@passioncode-ai/fabric-agent-adapter 0.20.0 → 0.21.0

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,70 @@
 # Changelog
 
+## 0.21.0 - 2026-10-12
+
+The estate record (contract DEC-0055, `estate-record/1`; contract backlog CT-18, CT-20) in both kits, and the pin
+moved to contract `b291bf09e0a9f9fd3c16cf540832cd021203b7d1`, the merge of contract PR #54 (FAA-31).
+
+### Added
+
+- **`fabric_estate.py` / `fabric-estate.mjs`** — the contract's `src/estate-record-rules.ts`, `src/webauthn.ts` and
+  `src/p256.ts`, ported answer for answer.
+  - **`verify_estate_record` / `verifyEstateRecord`.** The checks run in this order:
+    1. the clock, checked first;
+    2. the shape;
+    3. the digest (RFC 8785, without `digest` and `signature`);
+    4. the chain to the parent: estate, next revision, parent digest, issued no earlier, no revocation dropped;
+    5. the signing passkey among the trusted ones and not revoked by the parent (rotation stays valid);
+    6. the WebAuthn Level 3 assertion, offline: type, challenge, origin, cross-origin, RP ID hash, UP, UV, then the
+       ES256 or EdDSA signature under a validated key;
+    7. the 30-day window;
+    8. the record's own rules, which answer `rule-violation` with `codes`.
+
+    Dates are strict RFC 3339. Passkey JWK coordinates must be canonical base64url.
+  - **`estate_record_rules` / `estateRecordRules`** implement FAC-SEM-072…076 for `estate-record`,
+    `estate-record-revision` and `estate-placement`.
+  - **Also:** `placement_trust`, `estate_record_digest`, `estate_challenge` and `is_valid_p256_key` (SEC 1 §3.2.2).
+  - **The Python kit verifies ES256 in pure Python** (P-256, strict DER: minimal positive INTEGERs, nothing after
+    them, `r` and `s` below the group order). Its strictness matches OpenSSL's on a malleated, padded or trailing
+    signature; a test checks the two against each other.
+- **Trusting a delegation key (DL-14, CT-20).**
+  - `verify_delegation`, `verify_approval` and `delegation_gate` (and their Node twins) take `estate`: the current
+    verified revision, or a function that returns it.
+  - A token's `kid` is trusted only while that revision certifies it for a machine (same `kid` and key), does not
+    revoke it, and is within its window. Otherwise the token is refused with `kid-not-certified`.
+  - A record that cannot be read certifies nothing: `issuer-unavailable` with `estate-unreadable`.
+  - Without `estate`, nothing changes.
+  - `hub_key_certified` / `hubKeyCertified` answers the question on its own.
+- **Tests.**
+  - `test/fixtures/contract/estate-vectors.json` is generated by `make_estate_vectors.mjs` from the contract's own
+    functions and fixtures at the pin:
+    - 45 `verifyEstateRecord` cases, each re-answered against the contract's;
+    - 51 rule cases: the 38 semantic fixtures, the positive records, and strict-date and wrong-length edges;
+    - P-256 and passkey-key cases;
+    - the digest and challenge.
+
+    The private test keys of the contract's vectors are dropped: the kits only verify.
+  - Mutation testing: 42 planted defects, all caught.
+- **Independent review.** Nothing critical. The ES256 verifier matched OpenSSL on 3,300 signatures, and the Node
+  port matched the contract's TypeScript on 470 extra inputs.
+  - **One divergence that mattered, now fixed:** Python's `\d` matched a full-width digit in a date. A Python machine
+    would have applied a revision the contract refuses. Dates now take ASCII digits only.
+  - **`Number()` follows JavaScript.** Its whitespace, `0b`/`0o`/`0x`, and arrays are read as JavaScript reads them.
+  - **A verdict, never an exception**, for three inputs: deeply nested client data, a 400-digit revision, and a lone
+    surrogate in a pinned RP ID.
+  - **New vectors from the contract cover these:** 24 more rule cases.
+  - **The docs now require** that `estate` is a verified revision, and the highest one applied, since the rule trusts
+    the record it is given.
+
+### Changed
+
+- **The pin is `b291bf0`.** `0cacd08` stays supported. The compiled-schema checks pass for all three profiles against
+  the new pin.
+- **The settings canonical form refuses a lone surrogate in any string or key** (CT-25, DEC-0052), in both kits,
+  answering the contract's refusal vectors.
+- Docs: `references/estate-record.md` (new), `delegation.md` (*Keys the estate record certifies*), and `SKILL.md`.
+  The scenario eval `estate-record-and-certified-keys` and a trigger came first.
+
 ## 0.20.0 - 2026-10-12
 
 Runner routes in both kits: the closed probe results and the route checks FAC-SEM-028…034. These come from contract

package/README.md

@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ Scaffolding is non-destructive by default. It writes only the paths declared in
 The default pin for new bundles is [`fabric-contract.lock.json`](fabric-contract.lock.json):
 
 - version: `0.1.0`
-- commit: `0cacd08b0e95b6abf131eae1206b60792138bc3c`
+- commit: `b291bf09e0a9f9fd3c16cf540832cd021203b7d1`
 
 Every other mention of the default contract revision — this section, the skills' metadata, the
 skill card, `adapt_project.py` — must equal it; `python3 test/validate.py` fails a tree
@@ -230,8 +230,8 @@ FABRIC_CONTRACT_OLD=/path/to/legacy-contract FABRIC_CONTRACT_NEW=/path/to/curren
 ```
 
 Without both environment variables, those tests explicitly skip as `NOT_RUN`.
-This source checkout is 0.20.0. 0.19.0 is the latest published GitHub/npm release (2026-10-12; 0.7.0 and 0.11.0
-were never released); 0.20.0 is published by its `v0.20.0` tag. Source delivery does not update installed skills or live sessions.
+This source checkout is 0.21.0. 0.20.0 is the latest published GitHub/npm release (2026-10-12; 0.7.0 and 0.11.0
+were never released); 0.21.0 is published by its `v0.21.0` tag. Source delivery does not update installed skills or live sessions.
 
 ## License
 

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@passioncode-ai/fabric-agent-adapter",
-  "version": "0.20.0",
+  "version": "0.21.0",
   "description": "Create Fabric-compatible agents, run them as always-alive local services with dashboards (fabric-service/0.1), and adapt existing projects to the Fabric Agent Contract. This package is the installer CLI.",
   "scripts": {
     "test": "python3 test/validate.py && python3 -m unittest discover -s test -q && node --test 'test/*.test.mjs'"

package/plugins/fabric-agent-adapter/.claude-plugin/plugin.json

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
   "name": "fabric-agent-adapter",
   "displayName": "Fabric Agent Adapter",
   "description": "Create new Fabric-compatible agents, build them as always-alive local services with dashboards (fabric-service/0.1), and adapt existing projects to the Fabric Agent Contract through evidence-backed MCP, A2A, or local-runner provider bundles.",
-  "version": "0.20.0",
+  "version": "0.21.0",
   "author": {
     "name": "PassionCode.ai",
     "url": "https://passioncode.ai/"

package/plugins/fabric-agent-adapter/skills/adapting-projects-to-fabric/SKILL.md

@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ license: AGPL-3.0-only OR LicenseRef-PassionCode-Commercial
 compatibility: Requires filesystem access and Python 3.9+. Exact schema checks additionally need git, Node.js, pnpm, and the pinned fabric-agent-contract checkout (a public repository). Works without those tools in an explicitly degraded structural-check mode.
 metadata:
   author: PassionCode.ai
-  version: "0.20.0"
+  version: "0.21.0"
   contract-version: "0.1.0"
-  contract-commit: "0cacd08b0e95b6abf131eae1206b60792138bc3c"
+  contract-commit: "b291bf09e0a9f9fd3c16cf540832cd021203b7d1"
 ---
 
 # Adapting projects to Fabric
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ Use exactly:
 
 - contract version `0.1.0`;
 - repository `https://github.com/passioncode-ai/fabric-agent-contract`;
-- commit `0cacd08b0e95b6abf131eae1206b60792138bc3c`.
+- commit `b291bf09e0a9f9fd3c16cf540832cd021203b7d1`.
 
 This is the default for new bundles. When checking an issued legacy bundle, preserve its
 explicit supported lock and use that exact clean checkout. Never silently upgrade or

package/plugins/fabric-agent-adapter/skills/adapting-projects-to-fabric/scripts/adapt_project.py

@@ -21,10 +21,10 @@ import fabric_secrets as _secrets  # noqa: E402 - the contract's credential dete
 
 CONTRACT_VERSION = "0.1.0"
 CONTRACT_REPOSITORY = "https://github.com/passioncode-ai/fabric-agent-contract"
-CONTRACT_COMMIT = "0cacd08b0e95b6abf131eae1206b60792138bc3c"
+CONTRACT_COMMIT = "b291bf09e0a9f9fd3c16cf540832cd021203b7d1"
 # #region supported-contract-revisions — docs: README.md#contract-pin
 # Only this declaration may name a legacy revision in live files.
-SUPPORTED_CONTRACT_COMMITS = (CONTRACT_COMMIT, "2eb91c00e852d9c31d804310d38fad91589fcbac", "8e49fbd5fbbf230e32c1969cd24ac3c22422f0a5", "a83bec6b47776af688402c18efec507143061f68", "52da526d7cc1e063d74c5b520dbc03d0ace15246", "78b2da018d2c4bd9ac1bde1dc3b7f1a110a175f5", "623bf61358c339cb10297807b3f024b5d9f1f327", "23f9fda4c05f8a3852246ee98d4f2adf74ed0875", "9091d3d6606b0c4b5591a38c3674356a01fd7f55", "df55c8c54a23251342a7ee57ba95642b7eb39e61", "2ce392291c6668598d12cd38327e24696b5ca15c")
+SUPPORTED_CONTRACT_COMMITS = (CONTRACT_COMMIT, "0cacd08b0e95b6abf131eae1206b60792138bc3c", "2eb91c00e852d9c31d804310d38fad91589fcbac", "8e49fbd5fbbf230e32c1969cd24ac3c22422f0a5", "a83bec6b47776af688402c18efec507143061f68", "52da526d7cc1e063d74c5b520dbc03d0ace15246", "78b2da018d2c4bd9ac1bde1dc3b7f1a110a175f5", "623bf61358c339cb10297807b3f024b5d9f1f327", "23f9fda4c05f8a3852246ee98d4f2adf74ed0875", "9091d3d6606b0c4b5591a38c3674356a01fd7f55", "df55c8c54a23251342a7ee57ba95642b7eb39e61", "2ce392291c6668598d12cd38327e24696b5ca15c")
 # #endregion supported-contract-revisions
 INTEROP_KEY = "https://fabric.passioncode.ai/agent-contract/extensions/interop/0.1"
 MCP_REVISION = "2026-07-28"

package/plugins/fabric-agent-adapter/skills/building-fabric-services/SKILL.md

@@ -16,10 +16,10 @@ license: AGPL-3.0-only OR LicenseRef-PassionCode-Commercial
 compatibility: Python 3.9+ or Node.js 20+ for the kits; the probe needs Python 3.9+. launchd steps are macOS-only; Linux services install a systemd user unit and Windows ones a per-user Scheduled Task with the kits' writers. Dashboard handoff optionally uses Fabric Dashboards MCP link/host_status/open; without it, report unresolved host capability. The contract checkout is optional.
 metadata:
   author: PassionCode.ai
-  version: "0.20.0"
+  version: "0.21.0"
   contract-version: "0.1.0"
   extension: "fabric-service/0.1"
-  extension-commit: "0cacd08b0e95b6abf131eae1206b60792138bc3c"
+  extension-commit: "b291bf09e0a9f9fd3c16cf540832cd021203b7d1"
 ---
 
 # Building Fabric services
@@ -83,7 +83,9 @@ are in [`scripts/fabric_interop.py`](scripts/fabric_interop.py) and
 [`scripts/fabric-interop.mjs`](scripts/fabric-interop.mjs). When the callers are agents of the estate, the
 service checks each call's delegation token (DEC-0039): read [the delegation reference](references/delegation.md);
 the verifier is [`scripts/fabric_delegation.py`](scripts/fabric_delegation.py) /
-[`scripts/fabric-delegation.mjs`](scripts/fabric-delegation.mjs). When Fabric chooses the service's runner and models
+[`scripts/fabric-delegation.mjs`](scripts/fabric-delegation.mjs). A service on the operator's machines that
+applies the estate record (DEC-0055) verifies each revision first and trusts only the keys it certifies: read
+[the estate record reference](references/estate-record.md). When Fabric chooses the service's runner and models
 (DEC-0046), or a project routes its work through an ordered list of runners (DEC-0026: the doctor's closed probe
 results, the route checks FAC-SEM-028…034), read [the profiles reference](references/profiles.md).
 

package/plugins/fabric-agent-adapter/skills/building-fabric-services/references/delegation.md

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ contract's own verifier does.
 - Approvals
 - What a refusal looks like
 - Keys and the cache
+- Keys the estate record certifies
 - What the kit does not do
 
 ## Declaring it
@@ -92,6 +93,19 @@ Python kit verifies Ed25519 itself (RFC 8032, standard library only, strict as O
 canonical points, no small-order key); it follows no redirect when it reads the key set; the Node kit uses `node:crypto` and refuses small-order keys
 itself (`isSmallOrderKey`), because Node before 26 lets OpenSSL accept a signature under one.
 
+## Keys the estate record certifies
+
+A verifier that also reads the estate's record (DEC-0055, [the estate record reference](estate-record.md)) trusts a
+`kid` only while a current revision certifies it for a machine and does not revoke it (DL-14). Pass the current
+verified revision as `estate=` / `{ estate }`, as a value or as a function returning it, to `delegation_gate`,
+`verify_delegation` or `verify_approval`.
+- An uncertified `kid` is refused `unauthenticated` (`approval-invalid` for an approval), with detail
+  `kid-not-certified`.
+- An unreadable record is refused `issuer-unavailable`, with detail `estate-unreadable`.
+- Without `estate`, nothing changes.
+- Pass only a revision `verify_estate_record` accepted, and the highest one the machine has applied. The rule trusts
+  what it is given, so an unverified or older revision would certify a key the current one revoked.
+
 ## What the kit does not do
 
 It does not mint tokens, check attenuation against a parent (the issuer's rule, DL-5), check a grant or a spend

package/plugins/fabric-agent-adapter/skills/building-fabric-services/references/estate-record.md

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+# The estate record — what the operator's machines are, signed by their passkey (DEC-0055)
+
+Fabric Agent Contract DEC-0055, `docs/specification/estate-record.md`, schema `schemas/estate-record.schema.json`,
+rules `FAC-SEM-072…076`. One revision of one person's estate lists:
+- the passkeys that sign it;
+- the machines, with their device keys and a certificate of each machine's hub key;
+- the packages placed on each machine;
+- where each secret slot is filled from (by reference only);
+- share grants and revocations.
+
+A revision names its parent's digest and is signed by a passkey assertion (WebAuthn Level 3) over a challenge
+derived from its own digest. Python: [`scripts/fabric_estate.py`](../scripts/fabric_estate.py). Node:
+[`scripts/fabric-estate.mjs`](../scripts/fabric-estate.mjs). Both answer the contract's own vectors.
+
+## Contents
+
+- Applying a revision
+- Trusting a delegation key
+- Checking a record you produce
+- What the kit does not do
+
+## Applying a revision
+
+A machine applies a revision only when it is valid against `estate-record.schema.json` **and** the verifier accepts
+it. The verifier does not check the schema.
+
+```python
+verdict = fe.verify_estate_record(record, at=datetime.now(timezone.utc), parent=current)   # revision 2 and later
+verdict = fe.verify_estate_record(record, at=now, authorities=pinned_passkeys)             # revision 1
+if verdict["ok"]:
+    current = record          # verdict: digest, revision, signedBy, signCount
+```
+
+```js
+const verdict = verifyEstateRecord(record, { at: new Date(), parent: current });
+```
+
+It checks, in the order of the ER table:
+1. **The clock.** An unreadable one is `no-clock`, and it comes first.
+2. **The shape.**
+3. **The digest.** SHA-256 over the RFC 8785 form, without `digest` and `signature`.
+4. **The chain to the parent.** Same estate, the next revision number, the parent's digest, never issued before the
+   parent, and no revocation dropped.
+5. **The signer.** The signing passkey must be among the trusted ones and not revoked by the parent. A revision may
+   revoke its own signer: that is rotation.
+6. **The assertion.**
+   - Client data: type, challenge, origin, no cross-origin use.
+   - The RP ID hash, and the user-presence and user-verification flags.
+   - The signature: ES256 or EdDSA, under a key validated first (a valid P-256 point; an Ed25519 key of full order).
+7. **The window.** At most 30 days.
+8. **The record's own rules.** A violation is `rule-violation` with its `codes`.
+
+Dates are strict RFC 3339: a `T`, an offset, and a day that exists. `:60` and a space are refused. Passkey JWK `x`
+and `y` must be canonical base64url. The Python kit verifies ES256 in pure Python (P-256, strict DER), and the Node
+kit through `node:crypto`.
+
+## Trusting a delegation key
+
+A delegation verifier that reads the estate record trusts a token's `kid` only while a current revision certifies it
+for a machine and does not revoke it (DL-14, contract CT-20). Give the gate the current verified revision, or a
+function that returns it:
+
+```python
+gate = fd.delegation_gate(audience=..., jwks=keys, issuer=..., effects=..., estate=lambda: current)
+```
+
+- A `kid` the record does not certify is refused like an unknown key: `unauthenticated` (for an approval,
+  `approval-invalid`) with detail `kid-not-certified`. The same holds when the record names another key under that
+  kid, revokes it, or is outside its window.
+- A record that cannot be read certifies nothing: `issuer-unavailable` with detail `estate-unreadable`.
+- **What you pass in.** Pass only a revision that `verify_estate_record` accepted, and the highest revision the
+  machine has applied. The rule trusts the record it is given. A record nobody verified, or an older revision still
+  inside its window, would certify a key the current revision revoked (a rollback).
+- `hub_key_certified(record, kid, x, at)` / `hubKeyCertified(...)` answers the question on its own.
+
+## Checking a record you produce
+
+`estate_record_rules(kind, value)` / `estateRecordRules(kind, value)` are the contract's rules, finding for finding:
+- `estate-record` (FAC-SEM-072…076);
+- `estate-record-revision` `{parent, next}` (072);
+- `estate-placement` `{record, machine, package}` (074, 075).
+
+`placement_trust(record, machine, agentRef)` names the publisher keys a package verifier trusts for a placed package.
+
+## What the kit does not do
+
+- It does not sign: it holds no passkey and no private key.
+- It does not check the schema or verify packages.
+- It does not attest the authenticator (an assertion carries no attestation).
+- It does not track the signature counter: passkeys sync between devices.

package/plugins/fabric-agent-adapter/skills/building-fabric-services/references/protocol.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # fabric-service/0.1 — wire reference
 
-Pinned to `fabric-agent-contract` commit `0cacd08b0e95b6abf131eae1206b60792138bc3c`
+Pinned to `fabric-agent-contract` commit `b291bf09e0a9f9fd3c16cf540832cd021203b7d1`
 (`docs/specification/service.md`, DEC-0015; the usage report DEC-0021; Windows and Linux supervision
 DEC-0032 and DEC-0033; the operator channel DEC-0034 and DEC-0035; the embedded dashboard DEC-0036;
 delegation and the operator session's lifetime DEC-0039; the meter's call window DEC-0041; session handoff DEC-0042;

package/plugins/fabric-agent-adapter/skills/building-fabric-services/scripts/fabric-delegation.mjs

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import crypto from 'node:crypto';
 import fs from 'node:fs';
 import net from 'node:net';
 import path from 'node:path';
+import { hubKeyCertified } from './fabric-estate.mjs';
 
 export const REFUSAL_CODES = Object.freeze([
   'unauthenticated', 'token-expired', 'wrong-audience', 'scope-not-granted', 'effect-above-ceiling', 'no-grant',
@@ -252,11 +253,30 @@ function approvalShape(payload) {
  * DL-13, in its fixed order: nothing about a token is believed before its signature is. `now` is seconds since
  * the epoch. Answers {ok: true, claims, principal, caller, chain, kid} or {ok: false, code, detail}.
  */
-export function verifyDelegation(token, { audience, jwks, now, capability, effect, issuer, readOnly } = {}) {
+/**
+ * DL-14 with DEC-0055: a verifier that reads the estate record trusts a kid only while a current revision certifies it
+ * for a machine and does not revoke it. `estate` is a revision the caller verified (fabric-estate.mjs
+ * verifyEstateRecord) or a function returning the current one; undefined skips the rule. `[kind, detail]` or null.
+ */
+function estateProblem(estate, jwks, kid, now) {
+  if (estate === undefined || estate === null) return null;
+  let record;
+  try {
+    record = typeof estate === 'function' ? estate() : estate;
+  } catch {
+    return ['issuer', 'estate-unreadable']; // an unreadable record certifies nothing; it is never a pass
+  }
+  const jwk = jwks.keys.find((candidate) => isObject(candidate) && candidate.kid === kid) ?? {};
+  return hubKeyCertified(record, kid, jwk.x, now) ? null : ['token', 'kid-not-certified'];
+}
+
+export function verifyDelegation(token, { audience, jwks, now, capability, effect, issuer, readOnly, estate } = {}) {
   if (!isString(issuer)) return refuse('issuer-unavailable', 'no-trusted-issuer');
   if (!hasKeys(jwks)) return refuse('issuer-unavailable', 'no-published-keys');
   const checked = authentic(token, jwks, DELEGATION_TYP);
   if ('problem' in checked) return refuse(checked.issuer ? 'issuer-unavailable' : 'unauthenticated', checked.problem);
+  const uncertified = estateProblem(estate, jwks, checked.kid, now);
+  if (uncertified) return refuse(uncertified[0] === 'issuer' ? 'issuer-unavailable' : 'unauthenticated', uncertified[1]);
   const shaped = delegationShape(checked.compact.payload);
   if ('problem' in shaped) return refuse('unauthenticated', shaped.problem);
   const { claims, depth } = shaped;
@@ -275,13 +295,15 @@ export function verifyDelegation(token, { audience, jwks, now, capability, effec
 }
 
 /** DL-18: approval-required carries the digest; any fault is approval-invalid; the jti is consumed last. */
-export function verifyApproval(approval, { audience, jwks, now, actionDigest: expected, issuer, jtiStore } = {}) {
+export function verifyApproval(approval, { audience, jwks, now, actionDigest: expected, issuer, jtiStore, estate } = {}) {
   if (approval === undefined || approval === null || approval === '') return refuse('approval-required', 'no-approval', { actionDigest: expected });
   if (!isObject(jtiStore) || typeof jtiStore.consume !== 'function') return refuse('unknown-state', 'no-jti-store');
   if (!isString(issuer)) return refuse('issuer-unavailable', 'no-trusted-issuer');
   if (!hasKeys(jwks)) return refuse('issuer-unavailable', 'no-published-keys');
   const checked = authentic(approval, jwks, APPROVAL_TYP);
   if ('problem' in checked) return refuse(checked.issuer ? 'issuer-unavailable' : 'approval-invalid', checked.problem);
+  const uncertified = estateProblem(estate, jwks, checked.kid, now);
+  if (uncertified) return refuse(uncertified[0] === 'issuer' ? 'issuer-unavailable' : 'approval-invalid', uncertified[1]);
   const claims = approvalShape(checked.compact.payload);
   if (!claims) return refuse('approval-invalid', 'malformed-claims');
   if (claims.iss !== issuer) return refuse('approval-invalid', 'wrong-issuer');
@@ -447,7 +469,7 @@ export const TIERS = Object.freeze(['T0', 'T1', 'T2']);
  * relayed from off the machine). A T0 or T1 caller is never required to present a token: with none, the call passes
  * with no delegation. A present token is verified at every tier. `issuer` (auth.delegation.issuer) is required.
  */
-export function delegationGate({ audience, jwks, effects, issuer, readOnly = false, clock = () => Date.now() / 1000 }) {
+export function delegationGate({ audience, jwks, effects, issuer, readOnly = false, clock = () => Date.now() / 1000, estate }) {
   if (!isString(issuer)) throw new Error('the gate needs the issuer it trusts (auth.delegation.issuer)');
   return async (tool, headers, tier = 'T2') => {
     const effect = effects?.[tool];
@@ -458,7 +480,7 @@ export function delegationGate({ audience, jwks, effects, issuer, readOnly = fal
       return refuse('unauthenticated', 'no-token');
     }
     const keys = jwks instanceof JwksCache ? await jwks.get(kidOf(carried.token)) : jwks;
-    const verdict = verifyDelegation(carried.token, { audience, jwks: keys, now: clock(), capability: tool, effect, readOnly, issuer });
+    const verdict = verifyDelegation(carried.token, { audience, jwks: keys, now: clock(), capability: tool, effect, readOnly, issuer, estate });
     if (verdict.ok) verdict.tier = TIERS.includes(tier) ? tier : 'T2';
     return verdict;
   };