@parmana/shared 0.0.0-stage → 2.0.0

package/dist/domain/policy-reference.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+export interface PolicyReference {
+    /**
+     * Policy identifier.
+     */
+    readonly name: string;
+    /**
+     * Business policy version.
+     */
+    readonly version: string;
+    /**
+     * Policy schema version.
+     */
+    readonly schemaVersion: string;
+    /**
+     * sha256 of the canonicalized policy.json content actually loaded
+     * for this decision (G-24 remediation). Optional and caller-
+     * unsettable: a request-supplied PolicyReference never carries this
+     * -- it is computed by RuntimeEngine from the real loaded Policy
+     * document, after policyRouter.load, and merged into the copy of
+     * this reference embedded in ExecutionTrustRecord.transaction.policy
+     * only. Lets a later audit confirm exactly which policy *content*
+     * (not merely which version string) was in force for a specific
+     * past decision, closing the gap where an in-place edit to an
+     * existing version's file (see VERIFICATION-GAPS.md G-24's own
+     * precedent for this) would otherwise be undetectable from the
+     * trust record alone.
+     */
+    readonly contentHash?: string;
+    /**
+     * Whether the policy content above is traceable to a completed
+     * Policy Governance approval, resolved at decision time
+     * (docs/internal/VERIFICATION-GAPS.md G-45). Same provenance and optionality
+     * as contentHash: computed by RuntimeEngine, from the real loaded
+     * Policy document, merged only into the copy of this reference
+     * embedded in ExecutionTrustRecord.transaction.policy -- never
+     * caller-settable, absent on a Decision built before this field
+     * existed. Unlike contentHash, this is resolved unconditionally
+     * (PolicyGovernanceAnchorResolver never blocks execution), so its
+     * presence does not imply POLICY_EXECUTION_VERIFICATION_ENFORCED is
+     * on -- only that the lookup itself ran and recorded what it found,
+     * which may honestly be "no approval record exists for this policy
+     * yet."
+     */
+    readonly governanceAnchor?: PolicyGovernanceAnchor;
+}
+/**
+ * Mirrors @parmana/policy's PolicyGovernanceAnchor exactly.
+ * Duplicated here (not imported) because @parmana/shared sits below
+ * @parmana/policy in the dependency graph (policy depends on shared,
+ * never the reverse) -- the same constraint PendingPolicyChange's own
+ * doc comment explains for JsonValue vs. the real Policy type.
+ */
+export type PolicyGovernanceAnchorStatus = "VERIFIED" | "NO_APPROVAL_RECORD" | "SIGNATURE_INVALID" | "CONTENT_MISMATCH";
+export interface PolicyGovernanceAnchor {
+    readonly status: PolicyGovernanceAnchorStatus;
+    readonly approvalRecordId?: string;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=policy-reference.d.ts.map

package/dist/domain/policy-reference.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"policy-reference.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/domain/policy-reference.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,MAAM,WAAW,eAAe;IAC9B;;OAEG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAEtB;;OAEG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAEzB;;OAEG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAE/B;;;;;;;;;;;;;OAaG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAE9B;;;;;;;;;;;;;;OAcG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,EAAE,sBAAsB,CAAC;CACpD;AAED;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,MAAM,MAAM,4BAA4B,GACtC,UAAU,GAAG,oBAAoB,GAAG,mBAAmB,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC;AAE/E,MAAM,WAAW,sBAAsB;IACrC,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,4BAA4B,CAAC;IAE9C,QAAQ,CAAC,gBAAgB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACpC"}

package/dist/domain/policy-reference.js

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+export {};
+//# sourceMappingURL=policy-reference.js.map

package/dist/domain/policy-reference.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"policy-reference.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/domain/policy-reference.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":""}

package/dist/domain/receipt.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+import type { SignatureEntry } from "./signature-entry.js";
+/**
+ * Parmana Trust Core
+ *
+ * Execution Trust Receipt
+ *
+ * A cryptographically verifiable receipt proving the
+ * outcome of an Execution Trust Record.
+ *
+ * Receipts are immutable trust artifacts generated
+ * automatically by Parmana.
+ */
+export interface Receipt {
+    /**
+     * Unique Receipt identifier.
+     */
+    readonly receiptId: string;
+    /**
+     * Business Transaction represented by this Receipt.
+     */
+    readonly businessTransactionId: string;
+    /**
+     * Execution represented by this Receipt.
+     *
+     * Undefined when the Receipt represents the
+     * latest transaction state.
+     */
+    readonly executionId?: string;
+    /**
+     * Hash of the Execution Trust Record.
+     *
+     * Used for independent verification.
+     */
+    readonly trustRecordHash: string;
+    /**
+     * Hash of this Receipt.
+     */
+    readonly receiptHash: string;
+    /**
+     * Digital signature over the Receipt.
+     */
+    readonly signature: string;
+    /**
+     * Signing algorithm.
+     *
+     * Example:
+     * Ed25519
+     */
+    readonly algorithm: string;
+    /**
+     * Envelope schema version (Hybrid Signature Support milestone,
+     * Phase A). Absent means schema v1: exactly today's shape,
+     * `signature`/`algorithm` above are the sole cryptographic
+     * attestation. Present and >= 2 means `signatures` (below) was
+     * populated at signing time and MUST be independently verified in
+     * full. See the identical field on ExecutionTrustRecord.
+     */
+    readonly schemaVersion?: number;
+    /**
+     * Additional signatures over this Receipt, one per algorithm,
+     * produced only when CRYPTO_MODE=hybrid was active at signing time.
+     * See the identical field on ExecutionTrustRecord for the fail-
+     * closed verification requirement.
+     */
+    readonly signatures?: readonly SignatureEntry[];
+    /**
+     * UTC timestamp when the Receipt
+     * was generated.
+     */
+    readonly issuedAt: Date;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=receipt.d.ts.map

package/dist/domain/receipt.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"receipt.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/domain/receipt.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAE3D;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,OAAO;IACtB;;OAEG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAE3B;;OAEG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAEvC;;;;;OAKG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAE9B;;;;OAIG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAEjC;;OAEG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAE7B;;OAEG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAE3B;;;;;OAKG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAE3B;;;;;;;OAOG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAEhC;;;;;OAKG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC;IAEhD;;;OAGG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;CACzB"}

package/dist/domain/receipt.js

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+export {};
+//# sourceMappingURL=receipt.js.map

package/dist/domain/receipt.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"receipt.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/domain/receipt.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":""}

package/dist/domain/refusal-record.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+import { Decision } from "./decision.js";
+import { Signature } from "./signature.js";
+/**
+ * The subset of a Business Transaction's Intent a policy decision was
+ * evaluated against. Mirrors @parmana/policy's own IntentSnapshot
+ * shape exactly (target, parameters) rather than depending on
+ * @parmana/policy from @parmana/shared, which would invert the
+ * package dependency direction.
+ */
+export interface RefusalIntentSnapshot {
+    readonly target?: string;
+    readonly parameters?: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;
+}
+/**
+ * One boundSignals entry whose declared signal value did not match
+ * the value found at its Intent dot-path. Mirrors
+ * @parmana/policy's SignalIntentBindingViolation shape exactly, for
+ * the same reason RefusalIntentSnapshot mirrors IntentSnapshot.
+ */
+export interface RefusalBindingViolation {
+    readonly signalKey: string;
+    readonly intentPath: string;
+    readonly signalValue: unknown;
+    readonly intentValue: unknown;
+}
+/**
+ * Refusal Record (RFC-0021).
+ *
+ * Durable, signed, independently verifiable evidence that a policy
+ * decision REJECTED a transaction — the REJECT-path counterpart to
+ * ExecutionTrustRecord. Scope is deliberately narrow: this covers
+ * PolicyEngine.evaluate REJECTs and SignalIntentBinder
+ * binding-violation REJECTs only, not every kind of rejection this
+ * system can produce (caller-auth failures and webhook signature
+ * failures are a separate, unsigned audit-sink milestone; see
+ * RFC-0021 Non-Goals). Any claim this record supports should be
+ * scoped to "a policy decided to reject," not "every rejection of
+ * any kind."
+ *
+ * Unlike ExecutionTrustRecord, this is not an append-only aggregate
+ * with sub-histories (executions, receipts, ...) — a refusal is a
+ * single terminal event for a transaction that was never accepted
+ * for execution, so there is nothing to append to. At most one
+ * RefusalRecord exists per businessTransactionId.
+ */
+export interface RefusalRecord {
+    /**
+     * Unique Refusal Record identifier.
+     */
+    readonly refusalRecordId: string;
+    /**
+     * Business Transaction this refusal is about.
+     */
+    readonly businessTransactionId: string;
+    /**
+     * The exact rejected Decision: decisionId, intentId, the policy
+     * reference, the exact signals evaluated, outcome, reason,
+     * evaluatedAt. Not summarized or reconstructed — the same Decision
+     * object RuntimeEngine already builds before ExecutionGate.enforce()
+     * throws.
+     */
+    readonly decision: Decision;
+    /**
+     * The exact Intent snapshot the signals were evaluated against.
+     * Present for every refusal (not only binding violations) so an
+     * ordinary policy REJECT and a signal/intent-binding REJECT are
+     * evidenced the same way and stay directly comparable.
+     */
+    readonly evaluatedIntent: RefusalIntentSnapshot;
+    /**
+     * Present only when the rejection came from SignalIntentBinder.
+     * Absent (not an empty array) for an ordinary PolicyEngine.evaluate
+     * REJECT that never reached binding-violation logic at all.
+     */
+    readonly bindingViolations?: readonly RefusalBindingViolation[];
+    /**
+     * Authenticated caller who submitted the rejected request, from
+     * the same server-set metadata.submittedBy field trust records and
+     * isOwnedByCaller already rely on. Absent when caller-auth is
+     * disabled.
+     */
+    readonly submittedBy?: string;
+    /**
+     * SHA-256 hash of the policy content that decided this refusal, the
+     * same value an Execution Trust Record carries in
+     * transaction.policy.contentHash. Computed by the runtime from the
+     * policy that actually loaded, never from the request. Inside the
+     * signed canonical record. Absent on Refusal Records written before
+     * 2026-10-06, which still verify.
+     */
+    readonly policyContentHash?: string;
+    /**
+     * Canonical hash of this Refusal Record, same convention as
+     * ExecutionTrustRecord.trustRecordHash.
+     */
+    readonly refusalRecordHash: string;
+    /**
+     * Cryptographic signature over the canonical Refusal Record. Proves
+     * the refusal was recorded by Parmana and has not been modified
+     * since. Signed with the same key (DEFAULT_KEY_ID) as
+     * ExecutionTrustRecord — one root of trust for both approvals and
+     * refusals (RFC-0021 §2).
+     */
+    readonly signature: Signature;
+    /**
+     * UTC timestamp when this Refusal Record was created.
+     */
+    readonly createdAt: Date;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=refusal-record.d.ts.map

package/dist/domain/refusal-record.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"refusal-record.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/domain/refusal-record.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,eAAe,CAAC;AACzC,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,gBAAgB,CAAC;AAE3C;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,qBAAqB;IACpC,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACzB,QAAQ,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;CACzD;AAED;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,uBAAuB;IACtC,QAAQ,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC3B,QAAQ,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC5B,QAAQ,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IAC9B,QAAQ,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;CAC/B;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAmBG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,aAAa;IAC5B;;OAEG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAEjC;;OAEG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAEvC;;;;;;OAMG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,QAAQ,CAAC;IAE5B;;;;;OAKG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,eAAe,EAAE,qBAAqB,CAAC;IAEhD;;;;OAIG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,iBAAiB,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,uBAAuB,EAAE,CAAC;IAEhE;;;;;OAKG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAE9B;;;;;;;OAOG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,iBAAiB,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAEpC;;;OAGG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAEnC;;;;;;OAMG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC;IAE9B;;OAEG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;CAC1B"}

package/dist/domain/refusal-record.js

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+export {};
+//# sourceMappingURL=refusal-record.js.map

package/dist/domain/refusal-record.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"refusal-record.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/domain/refusal-record.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":""}

package/dist/domain/release-approval.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+/**
+ * One signed human approval behind a released action, as the Execution
+ * Gateway found it in the request's signals after checking them against
+ * the authorization's signed signalsHash. It names who approved and with
+ * which key; the approval itself was verified when the decision was
+ * made. An external connector's signed release lists these as
+ * approvedBy (ADR-0013).
+ */
+export interface ReleaseApproval {
+    readonly approverId: string;
+    readonly keyId: string;
+    readonly approvalId: string;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=release-approval.d.ts.map

package/dist/domain/release-approval.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"release-approval.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/domain/release-approval.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,eAAe;IAC9B,QAAQ,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAC5B,QAAQ,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACvB,QAAQ,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CAC7B"}

package/dist/domain/release-approval.js

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+export {};
+//# sourceMappingURL=release-approval.js.map

package/dist/domain/release-approval.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"release-approval.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/domain/release-approval.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":""}

package/dist/domain/signals.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+/**
+ * Business signals evaluated by a Policy.
+ *
+ * Parmana is policy-driven and therefore does not define
+ * the structure of business signals. The resolved Policy
+ * and its associated Signal Schema determine the allowed
+ * fields and validation rules.
+ */
+export type Signals = Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=signals.d.ts.map

package/dist/domain/signals.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"signals.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/domain/signals.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,MAAM,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC"}

package/dist/domain/signals.js

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+export {};
+//# sourceMappingURL=signals.js.map

package/dist/domain/signals.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"signals.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/domain/signals.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":""}

package/dist/domain/signature-entry.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+import type { SignatureAlgorithm } from "../config/CryptoAlgorithms.js";
+/**
+ * One entry in a hybrid-signed artifact's `signatures` array
+ * (Hybrid Signature Support milestone, Phase A).
+ *
+ * Distinct from the legacy `Signature` domain type (signature.ts):
+ * that type's singular `signature` field on ExecutionTrustRecord /
+ * Receipt is always computed exactly as it was before this milestone,
+ * over exactly the same canonical content, so pre-existing single-
+ * signature records and third-party verifiers that
+ * only know that field keep working unchanged. `signatures` is
+ * additive: present only on records signed under CRYPTO_MODE=hybrid,
+ * where every entry must independently verify (see
+ * HybridSignatureProvider in @parmana/crypto) -- a missing or
+ * malformed entry is a rejection, never a silent downgrade to
+ * checking only the legacy field.
+ */
+export interface SignatureEntry {
+    readonly algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm;
+    readonly keyId: string;
+    readonly signature: string;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=signature-entry.d.ts.map

package/dist/domain/signature-entry.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"signature-entry.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/domain/signature-entry.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,+BAA+B,CAAC;AAExE;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAeG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,cAAc;IAC7B,QAAQ,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,kBAAkB,CAAC;IAEvC,QAAQ,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAEvB,QAAQ,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CAC5B"}

package/dist/domain/signature-entry.js

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+export {};
+//# sourceMappingURL=signature-entry.js.map

package/dist/domain/signature-entry.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"signature-entry.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/domain/signature-entry.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":""}

package/dist/domain/signature.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+import type { SignatureAlgorithm } from "../config/CryptoAlgorithms.js";
+/**
+ * Canonical cryptographic signature.
+ *
+ * Represents an immutable digital signature that can
+ * be independently verified by any trusted verifier.
+ */
+export interface Signature {
+    /**
+     * Signature algorithm.
+     */
+    readonly algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm;
+    /**
+     * Identifier of the signing key.
+     */
+    readonly keyId: string;
+    /**
+     * Base64 encoded signature value.
+     */
+    readonly value: string;
+    /**
+     * UTC timestamp when the signature was created.
+     */
+    readonly signedAt: Date;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=signature.d.ts.map

package/dist/domain/signature.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"signature.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/domain/signature.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,+BAA+B,CAAC;AAExE;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,SAAS;IACxB;;OAEG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,kBAAkB,CAAC;IAEvC;;OAEG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAEvB;;OAEG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAEvB;;OAEG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;CACzB"}

package/dist/domain/signature.js

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+export {};
+//# sourceMappingURL=signature.js.map

package/dist/domain/signature.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"signature.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/domain/signature.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":""}

package/dist/domain/unsigned-execution-trust-record.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+import type { ExecutionTrustRecord } from "./execution-trust-record.js";
+/**
+ * Internal unsigned Trust Record used only during
+ * construction prior to cryptographic signing.
+ */
+export type UnsignedExecutionTrustRecord = Omit<ExecutionTrustRecord, "signature">;
+//# sourceMappingURL=unsigned-execution-trust-record.d.ts.map

package/dist/domain/unsigned-execution-trust-record.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"unsigned-execution-trust-record.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/domain/unsigned-execution-trust-record.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,oBAAoB,EAAE,MAAM,6BAA6B,CAAC;AAExE;;;GAGG;AACH,MAAM,MAAM,4BAA4B,GAAG,IAAI,CAC7C,oBAAoB,EACpB,WAAW,CACZ,CAAC"}

package/dist/domain/unsigned-execution-trust-record.js

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+export {};
+//# sourceMappingURL=unsigned-execution-trust-record.js.map

package/dist/domain/unsigned-execution-trust-record.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"unsigned-execution-trust-record.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/domain/unsigned-execution-trust-record.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":""}

package/dist/domain/verification.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+/**
+ * Parmana Trust Core
+ *
+ * Verification
+ *
+ * Records the result of verifying an entire
+ * Execution Trust Record.
+ *
+ * Verifications are immutable trust artifacts.
+ */
+export interface Verification {
+    /**
+     * Unique Verification identifier.
+     */
+    readonly verificationId: string;
+    /**
+     * Business Transaction being verified.
+     */
+    readonly businessTransactionId: string;
+    /**
+     * Verification result.
+     */
+    readonly status: VerificationStatus;
+    /**
+     * Human-readable verification summary.
+     */
+    readonly message?: string;
+    /**
+     * UTC timestamp when verification completed.
+     */
+    readonly verifiedAt: Date;
+    /**
+     * Digest (hash) of the verified
+     * Execution Trust Record.
+     *
+     * Used to prove exactly which record
+     * was verified.
+     */
+    readonly trustRecordHash: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Canonical verification outcomes.
+ */
+export declare enum VerificationStatus {
+    VERIFIED = "VERIFIED",
+    FAILED = "FAILED"
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=verification.d.ts.map

package/dist/domain/verification.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"verification.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/domain/verification.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;GASG;AACH,MAAM,WAAW,YAAY;IAC3B;;OAEG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAEhC;;OAEG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAEvC;;OAEG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,kBAAkB,CAAC;IAEpC;;OAEG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAE1B;;OAEG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC;IAE1B;;;;;;OAMG;IACH,QAAQ,CAAC,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CAClC;AAED;;GAEG;AACH,oBAAY,kBAAkB;IAC5B,QAAQ,aAAa;IAErB,MAAM,WAAW;CAClB"}

package/dist/domain/verification.js

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+/**
+ * Canonical verification outcomes.
+ */
+export var VerificationStatus;
+(function (VerificationStatus) {
+    VerificationStatus["VERIFIED"] = "VERIFIED";
+    VerificationStatus["FAILED"] = "FAILED";
+})(VerificationStatus || (VerificationStatus = {}));
+//# sourceMappingURL=verification.js.map

package/dist/domain/verification.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"verification.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/domain/verification.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AA8CA;;GAEG;AACH,MAAM,CAAN,IAAY,kBAIX;AAJD,WAAY,kBAAkB;IAC5B,2CAAqB,CAAA;IAErB,uCAAiB,CAAA;AACnB,CAAC,EAJW,kBAAkB,KAAlB,kBAAkB,QAI7B"}

package/dist/errors/approval-issuer-change-not-found-error.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+import { ParmanaError } from "./parmana-error.js";
+/**
+ * Thrown when an approver change lookup or resolution is given an id
+ * that does not exist.
+ */
+export declare class ApprovalIssuerChangeNotFoundError extends ParmanaError {
+    constructor(changeId: string);
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=approval-issuer-change-not-found-error.d.ts.map

package/dist/errors/approval-issuer-change-not-found-error.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"approval-issuer-change-not-found-error.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/errors/approval-issuer-change-not-found-error.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AAElD;;;GAGG;AACH,qBAAa,iCAAkC,SAAQ,YAAY;IACjE,YAAY,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,EAM3B;CACF"}

package/dist/errors/approval-issuer-change-not-found-error.js

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+import { ParmanaError } from "./parmana-error.js";
+/**
+ * Thrown when an approver change lookup or resolution is given an id
+ * that does not exist.
+ */
+export class ApprovalIssuerChangeNotFoundError extends ParmanaError {
+    constructor(changeId) {
+        super("APPROVAL_ISSUER_CHANGE_NOT_FOUND", `Approver change '${changeId}' not found.`, 404);
+    }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=approval-issuer-change-not-found-error.js.map

package/dist/errors/approval-issuer-change-not-found-error.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"approval-issuer-change-not-found-error.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/errors/approval-issuer-change-not-found-error.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AAElD;;;GAGG;AACH,MAAM,OAAO,iCAAkC,SAAQ,YAAY;IACjE,YAAY,QAAgB;QAC1B,KAAK,CACH,kCAAkC,EAClC,oBAAoB,QAAQ,cAAc,EAC1C,GAAG,CACJ,CAAC;IACJ,CAAC;CACF"}

package/dist/errors/authority-grant-change-not-found-error.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+import { ParmanaError } from "./parmana-error.js";
+/**
+ * Thrown when an authority grant change lookup or resolution is given
+ * an id that does not exist.
+ */
+export declare class AuthorityGrantChangeNotFoundError extends ParmanaError {
+    constructor(changeId: string);
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=authority-grant-change-not-found-error.d.ts.map

package/dist/errors/authority-grant-change-not-found-error.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"authority-grant-change-not-found-error.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/errors/authority-grant-change-not-found-error.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AAElD;;;GAGG;AACH,qBAAa,iCAAkC,SAAQ,YAAY;IACjE,YAAY,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,EAM3B;CACF"}

package/dist/errors/authority-grant-change-not-found-error.js

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+import { ParmanaError } from "./parmana-error.js";
+/**
+ * Thrown when an authority grant change lookup or resolution is given
+ * an id that does not exist.
+ */
+export class AuthorityGrantChangeNotFoundError extends ParmanaError {
+    constructor(changeId) {
+        super("AUTHORITY_GRANT_CHANGE_NOT_FOUND", `Authority grant change '${changeId}' not found.`, 404);
+    }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=authority-grant-change-not-found-error.js.map

package/dist/errors/authority-grant-change-not-found-error.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"authority-grant-change-not-found-error.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/errors/authority-grant-change-not-found-error.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AAElD;;;GAGG;AACH,MAAM,OAAO,iCAAkC,SAAQ,YAAY;IACjE,YAAY,QAAgB;QAC1B,KAAK,CACH,kCAAkC,EAClC,2BAA2B,QAAQ,cAAc,EACjD,GAAG,CACJ,CAAC;IACJ,CAAC;CACF"}

package/dist/errors/authority-required-error.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+import { TrustChainValidationError } from "./trust-chain-validation-error.js";
+export declare class AuthorityRequiredError extends TrustChainValidationError {
+    constructor();
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=authority-required-error.d.ts.map

package/dist/errors/authority-required-error.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"authority-required-error.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/errors/authority-required-error.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,MAAM,mCAAmC,CAAC;AAE9E,qBAAa,sBAAuB,SAAQ,yBAAyB;IACnE,cAEC;CACF"}

package/dist/errors/authority-required-error.js

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+import { TrustChainValidationError } from "./trust-chain-validation-error.js";
+export class AuthorityRequiredError extends TrustChainValidationError {
+    constructor() {
+        super("AUTHORITY_REQUIRED", "Authority is required before execution.");
+    }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=authority-required-error.js.map

package/dist/errors/authority-required-error.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"authority-required-error.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/errors/authority-required-error.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,MAAM,mCAAmC,CAAC;AAE9E,MAAM,OAAO,sBAAuB,SAAQ,yBAAyB;IACnE;QACE,KAAK,CAAC,oBAAoB,EAAE,yCAAyC,CAAC,CAAC;IACzE,CAAC;CACF"}

package/dist/errors/authorization-no-longer-valid-error.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+import { ExecutionAssessmentStatus } from "../domain/business-validation.js";
+import { ParmanaError } from "./parmana-error.js";
+/**
+ * Thrown by @parmana/execution-gateway's ExecutionGateway.execute() when
+ * the only checks that failed are the ones RFC-0023 phase 4 adds at
+ * release: a business condition the authorization rests on is past its
+ * validUntil, or the authority grant it rests on has expired or been
+ * revoked. Everything else verified, and nothing was sent to a
+ * connector, so the action was not executed.
+ *
+ * A 409, like NonceAlreadyConsumedError, and for the same reason: it is
+ * a fact about this authorization, not a server failure. The remedy is a
+ * new request, decided again on current facts and authority.
+ */
+export declare class AuthorizationNoLongerValidError extends ParmanaError {
+    readonly executionStatus = ExecutionAssessmentStatus.NOT_EXECUTED;
+    constructor(businessTransactionId: string, reasons: readonly string[]);
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=authorization-no-longer-valid-error.d.ts.map

package/dist/errors/authorization-no-longer-valid-error.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"authorization-no-longer-valid-error.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/errors/authorization-no-longer-valid-error.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,MAAM,kCAAkC,CAAC;AAC7E,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AAElD;;;;;;;;;;;GAWG;AACH,qBAAa,+BAAgC,SAAQ,YAAY;IAC/D,QAAQ,CAAC,eAAe,0CAA0C;IAElE,YAAY,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,EAQpE;CACF"}

package/dist/errors/authorization-no-longer-valid-error.js

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+import { ExecutionAssessmentStatus } from "../domain/business-validation.js";
+import { ParmanaError } from "./parmana-error.js";
+/**
+ * Thrown by @parmana/execution-gateway's ExecutionGateway.execute() when
+ * the only checks that failed are the ones RFC-0023 phase 4 adds at
+ * release: a business condition the authorization rests on is past its
+ * validUntil, or the authority grant it rests on has expired or been
+ * revoked. Everything else verified, and nothing was sent to a
+ * connector, so the action was not executed.
+ *
+ * A 409, like NonceAlreadyConsumedError, and for the same reason: it is
+ * a fact about this authorization, not a server failure. The remedy is a
+ * new request, decided again on current facts and authority.
+ */
+export class AuthorizationNoLongerValidError extends ParmanaError {
+    executionStatus = ExecutionAssessmentStatus.NOT_EXECUTED;
+    constructor(businessTransactionId, reasons) {
+        super("AUTHORIZATION_NO_LONGER_VALID", `Not released: what the authorization for business transaction '${businessTransactionId}' ` +
+            `rests on no longer holds (${reasons.join("; ")}). Nothing was executed. ` +
+            "Send a new request to be decided again.", 409);
+    }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=authorization-no-longer-valid-error.js.map

package/dist/errors/authorization-no-longer-valid-error.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"authorization-no-longer-valid-error.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/errors/authorization-no-longer-valid-error.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,yBAAyB,EAAE,MAAM,kCAAkC,CAAC;AAC7E,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AAElD;;;;;;;;;;;GAWG;AACH,MAAM,OAAO,+BAAgC,SAAQ,YAAY;IACtD,eAAe,GAAG,yBAAyB,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC;IAElE,YAAY,qBAA6B,EAAE,OAA0B;QACnE,KAAK,CACH,+BAA+B,EAC/B,kEAAkE,qBAAqB,IAAI;YACzF,6BAA6B,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,2BAA2B;YAC1E,yCAAyC,EAC3C,GAAG,CACJ,CAAC;IACJ,CAAC;CACF"}