@parmana/crypto 0.1.1 → 2.0.1

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@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import type { Signature } from "@parmana/shared";
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  /**
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  * One caller_audit_events row, in the shape a verifier reads it back:
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  * the original CallerAuditEvent-shaped fields (occurredAt, callerId,
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- * etc, exactly as SupabaseCallerAuditSink.record() received them —
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+ * etc, exactly as PostgresCallerAuditSink.record() received them —
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  * never including storage-only fields like a database row id), plus
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  * the signature and chain columns that sit alongside it.
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  */
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ export interface CallerAuditChainVerificationResult {
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  readonly reason?: string;
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  }
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  /**
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- * Verifies one caller's full audit chain (SupabaseCallerAuditSink's
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+ * Verifies one caller's full audit chain (PostgresCallerAuditSink's
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  * per-caller chaining): each row's signature against its own
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  * recomputed content -- including the previousChainHash/chainPosition
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  * fields folded into what was actually signed -- and that each row's
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import { AuditEventCrypto } from "./AuditEventCrypto.js";
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  import { CryptoBootstrap } from "./CryptoBootstrap.js";
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  import { TrustRecordHasher } from "./TrustRecordHasher.js";
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  /**
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- * Verifies one caller's full audit chain (SupabaseCallerAuditSink's
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+ * Verifies one caller's full audit chain (PostgresCallerAuditSink's
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  * per-caller chaining): each row's signature against its own
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  * recomputed content -- including the previousChainHash/chainPosition
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  * fields folded into what was actually signed -- and that each row's
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ import type { ExecutionTrustRecord } from "@parmana/shared";
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  * their own right -- exactly the kind of drift a third-party verifier
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  * must never have to guess at.
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  *
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- * PQC audit RED-1 (docs/VERIFICATION-GAPS.md): before this file
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+ * PQC audit RED-1 (docs/internal/VERIFICATION-GAPS.md): before this file
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  * existed, this mapping lived only as a private method on
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  * VerificationCrypto, so a third party had no way to reconstruct it
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  * without reading this repository's source directly. A separately
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
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  * their own right -- exactly the kind of drift a third-party verifier
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  * must never have to guess at.
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  *
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- * PQC audit RED-1 (docs/VERIFICATION-GAPS.md): before this file
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+ * PQC audit RED-1 (docs/internal/VERIFICATION-GAPS.md): before this file
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  * existed, this mapping lived only as a private method on
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  * VerificationCrypto, so a third party had no way to reconstruct it
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  * without reading this repository's source directly. A separately
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ export declare const DEFAULT_SECONDARY_KEY_ID = "default-secondary";
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  * Resolves the keyId that VerificationCrypto/RefusalCrypto/
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  * AuditEventCrypto -- the durable-evidence signers (Trust Records,
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  * Refusal Records, Audit Events) -- use for NEW signatures (PQC audit
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- * RED-3, docs/VERIFICATION-GAPS.md). Every one of these three signers
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+ * RED-3, docs/internal/VERIFICATION-GAPS.md). Every one of these three signers
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  * previously hardcoded DEFAULT_KEY_ID directly, so the only way to
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  * "rotate" was to overwrite default.private.pem/default.public.pem in
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  * place -- which silently invalidates every record ever signed under
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ export interface KeyProvider {
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  hasKey(keyId: string): Promise<boolean>;
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  /**
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  * Lists every keyId this provider can currently load a public key
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- * for (PQC audit RED-2, docs/VERIFICATION-GAPS.md) -- used by the
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+ * for (PQC audit RED-2, docs/internal/VERIFICATION-GAPS.md) -- used by the
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  * key-discovery endpoints (packages/api/src/routes/keys.ts) to
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  * enumerate every key an auditor might need, not only whichever one
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  * happens to be "current."
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ export const DEFAULT_SECONDARY_KEY_ID = "default-secondary";
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  * Resolves the keyId that VerificationCrypto/RefusalCrypto/
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  * AuditEventCrypto -- the durable-evidence signers (Trust Records,
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  * Refusal Records, Audit Events) -- use for NEW signatures (PQC audit
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- * RED-3, docs/VERIFICATION-GAPS.md). Every one of these three signers
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+ * RED-3, docs/internal/VERIFICATION-GAPS.md). Every one of these three signers
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  * previously hardcoded DEFAULT_KEY_ID directly, so the only way to
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  * "rotate" was to overwrite default.private.pem/default.public.pem in
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  * place -- which silently invalidates every record ever signed under
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import { SignatureVerifier } from "./SignatureVerifier.js";
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  import { TrustRecordHasher } from "./TrustRecordHasher.js";
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  /**
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  * Standalone, offline verification of an Execution Trust Record
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- * (PQC audit RED-1, docs/VERIFICATION-GAPS.md).
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+ * (PQC audit RED-1, docs/internal/VERIFICATION-GAPS.md).
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  *
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  * Zero network calls, zero disk reads, zero environment variables.
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  * Callers supply the exact public key material for every keyId a
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ import { TrustRecordHasher } from "./TrustRecordHasher.js";
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  * SignatureRegistry (CryptoBootstrap.ts) registers -- "ecdsa-p256",
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  * "dilithium5", and "sphincs-plus" are declared as valid
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  * PRIMARY_SIGNATURE_PROVIDER config values elsewhere in this codebase
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- * but have no real implementation anywhere (see docs/REMAINING-WORK.md, section D);
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+ * but have no real implementation anywhere (see docs/internal/REMAINING-WORK.md, section D);
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  * an offline verifier claiming to support them would be worse than
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  * refusing outright.
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  */
package/dist/Signer.d.ts CHANGED
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import type { KeyMetadata } from "./KeyProvider.js";
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  * cannot be implemented honestly against such a
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  * backend, since the whole point of those backends is that the
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  * private key never leaves them. ADR-0009
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- * (docs/adr/ADR-0009-KMS-Secrets-And-Connector-Signature-Hardening.md)
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+ * (docs/internal/adr/ADR-0009-KMS-Secrets-And-Connector-Signature-Hardening.md)
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  * is the design this interface exists for.
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  *
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  * Read operations (getPublicKey/getMetadata/hasKey/listKeys) are
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ import type { Signer } from "./Signer.js";
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  * `loadConfig().keys.keyDirectory` (and so the current
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  * PARMANA_KEY_DIR) fresh every time. A static singleton here broke
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  * that -- caught by a real CI failure
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- * (packages/api/tests/unit/supabase-caller-audit-sink.test.ts), where
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+ * (packages/api/tests/unit/postgres-caller-audit-sink.test.ts), where
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  * each test sets PARMANA_KEY_DIR to its own temp directory and tears
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  * it down in afterEach: the first test to run would permanently poison
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  * a process-wide cached signer pointing at a directory every
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ import { LocalFileSigner } from "./providers/signer/LocalFileSigner.js";
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  * `loadConfig().keys.keyDirectory` (and so the current
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  * PARMANA_KEY_DIR) fresh every time. A static singleton here broke
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  * that -- caught by a real CI failure
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- * (packages/api/tests/unit/supabase-caller-audit-sink.test.ts), where
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+ * (packages/api/tests/unit/postgres-caller-audit-sink.test.ts), where
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  * each test sets PARMANA_KEY_DIR to its own temp directory and tears
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  * it down in afterEach: the first test to run would permanently poison
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  * a process-wide cached signer pointing at a directory every
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ export declare class VerificationCrypto {
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  */
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  sign(trustRecord: ExecutionTrustRecord): Promise<Signature>;
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  /**
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- * Signing readiness probe (docs/VERIFICATION-GAPS.md G-52).
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+ * Signing readiness probe (docs/internal/VERIFICATION-GAPS.md G-52).
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  *
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  * Proves, before an action is released, that the evidence signing path
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  * can currently produce a signature that verifies. It signs a synthetic
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ export declare class VerificationCrypto {
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  * fails here even if the legacy `signature` alone is valid: never a
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  * silent downgrade to single-signature verification.
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  *
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- * PQC audit RED-4 (docs/VERIFICATION-GAPS.md): by itself, the
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+ * PQC audit RED-4 (docs/internal/VERIFICATION-GAPS.md): by itself, the
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  * paragraph above only protects a record that still *carries* its
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  * `signatures` array -- nothing stopped `signatures` from being
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  * stripped entirely, at which point this method fell back to
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ export class VerificationCrypto {
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  };
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  }
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  /**
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- * Signing readiness probe (docs/VERIFICATION-GAPS.md G-52).
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+ * Signing readiness probe (docs/internal/VERIFICATION-GAPS.md G-52).
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  *
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  * Proves, before an action is released, that the evidence signing path
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  * can currently produce a signature that verifies. It signs a synthetic
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ export class VerificationCrypto {
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  * fails here even if the legacy `signature` alone is valid: never a
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  * silent downgrade to single-signature verification.
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  *
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- * PQC audit RED-4 (docs/VERIFICATION-GAPS.md): by itself, the
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+ * PQC audit RED-4 (docs/internal/VERIFICATION-GAPS.md): by itself, the
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  * paragraph above only protects a record that still *carries* its
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  * `signatures` array -- nothing stopped `signatures` from being
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  * stripped entirely, at which point this method fell back to
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ export declare class FileKeyProvider implements KeyProvider {
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  /**
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  * Returns key metadata.
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  *
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- * PQC audit RED-2 (docs/VERIFICATION-GAPS.md) fix: algorithm is
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+ * PQC audit RED-2 (docs/internal/VERIFICATION-GAPS.md) fix: algorithm is
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  * derived from the actual public key material's own
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  * `asymmetricKeyType`, not from `config.crypto.primarySignatureProvider`
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  * as this method previously did. That global config value describes
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ export class FileKeyProvider {
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  /**
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  * Returns key metadata.
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  *
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- * PQC audit RED-2 (docs/VERIFICATION-GAPS.md) fix: algorithm is
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+ * PQC audit RED-2 (docs/internal/VERIFICATION-GAPS.md) fix: algorithm is
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  * derived from the actual public key material's own
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  * `asymmetricKeyType`, not from `config.crypto.primarySignatureProvider`
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  * as this method previously did. That global config value describes
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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  {
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  "name": "@parmana/crypto",
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- "version": "0.1.1",
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+ "version": "2.0.1",
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  "description": "Parmana Crypto Module",
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  "type": "module",
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  "main": "./dist/index.js",
@@ -23,21 +23,21 @@
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  "test": "vitest run"
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  },
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  "dependencies": {
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- "@aws-sdk/client-kms": "^3.1155.0",
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- "@parmana/shared": "0.1.0",
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- "@vercel/oidc-aws-credentials-provider": "^3.3.14",
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+ "@aws-sdk/client-kms": "^3.1162.0",
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+ "@parmana/shared": "2.0.1",
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+ "@vercel/oidc-aws-credentials-provider": "^3.3.18",
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  "express": "^5.3.0"
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  },
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  "devDependencies": {
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  "@eslint/js": "^10.0.1",
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  "@types/express": "^5.0.6",
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  "@types/node": "^24.19.2",
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- "dotenv": "^18.0.8",
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- "eslint": "^10.13.0",
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+ "dotenv": "^18.0.9",
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+ "eslint": "^10.14.0",
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  "eslint-config-prettier": "^10.1.8",
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  "tsx": "^4.23.15",
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  "typescript": "^6.0.3",
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- "typescript-eslint": "^8.72.0",
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+ "typescript-eslint": "^8.72.1",
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  "vitest": "^5.0.3"
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  },
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  "engines": {