@pawmaskrelease/psecure 1.1.0 → 1.1.1

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,56 @@
 # Changelog: `@pawmaskrelease/psecure`
 
+## 1.1.1
+
+Fixes from a first production integration of 1.1.0. Backward compatible with 1.1.0.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- **Every real browser was reported as tampered (critical, all web clients ≤ 1.1.0).** The `env_stub_dom_traps`
+  RASP probe treated a configurable `document.all[0]` descriptor as a polyfill, but WebIDL makes it configurable in
+  every genuine browser (verified on Edge/Chrome 157). Each sealed request carried a RASP bit, the authority counted a
+  strike, and the third request banned the account and device for 24 h. The check is removed. The authority (1.1.1)
+  also no longer counts strikes for apps in Monitor, so a false positive can never ban users there.
+- **`clientIp` option (Fastify, Express)** to pass the end-user IP when `request.ip` is a proxy hop (e.g. Cloudflare
+  Tunnel → Traefik). Use a resolver that only trusts headers your edge sets.
+- **Fastify typing.** `app.register(psecureFastify, { onDecision, blockedResponse })` left the callback parameters
+  implicitly `any` under `strict` (the plugin's optional options parameter made Fastify infer `Record<string, any>`).
+  `psecureFastify` is now typed `PSecureFastifyPlugin` with a required options parameter; Fastify always passes one,
+  and `app.register(psecureFastify)` without options still works.
+- **`createPSecureFetch().ready()` / `status()`** reported `ready` after a background lease refresh failed
+  (`lease acquisition failed`), and `ready()` called right after a request resolved before the queued refresh began.
+  A failed acquisition now sets `failed` (the previous client keeps sealing until its lease expires), `ready()` waits
+  for a queued refresh, and the next successful lease returns to `ready` and clears `lastError()`.
+- README: the backend verification section said the console Monitor/Block switch does not change verdicts. It now
+  describes 1.1: the adapters follow it in `auto`, verifier callers read `verdict.appMode`, pre-1.1 middlewares ignore
+  it.
+
+### Added
+
+- `@pawmaskrelease/psecure/fastify/augment` (types only): types `request.psecure` (`PSecureDecision | null`) and route
+  config `{ psecure?: boolean; psecureAppKey?: string }`. Also exported: `PSecureFastifyRequestDecoration`,
+  `PSecureFastifyRouteConfig`, `PSecureFastifyPlugin`. `request.psecure` is now decorated in every mode (`null` in
+  `off`).
+- `createPSecureAuditThrottle` and its types (`PSecureGuardAuditEvent`, `PSecureAuditSink`,
+  `PSecureAuditThrottleOptions`, `PSecureAuditThrottle`) from `/fastify`, `/express` and `/edge`, not only `/server`.
+  `flush()` and `close()` now return a promise that settles once the sink finished (a failing sink never rejects);
+  `close()` flushes, is idempotent and ignores later decisions.
+- `modeFallback` / `PSECURE_MODE_FALLBACK` (`monitor` | `enforce`, default `monitor`): the mode `auto` applies while
+  the console mode is unknown (restart during an authority outage, cached mode expired). A verdict carrying the
+  console mode always wins.
+- Docs: app pinning and `appMode` trust, testing with a stubbed authority, `blockedResponse` status for reissued
+  leases, per-route opt-in (`protect: []` + route config), audit events, dynamic import of `/fetch`, web setup
+  (`setAccount`, `enabled`, lazy loading, CSP `connect-src`), the cold-start caveat of `auto`.
+- `SERVER_KEY_IS_APP_KEY` (an app key `psec_app_…` in `PSECURE_SERVER_KEY`) now names both key kinds in its message.
+
+### Same release, outside the npm package
+
+- Console: new applications no longer get made-up figures (SDK version, p95 latency, device count); stored
+  placeholders are cleared on load and the Console shows "No data yet". "Apps in use" is counted from the
+  organization's applications (console, admin, app-limit check) instead of a stored counter that drifted.
+- Docs: a "Go to production" checklist (secrets on hosting, real client IP behind proxies, browser checks, Monitor to
+  Block), troubleshooting for denials right after a deploy and a leaked server key runbook.
+
 ## 1.1.0
 
 Integrations in under an hour: framework adapters, a sealing `fetch`, actionable errors and a `doctor` CLI.

package/README.md

@@ -354,11 +354,20 @@ const handler = createPSecureRemoteFetchEdgeMiddleware(
 export default { fetch: handler };
 ```
 
-Roll out in two phases. **Monitor** first: verify every request and record the verdicts, but let denied requests
-through — this is a decision of your backend (for example an environment flag around the `if (!verdict.allowed)`
-branch). **Enforce** once the reports look clean. The application mode in the PSecure console (Monitor / Block)
-classifies the app's telemetry; it does not change verdicts. `verdict.shadowWouldHaveAction` is set only when the
-authority deployment itself runs in shadow mode. See https://psecure.pawmask.com/docs/backend/rollout.
+Roll out in two phases: **Monitor** first (verify every request and record the verdicts, let denied requests
+through), **Block** once the reports look clean. The console Monitor/Block switch of the app drives this:
+
+- **1.1 adapters** (`psecureFastify`, `psecure()`, `withPSecure`, `createPSecureGuard`) in the default mode `auto`
+  follow the switch on the next request, no redeploy (see [Monitor / Block](#monitor--block-mode-auto)).
+- **This lower-level verifier** returns the verdict only; the decision to refuse is your code. The authority (>= 1.1)
+  reports the switch on every verdict as `verdict.appMode` (`'monitor' | 'block'`, with `verdict.appKey`): branch on
+  it, e.g. refuse when `!verdict.allowed && verdict.appMode === 'block'`.
+- **Pre-1.1 middlewares** (`createPSecureExpressMiddleware`, `createPSecureRemoteFetchEdgeMiddleware`) ignore
+  `appMode`: they refuse every denied request whatever the switch says. Upgrade to the 1.1 adapters to follow it.
+
+The verdict itself (`allowed`, `action`, `reason`) does not depend on the switch. `verdict.shadowWouldHaveAction` is
+set only when the authority deployment itself runs in shadow mode. See
+https://psecure.pawmask.com/docs/backend/rollout.
 
 The HTTP contract of the authority (including `POST /v1/request/verify`) is published as OpenAPI 3.1 in
 `server/api/openapi.json` of the repository.
@@ -380,17 +389,44 @@ arguments.
 | `mode` | `PSECURE_MODE` | `'auto'` | `auto` follows the console switch; `monitor` / `enforce` / `off` override it. |
 | `authorityUrl` | `PSECURE_AUTHORITY_URL` | `https://psecure-api.pawmask.com` | https only (http for loopback). |
 | `timeoutMs` | `PSECURE_TIMEOUT_MS` | `1500` | Authority call timeout. |
+| `modeFallback` | `PSECURE_MODE_FALLBACK` | `'monitor'` | Mode `auto` applies while the console mode is unknown (cold start, cached mode expired). `'enforce'` for apps in Block: see [Monitor / Block](#monitor--block-mode-auto). |
 | `appKey` | `PSECURE_APP_KEY` | none | **Recommended.** The app this backend serves: sent as `expectedAppKey`, so the authority refuses leases of any other app (`app_mismatch`) and the console mode is only taken for this app. Also scopes the mode cache. Per request: `appKey` on the request (Fastify route config `psecureAppKey`). |
-| `protect` | | `'all'` | Routes that fail closed (see below). Matchers: `'/pay'`, `'/api/*'`, `'/orders/:id'`, `'POST /pay'`, `RegExp`, `(info) => boolean`. |
+| `protect` | | `'all'` | Routes that fail closed (see below). Default: **every** guarded route; for per-route opt-in pass `protect: []` and mark routes (Fastify route config `{ psecure: true }`, or matchers). Matchers: `'/pay'`, `'/api/*'`, `'/orders/:id'`, `'POST /pay'`, `RegExp`, `(info) => boolean`. |
 | `skip` | | `[]` | Routes never checked (health checks, webhooks). `OPTIONS` is always skipped. |
-| `onDecision` | | | `(decision, { method, path, route, ip }) => void` for metrics / audit. `createPSecureAuditThrottle({ sink })` turns it into deduplicated audit events. |
+| `onDecision` | | | `(decision, { method, path, route, ip }) => void` for metrics / audit. `createPSecureAuditThrottle({ sink })` turns it into deduplicated audit events (see [Audit events](#audit-events)). |
 | `logger` | | console | pino-compatible `{ info, warn, debug? }` (Fastify uses `app.log`); `false` disables. |
-| `blockedResponse` | | `403 { error: 'PSECURE_REJECTED' }` | Your API's error shape for refused requests. |
+| `blockedResponse` | | `403 { error: 'PSECURE_REJECTED' }` | `(decision) => ({ status?, body })`: your API's error shape for refused requests. Without `status` the SDK's status is kept: **401** for a reissued lease (the client needs it to adopt the lease and retry), else 403. Keep `error: 'PSECURE_REJECTED'` in the body if you use `createPSecureFetch`: it refreshes the lease on that answer. |
 
-Fastify extras: route config `{ psecure: true }` protects a route, `{ psecure: false }` skips it. Express extras:
+Fastify extras: route config `{ psecure: true }` protects a route, `{ psecure: false }` skips it, `{ psecureAppKey }`
+pins the route to another app. Express extras:
 `maxBodyBytes` (default 1 MiB). Edge extras: `maxBodyBytes`, `clientIp(request)`; `options` may be a function of the
 handler's extra arguments (Cloudflare Workers `env`).
 
+**Per-route opt-in.** By default every guarded route is fail-closed in Block. To protect only some routes:
+
+```ts
+await app.register(psecureFastify, { protect: [] });             // nothing fails closed by default…
+app.post('/v1/pay', { config: { psecure: true } }, handler);     // …except the routes you mark
+app.post('/v1/webhook', { config: { psecure: false } }, handler); // never checked
+// Express / Edge: psecure({ protect: ['POST /v1/pay', '/v1/orders/*'] })
+```
+
+Denied and malformed envelopes are still refused on every guarded route in Block; `protect` only decides where a
+**missing** envelope or an unreachable authority is refused.
+
+**Fastify with TypeScript.** `app.register(psecureFastify, { onDecision, blockedResponse })` types the callbacks
+(1.1.1; in 1.1.0 they were implicitly `any` under `strict`). Add the augmentation once to type `request.psecure`
+(`PSecureDecision | null`) and the route config:
+
+```ts
+import '@pawmaskrelease/psecure/fastify/augment'; // types only (needs fastify 4 or 5 in your project)
+// or, equivalently:
+// declare module 'fastify' {
+//   interface FastifyRequest extends PSecureFastifyRequestDecoration {}
+//   interface FastifyContextConfig extends PSecureFastifyRouteConfig {}
+// }
+```
+
 ### Decision table
 
 | Outcome | Monitor | Block (enforce), `protect` route | Block, other route |
@@ -412,13 +448,59 @@ trusting it.
 The authority reports the app's console mode on every verdict (`appMode`). In `auto` the guard blocks only while the
 app is in **Block**. When a request carries no verdict (no envelope, authority unreachable), the guard uses the last
 mode it saw for the app, for up to 10 minutes; with nothing known yet (cold start) it behaves as Monitor. Trade-off:
-right after a restart during an authority outage, unsealed requests are served until the first verdict arrives.
-Pin `mode: 'enforce'` (or `PSECURE_MODE=enforce`) where that matters more than availability.
+right after a restart during an authority outage, unsealed requests are served until the first verdict arrives (a
+cold start is Monitor), and the same happens when the cached mode expired during a long outage. Where that matters
+more than availability:
+
+- `PSECURE_MODE=enforce` pins Block whatever the console says (the switch is then ignored), or
+- `PSECURE_MODE_FALLBACK=enforce` (`modeFallback: 'enforce'`) keeps following the switch but applies Block while the
+  console mode is unknown. A verdict that carries the console mode always wins. Default `monitor`.
 
 Set `PSECURE_APP_KEY`. Without it, the guard follows the mode of whichever app a lease belongs to, so a lease of one
 of your Monitor apps replayed against a Block app's backend would only be logged; the guard warns once at startup
-(`APP_KEY_NOT_PINNED`). With it, that lease is denied (`reason: 'app_mismatch'`) and refused in Block. Each decision says which
-mode applied (`effectiveMode`) and why (`modeSource`: `console`, `cache`, `default` or `config`).
+(`APP_KEY_NOT_PINNED`). With it, that lease is denied (`reason: 'app_mismatch'`) and refused in Block, and the guard
+trusts a verdict's `appMode` only when the verdict's `appKey` equals the pinned key; any other verdict is treated as
+carrying no mode (cache, then `modeFallback`). Each decision says which mode applied (`effectiveMode`) and why
+(`modeSource`: `console`, `cache`, `default` or `config`).
+
+### Audit events
+
+```ts
+import { createPSecureAuditThrottle } from '@pawmaskrelease/psecure/fastify'; // also /express, /edge, /server
+const audit = createPSecureAuditThrottle({ sink: (event) => auditLog.write(event) });
+await app.register(psecureFastify, { onDecision: audit.onDecision });
+app.addHook('onClose', () => audit.close());
+```
+
+The sink (`PSecureAuditSink`, `(event) => void | Promise<void>`) receives a `PSecureGuardAuditEvent`; it is never
+awaited by the request path and its errors are swallowed. Events never contain the key, envelope, lease or body:
+
+- `{ type: 'psecure.reject', result, action, reason, route, method, ip? }`: a refused request, emitted at once.
+  Identical refusals (result, reason, route, ip) are emitted once per `rejectCooldownMs` (default 60 s).
+- `{ type: 'psecure.monitor_summary', windowStart, windowEnd, wouldBlock, distinctIps, distinctIpsCapped, buckets }`:
+  what Monitor would have refused in a window (`summaryWindowMs`, default 10 min); `buckets` is
+  `[{ result, reason, route, count }]`, top 50 by count.
+
+`flush()` emits the pending summary now (nothing if the window is empty) and starts a new window; refusals are never
+buffered. `close()` stops the timer and **flushes**, then ignores later decisions; it is idempotent. Both return a
+promise that settles when the sink finished (`await audit.close()` before exiting).
+
+### Testing with a stubbed authority
+
+Point `authorityUrl` at a local stub (http is accepted on loopback) or pass `fetch`. The guard calls
+`POST {authorityUrl}/psecure.authority.v1.PSecureAuthorityService/VerifySealedRequest` and needs only:
+
+```json
+{ "allowed": true, "action": "ALLOW", "reason": "ok" }
+```
+
+A denial is `{ "allowed": false, "action": "STEP_UP_CHALLENGE", "reason": "verification_failed" }`; a reissue is
+`{ "allowed": false, "action": "REISSUE_LEASE", "reason": "reissue_required", "reissuedLease": { "compactToken": "…" } }`.
+To exercise `auto`, add `"appMode": "block"` (or `"monitor"`) and, when the guard is pinned,
+`"appKey": "<the pinned PSECURE_APP_KEY>"`: without a matching `appKey` the mode is ignored. Requests still need a
+well-formed `x-psecure-envelope` (from a real client, or `sealWirePayloadB64Url` from
+`@pawmaskrelease/psecure/protocol`); without one the guard does not call the authority (`result: 'missing'`). For
+tests that need no verification at all, `PSECURE_MODE=off`.
 
 ### Raw body
 
@@ -487,9 +569,29 @@ Returns `{ fetch, setAccount, status, lastError, ready, start, dispose }`. `stat
   never re-sent unsealed (no duplicated POST).
 - The lease is refreshed in the background when it expires or the API answers `PSECURE_REJECTED`.
 - The SDK core is loaded lazily on the first sealed request (a dynamic import your bundler puts in its own chunk).
-  The eager part of `@pawmaskrelease/psecure/fetch` is about 16 KiB gzip; the lazy core about 112 KiB gzip (1.1.0,
-  before your bundler's minification).
-- Browser CSP: add the authority origin to `connect-src`. A blocked request is reported as `CSP_BLOCKED`.
+  The eager part of `@pawmaskrelease/psecure/fetch` is about 16 KiB gzip; the lazy core about 112 KiB gzip (measured
+  on 1.1.0, before your bundler's minification).
+- `ready()` resolves with the outcome of the connect or lease refresh in flight: `ready`, or `failed` when the latest
+  lease acquisition failed (including a failed background refresh, 1.1.1); the next successful lease returns to
+  `ready`.
+- Browser CSP: add the authority origin to `connect-src` (e.g. `connect-src 'self' https://api.example.com
+  https://psecure-api.pawmask.com`). A blocked request is reported as `CSP_BLOCKED`.
+
+**Web apps.** Call `setAccount(user.id)` after sign-in and `setAccount(null)` after sign-out: the lease is bound to the
+account and re-acquired (calling it before the first request only records the account). Use `enabled` as the rollout
+switch (`enabled: false` = plain `fetch`, the core is never loaded). The core is loaded on the first sealed request or
+`start()`; call `start()` early (e.g. after the first render) to hide the lease latency.
+
+To keep even the eager ~16 KiB out of a build where PSecure is disabled, import the helper dynamically behind your
+flag; your bundler then splits it out and never loads it:
+
+```ts
+let apiFetch: typeof fetch = fetch;
+if (import.meta.env.VITE_PSECURE_ENABLED === 'true') {
+  const { createPSecureFetch } = await import('@pawmaskrelease/psecure/fetch');
+  apiFetch = createPSecureFetch({ appKey, serverPublicKey, apiOrigins: ['https://api.example.com'] }).fetch;
+}
+```
 
 ## Errors
 
@@ -508,7 +610,7 @@ as `psecure config:` lines with the same codes.
 | `AUTHORITY_INSECURE`, `AUTHORITY_INVALID`, `AUTHORITY_UNREACHABLE`, `CSP_BLOCKED` | http authority, bad URL, network/DNS, CSP `connect-src` |
 | `CLOCK_SKEW` | the device or server clock is off |
 | `RAW_BODY_MISSING` | the body parser dropped the raw bytes |
-| `MODE_INVALID` | `PSECURE_MODE` is not `auto`, `monitor`, `enforce` or `off` |
+| `MODE_INVALID` | `PSECURE_MODE` is not `auto`, `monitor`, `enforce` or `off` (or `PSECURE_MODE_FALLBACK` not `monitor` / `enforce`) |
 
 ## `doctor` CLI
 
@@ -529,8 +631,9 @@ the token's organization; unset, `doctor` warns. Exit code 1 when a check fails.
 | --- | --- |
 | `@pawmaskrelease/psecure` | Client SDK barrel (protocol, crypto, vm, rasp, client, adapters); no server code |
 | `@pawmaskrelease/psecure/fetch` | `createPSecureFetch` (sealing `fetch` with fallback; lazy-loads the client core) |
-| `@pawmaskrelease/psecure/fastify` | **Backend.** `psecureFastify` plugin, `PSECURE_REQUEST_HEADERS`, `PSECURE_EXPOSED_HEADERS` |
-| `@pawmaskrelease/psecure/express` | **Backend.** `psecure()` middleware, `psecureRawBody` |
+| `@pawmaskrelease/psecure/fastify` | **Backend.** `psecureFastify` plugin, `PSECURE_REQUEST_HEADERS`, `PSECURE_EXPOSED_HEADERS`, `createPSecureAuditThrottle` |
+| `@pawmaskrelease/psecure/fastify/augment` | Types only: `request.psecure` and route config `{ psecure, psecureAppKey }` on Fastify's types |
+| `@pawmaskrelease/psecure/express` | **Backend.** `psecure()` middleware, `psecureRawBody`, `createPSecureAuditThrottle` |
 | `@pawmaskrelease/psecure/edge` | **Backend / Edge.** `withPSecure`, `createPSecureEdge` (Next.js, Hono, Workers, Bun, Deno) |
 | `@pawmaskrelease/psecure/client` | `PSecureClient` (`connect` / `sealRequest` / `sealRequestAsync` / `protectFetch` / `dispose`) |
 | `@pawmaskrelease/psecure/server` | **Backend / Edge only.** Remote Authority client & verification middlewares: `PSecureRemoteAuthorityClient`, `createExpressMiddleware`, `createPSecureExpressMiddleware`, `createPSecureRemoteExpressMiddleware`, `createPSecureFetchEdgeMiddleware`, `createPSecureRemoteFetchEdgeMiddleware`, plus the 1.1 guard (`createPSecureGuard`) and the Express / Edge adapters. (The Split-Key Verification Engine is never shipped in the public npm package to prevent offline white-box oracle attacks; never import `@pawmaskrelease/psecure/server` from browser code.) |

package/dist/adapters/desktop.js

@@ -55,4 +55,4 @@ dispose(){if(this.#_0x1dd12b)
 return;this.#_0x1dd12b=true;this.#_0x557f55.fill(0);this.#_0xd63721.clear();this.#_0x32df7f.dispose();}}
 export async function sealDesktopRequestAsync(_0x53637e,_0x02eef0){if(_0x53637e instanceof PSecureDesktopBridge){return _0x53637e.sealDesktopRequestAsync(_0x02eef0);}
 return _0x53637e.sealRequestAsync({[_0xc9bd50_S(26)]:_0x02eef0.method,[_0xc9bd50_S(27)]:_0x02eef0.path,[_0xc9bd50_S(28)]:_0x02eef0.origin,[_0xc9bd50_S(29)]:_0x02eef0.body,[_0xc9bd50_S(30)]:_0x02eef0.nowMs,});}
-/* @psec-self-seal sha256=1789b4905f27eec1dc7c7be9cbd964b8e06e194e710d2ed7cf3606b00c234077 fnv1a=117da010 */
+/* @psec-self-seal sha256=2a8c0aa9c667aa603e5f3b3a4cf29077637dc0fb7a64c87c5edf46e6766b9daf fnv1a=dd197b03 */

package/dist/adapters/index.js

@@ -3,4 +3,4 @@ export * from "./mobile-bridge.js";
 export * from "./react-native.js";
 export * from "./desktop.js";
 
-/* @psec-self-seal sha256=2f38a9597f9db18b05602cfca1bafa465b1ac361b00890553793033f004b80d6 fnv1a=117da010 */
+/* @psec-self-seal sha256=6711c3a559952f6bcf55039df4e99df9f78f11aa2db94ff9d53f19950930e50c fnv1a=dd197b03 */

package/dist/adapters/mobile-bridge.js

@@ -51,4 +51,4 @@ const _0xe2bdfd=this.evaluateMobileSignals(_0x3bcc02);if(_0x567126===PSecureNati
 if(_0x567126===PSecureNativeCommand.CMD_COLLECT_NATIVE_RASP){const _0x430798=new Uint8Array(8);const _0xa0e68a=new DataView(_0x430798.buffer);_0xa0e68a.setUint32(0,_0xe2bdfd>>>0,true);_0xa0e68a.setUint32(4,psecPolyHash32(_0x954c5b,_0xe2bdfd)>>>0,true);return{[_0x1aa615_S(11)]:0,[_0x1aa615_S(12)]:_0x1aa615_S(2),[_0x1aa615_S(13)]:_0xe2bdfd,[_0x1aa615_S(14)]:bytesToHex(_0x430798),};}
 const _0x4eace7=new Uint8Array(this.#_0xa727e7);if(_0xe2bdfd!==0){_0x4eace7[0]=(_0x4eace7[0]^(_0xe2bdfd&(0x5a3ee1a5^0x5a3ee15a)))&(0x2f6ed5a5^0x2f6ed55a);_0x4eace7[1]=(_0x4eace7[1]^((_0xe2bdfd>>>8)&(0x1f803ca5^0x1f803c5a)))&(0x64879ea5^0x64879e5a);_0x4eace7[2]=(_0x4eace7[2]^((_0xe2bdfd>>>(0x9e7964a^0x9e7965a))&(0x3fe139a5^0x3fe1395a)))&(0x166786a5^0x1667865a);_0x4eace7[3]=(_0x4eace7[3]^((_0xe2bdfd>>>(0x7bf8ef42^0x7bf8ef5a))&(0x12a035a5^0x12a0355a)))&(0x6c1325a5^0x6c13255a);_0x4eace7[(0x52913045^0x5291305a)]=(_0x4eace7[(0x1f31f645^0x1f31f65a)]^(0x5b85a3ff^0x5b85a35a))&(0x67acf4a5^0x67acf45a);}
 const _0x088074=psecRandomBytes((0x686bac56^0x686bac5a));const _0xfb6e20=new DataView(_0x088074.buffer,_0x088074.byteOffset,_0x088074.byteLength);_0xfb6e20.setUint32(0,(_0xfb6e20.getUint32(0,true)^(_0x567126>>>0))>>>0,true);_0xfb6e20.setUint32(4,(_0xfb6e20.getUint32(4,true)^(_0x954c5b.length>>>0))>>>0,true);const _0x3271f6=psecChaChaCfbSeal(_0x954c5b,_0x4eace7,_0x088074);_0x4eace7.fill(0);const _0x733c76=new Uint8Array(_0x088074.length+_0x3271f6.ciphertext.length+_0x3271f6.tag.length);_0x733c76.set(_0x088074,0);_0x733c76.set(_0x3271f6.ciphertext,_0x088074.length);_0x733c76.set(_0x3271f6.tag,_0x088074.length+_0x3271f6.ciphertext.length);return{[_0x1aa615_S(11)]:0,[_0x1aa615_S(12)]:_0x1aa615_S(2),[_0x1aa615_S(13)]:_0xe2bdfd,[_0x1aa615_S(14)]:bytesToHex(_0x733c76),[_0x1aa615_S(15)]:bytesToHex(_0x088074),};}}
-/* @psec-self-seal sha256=43061b8174042b3ad21ad653d5c37bac4f32dd0c8143c2eb668e220a6e6299cc fnv1a=117da010 */
+/* @psec-self-seal sha256=4515ad549f59476dfb8fca019b54a1b205734b6112b067ea6eaa8d041c6bc8af fnv1a=dd197b03 */

package/dist/adapters/react-native.js

@@ -43,4 +43,4 @@ pingNativeCore(){this.#_0xafdc03();return this.#_0xae6fa2.dispatch(PSecureNative
 sealMobileRequest(_0x167378){this.#_0xafdc03();return this.#_0xae6fa2.sealMobileRequest(this.#_0x7902b1,_0x167378,this.#_0xa9f01f);}
 async sealRequestAsync(_0x167378){this.#_0xafdc03();return this.#_0xae6fa2.sealMobileRequestAsync(this.#_0x7902b1,_0x167378,this.#_0xa9f01f);}
 async sealMobileRequestAsync(_0x167378){return this.sealRequestAsync(_0x167378);}}
-/* @psec-self-seal sha256=30fd0e998f80cc8e85dab875d3bc52dd90d456c40ea02e64d202e1f78afc0998 fnv1a=117da010 */
+/* @psec-self-seal sha256=2ba3a484fdf1b03616607acecee1b1da2d21a7127676c0a5188a4ef814901727 fnv1a=dd197b03 */

package/dist/adapters/web-shield.js

@@ -50,4 +50,4 @@ return{[_0x63aba3_S(17)]:_0x219643.length===0,[_0x63aba3_S(18)]:_0x219643,[_0x63
 createProtectedFetchInterceptor(_0x81dde3,_0x58a799){return(_0xe81982,_0xf1ec43)=>{if(_0x81dde3.requiresAsyncSealing){throw new Error(_0x63aba3_S(4));}
 const _0xb962a1=globalThis.location;const _0x22312b=typeof _0xb962a1?.href===_0x63aba3_S(5)&&/^https?:/i.test(_0xb962a1.href)?_0xb962a1.href:undefined;const _0xd56d2b=typeof _0xe81982===_0x63aba3_S(5)?new URL(_0xe81982,_0x22312b):new URL(_0xe81982.href);const origin=canonicalizeOrigin(_0xd56d2b);if(!_0x81dde3.isSealOriginAllowed(origin)){throw new Error(`PSecureWebShield: refusing to seal for non-allowlisted origin ${origin} (configure sealOrigins)`);}
 const _0xbb457f=_0x58a799();const _0xb4f832=this.verifyDomSimHashDrift(_0xbb457f.domTokens);const _0x795be8=this.auditScriptTagsForSkimming(_0xbb457f.scripts);const _0x91cb3a=_0xb4f832.raspBit|_0x795be8.raspBit;return _0x81dde3.sealRequest({[_0x63aba3_S(19)]:_0xf1ec43?.method??_0x63aba3_S(6),[_0x63aba3_S(20)]:origin,[_0x63aba3_S(21)]:buildPathAndQuery(_0xd56d2b),[_0x63aba3_S(22)]:(_0xf1ec43?.body??''),[_0x63aba3_S(23)]:_0x91cb3a!==0?_0x91cb3a:undefined,});};}}
-/* @psec-self-seal sha256=47abfa9f579d6822bcc6cf9bcc6e48c3815e142c57dc4c3d9a11e2c259d8abab fnv1a=117da010 */
+/* @psec-self-seal sha256=4d1ad4a9f3a42a09c88458d8b580fd0de9dbf5117546402736259e45d954f4ac fnv1a=dd197b03 */

package/dist/adapters/web-vault.js

@@ -127,4 +127,4 @@ _0x69cf3d.poisonMask)>>>
 return;}
 if(!handlerObj||typeof handlerObj!==_0x1b7e94_S((0x42513f4b^0x42513f5a))){return;}
 const _0x0fb898=handlerObj;if(typeof _0x0fb898.PS762===_0x1b7e94_S((0x2d3c9c78^0x2d3c9c5a))){handshakeCompleted=true;const _0xa458a0=_0x0fb898.PS762;_0x0fb898.PS762=()=>{};_0xa458a0(Object.freeze(_0x802124),_0xc00404,_0xf1626f);}},});return{[_0x1b7e94_S(119)]:_0xb6fbb2};}
-/* @psec-self-seal sha256=a211895f858b8ee7b9dd4c247af008e5ee41715a10b9ecb22eba33daa6d33a6f fnv1a=117da010 */
+/* @psec-self-seal sha256=e6add63495a52a16fb9fe77bd728e7e755745a4a80e6f7e9d6f0dd7c5366da87 fnv1a=dd197b03 */

package/dist/cli/doctor.js

@@ -105,4 +105,4 @@ if(m[1]===_0xb25bc7_S((0x3d6f9266^0x3d6f925a))){_0x8ee251.stderr(_0xb25bc7_S((0x
 const value=m[2]??_0xbfbda6[++i];if(value===undefined){_0x8ee251.stderr(`Option --${m[1]} needs a value.`);return 2;}
 _0xfef070[m[1]]=value;}
 const env=_0x8ee251.env;const checks=await runPSecureDoctor({[_0xb25bc7_S(97)]:_0xfef070.authority??env.PSECURE_AUTHORITY_URL,[_0xb25bc7_S(115)]:_0xfef070[_0xb25bc7_S((0x30cca038^0x30cca05a))]??env.PSECURE_APP_KEY,[_0xb25bc7_S(130)]:_0xfef070[_0xb25bc7_S((0x458a4046^0x458a405a))]??env.PSECURE_PUBLIC_KEY,[_0xb25bc7_S(99)]:_0xfef070.origin??env.PSECURE_WEB_ORIGIN,...(_0xfef070.api?{[_0xb25bc7_S(100)]:_0xfef070.api}:{}),...(env.PSECURE_SERVER_KEY?{[_0xb25bc7_S(131)]:env.PSECURE_SERVER_KEY}:{}),...(env.PSECURE_APP_KEY?{[_0xb25bc7_S(132)]:env.PSECURE_APP_KEY}:{}),...(_0x8ee251.fetch?{[_0xb25bc7_S(133)]:_0x8ee251.fetch}:{}),});_0x8ee251.stdout(json?JSON.stringify({[_0xb25bc7_S(134)]:PSECURE_SDK_VERSION,[_0xb25bc7_S(135)]:checks},null,2):formatPSecureDoctorReport(checks));return checks.some((c)=>c.status===_0xb25bc7_S(2))?1:0;}
-/* @psec-self-seal sha256=85f5f30f33cec02eebe8432377c8dd9201571f1fd2364ac358e7d0b28ce3e89a fnv1a=117da010 */
+/* @psec-self-seal sha256=6eebabdc16f03292df4612a2b6d8c121f44ce4ad5b5dff1f304268e3b9a987b3 fnv1a=dd197b03 */

package/dist/client/index.js

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 export * from "./psecure-client.js";
 
-/* @psec-self-seal sha256=ae699fe109d16306da1cf2f6c9bac30d894988dfadbd51b7706d74ae1ff1a1c5 fnv1a=117da010 */
+/* @psec-self-seal sha256=214583390c6cb45c82f9b240f054d31e9c8eb266ea5bf4ceb754d286acd1db9b fnv1a=dd197b03 */

package/dist/client/psecure-client.js

@@ -213,4 +213,4 @@ function _0x1e9a27(_0x7f3676,_0xff2e92){const _0x60c0b2=_0x7f3676===_0x559202_S(
 else if(!_0xff2e92.hardwareAnchors){_0xfc7320.push(_0x559202_S((0x52b05033^0x52b0505a)));}
 if(_0x5136b1)
 _0xfc7320.push(_0x559202_S((0x541fb430^0x541fb45a)));return Object.freeze({[_0x559202_S(172)]:_0x7f3676,[_0x559202_S(173)]:_0x5136b1,[_0x559202_S(174)]:_0x60c0b2,[_0x559202_S(175)]:Object.freeze(_0xfc7320),});}
-/* @psec-self-seal sha256=1655a6d4df6347f2243d3a5c8dadf9b58c545ec4fb759ad89f51dcd812d7488c fnv1a=117da010 */
+/* @psec-self-seal sha256=7499b01d86e14b8aeaf7c03d5e2386d1da8fd8d4b28255c93b7641ce3bf39407 fnv1a=dd197b03 */

package/dist/crypto/block-ciphers.js

@@ -55,4 +55,4 @@ throw new Error(_0xd329e2_S(6));const S=this.expandKey(_0x67835c);const _0xb5ce7
 A=(A+S[(0x26d84e70^0x26d84e5a)])>>>0;C=(C+S[(0x554e1671^0x554e165a)])>>>0;const _0xb54442=new Uint8Array((0x3d83a4a^0x3d83a5a));const _0x06c6c8=new DataView(_0xb54442.buffer);_0x06c6c8.setUint32(0,A,true);_0x06c6c8.setUint32(4,B,true);_0x06c6c8.setUint32(8,C,true);_0x06c6c8.setUint32((0x4c0ef656^0x4c0ef65a),D,true);return _0xb54442;},decryptBlock(_0x3d60f3,_0x67835c){if(_0x3d60f3.length!==(0x1002664a^0x1002665a))
 throw new Error(_0xd329e2_S(6));const S=this.expandKey(_0x67835c);const _0xb5ce7c=new DataView(_0x3d60f3.buffer,_0x3d60f3.byteOffset,(0x32cd264a^0x32cd265a));let A=(_0xb5ce7c.getUint32(0,true)-S[(0x46675870^0x4667585a)])>>>0;let B=_0xb5ce7c.getUint32(4,true);let C=(_0xb5ce7c.getUint32(8,true)-S[(0x4fc39171^0x4fc3915a)])>>>0;let D=_0xb5ce7c.getUint32((0x7ee58156^0x7ee5815a),true);for(let r=(0x14f5f84e^0x14f5f85a);r>=1;r--){const _0x2434c4=D;D=C;C=B;B=A;A=_0x2434c4;const u=rotl32(Math.imul(D,((D<<1)|1)>>>0)>>>0,5);const t=rotl32(Math.imul(B,((B<<1)|1)>>>0)>>>0,5);C=rotr32((C-S[2*r+1])>>>0,t&(0x65a81c45^0x65a81c5a))^u;A=rotr32((A-S[2*r])>>>0,u&(0x7cd2b845^0x7cd2b85a))^t;}
 D=(D-S[1])>>>0;B=(B-S[0])>>>0;const _0xb54442=new Uint8Array((0x2672714a^0x2672715a));const _0x06c6c8=new DataView(_0xb54442.buffer);_0x06c6c8.setUint32(0,A>>>0,true);_0x06c6c8.setUint32(4,B>>>0,true);_0x06c6c8.setUint32(8,C>>>0,true);_0x06c6c8.setUint32((0x6f017056^0x6f01705a),D>>>0,true);return _0xb54442;},};
-/* @psec-self-seal sha256=a534b30cd57579571504a1fbf479108d4e53a4a23d7e5bb4c01575efd8e9b7a8 fnv1a=117da010 */
+/* @psec-self-seal sha256=d29d0d97e30379b7d4cceeab7fb384e67e098ad4d574f51a604ef9bcb504d07c fnv1a=dd197b03 */

package/dist/crypto/chacha-cfb.js

@@ -78,4 +78,4 @@ if(!Number.isSafeInteger(length)||length<=0||length>(0x3d7fe7a5^0x3d7fe75a)*(0x2
 const _0x4be346=Math.ceil(length/(0x2ef5f7a^0x2ef5f5a));const _0xe3d75c=new Uint8Array(_0x4be346*(0x6b55c97a^0x6b55c95a));let t=new Uint8Array(0);for(let i=1;i<=_0x4be346;i++){const _0xaccf8c=new Uint8Array(t.length+_0xbae16e.length+1);_0xaccf8c.set(t,0);_0xaccf8c.set(_0xbae16e,t.length);_0xaccf8c[t.length+_0xbae16e.length]=i;t=psecHmacSha256Bytes(_0x653b72,_0xaccf8c);_0xe3d75c.set(t,(i-1)*(0x4c5e797a^0x4c5e795a));}
 return _0xe3d75c.subarray(0,length);}
 export function psecHkdfSha256(_0xa627e2,length,_0x89fec8=new Uint8Array(0),_0xbae16e=new Uint8Array(0)){const _0x653b72=psecHkdfSha256Extract(_0x89fec8,_0xa627e2);return psecHkdfSha256Expand(_0x653b72,_0xbae16e,length);}
-/* @psec-self-seal sha256=4110d1c2ff357f1203edd205b8b5b2b7abc7fedf030a44b7cccc990b80a03ea6 fnv1a=117da010 */
+/* @psec-self-seal sha256=80682afdca54cbba95139df34b8da67632c30157630ddfb44b74b41a43dc23b7 fnv1a=dd197b03 */

package/dist/crypto/index.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 export * from "./primitives.js";
 export * from "./wasm-coprocessor.js";
 
-/* @psec-self-seal sha256=e387570005ab1b1768ff0a56b62ad259ec3cc9f6730bd35e2e9e318412dc37aa fnv1a=117da010 */
+/* @psec-self-seal sha256=c87e64f28c142c7eb9a8b49838ad2a0db486de5156ec318eddc0849aea818745 fnv1a=dd197b03 */

package/dist/crypto/mba.js

@@ -46,4 +46,4 @@ const _0xf9b964=psecMba32.linearAdd(x,_0x8cd27b);const _0x40c9cc=rotl32(_0xf9b96
 const _0x5f23aa=(_0x6138d3^_0x2dc805)>>>0;const _0x98123c=(_0x3ade4c^_0xe8638b)>>>0;return psecMba32.affineMix(psecMba32.linearAdd(_0x5f23aa,_0x98123c),_0xc5ed5c);},wasmArxMix(x,y,z){const _0x4f3bfd=_0xcdbdf8();if(_0x4f3bfd){return _0x4f3bfd._0x4d(x|0,y|0,z|0)>>>0;}
 const a=(rotl32((x+y)>>>0,(0x622ca14a^0x622ca15a))^z)>>>0;const b=rotl32((y^z)>>>0,(0x77717956^0x7771795a));return psecMba32.linearAdd(a,b);},};export function psecPolyHash32(_0x990d25,_0x94e3a1=((0x318eba^0x812d137f)>>>0)){let _0xa5d6a9=_0x94e3a1>>>0;for(let i=0;i<_0x990d25.length;i++){const _0x60b5af=_0x990d25[i]>>>0;const _0x86cd2c=psecMba32.orAndAdd(_0x60b5af,(i&(0x14ce65a5^0x14ce655a))^(0x7583c900^0x7583c95a));_0xa5d6a9=psecMba32.affineMix(_0xa5d6a9,_0x86cd2c);}
 return _0xa5d6a9>>>0;}
-/* @psec-self-seal sha256=da4bc84bb3426b13acb3f65de1df1f96a6b943033ca45109144e9c826bcd8028 fnv1a=117da010 */
+/* @psec-self-seal sha256=78c1c39df52a9ad0060c96deeb7504ffc5171fdf2ef11490892c603ad768311a fnv1a=dd197b03 */

package/dist/crypto/primitives.js

@@ -5,4 +5,4 @@ export * from "./whitebox-aes.js";
 export * from "./chacha-cfb.js";
 export { psecRandomBytes } from "../protocol/codecs.js";
 
-/* @psec-self-seal sha256=7201ec6d1cd5bbff6e2fbe1c87dd3f651f2959e3140d7b39eea82dd4cca44990 fnv1a=117da010 */
+/* @psec-self-seal sha256=b38f5b6360fc33e062cf1690db0fe19f7f92a976f3fcdb72ca45c783d50d0d16 fnv1a=dd197b03 */

package/dist/crypto/threefish.js

@@ -51,4 +51,4 @@ _0x579e60[i]=v[_0x6e84ab[i]];v=_0x579e60;const r=_0xc944d4[d%8];for(let j=0;j<4;
 if(d%4===0){const s=d/4;for(let i=0;i<8;i++){v[i]=(v[i]-this.subkey(_0x60a0de,_0x424efd,s,i))&MASK64;}}}
 const _0xfb76e0=new Uint8Array((0x3f79581a^0x3f79585a));const _0xe8257e=new DataView(_0xfb76e0.buffer);for(let i=0;i<8;i++)
 _0xe8257e.setBigUint64(i*8,v[i],true);return _0xfb76e0;},};
-/* @psec-self-seal sha256=6403626f9c6bad9e2098e413a160cad83173127cba791e2a8751c609e725b4ad fnv1a=117da010 */
+/* @psec-self-seal sha256=983452beb61a131b1ecffd47b3b09f9cbd7738447a0aeb9a8432e53b471401ed fnv1a=dd197b03 */

package/dist/crypto/wasm-coprocessor.js

@@ -70,4 +70,4 @@ const[wrappedB64,nonceB64,tagB64,cipherB64]=_0x6fa97b.slice(-4);const kid=_0x6fa
 if(expectedKid!==undefined&&kid!==expectedKid){throw new Error(`Unexpected hybrid envelope key ID: ${kid} (expected ${expectedKid})`);}
 const _0x61af5d=_0xb7abbf(_0x50fdab);const _0x060b86=fromBase64Url(wrappedB64);const _0x7e7b26=new Uint8Array(_0x9d5453({[_0x27819f_S(37)]:_0x61af5d,[_0x27819f_S(38)]:_0xc3c6f0.RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING,[_0x27819f_S(39)]:_0x27819f_S((0x78361e50^0x78361e5a)),},_0x060b86));let key32;try{key32=psecHkdfSha256(_0x7e7b26,(0x1a30767a^0x1a30765a),new Uint8Array(0),new TextEncoder().encode(`psec-hybrid-rfc8439:${kid}`));const _0xe43fe8=fromBase64Url(nonceB64);const _0x2cb569=fromBase64Url(tagB64);const _0x2e5bb1=fromBase64Url(cipherB64);const _0x360001=new TextEncoder().encode(`rfc8439.${kid}.${wrappedB64}.${nonceB64}`);const _0x8762e6=psecRfc8439ChaCha20Poly1305Open({[_0x27819f_S(42)]:_0xe43fe8,[_0x27819f_S(43)]:_0x2e5bb1,[_0x27819f_S(44)]:_0x2cb569},key32,_0x360001);return{[_0x27819f_S(31)]:kid,[_0x27819f_S(45)]:new TextDecoder().decode(_0x8762e6),};}
 finally{_0x7e7b26.fill(0);key32?.fill(0);}}
-/* @psec-self-seal sha256=49aff11948cff426060a0de377a8bb8e5f9c822ab4a2191e171be019092ed336 fnv1a=117da010 */
+/* @psec-self-seal sha256=54b10c4ad080252a34d8a910a245d6864872dc15cb325730b0a3642a93710d78 fnv1a=dd197b03 */

package/dist/crypto/whitebox-aes.js

@@ -73,4 +73,4 @@ _0x17b321=this.invShiftRows(_0x17b321);const _0xd40bf9=new Uint8Array((0x6ff2744
 _0x17b321=_0xd40bf9;}
 const _0x45399a=new Uint8Array((0x1d92d04a^0x1d92d05a));for(let _0x47a223=0;_0x47a223<(0x4b94c04a^0x4b94c05a);_0x47a223++){_0x45399a[_0x47a223]=_0x7021db.invInputBijections[_0x47a223*(0x24c56e5a^0x24c56f5a)+_0x17b321[_0x47a223]];}
 return _0x45399a;},};
-/* @psec-self-seal sha256=c39bc0eec8f2d5573abaa079f2a05e1a5f0d296a921e02086674812d39d93d8f fnv1a=117da010 */
+/* @psec-self-seal sha256=28414b1ed793bc8584be5bc0e8b94342880e68023bc843f6aec5a1c5e7abe27f fnv1a=dd197b03 */