@patronage/software-factory 1.0.0-alpha.24 → 1.0.0-alpha.26

package/dist/review-prompts/security/SKILL.md

@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ Load only matching references:
 | Crypto and randomness | Weak hashes, predictable random values, static IVs, ECB mode, timing-unsafe compares, unsigned tokens, or custom crypto protect security-sensitive data. |
 | Abuse controls | Sensitive or expensive operations such as login, MFA, invites, exports, password reset, billing, email, SMS, or paid API calls lack meaningful rate, quota, replay, or idempotency controls. |
 | CI and workflows | Workflow changes let untrusted or caller-controlled code, text, artifacts, caches, or actions reach privileged execution, secrets, write tokens, releases, packages, deployments, or sensitive runners. |
+| Infrastructure exposure | An infrastructure declaration publishes a service to the internet without a declared authentication mechanism. In an Alchemy stack, a Worker declaring `workersDev: true`, a `domain`, or `routes` must also declare its guard — Cloudflare Access, an auth secret binding, or an equivalent check inside the Worker — or carry a written reason in the change for why it is public. |
 
 ## Severity
 

package/dist/review-prompts/security/references/javascript-typescript.md

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ Use this when reviewing JavaScript, TypeScript, Node, React, Next.js, or browser
 | Path traversal | `path.join(root, userPath)` without realpath containment, archive extraction by entry name | Normalize and resolve real paths, verify containment, generate server-side filenames |
 | Webhook forgery | State-changing webhook parses JSON before verifying signature or skips timestamp/replay checks | Verify raw body signature, timestamp freshness, replay/idempotency, and provider secret before side effects |
 | Secrets exposure | Secrets in client components, `NEXT_PUBLIC_*`, serialized props, logs, or error responses | Server-only reads, redacted logs, safe error messages, no hardcoded production fallback |
+| Public Worker without auth | Alchemy `Cloudflare.Worker` gains `workersDev: true`, a `domain`, or a `routes` entry while its handler enforces no identity check | Cloudflare Access on the Worker (`access` prop or an Access application destination), an auth secret binding the handler verifies, or a written reason in the change for why the Worker is public |
 
 ## False-Positive Controls
 

package/dist/schemas.d.ts

@@ -21,6 +21,23 @@ declare const reviewPromptSectionsSchema: z.ZodArray<z.ZodObject<{
   text: z.ZodString;
 }, z.core.$strict>>;
 //#endregion
+//#region src/policy-resolution.d.ts
+/** How a gate resolved the review policy it evaluated a candidate under. */
+declare const policyResolutionSchema: z.ZodDiscriminatedUnion<[z.ZodObject<{
+  basePolicyDigest: z.ZodString;
+  baseRefName: z.ZodString;
+  candidatePolicyDigest: z.ZodString;
+  effectiveDigest: z.ZodString;
+  policyBaseSha: z.ZodString;
+  reviewPolicyChanged: z.ZodBoolean;
+  status: z.ZodLiteral<"authoritative">;
+}, z.core.$strict>, z.ZodObject<{
+  baseRefName: z.ZodString;
+  reason: z.ZodString;
+  status: z.ZodLiteral<"unresolved">;
+}, z.core.$strict>], "status">;
+type PolicyResolution = z.infer<typeof policyResolutionSchema>;
+//#endregion
 //#region src/review-ladder-policy.d.ts
 type ReviewFindingCategory = "correctness" | "safety" | "coordination" | "maintainability" | "unknown";
 declare const FINDING_DISPOSITIONS: readonly ["open", "fixed-in-thread", "follow-up-filed", "waived", "stale-repeat", "rerun-noise"];
@@ -77,6 +94,7 @@ interface ReviewLadderCycle {
     headSha: string;
     patchId: string;
   };
+  historical?: true;
   model?: string;
   correlatedRerun?: boolean;
   session?: LadderSessionAttribution;
@@ -128,6 +146,13 @@ interface PrReviewProof {
   changedFiles: string[];
   cleanedPaths: string[];
   ladder?: PrReviewLadderState;
+  /**
+   * The policy identity this review run resolved its demanded kinds under
+   * (#922 Slice B). Optional: a run that could not reach the authority records
+   * the refusal instead, and `pr:ready` decides what an unresolved or
+   * disagreeing identity means for admission.
+   */
+  policyResolution?: PolicyResolution;
   reviewRequirement?: {
     reason: "no-applicable-mode" | "faithful-merge";
     status: "not-required";
@@ -227,23 +252,6 @@ declare const boundaryReviewProofBaseSchema: z.ZodObject<{
 }, z.core.$loose>;
 type BoundaryReviewProof = z.infer<typeof boundaryReviewProofBaseSchema>;
 //#endregion
-//#region src/policy-resolution.d.ts
-/** How a gate resolved the review policy it evaluated a candidate under. */
-declare const policyResolutionSchema: z.ZodDiscriminatedUnion<[z.ZodObject<{
-  basePolicyDigest: z.ZodString;
-  baseRefName: z.ZodString;
-  candidatePolicyDigest: z.ZodString;
-  effectiveDigest: z.ZodString;
-  policyBaseSha: z.ZodString;
-  reviewPolicyChanged: z.ZodBoolean;
-  status: z.ZodLiteral<"authoritative">;
-}, z.core.$strict>, z.ZodObject<{
-  baseRefName: z.ZodString;
-  reason: z.ZodString;
-  status: z.ZodLiteral<"unresolved">;
-}, z.core.$strict>], "status">;
-type PolicyResolution = z.infer<typeof policyResolutionSchema>;
-//#endregion
 //#region src/catch-up-recognition-record.d.ts
 interface CatchUpRecognition {
   /** The ref the candidate targets, as the recognizing command resolved it. */
@@ -579,6 +587,16 @@ interface PrVerifyProof {
   notRequiredCommands?: PrVerifyNotRequiredCommand[];
   outcome?: "aborted" | "passed";
   patchId?: string;
+  /**
+   * The review policy identity this verification run resolved (#922 Slice B).
+   *
+   * Verification demands no review mode of its own. It records the identity so
+   * `pr:ready` can see whether the stage that produced this proof judged the
+   * candidate under the same policy readiness resolves. Optional, and normally
+   * `unresolved` on the first run of a branch: a candidate is verified before
+   * it has a pull request, and there is no authority to read without one.
+   */
+  policyResolution?: PolicyResolution;
   profilePath: string;
   projectKey: string;
   repository: string;
@@ -663,6 +681,19 @@ declare const prVerifyProofSchema: z.ZodObject<{
     aborted: "aborted";
   }>>;
   patchId: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
+  policyResolution: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodDiscriminatedUnion<[z.ZodObject<{
+    basePolicyDigest: z.ZodString;
+    baseRefName: z.ZodString;
+    candidatePolicyDigest: z.ZodString;
+    effectiveDigest: z.ZodString;
+    policyBaseSha: z.ZodString;
+    reviewPolicyChanged: z.ZodBoolean;
+    status: z.ZodLiteral<"authoritative">;
+  }, z.core.$strict>, z.ZodObject<{
+    baseRefName: z.ZodString;
+    reason: z.ZodString;
+    status: z.ZodLiteral<"unresolved">;
+  }, z.core.$strict>], "status">>;
   profilePath: z.ZodString;
   projectKey: z.ZodString;
   repository: z.ZodString;

package/dist/schemas.js

@@ -19,6 +19,13 @@ const DEMAND_KEYS = {
 	* happen.
 	*/
 	boundaryWave: "boundary-wave",
+	/**
+	* Closeout pin (#901): a merged interior's declared child issue is still
+	* open. The factory does not close issues; the operator closes, or waives
+	* this demand for that interior PR. In force at `boundary:check --final`,
+	* not at interior `boundary:check` and not at `pr:ready`.
+	*/
+	childIssueOpen: "child-issue-open",
 	/** The PR is still a draft. */
 	draft: "draft",
 	/** GitHub's own check rollup for the candidate head. */
@@ -37,6 +44,13 @@ const DEMAND_KEYS = {
 	* neither a review-rung authority nor a scheduling requirement.
 	*/
 	nativeApproval: "native-approval",
+	/**
+	* The policy identity an earlier stage recorded must be the one readiness
+	* resolved (#922 Slice B). In force when a consumed `pr:verify` or
+	* `pr:review` proof judged this candidate under a different review policy,
+	* or recorded none where the resolved demand includes a security review.
+	*/
+	policyIdentity: "policy-identity",
 	/** A current, head-bound, passing typed `pr:verify` proof. */
 	prVerify: "pr-verify",
 	/** The profile-resolved review ladder policy. */
@@ -808,6 +822,7 @@ const prReviewProofSchema = z.object({
 	ladder: prReviewLadderStateSchema.optional(),
 	maxReviewCycles: z.number().int().positive().optional(),
 	patchId: z.string().regex(/^[0-9a-f]{40,64}$/u),
+	policyResolution: policyResolutionSchema.optional(),
 	reviewCycle: z.number().int().positive().optional(),
 	reviewRequirement: z.object({
 		reason: z.enum(["no-applicable-mode", "faithful-merge"]),
@@ -1249,6 +1264,7 @@ const prVerifyProofSchema = z.object({
 	notRequiredCommands: z.array(notRequiredCommandSchema).min(1).optional(),
 	outcome: z.enum(["aborted", "passed"]).optional(),
 	patchId: z.string().regex(/^[0-9a-f]{40}$/u).optional(),
+	policyResolution: policyResolutionSchema.optional(),
 	profilePath: z.string().min(1),
 	projectKey: z.string().min(1),
 	repository: z.string().min(1),

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@patronage/software-factory",
-  "version": "1.0.0-alpha.24",
+  "version": "1.0.0-alpha.26",
   "description": "Shared Patronage software factory CLI and project-profile validation tools",
   "license": "MIT",
   "repository": {
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
     "picomatch": "^4.0.5",
     "yaml": "^2.9.0",
     "zod": "4.4.3",
-    "@patronage/factory-ci": "1.0.0-alpha.24"
+    "@patronage/factory-ci": "1.0.0-alpha.26"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
     "@types/node": "24.13.3",