@passioncode-ai/fabric-agent-adapter 0.37.0 → 0.37.1

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,23 @@
 # Changelog
 
+## 0.37.1 - 2026-10-20
+
+### Added
+
+- **The rest of contract DEC-0084 in both kits** (FAA-57), in `fabric_ceremonies.py` / `fabric-ceremonies.mjs`: the
+  nearby pairing (`pairing_commit`, `check_reveal`, `comparison_code`, `checked_comparison_code`, `estate_fingerprint`,
+  `rendezvous_verdict`, `join_listed`, `own_keys_decision`, `machine_of_keys`) held to the contract's `pairing.json`
+  (116 cases in eight groups), and the hub's single use of a token (`redeem_enroll_token`, with the `enroll-join/1`
+  proof as ES256 r and s low S or Ed25519) held to `enroll-token.json` group `redeem` and a high-S variant. 26 planted
+  defects across both kits, all caught. `fabric-estate.mjs` exports `validDeviceKey`.
+
+### Changed
+
+- **`building-fabric-services` → remote placement:** which `installedBy` form an agent installer writes (the string
+  form, or `{by: "person", role: "operator", tool}` when a person asked it), and that a TypeScript app must name its
+  `.well-known` route folder in `tsconfig` `include`, which skips dot folders. Both reported by an agent that built a
+  remote service in a Next.js app.
+
 ## 0.37.0 - 2026-10-19
 
 ### Added

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@passioncode-ai/fabric-agent-adapter",
-  "version": "0.37.0",
+  "version": "0.37.1",
   "description": "Create Fabric-compatible agents, run them as always-alive local services with dashboards (fabric-service/0.1), and adapt existing projects to the Fabric Agent Contract. This package is the installer CLI.",
   "scripts": {
     "test": "python3 test/validate.py && python3 -m unittest discover -s test -q && node --test 'test/*.test.mjs'"

package/plugins/fabric-agent-adapter/.claude-plugin/plugin.json

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
   "name": "fabric-agent-adapter",
   "displayName": "Fabric Agent Adapter",
   "description": "Create new Fabric-compatible agents, build them as always-alive local services with dashboards (fabric-service/0.1), and adapt existing projects to the Fabric Agent Contract through evidence-backed MCP, A2A, or local-runner provider bundles; and teach a coding agent to work in a project through Fabric (fabric-mcp, fabric_whoami, claim and release), with Claude Code session hooks.",
-  "version": "0.37.0",
+  "version": "0.37.1",
   "author": {
     "name": "PassionCode.ai",
     "url": "https://passioncode.ai/"

package/plugins/fabric-agent-adapter/skills/adapting-projects-to-fabric/SKILL.md

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ license: AGPL-3.0-only OR LicenseRef-PassionCode-Commercial
 compatibility: Requires filesystem access and Python 3.9+. Exact schema checks additionally need git, Node.js, pnpm, and the pinned fabric-agent-contract checkout (a public repository). Works without those tools in an explicitly degraded structural-check mode.
 metadata:
   author: PassionCode.ai
-  version: "0.37.0"
+  version: "0.37.1"
   contract-version: "0.1.0"
   contract-commit: "07042181bfae2a481aa0da1a5651f24c76669c48"
 ---

package/plugins/fabric-agent-adapter/skills/building-fabric-services/SKILL.md

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ license: AGPL-3.0-only OR LicenseRef-PassionCode-Commercial
 compatibility: Python 3.9+ or Node.js 20+ for the kits; the probe needs Python 3.9+. launchd steps are macOS-only; Linux services install a systemd user unit and Windows ones a per-user Scheduled Task with the kits' writers. Dashboard handoff optionally uses Fabric Dashboards MCP link/host_status/open; without it, report unresolved host capability. The contract checkout is optional.
 metadata:
   author: PassionCode.ai
-  version: "0.37.0"
+  version: "0.37.1"
   contract-version: "0.1.0"
   extension: "fabric-service/0.1"
   extension-commit: "07042181bfae2a481aa0da1a5651f24c76669c48"

package/plugins/fabric-agent-adapter/skills/building-fabric-services/references/estate-record.md

@@ -137,9 +137,19 @@ passkey; what a service applying the record checks is in the record itself:
   with the machine's `#sig` key and present that proof with the token. The token gives the machine no trust: only the
   passkey-signed revision that lists it does. `enroll_token_rules("enroll-token", token)` is FAC-SEM-113.
 
-The nearby pairing (`pairing-message/1`, the comparison code, the rendezvous) and the hub's single use of a token are
-Project Observatory's node and Fabric's hub; the kits port them in a later version (FAA-57). The relay's admission and
-session checks belong to the relay; the kits do not run a relay.
+- **A machine nearby pairs by a comparison code.** Each side commits (`pairing_commit`), then reveals; each checks the
+  other's reveal against its commitment, and both screens show the same six digits only when nothing sat in the middle
+  (`checked_comparison_code`, never `comparison_code` on unchecked reveals). The one-time rendezvous burns on the first
+  repeat, out-of-order message, mismatch, abort or after 600 s (`rendezvous_verdict`). Before it pins the estate, the new
+  machine checks that the revision lists it with the keys it revealed and the trusted machine with its `#sig` key
+  (`join_listed`), and shows `estate_fingerprint` of revision 1 for the person to compare. On each later revision it
+  runs `own_keys_decision`: apply and retire the keys the record dropped, or stop when it was removed or another holder
+  carries its key.
+- **The hub binds a token once** (`redeem_enroll_token`): the joining machine's proof is its `#sig` key's signature over
+  `enroll_join_input(token)` (ES256 as 64 bytes r and s, low S; Ed25519), and a second use, by any key, is refused and
+  logged.
+
+The relay's admission and session checks belong to the relay; the kits do not run a relay.
 
 ## Share grants into an organization
 

package/plugins/fabric-agent-adapter/skills/building-fabric-services/references/remote-placement.md

@@ -30,6 +30,16 @@ same objects — well-known document, events feed, login code — at the same pa
   literal; not `localhost`, `*.local`, `*.internal`, `*.home.arpa`, `*.lan`, `*.localdomain`.
 - `lifecycle.manager` is `none`, with no `label` or `plist`. `paths` is optional.
 - `commands` may carry `doctor` (a local executable); never `update`.
+- `installedBy` is the installer's name and version as a string (`"example-installer 1.2.0"`), or
+  `{by, role?, tool}` where `by` is `person`, `node` or `organization` and `role` (`operator`, `administrator`) is a
+  person's only. There is no `agent` kind: an agent that registers a service writes the string form, or
+  `{by: "person", role: "operator", tool: "<agent> <version>"}` when a person asked it to. `registerRemote` defaults to
+  the person form with `tool: "fabric-service register-remote"`.
+
+**A TypeScript app (Next.js and the like):** TypeScript's `include` and typescript-eslint skip dot folders by default,
+so `app/.well-known/fabric-service/route.ts` is neither type-checked nor linted until the project names it, for example
+`"include": [..., "src/app/.well-known/**/*.ts"]` in `tsconfig.json`. Check it is: put a type error in the route and
+watch the gate fail.
 
 ## On the platform
 

package/plugins/fabric-agent-adapter/skills/building-fabric-services/scripts/fabric-ceremonies.mjs

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 
 import crypto from 'node:crypto';
 import { jcs } from './fabric-delegation.mjs';
-import { CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS, estateTime, isSigningRpId, originWithin, verifyAssertion } from './fabric-estate.mjs';
+import { CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS, deviceKeyFingerprint, deviceKeyRef, estateTime, isSigningRpId, isValidP256Key, originWithin, validDeviceKey, verifyAssertion } from './fabric-estate.mjs';
 
 export const ENROLL_TOKEN_SCHEMA = 'enroll-token/1';
 export const ENROLL_TOKEN_TYPE = 'enroll-token/1';
@@ -126,4 +126,213 @@ export function enrollTokenRules(kind, value) {
   if (kind === 'enroll-token') return tokenFindings(isObject(value) ? value : {});
   return undefined;
 }
+// --- the hub's single use of a token (DEC-0084) ------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+const PROOF = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{85}[AQgw]$/;
+const P256_HALF_N = 0x7fffffff800000007fffffffffffffffde737d56d38bcf4279dce5617e3192a8n;
+
+function es256Raw(octets, message, raw) {
+  if (octets.length !== 65 || octets[0] !== 4 || !isValidP256Key(octets) || raw.length !== 64) return false;
+  if (BigInt(`0x${raw.subarray(32).toString('hex')}`) > P256_HALF_N) return false;
+  const jwk = { kty: 'EC', crv: 'P-256', x: octets.subarray(1, 33).toString('base64url'), y: octets.subarray(33).toString('base64url') };
+  try { return crypto.verify('sha256', Buffer.from(message, 'utf8'), { key: jwk, format: 'jwk', dsaEncoding: 'ieee-p1363' }, raw); } catch { return false; }
+}
+
+function proves(key, message, proof) {
+  if (!isString(proof) || !PROOF.test(proof)) return false;
+  const octets = Buffer.from(key.publicKey, 'base64');
+  const signature = Buffer.from(proof, 'base64url');
+  if (key.alg === 'es256') return es256Raw(octets, message, signature);
+  try {
+    const publicKey = crypto.createPublicKey({ key: { kty: 'OKP', crv: 'Ed25519', x: octets.toString('base64url') }, format: 'jwk' });
+    return crypto.verify(null, Buffer.from(message, 'utf8'), publicKey, signature);
+  } catch { return false; }
+}
+
+/** The hub's single use of a verified token; `ledger` is a Map from nonce to {state: redeemed, fingerprint} or {state: revoked}. */
+export function redeemEnrollToken(token, machineKey, proof, ledger) {
+  const input = enrollJoinInput(token);
+  if (input === undefined || !(ledger instanceof Map)) return { ok: false, problem: 'malformed' };
+  const { nonce } = statementFields(token);
+  if (machineOfKeys([machineKey]) === undefined) return { ok: false, problem: 'bad-key' };
+  if (!proves(machineKey, input, proof)) return { ok: false, problem: 'bad-proof' };
+  const fingerprint = deviceKeyFingerprint(machineKey);
+  const entry = ledger.get(nonce);
+  if (isObject(entry) && entry.state === 'revoked') return { ok: false, problem: 'revoked' };
+  if (entry !== undefined) return { ok: false, problem: 'reused', log: { nonce, presented: fingerprint, boundTo: isObject(entry) ? show(entry.fingerprint) : show(entry) } };
+  return { ok: true, record: { nonce, state: 'redeemed', fingerprint } };
+}
+
+// --- the nearby pairing (DEC-0084) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+export const PAIRING_SCHEMA = 'pairing-message/1';
+export const COMMIT_TYPE = 'fabric-enroll-commit/1';
+export const CODE_TYPE = 'fabric-enroll-code/1';
+export const FINGERPRINT_TYPE = 'estate-fingerprint/1';
+export const CODE_DIGITS = 6;
+export const FINGERPRINT_GROUPS = 5;
+export const FINGERPRINT_GROUP_DIGITS = 5;
+export const RENDEZVOUS_SECONDS = 600;
+const MACHINE_ID = /^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:~-]{0,127}$/;
+const KEY_MEMBERS = 'alg,kid,publicKey,use';
+const ALGORITHMS = new Map([['sig', ['es256', 'ed25519']], ['kem', ['ecdh-p256']]]);
+const sha = (text) => crypto.createHash('sha256').update(Buffer.from(text, 'utf8')).digest();
+const uint40 = (digest, offset) => digest.readUIntBE(offset, 5);
+const own = (value, key) => (isObject(value) && Object.hasOwn(value, key) ? value[key] : undefined);
+const isRole = (value) => value === 'new' || value === 'trusted';
+function jsonEqual(a, b) {
+  if (Array.isArray(a) || Array.isArray(b)) return Array.isArray(a) && Array.isArray(b) && a.length === b.length && a.every((item, i) => jsonEqual(item, b[i]));
+  if (isObject(a) || isObject(b)) {
+    if (!isObject(a) || !isObject(b)) return false;
+    const keys = Object.keys(a);
+    return keys.length === Object.keys(b).length && keys.every((key) => Object.hasOwn(b, key) && jsonEqual(a[key], b[key]));
+  }
+  return a === b;
+}
+
+/** The machine a key list belongs to, or undefined (one sig key, at most one kem key, one machine id, valid keys). */
+export function machineOfKeys(keys) {
+  if (!Array.isArray(keys) || keys.length < 1 || keys.length > 2) return undefined;
+  const ids = new Set(); const uses = new Set(); const octets = new Set();
+  for (const key of keys) {
+    if (!isObject(key) || Object.keys(key).sort().join() !== KEY_MEMBERS) return undefined;
+    const { use, kid } = key;
+    if (!isString(use) || !isString(kid) || !isString(key.alg) || !ALGORITHMS.get(use)?.includes(key.alg)) return undefined;
+    const id = kid.endsWith(`#${use}`) ? kid.slice(0, -(use.length + 1)) : '';
+    if (!MACHINE_ID.test(id) || uses.has(use) || deviceKeyFingerprint(key) === undefined || !validDeviceKey(key) || octets.has(key.publicKey)) return undefined;
+    ids.add(id); uses.add(use); octets.add(key.publicKey);
+  }
+  const [id] = [...ids];
+  return ids.size === 1 && uses.has('sig') ? id : undefined;
+}
+
+function sideProblem(side) {
+  if (!isObject(side)) return 'malformed';
+  const role = own(side, 'role');
+  if (!isRole(role)) return 'bad-role';
+  if (!matches(NONCE32, own(side, 'nonce'))) return 'bad-nonce';
+  if (machineOfKeys(own(side, 'keys')) === undefined) return 'bad-keys';
+  const genesis = own(side, 'genesis');
+  if (role === 'trusted' ? !matches(SHA256, genesis) : Object.hasOwn(side, 'genesis')) return 'bad-genesis';
+  return undefined;
+}
+const covered = (side) => (side.role === 'trusted' ? { keys: side.keys, nonce: side.nonce, genesis: side.genesis } : { keys: side.keys, nonce: side.nonce });
+
+/** A side's commitment over {type, role, keys, nonce, genesis?}. */
+export function pairingCommit(side) {
+  const problem = sideProblem(side);
+  if (problem) return { ok: false, problem };
+  return { ok: true, commit: `sha256:${sha(jcs({ type: COMMIT_TYPE, role: side.role, ...covered(side) })).toString('hex')}` };
+}
+
+function message(value, step) {
+  if (!isObject(value) || own(value, 'schema') !== PAIRING_SCHEMA || own(value, 'step') !== step) return undefined;
+  const members = Object.keys(value).sort().join();
+  if (step === 'commit') return members === 'commit,role,schema,step' && matches(SHA256, value.commit) ? value : undefined;
+  return members === 'keys,nonce,role,schema,step' || members === 'genesis,keys,nonce,role,schema,step' ? value : undefined;
+}
+
+/** Check the other side's reveal against its commitment; answers the revealing machine's id. */
+export function checkReveal(commit, reveal, expected) {
+  const c = message(commit, 'commit');
+  const r = message(reveal, 'reveal');
+  if (!c || !r) return { ok: false, problem: 'malformed' };
+  if (r.role !== c.role || (expected !== undefined && expected !== null && r.role !== expected)) return { ok: false, problem: 'role-mismatch' };
+  const { schema: _schema, step: _step, ...side } = r;
+  const made = pairingCommit(side);
+  if (!made.ok) return made;
+  if (made.commit !== c.commit) return { ok: false, problem: 'commit-mismatch' };
+  return { ok: true, machine: machineOfKeys(r.keys) };
+}
+
+/** The six-digit code both screens show. */
+export function comparisonCode(newReveal, trustedReveal) {
+  const a = message(newReveal, 'reveal');
+  const b = message(trustedReveal, 'reveal');
+  if (!a || !b) return { ok: false, problem: 'malformed' };
+  if (a.role !== 'new' || b.role !== 'trusted') return { ok: false, problem: isRole(a.role) && isRole(b.role) ? 'role-mismatch' : 'bad-role' };
+  const problem = sideProblem(a) ?? sideProblem(b);
+  if (problem) return { ok: false, problem };
+  if (machineOfKeys(a.keys) === machineOfKeys(b.keys)) return { ok: false, problem: 'same-machine' };
+  const value = uint40(sha(jcs({ type: CODE_TYPE, new: covered(a), trusted: covered(b) })), 0) % 10 ** CODE_DIGITS;
+  return { ok: true, code: String(value).padStart(CODE_DIGITS, '0') };
+}
+
+/** The estate's fingerprint from revision 1's digest. */
+export function estateFingerprint(digest) {
+  if (!matches(SHA256, digest)) return { ok: false, problem: 'malformed' };
+  const f = sha(jcs({ type: FINGERPRINT_TYPE, digest }));
+  return { ok: true, fingerprint: Array.from({ length: FINGERPRINT_GROUPS }, (_, i) => String(uint40(f, 5 * i) % 10 ** FINGERPRINT_GROUP_DIGITS).padStart(FINGERPRINT_GROUP_DIGITS, '0')).join(' ') };
+}
+
+/** The comparison code only after each reveal opened its own commitment. */
+export function checkedComparisonCode(newCommit, newReveal, trustedCommit, trustedReveal) {
+  const a = checkReveal(newCommit, newReveal, 'new');
+  if (!a.ok) return a;
+  const b = checkReveal(trustedCommit, trustedReveal, 'trusted');
+  if (!b.ok) return b;
+  return comparisonCode(newReveal, trustedReveal);
+}
+
+/** A one-time rendezvous after its messages at `at` (a Date): open, complete, or burned with its reason and index. */
+export function rendezvousVerdict(openedAt, messages, at) {
+  const opened = estateTime(openedAt);
+  const now = at instanceof Date ? at.getTime() : Number.NaN;
+  if (!Number.isFinite(opened) || !Number.isFinite(now) || !Array.isArray(messages)) return { state: 'burned', reason: 'malformed', index: -1 };
+  if (now > opened + RENDEZVOUS_SECONDS * 1000 || now < opened - CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS * 1000) return { state: 'burned', reason: 'expired', index: -1 };
+  const commits = new Map();
+  const revealed = new Set();
+  for (const [index, item] of messages.entries()) {
+    const burn = (reason) => ({ state: 'burned', reason, index });
+    if (isObject(item) && own(item, 'schema') === PAIRING_SCHEMA && own(item, 'step') === 'abort' && Object.keys(item).sort().join() === 'role,schema,step' && isRole(item.role)) return burn('aborted');
+    if (revealed.size === 2) return burn('closed');
+    const commit = message(item, 'commit');
+    const reveal = message(item, 'reveal');
+    const role = (commit ?? reveal)?.role;
+    if (!isRole(role)) return burn('malformed');
+    if (commit) {
+      if (commits.has(role)) return burn('repeated');
+      commits.set(role, commit);
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (revealed.has(role)) return burn('repeated');
+    if (commits.size < 2) return burn('out-of-order');
+    const checked = checkReveal(commits.get(role), reveal, role);
+    if (!checked.ok) return burn(checked.problem === 'commit-mismatch' ? 'commit-mismatch' : 'malformed');
+    revealed.add(role);
+  }
+  return revealed.size === 2 ? { state: 'complete' } : { state: 'open' };
+}
+
+const machineOf = (record, id) => (Array.isArray(record.machines) ? record.machines.find((machine) => isObject(machine) && machine.id === id) : undefined);
+const machineRevoked = (record, id) => Array.isArray(record.revocations) && record.revocations.some((entry) => isObject(entry) && entry.kind === 'machine' && entry.ref === id);
+const sameKeys = (a, b) => a.length === b.length && a.every((key) => b.some((other) => jsonEqual(key, other)));
+
+/** What the new machine checks before it pins and applies a revision that adds it. */
+export function joinListed(record, newReveal, trustedReveal, genesis) {
+  const a = message(newReveal, 'reveal');
+  const b = message(trustedReveal, 'reveal');
+  if (!isObject(record) || !a || !b || a.role !== 'new' || b.role !== 'trusted' || sideProblem(a) || sideProblem(b)) return { ok: false, problem: 'malformed' };
+  if (b.genesis !== genesis) return { ok: false, problem: 'other-estate' };
+  const newId = machineOfKeys(a.keys);
+  const trustedId = machineOfKeys(b.keys);
+  const machine = machineOf(record, newId);
+  if (!machine || machineRevoked(record, newId)) return { ok: false, problem: 'not-listed' };
+  if (!Array.isArray(machine.deviceKeys) || !sameKeys(machine.deviceKeys, a.keys)) return { ok: false, problem: 'other-keys' };
+  const trusted = machineOf(record, trustedId);
+  const sig = b.keys.find((key) => key.use === 'sig');
+  if (!trusted || machineRevoked(record, trustedId) || !Array.isArray(trusted.deviceKeys) || !trusted.deviceKeys.some((key) => jsonEqual(key, sig))) return { ok: false, problem: 'trusted-not-listed' };
+  return { ok: true };
+}
+
+/** What a node does with a verified revision when its own keys are in question. */
+export function ownKeysDecision(record, machineId, held) {
+  if (!isObject(record) || !isString(machineId) || !Array.isArray(held)) return { action: 'malformed' };
+  const machine = machineOf(record, machineId);
+  if (!machine || machineRevoked(record, machineId)) return { action: 'stop', reason: 'removed' };
+  const listed = Array.isArray(machine.deviceKeys) ? machine.deviceKeys : [];
+  if (listed.length === 0 || !listed.every((key) => held.some((mine) => jsonEqual(key, mine)))) return { action: 'stop', reason: 'keys-replaced' };
+  const retire = held.filter((key) => !listed.some((other) => jsonEqual(key, other))).map(deviceKeyRef).filter(isString);
+  return { action: 'apply', retire };
+}
 // #endregion ceremonies-kit-node

package/plugins/fabric-agent-adapter/skills/building-fabric-services/scripts/fabric-estate.mjs

@@ -412,7 +412,7 @@ export function deviceKeyRef(key) {
   return fingerprint !== undefined && isString(kid) ? `${kid}@${fingerprint}` : undefined;
 }
 
-const validDeviceKey = (key) => {
+export const validDeviceKey = (key) => {
   const raw = Buffer.from(show(key.publicKey ?? ''), 'base64');
   return key.alg === 'ed25519' ? raw.length === 32 && !smallOrder(raw) : isValidP256Key(raw);
 };

package/plugins/fabric-agent-adapter/skills/building-fabric-services/scripts/fabric_ceremonies.py

@@ -10,6 +10,9 @@ no trust; only a passkey-signed revision that lists it does. Its ``genesis`` aut
 - ``verify_enroll_token(token, record=, genesis=, at=)``: the reference verifier, the hub's and the node's.
 - ``enroll_join_input(token)``: the ``enroll-join/1`` statement the joining machine signs with its ``#sig`` key.
 - ``enroll_token_rules("enroll-token", token)``: FAC-SEM-113.
+- ``redeem_enroll_token(token, machine_key, proof, ledger)``: the hub's single use of a verified token.
+- The nearby pairing: ``pairing_commit``, ``check_reveal``, ``comparison_code``, ``checked_comparison_code``,
+  ``estate_fingerprint``, ``rendezvous_verdict``, ``join_listed``, ``own_keys_decision`` (``machine_of_keys``).
 
 Every function answers and never raises on malformed input. Normative source: the contract's src/enroll-token.ts,
 src/signing-challenges.ts and docs/specification/ceremonies.md.
@@ -18,6 +21,7 @@ src/signing-challenges.ts and docs/specification/ceremonies.md.
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import base64
 import hashlib
 import re
 import sys
@@ -191,4 +195,298 @@ def enroll_token_rules(kind: str, value: Any) -> Optional[List[Dict[str, str]]]:
     if kind == "enroll-token":
         return _token_findings(value if isinstance(value, dict) else {})
     return None
+# --- the hub's single use of a token (DEC-0084) ----------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+_PROOF = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9_-]{85}[AQgw]\Z")
+
+
+def _b64url(text: str) -> bytes:
+    return base64.urlsafe_b64decode(text + "=" * (-len(text) % 4))
+
+
+def _es256_raw(octets: bytes, message: bytes, raw: bytes) -> bool:
+    """ECDSA P-256 over SHA-256 with a 64-byte r || s signature, low-S only (relay-auth/1's form)."""
+    if len(octets) != 65 or octets[0] != 4 or not _estate.is_valid_p256_key(octets) or len(raw) != 64:
+        return False
+    r, s = int.from_bytes(raw[:32], "big"), int.from_bytes(raw[32:], "big")
+    n = _estate._N
+    if not (1 <= r < n and 1 <= s <= n // 2):
+        return False
+    e = int.from_bytes(hashlib.sha256(message).digest(), "big")
+    w = pow(s, -1, n)
+    point = _estate._shamir(e * w % n, r * w % n, (int.from_bytes(octets[1:33], "big"), int.from_bytes(octets[33:], "big")))
+    return point is not None and point[0] % n == r
+
+
+def _proves(key: Dict[str, Any], message: str, proof: Any) -> bool:
+    """Whether ``proof`` is the presented key's signature over ``message``: 64 bytes in their one canonical base64url
+    form, ES256 as r || s low-S, Ed25519 as itself."""
+    if not isinstance(proof, str) or not _PROOF.match(proof):
+        return False
+    octets = base64.b64decode(key["publicKey"])
+    signature = _b64url(proof)
+    if key.get("alg") == "es256":
+        return _es256_raw(octets, message.encode("utf-8"), signature)
+    return _delegation.ed25519_verify(octets, message.encode("utf-8"), signature)
+
+
+def redeem_enroll_token(token: Any, machine_key: Any, proof: Any, ledger: Any) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+    """The hub's single use of a token verify_enroll_token accepted. ``machine_key`` is the joining machine's #sig key,
+    ``proof`` its signature over ``enroll_join_input(token)``, ``ledger`` the hub's dict from nonce to entry
+    (``{"state": "redeemed", "fingerprint"}`` or ``{"state": "revoked"}``). The first failure answers: malformed,
+    bad-key, bad-proof, revoked, reused (with the log the hub records); the first use answers the record to store."""
+    join = enroll_join_input(token)
+    if join is None or not isinstance(ledger, dict):
+        return {"ok": False, "problem": "malformed"}
+    nonce = _statement_fields(token)["nonce"]
+    if machine_of_keys([machine_key]) is None:
+        return {"ok": False, "problem": "bad-key"}
+    if not _proves(machine_key, join, proof):
+        return {"ok": False, "problem": "bad-proof"}
+    fingerprint = _estate.device_key_fingerprint(machine_key)
+    entry = ledger.get(nonce, _estate._MISSING)
+    if isinstance(entry, dict) and entry.get("state") == "revoked":
+        return {"ok": False, "problem": "revoked"}
+    if entry is not _estate._MISSING:
+        bound = _estate._show(entry.get("fingerprint", _estate._MISSING)) if isinstance(entry, dict) else _estate._show(entry)
+        return {"ok": False, "problem": "reused", "log": {"nonce": nonce, "presented": fingerprint, "boundTo": bound}}
+    return {"ok": True, "record": {"nonce": nonce, "state": "redeemed", "fingerprint": fingerprint}}
+
+
+# --- the nearby pairing (DEC-0084) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+PAIRING_SCHEMA = "pairing-message/1"
+COMMIT_TYPE = "fabric-enroll-commit/1"
+CODE_TYPE = "fabric-enroll-code/1"
+FINGERPRINT_TYPE = "estate-fingerprint/1"
+CODE_DIGITS = 6
+FINGERPRINT_GROUPS = 5
+FINGERPRINT_GROUP_DIGITS = 5
+RENDEZVOUS_SECONDS = 600
+_MACHINE_ID = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:~-]{0,127}\Z")
+_KEY_MEMBERS = ["alg", "kid", "publicKey", "use"]
+_ALGORITHMS = {"sig": ("es256", "ed25519"), "kem": ("ecdh-p256",)}
+
+
+def _json_equal(a: Any, b: Any) -> bool:
+    """The contract's jsonEqual: arrays in order, objects by their members, primitives as JavaScript's ===."""
+    if isinstance(a, list) or isinstance(b, list):
+        return isinstance(a, list) and isinstance(b, list) and len(a) == len(b) and all(_json_equal(x, y) for x, y in zip(a, b))
+    if isinstance(a, dict) or isinstance(b, dict):
+        return isinstance(a, dict) and isinstance(b, dict) and len(a) == len(b) and all(k in b and _json_equal(a[k], b[k]) for k in a)
+    return _estate._same(a, b)
+
+
+def _is_role(value: Any) -> bool:
+    return value in ("new", "trusted") and isinstance(value, str)
+
+
+def machine_of_keys(keys: Any) -> Optional[str]:
+    """The machine a key list belongs to, or None: one or two keys, each exactly {kid, use, alg, publicKey}, one sig
+    (es256 or ed25519) and at most one kem (ecdh-p256), each kid <id>#<use> for one machine id, each key valid and in
+    canonical padded base64, no key in both roles."""
+    if not isinstance(keys, list) or not 1 <= len(keys) <= 2:
+        return None
+    ids, uses, octets = set(), set(), set()
+    for key in keys:
+        if not isinstance(key, dict) or sorted(key) != _KEY_MEMBERS:
+            return None
+        use, kid, alg = key["use"], key["kid"], key["alg"]
+        if not isinstance(use, str) or not isinstance(kid, str) or not isinstance(alg, str) or alg not in _ALGORITHMS.get(use, ()):
+            return None
+        machine = kid[: -(len(use) + 1)] if kid.endswith("#" + use) else ""
+        if (not _MACHINE_ID.match(machine) or use in uses or _estate.device_key_fingerprint(key) is None
+                or not _estate._valid_device_key(key) or key["publicKey"] in octets):
+            return None
+        ids.add(machine)
+        uses.add(use)
+        octets.add(key["publicKey"])
+    return next(iter(ids)) if len(ids) == 1 and "sig" in uses else None
+
+
+def _side_problem(side: Any) -> Optional[str]:
+    if not isinstance(side, dict):
+        return "malformed"
+    role = side.get("role")
+    if not _is_role(role):
+        return "bad-role"
+    if not _matches(_NONCE32, side.get("nonce")):
+        return "bad-nonce"
+    if machine_of_keys(side.get("keys")) is None:
+        return "bad-keys"
+    if role == "trusted":
+        if not _matches(_SHA256, side.get("genesis")):
+            return "bad-genesis"
+    elif "genesis" in side:
+        return "bad-genesis"
+    return None
+
+
+def _covered(side: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+    if side["role"] == "trusted":
+        return {"keys": side["keys"], "nonce": side["nonce"], "genesis": side["genesis"]}
+    return {"keys": side["keys"], "nonce": side["nonce"]}
+
+
+def _sha_hex(text: str) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(text.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+
+
+def pairing_commit(side: Any) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+    """A side's commitment: sha256 of the RFC 8785 form of {type: fabric-enroll-commit/1, role, keys, nonce, genesis?}."""
+    problem = _side_problem(side)
+    if problem:
+        return {"ok": False, "problem": problem}
+    return {"ok": True, "commit": "sha256:" + _sha_hex(_delegation.jcs(dict({"type": COMMIT_TYPE, "role": side["role"]}, **_covered(side))))}
+
+
+def _message(value: Any, step: str) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
+    if not isinstance(value, dict) or value.get("schema") != PAIRING_SCHEMA or value.get("step") != step:
+        return None
+    members = ",".join(sorted(value))
+    if step == "commit":
+        return value if members == "commit,role,schema,step" and _matches(_SHA256, value.get("commit")) else None
+    return value if members in ("keys,nonce,role,schema,step", "genesis,keys,nonce,role,schema,step") else None
+
+
+def check_reveal(commit: Any, reveal: Any, expected: Optional[str] = None) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+    """Check the other side's reveal against its commitment; answers the revealing machine's id."""
+    c, r = _message(commit, "commit"), _message(reveal, "reveal")
+    if c is None or r is None:
+        return {"ok": False, "problem": "malformed"}
+    if not _estate._same(r["role"], c["role"]) or (expected is not None and not _estate._same(r["role"], expected)):
+        return {"ok": False, "problem": "role-mismatch"}
+    made = pairing_commit({k: v for k, v in r.items() if k not in ("schema", "step")})
+    if not made["ok"]:
+        return made
+    if made["commit"] != c["commit"]:
+        return {"ok": False, "problem": "commit-mismatch"}
+    return {"ok": True, "machine": machine_of_keys(r["keys"])}
+
+
+def comparison_code(new_reveal: Any, trusted_reveal: Any) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+    """The six-digit code both screens show, over both reveals' keys, nonces and the estate's genesis."""
+    a, b = _message(new_reveal, "reveal"), _message(trusted_reveal, "reveal")
+    if a is None or b is None:
+        return {"ok": False, "problem": "malformed"}
+    if not _estate._same(a["role"], "new") or not _estate._same(b["role"], "trusted"):
+        return {"ok": False, "problem": "role-mismatch" if _is_role(a["role"]) and _is_role(b["role"]) else "bad-role"}
+    problem = _side_problem(a) or _side_problem(b)
+    if problem:
+        return {"ok": False, "problem": problem}
+    if machine_of_keys(a["keys"]) == machine_of_keys(b["keys"]):
+        return {"ok": False, "problem": "same-machine"}
+    digest = hashlib.sha256(_delegation.jcs({"type": CODE_TYPE, "new": _covered(a), "trusted": _covered(b)}).encode("utf-8")).digest()
+    return {"ok": True, "code": str(int.from_bytes(digest[:5], "big") % 10 ** CODE_DIGITS).zfill(CODE_DIGITS)}
+
+
+def estate_fingerprint(digest: Any) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+    """The estate's fingerprint from revision 1's digest: five groups of five digits a person compares."""
+    if not _matches(_SHA256, digest):
+        return {"ok": False, "problem": "malformed"}
+    f = hashlib.sha256(_delegation.jcs({"type": FINGERPRINT_TYPE, "digest": digest}).encode("utf-8")).digest()
+    groups = [str(int.from_bytes(f[5 * i:5 * i + 5], "big") % 10 ** FINGERPRINT_GROUP_DIGITS).zfill(FINGERPRINT_GROUP_DIGITS) for i in range(FINGERPRINT_GROUPS)]
+    return {"ok": True, "fingerprint": " ".join(groups)}
+
+
+def checked_comparison_code(new_commit: Any, new_reveal: Any, trusted_commit: Any, trusted_reveal: Any) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+    """The comparison code only after each reveal opened its own commitment."""
+    a = check_reveal(new_commit, new_reveal, "new")
+    if not a["ok"]:
+        return a
+    b = check_reveal(trusted_commit, trusted_reveal, "trusted")
+    if not b["ok"]:
+        return b
+    return comparison_code(new_reveal, trusted_reveal)
+
+
+def rendezvous_verdict(opened_at: Any, messages: Any, at: Any) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+    """A one-time rendezvous after the messages it carried, at ``at`` (an aware datetime or epoch seconds): open,
+    complete, or burned with the reason and the index of the message that burned it."""
+    opened = _estate.estate_time(opened_at)
+    now = _estate._clock(at)
+    if not _finite(opened) or not _finite(now) or not isinstance(messages, list):
+        return {"state": "burned", "reason": "malformed", "index": -1}
+    if now > opened + RENDEZVOUS_SECONDS * 1000 or now < opened - _estate.CLOCK_SKEW_SECONDS * 1000:
+        return {"state": "burned", "reason": "expired", "index": -1}
+    commits: Dict[str, Any] = {}
+    revealed: set = set()
+    for index, item in enumerate(messages):
+        def burn(reason: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+            return {"state": "burned", "reason": reason, "index": index}
+        if (isinstance(item, dict) and item.get("schema") == PAIRING_SCHEMA and item.get("step") == "abort"
+                and sorted(item) == ["role", "schema", "step"] and _is_role(item.get("role"))):
+            return burn("aborted")
+        if len(revealed) == 2:
+            return burn("closed")
+        commit, reveal = _message(item, "commit"), _message(item, "reveal")
+        role = (commit or reveal or {}).get("role")
+        if not _is_role(role):
+            return burn("malformed")
+        if commit is not None:
+            if role in commits:
+                return burn("repeated")
+            commits[role] = commit
+            continue
+        if role in revealed:
+            return burn("repeated")
+        if len(commits) < 2:
+            return burn("out-of-order")
+        checked = check_reveal(commits.get(role), reveal, role)
+        if not checked["ok"]:
+            return burn("commit-mismatch" if checked["problem"] == "commit-mismatch" else "malformed")
+        revealed.add(role)
+    return {"state": "complete"} if len(revealed) == 2 else {"state": "open"}
+
+
+def _machine_of(record: Dict[str, Any], machine_id: Any) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
+    machines = record.get("machines")
+    if not isinstance(machines, list):
+        return None
+    return next((m for m in machines if isinstance(m, dict) and _estate._same(m.get("id", _estate._MISSING), machine_id)), None)
+
+
+def _machine_revoked(record: Dict[str, Any], machine_id: Any) -> bool:
+    revocations = record.get("revocations")
+    return isinstance(revocations, list) and any(isinstance(e, dict) and e.get("kind") == "machine"
+                                                 and _estate._same(e.get("ref", _estate._MISSING), machine_id) for e in revocations)
+
+
+def join_listed(record: Any, new_reveal: Any, trusted_reveal: Any, genesis: Any) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+    """What the new machine checks before it pins and applies: the estate is the one the code bound, and the record
+    lists it with exactly the keys it revealed and the trusted machine with its revealed #sig key, revoking neither."""
+    a, b = _message(new_reveal, "reveal"), _message(trusted_reveal, "reveal")
+    if (not isinstance(record, dict) or a is None or b is None or not _estate._same(a["role"], "new")
+            or not _estate._same(b["role"], "trusted") or _side_problem(a) or _side_problem(b)):
+        return {"ok": False, "problem": "malformed"}
+    if not isinstance(genesis, str) or b["genesis"] != genesis:
+        return {"ok": False, "problem": "other-estate"}
+    new_id, trusted_id = machine_of_keys(a["keys"]), machine_of_keys(b["keys"])
+    machine = _machine_of(record, new_id)
+    if machine is None or _machine_revoked(record, new_id):
+        return {"ok": False, "problem": "not-listed"}
+    listed = machine.get("deviceKeys")
+    if not isinstance(listed, list) or len(listed) != len(a["keys"]) or not all(any(_json_equal(k, o) for o in a["keys"]) for k in listed):
+        return {"ok": False, "problem": "other-keys"}
+    trusted = _machine_of(record, trusted_id)
+    sig = next(k for k in b["keys"] if k["use"] == "sig")
+    if (trusted is None or _machine_revoked(record, trusted_id) or not isinstance(trusted.get("deviceKeys"), list)
+            or not any(_json_equal(k, sig) for k in trusted["deviceKeys"])):
+        return {"ok": False, "problem": "trusted-not-listed"}
+    return {"ok": True}
+
+
+def own_keys_decision(record: Any, machine_id: Any, held: Any) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+    """What a node does with a verified revision when its own keys are in question: apply (retiring the held keys the
+    record no longer lists, by key reference), stop as removed, stop as keys-replaced, or malformed."""
+    if not isinstance(record, dict) or not isinstance(machine_id, str) or not isinstance(held, list):
+        return {"action": "malformed"}
+    machine = _machine_of(record, machine_id)
+    if machine is None or _machine_revoked(record, machine_id):
+        return {"action": "stop", "reason": "removed"}
+    listed = machine.get("deviceKeys") if isinstance(machine.get("deviceKeys"), list) else []
+    if not listed or not all(any(_json_equal(k, mine) for mine in held) for k in listed):
+        return {"action": "stop", "reason": "keys-replaced"}
+    retire = [ref for ref in (_estate.device_key_ref(k) for k in held if not any(_json_equal(k, o) for o in listed)) if isinstance(ref, str)]
+    return {"action": "apply", "retire": retire}
 # #endregion ceremonies-kit

package/plugins/fabric-agent-adapter/skills/creating-fabric-agents/SKILL.md

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ license: AGPL-3.0-only OR LicenseRef-PassionCode-Commercial
 compatibility: Requires filesystem access and Python 3.9+. Exact schema checks additionally need git, Node.js, pnpm, and the pinned fabric-agent-contract checkout (a public repository). Works without those tools in an explicitly degraded structural-check mode. Ships in one plugin with adapting-projects-to-fabric, whose scripts it reuses.
 metadata:
   author: PassionCode.ai
-  version: "0.37.0"
+  version: "0.37.1"
   contract-version: "0.1.0"
   contract-commit: "07042181bfae2a481aa0da1a5651f24c76669c48"
 ---

package/plugins/fabric-agent-adapter/skills/working-with-fabric/SKILL.md

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ compatibility: >-
   this plugin; Codex/Kimi use command hooks; Hermes/OpenCode/OpenClaw/Pi use native context plugins after opt-in.
 metadata:
   author: PassionCode.ai
-  version: "0.37.0"
+  version: "0.37.1"
 ---
 
 # Working with Fabric

package/plugins/fabric-agent-adapter/skills/working-with-fabric/scripts/fabric_session.py

@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ WATCH_MAX_BACKOFF_S = 900
 SESSION_ID = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9._:-]{1,128}")
 LOOPBACK_ORIGIN = re.compile(r"http://127\.0\.0\.1:(\d{1,5})")
 LOCAL_ORIGIN = re.compile(r'"origin": "http://(?:127\.0\.0\.1|localhost)')
-VERSION = "0.37.0"
+VERSION = "0.37.1"
 HOSTS = {"claude": "Claude Code", "codex": "Codex", "kimi": "Kimi Code",
          "hermes": "Hermes", "opencode": "OpenCode", "openclaw": "OpenClaw", "pi": "Pi"}
 NATIVE_PLUGIN_HOSTS = frozenset(("hermes", "opencode", "openclaw", "pi"))