@parmana/verifier 0.0.0-stage → 1.6.2

package/LICENSE

@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
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package/NOTICE

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+Copyright 2026 Parmana Systems Private Limited

package/README.md

@@ -1,3 +1,207 @@
-# Temporary Holding Version
+# Parmana Verifier
 
-This version is a temporary placeholder for this package. An operational version to replace this has been submitted for review and is awaiting a staged release.
+[![CI](https://github.com/pavancharak/parmana-verifier/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/pavancharak/parmana-verifier/actions/workflows/ci.yml) [![License: Apache-2.0](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-Apache--2.0-blue.svg)](LICENSE) [![Node](https://img.shields.io/badge/node-%3E%3D24-brightgreen)](package.json)
+
+Every action stays within what your business allowed, and Parmana keeps proof of what happened. This verifier checks that proof using only a file and the keys you trust. No network access, no account, no dependencies.
+
+Parmana signs an **Execution Trust Record** for every action an agent takes through it. The record says what was authorized, what ran, and what the outcome was, and it is signed with keys. This verifier checks that a record has not been changed and that it was signed by keys you chose to trust. It does not ask Parmana's servers anything, so you do not have to trust them to check a record.
+
+The records come from [Parmana](https://github.com/pavancharak/parmana-core), which signs them. The verifier works without the rest of Parmana: it needs only a record and a trust file.
+
+Test results, the security review scope and the changelog are indexed under [Reports and evidence](#reports-and-evidence).
+
+## Who it is for
+
+- **Auditors and reviewers** who need to confirm a record without relying on the system that produced it.
+- **Operators** who want to check records in their own environment, with keys they pinned themselves.
+- **Developers** who want a small, dependency-free reference implementation of the record checks.
+
+## Quick start
+
+Requires Node.js 24 or later. Ed25519 works on any Node 24 build; post-quantum ML-DSA-65 signatures need OpenSSL 3.5 or later. From a clone of this repository:
+
+```sh
+node bin/parmana-verify.mjs test/vectors/record-whole-record-v3.json test/vectors/trust-whole-record.json
+```
+
+```json
+{"valid":true,"coverage":"full","errors":[],"checks":{"trustRecordHash":true,"signature":true,"hybridSignatures":true}}
+```
+
+The exit code is `0`. A record that has been changed is rejected:
+
+```sh
+node bin/parmana-verify.mjs test/vectors/record-tampered-amount.json test/vectors/trust.json
+```
+
+The exit code is `1`, and the output lists the failed checks. The test vectors are labelled test material; see [test/vectors/README.md](test/vectors/README.md). For real records, pin the keys you trust (see [Pinning a key](#pinning-a-key)).
+
+## Installation and usage
+
+The package is published on npm as [`@parmana/verifier`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@parmana/verifier). Install it, or run it without installing:
+
+```sh
+npm install -g @parmana/verifier
+parmana-verify <proof.json> <trust.json>
+parmana-verify key-fingerprint <public-key.pem>
+```
+
+```sh
+npx @parmana/verifier <proof.json> <trust.json>
+```
+
+From a clone of this repository, run the same commands with `node bin/parmana-verify.mjs` in place of `parmana-verify`.
+
+There is also a Python version in [`python/`](python/README.md). It checks the same records and gives the same results, except that it cannot check ML-DSA-65 (hybrid) signatures. Use the Node version for those.
+
+```sh
+pip install parmana-verifier
+parmana-verify <proof.json> <trust.json>
+```
+
+- `proof.json` is the Execution Trust Record.
+- `trust.json` is the trust set. It lists each key you accept:
+
+  ```json
+  {
+    "keys": [
+      {
+        "keyId": "default",
+        "algorithm": "ed25519",
+        "publicKeyPem": "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\n...\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n",
+        "fingerprint": "sha256:<64 hex digits>",
+        "validFrom": "2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z",
+        "validUntil": null,
+        "compromised": false
+      }
+    ]
+  }
+  ```
+
+- `key-fingerprint` prints the `sha256:` value to pin for a PEM key. To pin a key safely, follow the steps in [Pinning a key](#pinning-a-key).
+
+The verify command prints one line of JSON and exits with `0` (valid), `1` (invalid, with reasons), or `2` (usage, missing file, or invalid JSON). The full input and output rules are in [docs/FORMAT.md](docs/FORMAT.md).
+
+On Windows PowerShell, use the same commands with Windows paths, for example `node bin\parmana-verify.mjs proof.json trust.json`.
+
+## Pinning a key
+
+A signature proves only that a key made it. Before you trust a record, decide which keys you trust, and check that each key is the one its owner published.
+
+1. Get the operator's public key PEM and the `sha256:` fingerprint they published. Get the fingerprint from a source other than the one that gave you the key, such as a signed message or a call to a known number.
+2. Run `node bin/parmana-verify.mjs key-fingerprint public-key.pem` on the PEM you received.
+3. Compare the two fingerprints character by character. If they differ, do not use the key.
+4. Only then add the key to your trust file with that fingerprint.
+
+## Trust rules
+
+A key is used only if all of these hold:
+
+- its PEM hashes to the pinned fingerprint (SHA-256 of the SPKI DER encoding);
+- the algorithm named by the signature matches the algorithm in the trust file;
+- it is not marked `compromised`;
+- the record's `createdAt` is at or after `validFrom` and before `validUntil` (if set).
+
+A compromised key is rejected whatever the timestamp, so signatures it made stay void.
+
+## Examples
+
+Run every example with:
+
+```sh
+npm run examples
+```
+
+The examples are in `examples/`, and each one prints what it checks:
+
+- `01-verify-a-proof.mjs`: verify a record and explain each check.
+- `02-tamper-detection.mjs`: change a signed field, then show that recomputing the hash does not help an attacker.
+- `03-pinned-keys-and-windows.mjs`: how pinned fingerprints, validity windows and compromised keys decide what is accepted.
+- `04-hybrid-envelope.mjs`: the Ed25519 and ML-DSA-65 entries of a hybrid record (needs Node 24).
+- `05-build-and-verify-a-record.mjs`: build, hash, sign, pin and verify a record from scratch, with a runtime test key.
+- `06-command-line.mjs`: the command-line exit codes, and fingerprinting a key for pinning.
+- `07-whole-record-coverage.mjs`: what coverage `full` and `legacy` mean, and that a changed covered field is refused.
+- `08-hybrid-cutover.mjs`: the `hybridRequiredFrom` cutover, and what it adds to a record created after it.
+- `09-unsupported-schema-version.mjs`: a schema version other than 2 or 3 is refused, not guessed at.
+
+Each example exits `0` when it behaves as described, so the set runs in CI.
+
+## Testing
+
+```sh
+npm test
+```
+
+Run the tests on Node 24. On Node 22 or any runtime without ML-DSA-65, the hybrid tests are skipped. Test keys are generated at run time, labelled "TEST KEY - NOT FOR PRODUCTION", and never written to disk.
+
+The suite covers the legacy signature and hash, hybrid signatures, schema version 3 coverage, the trust rules, the test vectors, and the command-line exit codes. Each area has its own file under `test/`.
+
+## Limitations
+
+- The verifier can only check that a record was signed by the key you pinned. It cannot prove that the key belongs to Parmana. That depends on how you obtained and compared the fingerprint.
+- For records with `schemaVersion` 2, or with no `schemaVersion`, only the fields listed in [docs/FORMAT.md](docs/FORMAT.md) are protected. Any other field can be changed without the verifier noticing. Read decisions only from covered fields. See "Fields not covered by any signature" in that document.
+- For records with `schemaVersion` 3, every field except the signature envelope, `verifications` and `receipts` is protected. Check that `coverage` is `full` when that matters.
+- A record with `schemaVersion` 2 can be downgraded by someone who can write to storage, since `schemaVersion` is unsigned. Set `hybridRequiredFrom` in the trust file to reject downgraded records created after a cutover. Records before the cutover stay open to this.
+- The validity window is checked against the record's `createdAt`, not against the signing time. A record that carries a false `createdAt` is checked against the window for that false time.
+- Keys and fingerprints must be kept current. The verifier does not know about rotations or revocations that you have not written into the trust file.
+- It does not verify the policy the record cites, the authorization decision logic, or the state of any connector or external system.
+- It does not confirm that the action described by the record was executed.
+- The records in `test/vectors/` were produced by the Parmana signing code and are test material only. They show that the checks agree with that code; they are not an independent specification.
+
+## Reports and evidence
+
+Every report is listed once, here. Start with the question you have.
+
+**Test results**
+
+- **Live CI runs:** the [CI workflow](https://github.com/pavancharak/parmana-verifier/actions/workflows/ci.yml) runs the tests and examples on every push. The [Python workflow](https://github.com/pavancharak/parmana-verifier/actions/workflows/python.yml) runs the Python package tests.
+- **Test suite:** what it covers, and how to run it on Node 24, is under [Testing](#testing).
+- **Test vectors:** labelled test records and keys, in [test/vectors/](test/vectors/README.md). They are for tests only, not for production use.
+- **Examples:** nine runnable examples that check their own behaviour, run by `npm run examples` ([Examples](#examples)).
+
+**Security**
+
+- **Security review scope:** [docs/SECURITY-REVIEW.md](docs/SECURITY-REVIEW.md) is written for an external reviewer. It covers what the verifier claims, what to examine, and its known limits.
+- **Security policy:** [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) explains how to report a vulnerability privately.
+
+**Releases**
+
+- **Changelog:** [CHANGELOG.md](CHANGELOG.md) lists each change to the record formats and the command-line interface.
+
+---
+## Read the Parmana blog
+
+The [Parmana blog](https://blog.parmanasystems.com) explains how the verifier fits into the wider product, in plain terms. Read the post for your role:
+
+- **Auditors and risk teams:** [Check a record offline, without trusting us](https://blog.parmanasystems.com/2026/10/25/check-a-record-offline/). How to verify a signed record with only a file and a trust file, and what the check does not cover.
+- **Engineers:** [Run the checks in an afternoon](https://blog.parmanasystems.com/2026/10/25/run-the-checks-in-an-afternoon/). Build, test and verify a record from source.
+- **Anyone who wants the honest picture:** [Lessons from the limits we still have](https://blog.parmanasystems.com/2026/10/25/lessons-from-the-limits-we-still-have/). What we got wrong, and what remains open.
+
+New posts are published regularly, so check the blog for updates.
+
+## Status
+
+This is version 1.6.2, released with the SDK packages. Each change to the record formats or the command-line interface is listed in [CHANGELOG.md](CHANGELOG.md).
+
+## Repository layout
+
+| Path         | Contents                                                                 |
+| ------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
+| `bin/`       | The `parmana-verify` command-line entry point                            |
+| `src/`       | The checks: canonical JSON, hashing, signatures, trust rules             |
+| `test/`      | The test suite, and `test/vectors/`, the labelled test records           |
+| `examples/`  | Nine runnable examples, run by `npm run examples`                        |
+| `docs/`      | `FORMAT.md` (the input and output rules) and `SECURITY-REVIEW.md`        |
+| `reports/`   | Pointer to the reports index in this README (see Reports and evidence)   |
+
+## Security
+
+Do not open a public issue for a security problem. Report it through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting: open the **Security** tab and choose **Report a vulnerability**. See [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md). The scope for an external review is in [docs/SECURITY-REVIEW.md](docs/SECURITY-REVIEW.md).
+
+## Contributing
+
+Read [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md) before you open a pull request. Run `npm test` on Node 24 first. Every commit must carry a `Signed-off-by` line (`git commit -s`), certifying the [Developer Certificate of Origin](https://developercertificate.org). Everyone taking part follows the [Code of Conduct](CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md).
+
+## License
+
+Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0. See [LICENSE](LICENSE) and [NOTICE](NOTICE).

package/bin/parmana-verify.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env node
+// Usage:
+//   parmana-verify <proof.json> <trust.json>
+//   parmana-verify key-fingerprint <public-key.pem>
+//
+// verify exits 0 = valid, 1 = invalid, 2 = usage or read error.
+// key-fingerprint prints the "sha256:..." value to pin in a trust file.
+
+import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
+import { verifyExecutionTrustRecord } from "../src/verify.mjs";
+import { keyFingerprint, parseTrustPolicy } from "../src/trust.mjs";
+
+const args = process.argv.slice(2);
+const USAGE = "usage: parmana-verify <proof.json> <trust.json>\n       parmana-verify key-fingerprint <public-key.pem>";
+
+if (args[0] === "key-fingerprint") {
+  if (args.length !== 2) {
+    console.error(USAGE);
+    process.exit(2);
+  }
+
+  try {
+    console.log(keyFingerprint(readFileSync(args[1], "utf8")));
+    process.exit(0);
+  } catch (error) {
+    console.error(`key error: ${error.message}`);
+    process.exit(2);
+  }
+}
+
+const [proofPath, trustPath] = args;
+
+if (!proofPath || !trustPath || args.length !== 2) {
+  console.error(USAGE);
+  process.exit(2);
+}
+
+let proof;
+let policy;
+
+try {
+  proof = JSON.parse(readFileSync(proofPath, "utf8"));
+  policy = parseTrustPolicy(JSON.parse(readFileSync(trustPath, "utf8")));
+} catch (error) {
+  console.error(`read error: ${error.message}`);
+  process.exit(2);
+}
+
+const result = verifyExecutionTrustRecord(proof, policy.keys, { hybridRequiredFrom: policy.hybridRequiredFrom ?? undefined });
+
+console.log(JSON.stringify(result));
+
+process.exit(result.valid ? 0 : 1);

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,40 @@
 {
   "name": "@parmana/verifier",
-  "version": "0.0.0-stage",
-  "stub": true,
-  "description": "Temporary package placeholder for staged publishing"
-}
+  "version": "1.6.2",
+  "description": "Offline verifier for Parmana Execution Trust Records.",
+  "license": "Apache-2.0",
+  "type": "module",
+  "bin": {
+    "parmana-verify": "bin/parmana-verify.mjs"
+  },
+  "files": [
+    "bin",
+    "src",
+    "LICENSE",
+    "NOTICE"
+  ],
+  "scripts": {
+    "test": "node --test test/verify.test.mjs test/hybrid.test.mjs test/trust.test.mjs test/vectors.test.mjs test/whole-record.test.mjs",
+    "examples": "node examples/run-all.mjs"
+  },
+  "engines": {
+    "node": ">=24"
+  },
+  "repository": {
+    "type": "git",
+    "url": "git+https://github.com/pavancharak/parmana-verifier.git"
+  },
+  "homepage": "https://github.com/pavancharak/parmana-verifier#readme",
+  "bugs": {
+    "url": "https://github.com/pavancharak/parmana-verifier/issues"
+  },
+  "keywords": [
+    "parmana",
+    "verifier",
+    "execution-trust-record",
+    "ed25519",
+    "ml-dsa",
+    "post-quantum",
+    "offline"
+  ]
+}

package/src/canonical.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+// Canonical serialization for Parmana artifacts.
+//
+// Object keys are sorted in code-unit order, arrays keep their order, and the
+// result is UTF-8 encoded JSON. Every hash and signature is computed over
+// these bytes, so the verifier must produce exactly the same bytes as the
+// signer.
+
+export function canonicalBytes(value) {
+  return new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(normalize(value)));
+}
+
+function normalize(value) {
+  if (value === null || typeof value !== "object") {
+    return value;
+  }
+
+  if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+    return value.map(normalize);
+  }
+
+  const normalized = {};
+
+  for (const key of Object.keys(value).sort()) {
+    // defineProperty, not assignment: a key named "__proto__" must stay an
+    // own property so its content is covered by the hash and signature.
+    Object.defineProperty(normalized, key, {
+      value: normalize(value[key]),
+      enumerable: true,
+      writable: true,
+      configurable: true,
+    });
+  }
+
+  return normalized;
+}

package/src/trust.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+// Trust set: the keys a verifier accepts, each pinned by fingerprint.
+//
+// A key is used only when all of these hold:
+//   - its PEM hashes to the pinned fingerprint (SHA-256 of the SPKI DER);
+//   - its algorithm matches the algorithm the signature names;
+//   - it is not marked compromised;
+//   - the record's createdAt falls within [validFrom, validUntil).
+//
+// The trust set is supplied by the caller. The verifier never fetches keys.
+
+import { createHash, createPublicKey } from "node:crypto";
+
+export const ALGORITHM_NAMES = ["ed25519", "dilithium3"];
+
+export function keyFingerprint(publicKeyPem) {
+  return fingerprintOfKey(createPublicKey(publicKeyPem));
+}
+
+export function fingerprintOfKey(publicKey) {
+  const der = publicKey.export({ type: "spki", format: "der" });
+  return `sha256:${createHash("sha256").update(der).digest("hex")}`;
+}
+
+// Parses a trust-set document into a Map keyId -> entry. Throws an Error with
+// a readable message when the document is malformed.
+export function parseTrustSet(document) {
+  return parseTrustPolicy(document).keys;
+}
+
+// Parses a trust-set document into { keys, hybridRequiredFrom }. keys is the
+// Map that parseTrustSet returns. hybridRequiredFrom is the optional cutover:
+// a record created at or after it must carry a valid hybrid envelope. It is
+// null when the document does not set one. It must be an ISO-8601 UTC
+// timestamp ending in "Z", so that it means the same time everywhere.
+export function parseTrustPolicy(document) {
+  if (document === null || typeof document !== "object" || !Array.isArray(document.keys)) {
+    throw new Error('trust set must be an object with a "keys" array');
+  }
+
+  let hybridRequiredFrom = null;
+
+  if (document.hybridRequiredFrom !== undefined && document.hybridRequiredFrom !== null) {
+    if (typeof document.hybridRequiredFrom !== "string" || !/Z$/.test(document.hybridRequiredFrom) || Number.isNaN(Date.parse(document.hybridRequiredFrom))) {
+      throw new Error('hybridRequiredFrom must be an ISO-8601 UTC timestamp ending in "Z"');
+    }
+
+    hybridRequiredFrom = document.hybridRequiredFrom;
+  }
+
+  const trustKeys = new Map();
+
+  for (const [index, entry] of document.keys.entries()) {
+    const at = `keys[${index}]`;
+
+    if (entry === null || typeof entry !== "object") {
+      throw new Error(`${at} must be an object`);
+    }
+
+    if (typeof entry.keyId !== "string" || entry.keyId === "") {
+      throw new Error(`${at}.keyId must be a non-empty string`);
+    }
+
+    if (trustKeys.has(entry.keyId)) {
+      throw new Error(`duplicate keyId "${entry.keyId}"`);
+    }
+
+    if (!ALGORITHM_NAMES.includes(entry.algorithm)) {
+      throw new Error(`${at}.algorithm must be one of ${ALGORITHM_NAMES.join(", ")}`);
+    }
+
+    if (typeof entry.publicKeyPem !== "string") {
+      throw new Error(`${at}.publicKeyPem must be a PEM string`);
+    }
+
+    if (typeof entry.fingerprint !== "string" || !/^sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(entry.fingerprint)) {
+      throw new Error(`${at}.fingerprint must be "sha256:" followed by 64 lowercase hex digits`);
+    }
+
+    if (typeof entry.validFrom !== "string" || Number.isNaN(Date.parse(entry.validFrom))) {
+      throw new Error(`${at}.validFrom must be an ISO timestamp`);
+    }
+
+    if (entry.validUntil !== undefined && entry.validUntil !== null &&
+        (typeof entry.validUntil !== "string" || Number.isNaN(Date.parse(entry.validUntil)))) {
+      throw new Error(`${at}.validUntil must be an ISO timestamp or null`);
+    }
+
+    if (entry.compromised !== undefined && typeof entry.compromised !== "boolean") {
+      throw new Error(`${at}.compromised must be true or false`);
+    }
+
+    trustKeys.set(entry.keyId, {
+      keyId: entry.keyId,
+      algorithm: entry.algorithm,
+      publicKeyPem: entry.publicKeyPem,
+      fingerprint: entry.fingerprint,
+      validFrom: entry.validFrom,
+      validUntil: entry.validUntil ?? null,
+      compromised: entry.compromised ?? false,
+    });
+  }
+
+  return { keys: trustKeys, hybridRequiredFrom };
+}

package/src/verify.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,312 @@
+// Offline verification of an Execution Trust Record.
+//
+// Checks run on the record alone:
+//   1. trustRecordHash equals the SHA-256 (hex) of the canonical record fields.
+//   2. signature is a valid signature over those canonical bytes, made by a
+//      trusted key named by signature.keyId (see trust.mjs for the trust rules).
+//   3. If signatures is present, it is a hybrid envelope: at least two entries,
+//      no repeated algorithm, and every entry verifies over the message for
+//      its schemaVersion (default 2). Any failure makes the record invalid.
+//      A record with schemaVersion 3 must carry a hybrid envelope.
+//   4. If a cutover is given (options.hybridRequiredFrom, from the trust
+//      file), a record created at or after it must pass check 3.
+//
+// Schema versions:
+//   2  the message is the canonical fields plus schemaVersion.
+//   3  the message is every top-level field except signature, signatures,
+//      schemaVersion, verifications and receipts, plus schemaVersion.
+//      Fields outside the version 2 message, such as updatedAt, are covered.
+//
+// The result's coverage is "full" when a version 3 envelope verifies, and
+// "legacy" otherwise. Records with other schemaVersion values are invalid.
+//
+// Supported algorithms:
+//   ed25519     Ed25519 keys. Messages over 4096 bytes may be signed as a
+//               commitment: the prefix below followed by the SHA-512 digest of
+//               the canonical bytes. A raw signature over a large message is
+//               also accepted. A commitment over a small message is rejected.
+//   dilithium3  ML-DSA-65 keys (Node 24+ with OpenSSL 3.5+). Raw signatures
+//               only.
+//
+// The verifier reads no environment variables, no private keys, and makes no
+// network calls.
+
+import {
+  createHash,
+  createPublicKey,
+  generateKeyPairSync,
+  verify as verifySignature,
+} from "node:crypto";
+import { canonicalBytes } from "./canonical.mjs";
+import { fingerprintOfKey } from "./trust.mjs";
+
+const ALGORITHMS = {
+  ed25519: { keyType: "ed25519", commitment: true },
+  dilithium3: { keyType: "ml-dsa-65", commitment: false },
+};
+
+const RAW_MESSAGE_LIMIT_BYTES = 4096;
+const COMMITMENT_PREFIX = Buffer.from("PARMANA-ED25519-LARGE-MESSAGE-V1\0", "utf8");
+const DEFAULT_SCHEMA_VERSION = 2;
+const WHOLE_RECORD_SCHEMA_VERSION = 3;
+const SUPPORTED_SCHEMA_VERSIONS = [2, 3];
+
+// Top-level fields that a version 3 message does not cover. verifications and
+// receipts are attached after signing; receipts carry their own signature.
+const WHOLE_RECORD_EXCLUDED_FIELDS = ["signature", "signatures", "schemaVersion", "verifications", "receipts"];
+
+// The fields covered by trustRecordHash and the legacy signature.
+export function canonicalTrustRecord(record) {
+  return {
+    trustRecordId: record.trustRecordId,
+    businessTransactionId: record.businessTransactionId,
+    transaction: record.transaction,
+    authorization: record.authorization,
+    overrides: record.overrides,
+    executions: record.executions,
+    createdAt: record.createdAt,
+  };
+}
+
+// The message a hybrid envelope of the given schema version signs.
+export function hybridMessage(record, schemaVersion) {
+  if (schemaVersion === WHOLE_RECORD_SCHEMA_VERSION) {
+    const covered = Object.entries(record).filter(([key]) => !WHOLE_RECORD_EXCLUDED_FIELDS.includes(key));
+
+    return canonicalBytes({ ...Object.fromEntries(covered), schemaVersion });
+  }
+
+  return canonicalBytes({ ...canonicalTrustRecord(record), schemaVersion });
+}
+
+// trustKeys is a Map from keyId to a trust entry, as returned by parseTrustSet.
+// options.hybridRequiredFrom is an ISO-8601 UTC timestamp from the trust file
+// (see parseTrustPolicy); records created at or after it need a hybrid envelope.
+export function verifyExecutionTrustRecord(record, trustKeys, options = {}) {
+  const errors = [];
+
+  if (!isObject(record)) {
+    return { valid: false, coverage: "legacy", errors: ["record must be a JSON object"], checks: {} };
+  }
+
+  const legacyMessage = canonicalBytes(canonicalTrustRecord(record));
+  const expectedHash = createHash("sha256").update(legacyMessage).digest("hex");
+  const hashValid = expectedHash === record.trustRecordHash;
+
+  if (!hashValid) {
+    errors.push(`trustRecordHash mismatch: expected ${expectedHash}.`);
+  }
+
+  const context = { trustKeys, createdAt: record.createdAt };
+
+  const signatureValid = verifyLegacySignature(record.signature, legacyMessage, context, errors);
+
+  const checks = { trustRecordHash: hashValid, signature: signatureValid };
+
+  const schemaVersion = record.schemaVersion ?? DEFAULT_SCHEMA_VERSION;
+  const hasEnvelope = record.signatures !== undefined && record.signatures !== null;
+
+  if (!SUPPORTED_SCHEMA_VERSIONS.includes(schemaVersion)) {
+    errors.push(`unsupported schemaVersion ${String(schemaVersion)}: expected 2 or 3.`);
+    checks.hybridSignatures = false;
+  } else if (hasEnvelope) {
+    checks.hybridSignatures = verifyHybridSignatures(record.signatures, hybridMessage(record, schemaVersion), context, errors);
+  } else if (schemaVersion === WHOLE_RECORD_SCHEMA_VERSION) {
+    errors.push("schemaVersion 3 record has no signatures array: a whole-record signature is required.");
+    checks.hybridSignatures = false;
+  }
+
+  const cutoverOk = !isAtOrAfterCutover(record.createdAt, options.hybridRequiredFrom) || checks.hybridSignatures === true;
+
+  if (!cutoverOk) {
+    errors.push(`record created at or after hybridRequiredFrom (${options.hybridRequiredFrom}) has no valid hybrid envelope.`);
+  }
+
+  const coverage = schemaVersion === WHOLE_RECORD_SCHEMA_VERSION && checks.hybridSignatures === true ? "full" : "legacy";
+
+  return {
+    valid: hashValid && signatureValid && (checks.hybridSignatures ?? true) && cutoverOk,
+    coverage,
+    errors,
+    checks,
+  };
+}
+
+function isAtOrAfterCutover(createdAt, hybridRequiredFrom) {
+  if (hybridRequiredFrom === undefined) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  const created = Date.parse(createdAt);
+
+  return !Number.isNaN(created) && created >= Date.parse(hybridRequiredFrom);
+}
+
+function verifyLegacySignature(signature, message, context, errors) {
+  if (!isSignatureEntry(signature)) {
+    errors.push("signature is missing or malformed.");
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return verifyEntry(signature, message, context, errors);
+}
+
+function verifyHybridSignatures(entries, message, context, errors) {
+  if (!Array.isArray(entries) || !entries.every(isSignatureEntry)) {
+    errors.push("malformed signatures: expected an array of entries with string algorithm, keyId and signature.");
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (entries.length < 2) {
+    errors.push(`signatures array has ${entries.length} entr${entries.length === 1 ? "y" : "ies"}, need at least 2 for a hybrid record.`);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  const seen = new Set();
+  let allValid = true;
+
+  for (const entry of entries) {
+    if (seen.has(entry.algorithm)) {
+      errors.push(`duplicate algorithm in signatures array: ${entry.algorithm}.`);
+      allValid = false;
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    seen.add(entry.algorithm);
+    allValid = verifyEntry(entry, message, context, errors) && allValid;
+  }
+
+  return allValid;
+}
+
+// Accepts { algorithm, keyId, signature } entries. The legacy `signature` field
+// uses `value` for the same three parts, so that is accepted too.
+function verifyEntry(entry, message, context, errors) {
+  const signatureText = entry.signature ?? entry.value;
+  const algorithm = ALGORITHMS[entry.algorithm];
+
+  if (!algorithm) {
+    errors.push(`unsupported algorithm: ${entry.algorithm}.`);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  const trusted = context.trustKeys.get(entry.keyId);
+
+  if (!trusted) {
+    errors.push(`no trusted key for keyId "${entry.keyId}".`);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (trusted.algorithm !== entry.algorithm) {
+    errors.push(`keyId "${entry.keyId}" is trusted for ${trusted.algorithm}, not ${entry.algorithm}.`);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (trusted.compromised) {
+    errors.push(`keyId "${entry.keyId}" is marked compromised; its signatures are not accepted.`);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (!withinValidityWindow(trusted, context.createdAt)) {
+    errors.push(`createdAt ${context.createdAt} is outside the validity window of keyId "${entry.keyId}".`);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (entry.algorithm === "dilithium3" && !mlDsaSupported()) {
+    errors.push("algorithm dilithium3 needs Node 24 or later with OpenSSL 3.5 or later.");
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  let publicKey;
+
+  try {
+    publicKey = createPublicKey(trusted.publicKeyPem);
+  } catch {
+    errors.push(`public key for keyId "${entry.keyId}" is not a valid PEM key.`);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (fingerprintOfKey(publicKey) !== trusted.fingerprint) {
+    errors.push(`public key for keyId "${entry.keyId}" does not match its pinned fingerprint.`);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (publicKey.asymmetricKeyType !== algorithm.keyType) {
+    errors.push(`public key for keyId "${entry.keyId}" has type ${publicKey.asymmetricKeyType}, expected ${algorithm.keyType}.`);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  const sigBytes = Buffer.from(signatureText, "base64");
+
+  const rawValid = safeVerify(message, sigBytes, publicKey);
+
+  const commitmentValid =
+    !rawValid &&
+    algorithm.commitment &&
+    message.length > RAW_MESSAGE_LIMIT_BYTES &&
+    safeVerify(commitment(message), sigBytes, publicKey);
+
+  if (!rawValid && !commitmentValid) {
+    errors.push(`signature verification failed for keyId "${entry.keyId}" (${entry.algorithm}).`);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+function withinValidityWindow(trusted, createdAt) {
+  const at = Date.parse(createdAt);
+
+  if (Number.isNaN(at)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (at < Date.parse(trusted.validFrom)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return trusted.validUntil === null || at < Date.parse(trusted.validUntil);
+}
+
+function commitment(message) {
+  return Buffer.concat([
+    COMMITMENT_PREFIX,
+    createHash("sha512").update(message).digest(),
+  ]);
+}
+
+function safeVerify(message, sigBytes, publicKey) {
+  try {
+    return verifySignature(null, Buffer.from(message), publicKey, sigBytes);
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+let mlDsa;
+
+function mlDsaSupported() {
+  if (mlDsa === undefined) {
+    try {
+      generateKeyPairSync("ml-dsa-65");
+      mlDsa = true;
+    } catch {
+      mlDsa = false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return mlDsa;
+}
+
+function isSignatureEntry(value) {
+  return (
+    isObject(value) &&
+    typeof value.algorithm === "string" &&
+    typeof value.keyId === "string" &&
+    (typeof value.signature === "string" || typeof value.value === "string")
+  );
+}
+
+function isObject(value) {
+  return value !== null && typeof value === "object" && !Array.isArray(value);
+}