@passioncode-ai/fabric-agent-adapter 0.76.0 → 0.78.0

package/plugins/fabric-agent-adapter/skills/building-fabric-services/references/connectors.md

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ const answer = await request('GET', 'https://api.example/v1/items', { headers, d
 | The body is read to one byte past `max_bytes`; over it is an error | 8 MiB | a runaway answer never fills memory |
 | Redirects are answered, never followed | | a redirect must not carry the `Authorization` header to another host |
 | Plain `http://` is refused unless the host is loopback or `insecure=True`; credentials in a URL are refused | | a token never crosses a network in clear, nor sits in a URL |
-| Plain `http://` to a loopback host goes on a connection whose server end is this OS account's process, told from the socket table before a byte is sent and never through a proxy from the environment (`fabric_peer_owner`); another account's listener, root's, or one whose owner cannot be told is kind `foreign-user`, nothing sent, never retried. The Node twin sends such a request through `node:http` on a checked connection, not `fetch` | | DEC-0154 HA-2: loopback is one per computer, not one per OS account |
+| Plain `http://` to a loopback host goes on a connection whose server end is this OS account's process, told from the socket table before a byte is sent and never through a proxy from the environment (`fabric_peer_owner`); another account's listener, root's, or one whose owner cannot be told is kind `foreign-user`, nothing sent, never retried (on a restricted macOS table its reason says `table-restricted`: protocol.md, FAA-272). The Node twin sends such a request through `node:http` on a checked connection, not `fetch` | | DEC-0154 HA-2: loopback is one per computer, not one per OS account |
 | Header names must be tokens; a value with a line break or NUL is refused | | header injection |
 | A JSON body is written as `JSON.stringify` writes it: a lone surrogate escaped, NaN and Infinity refused | | both twins send the same bytes |
 | Whatever the transport throws is a connection error, in both languages; a timeout is a timeout | | |

package/plugins/fabric-agent-adapter/skills/building-fabric-services/references/events-and-notifications.md

@@ -25,7 +25,10 @@ in the URL.
 - `kind`: dotted, stable, past tense or state (`job.failed`, `job.awaiting_choice`,
   `service.started`, `collector.stale`). Hosts filter on it.
 - `level`: `info` (routine), `notice` (the operator may want to look), `warning`
-  (something is degrading), `error` (something failed and needs action).
+  (something is degrading), `error` (something failed and needs action). The kits take `warn`, the
+  dashboard chip's name, and store it as `warning` (FAA-276), never as `error`: a failed action is `error` (the chip
+  `danger`). The alias goes by name only: an event that needs a person stays `notice` with notify (below), whatever
+  chip a page shows for it.
 - `text`: one sentence, in the operator's language, with the object named and the
   number stated: "The Q3 report draft is ready for your approval (12 sections, 3
   languages)." Never a machine id, never a stack trace.

package/plugins/fabric-agent-adapter/skills/building-fabric-services/references/kit-modules.md

@@ -59,7 +59,8 @@ A module imports only modules listed before it in `kit.json`, so the kit has no
 | L0 | `fabric_time` | strict RFC 3339, UTC days, formatting, day windows, the clock ([dates](#dates-and-times)) |
 | L0 | `fabric_identifiers` | identifier equality by normal form (DEC-0076) |
 | L0 | `fabric_secrets` | the contract's one credential detector (DEC-0044) |
-| L0 | `fabric_peer_owner` | which OS account owns each end of a loopback connection, from the computer's socket table (DEC-0154 HA-2, FAA-226): `listener`, `server_end`, `peer`, `CheckedHTTPConnection`; the Python file is Project Observatory's `peer_owner.py` 1.1.0 vendored from commit `f86f0622` with the readings its header names (`1.1.0+kit.2`), the Node twin reads netstat, `/proc` and the owner SID where Python reads `sysctl`, `/proc` and `GetExtendedTcpTable`; on a restricted macOS table (FAA-267) a caller may vouch with a pid it started, proved by `lsof -p` |
+| L0 | `fabric_peer_owner` | which OS account owns each end of a loopback connection, from the computer's socket table (DEC-0154 HA-2, FAA-226): `listener`, `server_end`, `peer`, `CheckedHTTPConnection`; the Python file is Project Observatory's `peer_owner.py` 1.1.0 vendored from commit `f86f0622` with the readings its header names (`1.1.0+kit.3`), the Node twin reads netstat, `/proc` and the owner SID where Python reads `sysctl`, `/proc` and `GetExtendedTcpTable`; on a restricted macOS table (FAA-267) a caller may vouch with a pid it started, proved by `lsof -p` |
+| L0 | `fabric_tailnet` | who calls an agent behind `tailscale serve` and what that person may open (FAA-297): `Tailscale-User-Login` only on the agent's own serve listener from a loopback peer, groups from a generated `tailnet-perimeter/1` file, a personal SHA-256-stored key for MCP no wider than the groups; `authorize`, `load_perimeter`, `load_keys`, `hash_key`, refusals 401/403 with a code ([surfaces-and-auth.md](surfaces-and-auth.md#behind-tailscale-serve)) |
 | L1 | `fabric_crypto` | Ed25519 signing (a Montgomery ladder that does not branch on the key) and verification, P-256 verification, base64url, sha256 |
 | L1 | `fabric_base` | the protocol name, `ServiceError`, small shared helpers |
 | L1 | `fabric_platform` | Windows: named pipes, owner-only files (DEC-0032) |
@@ -85,7 +86,7 @@ A module imports only modules listed before it in `kit.json`, so the kit has no
 | L3 | `fabric_auth` | the token, the network guard, login codes |
 | L3 | `fabric_events` | events, paging, the JSONL event log (DEC-0029) |
 | L3 | `fabric_logs` | rotating logs, the stop signal and the drain (LC-12) |
-| L3 | `fabric_supervisors` | launchd, systemd user units, Task Scheduler (DEC-0032, LC-14) |
+| L3 | `fabric_supervisors` | launchd (a LaunchAgent, or a LaunchDaemon in the system domain, FAA-278), systemd user units, Task Scheduler (DEC-0032, LC-14) |
 | L3 | `fabric_service` | the facade: every name 0.39.1 exported, re-exported from the modules above |
 | L3 | `fabric_profiles` | runner and model profiles ([profiles](profiles.md)) |
 | L3 | `fabric_interop_rules` | `fabric-interop/0.1` rules without a service: constants, `InteropError`, trace context, job limits (DEC-0087; FAA-92), a job's approval step under the mandate (`job_step`, C3.3) |

package/plugins/fabric-agent-adapter/skills/building-fabric-services/references/lifecycle.md

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ PassionCode.ai the same rules make up the organization's product lifecycle contr
 - [The rules](#the-rules)
 - [launchd plist](#launchd-plist-generate-it-with-launchd_plist-or-launchdplist-both-kits-write-the-same-bytes)
 - [Install, upgrade, uninstall](#install-upgrade-uninstall)
+- [The system domain](#the-system-domain)
 - [One copy under a supervisor](#one-copy-under-a-supervisor)
 - [An app's own descriptor and the node](#an-apps-own-descriptor-and-the-node)
 - [Directories](#directories)
@@ -49,7 +50,8 @@ carry a credential. Only `doctor` and `update` are commands a host may run.
 
 **Started is not ready.** Readiness is the well-known document, `GET /.well-known/fabric-service`: answered without
 authentication, from memory, in under 100 ms, with `service.id` and `service.instance` equal to the descriptor's,
-on a listener of this OS account (DEC-0154 HA-2: another account's listener is `foreign-user` whatever it answers).
+on a listener of this OS account (DEC-0154 HA-2: another account's listener is `foreign-user` whatever it answers; a
+LaunchDaemon's root installer reads it as *The system domain* says).
 `status` is `starting`, `ready`, `degraded` or `stopping`; `degraded` is always present, and an empty list asserts
 full health. A process that cannot serve does not answer, and a host derives `down`. An install or upgrade polls
 that document until `service.id` matches (at most 40 s) before it calls the service started (the launchd installers;
@@ -76,7 +78,7 @@ systemd and Task Scheduler do not poll yet, FAA-253).
 |---|---|---|
 | `Label` | reverse-DNS, stable (`com.example.example-agent`) | the host controls the job by label |
 | `ProgramArguments` | absolute interpreter + module/script inside a **release** directory | a worktree or checkout path breaks the day it moves |
-| `RunAtLoad` | `true` | back at every login |
+| `RunAtLoad` | `true` | back at every login (a LaunchDaemon: at every boot) |
 | `KeepAlive` | `true` | `{SuccessfulExit:false}` leaves a cleanly exited service down |
 | `ThrottleInterval` | `10` | bounds a crash loop |
 | `ExitTimeOut` | above the drain and its hard exit (15 s default; `Drain` ends by 10 s) | SIGKILL arrives after it, so it must never come first |
@@ -102,11 +104,13 @@ systemd and Task Scheduler do not poll yet, FAA-253).
    cannot prove reads `table-restricted` and the error names the way round it (FAA-267). The pid is the job's own, so a
    `ProgramArguments` wrapper that starts the server as a child (`sh -c` without `exec`, `uv run`, `npm start`) cannot
    vouch for it: on such a host start the server with `exec` or run the installer from Apple's `/usr/bin/python3`.
+   A LaunchDaemon reads its answer differently: *The system domain*, below.
 4. Upgrade = new release, rewrite the plist with the new path, `launchd_install`
    again, then `prune_releases(releases_dir, current=<new release>)`: the running release
    and the one before it stay for rollback, older ones go (LC-11, LC-15).
 5. Uninstall = `launchd_uninstall` (Node: `await launchdUninstall(...)`) + `remove_descriptor`. Data stays; `purge=True`
-   (with `service_id`) removes data, logs and cache when the operator asks.
+   (with `service_id`) removes data, logs and cache when the operator asks; a LaunchDaemon refuses `purge` (*The system
+   domain*, below).
 
 **The operator's intent wins (LC-14).** A host stops a service with `bootout` **and**
 `disable` (off survives a login) and starts it with `enable` + `bootstrap`; restart is
@@ -123,6 +127,68 @@ that deletes an override, and a leftover `disabled` would make a later fresh ins
 off. Tests use a throwaway label or a fake `launchctl` first on `PATH`, never the
 operator's real jobs.
 
+## The system domain
+
+A `gui/<uid>` job (a LaunchAgent) runs only while its user is logged in. A headless Mac that a FileVault restart
+(`fdesetup authrestart`) leaves with no GUI login, or an SSH session of a user with no GUI login, has none: `bootstrap`
+answers error 125 ("Domain does not support specified action") and the installer's error says to remove the LaunchAgent
+it wrote (`launchd_uninstall`) and use the system domain (FAA-278). There the job is a **LaunchDaemon**: launchd starts
+it at boot, before any login, as the account its `UserName` names.
+
+- **The plist**: `launchd_plist(..., user_name="<short name>")` (Node: `userName`) writes `UserName`, which a system
+  install requires (without it the job would run as root, which every client refuses); the file goes in
+  `/Library/LaunchDaemons/<label>.plist`. A plist there is in the system domain by its path (the folder's case is
+  ignored); `domain="system"` (Node: `domain: 'system'`) says so for any path, and an explicit domain wins over the
+  path. Everything else is a LaunchAgent's.
+  `UserName` is the account whose Fabric and agents call the service: clients of another account refuse it (HA-2).
+- **Who runs which step.** The release, the descriptor and the service token are written as the `UserName` (steps 1 and
+  2 above, for example with `sudo -u <user> -H`), so they live in that user's home with its modes, and the plist's
+  working directory and log paths name that home; only the plist, `launchd_install` and `launchd_uninstall` run as root,
+  and at uninstall `remove_descriptor` runs as the `UserName` again. A service moved from a LaunchAgent is uninstalled
+  as one first, so launchd never holds both. The descriptor's `lifecycle.plist` names the path exactly,
+  `/Library/LaunchDaemons/<label>.plist`: a host that reads the folder by its spelling then knows the domain too.
+- **The label is the machine's.** `/Library/LaunchDaemons` and the system domain are shared by every account of the
+  Mac, so a LaunchDaemon's label is unique on the machine, not per account (put the account in it on a Mac with a
+  personal and an organization account); an install refuses, before writing anything, a label another plist holds
+  (the one launchd loaded the job from, or any plist of that label in the same folder) and the plist at its path when it
+  names another `UserName` or another label; an uninstall refuses a label another plist holds before its `bootout`,
+  which would stop that plist's job, so pass it the label the plist at its path names.
+- **Root installs and removes it.** `launchd_install` and `launchd_uninstall` in the system domain refuse, before writing
+  anything, in a process that is not root, and name the command to run as root (`launchctl bootstrap system <plist>`,
+  `launchctl bootout system/<label>`, removing the plist and `launchctl enable system/<label>`, as `launchd_uninstall`
+  does). `purge` is refused: the data belongs to the `UserName`, so remove it as that user. Upgrade is the same install
+  again as root, so a descriptor's `commands.update` for a LaunchDaemon runs as root, writes the new release (and any
+  descriptor it rewrites) as the `UserName` as an install does, and runs only the plist and `launchd_install` as root; a
+  host without root reports it as the operator's. A host's verbs need root too and keep LC-14 (off stays off, across a boot as well as a login): stop is
+  `bootout` + `disable system/<label>`, start is `enable` + `bootstrap system <plist>`, restart is
+  `kickstart -k system/<label>`; a host or broker without root reports the job read-only.
+- **Status and pid read without root**: `launchd_loaded(label, "system")` and `launchd_pid(label, "system")` ask
+  `launchctl print system/<label>`, and `launchd_override(label, "system")` asks `launchctl print-disabled system`
+  (Node: the `domain: 'system'` option), both of which any account may read; the probe's `lifecycle.one-copy` reads the
+  domain from the descriptor's plist the same way.
+- **The answer the installer waits for**: root reads the service's listener as another account's, so the installer takes
+  the job's pid from `launchctl print system/<label>` and reads the token-free well-known document only on a connection
+  that pid accepted, while the pid runs as the `UserName`'s uid (`ps`) and listens on exactly `127.0.0.1` (`lsof -p`);
+  an install refuses a `UserName` that is not a short name, no account of the Mac or root, and an origin other than
+  `http://127.0.0.1:<port>`, where nothing could prove it. Where the socket table is restricted it accepts a port that
+  pid listens on at exactly `127.0.0.1`, the weaker vouch SECURITY.md names (CT-261). A `ProgramArguments` wrapper that
+  starts the server as a child cannot pass either check, and the refusal says so: start the server with `exec`. An
+  install refused after its bootstrap leaves the job loaded, and its plist starts it again at boot; the error says so,
+  and as root `launchctl bootout system/<label>` and removing the plist (or `launchd_uninstall`) take it away. For hosts and the probe the domain comes from the plist's folder alone, so a LaunchDaemon's plist must live
+  in `/Library/LaunchDaemons` even when the installer is given `domain="system"`: the installer neither moves nor checks
+  it. A descriptor field for the domain is the contract's CT-234, open.
+- **A contract exception, accepted in principle.** At the pin, HA-2 reads a launch daemon's listener as another
+  account's and nothing it answers as the service's; the contract's later RT-3 vouches only for the caller's own uid. The
+  root installer reads its own job's token-free well-known answer anyway, proved by launchd's pid, that pid's uid and its
+  bind on exactly `127.0.0.1` (`lsof -p`, never a wildcard), and sends no credential; under a restricted socket table the
+  first proof is the CT-261 weaker vouch (the pid listens on the port; that it accepted the connection is not shown). The contract owner accepted this in
+  principle as DEC-0161 (RT-3 extended to launchd's system domain, the restricted-table vouch included; proposed, its
+  text after its readings), so it stays a departure from the pin until the next repin (FAA-288).
+  Every other client keeps HA-2 as written.
+- **Hosts.** A host or broker that reads launchd only in `gui/<uid>` sees a LaunchDaemon as not loaded and must not load
+  its plist into `gui/<uid>`. Fabric Dashboards from 0.8.39 takes the domain from the plist's folder and offers no verbs
+  for a system job; the lifecycle broker is still asked (FAA-287).
+
 ## One copy under a supervisor
 
 Started by hand, a copy that finds `service.lock` held prints one sentence naming the

package/plugins/fabric-agent-adapter/skills/building-fabric-services/references/protocol.md

@@ -212,7 +212,9 @@ Loopback is one per computer, not one per OS account. Before a client sends any
 `http://127.0.0.1:<port>` (a descriptor's token, a delegation token, a login code's request, a session cookie, a door's
 token), and before a host calls a local service healthy, it tells the owner of the server end of its own connection
 from the computer's socket table. A listener of another OS account, of root, SYSTEM or a service account, or one whose
-owner cannot be told, is `foreign-user`: nothing is sent and nothing it answers is read as the service's. The order of
+owner cannot be told, is `foreign-user`: nothing is sent and nothing it answers is read as the service's. One exception:
+a LaunchDaemon's root installer reads its own job's token-free well-known answer, proved by the job's pid, uid and exact
+`127.0.0.1` bind (lifecycle.md, *The system domain*; DEC-0161 accepted in principle, proposed; FAA-288). The order of
 a local service's states is `down`, `foreign-user`, `foreign` (`FAC-SEM-009`), then the well-known `status`; the
 well-known `process.pid` is never proof (`docs/specification/service.md#ha-2` at the pin).
 
@@ -232,14 +234,14 @@ listener of this account's pid on the port counts as this account's (`CheckedHTT
 `checkedSocket({vouchPid})`). The launchd installers vouch with their own job's pid; elsewhere a restricted table
 refuses (the probe, the hub client and `fabric_http` included, FAA-272), and Apple's `/usr/bin/python3` sees the
 whole table (FAA-267). A vouch is a weaker proof than the table's: it shows the job's pid listens on the port (`127.0.0.1` or the
-IPv4 wildcard), not that it accepted this connection, so a more specific bind by root over a wildcard job would pass;
+IPv4 wildcard for a LaunchAgent's installer, exactly `127.0.0.1` for a LaunchDaemon's), not that it accepted this connection, so a more specific bind by root over a wildcard job would pass;
 the contract's ruling on vouching is CT-261.
 
 Every kit client that sends a credential to loopback checks first: `check_service.py` (rule `listener.owner`, the first that reads the port for
 a local placement; `FAIL` `foreign-user` and no rule reads the port), the hub client (`HubError` `foreign-user`),
 `fabric_http` / `fabric-http.mjs` for a plain `http://` loopback URL (`HttpError` kind `foreign-user`, never retried),
 `check_dashboard_layout.mjs` before a local login code, and the launchd installers' poll (a listener of another account
-is never a successful install; the systemd and Task Scheduler installers do not poll yet, FAA-253). A running board
+is never a successful install, except a LaunchDaemon's job as its root installer proves it; the systemd and Task Scheduler installers do not poll yet, FAA-253). A running board
 session reports a door another account holds as `board.down` with reason `unreachable` until FAA-252. On macOS the Node
 twin reads the pid from `netstat` and the uid from `ps` a few milliseconds apart, so a pid reused in between would be
 misread; the Python twin's `sysctl` reader takes both from one record. A service's own loopback server refusing another account's peer (HA-3) is FAA-227, and the port

package/plugins/fabric-agent-adapter/skills/building-fabric-services/references/remote-placement.md

@@ -79,6 +79,11 @@ watch the gate fail.
   "used before honoured" write); memory works for one process.
 - **Behind a router**: check the platform-set forwarded scheme; `Host` is preserved by common
   platforms and must equal the origin's host.
+- **A provider key** the remote service needs is issued and kept in Project Observatory, pushed to the platform, and
+  the movement recorded with
+  `python3 "$(project-observatory full-path)/tools/vault.py" moved <project> <env> <NAME> --how "<what moved, where, evidence>" --at <provider>`,
+  so the platform's copy is known rather than invisible. Without Project Observatory, record where the key lives in
+  the person's own secret manager.
 
 ## Checking it
 

package/plugins/fabric-agent-adapter/skills/building-fabric-services/references/surfaces-and-auth.md

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 - [MCP for agents](#mcp-for-agents)
 - [CLI for people and scripts](#cli-for-people-and-scripts)
 - [A2A for remote agents](#a2a-for-remote-agents)
+- [Behind tailscale serve](#behind-tailscale-serve)
 - [Token](#token)
 - [Dashboard session](#dashboard-session)
 - [Headers every response carries](#headers-every-response-carries)
@@ -40,7 +41,9 @@
 
 ## CLI for people and scripts
 
-`<tool> service status|start|stop|restart` (launchctl on the label, then the
+`<tool> service status|start|stop|restart` (launchctl on the label in the domain `launchd_domain(plist)` names; for a
+LaunchDaemon start, stop and restart are root's, and a CLI without root reports the job read-only, lifecycle.md, The system
+domain; then the
 well-known document from this OS account's listener, else `foreign-user`: protocol.md, The listener's owner), `<tool> dashboard` (resolve the exact registered service with the `fabric-dashboards`
 MCP, run `check_dashboard_link.py` on the action, then open its `open_link` with the host's `open` and
 `fallback=never`; never `open <url>`, `open -a Safari`, `xdg-open` or `webbrowser.open`; an installed host that
@@ -82,6 +85,45 @@ A probe cannot see whether an interface would take the descriptor's token withou
 forbids, so it reads the card only and never calls an interface: an API-key scheme in the descriptor's own
 `auth.header` is a finding, and with `Authorization` (the default) the card cannot show it.
 
+## Behind tailscale serve
+
+An agent on a server (a VM, a teammate's machine) can reach people on the tailnet through `tailscale serve`, which
+proxies HTTPS on the node's tailnet name to a loopback listener and adds the caller's `Tailscale-User-Login`. The
+kit's `fabric_tailnet.py` / `fabric-tailnet.mjs` (FAA-297) turn that into a decision; the agent wires it into its own
+handler.
+
+- **A listener of serve's own.** Any process on the machine can send `Tailscale-User-Login` to a loopback port, so the
+  header is believed only on a listener that serve alone uses: a second loopback port, or, where the installed
+  `tailscale serve` can proxy to one, a Unix socket whose mode keeps other accounts out. Pass `listener="serve"` and the
+  connection's peer (`"unix"` for a socket). On any other listener a request carrying serve's headers is refused
+  (`serve-header-off-serve`); the Fabric listener keeps its session key and never reads them.
+- **A perimeter generated, not kept by hand.** `load_perimeter` / `loadPerimeter` take a `tailnet-perimeter/1`
+  document: `generatedFrom {registry, revision, at}` (required: a file without its source is refused,
+  `perimeter-not-generated`) and `groups {name: {members, dashboards, capabilities}}`. The organization's generator
+  writes it from its access registry; the agent reloads it when the file changes.
+- **A personal key for MCP.** `load_keys` / `loadKeys` take `[{id, login, sha256, capabilities}]`, the key's
+  `hash_key` / `hashKey` only. A call on the `mcp` surface needs `Authorization: Bearer <key>`; the key must belong to
+  the caller's login and its capabilities may not be wider than that login's groups.
+- **The answer.** `authorize(listener=, peer=, headers=, perimeter=, surface="dashboard"|"mcp", target=, keys=)`
+  answers `{allowed, status, code, login, groups}` (and `key`, the key's id, on an allowed MCP call). Send the
+  status and the code as they are; no answer carries a key or its hash.
+
+| Code | Status | When |
+|---|---|---|
+| `serve-header-off-serve` | 403 | serve's headers on a listener that is not serve's |
+| `peer-not-loopback` | 403 | the serve listener was reached from another address |
+| `identity-missing`, `identity-ambiguous`, `identity-malformed` | 401 | no login, two, or not a login |
+| `not-in-perimeter` | 403 | the login is in no group |
+| `dashboard-not-granted` | 403 | no group of the login lists the dashboard |
+| `key-required`, `key-unknown` | 401 | an MCP call without a bearer key, or with one not on the list |
+| `key-not-yours` | 403 | the key belongs to another login |
+| `key-wider-than-group` | 403 | the key's capabilities exceed the login's groups |
+| `capability-not-granted` | 403 | the key does not carry the capability called |
+
+A tagged node (a server, not a person) gets no identity header from serve and is refused `identity-missing`; a
+machine caller uses the estate's delegation tokens instead. The serve listener is an outward surface: watch it like
+the A2A tunnel above.
+
 ## Token
 
 - Created once with `ensure_token` at first start, after the instance lock.

package/plugins/fabric-agent-adapter/skills/building-fabric-services/references/when-to-use.md

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# When to use building-fabric-services
+
+The skill's full trigger description, kept here so the front matter's `description` stays within the client's skill listing budget (about 350 characters a skill). Read it when choosing between this skill and a neighbour.
+
+Use when running an agent as a Fabric service (fabric-service/0.1, its kits and probe): a local service (launchd, systemd, Windows), an ONLINE agent or dashboard on https, its dashboard link and kit (narrow panel, themes), data and cache paths, how callers reach and authenticate it, long jobs (fabric.job.*), spend report and limits, runner routes and model profiles, the estate record and delegation tokens, answering a Project's board requests, or packing and signing it. «сделай агенту дашборд», «локальный сервис агента», «подключи агента к Fabric Dashboards», «отвечать на запросы с доски проекта», «расходы агента на модели», "make this agent a local service", "make an online dashboard a Fabric service", "add the well-known endpoint". NOT for a one-off script or cron job, a hosted product with no agent, the provider manifest (adapting-projects-to-fabric), a new agent's design (creating-fabric-agents), a session using Fabric or its board (working-with-fabric), or building the Dashboards app (window, tray).

package/plugins/fabric-agent-adapter/skills/building-fabric-services/scripts/check_service.py

@@ -833,11 +833,12 @@ class Probe:
         if sys.platform != "darwin" or not shutil.which("launchctl"):
             self.add("lifecycle.one-copy", "NOT_RUN", "launchctl is not available")
             return
-        out = subprocess.run(["launchctl", "print", "gui/%d/%s" % (os.getuid(), life.get("label"))], capture_output=True, text=True)
+        domain = fs.launchd_domain(plist_path)  # a plist in /Library/LaunchDaemons is a LaunchDaemon (FAA-278)
+        out = subprocess.run(["launchctl", "print", "%s/%s" % (domain, life.get("label"))], capture_output=True, text=True)
         match = re.search(r"^\s*pid = (\d+)", out.stdout, re.MULTILINE)
         served = ((self.wk or {}).get("process") or {}).get("pid")
         if out.returncode != 0:
-            self.add("lifecycle.one-copy", "FAIL", "launchd job %s is not loaded" % life.get("label"))
+            self.add("lifecycle.one-copy", "FAIL", "launchd job %s is not loaded in %s" % (life.get("label"), domain))
         elif not match:
             self.add("lifecycle.one-copy", "FAIL", "launchd job loaded but not running")
         else:

package/plugins/fabric-agent-adapter/skills/building-fabric-services/scripts/fabric-events.mjs

@@ -5,6 +5,9 @@ import { feedDataProblems } from './fabric-protocols.mjs';
 
 export const LEVELS = ['info', 'notice', 'warning', 'error'];
 
+// The dashboard kit names its chip `warn`; an event written at that name is stored at the feed's `warning` (FAA-276).
+export const LEVEL_ALIASES = Object.freeze({ warn: 'warning' });
+
 export const EVENTS_DEFAULT_LIMIT = 50;
 
 export const EVENTS_MAX_LIMIT = 200;
@@ -15,9 +18,10 @@ const TRACE_ID = /^(?!0{32}$)[0-9a-f]{32}$/;
 
 const SPAN_ID = /^(?!0{16}$)[0-9a-f]{16}$/;
 
-/** One activity event. `data` (DEC-0070) adds machine-readable fields, `{schema, value}`, never a secret: refused here, so no feed carries one. */
-export function makeEvent(id, at, kind, level, text, { subject, link, notify, traceId, spanId, data } = {}) {
-  if (!LEVELS.includes(level)) throw new ServiceError(`level must be one of ${LEVELS.join(', ')}.`);
+/** One activity event. `level` is one of LEVELS; `warn`, the dashboard chip's name, is stored as `warning`. `data` (DEC-0070) adds machine-readable fields, `{schema, value}`, never a secret: refused here, so no feed carries one. */
+export function makeEvent(id, at, kind, given, text, { subject, link, notify, traceId, spanId, data } = {}) {
+  const level = typeof given === 'string' && Object.hasOwn(LEVEL_ALIASES, given) ? LEVEL_ALIASES[given] : given;
+  if (!LEVELS.includes(level)) throw new ServiceError(`level must be one of ${LEVELS.join(', ')} (or \`warn\` for \`warning\`).`);
   if (!KIND.test(kind)) throw new ServiceError(`kind ${kind} must be dotted lowercase.`);
   const sentence = String(text).split(/\s+/).filter(Boolean).join(' ');
   if (!sentence) throw new ServiceError('An event needs a sentence.');

package/plugins/fabric-agent-adapter/skills/building-fabric-services/scripts/fabric-peer-owner.mjs

@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ import http from 'node:http';
 import net from 'node:net';
 import os from 'node:os';
 
-export const PEER_OWNER_VERSION = '1.1.0+kit.2'; // the Python twin's, Observatory's 1.1.0 with the kit's differences
+export const PEER_OWNER_VERSION = '1.1.0+kit.3'; // the Python twin's, Observatory's 1.1.0 with the kit's differences
 export const THIS_ACCOUNT = 'this-account';
 export const ANOTHER_ACCOUNT = 'another-account';
 export const SYSTEM = 'system';

package/plugins/fabric-agent-adapter/skills/building-fabric-services/scripts/fabric-service.mjs

@@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ export {
   cookieValue,
 } from './fabric-auth.mjs';
 export {
+  LEVEL_ALIASES,
   LEVELS,
   EVENTS_DEFAULT_LIMIT,
   EVENTS_MAX_LIMIT,
@@ -176,6 +177,10 @@ export {
   taskInstall,
   taskUninstall,
   launchdPlist,
+  SYSTEM_DAEMONS,
+  launchdDomain,
+  jobWellKnownOf,
+  ForeignUserAnswer,
   launchdLoaded,
   launchdPid,
   launchdOverride,