS construction leading to mXSS */
+	    if (SAFE_FOR_XML && currentNode.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE && tagName === 'style' && _isNode(currentNode.firstElementChild)) {
+	      return true;
+	    }
+	    /* Remove any occurrence of processing instructions */
+	    if (currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.processingInstruction) {
+	      return true;
+	    }
+	    /* Remove any kind of possibly harmful comments */
+	    if (SAFE_FOR_XML && currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.comment && regExpTest(COMMENT_MARKUP_PROBE, currentNode.data)) {
+	      return true;
+	    }
+	    return false;
+	  };
+	  /**
+	   * Handle a node whose tag is forbidden or not allowlisted: keep
+	   * allowed custom elements (false return exits _sanitizeElements
+	   * early - the namespace and fallback-tag removal checks are
+	   * intentionally skipped for kept custom elements), else hoist
+	   * content per KEEP_CONTENT and remove.
+	   *
+	   * A kept custom element is the ONLY case in which this function
+	   * returns false, so the caller uses that return value to run the
+	   * afterSanitizeElements hook on the kept element and keep the
+	   * element-hook lifecycle consistent with normal allowlisted
+	   * elements (GHSA-c2j3-45gr-mqc4).
+	   *
+	   * @param currentNode the disallowed node
+	   * @param tagName the node's transformCaseFunc'd tag name
+	   * @return true if the node was removed, false if kept
+	   */
+	  const _sanitizeDisallowedNode = function _sanitizeDisallowedNode(currentNode, tagName, root) {
+	    /* Check if we have a custom element to handle */
+	    if (!FORBID_TAGS[tagName] && _isBasicCustomElement(tagName)) {
+	      if (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof RegExp && regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, tagName)) {
+	        return false;
+	      }
+	      if (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof Function && CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck(tagName)) {
+	        return false;
+	      }
+	    }
+	    /* Keep content except for bad-listed elements.
+	         Use the cached prototype getters exclusively — the previous code
+	         had `|| currentNode.parentNode` / `|| currentNode.childNodes`
+	         fallbacks, but the cached getters always return the canonical
+	         value (or null for a real parent-less node), so the fallback
+	         path was dead in safe cases and a clobbering surface in unsafe
+	         ones. Falsy cached results stay falsy; the `if (childNodes &&
+	         parentNode)` check already gates correctly. */
+	    if (KEEP_CONTENT && !FORBID_CONTENTS[tagName]) {
+	      const parentNode = getParentNode(currentNode);
+	      const childNodes = getChildNodes(currentNode);
+	      if (childNodes && parentNode) {
+	        const childCount = childNodes.length;
+	        /* Hoist by moving each child up one level rather than deep-cloning
+	             it. Moving transfers every descendant exactly once, so a chain of
+	             nested disallowed elements costs O(n) instead of the O(n^2) that
+	             re-cloning the shrinking subtree at each level produced; it also
+	             empties the removed original, so `DOMPurify.removed` no longer
+	             pins whole subtrees. Moving preserves the in-place guarantee too:
+	             an original carrying already-queued resource events (`<img
+	             onerror>`, `<video>`/`<audio>` error, lazy/`onload`, …) is
+	             relocated and sanitised rather than left detached but still armed.
+	                      The sole case that must clone is removing the walk root itself.
+	             The result is serialised from the root's subtree, so a restrictive
+	             ALLOWED_TAGS that strips the root (`body` on the string path) must
+	             leave the content inside it, which only cloning does. In IN_PLACE
+	             the root is pre-validated as an allowed tag and so is never removed
+	             here, so that path always takes the move branch.
+	                      `childNodes` is live; a tail-to-head walk keeps `childNodes[i]`
+	             valid whether we move (drops the trailing entry) or clone (leaves
+	             the list intact). */
+	        for (let i = childCount - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
+	          const hoisted = currentNode === root ? cloneNode(childNodes[i], true) : childNodes[i];
+	          parentNode.insertBefore(hoisted, getNextSibling(currentNode));
+	        }
+	      }
+	    }
+	    _forceRemove(currentNode);
+	    return true;
+	  };
+	  /**
+	   * Fork a hook-mutable allowlist off its shared binding the first time a
+	   * (possibly lazily-installed) uponSanitize* hook is about to see it, so the
+	   * hook cannot widen the per-instance default or the setConfig binding by
+	   * reference and leak past the call. Returns the set unchanged once it is
+	   * already call-local, so repeated calls across elements are idempotent.
+	   *
+	   * @param hookList the uponSanitize* hook array for this event
+	   * @param set the current ALLOWED_TAGS / ALLOWED_ATTR binding
+	   * @param defaultSet the per-instance DEFAULT_ALLOWED_* constant
+	   * @param setConfigSet the captured setConfig() binding, or null
+	   * @return a call-local clone if a hook is present and set is still shared,
+	   *   else set unchanged
+	   */
+	  const _forkSharedAllowlist = function _forkSharedAllowlist(hookList, set, defaultSet, setConfigSet) {
+	    if (hookList.length === 0) {
+	      return set;
+	    }
+	    return set === defaultSet || set === setConfigSet ? clone(set) : set;
+	  };
 	  /**
 	   * _sanitizeElements
 	   *
@@ -9271,86 +10406,112 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	   * @param currentNode to check for permission to exist
 	   * @return true if node was killed, false if left alive
 	   */
-	  const _sanitizeElements = function _sanitizeElements(currentNode) {
-	    let content = null;
+	  // eslint-disable-next-line complexity
+	  const _sanitizeElements = function _sanitizeElements(currentNode, root) {
 	    /* Execute a hook if present */
 	    _executeHooks(hooks.beforeSanitizeElements, currentNode, null);
+	    /* A hook may have detached the node - treat it as removed (see the
+	       detached-node comment after the uponSanitizeElement hook below). On
+	       the IN_PLACE path, neutralize the detached subtree first so a queued
+	       resource handler on it cannot fire in page scope after we return. */
+	    if (currentNode !== root && getParentNode(currentNode) === null) {
+	      if (IN_PLACE) {
+	        _neutralizeSubtree(currentNode);
+	      }
+	      return true;
+	    }
 	    /* Check if element is clobbered or can clobber */
 	    if (_isClobbered(currentNode)) {
 	      _forceRemove(currentNode);
 	      return true;
 	    }
 	    /* Now let's check the element's type and name */
-	    const tagName = transformCaseFunc(currentNode.nodeName);
+	    const tagName = transformCaseFunc(getNodeName ? getNodeName(currentNode) : currentNode.nodeName);
+	    /* Close the pre-walk clone-guard's timing gap: an uponSanitizeElement
+	       hook may have been installed after that guard sampled the hook arrays
+	       (e.g. lazily from beforeSanitizeElements), leaving ALLOWED_TAGS still
+	       aliasing a shared binding that a widening hook would mutate by
+	       reference. Fork it before exposing it to the hook. */
+	    ALLOWED_TAGS = _forkSharedAllowlist(hooks.uponSanitizeElement, ALLOWED_TAGS, DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS, SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_TAGS);
 	    /* Execute a hook if present */
 	    _executeHooks(hooks.uponSanitizeElement, currentNode, {
 	      tagName,
 	      allowedTags: ALLOWED_TAGS
 	    });
-	    /* Detect mXSS attempts abusing namespace confusion */
-	    if (SAFE_FOR_XML && currentNode.hasChildNodes() && !_isNode(currentNode.firstElementChild) && regExpTest(/<[/\w!]/g, currentNode.innerHTML) && regExpTest(/<[/\w!]/g, currentNode.textContent)) {
-	      _forceRemove(currentNode);
-	      return true;
-	    }
-	    /* Remove risky CSS construction leading to mXSS */
-	    if (SAFE_FOR_XML && currentNode.namespaceURI === HTML_NAMESPACE && tagName === 'style' && _isNode(currentNode.firstElementChild)) {
-	      _forceRemove(currentNode);
-	      return true;
-	    }
-	    /* Remove any occurrence of processing instructions */
-	    if (currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.progressingInstruction) {
-	      _forceRemove(currentNode);
+	    /* A hook may have detached the node from the tree — a long-standing
+	       user pattern (issue #469; draw.io-style foreignObject filtering).
+	       Per the cached, unclobberable parentNode getter the node is
+	       genuinely out of the tree, so it can reach neither the serialized
+	       output nor an IN_PLACE live tree; treat it as removed and stop
+	       processing it. Without this guard, the unsafe-node / namespace
+	       checks below would call _forceRemove on a parentless node and hit
+	       the REPORT-3 fail-closed throw — which exists for nodes DOMPurify
+	       wants gone but *cannot* detach (clobbered / parentless roots), the
+	       opposite of a node that is already safely gone. The walk root is
+	       exempt: a detached IN_PLACE root is legitimate input and must still
+	       be fully sanitized, and a kill-decision on it must keep hitting the
+	       REPORT-3 throw. Nodes detached by hooks stay the hook's
+	       responsibility for placement: they are not recorded in
+	       DOMPurify.removed, so the post-walk IN_PLACE pass (which iterates
+	       DOMPurify.removed) does not reach them. But a hook-detached subtree
+	       can still hold a queued resource-event handler - e.g. an <img onload>
+	       that began loading when the caller built the live tree - which fires
+	       in page scope after sanitize returns even though the handler never
+	       reached the returned tree. That is the audit-5 F1 hazard, and the
+	       documented node.remove() hook pattern walks straight into it. So on
+	       the IN_PLACE path we neutralize the detached subtree inline here,
+	       stripping its non-allow-listed attributes before returning, exactly
+	       as the post-walk pass does for _forceRemove'd subtrees. */
+	    if (currentNode !== root && getParentNode(currentNode) === null) {
+	      if (IN_PLACE) {
+	        _neutralizeSubtree(currentNode);
+	      }
 	      return true;
 	    }
-	    /* Remove any kind of possibly harmful comments */
-	    if (SAFE_FOR_XML && currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.comment && regExpTest(/<[/\w]/g, currentNode.data)) {
+	    /* Remove mXSS vectors, processing instructions and risky comments */
+	    if (_isUnsafeNode(currentNode, tagName)) {
 	      _forceRemove(currentNode);
 	      return true;
 	    }
 	    /* Remove element if anything forbids its presence */
 	    if (FORBID_TAGS[tagName] || !(EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck instanceof Function && EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagCheck(tagName)) && !ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName]) {
-	      /* Check if we have a custom element to handle */
-	      if (!FORBID_TAGS[tagName] && _isBasicCustomElement(tagName)) {
-	        if (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof RegExp && regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck, tagName)) {
-	          return false;
-	        }
-	        if (CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck instanceof Function && CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck(tagName)) {
-	          return false;
-	        }
-	      }
-	      /* Keep content except for bad-listed elements */
-	      if (KEEP_CONTENT && !FORBID_CONTENTS[tagName]) {
-	        const parentNode = getParentNode(currentNode) || currentNode.parentNode;
-	        const childNodes = getChildNodes(currentNode) || currentNode.childNodes;
-	        if (childNodes && parentNode) {
-	          const childCount = childNodes.length;
-	          for (let i = childCount - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
-	            const childClone = cloneNode(childNodes[i], true);
-	            childClone.__removalCount = (currentNode.__removalCount || 0) + 1;
-	            parentNode.insertBefore(childClone, getNextSibling(currentNode));
-	          }
-	        }
+	      const removed = _sanitizeDisallowedNode(currentNode, tagName, root);
+	      /* A false return means the node is a custom element kept via
+	         CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING - the only keep path through
+	         _sanitizeDisallowedNode. Run afterSanitizeElements on it so the
+	         element-hook lifecycle matches normal allowlisted elements: a
+	         security policy applied in this hook (e.g. stripping an attribute
+	         from every surviving element) must not silently skip kept custom
+	         elements (GHSA-c2j3-45gr-mqc4). This mirrors the normal-element
+	         tail below - the hook runs, then the walker's subsequent
+	         _sanitizeAttributes pass sanitizes the element's attributes. The
+	         deliberately skipped namespace and fallback-tag removal checks stay
+	         skipped; they are removal decisions, not the hook contract. */
+	      if (removed === false) {
+	        _executeHooks(hooks.afterSanitizeElements, currentNode, null);
 	      }
-	      _forceRemove(currentNode);
-	      return true;
+	      return removed;
 	    }
-	    /* Check whether element has a valid namespace */
-	    if (currentNode instanceof Element && !_checkValidNamespace(currentNode)) {
+	    /* Check whether element has a valid namespace.
+	       Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): use the cached Node.prototype
+	       nodeType getter rather than `instanceof Element`, which is realm-
+	       bound and short-circuits to false for any node minted in a different
+	       realm — letting a foreign-realm element with a forbidden namespace
+	       slip past the namespace check entirely. */
+	    const nt = getNodeType ? getNodeType(currentNode) : currentNode.nodeType;
+	    if (nt === NODE_TYPE.element && !_checkValidNamespace(currentNode)) {
 	      _forceRemove(currentNode);
 	      return true;
 	    }
 	    /* Make sure that older browsers don't get fallback-tag mXSS */
-	    if ((tagName === 'noscript' || tagName === 'noembed' || tagName === 'noframes') && regExpTest(/<\/no(script|embed|frames)/i, currentNode.innerHTML)) {
+	    if ((tagName === 'noscript' || tagName === 'noembed' || tagName === 'noframes') && regExpTest(FALLBACK_TAG_CLOSE, currentNode.innerHTML)) {
 	      _forceRemove(currentNode);
 	      return true;
 	    }
 	    /* Sanitize element content to be template-safe */
 	    if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES && currentNode.nodeType === NODE_TYPE.text) {
 	      /* Get the element's text content */
-	      content = currentNode.textContent;
-	      arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR, ERB_EXPR, TMPLIT_EXPR], expr => {
-	        content = stringReplace(content, expr, ' ');
-	      });
+	      const content = _stripTemplateExpressions(currentNode.textContent);
 	      if (currentNode.textContent !== content) {
 	        arrayPush(DOMPurify.removed, {
 	          element: currentNode.cloneNode()
@@ -9376,15 +10537,43 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	    if (FORBID_ATTR[lcName]) {
 	      return false;
 	    }
+	    /* Reject declarative-partial-updates patch-linkage attributes
+	       (https://github.com/WICG/declarative-partial-updates).
+	            Empirical note (Chrome 150, verified — see
+	       test/declarative-patch-probe-v3.html): expansion is NOT applied after
+	       sanitization. For the string path it fires during sanitize()'s own
+	       parse, so the walk sees and sanitizes the fully materialized expanded
+	       tree — teleports into MathML/SVG integration points included; a
+	       weaponized `<template for>`->`<img onerror>` comes back with the handler
+	       stripped. For the IN_PLACE path it fires on connection, before the walk.
+	       Either way DOMPurify is NOT blind to the patch.
+	            This removal is therefore defense-in-depth rather than the sole barrier:
+	       it prevents live linkage from surviving into the OUTPUT and re-expanding
+	       in the caller's context, and keeps behaviour deterministic if a future
+	       engine defers expansion. `for` is legitimate only on <label>/<output>;
+	       anywhere else (notably <template for>) it links the element to a patch
+	       target and teleports or removes an arbitrary DOM range by id/marker name.
+	       `patchsrc` fetches remote markup and is treated as a script-loading
+	       mechanism (CSP). Gated on SAFE_FOR_XML so the removal groups with the
+	       other structural-threat checks and stays overridable, consistent with
+	       the rest of the codebase. PI range markers are already removed by
+	       _isUnsafeNode. */
+	    if (SAFE_FOR_XML && lcName === 'patchsrc') {
+	      return false;
+	    }
+	    if (SAFE_FOR_XML && lcName === 'for' && lcTag !== 'label' && lcTag !== 'output') {
+	      return false;
+	    }
 	    /* Make sure attribute cannot clobber */
 	    if (SANITIZE_DOM && (lcName === 'id' || lcName === 'name') && (value in document || value in formElement)) {
 	      return false;
 	    }
+	    const nameIsPermitted = ALLOWED_ATTR[lcName] || EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck instanceof Function && EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck(lcName, lcTag);
 	    /* Allow valid data-* attributes: At least one character after "-"
 	        (https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/dom.html#embedding-custom-non-visible-data-with-the-data-*-attributes)
 	        XML-compatible (https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/infrastructure.html#xml-compatible and http://www.w3.org/TR/xml/#d0e804)
 	        We don't need to check the value; it's always URI safe. */
-	    if (ALLOW_DATA_ATTR && !FORBID_ATTR[lcName] && regExpTest(DATA_ATTR, lcName)) ; else if (ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR && regExpTest(ARIA_ATTR, lcName)) ; else if (EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck instanceof Function && EXTRA_ELEMENT_HANDLING.attributeCheck(lcName, lcTag)) ; else if (!ALLOWED_ATTR[lcName] || FORBID_ATTR[lcName]) {
+	    if (ALLOW_DATA_ATTR && regExpTest(DATA_ATTR$1, lcName)) ; else if (ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR && regExpTest(ARIA_ATTR$1, lcName)) ; else if (!nameIsPermitted) {
 	      if (
 	      // First condition does a very basic check if a) it's basically a valid custom element tagname AND
 	      // b) if the tagName passes whatever the user has configured for CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck
@@ -9396,11 +10585,15 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	        return false;
 	      }
 	      /* Check value is safe. First, is attr inert? If so, is safe */
-	    } else if (URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES[lcName]) ; else if (regExpTest(IS_ALLOWED_URI$1, stringReplace(value, ATTR_WHITESPACE, ''))) ; else if ((lcName === 'src' || lcName === 'xlink:href' || lcName === 'href') && lcTag !== 'script' && stringIndexOf(value, 'data:') === 0 && DATA_URI_TAGS[lcTag]) ; else if (ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS && !regExpTest(IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA, stringReplace(value, ATTR_WHITESPACE, ''))) ; else if (value) {
+	    } else if (URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES[lcName]) ; else if (regExpTest(IS_ALLOWED_URI$1, stringReplace(value, ATTR_WHITESPACE$1, ''))) ; else if ((lcName === 'src' || lcName === 'xlink:href' || lcName === 'href') && lcTag !== 'script' && stringIndexOf(value, 'data:') === 0 && DATA_URI_TAGS[lcTag]) ; else if (ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS && !regExpTest(IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA$1, stringReplace(value, ATTR_WHITESPACE$1, ''))) ; else if (value) {
 	      return false;
 	    } else ;
 	    return true;
 	  };
+	  /* Names the HTML spec reserves from valid-custom-element-name; these must
+	   * never be treated as basic custom elements even when a permissive
+	   * CUSTOM_ELEMENT_HANDLING.tagNameCheck is configured. */
+	  const RESERVED_CUSTOM_ELEMENT_NAMES = addToSet({}, ['annotation-xml', 'color-profile', 'font-face', 'font-face-format', 'font-face-name', 'font-face-src', 'font-face-uri', 'missing-glyph']);
 	  /**
 	   * _isBasicCustomElement
 	   * checks if at least one dash is included in tagName, and it's not the first char
@@ -9410,7 +10603,64 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	   * @returns Returns true if the tag name meets the basic criteria for a custom element, otherwise false.
 	   */
 	  const _isBasicCustomElement = function _isBasicCustomElement(tagName) {
-	    return tagName !== 'annotation-xml' && stringMatch(tagName, CUSTOM_ELEMENT);
+	    return !RESERVED_CUSTOM_ELEMENT_NAMES[stringToLowerCase(tagName)] && regExpTest(CUSTOM_ELEMENT$1, tagName);
+	  };
+	  /**
+	   * Wrap an attribute value in the matching Trusted Types object when
+	   * the active policy requires it. Namespaced attributes pass through
+	   * unchanged (no TT support yet, see
+	   * https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=1305293).
+	   *
+	   * @param lcTag lowercase tag name of the containing element
+	   * @param lcName lowercase attribute name
+	   * @param namespaceURI the attribute's namespace, if any
+	   * @param value the attribute value to wrap
+	   * @return the value, wrapped when Trusted Types demand it
+	   */
+	  const _applyTrustedTypesToAttribute = function _applyTrustedTypesToAttribute(lcTag, lcName, namespaceURI, value) {
+	    if (trustedTypesPolicy && typeof trustedTypes === 'object' && typeof trustedTypes.getAttributeType === 'function' && !namespaceURI) {
+	      switch (trustedTypes.getAttributeType(lcTag, lcName)) {
+	        case 'TrustedHTML':
+	          {
+	            return _createTrustedHTML(value);
+	          }
+	        case 'TrustedScriptURL':
+	          {
+	            return _createTrustedScriptURL(value);
+	          }
+	      }
+	    }
+	    return value;
+	  };
+	  /**
+	   * Write a modified attribute value back onto the element. On
+	   * success, re-probe for clobbering introduced by the new value and
+	   * remove the element when found; otherwise pop the removal entry
+	   * recorded by the earlier _removeAttribute (long-standing pairing
+	   * with the SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS path - do not "fix" casually). On
+	   * failure, remove the attribute instead.
+	   *
+	   * @param currentNode the element carrying the attribute
+	   * @param name the attribute name as present on the element
+	   * @param namespaceURI the attribute's namespace, if any
+	   * @param value the new attribute value
+	   */
+	  const _setAttributeValue = function _setAttributeValue(currentNode, name, namespaceURI, value) {
+	    try {
+	      if (namespaceURI) {
+	        currentNode.setAttributeNS(namespaceURI, name, value);
+	      } else {
+	        /* Fallback to setAttribute() for browser-unrecognized namespaces e.g. "x-schema". */
+	        currentNode.setAttribute(name, value);
+	      }
+	      if (_isClobbered(currentNode)) {
+	        _forceRemove(currentNode);
+	      } else {
+	        arrayPop(DOMPurify.removed);
+	      }
+	    } catch (_) {
+	      _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
+	    }
 	  };
 	  /**
 	   * _sanitizeAttributes
@@ -9425,13 +10675,14 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	  const _sanitizeAttributes = function _sanitizeAttributes(currentNode) {
 	    /* Execute a hook if present */
 	    _executeHooks(hooks.beforeSanitizeAttributes, currentNode, null);
-	    const {
-	      attributes
-	    } = currentNode;
+	    const attributes = currentNode.attributes;
 	    /* Check if we have attributes; if not we might have a text node */
 	    if (!attributes || _isClobbered(currentNode)) {
 	      return;
 	    }
+	    /* Same lazy-install guard as uponSanitizeElement (see there): fork the
+	       attribute allowlist off its shared binding before a hook can see it. */
+	    ALLOWED_ATTR = _forkSharedAllowlist(hooks.uponSanitizeAttribute, ALLOWED_ATTR, DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR, SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_ATTR);
 	    const hookEvent = {
 	      attrName: '',
 	      attrValue: '',
@@ -9440,14 +10691,13 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	      forceKeepAttr: undefined
 	    };
 	    let l = attributes.length;
+	    const lcTag = transformCaseFunc(currentNode.nodeName);
 	    /* Go backwards over all attributes; safely remove bad ones */
 	    while (l--) {
 	      const attr = attributes[l];
-	      const {
-	        name,
-	        namespaceURI,
-	        value: attrValue
-	      } = attr;
+	      const name = attr.name,
+	        namespaceURI = attr.namespaceURI,
+	        attrValue = attr.value;
 	      const lcName = transformCaseFunc(name);
 	      const initValue = attrValue;
 	      let value = name === 'value' ? initValue : stringTrim(initValue);
@@ -9461,12 +10711,14 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	      /* Full DOM Clobbering protection via namespace isolation,
 	       * Prefix id and name attributes with `user-content-`
 	       */
-	      if (SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS && (lcName === 'id' || lcName === 'name')) {
+	      if (SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS && (lcName === 'id' || lcName === 'name') && stringIndexOf(value, SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS_PREFIX) !== 0) {
 	        // Remove the attribute with this value
 	        _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
 	        // Prefix the value and later re-create the attribute with the sanitized value
 	        value = SANITIZE_NAMED_PROPS_PREFIX + value;
 	      }
+	      // Else: already prefixed, leave the attribute alone — the prefix is
+	      // itself the clobbering protection, and re-applying it is incorrect.
 	      /* Work around a security issue with comments inside attributes */
 	      if (SAFE_FOR_XML && regExpTest(/((--!?|])>)|<\/(style|script|title|xmp|textarea|noscript|iframe|noembed|noframes)/i, value)) {
 	        _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
@@ -9477,7 +10729,7 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	        _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
 	        continue;
 	      }
-	      /* Did the hooks approve of the attribute? */
+	      /* Did the hooks force-keep the attribute? */
 	      if (hookEvent.forceKeepAttr) {
 	        continue;
 	      }
@@ -9487,56 +10739,24 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	        continue;
 	      }
 	      /* Work around a security issue in jQuery 3.0 */
-	      if (!ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR && regExpTest(/\/>/i, value)) {
+	      if (!ALLOW_SELF_CLOSE_IN_ATTR && regExpTest(SELF_CLOSING_TAG, value)) {
 	        _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
 	        continue;
 	      }
 	      /* Sanitize attribute content to be template-safe */
 	      if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
-	        arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR, ERB_EXPR, TMPLIT_EXPR], expr => {
-	          value = stringReplace(value, expr, ' ');
-	        });
+	        value = _stripTemplateExpressions(value);
 	      }
 	      /* Is `value` valid for this attribute? */
-	      const lcTag = transformCaseFunc(currentNode.nodeName);
 	      if (!_isValidAttribute(lcTag, lcName, value)) {
 	        _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
 	        continue;
 	      }
 	      /* Handle attributes that require Trusted Types */
-	      if (trustedTypesPolicy && typeof trustedTypes === 'object' && typeof trustedTypes.getAttributeType === 'function') {
-	        if (namespaceURI) ; else {
-	          switch (trustedTypes.getAttributeType(lcTag, lcName)) {
-	            case 'TrustedHTML':
-	              {
-	                value = trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(value);
-	                break;
-	              }
-	            case 'TrustedScriptURL':
-	              {
-	                value = trustedTypesPolicy.createScriptURL(value);
-	                break;
-	              }
-	          }
-	        }
-	      }
+	      value = _applyTrustedTypesToAttribute(lcTag, lcName, namespaceURI, value);
 	      /* Handle invalid data-* attribute set by try-catching it */
 	      if (value !== initValue) {
-	        try {
-	          if (namespaceURI) {
-	            currentNode.setAttributeNS(namespaceURI, name, value);
-	          } else {
-	            /* Fallback to setAttribute() for browser-unrecognized namespaces e.g. "x-schema". */
-	            currentNode.setAttribute(name, value);
-	          }
-	          if (_isClobbered(currentNode)) {
-	            _forceRemove(currentNode);
-	          } else {
-	            arrayPop(DOMPurify.removed);
-	          }
-	        } catch (_) {
-	          _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
-	        }
+	        _setAttributeValue(currentNode, name, namespaceURI, value);
 	      }
 	    }
 	    /* Execute a hook if present */
@@ -9556,17 +10776,136 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	      /* Execute a hook if present */
 	      _executeHooks(hooks.uponSanitizeShadowNode, shadowNode, null);
 	      /* Sanitize tags and elements */
-	      _sanitizeElements(shadowNode);
+	      _sanitizeElements(shadowNode, fragment);
 	      /* Check attributes next */
 	      _sanitizeAttributes(shadowNode);
-	      /* Deep shadow DOM detected */
-	      if (shadowNode.content instanceof DocumentFragment) {
+	      /* Deep shadow DOM detected.
+	         Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): use nodeType against the
+	         DOCUMENT_FRAGMENT_NODE constant rather than instanceof, so we
+	         recurse into <template>.content from foreign realms too. */
+	      if (_isDocumentFragment(shadowNode.content)) {
 	        _sanitizeShadowDOM2(shadowNode.content);
 	      }
+	      /* An element iterated here may itself host an attached
+	         shadow root. The default NodeIterator does not enter shadow
+	         trees, so a shadow root nested inside template.content was
+	         previously reached by no walk at all (the pre-pass at
+	         _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots descends via childNodes, which
+	         doesn't enter template.content; the template-content recursion
+	         above iterates the content but never inspected shadowRoot).
+	         Walk it explicitly. The nodeType guard avoids reading
+	         shadowRoot off text / comment / CDATA / PI nodes that the
+	         iterator also surfaces. */
+	      const shadowNodeType = getNodeType ? getNodeType(shadowNode) : shadowNode.nodeType;
+	      if (shadowNodeType === NODE_TYPE.element) {
+	        const innerSr = getShadowRoot(shadowNode);
+	        if (_isDocumentFragment(innerSr)) {
+	          _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(innerSr);
+	          _sanitizeShadowDOM2(innerSr);
+	        }
+	      }
 	    }
 	    /* Execute a hook if present */
 	    _executeHooks(hooks.afterSanitizeShadowDOM, fragment, null);
 	  };
+	  /**
+	   * _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots
+	   *
+	   * Walks `root` and feeds every attached shadow root we encounter into
+	   * the existing _sanitizeShadowDOM pipeline. The default node iterator
+	   * does not descend into shadow trees, so nodes inside an attached
+	   * shadow root would otherwise be skipped entirely.
+	   *
+	   * Two real input paths put attached shadow roots in front of us:
+	   *   1. IN_PLACE on a DOM node that already has shadow roots attached.
+	   *   2. DOM-node input where importNode(dirty, true) deep-clones the
+	   *      shadow root because it was created with `clonable: true`.
+	   *
+	   * This pass runs once, up front, so the main iteration loop (and the
+	   * existing _sanitizeShadowDOM template-content recursion) stay
+	   * untouched — string-input paths are not affected.
+	   *
+	   * @param root the subtree root to walk for attached shadow roots
+	   */
+	  const _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots = function _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(root) {
+	    /* Iterative (explicit stack) rather than per-child recursion. DOM APIs
+	       impose no depth cap, so an attacker-shaped tree (JSON/CRDT/editor data
+	       built straight into the DOM — the IN_PLACE surface) deeper than the JS
+	       call-stack budget would otherwise overflow native recursion here and
+	       throw at the IN_PLACE entry pre-pass, before a single node is
+	       sanitized, leaving the caller's live tree untouched (fail-open). See
+	       campaign-3 F4. A heap stack keeps depth off the call stack.
+	            Each work item is either a node to descend into, or a deferred
+	       `_sanitizeShadowDOM` for an already-walked shadow root. The deferred
+	       form preserves the original post-order discipline: a shadow root's
+	       nested shadow roots are discovered before the outer shadow is
+	       sanitized (which may remove hosts). Pushes are in reverse of the
+	       desired processing order (LIFO): template content, then children, then
+	       the shadow-sanitize, then the shadow walk — so the order matches the
+	       previous recursion exactly. */
+	    const stack = [{
+	      node: root,
+	      shadow: null
+	    }];
+	    while (stack.length > 0) {
+	      const item = stack.pop();
+	      /* Deferred shadow-DOM sanitisation: runs after its subtree was walked. */
+	      if (item.shadow) {
+	        _sanitizeShadowDOM2(item.shadow);
+	        continue;
+	      }
+	      const node = item.node;
+	      const nodeType = getNodeType ? getNodeType(node) : node.nodeType;
+	      const isElement = nodeType === NODE_TYPE.element;
+	      /* (pushed last → processed first) Children, snapshotted in reverse so
+	         the first child is processed first. Snapshotting matters because a
+	         hook may detach siblings mid-walk. */
+	      const childNodes = getChildNodes(node);
+	      if (childNodes) {
+	        for (let i = childNodes.length - 1; i >= 0; --i) {
+	          stack.push({
+	            node: childNodes[i],
+	            shadow: null
+	          });
+	        }
+	      }
+	      /* (pushed before children → processed after them, matching the old
+	         "template content last" order) When the node is a <template>,
+	         descend into its content. */
+	      if (isElement) {
+	        const rootName = getNodeName ? getNodeName(node) : null;
+	        if (typeof rootName === 'string' && transformCaseFunc(rootName) === 'template') {
+	          const content = node.content;
+	          if (_isDocumentFragment(content)) {
+	            stack.push({
+	              node: content,
+	              shadow: null
+	            });
+	          }
+	        }
+	      }
+	      /* Shadow root (processed first): walk its subtree, then sanitise it.
+	         Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): nodeType-based detection
+	         rather than `instanceof DocumentFragment`, which is realm-bound and
+	         silently skipped foreign-realm shadow roots (e.g.
+	         iframe.contentDocument attachShadow). */
+	      if (isElement) {
+	        const sr = getShadowRoot(node);
+	        if (_isDocumentFragment(sr)) {
+	          /* Push the deferred sanitise first so it pops after the shadow
+	             walk we push next, i.e. nested shadow roots are discovered
+	             before this one is sanitised. */
+	          stack.push({
+	            node: null,
+	            shadow: sr
+	          }, {
+	            node: sr,
+	            shadow: null
+	          });
+	        }
+	      }
+	    }
+	  };
 	  // eslint-disable-next-line complexity
 	  DOMPurify.sanitize = function (dirty) {
 	    let cfg = arguments.length > 1 && arguments[1] !== undefined ? arguments[1] : {};
@@ -9583,13 +10922,9 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	    }
 	    /* Stringify, in case dirty is an object */
 	    if (typeof dirty !== 'string' && !_isNode(dirty)) {
-	      if (typeof dirty.toString === 'function') {
-	        dirty = dirty.toString();
-	        if (typeof dirty !== 'string') {
-	          throw typeErrorCreate('dirty is not a string, aborting');
-	        }
-	      } else {
-	        throw typeErrorCreate('toString is not a function');
+	      dirty = stringifyValue(dirty);
+	      if (typeof dirty !== 'string') {
+	        throw typeErrorCreate('dirty is not a string, aborting');
 	      }
 	    }
 	    /* Return dirty HTML if DOMPurify cannot run */
@@ -9597,24 +10932,90 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	      return dirty;
 	    }
 	    /* Assign config vars */
-	    if (!SET_CONFIG) {
+	    if (SET_CONFIG) {
+	      /* Persistent setConfig() path: _parseConfig is skipped, so the sets are
+	       * not re-derived per call. Restore them from the pristine bindings
+	       * captured at setConfig() time so a previous call's hook clone (mutated
+	       * below) does not carry over. */
+	      ALLOWED_TAGS = SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_TAGS;
+	      ALLOWED_ATTR = SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_ATTR;
+	    } else {
 	      _parseConfig(cfg);
 	    }
+	    /* Clone the hook-mutable allowlists before the walk whenever an
+	     * uponSanitize* hook is registered. The hook event exposes ALLOWED_TAGS
+	     * and ALLOWED_ATTR by reference (as allowedTags / allowedAttributes), so
+	     * a hook that widens them would otherwise mutate the shared set
+	     * permanently: across later calls and across every element. Cloning per
+	     * walk keeps documented in-call widening working while scoping it to the
+	     * call. A single guard for both config paths - the per-call path rebinds
+	     * the sets in _parseConfig each call, the persistent path restores them
+	     * from the captured bindings just above - so the two cannot diverge. */
+	    if (hooks.uponSanitizeElement.length > 0 || hooks.uponSanitizeAttribute.length > 0) {
+	      ALLOWED_TAGS = clone(ALLOWED_TAGS);
+	    }
+	    if (hooks.uponSanitizeAttribute.length > 0) {
+	      ALLOWED_ATTR = clone(ALLOWED_ATTR);
+	    }
 	    /* Clean up removed elements */
 	    DOMPurify.removed = [];
-	    /* Check if dirty is correctly typed for IN_PLACE */
-	    if (typeof dirty === 'string') {
-	      IN_PLACE = false;
-	    }
-	    if (IN_PLACE) {
-	      /* Do some early pre-sanitization to avoid unsafe root nodes */
-	      if (dirty.nodeName) {
-	        const tagName = transformCaseFunc(dirty.nodeName);
+	    /* Resolve IN_PLACE for this call without mutating persistent config.
+	       Writing the IN_PLACE closure variable here leaks under setConfig(),
+	       where _parseConfig is skipped on later calls: a single string call would
+	       disable in-place mode for every subsequent node call, returning a
+	       sanitized copy while leaving the caller's node — which in-place callers
+	       keep using and whose return value they ignore — unsanitized. REPORT-2. */
+	    const inPlace = IN_PLACE && typeof dirty !== 'string' && _isNode(dirty);
+	    if (inPlace) {
+	      /* Declarative-partial-updates / streaming pre-pass: sever every patch
+	         linkage across the live tree BEFORE the walk, so no patch can fire
+	         mid-walk and inject into an already-processed region. Runs first, so
+	         it also covers the forbidden/clobbered roots that throw below. */
+	      _neutralizePatchLinkage(dirty);
+	      /* Do some early pre-sanitization to avoid unsafe root nodes.
+	         Read nodeName through the cached prototype getter — a clobbering
+	         child named "nodeName" on the form root would otherwise shadow
+	         the property and let this check skip the root-allowlist
+	         validation entirely. */
+	      const nn = getNodeName ? getNodeName(dirty) : dirty.nodeName;
+	      if (typeof nn === 'string') {
+	        const tagName = transformCaseFunc(nn);
 	        if (!ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName] || FORBID_TAGS[tagName]) {
+	          /* Fail closed on a live root: neutralize handlers/children before
+	             throwing, exactly as the mid-walk abort path does. */
+	          _neutralizeRoot(dirty);
 	          throw typeErrorCreate('root node is forbidden and cannot be sanitized in-place');
 	        }
 	      }
-	    } else if (dirty instanceof Node) {
+	      /* Pre-flight the root through _isClobbered. The iterator-driven
+	         removal path can not detach a parent-less root: _forceRemove
+	         falls through to Element.prototype.remove(), which per spec
+	         is a no-op on a node with no parent. A clobbered root would
+	         then survive the main loop with its attributes uninspected,
+	         because _sanitizeAttributes early-returns on _isClobbered. The
+	         result would be an attacker-controlled form, complete with any
+	         event-handler attributes the caller passed in, handed back to
+	         the application unsanitized. Refuse to sanitize such a root
+	         the same way we refuse a forbidden tag. GHSA-r47g-fvhr-h676. */
+	      if (_isClobbered(dirty)) {
+	        /* Fail closed on a live clobbered root before throwing.
+	           _neutralizeRoot's reads are clobber-safe (cached getters); the
+	           form's non-clobbered descendants, e.g. an armed <img>, are scrubbed. */
+	        _neutralizeRoot(dirty);
+	        throw typeErrorCreate('root node is clobbered and cannot be sanitized in-place');
+	      }
+	      /* Sanitize attached shadow roots before the main iterator runs.
+	         The iterator does not descend into shadow trees. Same fail-closed
+	         barrier as the main walk (campaign-3 F2): a custom-element reaction
+	         inside a shadow root could abort this pre-pass before the walk runs,
+	         which would otherwise leave the entire live tree unsanitized. */
+	      try {
+	        _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(dirty);
+	      } catch (error) {
+	        _neutralizeRoot(dirty);
+	        throw error;
+	      }
+	    } else if (_isNode(dirty)) {
 	      /* If dirty is a DOM element, append to an empty document to avoid
 	         elements being stripped by the parser */
 	      body = _initDocument('<!---->');
@@ -9628,12 +11029,18 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	        // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-dom-node-append
 	        body.appendChild(importedNode);
 	      }
+	      /* Clonable shadow roots are deep-cloned by importNode(); sanitize
+	         them before the main iterator runs, since the iterator does not
+	         descend into shadow trees. The walk routes every read through a
+	         cached prototype getter so clobbering descendants on a form root
+	         cannot hide a shadow host from this pass. */
+	      _sanitizeAttachedShadowRoots(importedNode);
 	    } else {
 	      /* Exit directly if we have nothing to do */
 	      if (!RETURN_DOM && !SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES && !WHOLE_DOCUMENT &&
 	      // eslint-disable-next-line unicorn/prefer-includes
 	      dirty.indexOf('<') === -1) {
-	        return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(dirty) : dirty;
+	        return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? _createTrustedHTML(dirty) : dirty;
 	      }
 	      /* Initialize the document to work on */
 	      body = _initDocument(dirty);
@@ -9647,31 +11054,71 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	      _forceRemove(body.firstChild);
 	    }
 	    /* Get node iterator */
-	    const nodeIterator = _createNodeIterator(IN_PLACE ? dirty : body);
-	    /* Now start iterating over the created document */
-	    while (currentNode = nodeIterator.nextNode()) {
-	      /* Sanitize tags and elements */
-	      _sanitizeElements(currentNode);
-	      /* Check attributes next */
-	      _sanitizeAttributes(currentNode);
-	      /* Shadow DOM detected, sanitize it */
-	      if (currentNode.content instanceof DocumentFragment) {
-	        _sanitizeShadowDOM2(currentNode.content);
+	    const walkRoot = inPlace ? dirty : body;
+	    /* Now start iterating over the created document.
+	       The walk runs inside an exception barrier (campaign-3 F2): a re-entrant
+	       engine/custom-element mutation can detach a node mid-walk so
+	       `_forceRemove`'s parentless guard throws, aborting the loop. Without the
+	       barrier the caller's in-place tree would be left half-sanitized with the
+	       unvisited tail still armed. _createNodeIterator itself is inside the
+	       barrier too: constructing the iterator dereferences the root's document,
+	       and any failure there (e.g. an exotic/clobbered root) must still fail
+	       closed rather than skip the neutralize. On any throw we fail closed -
+	       strip the in-place root bare - then rethrow so the existing throw
+	       contract is preserved. (String/DOM-copy paths never return the partial
+	       body, so the propagating throw is already fail-closed there.) */
+	    try {
+	      const nodeIterator = _createNodeIterator(walkRoot);
+	      while (currentNode = nodeIterator.nextNode()) {
+	        /* Sanitize tags and elements */
+	        _sanitizeElements(currentNode, walkRoot);
+	        /* Check attributes next */
+	        _sanitizeAttributes(currentNode);
+	        /* Shadow DOM detected, sanitize it.
+	           Realm-safe check (GHSA-hpcv-96wg-7vj8): nodeType-based detection
+	           instead of instanceof, so foreign-realm <template>.content is
+	           walked correctly. */
+	        if (_isDocumentFragment(currentNode.content)) {
+	          _sanitizeShadowDOM2(currentNode.content);
+	        }
+	      }
+	    } catch (error) {
+	      if (inPlace) {
+	        _neutralizeRoot(dirty);
+	        /* Nodes _forceRemove'd earlier in the aborted walk are already
+	           detached from the root, so _neutralizeRoot's subtree pass does not
+	           reach them. Defuse them too, mirroring the success-path loop below. */
+	        arrayForEach(DOMPurify.removed, entry => {
+	          if (entry.element) {
+	            _neutralizeSubtree(entry.element);
+	          }
+	        });
 	      }
+	      throw error;
 	    }
 	    /* If we sanitized `dirty` in-place, return it. */
-	    if (IN_PLACE) {
+	    if (inPlace) {
+	      /* Fail-closed completion of the audit-5 F1 fix: every node removed from
+	         the caller's live tree is detached but may still hold a queued
+	         resource-event handler that fires in page scope after we return. The
+	         move-hoist covers only disallowed-tag KEEP_CONTENT removals; strip the
+	         non-allow-listed attributes off every other removed subtree (clobber,
+	         mXSS, namespace, comments, KEEP_CONTENT:false, …) so those handlers are
+	         cancelled before any event can fire. Runs synchronously, pre-return. */
+	      arrayForEach(DOMPurify.removed, entry => {
+	        if (entry.element) {
+	          _neutralizeSubtree(entry.element);
+	        }
+	      });
+	      if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
+	        _scrubTemplateExpressions2(dirty);
+	      }
 	      return dirty;
 	    }
 	    /* Return sanitized string or DOM */
 	    if (RETURN_DOM) {
 	      if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
-	        body.normalize();
-	        let html = body.innerHTML;
-	        arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR, ERB_EXPR, TMPLIT_EXPR], expr => {
-	          html = stringReplace(html, expr, ' ');
-	        });
-	        body.innerHTML = html;
+	        _scrubTemplateExpressions2(body);
 	      }
 	      if (RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {
 	        returnNode = createDocumentFragment.call(body.ownerDocument);
@@ -9701,20 +11148,28 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	    }
 	    /* Sanitize final string template-safe */
 	    if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
-	      arrayForEach([MUSTACHE_EXPR, ERB_EXPR, TMPLIT_EXPR], expr => {
-	        serializedHTML = stringReplace(serializedHTML, expr, ' ');
-	      });
+	      serializedHTML = _stripTemplateExpressions(serializedHTML);
 	    }
-	    return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(serializedHTML) : serializedHTML;
+	    return trustedTypesPolicy && RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE ? _createTrustedHTML(serializedHTML) : serializedHTML;
 	  };
 	  DOMPurify.setConfig = function () {
 	    let cfg = arguments.length > 0 && arguments[0] !== undefined ? arguments[0] : {};
 	    _parseConfig(cfg);
 	    SET_CONFIG = true;
+	    SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_TAGS = ALLOWED_TAGS;
+	    SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_ATTR = ALLOWED_ATTR;
 	  };
 	  DOMPurify.clearConfig = function () {
 	    CONFIG = null;
 	    SET_CONFIG = false;
+	    SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_TAGS = null;
+	    SET_CONFIG_ALLOWED_ATTR = null;
+	    // Drop any caller-supplied Trusted Types policy so it cannot poison later
+	    // `RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE` output. The internal default policy (cached, and
+	    // never recreated — Trusted Types throws on duplicate names) is restored by
+	    // the next `_parseConfig`. See GHSA-vxr8-fq34-vvx9.
+	    trustedTypesPolicy = defaultTrustedTypesPolicy;
+	    emptyHTML = '';
 	  };
 	  DOMPurify.isValidAttribute = function (tag, attr, value) {
 	    /* Initialize shared config vars if necessary. */
@@ -9729,9 +11184,19 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	    if (typeof hookFunction !== 'function') {
 	      return;
 	    }
+	    /* Reject unknown entry points. Without this, a non-hook key (e.g.
+	     * '__proto__') indexes off the prototype chain rather than a real
+	     * hook array, and arrayPush then writes to Object.prototype. Guard
+	     * with an own-property check against the known hook names. */
+	    if (!objectHasOwnProperty(hooks, entryPoint)) {
+	      return;
+	    }
 	    arrayPush(hooks[entryPoint], hookFunction);
 	  };
 	  DOMPurify.removeHook = function (entryPoint, hookFunction) {
+	    if (!objectHasOwnProperty(hooks, entryPoint)) {
+	      return undefined;
+	    }
 	    if (hookFunction !== undefined) {
 	      const index = arrayLastIndexOf(hooks[entryPoint], hookFunction);
 	      return index === -1 ? undefined : arraySplice(hooks[entryPoint], index, 1)[0];
@@ -9739,6 +11204,9 @@ function requirePurify_cjs () {
 	    return arrayPop(hooks[entryPoint]);
 	  };
 	  DOMPurify.removeHooks = function (entryPoint) {
+	    if (!objectHasOwnProperty(hooks, entryPoint)) {
+	      return;
+	    }
 	    hooks[entryPoint] = [];
 	  };
 	  DOMPurify.removeAllHooks = function () {
@@ -9999,10 +11467,26 @@ var WalletBackground = /*#__PURE__*/function (_Background) {
 }(Background);
 
 /**
- * Generate a unique id compatible with HTML element id
+ * Generate a unique id compatible with HTML element id.
+ * Uses the Web Crypto API for cryptographically strong randomness, with a
+ * deterministic fallback only when crypto is unavailable.
  */
 function getUniqueId() {
-  return Math.random().toString(36).replace(/[^a-z]+/g, '').substr(2, 10);
+  var letters = 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz';
+  var length = 10;
+  var bytes = new Uint8Array(length);
+  if (typeof crypto !== 'undefined' && typeof crypto.getRandomValues === 'function') {
+    crypto.getRandomValues(bytes);
+  } else {
+    for (var i = 0; i < length; i++) {
+      bytes[i] = (i * 31 + 7) % 256;
+    }
+  }
+  var id = '';
+  for (var _i = 0; _i < length; _i++) {
+    id += letters[bytes[_i] % letters.length];
+  }
+  return id;
 }
 
 function getFlypayV2Button(widgetId) {
@@ -14035,6 +15519,54 @@ var MultiWidget = /*#__PURE__*/function () {
         validate_card_types: validateCardNumberInput
       });
     }
+    /**
+     * Current method restricts which card schemes the card number input accepts, without changing which card
+     * icons the widget displays. Scheme identifiers are matched case-insensitively and ignoring surrounding
+     * whitespace; unsupported identifiers are ignored with a warning, so a list in which every identifier is
+     * unsupported applies no restriction at all.
+     *
+     * Takes precedence over setSupportedCardIcons: when a non-empty list is supplied here, it is the only list
+     * used for validation and the validateCardNumberInput flag of setSupportedCardIcons no longer affects it.
+     * Calling this method more than once replaces the previous list rather than merging with it.
+     *
+     * Must be called before load().
+     *
+     * @example
+     *
+     * widget.setAllowedCardSchemes(['visa', 'mastercard']);
+     *
+     * @param {string[]} schemes - [CARD_SCHEME]{@link CARD_SCHEME}
+     */
+  }, {
+    key: "setAllowedCardSchemes",
+    value: function setAllowedCardSchemes(schemes) {
+      var vocabulary = ObjectHelper.values(CARD_SCHEME);
+      var allowedSchemes = [];
+      var _iterator = _createForOfIteratorHelper(Array.isArray(schemes) ? schemes : []),
+        _step;
+      try {
+        for (_iterator.s(); !(_step = _iterator.n()).done;) {
+          var entry = _step.value;
+          var scheme = typeof entry === 'string' ? entry.trim().toLowerCase() : '';
+          if (vocabulary.indexOf(scheme) === -1) {
+            console.warn("Widget::setAllowedCardSchemes: unsupported card scheme ".concat(entry));
+            continue;
+          }
+          if (allowedSchemes.indexOf(scheme) === -1) {
+            allowedSchemes.push(scheme);
+          }
+        }
+      } catch (err) {
+        _iterator.e(err);
+      } finally {
+        _iterator.f();
+      }
+      if (allowedSchemes.length) {
+        this.link.setParams({
+          allowed_card_schemes: allowedSchemes.join(',')
+        });
+      }
+    }
     /**
      * Current method can hide prevent the widget from showing the error messages
      *
@@ -19134,6 +20666,90 @@ var EVENT$1;
   EVENT["ON_SHIPPING_OPTIONS_CHANGE"] = "onShippingOptionsChange";
 })(EVENT$1 || (EVENT$1 = {}));
 
+/** TTL for a cached service configuration: 1 day, in milliseconds. */
+var CACHE_TTL_MS = 86400000;
+/** Builds the `localStorage` key used to cache a service's configuration. */
+function serviceConfigStorageKey(serviceId) {
+  return "paydock-serviceConfig-".concat(serviceId);
+}
+/**
+ * Removes the cached service configuration for the given service ID, forcing the next
+ * fetch to go to the network. Called on error / unavailable flows so a potentially
+ * stale cached config is not reused after something changed server-side. No-throw when
+ * `localStorage` is unavailable.
+ *
+ * @param serviceId - The service ID whose cached configuration should be cleared.
+ */
+function clearServiceConfigCache(serviceId) {
+  try {
+    localStorage.removeItem(serviceConfigStorageKey(serviceId));
+  } catch (_error) {
+    // localStorage may be unavailable; nothing to clear
+  }
+}
+/**
+ * Fetches the wallet service configuration, backed by a 1-day `localStorage` cache
+ * keyed on the service ID. Falls back gracefully (no caching) when `localStorage`
+ * is unavailable (e.g. private browsing). Shared by the instance `load()` flow and
+ * the static availability checks so both reuse the same cached fetch.
+ *
+ * @param api - The configured API client (env must already be set).
+ * @param serviceId - The service ID to fetch the configuration for.
+ * @returns The service configuration response.
+ */
+function getServiceConfigCached(api, serviceId) {
+  return __awaiter(this, void 0, void 0, /*#__PURE__*/_regenerator().m(function _callee() {
+    var storageKey, cachedData, _JSON$parse, data, timestamp, serviceConfigResponse, encodedData;
+    return _regenerator().w(function (_context) {
+      while (1) switch (_context.p = _context.n) {
+        case 0:
+          storageKey = serviceConfigStorageKey(serviceId);
+          _context.p = 1;
+          cachedData = localStorage.getItem(storageKey);
+          if (!cachedData) {
+            _context.n = 5;
+            break;
+          }
+          _context.p = 2;
+          _JSON$parse = JSON.parse(atob(cachedData)), data = _JSON$parse.data, timestamp = _JSON$parse.timestamp;
+          if (!(Date.now() - timestamp < CACHE_TTL_MS)) {
+            _context.n = 3;
+            break;
+          }
+          return _context.a(2, JSON.parse(data));
+        case 3:
+          _context.n = 5;
+          break;
+        case 4:
+          _context.p = 4;
+          _context.v;
+          localStorage.removeItem(storageKey);
+        case 5:
+          _context.n = 7;
+          break;
+        case 6:
+          _context.p = 6;
+          _context.v;
+        case 7:
+          _context.n = 8;
+          return api.service().getConfig(serviceId);
+        case 8:
+          serviceConfigResponse = _context.v;
+          try {
+            encodedData = btoa(JSON.stringify({
+              data: JSON.stringify(serviceConfigResponse),
+              timestamp: Date.now()
+            }));
+            localStorage.setItem(storageKey, encodedData);
+          } catch (_error) {
+            // localStorage may be unavailable; proceed without caching
+          }
+          return _context.a(2, serviceConfigResponse);
+      }
+    }, _callee, null, [[2, 4], [1, 6]]);
+  }));
+}
+
 /**
  * @classdesc Abstract base class for Open Wallet buttons. **Do not instantiate directly.**
  * Use {@link ApplePayOpenWalletButton} or {@link GooglePayOpenWalletButton} instead.
@@ -19167,10 +20783,30 @@ var OpenWalletButtons = /*#__PURE__*/function () {
     this.api = new ApiInternal(publicKeyOrAccessToken, this.getApiAuthType(publicKeyOrAccessToken));
     this.serviceId = serviceId;
     this.meta = meta;
+    this.registerCacheInvalidationOnError();
     this.validateBaseMeta();
     this.validateWalletMeta();
   }
+  /**
+   * Invalidates the cached service configuration whenever an error or unavailable
+   * event fires, so the next `load()` re-fetches a fresh config. The cache is keyed
+   * on the service ID with a 1-day TTL; clearing it on failure means a config that
+   * changed server-side (and caused the failure) is not reused until the TTL expires.
+   * Registered once per button, independently of any merchant-registered handlers.
+   *
+   * @private
+   */
   return _createClass(OpenWalletButtons, [{
+    key: "registerCacheInvalidationOnError",
+    value: function registerCacheInvalidationOnError() {
+      var _this = this;
+      var invalidate = function invalidate() {
+        return clearServiceConfigCache(_this.serviceId);
+      };
+      this.eventEmitter.subscribe(EVENT$1.ERROR, invalidate);
+      this.eventEmitter.subscribe(EVENT$1.UNAVAILABLE, invalidate);
+    }
+  }, {
     key: "getApiAuthType",
     value: function getApiAuthType(publicKeyOrAccessToken) {
       if (AccessToken.validateJWT(publicKeyOrAccessToken)) {
@@ -19204,57 +20840,7 @@ var OpenWalletButtons = /*#__PURE__*/function () {
   }, {
     key: "getOpenWalletServiceConfig",
     value: function getOpenWalletServiceConfig() {
-      return __awaiter(this, void 0, void 0, /*#__PURE__*/_regenerator().m(function _callee() {
-        var storageKey, cachedData, _JSON$parse, data, timestamp, oneDay, serviceConfigResponse, encodedData;
-        return _regenerator().w(function (_context) {
-          while (1) switch (_context.p = _context.n) {
-            case 0:
-              storageKey = "serviceConfig-".concat(this.serviceId);
-              _context.p = 1;
-              cachedData = localStorage.getItem(storageKey);
-              if (!cachedData) {
-                _context.n = 5;
-                break;
-              }
-              _context.p = 2;
-              _JSON$parse = JSON.parse(atob(cachedData)), data = _JSON$parse.data, timestamp = _JSON$parse.timestamp;
-              oneDay = 86400000;
-              if (!(Date.now() - timestamp < oneDay)) {
-                _context.n = 3;
-                break;
-              }
-              return _context.a(2, JSON.parse(data));
-            case 3:
-              _context.n = 5;
-              break;
-            case 4:
-              _context.p = 4;
-              _context.v;
-              localStorage.removeItem(storageKey);
-            case 5:
-              _context.n = 7;
-              break;
-            case 6:
-              _context.p = 6;
-              _context.v;
-            case 7:
-              _context.n = 8;
-              return this.api.service().getConfig(this.serviceId);
-            case 8:
-              serviceConfigResponse = _context.v;
-              try {
-                encodedData = btoa(JSON.stringify({
-                  data: JSON.stringify(serviceConfigResponse),
-                  timestamp: Date.now()
-                }));
-                localStorage.setItem(storageKey, encodedData);
-              } catch (_error) {
-                // localStorage may be unavailable; proceed without caching
-              }
-              return _context.a(2, serviceConfigResponse);
-          }
-        }, _callee, this, [[2, 4], [1, 6]]);
-      }));
+      return getServiceConfigCached(this.api, this.serviceId);
     }
   }, {
     key: "handleOnError",
@@ -19289,13 +20875,13 @@ var OpenWalletButtons = /*#__PURE__*/function () {
   }, {
     key: "load",
     value: function load() {
-      var _this = this;
+      var _this2 = this;
       this.getOpenWalletServiceConfig().then(function (serviceConfig) {
-        _this.validateServiceType(serviceConfig);
-        _this.walletService = _this.createWalletService(serviceConfig);
-        _this.walletService.load();
+        _this2.validateServiceType(serviceConfig);
+        _this2.walletService = _this2.createWalletService(serviceConfig);
+        _this2.walletService.load();
       })["catch"](function (error) {
-        _this.handleOnError(error instanceof Error ? error : new Error(String(error)), exports.ERROR_OPERATION.CONFIGURATION);
+        _this2.handleOnError(error instanceof Error ? error : new Error(String(error)), exports.ERROR_OPERATION.CONFIGURATION);
       });
     }
     /**
@@ -19493,28 +21079,28 @@ var OpenWalletButtons = /*#__PURE__*/function () {
   }, {
     key: "onSuccess",
     value: function onSuccess(handler) {
-      var _this2 = this;
+      var _this3 = this;
       if (typeof handler === 'function') {
         this.eventEmitter.subscribe(EVENT$1.SUCCESS, function (data) {
-          return __awaiter(_this2, void 0, void 0, /*#__PURE__*/_regenerator().m(function _callee2() {
-            var _t3;
-            return _regenerator().w(function (_context2) {
-              while (1) switch (_context2.p = _context2.n) {
+          return __awaiter(_this3, void 0, void 0, /*#__PURE__*/_regenerator().m(function _callee() {
+            var _t;
+            return _regenerator().w(function (_context) {
+              while (1) switch (_context.p = _context.n) {
                 case 0:
-                  _context2.p = 0;
-                  _context2.n = 1;
+                  _context.p = 0;
+                  _context.n = 1;
                   return handler(data);
                 case 1:
-                  _context2.n = 3;
+                  _context.n = 3;
                   break;
                 case 2:
-                  _context2.p = 2;
-                  _t3 = _context2.v;
-                  console.warn('Merchant onSuccess handler threw (swallowed):', _t3);
+                  _context.p = 2;
+                  _t = _context.v;
+                  console.warn('Merchant onSuccess handler threw (swallowed):', _t);
                 case 3:
-                  return _context2.a(2);
+                  return _context.a(2);
               }
-            }, _callee2, null, [[0, 2]]);
+            }, _callee, null, [[0, 2]]);
           }));
         });
         return;
@@ -19545,28 +21131,28 @@ var OpenWalletButtons = /*#__PURE__*/function () {
   }, {
     key: "onUnavailable",
     value: function onUnavailable(handler) {
-      var _this3 = this;
+      var _this4 = this;
       if (typeof handler === 'function') {
         this.eventEmitter.subscribe(EVENT$1.UNAVAILABLE, function (data) {
-          return __awaiter(_this3, void 0, void 0, /*#__PURE__*/_regenerator().m(function _callee3() {
-            var _t4;
-            return _regenerator().w(function (_context3) {
-              while (1) switch (_context3.p = _context3.n) {
+          return __awaiter(_this4, void 0, void 0, /*#__PURE__*/_regenerator().m(function _callee2() {
+            var _t2;
+            return _regenerator().w(function (_context2) {
+              while (1) switch (_context2.p = _context2.n) {
                 case 0:
-                  _context3.p = 0;
-                  _context3.n = 1;
+                  _context2.p = 0;
+                  _context2.n = 1;
                   return handler(data);
                 case 1:
-                  _context3.n = 3;
+                  _context2.n = 3;
                   break;
                 case 2:
-                  _context3.p = 2;
-                  _t4 = _context3.v;
-                  console.warn('Merchant onUnavailable handler threw (swallowed):', _t4);
+                  _context2.p = 2;
+                  _t2 = _context2.v;
+                  console.warn('Merchant onUnavailable handler threw (swallowed):', _t2);
                 case 3:
-                  return _context3.a(2);
+                  return _context2.a(2);
               }
-            }, _callee3, null, [[0, 2]]);
+            }, _callee2, null, [[0, 2]]);
           }));
         });
         return;
@@ -19598,28 +21184,28 @@ var OpenWalletButtons = /*#__PURE__*/function () {
   }, {
     key: "onError",
     value: function onError(handler) {
-      var _this4 = this;
+      var _this5 = this;
       if (typeof handler === 'function') {
         this.eventEmitter.subscribe(EVENT$1.ERROR, function (data) {
-          return __awaiter(_this4, void 0, void 0, /*#__PURE__*/_regenerator().m(function _callee4() {
-            var _t5;
-            return _regenerator().w(function (_context4) {
-              while (1) switch (_context4.p = _context4.n) {
+          return __awaiter(_this5, void 0, void 0, /*#__PURE__*/_regenerator().m(function _callee3() {
+            var _t3;
+            return _regenerator().w(function (_context3) {
+              while (1) switch (_context3.p = _context3.n) {
                 case 0:
-                  _context4.p = 0;
-                  _context4.n = 1;
+                  _context3.p = 0;
+                  _context3.n = 1;
                   return handler(data);
                 case 1:
-                  _context4.n = 3;
+                  _context3.n = 3;
                   break;
                 case 2:
-                  _context4.p = 2;
-                  _t5 = _context4.v;
-                  console.warn('Merchant onError handler threw (swallowed):', _t5);
+                  _context3.p = 2;
+                  _t3 = _context3.v;
+                  console.warn('Merchant onError handler threw (swallowed):', _t3);
                 case 3:
-                  return _context4.a(2);
+                  return _context3.a(2);
               }
-            }, _callee4, null, [[0, 2]]);
+            }, _callee3, null, [[0, 2]]);
           }));
         });
         return;
@@ -19650,28 +21236,28 @@ var OpenWalletButtons = /*#__PURE__*/function () {
   }, {
     key: "onCancel",
     value: function onCancel(handler) {
-      var _this5 = this;
+      var _this6 = this;
       if (typeof handler === 'function') {
         this.eventEmitter.subscribe(EVENT$1.CHECKOUT_CLOSE, function (data) {
-          return __awaiter(_this5, void 0, void 0, /*#__PURE__*/_regenerator().m(function _callee5() {
-            var _t6;
-            return _regenerator().w(function (_context5) {
-              while (1) switch (_context5.p = _context5.n) {
+          return __awaiter(_this6, void 0, void 0, /*#__PURE__*/_regenerator().m(function _callee4() {
+            var _t4;
+            return _regenerator().w(function (_context4) {
+              while (1) switch (_context4.p = _context4.n) {
                 case 0:
-                  _context5.p = 0;
-                  _context5.n = 1;
+                  _context4.p = 0;
+                  _context4.n = 1;
                   return handler(data);
                 case 1:
-                  _context5.n = 3;
+                  _context4.n = 3;
                   break;
                 case 2:
-                  _context5.p = 2;
-                  _t6 = _context5.v;
-                  console.warn('Merchant onCancel handler threw (swallowed):', _t6);
+                  _context4.p = 2;
+                  _t4 = _context4.v;
+                  console.warn('Merchant onCancel handler threw (swallowed):', _t4);
                 case 3:
-                  return _context5.a(2);
+                  return _context4.a(2);
               }
-            }, _callee5, null, [[0, 2]]);
+            }, _callee4, null, [[0, 2]]);
           }));
         });
         return;
@@ -19695,28 +21281,28 @@ var OpenWalletButtons = /*#__PURE__*/function () {
   }, {
     key: "onLoaded",
     value: function onLoaded(handler) {
-      var _this6 = this;
+      var _this7 = this;
       if (typeof handler === 'function') {
         this.eventEmitter.subscribe(EVENT$1.LOADED, function (data) {
-          return __awaiter(_this6, void 0, void 0, /*#__PURE__*/_regenerator().m(function _callee6() {
-            var _t7;
-            return _regenerator().w(function (_context6) {
-              while (1) switch (_context6.p = _context6.n) {
+          return __awaiter(_this7, void 0, void 0, /*#__PURE__*/_regenerator().m(function _callee5() {
+            var _t5;
+            return _regenerator().w(function (_context5) {
+              while (1) switch (_context5.p = _context5.n) {
                 case 0:
-                  _context6.p = 0;
-                  _context6.n = 1;
+                  _context5.p = 0;
+                  _context5.n = 1;
                   return handler(data);
                 case 1:
-                  _context6.n = 3;
+                  _context5.n = 3;
                   break;
                 case 2:
-                  _context6.p = 2;
-                  _t7 = _context6.v;
-                  console.warn('Merchant onLoaded handler threw (swallowed):', _t7);
+                  _context5.p = 2;
+                  _t5 = _context5.v;
+                  console.warn('Merchant onLoaded handler threw (swallowed):', _t5);
                 case 3:
-                  return _context6.a(2);
+                  return _context5.a(2);
               }
-            }, _callee6, null, [[0, 2]]);
+            }, _callee5, null, [[0, 2]]);
           }));
         });
         return;
@@ -20064,7 +21650,143 @@ exports.WALLET_TYPES = void 0;
   WALLET_TYPES["GOOGLE_PAY"] = "google";
 })(exports.WALLET_TYPES || (exports.WALLET_TYPES = {}));
 
-var DEFAULT_APPLE_PAY_CAPABILITIES$1 = ['paymentCredentialsAvailable'];
+/** CDN location of Apple's web SDK (provides the `<apple-pay-button>` web component). */
+var APPLE_PAY_SDK_URL = 'https://applepay.cdn-apple.com/jsapi/1.latest/apple-pay-sdk.js';
+/**
+ * Statuses that count as available when the merchant does not override them.
+ * Includes `paymentCredentialStatusUnknown` so the button is shown in third-party /
+ * cross-device (QR) browsers, per Apple's guidance.
+ */
+var DEFAULT_APPLE_PAY_CAPABILITIES$1 = ['paymentCredentialsAvailable', 'paymentCredentialStatusUnknown'];
+/**
+ * Maps the SDK's friendly capability tokens to Apple's `PaymentCredentialStatus` values.
+ * Unknown tokens are passed through unchanged.
+ */
+function formatCapabilities(capabilities) {
+  var fieldMap = {
+    credentials_available: 'paymentCredentialsAvailable',
+    credentials_status_unknown: 'paymentCredentialStatusUnknown',
+    credentials_unavailable: 'paymentCredentialsUnavailable'
+  };
+  return capabilities.map(function (capability) {
+    return fieldMap[capability] || capability;
+  });
+}
+/**
+ * Synchronous, network-free check for a **native, same-device** Apple Pay session
+ * (`window.ApplePaySession` exists and `canMakePayments()` is `true`). Safe to call in
+ * any environment (never throws).
+ *
+ * Note: this is a legacy/Safari-oriented signal. It is **not** authoritative for
+ * cross-browser / cross-device (QR) availability — in Chrome/Edge/Firefox
+ * `window.ApplePaySession` is supplied by the CDN SDK and may be absent until it loads,
+ * and the cross-device flow is reflected by `applePayCapabilities()`, not this call.
+ * Use {@link evaluateApplePayAvailability} for the authoritative, cross-browser answer.
+ */
+function hasNativeApplePaySession() {
+  try {
+    return typeof window !== 'undefined' && !!window.ApplePaySession && typeof ApplePaySession !== 'undefined' && ApplePaySession.canMakePayments();
+  } catch (_a) {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+var sdkLoadPromise = null;
+/**
+ * Idempotently loads Apple's web SDK from the CDN.
+ * Resolves immediately if the `<apple-pay-button>` custom element is already
+ * registered, and de-duplicates concurrent loads. Rejects if the script fails to load.
+ */
+function loadApplePaySdk() {
+  if (typeof customElements !== 'undefined' && customElements.get('apple-pay-button')) {
+    return Promise.resolve();
+  }
+  if (sdkLoadPromise) {
+    return sdkLoadPromise;
+  }
+  sdkLoadPromise = new Promise(function (resolve, reject) {
+    var script = document.createElement('script');
+    script.src = APPLE_PAY_SDK_URL;
+    script.type = 'text/javascript';
+    script.crossOrigin = 'anonymous';
+    script.onload = function () {
+      return resolve();
+    };
+    script.onerror = function () {
+      // Allow a future retry after a transient failure.
+      sdkLoadPromise = null;
+      reject(new Error('Failed to load Apple Pay script'));
+    };
+    document.head.appendChild(script);
+  });
+  return sdkLoadPromise;
+}
+/**
+ * Core Apple Pay availability evaluation, shared by the instance flow
+ * (`ApplePayOpenWalletService`) and the static `ApplePayOpenWalletButton.checkAvailability`.
+ *
+ * Assumes the Apple Pay SDK is already loaded (call {@link loadApplePaySdk} first).
+ */
+function evaluateApplePayAvailability(params) {
+  return __awaiter(this, void 0, void 0, /*#__PURE__*/_regenerator().m(function _callee() {
+    var _a, hasNativeSession, allowed, capabilities, paymentCredentialStatus, available;
+    return _regenerator().w(function (_context) {
+      while (1) switch (_context.p = _context.n) {
+        case 0:
+          if (!(typeof window === 'undefined' || !window.ApplePaySession)) {
+            _context.n = 1;
+            break;
+          }
+          return _context.a(2, {
+            available: false,
+            supported: false,
+            has_native_session: false,
+            reason: 'unsupported_browser'
+          });
+        case 1:
+          hasNativeSession = hasNativeApplePaySession();
+          allowed = ((_a = params.apple_pay_capabilities) === null || _a === void 0 ? void 0 : _a.length) ? formatCapabilities(params.apple_pay_capabilities) : DEFAULT_APPLE_PAY_CAPABILITIES$1;
+          _context.p = 2;
+          _context.n = 3;
+          return ApplePaySession.applePayCapabilities(params.merchantId);
+        case 3:
+          capabilities = _context.v;
+          paymentCredentialStatus = capabilities === null || capabilities === void 0 ? void 0 : capabilities.paymentCredentialStatus; // `applePayCapabilities` is authoritative: trust an explicit `applePayUnsupported`
+          // (e.g. an unregistered/misconfigured merchant) rather than overriding it with the
+          // coarse `canMakePayments()` signal.
+          if (!(paymentCredentialStatus === 'applePayUnsupported')) {
+            _context.n = 4;
+            break;
+          }
+          return _context.a(2, {
+            available: false,
+            supported: false,
+            has_native_session: hasNativeSession,
+            payment_credential_status: paymentCredentialStatus,
+            reason: 'unsupported_browser'
+          });
+        case 4:
+          available = allowed.includes(paymentCredentialStatus);
+          return _context.a(2, {
+            available: available,
+            supported: true,
+            has_native_session: hasNativeSession,
+            payment_credential_status: paymentCredentialStatus,
+            reason: available ? undefined : 'no_credentials'
+          });
+        case 5:
+          _context.p = 5;
+          _context.v;
+          return _context.a(2, {
+            available: false,
+            supported: hasNativeSession,
+            has_native_session: hasNativeSession,
+            reason: 'query_failed'
+          });
+      }
+    }, _callee, null, [[2, 5]]);
+  }));
+}
+
 /**
  * Apple Pay implementation of the OpenWallet service.
  *
@@ -20340,7 +22062,6 @@ var ApplePayOpenWalletService = /*#__PURE__*/function (_OpenWalletService) {
     value: function load() {
       return __awaiter(this, void 0, void 0, /*#__PURE__*/_regenerator().m(function _callee3() {
         var _this4 = this;
-        var applePayScript;
         return _regenerator().w(function (_context3) {
           while (1) switch (_context3.n) {
             case 0:
@@ -20351,26 +22072,12 @@ var ApplePayOpenWalletService = /*#__PURE__*/function (_OpenWalletService) {
               this.handleOnUnavailable('Promises not supported');
               return _context3.a(2);
             case 1:
-              if (!(customElements === null || customElements === void 0 ? void 0 : customElements.get('apple-pay-button'))) {
-                _context3.n = 2;
-                break;
-              }
-              this.onScriptLoaded();
-              return _context3.a(2);
-            case 2:
-              applePayScript = document.createElement('script');
-              applePayScript.src = 'https://applepay.cdn-apple.com/jsapi/1.latest/apple-pay-sdk.js';
-              applePayScript.type = 'text/javascript';
-              applePayScript.crossOrigin = 'anonymous';
-              applePayScript.onload = function () {
+              loadApplePaySdk().then(function () {
                 _this4.onScriptLoaded();
-              };
-              applePayScript.onerror = function () {
+              })["catch"](function () {
                 _this4.handleOnUnavailable('Failed to load Apple Pay script');
-                return;
-              };
-              document.head.appendChild(applePayScript);
-            case 3:
+              });
+            case 2:
               return _context3.a(2);
           }
         }, _callee3, this);
@@ -20398,26 +22105,22 @@ var ApplePayOpenWalletService = /*#__PURE__*/function (_OpenWalletService) {
   }, {
     key: "checkAvailability",
     value: function checkAvailability() {
-      var _this6 = this;
-      return new Promise(function (resolve) {
-        var _a;
-        if (!window.ApplePaySession || !ApplePaySession) {
-          return resolve(false);
-        }
-        var formattedCapabilities = DEFAULT_APPLE_PAY_CAPABILITIES$1;
-        if (((_a = _this6.meta.apple_pay_capabilities) === null || _a === void 0 ? void 0 : _a.length) > 0) {
-          formattedCapabilities = _this6.formatCapabilities(_this6.meta.apple_pay_capabilities);
-        }
-        ApplePaySession.applePayCapabilities(_this6.getMerchantId()).then(function (capabilities) {
-          if (_this6.isUnsuportedBrowser(capabilities)) {
-            return resolve(ApplePaySession.canMakePayments());
+      return __awaiter(this, void 0, void 0, /*#__PURE__*/_regenerator().m(function _callee4() {
+        var result;
+        return _regenerator().w(function (_context4) {
+          while (1) switch (_context4.n) {
+            case 0:
+              _context4.n = 1;
+              return evaluateApplePayAvailability({
+                merchantId: this.getMerchantId(),
+                apple_pay_capabilities: this.meta.apple_pay_capabilities
+              });
+            case 1:
+              result = _context4.v;
+              return _context4.a(2, result.available);
           }
-          var allowedCapability = formattedCapabilities.includes(capabilities === null || capabilities === void 0 ? void 0 : capabilities.paymentCredentialStatus);
-          return resolve(allowedCapability);
-        })["catch"](function () {
-          resolve(false);
-        });
-      });
+        }, _callee4, this);
+      }));
     }
   }, {
     key: "mount",
@@ -20443,7 +22146,7 @@ var ApplePayOpenWalletService = /*#__PURE__*/function (_OpenWalletService) {
   }, {
     key: "onApplePayButtonClicked",
     value: function onApplePayButtonClicked() {
-      var _this7 = this;
+      var _this6 = this;
       if (this.isButtonDisabled()) {
         return;
       }
@@ -20462,26 +22165,27 @@ var ApplePayOpenWalletService = /*#__PURE__*/function (_OpenWalletService) {
       // As part of PAYCA-2065 we detect that the paymentSession.onvalidatemerchant is not
       // executed if the browser is not safari. In that case, we handle it outside the
       // actual merchant validation function.
-      var isIOS = /iPhone|iPad|iPod/.test(navigator.userAgent);
-      var isDesktopRequestIOS = navigator.maxTouchPoints > 1 && /Macintosh/.test(navigator.userAgent);
+      var userAgent = navigator.userAgent || '';
+      var isIOS = userAgent.includes('iPhone') || userAgent.includes('iPad') || userAgent.includes('iPod');
+      var isDesktopRequestIOS = navigator.maxTouchPoints > 1 && userAgent.includes('Macintosh');
       if (!window.safari && !isIOS && !isDesktopRequestIOS) {
         this.handleMerchantOnButtonClickEvent()["catch"](function (err) {
           console.error('Error while processing merchant callback', err);
-          _this7.paymentSession.abort();
+          _this6.paymentSession.abort();
         });
       }
     }
   }, {
     key: "getMerchantSession",
     value: function getMerchantSession() {
-      var _this8 = this;
+      var _this7 = this;
       return new Promise(function (resolve, reject) {
-        return _this8.api.paymentSource().createSession(_extends({
-          service_id: _this8.serviceId,
+        return _this7.api.paymentSource().createSession(_extends({
+          service_id: _this7.serviceId,
           session_id: window.location.hostname,
-          store_name: _this8.meta.store_name
-        }, _this8.isShippingRequired() && {
-          request_shipping: _this8.meta.request_shipping
+          store_name: _this7.meta.store_name
+        }, _this7.isShippingRequired() && {
+          request_shipping: _this7.meta.request_shipping
         })).then(function (res) {
           resolve(res);
         })["catch"](function (err) {
@@ -20492,42 +22196,30 @@ var ApplePayOpenWalletService = /*#__PURE__*/function (_OpenWalletService) {
   }, {
     key: "handleMerchantOnButtonClickEvent",
     value: function handleMerchantOnButtonClickEvent() {
-      return __awaiter(this, void 0, void 0, /*#__PURE__*/_regenerator().m(function _callee4() {
+      return __awaiter(this, void 0, void 0, /*#__PURE__*/_regenerator().m(function _callee5() {
         var results;
-        return _regenerator().w(function (_context4) {
-          while (1) switch (_context4.n) {
+        return _regenerator().w(function (_context5) {
+          while (1) switch (_context5.n) {
             case 0:
-              _context4.n = 1;
+              _context5.n = 1;
               return this.eventEmitter.emitWithResult(EVENT$1.ON_CLICK, {
                 event: EVENT$1.ON_CLICK
               });
             case 1:
-              results = _context4.v;
+              results = _context5.v;
               if (!results.some(function (r) {
                 return r === false;
               })) {
-                _context4.n = 2;
+                _context5.n = 2;
                 break;
               }
               throw new Error('onClick handler aborted the payment flow');
             case 2:
-              return _context4.a(2);
+              return _context5.a(2);
           }
-        }, _callee4, this);
+        }, _callee5, this);
       }));
     }
-  }, {
-    key: "formatCapabilities",
-    value: function formatCapabilities(capabilities) {
-      var fieldMap = {
-        credentials_available: 'paymentCredentialsAvailable',
-        credentials_status_unknown: 'paymentCredentialStatusUnknown',
-        credentials_unavailable: 'paymentCredentialsUnavailable'
-      };
-      return capabilities.map(function (capability) {
-        return fieldMap[capability] || capability;
-      });
-    }
   }, {
     key: "formatErrorFields",
     value: function formatErrorFields(error) {
@@ -20694,11 +22386,6 @@ var ApplePayOpenWalletService = /*#__PURE__*/function (_OpenWalletService) {
         applePayLaterAvailability: this.meta.apple_pay_later_availability
       });
     }
-  }, {
-    key: "isUnsuportedBrowser",
-    value: function isUnsuportedBrowser(capabilities) {
-      return (capabilities === null || capabilities === void 0 ? void 0 : capabilities.paymentCredentialStatus) === 'applePayUnsupported';
-    }
   }]);
 }(OpenWalletService);
 
@@ -20747,17 +22434,57 @@ var ApplePayOpenWalletButton = /*#__PURE__*/function (_OpenWalletButtons) {
     return _this;
   }
   /**
-   * Validates Apple Pay-specific required metadata fields.
-   * Apple Pay requires `amount_label` and `store_name` to be present and strings.
+   * Checks Apple Pay availability **without instantiating the button** — the single,
+   * authoritative, cross-browser-aware availability entry point.
    *
-   * @private
-   * @throws {Error} If `amount_label` is missing or not a string.
-   * @throws {Error} If `store_name` is missing or not a string.
+   * Resolves the merchant identifier (either supplied directly or fetched from the
+   * service configuration), loads Apple's web SDK if needed, then queries
+   * `ApplePaySession.applePayCapabilities()`. Returns a convenience `available` verdict
+   * (computed against `apple_pay_capabilities`), the raw device-reported
+   * `payment_credential_status`, and `has_native_session` so callers can infer the transport:
+   * `available && has_native_session` ⇒ native sheet likely; `available && !has_native_session`
+   * ⇒ cross-device / QR handoff likely.
+   *
+   * Pass `{ sync: true }` for a cheap, network-free native same-device pre-check that
+   * resolves immediately (see {@link ApplePayAvailabilityOptions.sync}).
+   *
+   * @param {ApplePayAvailabilityOptions} [options] - Merchant context, allowed capabilities, and mode.
+   * @returns {Promise<ApplePayAvailabilityResult>} The availability result.
+   *
+   * @example
+   * // Lightest path — no network, when you already know the merchant identifier:
+   * const result = await ApplePayOpenWalletButton.checkAvailability({ merchant_id });
+   *
+   * @example
+   * // Resolve the merchant identifier from the service configuration:
+   * const result = await ApplePayOpenWalletButton.checkAvailability({
+   *   public_key_or_access_token,
+   *   service_id,
+   *   env: 'sandbox',
+   * });
+   * if (result.available) {
+   *   // Render the Apple Pay button (native sheet or cross-device QR, per has_native_session).
+   * } else {
+   *   console.log('Unavailable:', result.reason, result.payment_credential_status);
+   * }
+   *
+   * @example
+   * // Synchronous native-only fast check (no network / SDK load):
+   * const { has_native_session } = await ApplePayOpenWalletButton.checkAvailability({ sync: true });
    */
   _inherits(ApplePayOpenWalletButton, _OpenWalletButtons);
   return _createClass(ApplePayOpenWalletButton, [{
     key: "validateWalletMeta",
-    value: function validateWalletMeta() {
+    value:
+    /**
+     * Validates Apple Pay-specific required metadata fields.
+     * Apple Pay requires `amount_label` and `store_name` to be present and strings.
+     *
+     * @private
+     * @throws {Error} If `amount_label` is missing or not a string.
+     * @throws {Error} If `store_name` is missing or not a string.
+     */
+    function validateWalletMeta() {
       if (typeof this.meta.amount_label !== 'string' || this.meta.amount_label.trim() === '') {
         throw new Error("meta.amount_label is required for Apple Pay and must be a non-empty string (e.g. 'TOTAL').");
       }
@@ -20791,6 +22518,114 @@ var ApplePayOpenWalletButton = /*#__PURE__*/function (_OpenWalletButtons) {
     value: function createWalletService(serviceConfig) {
       return new ApplePayOpenWalletService(this.api, this.eventEmitter, this.serviceId, this.container, this.meta, serviceConfig);
     }
+  }], [{
+    key: "checkAvailability",
+    value: function checkAvailability() {
+      return __awaiter(this, arguments, void 0, function () {
+        var options = arguments.length > 0 && arguments[0] !== undefined ? arguments[0] : {};
+        return /*#__PURE__*/_regenerator().m(function _callee() {
+          var hasNativeSession, merchantId, authType, api, serviceConfig;
+          return _regenerator().w(function (_context) {
+            while (1) switch (_context.p = _context.n) {
+              case 0:
+                hasNativeSession = hasNativeApplePaySession();
+                if (!options.sync) {
+                  _context.n = 1;
+                  break;
+                }
+                return _context.a(2, {
+                  available: hasNativeSession,
+                  supported: hasNativeSession,
+                  has_native_session: hasNativeSession,
+                  reason: hasNativeSession ? undefined : 'no_native_session'
+                });
+              case 1:
+                merchantId = options.merchant_id;
+                if (merchantId) {
+                  _context.n = 6;
+                  break;
+                }
+                if (!(!options.public_key_or_access_token || !options.service_id)) {
+                  _context.n = 2;
+                  break;
+                }
+                return _context.a(2, {
+                  available: false,
+                  supported: hasNativeSession,
+                  has_native_session: hasNativeSession,
+                  reason: 'missing_merchant_id'
+                });
+              case 2:
+                _context.p = 2;
+                authType = AccessToken.validateJWT(options.public_key_or_access_token) ? API_AUTH_TYPE.TOKEN : API_AUTH_TYPE.PUBLIC_KEY;
+                api = new ApiInternal(options.public_key_or_access_token, authType);
+                if (options.env) {
+                  api.setEnv(options.env);
+                }
+                _context.n = 3;
+                return getServiceConfigCached(api, options.service_id);
+              case 3:
+                serviceConfig = _context.v;
+                if (!(serviceConfig.type !== SERVICE_TYPES.APPLE_PAY)) {
+                  _context.n = 4;
+                  break;
+                }
+                return _context.a(2, {
+                  available: false,
+                  supported: hasNativeSession,
+                  has_native_session: hasNativeSession,
+                  reason: 'service_type_mismatch'
+                });
+              case 4:
+                merchantId = serviceConfig.merchant;
+                _context.n = 6;
+                break;
+              case 5:
+                _context.p = 5;
+                _context.v;
+                return _context.a(2, {
+                  available: false,
+                  supported: hasNativeSession,
+                  has_native_session: hasNativeSession,
+                  reason: 'config_fetch_failed'
+                });
+              case 6:
+                if (merchantId) {
+                  _context.n = 7;
+                  break;
+                }
+                return _context.a(2, {
+                  available: false,
+                  supported: hasNativeSession,
+                  has_native_session: hasNativeSession,
+                  reason: 'missing_merchant_id'
+                });
+              case 7:
+                _context.p = 7;
+                _context.n = 8;
+                return loadApplePaySdk();
+              case 8:
+                _context.n = 10;
+                break;
+              case 9:
+                _context.p = 9;
+                _context.v;
+                return _context.a(2, {
+                  available: false,
+                  supported: hasNativeSession,
+                  has_native_session: hasNativeSession,
+                  reason: 'sdk_load_failed'
+                });
+              case 10:
+                return _context.a(2, evaluateApplePayAvailability({
+                  merchantId: merchantId,
+                  apple_pay_capabilities: options.apple_pay_capabilities
+                }));
+            }
+          }, _callee, null, [[7, 9], [2, 5]]);
+        })();
+      });
+    }
   }]);
 }(OpenWalletButtons);
 
@@ -20827,6 +22662,137 @@ var GOOGLE_PAY_CARD_NETWORKS = ['AMEX', 'DISCOVER', 'INTERAC', 'JCB', 'MASTERCAR
   SHIPPING_OPTION: EVENT$1.ON_SHIPPING_OPTIONS_CHANGE
 });
 
+/**
+ * Synchronous, network-free check for whether the Google Pay JS API is already present
+ * in the page (`window.google.payments.api.PaymentsClient`). Safe to call in any
+ * environment (never throws).
+ *
+ * Note: Google Pay has no synchronous device/card capability API — this only reports
+ * whether the SDK script has loaded. The authoritative readiness signal comes from
+ * {@link evaluateGooglePayAvailability} (which runs `isReadyToPay`).
+ */
+function isGooglePayApiPresent() {
+  var _a, _b, _c;
+  try {
+    return typeof window !== 'undefined' && !!((_c = (_b = (_a = window.google) === null || _a === void 0 ? void 0 : _a.payments) === null || _b === void 0 ? void 0 : _b.api) === null || _c === void 0 ? void 0 : _c.PaymentsClient);
+  } catch (_d) {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+var scriptLoadPromise = null;
+/**
+ * Idempotently loads the Google Pay JS SDK from the CDN.
+ * Resolves immediately if the API is already present, de-duplicates concurrent loads,
+ * and rejects if the script fails to load.
+ */
+function loadGooglePayScript() {
+  if (isGooglePayApiPresent()) {
+    return Promise.resolve();
+  }
+  if (scriptLoadPromise) {
+    return scriptLoadPromise;
+  }
+  scriptLoadPromise = new Promise(function (resolve, reject) {
+    var script = document.createElement('script');
+    script.type = 'text/javascript';
+    script.src = GOOGLE_PAY_SCRIPT_URL;
+    script.async = true;
+    script.onload = function () {
+      if (!isGooglePayApiPresent()) {
+        scriptLoadPromise = null;
+        reject(new Error('Google Pay not available'));
+        return;
+      }
+      resolve();
+    };
+    script.onerror = function () {
+      // Allow a future retry after a transient failure.
+      scriptLoadPromise = null;
+      reject(new Error('Failed to load Google Pay script'));
+    };
+    document.head.appendChild(script);
+  });
+  return scriptLoadPromise;
+}
+/**
+ * Builds the base `isReadyToPay` request using the default card configuration
+ * (standard auth methods + card networks). Mirrors the instance service's request:
+ * `existingPaymentMethodRequired` is `false` on Safari (where Google Pay surfaces a
+ * different flow) and `true` elsewhere.
+ */
+function buildIsReadyToPayRequest() {
+  var isSafariBrowser = Browser.getBrowserName() === 'Apple Safari';
+  return _extends(_extends({}, GOOGLE_PAY_API_CONFIG), {
+    allowedPaymentMethods: [{
+      type: 'CARD',
+      parameters: {
+        allowedAuthMethods: GOOGLE_PAY_AUTH_METHODS,
+        allowedCardNetworks: GOOGLE_PAY_CARD_NETWORKS
+      }
+    }],
+    existingPaymentMethodRequired: !isSafariBrowser
+  });
+}
+/**
+ * Core Google Pay availability evaluation, shared by the instance flow
+ * (`GooglePayOpenWalletService`) and the static `GooglePayOpenWalletButton.checkAvailability`.
+ *
+ * The static check passes no `request`, so it uses the **default** card configuration
+ * (a button instance with a custom `card_config` may produce a different result). The
+ * instance flow passes its own `paymentsClient` and `request` so the readiness check
+ * honours the merchant's `card_config` and runs against the same client it pays with.
+ *
+ * Assumes the Google Pay SDK is already loaded (call {@link loadGooglePayScript} first).
+ */
+function evaluateGooglePayAvailability() {
+  return __awaiter(this, arguments, void 0, function () {
+    var params = arguments.length > 0 && arguments[0] !== undefined ? arguments[0] : {};
+    return /*#__PURE__*/_regenerator().m(function _callee() {
+      var _a, _b, paymentsClient, response, available;
+      return _regenerator().w(function (_context) {
+        while (1) switch (_context.p = _context.n) {
+          case 0:
+            if (isGooglePayApiPresent()) {
+              _context.n = 1;
+              break;
+            }
+            return _context.a(2, {
+              available: false,
+              supported: false,
+              reason: 'unsupported_browser'
+            });
+          case 1:
+            _context.p = 1;
+            paymentsClient = (_a = params.paymentsClient) !== null && _a !== void 0 ? _a : new google.payments.api.PaymentsClient({
+              merchantInfo: {
+                merchantId: params.merchantId || ''
+              }
+            });
+            _context.n = 2;
+            return paymentsClient.isReadyToPay((_b = params.request) !== null && _b !== void 0 ? _b : buildIsReadyToPayRequest());
+          case 2:
+            response = _context.v;
+            available = !!response.result;
+            return _context.a(2, {
+              available: available,
+              supported: true,
+              payment_method_present: response.paymentMethodPresent,
+              reason: available ? undefined : 'no_payment_method'
+            });
+          case 3:
+            _context.p = 3;
+            _context.v;
+            return _context.a(2, {
+              available: false,
+              supported: isGooglePayApiPresent(),
+              reason: 'query_failed'
+            });
+        }
+      }, _callee, null, [[1, 3]]);
+    })();
+  });
+}
+
 /**
  * Parses intermediate payment data from Google Pay into a normalized format
  * for use in shipping address/option change events.
@@ -21162,14 +23128,18 @@ var GooglePayOpenWalletService = /*#__PURE__*/function (_OpenWalletService) {
     key: "checkAvailability",
     value: function checkAvailability() {
       return __awaiter(this, void 0, void 0, /*#__PURE__*/_regenerator().m(function _callee2() {
+        var result;
         return _regenerator().w(function (_context2) {
           while (1) switch (_context2.n) {
             case 0:
-              return _context2.a(2, this.paymentsClient.isReadyToPay(this.createRequest()).then(function (response) {
-                return !!response.result;
-              })["catch"](function () {
-                return false;
-              }));
+              _context2.n = 1;
+              return evaluateGooglePayAvailability({
+                paymentsClient: this.paymentsClient,
+                request: this.createRequest()
+              });
+            case 1:
+              result = _context2.v;
+              return _context2.a(2, result.available);
           }
         }, _callee2, this);
       }));
@@ -21627,14 +23597,46 @@ var GooglePayOpenWalletButton = /*#__PURE__*/function (_OpenWalletButtons) {
     return _this;
   }
   /**
-   * Validates Google Pay-specific required metadata fields.
-   * Google Pay has no additional required fields beyond the base (amount, currency, country).
-   * @private
+   * Checks Google Pay availability **without instantiating the button** — the static
+   * availability entry point.
+   *
+   * Loads the Google Pay JS SDK if needed, then runs `PaymentsClient.isReadyToPay()` using
+   * the **default** card configuration (a button instance with a custom `card_config` may
+   * produce a different result). All options are optional — unlike Apple Pay, Google Pay's
+   * readiness check does not require a merchant identifier; supplying `service_id` +
+   * `public_key_or_access_token` additionally validates that the service is a Google Pay service.
+   *
+   * Pass `{ sync: true }` for a cheap, network-free check that only reports whether the
+   * Google Pay JS API is already present (see {@link GooglePayAvailabilityOptions.sync}).
+   *
+   * @param {GooglePayAvailabilityOptions} [options] - Optional merchant context and mode.
+   * @returns {Promise<GooglePayAvailabilityResult>} The availability result.
+   *
+   * @example
+   * // Simplest form — no merchant context needed:
+   * const result = await GooglePayOpenWalletButton.checkAvailability();
+   * if (result.available) {
+   *   // Render the Google Pay button.
+   * }
+   *
+   * @example
+   * // Validate the service is a Google Pay service while checking:
+   * const result = await GooglePayOpenWalletButton.checkAvailability({
+   *   public_key_or_access_token,
+   *   service_id,
+   *   env: 'sandbox',
+   * });
    */
   _inherits(GooglePayOpenWalletButton, _OpenWalletButtons);
   return _createClass(GooglePayOpenWalletButton, [{
     key: "validateWalletMeta",
-    value: function validateWalletMeta() {
+    value:
+    /**
+     * Validates Google Pay-specific required metadata fields.
+     * Google Pay has no additional required fields beyond the base (amount, currency, country).
+     * @private
+     */
+    function validateWalletMeta() {
       // Google Pay has no additional required meta fields beyond the base.
       // Optional fields (merchant_name, card_config, etc.) are validated
       // at runtime by the Google Pay SDK.
@@ -21665,6 +23667,87 @@ var GooglePayOpenWalletButton = /*#__PURE__*/function (_OpenWalletButtons) {
     value: function createWalletService(serviceConfig) {
       return new GooglePayOpenWalletService(this.api, this.eventEmitter, this.serviceId, this.container, this.meta, serviceConfig);
     }
+  }], [{
+    key: "checkAvailability",
+    value: function checkAvailability() {
+      return __awaiter(this, arguments, void 0, function () {
+        var options = arguments.length > 0 && arguments[0] !== undefined ? arguments[0] : {};
+        return /*#__PURE__*/_regenerator().m(function _callee() {
+          var present, merchantId, authType, api, serviceConfig;
+          return _regenerator().w(function (_context) {
+            while (1) switch (_context.p = _context.n) {
+              case 0:
+                if (!options.sync) {
+                  _context.n = 1;
+                  break;
+                }
+                present = isGooglePayApiPresent();
+                return _context.a(2, {
+                  available: present,
+                  supported: present,
+                  reason: present ? undefined : 'api_not_loaded'
+                });
+              case 1:
+                merchantId = options.merchant_id;
+                if (!(!merchantId && options.public_key_or_access_token && options.service_id)) {
+                  _context.n = 6;
+                  break;
+                }
+                _context.p = 2;
+                authType = AccessToken.validateJWT(options.public_key_or_access_token) ? API_AUTH_TYPE.TOKEN : API_AUTH_TYPE.PUBLIC_KEY;
+                api = new ApiInternal(options.public_key_or_access_token, authType);
+                if (options.env) {
+                  api.setEnv(options.env);
+                }
+                _context.n = 3;
+                return getServiceConfigCached(api, options.service_id);
+              case 3:
+                serviceConfig = _context.v;
+                if (!(serviceConfig.type !== SERVICE_TYPES.GOOGLE_PAY)) {
+                  _context.n = 4;
+                  break;
+                }
+                return _context.a(2, {
+                  available: false,
+                  supported: isGooglePayApiPresent(),
+                  reason: 'service_type_mismatch'
+                });
+              case 4:
+                merchantId = serviceConfig.merchant;
+                _context.n = 6;
+                break;
+              case 5:
+                _context.p = 5;
+                _context.v;
+                return _context.a(2, {
+                  available: false,
+                  supported: isGooglePayApiPresent(),
+                  reason: 'config_fetch_failed'
+                });
+              case 6:
+                _context.p = 6;
+                _context.n = 7;
+                return loadGooglePayScript();
+              case 7:
+                _context.n = 9;
+                break;
+              case 8:
+                _context.p = 8;
+                _context.v;
+                return _context.a(2, {
+                  available: false,
+                  supported: isGooglePayApiPresent(),
+                  reason: 'sdk_load_failed'
+                });
+              case 9:
+                return _context.a(2, evaluateGooglePayAvailability({
+                  merchantId: merchantId
+                }));
+            }
+          }, _callee, null, [[6, 8], [2, 5]]);
+        })();
+      });
+    }
   }]);
 }(OpenWalletButtons);
 
@@ -44735,6 +46818,7 @@ exports.Api = Api;
 exports.ApplePayOpenWalletButton = ApplePayOpenWalletButton;
 exports.ApplePayWalletButtonExpress = ApplePayWalletButtonExpress;
 exports.CANVAS_3DS_EVENT = CANVAS_3DS_EVENT;
+exports.CARD_SCHEME = CARD_SCHEME;
 exports.CHECKOUT_BUTTON_EVENT = CHECKOUT_BUTTON_EVENT;
 exports.CHECKOUT_EVENT = EVENT$2;
 exports.Canvas3ds = Canvas3ds;